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7	MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
8	November 20, 2009
9	(FRIDAY SESSION)
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19	Taken before D'Lois L. Jones, Certified
20	Shorthand Reporter in Travis County for the State of
21	Texas, reported by machine shorthand method, on the 20th
22	day of November, 2009, between the hours of 9:04 a.m. and
23	4:58 p.m., at the Texas Association of Broadcasters, 502
24	E. 11th Street, Suite 200, Austin, Texas 78701.
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have a full agenda this month, so we will be meeting tomorrow morning, and with that, we will hear as usual from Justice Hecht.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: We have a new justice at our court, Eva Guzman of Houston, appointed by the Governor, and she'll be running for a full term next year to replace Justice Brister, proving once again the importance of this committee as a steppingstone to greatness. And the Court has issued the Texas Disciplinary Rules for the Bar, and they are out for public comment. This represents an enormous amount of work by two lawyer groups who have been working at it for years literally, based upon work done by the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute for years preceding that, and trying to adapt those ideas to the Texas situation and traditions. So that's an enormous project that is out for comment and will be voted on by the Bar at a referendum to be determined later.

MS. PETERSON: And we've discussed potential dates with some State Bar committee representatives, and it sounds like the referendum may begin on the first day of the annual meeting, which would be June 10th, and then it would be a 30-day voting period.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And many of the

changes are just updates, but some of them are new and some may be controversial, so we look forward to getting 3 comments on that. Kennon spearheaded that effort through the Court, and it just took an enormous amount of time, 5 just hundreds of hours to do all of that, and the Court itself spent a lot of time discussing those rules. So they are very difficult, it's a very difficult area, so anyway, that's done, and as I say, we look forward to the comments on those rules. 9 10 And then the only other thing I have is that we had the swearing in of new lawyers last week, or 11 earlier this week I guess, and I thought I saw the name Tipps on the list of 2,300 new lawyers. 14 MR. TIPPS: One more Tipps around. 15 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: So we congratulate his family for that. That's all I have. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Great. Thank you, 18 Justice Hecht. We will turn to the third item on our agenda, which is the Senate Bill 1448 and the proposed 2.0 Texas Rule of Civil Procedures 737.1 through .16. Judge 21 Lawrence. 22 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Could I say 23 something to start this? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 24 25 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: This is a bill by

Senator West and Representative Thompson, and it requires the Supreme Court to adopt rules by January the 1st, this coming January the 1st. This is a procedure that really has to be built from the ground up, and so we appointed a task force right away to look at this, and I really don't know what we would do without Tom Lawrence. He's just -he's done an enormous amount of work on this and so many other projects in the past. So we're indebted to him as well as Justice Keith Baker of Bexar County. I'm just going to call the names because they did so much work. 11 Robert Doggett of the Texas RioGrande Legal Aid; David Fritsche in San Antonio; Fred Fuchs here in Austin, Legal 12 Aid here in Austin; Tom Morgan at the Realtors 13 Association; Justice Connie Mayfield of Navarro County; 14 15 Wendy Wilson, who is getting to be a regular here at our meetings, from the Apartment Association; and Justice 17 James Woltz of the -- of Galveston County; and also Tom 18 pointed out that the Bar and the law library and the Center for the Judiciary were good enough to provide space 19 20 for the committee members to meet, and some other people 21 pitched in as well. So for all of those people and all of 22 that work we are deeply grateful, and the Court will 23 promulgate rules next month to be effective January the 24 1st.

And as we have done in the past when we've

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had this quick deadline set by the Legislature, we'll honor the deadline and get comments after the rules become 3 effective and may make changes in response to the comments, which is different from the procedure that we usually use and different from the Rules Authority Act, but we had this situation come up several instances in House Bill 4 and other times, and we take the position that when the Legislature has specified a deadline, that that trumps the comment period, so we'll go ahead and make them effective, get comments, make any changes that we 10 need to and use that procedure rather than the usual. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Judge Lawrence. 13 Thank you. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. And let me 15 also mention Kennon Peterson was a big help. She attended 16 most of the meetings and a lot of comments and will be the person that's going to have to put all of this together 18 after we finish, too. MS. PETERSON: Can't wait. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, Senate Bill 1448, as Justice Hecht said, you would think it's a really 21 simple project because it's only 10 lines in the bill. 22 You think, well, this isn't going to take much, but it is actually pretty complicated. There is a section of the 24

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Texas Property Code that deals with repairs.

tenant feels the landlord should have repaired something and didn't then the tenant can actually go to court and get an order ordering the landlord to repair something and ordering that the rent be reduced, getting a judge to order the rent be reduced; and to award actual damages, for example, if they have to move out and move into a hotel; statutory damages, which is one month's rent, plus \$500, plus attorney's fees and court costs.

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Now, the section of the bill dealing with an order to repair and an order reducing rent is rarely used. I don't know that -- I think maybe somebody on the task force had seen it used maybe in Austin once or twice. talked to county court at law judges in Houston that had never seen it in over 10 years, and one reason is that the order to repair could not be filed in justice court. was excluded. It had to be filed in county and district So what this bill did is it took away that court. exemption from JPs to hear these types of suits. So now you can file a suit in JP court to get the JP to order the landlord to repair something and order the rent to be reduced, as well as the other things. So that's probably going to result in more of these types of suits, but the bill also put a kicker in there that you have to hold these hearings within 6 to 10 days.

It's like an eviction case, and it also caps

the -- the judgment at \$10,000, and it also says that included in that is the order to repair, and that's kind of significant. We'll talk more about that later, but that is what these rules are all about, and the rules have to be somewhat complicated because you've got all of these issues to deal with of the parties coming in, there are a lot of defenses to the landlord's ability to repair, and this 6 to 10 days requires everything to be expedited, so we've built in a lot of provisions for safeguards in the rules, and we'll get into all of this. We have modeled this for the most part after the eviction rules and after the rules for justice court suits and to a limited extent after the small claims court rules, so we borrowed heavily from all those existing JP court rules in order to do this.

Now, most of what you have in this packet -and there is the 29-page packet and then there is a
four-page handout that I brought today, some thoughts I
had late yesterday afternoon as I was reading over this
again. The first 17 pages of this deal with statutes and
laws that I have provided to form the background that
we're going to need, sections of the Property Code, the
Government Code, some Rules of Civil Procedure, and a
number of other things that we'll be referring back to,
but let's go ahead and get started. Page 18, if you

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We suggest that this be put in Rule 737. Now, Rule 737 was I think repealed a number of years back, so it's vacant right now, and it is in the special proceedings section, which I think this would logically be, so we think this is a good place so we're going to suggest 737.1, 737.2, and so forth in order to fit it within there. We're going to call this "A tenant's suit in justice court to enforce landlord's duty to repair." Kind of a cumbersome title, but these suits are only going to be for enforcing this narrow provision of the Texas Property Code, which is found in 92.0563 of the Texas Property Code, which you have in your materials. suggest putting a comment after the title to try to help people understand what this is all about, and the comment would be that "Rule 737.1 through .16 are promulgated to provide procedures for a tenant's request for relief in a justice court pursuant to Section 92.0563(a) of the Property Code. The procedures in Rules 523 through 574b also apply to the extent they're not inconsistent with the procedures in Rules 737.1 through .16." That's in there because we didn't want to reprint all of these provisions, particularly the service of process and a lot of other things. We tried to make these rules as free-standing as possible, but in order not to have to reprint everything,

where there is no inconsistency and these rules are silent then you would refer back to the justice court rules for guidance.

"Except where otherwise specifically provided, the terms in Rules 737.1 through .16 are defined consistent with Section 92.001 of the Property Code," which as you can imagine is where they -- is a section on definitions that talk about lease and landlord and tenant and dwelling and premises and all the things that we're going to be referring to. "All suits must be filed in accordance with the venue provisions of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code," which are the specific venue provisions for JP court. "A suit seeking an order to repair or to reduce rent may only be filed in justice court under Rule 737 or in county or district court."

Now, you might wonder, well, isn't that the point of these rules? Well, there are two different types of lawsuits you can file in a JP court. One are under -- one set are under the Government Code, Chapter 28, which are referred to as small claims court, and the other is what we refer to as justice court rules, which are under the 523 through 574. Now, you can't really file a suit for an order to repair in a small claims court proceeding because small claims court is only for money judgment. You can only recover a money judgment in small claims

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court, so while you could file the suit for the statutory damages, civil penalty, and attorney's fees and court 3 costs under this section of the Property Code, you couldn't file the other. So if somebody just wants to file for statutory damages, they can file under the small claims court, but we're trying to let people know that if 7 you want to sue for order to repair or to reduce rent, then that has to be filed in a justice court suit. So that's the comment. Simple, isn't it? 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm just sitting here 11 thinking about this. The tenant who wants to get their 12 toilet fixed --13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- is going to have to 14 15 navigate some fairly rocky harbor to the --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it's not that 16 we tried to make it complicated on purpose. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, there's nothing you 19 could do about it. 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We really tried to make it as simple and straightforward as we possibly could, but this section of the Property Code, this habitability section of the Property Code is not a simple set of statutes, and there are all sorts of -- when we get 24 25 to Rule 2 there are all of these things that have to be

listed in the petition, and that's because of various provisions in the Property Code that set up defenses for the landlord and hurdles that the tenant has to overcome, so we're trying to cover all of these things. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But, you know, we 7 spent a lot of time trying to -- we recognize that it's going to be pro se tenants that are going to be filing 90 8 percent of these, and believe it or not, we tried to make it as simple as we could. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, I wasn't being 11 12 critical. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, it's a valid 13 14 Yeah. concern. Okay. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Elaine. 15 16 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Judge Lawrence, are the conditions in 92.056 implicated, meaning a tenant can only 17 18 seek this order to repair or remedy in damages if the 19 repair materially affects the physical health or safety? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's correct. 20 The standard -- in other words, a tenant can't -- if your 21 22 cabinet -- I had an eviction case Tuesday, and the tenant said he wasn't paying rent because the cabinets weren't 231 fitting properly. Well, that's not the kind of thing that 24 you could come into court on because that doesn't

materially affect the health or safety of an ordinary tenant. That's the standard by which a landlord has to fix something. A landlord doesn't have to fix everything. There are also conditions that notices be given, that reasonable time to repair, let's see, what else, various other defenses that are all covered in here, but, yeah, that's the standard, and that's -- you know, we'll get to that a little bit later, but that is the standard, yes.

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Okay. 737.1, "A tenant may file a suit in justice court to seek judicial remedies under subchapter (b) of Chapter 2 of the Texas Property Code." 737.2, "Requisites of petition. The petition must be in writing and must include the following." Now, here there was a difference of opinion on the task force about the petition. Some felt that the petition -- or the majority, I quess it's fair to say, and Wendy and Kennon, correct me if I misstate something, but I believe the majority felt that the petition does not need to be sworn to, and the logic was that this is an unliquidated claim that would have to be proven up in court with sworn testimony and evidence, so it should not be sworn to. The minority opinion said that it should be sworn to because you're going to have some provisions later that deal with alternate service, putting it different locations that the landlord may be served and, you know, that's something

that should be required to be sworn to. 2 Now, as an aside, suits in eviction suits have to be sworn to, small claims suits have to be sworn to, but suits in justice court do not have to be sworn to, so we've got kind of a mix there, but that was the opinion of the task force that it not be sworn to. Okay. then in (a) --7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hang on for a second. Carl, you got a comment about that? 10 MR. HAMILTON: On the requisites of the 11 petition, shouldn't the petition have to state how the repair -- the lack of repairs is affecting the physical 12 13 health or safety? We're going to get HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 14 to that a little bit later. Let me see if that's --15 16 MR. MUNZINGER: Subsection (f), .2(f) talks about the condition of the premises the tenant seeks to 17 18 have repaired or remedied. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, I don't think 19 we -- we did not require them to specifically state that it affected their health or safety, but I don't think the 22 task force would have any problem with putting that in if 23 the committee wanted it. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher. 25 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I know y'all

have done a lot of work on this, and while I think it's great that a petition would have all of these things in it, if we're talking about mostly pro se people why are we making it so difficult for them to file something versus filing a regular lawsuit? I mean, when you put "must," you know, "must" be in there, if they miss one of them, does the landlord get to come in and say, "Didn't include that, can't have the hearing"? Are we going to have endless redrafting of a petition by a pro se? when I look at, you know, claims for relief under Rule 47, it just it's so different from what has to be and what I would hope would be something -- since they have to come down and present evidence anyway, you can sort of help them along at that point, but if we have this very detailed pleading requirement I just think it would be very hard. So I wondered what was the thinking of the task force on that.

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the task force I think had two primary concerns in mind. One is that the requirement that this be 6 to 10 days is so fast that we wanted, first of all, for the landlord to have sufficient notice as to what this is all about, because the landlord is going to have to come in and give the court some idea of what it's going to cost to repair this condition, whatever it is, and the landlord needs some

notice as to what the condition is. There also are a number of defenses that are in the statute to the landlord having to repair. For example, the notices, who caused the condition, all of these things need to be -- are going to have to come out at the trial at some point, and the judges wanted some advance notice as to what was going on with this, wanted this organized so that when the case is presented 6 to 10 days after it's served that you can look at the petition and have an understanding of what's going on. The landlord would have -- would be on notice as to the dates the notices were given, the exact condition, what happened, because the landlord may not have a clue. The landlord may not know that any of this has occurred, and that happens frequently.

So that was the reason, and, you know, help me out if I'm overlooking something, but that was the reason that we thought we needed to get everything we could up front in the petition so it's all there, that everybody knows what this suit is about; and, you know, tenants should understand that just because they think the landlord didn't fix the cabinet or shampoo the carpet that that's not necessarily something that they can come into court and get relief on, that they need to understand that they have to jump over all of these hurdles before they can get any relief. That was the thinking of the task

force.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray, then Jeff, and then Lonny.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Was there any thought given to a promulgated form to accompany the rule for the petition? Once upon a time I had the opportunity to file a case in small claims court. The JP handed me a petition form, and it worked very well for that circumstance, although it was quite a bit broader than this, and it would seem that by a form with a number of boxes to check or slots to write information in it would greatly facilitate this process.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If you look at your little four-page handout, page three of that is a sample petition form, and page four is a sample judgment.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Was it proposed that -I know you just said these were in what you were thinking
about last night. Were these something that y'all were
thinking about doing as an attachment to the rules?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. The task force, no, we were not thinking about promulgating any forms as a part of the rule, but what I anticipate happening is this petition — the task force never looked at this. This is something I did this week just to try to get a handle on how everything was going to flow, but I

would anticipate the JP training center is going to promulgate some forms that will be used, and I would think probably -- I don't see anybody from RioGrande Legal Aid, but typically the legal aid groups also have some petition forms that they give out. So I think there are going to be forms that are going to be promulgated that are going to help the tenant fill all of this out, but everything that is in the petition, this draft petition I have, would be information they would need, and you just go through and fill in the blanks basically.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Jeff, did you have -MR. BOYD: Well, yeah. I kind of wanted to
say the same things Tracy and -- that have already been
said, but --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, say it again.

MR. BOYD: I'll say it again. She doesn't have anything else to do today. But maybe hone it in a little bit more, is if 90 percent of them are pro se how will they even know that they have to include these things in their petition? That's the problem. I mean, as a lawyer, somebody called me about it, I would have to research to find the rules to even know it, but if they're pro se I'm not sure they would even find it, and what Tracy said, my concern is, well, if they file it's almost setting them up to fail because they're going to file the

lawsuit, they're not going to have listed everything in it. The landlord who does this all the time potentially is going to know that, you know, we just come in and "Judge, move to dismiss. They haven't met the requirements of the rule."

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, of course, a high percentage of landlords are pro se, too. You have apartment managers for the most part. Every once in a while you get attorneys, but a lot are pro ses. based on the statutes. We're not setting any hurdles up that are not already existing in the law in the Property Code. We're just trying to put everything up front so that everybody understands to begin with what they're going to have to prove up in order to get relief. don't do this then in six days when I've got the parties before me for the hearing nobody is going to have this information. Everything is going to have to be reset. The landlord is not going to know what the condition is. They're going to say, "Judge, I need a continuance, I had no idea that they had a leaky toilet. They've never said anything. I need to get a plumber out and find out what's involved in this. I need a reset," and the tenant is going to say, "Yeah, I gave notices. No, I left those at I need a reset to go back and get them." all of this stuff is in the petition and they know about

this then the likelihood is high that we're going to be able to dispose of this thing without having to reset and go back again.

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MR. BOYD: But unless you either give them a form -- when they come in and say, "I want to file a lawsuit against my landlord," you either give them a form to fill out or give them a copy of the rule, you're going to be doing that in 90 percent of the cases anyway because they're going to file an insufficient petition. landlord is going to come in. Six days later you'll have the hearing. The justice will look at it and say, "Well, your petition doesn't say what it has to say. You're going to have to replead it."

Well, I don't know HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: that it will have to be repled. I think most -- and I don't want to speak for all the JPs in Texas. Most JPs would just say, "You need to amend this." They're not going to make them refile the case. I think you're giving maybe landlords a little bit too much credit for knowing the law also, because most landlords that come in are pro They may know a little bit more about the law, but they're not going to have all of this in-depth knowledge. And, Wendy, correct me if you think I'm misstating it. 24 And Robert Doggett, who is also on the task force, with 25 RioGrande Legal Aid just walked in also.

Most JP courts have forms for everything. We have forms for small claims court, for justice court, for evictions, for writs of re-entry. Most courts have these forms available. I won't tell you that every court is going to have these forms, but most JP courts and clerks are pretty good about helping both sides fill out whatever paperwork needs to be filled out. So I think these forms are going to be promulgated out there. think legal aid, the various offices, are going to probably have forms of this type to file. Wouldn't you say?

> MR. DOGGETT: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lonny, and Richard

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PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: I want to continue 16 building on the same topic. So, I mean, I'm strongly inclined to agree that -- of the following. There should be in the rule a specific reference to a form. if you fill out form 2.5, whatever the number is, it complies with this rule, and that form promulgated pursuant to these rules would be made available -- will be available in the JP court so that we don't rely on good intentions or the vagaries that one JP has it or another -- reminds me even more extreme of the conversation we had last time about some courts are open sometimes and others

 $1 \mid \text{are gone } -- \text{ you know, } 3:00 \text{ o'clock gone fishing, and } I$ mean, you know, so for here what we're dealing with is 3 we're dealing with a very specific issue, how do you get into court on this, and so you have the problem that -- a priori that people won't know where the rule is to even look for it.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Or Latin either.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: What?

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MR. ORSINGER: She was mocking you.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Then the other point I want to make is about the contents of the -- that you've got here in 737.2. So you said before that, you know, these are the things that have to be in there to give notice to the other side, to give the landlord, so they won't have to restart this thing all over because they're going to show up and say, "We don't know what this thing is about." If you look at these provisions here, some of them are easy, and that makes sense and that matches, but others I don't follow. So look at (e). "The date any notice was given." Well, I mean, there may be a fight about that. There may be disagreement, but it's not clear to me why that's some essential condition to have in the pleading, one that you would throw out.

Look at (g). "The statement that the landlord had a reasonable time to repair." Well, I mean, heck, I mean, if you have a sentient tenant they're going to check the first box, and if they either check -- but if they check neither box, what difference does it make? I mean, the landlord is going to contest that if they're going to contest it. It's not like the landlord is going to show up and say, "Hang on, I've got some more information I want to provide on that point."

Look at (h). "A statement of how the condition occurred." Does the landlord need to know that detail in order to defend?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: They need to know that it's about the toilet that doesn't work to defend, but they don't need to know that it happened because -- you know, let's leave the rest out, but -- and then (j), why is it essential that the tenant properly plead the amount in controversy? Again, yeah, I get that it's legally required, but why isn't that a thing, as Tracy said a few minutes ago, we can nudge them through.

So, again, if the basic issue for why we're going to require a such detailed fact pleading of pro se plaintiffs is because we want to make it efficient so we don't have to adjourn when we have this time clock that's running, it seems like we should limit it to the absolute bare bones to make that possible. But the primary point I

want to make, again, though, is I don't see why if we're going to promulgate anything it wouldn't be with a form that would make everything easier.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't think the task force would have any problem with the Court promulgating a form. I mean, that's easier to promulgate and amend than a rule is, I think, if I recall. To take your points, (e) is required because the landlord doesn't have to fix anything unless the proper notice has been given, so that's why we need that information in (e).

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: But just to be clear,
Tom, why do they have to plead it? So, in other words,
obviously we're not having a fight about the substantive
law. The question is why are you making that a specific
factual averment that has to be -- well, otherwise the
landlord gets to come in and say, "This thing is
deficient, throw it out."

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the notice is integral to whether or not -- the date the notice is given and how the notice is given is very important to the outcome of the suit. The reduction of the rent goes back to the date the notice was given, the proper notice was given. So you need the date that notice was given in order to calculate when the rent is reduced from, what date it's reduced from. Some notices can be oral in some

situations, so you need to know if it was written or oral. The landlord is -- needs to be on notice as to when these notices are given and who they were given to and the date they were given. (f), the condition of the -- well, I think it was (g) you asked about.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Yeah.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's another element that's in the Property Code, is that the landlord has a reasonable time to repair something. You can't give the landlord a notice today that you want it repaired and then file a lawsuit Monday because he didn't repair it. So he's got to be given a reasonable time, and there's some -- there's a whole section of the Property Code that talks about the reasonableness and the actions that can be taken.

(h), how the condition occurred, that needs to be in there because there are defenses. Depending on who caused the damage, the landlord may or may not have an obligation to repair that, and the landlord needs to know all of these things in order to be able to present any kind of defense, because the appearance date is the trial date. I mean, we're going to trial 6 to 10 days after this notice is filed, so the more information you have available to everybody, the smoother the process is going to be.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger, and then Sarah had her hand up, and then Orsinger.

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MR. MUNZINGER: I agree with what the professor said. On the point of the advisability of a form, we ought to make the courts open to those who need relief. If a form is adopted as part of the rule, it satisfies all the prerequisites to the suit if properly completed. It leaves nothing to chance. It doesn't have a pro se litigant thrown out because of some technicality, which we all know is not justice or shouldn't be justice, so we ought to adopt the form or a form and make it part of the rules so that if a form is completed then people come to court and address the issue.

The only other comment I would make is that I think the phraseology in the second line of subsection (e), "who specifically the notice was given to" seems to be clumsy and might be better stated, with my apologies to the member of the committee who wrote it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: To press Lonny's point and ask a question, I understand all those things, Tom, are subject matters of proof and that when appearance day and trial day comes it's all going to have to get proved up or it's not going to get granted. Is there anything that prevents the landlord from just calling or

going by and asking the tenant "How did this happen? Who do you think you gave notice to, because I didn't get it?" I mean, why does it all -- certainly matters of proof.

That's fine. You're statutorily required, but why do they all have to be in the petition?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I mean, I don't know how to articulate it any differently. Another aspect was that a tenant comes in and they pay their \$92 or whatever it is to file the lawsuit. Wouldn't you want that tenant to have some idea that there are all these hurdles you have to jump over, and if you haven't crossed all these T's and dotted all these I's then your suit doesn't have a chance? So by putting all this out front it may show the tenant that, "Oh, well, we need to go back and do this. We've got to go give a notice then. We didn't know that." Robert.

MR. DOGGETT: Can I respond briefly? One thing is if you have a general pleading -- and, of course, my advocacy is on behalf of tenants, you understand. We were concerned about the level of detail as well. These are statutorily required. The other thing is if we have this general, you know, plead a cause of action, we're going to have special exceptions, and it's going to happen where somebody goes back into court and says, "Judge, I can't the defend this. I'm not ready. I need to know

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more information." Well, if it's right in the code, if it's right in the pleading, you know, there it is, and so we can move this case quicker. And the whole idea, and the Legislature tried to give us guidance there, is we need to do these quickly, and so that's what's going to help move this case along under the -- you know, under the rules that we've been given, and so from a tenant perspective we certainly like the idea of just saying, you know, plead a cause of action. That's the rule. But we're going to have landlords understandably not knowing what they're up against, requesting a special exception, and now we have more judge time spent on whether or not -- you know, what's the level of detail required in order to defend this case. Instead we're going to have a rule that says exactly what we should plead so you'll know.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Orsinger, and then Harvey Brown.

MR. ORSINGER: In the context of knowing that pro ses are going to be bringing this lawsuit, it reminds me of when we were grappling with how to handle the parental bypasses, which we were expecting to be initiated by single mothers who didn't have any legal assistance or otherwise, and we promulgated forms, and we put them on the Supreme Court's website, and we spread them around everywhere, and they became available to the

pro ses I think pretty successfully, and it would seem to me that once we have a form we should do the same thing. We should put it on an official website, and we should have signs everywhere telling people where they can go on the worldwide web to get this form.

The other thing that occurs to me is that while I do understand the feeling that we don't want to throw people out because their pleadings don't comply, these pro ses are not going to know what's in the Property Code unless we tell them, and if we tell them what's in the Property Code in the pleading and they see the pleading online, then for purposes of their pretrial activity, like whether they give notice or proper notice or how much notice, if the pleading is like a checklist of what they have to do to get the lawsuit off the ground, they'll use the pleading as a checklist for their pretrial behavior. Then when they show up for trial, if the pleading has basically laid out everything they have to prove to win then the pleading is a checklist of what they testify to when they're pleading their case.

So I know that -- I know that it's bad that people might not even get to court successfully because they don't plead it correctly, but I think it's worse if we don't give them a guideline on what they have to do before trial and during trial to win, and so as between

the two I think a detailed form that step-by-step tells them what they have to do and prove in order to win the lawsuit actually works to the benefit of the pro ses more so than saying we are making it too complicated for them to plead their way into court.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Harvey.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I think there is a real advantage to having a checklist for the pro ses, but I want to go back to the word "must." Why do we have to say "must"? What if they just missed one? Why not say they "should"? That way it functions as a checklist. tells them what they have to do, but if they miss one but prove it in court, which is all they're really required to do is to prove in court, they can still get their remedy that day, but if they just skip one inadvertently or they don't have an explanation good enough, while some judges might be fairly liberal on that, they wouldn't have to be. They could technically just knock it out on a technicality. It seems like to me the word "should" takes care of the efficiency concerns, Judge Lawrence, that you want but gives a little flexibility if the pro se makes the mistake like a pro se might do.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: Remember that this is only used in situations where there is a potential material

effect on health and safety of a tenant so that a rigid requirement for a pleading actually helps meet the requirement of a prompt resolution of a health or safety issue, and I think that's probably what the committee had in mind as well. It's not an ordinary lawsuit. There are considerations here that we all love to plead generally because we can't be tied down with judicial admissions and what have you, but this has a societal interest of health and safety, and to put the onus on the tenant but give him a form that allows him to meet the law satisfies that societal interest and gets the matter before a judge who can cure the matter promptly and does so fairly to the tenant.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I had the same comment about "must." I was surprised to see in the Government Code that "must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent, so I think "must" would be a bad word to use there. "Shall" I think would be better or "should." Plus, although I understand -- I understand that the idea behind these requirements is to meet the legal standard, it doesn't tell the tenant what the legal standard is. So, for example, the date of any notice given to the landlord, there's not a statement that says, "You must have given notice to the landlord before filing

this suit." So, I mean, if we're trying to make it easy and try to avoid the \$92 for no good reason in terms of filing the lawsuit then we need to tell them you had to have given notice, you had to have waited a certain amount of time to let them fix the condition, this condition must affect health and safety, how does this condition affect health and safety. I mean, the way you've written it here 7 it doesn't provide enough information, while at the same time making it very difficult to plead. I think. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Elaine. PROFESSOR CARLSON: Maybe a fix for that 11 would be to add a sentence after Rule 737.1 that's 12 13 parallel to our Rule 22 that says, "The suit is commenced 14 by filing a written petition, "maybe "in substantial compliance with 737.2," and I agree with Judge 15 Christopher, the conditions, if this is a checklist then 16 17 we do need to include the conditions materially affecting the physical health or safety and the tenant is not 18 19 delinquent, which 92.056 subsection (6) requires. My second comment is on the sworn versus 20 This is, in effect, an injunction? 21 unsworn. 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we're going to have a long and spirited discussion about that later in 23 24 the morning, but --25 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay. Okay. I'll wait

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for that then. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You predict. 3 It's sort of an HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 4 injunction, maybe. 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Well, you know, the injunction rules are -- of course, the TRO rules can be ex 6 parte, and I assume this can never be ex parte. You have to get some kind of service? 8 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh. 9 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Even if it's the 10 11 substitute service of leaving with someone over 16. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 12 Right. There's a lot of 13 PROFESSOR CARLSON: protections built into the injunction rules on sworn pleadings and bonds and all kinds of things, which I understand JP courts lack jurisdiction to order, but 16 17 apparently now they do to this extent. 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, JP courts do 19 not have injunctive powers, it's true, but yet the JP courts have been given quasi-injunctive powers, for want 20 21 of a better term, in writs of re-entry and writs of 22 restoration. For example, in a writ of re-entry, if a 23 landlord doesn't readmit a tenant then we can put the 24 landlord in jail until the landlord readmits them, which 25 would seem to be counterintuitive, but that's the way the

law is. So we have broad powers that are not specifically called injunctions, and this is yet a -- this is the third 2 3 in a series of statutory provisions that the Legislature has given to JP courts that one would think is an 5 injunction but is not called an injunction. It just says, "Do it or go to jail," but it's not an injunction per se. 6 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: It's a super injunction. 8 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, a super injunction. 9 It's a threat, legal threat. 10 MR. ORSINGER: 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're skipping the 12 injunction part and going right to the contempt. 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Justice Gray, and 14 then Buddy. 15 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Whether you go with the 16 "must" or "shall" with regard to the nature of the 17 pleadings, we've been following that language in some 18 circumstances and statutes with language like 19 "substantially comply," "must substantially comply," 20 "shall substantially comply." That way if they deviate 21 from a promulgated form, which I do think is a good idea, and use their own form, it doesn't matter, as long as they 23 substantially comply with that requirement. 24 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.

MR. LOW: Chip, we have several rules which do have forms. For instance, home equity loan foreclosure, it says, "The notice shall be sufficient if it substantially follows the form." And then we have a justice rule on -- that says, "and an affidavit which substantially complies to the evidence rules for this provision shall suffice." In other words, it doesn't say "must," but "substantially complies," and that gets around "must" and "shall."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Very good. Lonny.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Yeah, so just to kind of build on that, that's a great reference. So to be precise, my specific suggestion is -- and following on what Elaine was saying, I would -- my suggestion would be, is to drop 737.2, to replace it instead with effectively 22, a civil suit, you know, seeking relief under subsection -- "a suit to repair," whatever the section number is, "shall be commenced by filing a petition," and then track off the language that the petition will be sufficient if it's substantially in the following form and then literally have that form thereafter follow with very -- and, again, while I think, Tom, you know, you've done tons of work, and obviously you just threw this together, to tweak this to include, as Tracy was suggesting, the specific.

So, for instance, the form you have here under the tenant suit, the draft you have, doesn't say anything about the health or safety being a necessary condition. Put that in there. Instead of having this check box, they had a reasonable time, I would say, you know, they were given notice on blank day, which is at least, you know, whatever the minimum is that you need for that to be considered reasonable under the substantive law. So, again, just to be precise, I'm suggesting that there are costs, collateral costs, that 11 tenants -- apparently not all tenants -- should be 12 concerned about, but -- or are concerned about, by having 13 a heightened pleading standard; and even if there are 14 efficiencies to be gained, those collateral costs are 1.5 sufficiently great, we can achieve the same result you 16 want by having it generalized; and by saying the form 17 complies, everyone will go there, particularly if we give 18 clear notice to where one should go. 19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other All right. Great. Why don't we move right 211 comments? 221 along? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 23 want me to go through each condition of .2?

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know if we need

to go through each condition of .2. I don't think so.

2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay.

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, if you're not going to go through each one, I would comment on (c), is that in the first -- "the address of the landlord or the address of the landlord's agent," and then in (d) we say "the telephone numbers of the landlord and landlord's agent," which seems to be -- we probably only need one phone number in (d). I can tell Tom had a specific reason for the "or" in one and "and" in the other.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. This is really kind of a problem area of landlord-tenant law because you've got a specific provision of the Property Code, 92.003, that says that if the landlord has given the tenant written notice of the management company and their address, then that becomes the -- in essence the registered agent, so to speak, and the communications be through them, but that's not always clear if that notice has been given, and we've tried to keep that in mind throughout these rules when we get to the service of process section. But what we're trying to do here, because of this 6 to 10 days is so expedited, the more phone numbers we have, the better off, because a lot of these things may have to be reset, something may come up, and if we have the phone numbers to get in touch with

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people, that's why we're requiring the tenant's phone
  number, and we want the landlord's phone number if they
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  have it so we'll be able to get in touch with these
  people. So that's why we need all of that.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Would it be better to
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  have in (c) the address of the landlord and the address of
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   the agent of service of process?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Well, if the
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   landlord has given that written notice then the person
   that is the management company becomes the agent, so
   that's why it's "or" and not "and."
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So there.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And believe it or
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   not, we talked at length about that.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have no doubt.
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   go to .3.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: .3, citation.
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   "When the tenant files a written petition with the justice
   court, the justice shall immediately issue citation
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   directed to the landlord commanding the landlord to appear
   before such justice at the time and place named in the
   citation. The appearance date must be not earlier than
   the 6th day and not later than the 10th day after the date
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   of service of citation." This is very similar to rule --
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to the eviction rules and the rule in 520 something or other, the JP's rule.

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"The citation shall inform the landlord that upon timely request and payment of a jury fee, no later than five days after the landlord is served with citation, the case shall be heard by a jury." And that parallels the eviction rules.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Two questions. It says "to appear." Should it be "appear or answer," or do they have to actually appear?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we're going to talk about that in a later rule, in Rule 737.7. In essence the appearance date is the trial date.

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. And the next question

I have is how do you fix a date for trial that's dependent

upon the date of service when you don't know when the

service is?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We do this in evictions all the time, and stuff has to be sent back and redated all the time, but we set eviction dates and we set the date, send the citation to the constable, and the constable, we try to give them enough lead time to get it served, but if they can't get it served then they return it to court and we redate it and they go out and do it

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again. So that's the way it works in eviction cases.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments
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   about .3? Justice Hecht.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: If it's similar to
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   other citation provisions, is there a reason to have it
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   restated here as opposed to just referring to the citation
   in evictions?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it's similar,
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   but it's not exactly the same as what we have in the
   eviction rule and the justice court rule.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And what's the
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   reason for the difference? I mean, does the statute
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   specifically refer to citation here?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Well, the statute
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   referred -- no, the bill refers to 6 to 10 days.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: So it's the time
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   period that's --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, but that time
   period is the same as we have in the eviction rules.
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   Let's see, it may be -- let me check the eviction rules
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   real quick, because it may be that this is almost
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   identical to 742 -- or 740, I think it is. I guess that
23 we were trying to make these rules as free-standing as
   possible without reprinting everything, and this seemed to
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   be a -- this seemed to be a basic thing that ought to be
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in the rule so that a tenant and a landlord could for the most part look at these rules and not have to go anywhere 3 I think that was the idea behind it, so there may be some similar language, and this may be, in fact, almost 4 exactly like 730, but it's not -- it's modeled on 739, but it's not identical to it. We think we improved 739 a little bit, frankly, so --7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 8 Okay. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Buddy. 10 MR. LOW: Chip? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 11 12 MR. LOW: Judge, when you say in the second line "directed to the landlord," and other places you've 13 talked about "or the designated agent" because they have -- do the definitions include the designated agent so 15 you wouldn't have to state that here? Because a landlord may be a conglomerate of five or six people that own a 17 building, and property managers are the agents. 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the landlord 19 is the person responsible. You may serve the management 20 21 company, but it's the landlord that's on the hook for all of this. 22 MR. LOW: Well, but there are people that 23 24 manage multi properties, and different people own them, and this person is not truly the landlord unless the 25 l

property management company, so --2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, "landlord" is 3 defined in the Property Code. MR. LOW: Well, yeah, it's defined here, but 4 the definitions might not -- well, maybe it includes it. 5 6 That's all. If you're satisfied with it, I'm pleased. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: On the task force, just to give you an idea, we had the general counsel of 8 the Texas Apartment Association, general counsel of Texas Association of Realtors, two JPs that are attorneys that 10 practice law also, and we had two lawyers with RioGrande 11 Legal Aid, both of whom have extensive experience in 12 landlord-tenant, and three of the people on the task force 13 were involved in the statute, involved in the bill. 14 MR. LOW: For instance, "Landlord means an 15 owner, lessor, sublessor of a dwelling, but does not include a manager or agent of the landlord," and property 17 management companies are the ones that come down and 18 The owner of the property usually doesn't. 19 handle that. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's right. 20 And there's a rule that allows them, both in evictions and 21 in these types of suits, that's going to allow an agent to 22 represent them, but it's still the landlord that's the 24 person responsible. 25 MR. LOW: Okay.

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: They can have their 2 management company come down if they want to. That's 3 permitted in evictions, just like the tenant can have an 4 agent come down. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 5 MR. HAMILTON: But who do you serve? Do you 6 serve the landlord or the agent? 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we're --8 yeah, 92.003 talks about the landlord's agent for service of process if they have designated someone. If they have not then you would serve the landlord, and the landlord 11 may be the owner of the apartment complex. The landlord 12 may be the owner of the house. We talked about a number 13 of different scenarios, but the term "landlord" would 14 be -- that's how the statute refers to the person 15 responsible for this. That's how the Property Code defines them. 17 MR. HAMILTON: Shouldn't the citation, 18 though, be directed at whoever is going to be served? 19 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the service of citation in .4 -- in Rule 4 and Rule 5 we're going to 21 talk about the service of that, but the citation itself is 22 going to direct the landlord to appear, not the -- you know, the agent for service of process could be the 24 management company, it could be a real estate agent that 25

is handling for an absentee owner. It could be just a rent collector that's a relative of somebody that's living out of state.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: Judge, agent for service of process in my mind means the person so designated with the Is that what is included here? Secretary of State. Because, my goodness, if the property is owned by Buddy Low Properties in Beaumont, and he names Skip as his agent for service in Austin, and the apartment house is in El Paso, how can a tenant get relief? I mean, I would be stunned. We're talking about something that's six days because it's a matter of health and safety, and that's the problem that Buddy has been talking about. If you're going to have to serve the agent for service of process designated by the Secretary of State, for god sakes, and you're a pro se tenant with 92 bucks struggling to pay to get into court to have your toilet fixed so your children don't get sick, you've got a real problem.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, most -- for the most part for people living in apartments the agent is going to be the management company that manages the apartment complex, and that's going to be a high percentage of the time. You're going to have a smaller number that are going to be rent houses where you've got a

real estate company or some individual or maybe the owner that's collecting the rent, but the landlord is the person that is the defendant, so to speak, in the suit that is on the hook for this, and it's the landlord that you want to have notice of this to appear in court to defend it. The management company or the rent collector is just somebody that may be collecting the rent. They may or may not have authority to even fix these things.

So you've got a lot of different types of landlord-tenant relationships, all of which are taken into consideration in the definition in chapter -- in 92.003 of the Property Code that talks about landlords -- well, I think 90.001 is the definitions, but all of this is governed by the Property Code, which is a well-established body of law that defines who a landlord is and who the registered agent for service of process is.

And, fellow task force members, consider yourselves codefendants in this process today, so feel free to --

MR. DOGGETT: I would be happy to respond.

Also, remember, if there's somebody collecting the rent on behalf of this shell of an organization and often as might be in court requesting an eviction, so, remember, it works both ways. The agents that are involved in collecting the rent and enforcing the rules are also those same

individuals that may be subject to service of process. So we understand -- as a tenant advocate understand that difficulty, but it's not something insurmountable and that the justice of the peace courts do a lion's share of the work trying to, not assist, but at least try to imply that you don't need to be suing the management company or the manager, you need to be suing the owner of the property, who serves a different person. And, you know, it's a difficult problem, but it's something that the Property Code has had for a long time and we've managed to deal with for a long time, and, remember, it works both ways. You know, there's people that are trying to collect rent and file suits for evictions, so those same people are involved on the other side.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We were trying not to have a situation where a tenant is trying to sue, for example, a homeowner, and the homeowner may be out of state, but they may have a rent collector or a management company, so we don't want them to try to send the citation to Massachusetts and them ducking service and it never getting served and nothing ever happens. So there needs to be a way to serve an authorized agent to move this process forward. So it is the landlord that has to ultimately be on the hook for this and be responsible,

given the notice to appear, although he may be served through his rent collector or management company, may be served directly, but it's most of the time going to be the apartment manager that's going to be involved in this.

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MR. MUNZINGER: Because of the definition in 92.003. I understand, and I appreciate it. I'm sorry I took your time.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No problem. Let's go to .4, service.

Service of HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: citation. We have, for want of a better word, adopted a convention to try to comply with Rule 103. "The sheriff, constable, or other person authorized by law," meaning a private process server, "who receives the citation shall serve the citation by delivering a copy of it, along with a copy of the petition, including any exhibits, to the landlord at least six days before the appearance date." This was something that the tenants' lawyers felt strongly about, that they wanted a copy of the -- not only a copy of the petition to go with the citation but any exhibits. So a tenant, if a tenant wants exhibits, like the notices, for example, or maybe other things, but if the tenant wants an exhibit then the tenant would have to give the court copies of these exhibits that would be attached to the petition and the citation and delivered

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Bear in mind that just like in eviction these may ultimately end up being tacked to the door so that we're going to get to that in the next rule about alternate service, but oftentimes these are going to be -sometimes hand-delivered and sometimes slid under the door or sometimes attached to the door or put through a mail slot.

There was a difference of opinion on the task force as to whether or not exhibits needed to be attached, but I think, if I remember the philosophy, it was that -- it was that they wanted the landlords to have copies of these notices to see the written notices that I guess, Robert, is that correct? were given.

MR. DOGGETT: Absolutely. Because we feel like whatever the tenant files with the court, the landlord has to get the same thing that the court has, and that's just a matter of fairness. So far I feel awkward, but we want to make sure that the process is fair, so that landlords, you know, have everything they should have so when they walk into court they can't say, "I didn't get that, Judge. You got that, I didn't get that. I didn't 23 have time to investigate it." We want this process to be as fair as possible, and, frankly, it goes back to evictions when landlords file things with the court.

think it ought to be the same rule that if a landlord files notices and things with the court, the tenant should 3 get a copy of those. So, in other words, what's good for 4 the goose is good for the gander. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 5 MR. HAMILTON: Are you talking about serving 6 exhibits that are not attached to the petition? 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, I think these 8 would have to be -- I think what is anticipated is that a tenant comes in with his petition and a copy of his notice to -- of the condition, notice to the landlord, and that 11 he would have an original and then he would have to provide a copy of any of these attachments or exhibits 13 that would have to be served. The court is not going to 14 make copies. He's going to have to bring in the copies 15 that he wants attached to the petition to be served. MR. HAMILTON: But they are going to be 17 attached as exhibits to the petition, though. 18 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. MR. DOGGETT: And those are optional. The 20 exhibits are optional. Some people just want to file things, and that's great, but we want to make sure if they file something, that all parties have to get a copy of it. If they say, "Oh, if I don't want to make copies of this, 24 then forget it," they can pull it back and say, "No, I 25

just want to file this petition." So exhibits are optional, but whatever is filed with the court we want to make sure the defendants get it, too.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else on that? Yeah, Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Judge Lawrence, what is different about 737.4 and service and return under 536 and 537? Are they -- is all of that applicable?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well --

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Except for attaching

exhibits.

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, one thing that's different is that we want the citation returned at least one day prior to the day assigned for trial, and that's a problem with evictions, because the constables can return these citations on the day of trial, so if the docket is at 9:00 o'clock, we can't proceed until we get the citation back, so -- and we have to reset. So we want these things at least one day before so we know that we have the citation before we go to trial. That's one thing that's different. I don't know that it's exactly like 536. We looked at 536 and 537. We also looked at 739, 740 and 742 and 742a in these next two rules. I don't know that they're identical, but they were modeled on 25 l those rules, if that's what you're asking.

1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Well, I guess what I'm asking is I see, for example, in 536a, for example, if an 2 authorized person accomplishes service of citation they 3 file a verified return. Are you incorporating that here, 4 or is this different? 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the last 6 sentence -- we were trying not to reprint everything in 8 536. PROFESSOR CARLSON: 9 Right. 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: So we put the basics in there, and then the last sentence we intended, 11 "The person serving process shall return and serve it in 12 accordance with the justice court rules in part five of 13 the Rules of Civil Procedure." 15 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So that's an additional requirement, whatever is in 536 and 536a that's not 16 17 different than what's in 737.4 is supposed to be complied 18 with? 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: PROFESSOR CARLSON: Because I got confused 2.0 21 on what the officer is supposed to be doing. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we were 22 trying to avoid reprinting that entire text of what's in 24 536. 25 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But we can do that 1 if that troubles anybody. But we thought that we hit the 2 highlights of that and then referred to the rule. I don't 3 think there's anything that's inconsistent, other than the requirement that it be returned one day prior, and that 5 really is more an eviction rule type of problem, not 6 necessarily a justice court rule problem. 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So if the citation can't 8 be served then the officer would need to comply with 536a 9 and set forth the diligence used and --101 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And that's in 11 12 alternate service that we get to. The serving someone over the age of 16 and attaching it to the door is going 13 to be the next rule that we get to. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Speaking of that, 15 let's go to that. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: .5. Yeah, Justice 18 19 Gaultney. Sorry. HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: Maybe I'm missing 20 something, but if there are no exhibits attached to the 21 petition, can any exhibits be offered at trial? 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Certainly. 23 It's 24 not --25 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: This says

"including any exhibits." That just means anything that 1 is voluntarily attached? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. Anything that 3 the plaintiff brings, the tenant brings in, and says, "I want this attached to the petition," then under this 5 proposal they would be attached to the petition served. 6 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: So this is not a 7 strict notice requirement of any exhibits you're going to 8 intend to offer at trial? 9 No, you don't have 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: to attach anything if you don't want to, but you can 11 attach whatever you want to attach, if you choose to; and 12 what Robert's saying is that some tenants just feel the 13 l need to attach all sorts of things, letters, notices. Not 14 all on the task force thought that exhibits ought to be 15 attached, but that was the majority view. 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else? 18 Okay, .5. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: This is alternate 19 service. We ran all of these citation rules by a couple 20 of deputy constables, both of whom have served on another 21 task force that are familiar with this process, and they 22 didn't have any problems with the way we're doing it, but 23 what we're trying to do is overcome the problem with 24 alternate service where you've got a landlord that can't 25

be found or the agent that can't be found for whatever reason. So if you don't get them served then nothing is ever going to happen, so you've got to have some mechanism in order to serve them. So we borrowed heavily from the eviction rules, Rule 742a, which is the eviction alternate service rule.

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We borrowed heavily from that, but it's a little bit different because the problem with landlords, unlike with tenants, is that in tenants, the tenant is in the precinct. In other words, the suit has to be filed in the same precinct that the property is located in, so you have one constable or sheriff or whoever that's serving that's going to be serving that tenant. So they go out and they can't get the tenant to answer the door, they come back, they get a Rule 742a alternate, and they attach it to the door. So that's not really a problem, but with landlords it's a little bit different because there's no guarantee that all of these people that are going to be listed as possible -- as possible for service are going to be in the same precinct. They may be in different precincts. What that means is if you send the citation to the constable in precinct one, who tries to serve somebody, he can't do it, the next address is in precinct two. It has to go to that constable, who tries to serve it, or it may be out of state, depending on where the

owner lives.

So it's a little more cumbersome for alternate service, so we've modified Rule 742a a little bit, and just to give you the highlight, is that the service addresses that are listed in the complaint -- and that's part two. That's another reason we wanted that information in part two. That's all the places that you can serve the tenant, or serve the landlord, excuse me. So you go out and you make two attempts at service to personally serve them, and if you can't personally serve them, you come back and you get an authorization from the court to make alternate service.

The court then goes out and makes one attempt at each location to serve somebody over the age of 16, and if they are unsuccessful in that then they can simply slide it under the door, through a mail slot, or attach it to the door at one of those locations. This was the most streamlined procedure we could come up with that would make sure that they were trying to serve everybody, consistent with what we do on evictions, but yet ensure that someone could be served so the suit could go forward.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Justice Gray.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Just two comments. If there is a form promulgated, it would have to have the option of some items that are available but not necessary,

and this would be one of them because it appears to be optional to list all these addresses and then include the 2 statement that these are all the addresses, that the 3 person knows of no other addresses at which the landlord could be served. So that seems to be an option available to the tenant in the event that they choose to file the 6 petition, and I notice that right in the middle of the 7 second paragraph of 735.5 you use the term "complaint." 8 Is that something different than a petition? It's the seventh line down right in the middle of the page. 10 think that's probably just one of those instances where a 11 different word was used, but it looks like it --12 I think it's fair HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 13 to state that I missed that one. For some reason I 14 thought I caught everything, but that should be 15 "petition," you're right. 16 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay. 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The reason that 18 it's -- that it's optional to list these addresses is that 19 it may be that the landlord is the owner and the rent is 20 paid to the owner, and that's the person that would be 21 served, there are no alternative addresses. Or it may be 22 that the landlord has provided the tenant with the name of the landlord's management company in writing, and that's 24

the person that would be served. So you may only have one

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person. I would think you would very rarely have more You're going to have the owner maybe and 2 than two. whoever collects the rent would probably be the maximum, 3 so normally you're going to have one, you may have two in 4 many cases, but that's usually all you're going to have. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody else 6 7 on .5? Yeah, Carl. 8 MR. HAMILTON: In the paragraph above the (a) you say that if the justice can authorize service, anyone over 16, but if the sheriff is unsuccessful -- I 10 assume that means in serving someone over 16 -- then he 11 12 can do the following. Then again, we're going to serve someone over 16. 13 Yeah, I think HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 14 you're right. I think maybe we need to -- in the second 15 paragraph we probably need to cut out part of that language, because it is repetitive, isn't it? Well, or 17 what we need to do probably is cut it out in (a) maybe. 18 MR. HAMILTON: Cut it out in (a), yes. 19 / HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think you're 20 That's a good point. We -- the task force met 21 riaht. three times, and we had flurries of e-mails, but we were 22 still trying to correct language on the deadline date. And, by the way, we got this in on time and under budget, 24 25 too.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: A rarity these days. 1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. There may be 2 3 a few things like that that we probably overlooked, and that was probably because we changed something and I just 4 5 didn't catch it, but I think you're right. I think (a) probably needs to be -- we need to take some of that out. 6 7 Good point. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anything else on .5? 8 Okay, why don't we go to .6? 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right, .6 is 10 representation by agents, and this is similar to -- I 11 think it's rule 747 and also 24.007 or 009 of the Property 12 Code that allows -- in an eviction case allows a landlord 13 or a tenant to be represented by an agent, and typically 14 it's the landlord having the management company come in, 15 apartment manager come in, but sometimes we get tenants 16 that have someone come in because the tenant has to work 17 and they get their relative to come in and represent them. 18 So this is just really a continuation of that. 19 fair thing to do in these types of cases. 20 21

Now, the second sentence is added because I have a lot of people that decide that they are -- they are tenant attorneys, and they come in wanting to represent tenants. They're not lawyers, and the tenant is there, but they want to act like their lawyer, which we believe

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to be unauthorized practice of law, so what we're trying to say here is that "Nothing in this rule shall authorize a person who is not an attorney licensed to practice law in this state to represent a party before the court if the party is present." Now, it would be permissible under the rules if the tenant were not there or the landlord were not there for that person to speak for them and to represent them, but if they're there, we don't think they ought to act like an attorney and represent them in court. So that's the purpose of that sentence.

MR. LOW: But what if the person is going to be a witness, the landlord, I mean, they're going to claim "I told you at a party," but this management company, they handle all of it, and they could go down just because the person — the owner is going to be there, then the management company can't represent him as they could just because he might be a witness, they brought him in as a witness, and he's going to have to do it himself or stay away.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that sentence is -- well, now, the first sentence of Rule 6 is almost identical to Rule 747 that we have now and also a specific provision in the Texas Property Code. That first sentence is not a change. I mean, that's been the law for a long, long time.

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1 MR. LOW: No, I'm not questioning that. just questioning under this rule, would that be -- say 2 Richard, somebody -- he owns some houses and one of them -- and so he's -- he might be called as a witness because they may say that they told him about this defect 5 | at a party. He doesn't want to handle it. He doesn't do 6 that, so he's got a management company that handles -they do all of that, and they can do that. Just because Richard's going to be there then the management company 10 can't do it, and Richard would have to do it himself, be 11 his lawyer. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think that 12 that's the law now. I think if the party is there then 13 14 the party is supposed to be -- you know, the party before the court being the responsible party who can call 15 whatever other witnesses they want to call and can call 16 17 themselves as a witness, but correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that's exactly what the law is now. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if the landlord 20 doesn't -- isn't there at the beginning? He just comes in 21 later --22 MR. LOW: Yeah. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- as a witness. Is that okay, or does the management company then have to stop and 24 turn it over to the landlord who's there?

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't know 2 that I've ever been faced with that, but I think if the landlord got there, that at that point I would insist that the landlord be --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Take over. 5 6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- take up the proceeding, because I believe that's what the law requires 8 now. 9 MR. LOW: So you're suggesting landlords 10 stay away? 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, no, not at 12 all. 13 MR. LOW: No, I'm kidding. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Only this committee could 15 have thought of that hypothetical. Richard Munzinger, and then Frank. 16 17 MR. MUNZINGER: I'm just curious if the word "appear" were substituted for the word "representation" 18 would it clear some of that up a little bit? I don't 19 20 know. And also, you just answered my question about the disjunctive "or be represented." You couldn't have both 21 That's what the judge just said, but if you said 22 23 "appear by," "appear in person or by agent" that may remove the concern that somebody is acting as a lawyer 24 that shouldn't be. 25

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Is that consistent with the statute, Judge Lawrence?

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that we tracked the statute. The statute says, "Parties may represent themselves or be represented by authorized agent." Parties -- no, we tracked the statute. We tracked the rule and the statute. I mean, this is both in the Property Code and in the Rules of Procedure.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank Gilstrap.

MR. GILSTRAP: I understand that you're adding the second sentence to proposed Rule 737.6 to keep unauthorized people from practicing law for tenants in these proceedings, but it -- you know, you don't have it in Rule 747(a), and it seemed -- even though this suit involves -- contemplates a suit by the tenant against the landlord and eviction contemplates a suit by landlord against tenant, it would seem to me there is no difference in this situation. If it's in one, it ought to be in the other. In fact, I think if you put it in 747(a) and don't put it in -- excuse me, if you put it in this rule, 737.6, and don't put it in 747(a) I think the unauthorized attorney could come in and say, you know, "I'm not excluded, "you know. "They excluded me here, but they didn't exclude me in eviction, so I've got a right to be here."

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If that's a motion 2 to amend 747(a), I second it. 3 MR. GILSTRAP: And second, I mean, this 4 doesn't -- none of this prevents an unauthorized attorney 5 as an unlicensed attorney from representing landlords as long as the landlord is not present. 6 That's right. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 8 MR. GILSTRAP: It permits it, in fact. someone could set up a practice. "I'm not a lawyer, but I'm good at it, and you're a bunch of apartment owners, 10 and I'm going to represent you and cut you a good deal, 11 and I'm not a lawyer." Okay. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's what the 13 Legislature has provided and the Court. 14 MR. GILSTRAP: All right. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anything more on .6? 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 17 "Docketing, appearance, and trial." (a) is "The case 18 19 shall be docketed and tried as other cases; (b), the appearance date on citation shall constitute the trial 20 date," because that's what we believe the statute says, is 21 that it be handled -- I forget the exact language, but 22 23 within 6 to 10 days. 24 (c), "Any party shall have the right to 25 trial by jury by making a request to the court within five days after the date the landlord is served with citation by paying a jury fee. If either party demands a jury, the jury shall be empanelled as soon as practicable. If neither party demands a jury, the justice shall try the case.

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(d), "The justice may continue the trial for good cause shown. Continuances should be limited, and the case should be reset for trial on an expedited basis." We know that the Legislature says you need to handle these within 6 to 10 days, but there are things that are going to come up that are going to dictate a continuance, both from the tenant's side and the landlord's side, and we need to have some mechanism to do that, but we're trying to get across that it should be limited and for good cause.

(e), "If the tenant appears at trial and the landlord has been duly served and fails to appear at the trial, justice may proceed to hear evidence. If the tenant establishes that the tenant is entitled to recover, the justice shall render judgment against the landlord in accordance with the evidence." That's the default judgment provision, and then (f), "If the tenant fails to appear for trial the justice on motion of the landlord may dismiss the suit," and that's the DWOP provision.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Comments? Justice

Gray.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Under (c), while I always prefer shorter as opposed to longer, you use the word "the justice shall try the case." I would wonder if "the justice shall decide the case" would not be better in that circumstance, and in (f) I don't know why the justice should have to wait for the landlord to make the motion to dismiss the suit. They ought to be able to do it sua sponte, on their own motion.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, my opinion on that is that the -- is that the judge should not advocate rights for a party by on his own motion dismissing in a situation like this, that the motion needs to come from the party and the judge act on it as opposed to the judge deciding that he'll enforce some rights for a party on his own motion.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Then don't make it on his own motion. Just "the judge shall dismiss the case."

If the petitioner doesn't show up, the tenant doesn't show up, the justice shall dismiss the suit. Then he's not making a motion.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we just thought it was cleaner that there be a motion. We're going to have a motion on a default judgment.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You have a pro se

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landlord. He doesn't know he needs to move to dismiss if
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   the tenant doesn't show up. What happens?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, he gets
   hints.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: "If you move to
   dismiss, I will?"
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Do I hear a motion to
   dismiss? I thought so." Ralph had his hand up.
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                 MR. DUGGINS: Under (c), the jury request,
  you've also got similar language in 737.3. I'd like to
   suggest you delete the language in 737.3, the second
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   paragraph, since you have it here and ask whether or not
   this request, you ought to have the word "written" in
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   front of "request." I just don't feel strongly about it,
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   I just ask that question.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We know that there
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   is also a provision in 3, and I guess we thought it would
   be better to, I guess, provide a lot of notice on this and
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   have it in two places. Yeah, it is duplicative, but we
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   thought it needed to be in 3, and we thought it needed to
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   be here in 7.
                               But where do you advise the
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                 MR. DUGGINS:
  plaintiff that the plaintiff can do it like you advise the
   defendant in citation?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, right here.
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I think 3 also tells them that, but I think 7 certainly tells them that. It says, "Any party shall have the right 3 to trial by jury." MR. DUGGINS: I know, but in the citation 4 5 you're specifically admonishing a defendant that he or she or it pursue a jury trial by doing -- making the request and paying a fee. We don't have a similar admonition to 8 the plaintiff. 9 MR. DOGGETT: Maybe the form could say, "Do 10 you want a jury?" That's fine, but I think it 11 MR. DUGGINS: ought to be both ways if you're going to tell people that. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't know 13 how you -- other than putting it in the rule how would you -- how would you tell the tenant? Because it's the 16 landlord that's getting served the citation that we get 17 that notice. MR. DUGGINS: Put it in the form that you 18 19 may try the case to a jury, check this box, and pay whatever the fee is. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Jeff. 21 22 MR. BOYD: Yeah, related to that, the language of 737.7(c) as written sounds like if you're 23 going to request a jury you can't do it until after the 24 landlord has been served, and I assume the intent is that

the plaintiff could request the jury in the written 2 petition. 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well --It certainly has to be no later MR. BOYD: 4 5 than five days after the landlord is served, but as written to say "within five days," you have to make the 6 7 request within five days, it's unclear. It sounds like they can't do it until service has occurred. 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's the way Rule 744 is for evictions, and we just parroted that, but you're right. The tenant would have to know when he 11 was served and come in within that five days. We don't 12 mean to preclude a landlord -- or, I mean, a tenant from 13I requesting a jury trial when they file it. We don't mean 14 15 to preclude that. 16 MR. BOYD: So you might just change the word "within" to "no later than." 17 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Right. 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: "No later than." 20 Okay. 21 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Yelenosky. 23 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Why do we even 24 need (d), (e), and (f)? I don't think we say those things 25 with respect to any other appearance or failure to appear

1 or continuance, do we? I mean --2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 3 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: I mean, I don't know of anything in the Texas Rules of Civil 5 Procedure for district or -- for district courts where it 6 tells you what you do if somebody doesn't appear for 7 trial. 8 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, there is in JP court in the 500 series. 9 10 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Oh, there is? 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. Yeah. That's why we put this in there, because it's currently 13 existing. You need to have some mechanism to explain how these cases are handled. I mean, if you don't put anything, you're just sort of leaving it up to everyone to 15 interpret what they ought to do, so here you're setting 16 17 forth that if the landlord doesn't -- if the landlord doesn't show up, the tenant can move for default; tenant 18 doesn't show up, the landlord can move for dismissal. mean, you're setting it all out so everybody understands 21 the process. 22 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Okay. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine, then Harvey. 24 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah, 737.7(f), I like the fact that it's on motion of the landlord, because in a

Rule 165a dealing with DWOPs, when it's on the court's on 2 motion, has a lot of procedural protections that aren't incorporated here, and maybe they don't need to be because I guess if the tenant's case gets dismissed it's without prejudice. If it's still not repaired, I guess you have a 6 new cause of action. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Right. 8 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But that's different when somebody doesn't show up for trial. 10 mean, it's not a dismissal. It's just if they don't show up for trial, how are they ever going to meet their 11 12 burden. You just render a take-nothing judgment. Why do 13 you need --14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, this is 15 consistent with Rule 538, Rule -- oh, let's see --16 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: I mean, it's not as if you have a DWOP, a motion to dismiss, where the parties are acting outside the context of a setting on the 18 19 merits. You have a setting on the merits, one side 20 doesn't show. We all sort of know -- well, we, judges, should know what to do in that instance, who has the 21 22 burden, who's there. 23 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: This is standard practice in justice court under Rule 538, and we tried to 24 25 keep these consistent with the eviction rules and the

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justice court rules as much as possible. This spells it out. I don't think it hurts anything by being in there, 2 and it provides some clarity to the litigants and the 3 court as to how they proceed. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Harvev. 6 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: On subpart (d) I 7 wondered, Judge, why you use the verb "should be reset." 8 "Should be" rather than "must" or "shall" there. seems to give a little more discretion, and in light of 10 the legislative mandate of 6 to 10 days, I was curious about that. 11 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Just giving the trial judge some discretion. 13 14 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Over and above the 15 discretion the expedited basis already gives them? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't know 16 that there is a lot of conscious thought to that 17 particular word. I don't know. I don't have a strong 18 19 feeling one way or the other about it. I think "should" was there just to provide guidance more than specifics. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's pretty hard to say it's limited, but it "shall be limited." It's either 22 limited or it isn't. 23 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, "should be 25 reset on an expedited basis, " "shall be reset, " what is

the real practical difference of that? What does "expedited basis" mean? I mean, it's kind of a nebulous 2 term, so I don't know that the modifier makes much 3 difference with that ultimately. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hecht, did you 6 have something? 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yes. What is the 8 jury practice in these kinds of cases? 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I knew somebody was going to ask me about that. Here's the problem. 10 can't always get a case to jury trial within 6 to 10 days. 11 12 It's just not possible. If somebody comes in on the fifth day after service and says they want a jury trial, you're 13 in all likelihood not going to get that jury trial within 6 to 10 days after the date of service, because that only gives you, what, 2 to 5 days to get it in. So what happens is that you try to get it as quickly as possible. 17 You try to set it on the next jury docket. 18 Those of us in the urban counties typically 19 20 get our jurors from the central jury pool. We have to give them our jury dates a month in advance. If I call 22 down to the jury pool and say, "I need a jury out here on 23 next Tuesday," they might not laugh at me, but I'm not going to get it, you know, and --25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They respectfully

1 decline. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, they would respectfully decline, so that's why it's as soon as 31 practicable because it's just not going to happen within 6 5 to 10 days. Now, you might hit it lucky, and that happens 6 from time to time that you've got a jury docket set within that time period and you can add it to it or you can get it quickly after, but that's why we say "as soon as practical" because you can't always do it within 6 to 10 10 days. 11 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: So why should there 12 be juries in these cases? It looks like it's just a built-in delay. 13 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I quess 15 that's kind of a policy matter for the Court as to whether 16 they would want to deny a jury trial on these. We didn't even talk about the possibility of not having one. It was 17 just kind of understood. 18 19 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Damages can be up 20 to 10,000? 21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, capped at 22 10,000. 23 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But I suppose a lot of cases are about broken things and sort of repairs 24 25 that --

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I would say leaky 2 water pipes, toilets, would be a high percentage of the types of cases you get, but leaky roofs. You know, in Hurricane Ike you had a lot of roofs and things of that Maybe power off. Robert probably has a better feel 5 for the types of causes of action, but I would say 7 plumbing is going to be at the top of the list. 8 MR. DOGGETT: Electrical, there's all kinds of damages or issues that weren't repaired that landlords 10 don't want to spend the money on repairs. Air-conditioning, especially in South Texas, is a major 11 12 problem, but your question is a good one. It wasn't discussed heavily. Evictions, of course, there is that 13 There is a de novo appeal from a JP court, of 14 right. course, to the county court, and so it can be a whole new 15 jury trial. It's a reasonable question. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How often are juries demanded? 18 19 MR. DOGGETT: I would tell you rarely, but I 20 think Judge Lawrence would have a --21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, how often are juries demanded? 23 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: In evictions? 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no, no. In these repair situations. 25

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Who knows. 1 I've never talked to anybody that's ever seen 2 had one. 3 one, a repair case, filed under this particular section. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The only county court at law judge that I was able to get a response back 6 7 from has been there 10 years and never heard of one. 8 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But how many in eviction cases? 9 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, gosh. 11 probably 2,500 evictions a year, and I probably have eviction jury trials maybe 10, and of those 10 I might 12 have four or five actually go, so very few. 13 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Wendy, what's your 14 15 view of a jury in these cases? MS. WILSON: Well, your Honor, we really 16 didn't talk about this, and, you know, I mean, again, I'd reiterate what Robert said earlier in that they are 18 allowed in evictions, and we tried to -- the idea was to 19 20 have these proceedings be similar to those in evictions, but again, because of the expedited nature of them, you 21 know, I think probably the reality is they won't -- there won't be juries requested. 231 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: In a writ of re-entry, which is -- it's similar in that it's expedited

and there's a possibility of going to jail for contempt, but there's no money judgment for damages, but it's sort of similar. There's no jury trial in that, and the order 3 of restoration, I don't think there's a jury trial in that. So there are some somewhat similar things the Legislature has done that has not provided for jury 7 trials. The only difference is that you do have -- you will end up with a judgment that --9 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: That you can appeal 10 de novo? 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- that you can 12 appeal de novo without posting an appeal bond, so there is 13 that protection. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher, you 14 15 had your hand up a minute ago? HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Oh, this was 16 just on the continuances. In the other JP rules, "for good cause shown supported by affidavit of either party," 18 y'all have dropped that out of this on purpose? 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, on purpose. 20 We thought that was kind of cumbersome to do that, 21 particularly with this 6- to 10-day requirement, that you require somebody to in a short period of time to come down with an affidavit, and so we relaxed that a little bit. 25 It's up to the court to decide to grant it or not, so

there's -- you know, there's a stop there, but we thought the affidavit was just a little cumbersome.

> CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank.

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MR. GILSTRAP: I want to go back to the question of the parallelism between this proposal, which is going to be section two of the special proceedings, and forcible entry, which is going to be -- which is section three. It looks to me like this is covering the same material that's covered in Rule 743 through 747 and also 748 in the forcible entry rules. What -- can you tell me if there are any differences and are those differences significant, or is it basically going to be more or less the same in both type proceedings?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think that, you know, the base for these, for these set of rules, was the eviction rules, the small claims court rules, and the justice court rules. I don't know that we -- except with a few exceptions, we didn't reprint things exactly. changed things to make it work for these rules, and I think in some cases we improved it.

MR. GILSTRAP: I understand. I'm saying I 22 guess, you know, but a lot of these changes then could be also made in the forcible rules.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If that's a motion, 25 I'll second it.

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                 MR. GILSTRAP: I'm just concerned about --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're getting a lot done
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   today.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: I'm just concerned about
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   clever lawyers scrutinizing these things and saying,
   "A-ha, it's in the rules for landlord repair, but not in
6
   the eviction rules, and there's some significance to
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   that."
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 9
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Completely
   different causes of action, different parts of the rule, I
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   wouldn't think that would be much of an argument that
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   would be successful, but, yeah, I guess it could be made.
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                 MR. DOGGETT: And it's about ready to be
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   made in a few minutes when we get to the contempt issue.
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  No offense.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I knew there was some
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   clever lawyers here. Buddy.
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                 MR. LOW: Yeah, you were asked about the
   continuance, and you dealt specifically with that, but
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   Rule 566 provides default or dismissal and motions for new
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   trial. I know you can't meet within the six-day deadline.
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   Did y'all -- is there anything in there that says that 566
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   doesn't apply to this proceeding?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. We get to that
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   later.
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                 MR. LOW:
                           Okay. All right.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
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                                          That's in later
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  rules where we start talking about appeals and motions for
  new trial, but we'll deal with that a little bit later.
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                 MR. LOW: You had dealt with it up here and
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  Tracy asked about --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We're on pretrial
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   right now.
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                 MR. LOW:
                           Okay.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's take our morning
11 break. 15 minutes.
                 (Recess from 10:45 a.m. to 11:13 a.m.)
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge Lawrence,
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   let's get the firing squad back in place and start
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   shooting. .8.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We were on 16; is
   that right?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, we were on .16.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right.
   judgment. "A justice may enter a judgment against a
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   landlord for failure to repair or remedy condition at the
22 leased premises. If the total judgment including the
23 order directing the landlord to repair or remedy a
24 condition does not exceed 10,000, excluding interest and
25 costs of court." This 10,000 is an absolute cap.
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Normally I can render judgment for more than 10,000 if the amount in controversy goes up solely because of the passage of time, but not with this. This is absolutely capped by the statute at 10,000, and this becomes a problem, as we're going to see a little bit later, because you're going to have a landlord saying that, "Yeah, I can repair this for \$6,000." Then they may come back five days later and say, "I just got my contractor out there, it's going to take 11,000," and all the sudden you've got a jurisdiction problem. So this 10,000 is an important number because it can never exceed 10,000 exclusive of costs and interest.

"The judgment may, (a), order the landlord to take reasonable action to repair or remedy the condition. (b), order the landlord to reduce the tenant's rent." Now, this reduction of rent, keep in mind, what you're saying is — is that, all right, I got a notice to repair. The landlord got a notice to repair November the 1st, and I decide that, yeah, this condition materially affects your health or safety. I'm going to order the rent to be reduced. It relates back to the date of the notice. So ultimately, if you look at the judgment that I've got attached on this other handout, the judgment is going to be that the rent is reduced from 800 a month to 600 a month from November 1st, and then that goes on until

the condition is remedied or repaired.

One way that could happen is if the judge enters an order to repair at the same time the order to reduce rent occurs, then the order to reduce rent is going to terminate and revert back to the market rent on the completion date of the order to repair. That's a relatively clean concept and works out well without the necessity of an additional hearing. But if the landlord does -- if the judge does not order the landlord to repair something, for example, just says -- well, it may have already been repaired, and they come in and they say, "I'm not going to order it to be repaired or remedied, but I'm going to reduce the rent and I'm going to grant these other damages."

So if the rent is reduced, let's say that there's no order to repair and the rent is reduced conditioned upon this problem with the leasehold, then you've got to have some way to determine when that order to repair goes out of effect and it reverts back to market rent, and that's going to require another hearing. So when you read 8 and then you read 11 later, that's all going to be about the reduction of the rent. It's going to be cumbersome if you don't have an order to repair. I'm hoping that most of these will have orders to repair,

and it's going to be clean, and you're not going to have to have another hearing, but there may be some, because there are five separate things you can sue for, the tenant may not ask for the order to repair, the court may not grant the order to repair but may grant the other four, and so we've got to have some mechanism in the rules to account for that.

"Order the landlord to reduce the tenant's rent from the date of the first repair notice in proportion to the reduced rental value resulting from the condition until the condition is repaired or remedied, as long as the order reducing the rent states the amount of the rent to be paid by the tenant, if any, the frequency with which the rent is to be paid, the condition justifying the reduction of the rent, the effective date of the rent reduction, and the termination date of the order reducing rent.

"On the date the rent reduction terminates the rent will revert to the rent specified in the lease agreement. If an order to repair or remedy is issued in addition to an order to reduce the tenant's rent then the reduction in rent automatically terminates on the completion date set in the order to repair or remedy, after which the rent returns to the rent amount in the

lease. 1 2 "(2), if the justice did not issue an order 3 to remedy" -- "to repair or remedy in addition to the order to reduce the tenant's rent then the court must hold a hearing to determine when the condition has been repaired or remedied and may modify the rent reduction 7 based on that determination." Then (c), (d), and (e) are just the other 8 9 aspects of 92.0563, the civil penalty, actual damages, and court costs and attorney's fees. But the hard part, the part in this that's the tricky part, is (b), the reduction 11 12 of rent. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any comments? 14 Yeah, Ralph. 15 MR. DUGGINS: Why wouldn't you just take what's in the first paragraph and insert that in (a)? 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, (a) deals with the order to repair or remedy. That's separate from 181 the order to reduce rent. 19 20 MR. DUGGINS: No, I'm talking about the first paragraph says that "the order directing a landlord 21 22 to repair or remedy does not exceed \$10,000."

wouldn't you take out -- take that language out of that

24 and add it in (a)? "Order the landlord to take reasonable

25 action to repair or remedy the condition, provided that it

may not exceed \$10,000." HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Because you're 2 3 talking about the total judgment. It's not just the order 4 to repair. 5 MR. DUGGINS: Oh, okay. 6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's everything can't be more than 10,000. 7 8 MR. DUGGINS: I think that could probably stand some clarification then. I mean, make that clear that the total judgment may not under any circumstances 11 exceed. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we say that I think about three times in the rules. I mean, I don't 13 14 know how else we could do it. We tried to repeat that on a number of different occasions, but I -- I mean, we can try to redo that. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 17 18 MR. HAMILTON: Do I understand that you can order a rent reduction if there is a repair that needs to 19 20 be made, but let's say it costs over \$10,000, so you can't order it done, but you just order the rent reduced? 21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, you know, 22 23 that's a jurisdiction question that's going to come up. You know, I guess the -- like any other jurisdiction issue 24 25 like that where you've got an amount in controversy

problem, I think that the tenant could choose to abandon the order to repair and not sue for that and get within 2 the court's jurisdictional limit, and you could order the rest of that. Because you've got five separate things to 5 sue for, and somebody may correct my analysis here, but I believe when you've got five separate things that you 6 could choose to abandon any part of that and just sue for the other parts to get within the jurisdictional limit of 10,000, but if you say, "No, I want it repaired" and the 10 repairs are 8,000 and the value of the reduction of rent is a thousand and then you've got these actual and 11 statutory damages that get you over 10,000, then I'm going 12 to dismiss that for want of jurisdiction at that point if 13 the tenant insists on proceeding with all of that and I believe that the repairs are really going to cost 8,000. 16 I mean, there is an element that the landlord is going to have to prove what those repairs 17 18 cost. 19 MR. HAMILTON: Why would you not always enter an order requiring repairs? Why leave that open to 20 have a hearing later on? 21 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's not my 23 I mean, the tenant may not ask for an order to repair, or there may be -- and don't ask me what 24 25 circumstance it would be, but there may be some

circumstance that I would not order the landlord to repair for whatever reason. I mean, it's one of five different causes of action. It's possible it either won't be pled or won't be granted, and you have to take that into consideration if it's possible.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Pam.

MS. BARON: Yeah, I think, on amount in controversy, I think the cases are pretty clear that you can drop certain elements of damages to stay within the jurisdiction of the particular court. What's odd to me about this is that normally you would not include an order for somebody to go take an action as included within the amount of the judgment, but it looks like the statute here says the judgment including the order to repair can't exceed \$10,000, so it does look like you have to value that, which is an unusual way to calculate an amount in controversy, but is that what you concluded, that the statute --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah.

MS. BARON: -- required that?

the judgment form I dummied up. It's a funny-looking judgment form because you've got part of the judgment that is really -- that you can execute on and part of the judgment that judgment that's part of the amount in controversy that you

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can't levy and execute on.
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                 MS. BARON: Right.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I've never seen a
   judgment like that, but that's exactly what the statute
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   seems to require. Yeah, it's funny, but --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: If the landlord comes in and
   proves that the repairs are going to cost $11,000, does he
   get the suit dismissed?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Absolutely. If the
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  tenant wants to keep on with the order to repair, then,
  yeah, the suit's going to have to be dismissed.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But then he's going
14 to district court, right?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: He can go to county
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16 or district court.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Bound by his
18 $11,000.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. He doesn't
20 lose his cause of action. He just can't do it in JP
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   court.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: He has to come up with
23 another $92.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it's a little
25 more than that.
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1 MR. JEFFERSON: I mean, is that right, is it 2 -- I mean, the statute just says that a justice court may 3 not award a judgment that exceeds \$10,000. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 4 5 MR. JEFFERSON: Okav. So, I mean, if you 6 prove repairs that are greater than \$10,000, why wouldn't the judgment just be \$10,000? 8 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, well, because I 9 think the law is, is if the amount in controversy is over my jurisdictional limit I have to dismiss for want of 10 11 jurisdiction. 12 MR. JEFFERSON: I quess I'm questioning whether this is really a jurisdictional limitation. 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think it 14 15 I mean, I have a limit -- I have a jurisdictional limit anyway of 10,000, and then this caps it at 10,000 in 16 17 addition to that, but even outside of that, I'm going to have a -- I mean, there's case law that says that if the 18 19 amount in controversy is outside of my jurisdictional 20 limit I'm supposed to dismiss it. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont's point is that this may not be an amount in controversy. 23 I mean, the statute doesn't MR. JEFFERSON: seem to say that. It says you can't award a judgment more 24 25 than \$10,000, but it doesn't say you can't take the case.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But the Chapter 27 of the Government Code says that I have a limit of 10,000 on civil suits in my court, and if the amount in controversy is over that -- there are two different things that mandate a judgment of no more than 10,000. this specific statute, and the other is Chapter 27 of the Government Code that also says I can't render a judgment over 10,000, but that at least has some latitude that there's some circumstances I can go over it, but still, if it's -- if the pleading is 10,000 or is more than 10,000 and it doesn't meet some of these exceptions then 12 typically I have to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. MR. JEFFERSON: I mean, I hear what you're saying as far as if the Government Code says you can't take a case that has an amount in controversy over This seems to say you can't have an amount in 16 \$10,000. controversy in justice court that's over \$10,000, and so you could take -- you could take the case, but you just can't award a judgment that's over that number. You know, 19 I think it probably requires some judicial interpretation, but --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, see, I'm not 23 going to know at the time the suit is filed what the amount in controversy is, other than the plea may be for 24 25 actual damages and the statutory damages, civil penalty of

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500 plus a month's rent. I may know what those are, but 2 I'm not going to have any idea how much the repair is going to be until the landlord comes in and tells me how much it's going to cost. That's when I'm going to realize 5 I may have a jurisdiction problem. It's probably not going to be when the suit is filed that that comes to my 6 attention. It's going to be after I get proof on the 7 8 amount to repair. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger had his hand up. 10 MR. HUGHES: No, I -- just echoing Mr. Jefferson's comment, but it seems to me if you start off 11 saying that you have a jurisdictional statute limiting the 12 amount in controversy to \$10,000, if I remember the case 13 law, if the damages grow in the interim you can render a 141 judgment in excess, but it seems to me that what we've 15 done -- what's going on here is the Government Code says 16 you have to start off with no more than 10,000, and then 17 you have a statute that says the most you can award is 18 10,000 at the end, so maybe that's the best of both 19 20 worlds. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Judge 22 Yelenosky. 23 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, the practical matter, I would think the tenant's coming in 24 saying, for instance, "Water is coming through my roof. 25 Ι don't know where it's coming from, but they won't repair it," so that's the claim. Landlord comes in and says, "Yep, it's a roof problem. It's going to cost us a hundred thousand dollars to fix it." The tenant does not want a judgment for \$10,000 worth of repairs on that roof because it's not going to stop the water from coming They want an order to fix the roof. So surely through. the statute intended that if they have a good claim for fixing the roof that they get into a court that can order that, and so if we have the leeway here in interpreting the statute in the rules, it seems to me we want to get them into the court that can order the only relief that really is going to make any difference to them. And so if we're saying, well, the JP court could then order the landlord to do one-tenth of the roof work, that doesn't seem to me to be a real world solution.

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MR. JEFFERSON: Yeah, but is the answer to that to say you can't be in court at all? I mean, the whole idea is so that, you know, aggrieved parties can easily and efficiently get into court and get a judge to look at the situation, and, you know, this has a very expedited procedure to do that. Once it's in court then you've got the landlord's attention, and there are ways you can get either to the appropriate court or he can order some nonmonetary relief or whatever, whatever is the

equitable thing to do under the circumstances, but to say 1 that the court who's there for the people, you know, the 2 3 pro se folks, that if it's not pled right or if you have that technical problem of it's a remedy that would be more than \$10,000 you can't even be in court doesn't seem to me 6 to be the appropriate solution. 7 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: May I respond 8 to that? 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, sure. 10 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah. yeah, I think we have the same objective, and I'm just 11 12 thinking out loud, but I guess if you got a judgment from that in my scenario from the JP court that said, "I can't 13 order you to fix the roof because it's going to cost a 14 hundred thousand dollars, and this precludes me from doing 15 that, but I can do what then, order 10,000 in rent 16 credit?" And if the JP court does that, can the tenant 17 still then go file in county court to get the actual 18 injunctive order to fix the roof? Can they do both? 19 Because if they can't do both then we certainly don't want 20 to give them something that doesn't solve the problem. 21 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're in law school now, 23 right? Okay. HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, Judge 24 25 | Lawrence would know the answer to that. What happens if

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you get a judgment from the JP court that says, "I give you 10,000 worth of rent credit for the leaky roof, but I cannot order them to fix the roof"? Can they then go to county court to get that order? 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If I'm Wendy Wilson I'm going to argue that's collateral estoppel or res 6 judicata, and no. So I don't know the answer to that question. I can tell you that neither the statute nor the bill address that. 9 10 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: How could it be res judicata if the court can't render a verdict above a 11 certain number? 12 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't know. 14 I'm speculating it could be one of those two because you have a cause of action that you're bringing in the JP 15 court for part of it, but you're going to go somewhere 16 17 else for the other part? Does that present a problem? 18 mean, shouldn't you do it all at one time in one court? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The better res judicata 20 argument would be if the costs of the repairs are 11,000 21 and you say, "Look, I can only give you 10,000 under this 22 statute, but I can render a judgment up to 10,000, statute 23 says I can, and so I'll give you 10, but you're going to 24 be leaving a thousand on the table." And the election is 25 made, "Yeah, I want the 10 now. I don't want to have to

go to county court and get 11 later." 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: They just abandoned 3 part of their claim in essence, yeah. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 4 Yeah. Right. And if 5 they don't -- but they can't have it both ways. Anyway. 6 Roger. MR. HUGHES: Well, I'm not sure of the 8 answers, but I pose the question. The JP courts are usually not courts of record, and I thought res judicata, 10 collateral estoppel, only applied if you had a judgment from a court of record, but I still think that, getting 11 12 back to the original problem, that being aside, you know, I understand the desire of a sympathetic justice of the 13 peace -- justice wanting to do what he can and it not becoming a trap for unwary and somehow foreclosing them 15 16 from going to the court. I think, you know, I'm unsure -both courts would be very chagrinned to find out that the 17 18 justice court having done something for the aggrieved 19 tenant, the tenant loses the lion's share of his remedy. 20 So unless we put in some provision to either 21 transfer part of the case to the county court, I think the only -- maybe the only safe thing to do is either build in 22 23 some kind of safeguard that this does not prejudice their right to seek the remaining relief in county court, or 24 25 simply tell the judge you're going to have to dismiss the

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whole thing so they can get complete relief from some
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  court that doesn't have these problems.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know the
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   answer to that. The task force didn't address this,
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  because we were strictly concerned with the rules in JP
   court, not what might happen in county or district, so we
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   didn't even talk about this aspect.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other comments
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   about .8 other than the perhaps esoteric jurisdictional
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   issue?
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                 MS. BARON: I object to jurisdiction being
   called esoteric.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Jurisdiction, of course,
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   is fundamental --
                 MS. BARON:
                             Yes, thank you.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- but the discussion
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   could be esoteric. Okay. Anything else on .8? Okay.
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   .9.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Counterclaims.
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   These things have to be tried within 6 to 10 days. The
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   task force feels that counterclaims should not be
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   permitted. "Counterclaims and the joinder of suits
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   against third parties are not permitted in suits under
   these rules. Compulsory counterclaims may be brought in a
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   separate cause of action. Any potential causes of action,
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including compulsory counterclaim, that are not brought because of this rule shall not be deemed to be waived. Any landlord or tenant who prevails in a suit brought under these rules may recover the party's costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees as allowed by law."

Now, taking the last sentence first, that tracks 92.005 of the Property Code which says that the prevailing party in a suit under this section is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. Now, the first part of that is kind of similar to the eviction rules. The eviction rules -- and there's a lot of case law on that -- talk about the only part -- the only focus of the eviction rules is for possession, rent, court costs, and attorney's fees, and then the case law talks about any other cause of action that may -- that the landlord may have or that the tenant may have is a counterclaim or not waived and can be brought as a separate action. So we just kind of parroted what was in the eviction rules in the interest of trying to get this done in 6 to 10 days as the Legislature wants.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Harvey.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: The issue on attorney's fees seems to me like it's in the wrong place. I mean, why only put that in the counterclaims section? Why not have it as its own separate section because it really applies more to the plaintiff's claims than it

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applies to the -- well, it applies to both, not just
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   counterclaims.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. Elaine just
   said move it up to the judgment. I guess we felt --
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   because when we started talking about counterclaims we
   talked about counterclaims for attorney's fees and it
   seemed to be a logical place to put it because of that,
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   but I don't think we would object to putting it somewhere
   else.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It does seem -- since
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   it's going both ways, not just for the landlord defendant,
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   that maybe it ought to go up in the part --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We can do it up in
   8, in judgment, if that's what y'all want to do.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina, did you have
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   something?
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                 MS. CORTELL: I was just going to say we
18 could also play with the title.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's another way to do
20
   it. Okay. What else on .9? Any other comments on .9?
   Okay.
          This looks like this is going to be fun, .10.
                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Judge Lawrence?
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23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, I'm sorry. Justice
24
   Patterson.
                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: In 8 we reference
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attorney's fees, in 9 we reference attorney's fees as allowed by law, and I wonder whether "as allowed by law" 2 only adds confusion to that measurement. 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we actually 4 5 were trying to narrow it down to 92.005. Maybe it would 6 be better to say "92.005" --7 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Yes. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- and the task 8 force actually talked about that, and I don't remember why, but rejected that in favor of "as allowed by law," but that wasn't a big issue. It could be changed. 11 12 MS. BARON: It's probably because 92.005 13 might get renumbered and then where are you at that point? 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That may have been 15 it. I don't remember. That would be wise. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard Munzinger, 16 and then Frank. He beat you by a hair, Frank. 17 MR. MUNZINGER: The sentence says "any 18 19 potential causes of action, "second sentence, "including a 20 compulsory counterclaim that are not brought because of this rule shall not be deemed to be waived," and I just 22 ask those who know more about res judicata and claim preclusion if the word "waived" is correct as distinct from saying "precluded." 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or barred. 25

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1	MR. MUNZINGER: Sir? Or barred.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or barred.
3	MR. MUNZINGER: Yeah, because waiver is a
4	specific concept, and I'm not sure that that is
5	sufficiently broad.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, waiver is very
7	different than like other things like res judicata.
8	MR. MUNZINGER: It's esoteric, too.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Could be esoteric.
10	Frank.
11	MR. ORSINGER: Not since you mentioned it,
12	putting it in the record.
13	MR. GILSTRAP: Judge Lawrence, is this
14	there's nothing limiting this just to residential tenants,
15	is there?
16	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.
17	MR. GILSTRAP: It is? Okay. All right.
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. This section
19	only applies to residential tenants.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Orsinger, did you
21	have something?
22	MR. ORSINGER: No, I was just saying that
23	once it's on the record in here it's no longer esoteric.
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont.
25	MR. JEFFERSON: Back on the attorney fee
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thing for a second, the statute doesn't seem to require that the prevailing -- or that any party -- well, the 2 3 statute says that the judgment may award fees. Is that right? I mean, it's not a -- I don't know exactly what that means, if that means it's a prevailing party requirement or reasonable and equitable, whatever the 6 standard is. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the way I'm 8 reading it, it says, "A party who prevails in a suit brought under this subchapter may recover the party's costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees in relation 11 to work reasonably expended." 12 MR. JEFFERSON: So that "may" -- are we 13 reading the "may" as an automatic winner gets their fees? 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think it 15 always has to be proven up. Well, I know, but --17 MR. JEFFERSON: HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But does the 18 19 judge have discretion? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think he 20 does under that. Wendy, what do you -- have you dealt 22 | with that? 23 MS. WILSON: I have not, but I would think that it is at the discretion of the court, but --24 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I thought the

court -- well, maybe I'm mistaken. I thought the court always had discretion as to the attorney's fees. 2 3 MR. JEFFERSON: The amount, sure. As to the amount I think that's right, and maybe that's what the 5 "may" applies to, but my question was what -- does the "may" in the statute give the court the discretion to not 7 award attorney's fees? 8 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I would assume so, but I don't know the answer to that. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And how does 10 that dovetail into the Supreme Court line of cases that 11 say you don't prevail unless you get money or some sort of 12 declaratory relief? 13 To be honest --14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I mean, to put 15 in "any landlord or tenant who prevails" strikes me as problematic because that presumes that a landlord could 17 prevail, and I don't see how a landlord can prevail here, 18 because the landlord will never get money or declaratory 19 relief because there's no counterclaim. So are you 20 arguing that if the landlord wins the suit they get 21 attorney's fees? I mean that's --22 23 MR. JEFFERSON: That's my question. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Loser pay. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I don't think 25

that's what that statute means. I don't think it means to 2 change prevailing party law. 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we did not --I don't think we considered the Supreme Court cases. 4 looked at the statute the Legislature adopted, and we 5 based this on the legislative statute. 6 7 MR. MUNZINGER: The statute itself says that 8 it's a tenant judicial remedy of attorney's fees in Section 92.0563(a)(5), court costs and attorney's fees, so 10 it's a remedy given to the tenant. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, 92.005 is the 11 section that we're talking about. 12 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Tracy, are you 13 suggesting that -- I'm trying to follow what you're 14 saying, that maybe the way to read 92.005(a) is that only 15 tenants can be prevailing parties, because they're the 16 only ones seeking relief? 17 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yes. I mean, 18 19 that's what I'm suggesting. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't think 20 that's the case in landlord-tenant law. I think that it's typical that if a landlord -- if a tenant brings a suit and the landlord hires an attorney and the landlord wins, I think typically the landlord gets attorney's fees. 24 25 MS. WILSON: That's correct.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Correct me if I'm 1 2 wrong, Wendy. 3 MS. WILSON: That's my understanding. That's correct, and the way that provision has been 5 interpreted. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Based on 92.005. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So this is the English rule, the loser pays. 8 9 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Loser pays. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Remember when we 10 had the offer of settlement rule, which some people 11 thought was shifting attorney's fees to the loser? 12 was an uproar of monumental proportions in this committee 13 about that, but I agree with you. I think that's probably what this says, but Tracy's right, if you look at Supreme 15 16 Court jurisprudence on prevailing. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I know. Wendy. 17 18 MS. WILSON: And I think, too, that one of the reasons that -- if I'm recalling, Judge Lawrence, that 19 we put this last sentence in the counterclaim rule was 20 21 because we wanted to make sure that this was not considered -- or if it was considered a counterclaim, that 22 23 it didn't preclude in these cases a landlord who 24 prevailed; and, Judge Christopher, I think, you know, who gets a -- the tenant gets a take-nothing judgment, that

that's prevailing, would be able to recover attorney's fees under 92.005, and that it didn't mean that you had to 2 3 bring a separate counterclaim. I think that was the line of the discussion that we had. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that would make 6 sense. 7 MR. JEFFERSON: You thought a landlord would 8 automatically get fees if they prevailed? MS. WILSON: Well, automatically, that they 9 would be able to do it without having asserted a separate counterclaim for fees, but it would be based on 92.005. 12 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And there's never been 13 any controversy about 92.005(a) meaning that whoever wins 14 the lawsuit gets attorney's fees? Even in the absence of 15 a counterclaim. 16 MS. WILSON: Not to my knowledge, and I 17 would have to -- I'm not aware of that. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Buddy. 19 20 MR. LOW: But, Chip, my question is that, landlord or tenant, they can recover reasonable costs. They act as their own attorney, they can't get reasonable 22 attorney's fees for --23 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, that's right. 25 MR. LOW: I mean, you know, they say, "I'm

acting as my own attorney, I want a reasonable fee." you have to have incurred it or have an attorney, because 2 this could be read that I'm my own attorney, I want a 3 reasonable fee? 4 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't think that one's going to fly, Buddy. 6 7 MR. LOW: Well, okay. If it won't fly, we don't need to shoot it down. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We don't need to get on 9 10 the runway if it won't fly. Judge Christopher. 11 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: May I suggest just a -- instead of saying "any landlord or tenant who 12 prevails" we just say "any party who prevails" leaving the 13 ambiguity that is already there, there, as to whether the 14 landlord could prevail? 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Makes sense. Pam. 16 MS. BARON: Judge Christopher, I think in 17 the Texas Supreme Court case that dealt with the 18 prevailing party issue, they only considered it from the 19 perspective of the party that was seeking affirmative 20 relief as the plaintiff and that the defendant in that 21 case did not bring forward the issue about whether they would be entitled as a prevailing party to attorney's fees if the plaintiff failed to obtain any relief at all, so I

think that's still an open question. Is that correct,

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Judge Hecht?
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yes.
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                 MS. BARON:
                             Thank you.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Carl.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Under the
 6
   statute or a contract?
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                 MR. HAMILTON: Can our rule --
                 MS. BARON: Under a contract.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Under a
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   contract, yeah, I agree with you under a contract.
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                 THE REPORTER: Wait.
                 (Multiple simultaneous speakers)
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: But it's clear
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14 under our statute that you've got to get money or a
  judgment of relief to prevail.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I suppose we could.
   Whether we should is another matter. Buddy.
                 MR. HAMILTON: Well, the Legislature didn't
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19
   do it.
                           There's a line of cases where you
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                 MR. LOW:
   get one dollar in these cases and then that's not
   prevailing, so if somebody recovers one dollar, and --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Hey, Dee Dee, were
   you able to get Carl's comment?
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                 THE REPORTER: No, I didn't, actually.
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hey, Carl, you're going to have to repeat it.

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MR. HAMILTON: The question was can't we just define "prevail" in the rule? The Legislature didn't define it, so --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the question is -- I said we could, but the question is should we, and I'm not sure that the Senate Bill 1448 asked us to promulgate rules that might or might not encompass 92.005. You could argue that it doesn't.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The task force did not even talk about the issue of prevail because you've got a statute that says that, and prevail is kind of a tricky issue that I think the individual courts are going to have to deal with because you've got five separate things you can sue for, so can the -- does the landlord prevail only if he gets a plaintiff take-nothing, or does the landlord prevail if he wins on four of those but not the fifth? I don't know. I think that's up to the discretion of the court maybe, unless there is some case law on this, but we didn't attempt to define what the Legislature did not.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. And I would say, Carl, that there's a substantial policy issue embodied in 25 that statute, and I'm not sure by rule you should try to

solve that policy debate. It seems more substantive to 2 Buddy. me. 3 No, there is a lot of case law MR. LOW: under the civil rights, you know, the prevailing party, 4 and there is a lot of case law on who prevails, but to 5 define it, I don't know you can do that. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. What else? Anything else on .9? All right. Let's go to .10. 8 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. This will be fun. 101 · CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Particularly since we 11 have two options stretching over five pages. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 13 the problem: Contempt of court, what is the penalty if you order a landlord to repair something and the landlord doesn't repair something? 92.0563, which is the statute 16 on which all of this is based, does not have any 17 discussion as to what the penalty is. It's silent as to 18 that. All it says is that the court can order the 19 landlord to repair something with no discussion as to what 20 happens if he doesn't repair it. In the original bill, for what this is worth, Senate Bill 1448, the original bill which actually amended a section of the local Government Code, not the Property Code that we're dealing 24 with today, they put in there that the court could issue 25

an injunction against the landlord to order him to repair something, which, of course, has all the powers and rights under that to punish, but then they had a committee substitute; and the committee substitute, which is the bill that was passed, didn't make any determination about the penalty and didn't change the underlying section, so you can say that the statute itself is silent and the bill is silent.

Now, looking at some similar -- the argument for holding a landlord in contempt of court would be 21.001 of the Government Code and 21.002 of the Government Code, which says basically -- and it's in the materials -- it says a court has inherent power to enforce its orders, and then it talks about contempt of court in 21.002. So the argument is that it's an order of the court and you can -- you can enforce that through contempt. It's an inherent power of the court.

maybe is that the Legislature has passed similar statutes to this. One is what's called a writ of re-entry, where the court orders a landlord to readmit a tenant that's been illegally locked out, and that's an order of the court, and the Legislature dictated that if the landlord doesn't let him back in, then the court can put the tenant -- the landlord in jail until he lets him back in.

Not three days, not a hundred dollars, but in jail until he lets him back in. In the writ of restoration of utility services, which goes into effect January 1st, there's a similar statute, that if the court orders the landlord to restore utility services to the tenant and he doesn't do it then the landlord can hold -- the court can hold that landlord in contempt.

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So you've got two similar provisions where the Legislature has specifically said contempt if you don't comply, but the Legislature didn't speak to this. So what do you do in the rule? If you -- I think that the Court could put something in the rule. The Court has a number of places in the Rules of Procedure, all of which are in here where the Court has said that you can hold someone in contempt if they don't comply with this or obey So if the Court chose to do it then I think the Court could put something in this rule that you can hold a landlord in contempt under 21.002, three days and/or a hundred dollars, or you could decide that the Legislature did not intend for JPs to hold somebody in contempt because it was in the original bill, was left out of this. It's in similar statutes, but not in this, and 21.001, inherent power of the court, doesn't apply; therefore, you shouldn't do it, and maybe you put something in the comment that says you can't hold somebody in contempt.

We can write it round or we can write it flat. I'm only asking that we put something in there one way or the other because -- let me finish. Because JPs are taught to be careful with contempt. We're taught in the training schools and the desk book to use it sparingly, don't do it unless it's clear that you can. Some JPs are going to look at this statute and the bill and they're going to say, "Well, there's no contempt in here. I'm not holding a landlord in contempt." And if you don't hold a landlord in contempt who fails to repair something then there's no real remedy for the landlord not doing it. I mean, you've got other remedies, the reduction of rent and other things, but as far as the order to repair, there's no power to compel the landlord to do it.

So if you don't put something in the rule one way or the other, either you can hold them in contempt or not hold them in contempt, I believe that there is going to be confusion in JP world. I think you're going to have some JPs that say "inherent power of the court" and hold them in contempt, some that are going to be more cautious and say, "It's not in the rule, it's not in the statute, I'm reluctant to do that, and I'm not going to want to hold them in contempt." So that is the issue.

Now, Rule 10 is written in two ways. Option

one has a part (c) where you hold somebody in contempt, and option two does not have a part (c), so that's the 2 difference between the two, and that's the -- some of the -- the task force was split on this. Some felt it ought to -- that it was obvious that contempt is appropriate here, and it should be in the rule. Some felt 6 that contempt may be appropriate, but since the statute 7 doesn't say anything about it and the bill -- and the underlying -- neither the bill nor the statute say anything about it then the rule shouldn't say anything 10 about it. So that in essence is the debate. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why did the statute not 12 say anything about contempt, because it's an inherent 13 power of the court? 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't know. 15 I went back and listened to the tapes of the committee 16 hearings. I read the legislative history. There was no 17 discussion of that. All I know is that the original bill 18 had injunction and the substitute had nothing about it, 19 different sections, but Wendy was involved in that and 20 Robert. Maybe y'all have some -- but I don't know what the legislative intent was, but it's not clear, some would 23 arque. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, is contempt an

inherent power, or does it always have to be spelled out?

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I don't know.
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                 MS. WILSON: Well, Government Code 21.001?
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                 MS. PETERSON: 2. 1 and 2. 2 specifically.
                 MS. WILSON: 2, gives justice courts the
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   ability to impose contempt up to three days in jail or a
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   hundred-dollar fine.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, let me read
   -- I'm sorry.
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                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, it also
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   says that they can impose coercive contempt. Coercive
   contempt is not so limited.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          21 --
                 MS. WILSON: I guess the point is the
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  statute provides for it.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 21.001 and 21.002
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   aren't JP court. It says "a court." I mean, this is just
   the generic "a court." It's not specific to JP court.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: Yeah, but 02 has a provision
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   involving limiting the justice court power.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The range of
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   punishment, that's correct.
                 MR. GILSTRAP: So obviously it's inherent in
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23 that the justice court can impose contempt.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, and 21.001 is
   styled "Inherent power of the courts." Justice Yelenosky.
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HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: You're going
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  to promote me. Judge.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What?
                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: I think you
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  said "justice."
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, well, I promoted
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  you. You're doing good today.
                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Or justice of
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  the peace.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Justice Hecht said
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   demoted, so --
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                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah, I think
   it would -- I think it was Lincoln who said, "Law without
   enforcement is just good advice, " and so that's all this
   would be, and I mean, the question of whether it's
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   inherent power, I guess if you were talking about a
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   district court where you've got a constitutional basis you
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  might say it's inherent constitutionally, maybe not so
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   with JP courts, but this statute, whether you call it
   inherent or not, there's statutory power of contempt for a
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   court under 21.002, and it's clear that a court includes
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   the justice court not only because of what's in there, but
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23 if you look at the structure of the statute it's in the
   general provisions, which is then followed by appellate
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   courts, district courts, JP courts, municipal courts.
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And the only limitation with respect to -or the only reference to justice court is to set the limit for punitive contempt, criminal contempt, as it sets for district court and then down below it says "except as provided in subsection (h), " which puts an outer limit I quess even on coercive contempt. "A court's" -- "a court's power to confine or compel the contemptor to obey a court order is not otherwise restricted."

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I think your point, Judge Lawrence, about being careful with contempt is a very good one, but it's a big difference between -- there's a big difference between saying a court should not hold somebody in contempt without considering all the circumstances in trying perhaps a lesser coercion or maybe shouldn't confine until considering lesser coercion. That is completely different from saying the court doesn't have the power to do it, because, again, if the court doesn't have the power then it's just good advice.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Robert.

MR. DOGGETT: In terms of the legislation, there was two different bills that were pending before the They ended up running with the horse that Legislature. 23 made the least number of changes. In other words, there 24 was a horse that had quite a lot of new law, if you will, and used the word "injunction," and it was a change to the

local Government Code, as I recall. And the change that 2 ultimately passed, the Legislature made the change in the 3 Property Code where all the rules were already in play and there was already an indication that the county and district court had this authority, and there was an 6 indication that a justice court does not have this 7 authority, and so ultimately what was done was a strike, 8 as you will see in your packet, a strike through that language on the justice court. 9

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So although the words "injunction" was never used in the actual bill itself, nor is it ever stated in the Property Code where all this is originating from, I don't think there's ever been any doubt about what a court has or has not, and so what this bill ended up doing was raise the justice court jurisdiction, if you will, or abilities up to the level of a county and district court with regard to these particular matters and these particular matters alone. And, frankly, the lawyers for -- or the advocates for the landlords and tenants I think looked at this and had no dispute about whether or not a justice court has the right to hold somebody in It's found in the Government Code. 22 contempt.

The question for us is, frankly, do you want to have a road map for a justice to have so when they know what to do when they're thinking about holding someone in

contempt, or do you want to keep it out of the rule and leave it up to the individual justices to devise their own method, and we as an advocate for the tenants thought it would be really preferable so the justice courts know what they're supposed to do and how they're supposed to do it, there's a road map, they know what to do, and we think that would be very helpful for the justices, so that's where we came out on it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wendy.

MS. WILSON: Yes, I just wanted to say our -- my position is, our position is, that, you know, the contempt is certainly provided for in Chapter 21 of the Government Code to enforce various types of orders, including an order for repair. The question is whether it should be included in the Rule of Procedure, and it's my position that it shouldn't be, because it's not included and referenced in all the other Rules of Procedure where contempt is provided for for other failure to follow other types of orders in justice court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I have a problem with a contempt for that. I mean, if I'm a landlord and I have a building and I don't want to repair it, why should there be a court that can make me repair my property or put me in jail if I don't?

1 MR. GILSTRAP: Because you leased it to a 2 tenant. 3 MR. HAMILTON: Well, then they can cancel the lease or give him his money back or --5 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: We already crossed that bridge. The Legislature said you could order 7 The only question is whether you can enforce your order by contempt. 8 MR. HAMILTON: That's what I'm saying. 9 can enforce it by other ways, cancel the contract or something else. I just have a problem with somebody being 11 12 put in jail because they don't want to make a repair to their property. 13 14 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, then you wouldn't support the law that allows the court to order 15 them to repair it. I just -- it makes no sense to me to 16 stay a court can order something but cannot then compel 17 18 that to happen. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine. 19 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Judge Lawrence, would 20 21 contempt be off the table, assuming it is otherwise available, once the landlord appeals de novo? Am I 23 reading that statute --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It would be off the 24 25 l table in JP court.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: JP court. 1 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Right. 3 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So if a landlord appeals de novo to the county court, the statute says it 4 automatically stays the effect of the judgment. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, so long as he 6 7 timely appeals. 8 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Right. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But if he doesn't 9 timely appeal then he would be out of luck. 10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So the question is 11 whether the justice court would have contempt power once 12 there's a final judgment that's not appealable. 13 Well, or contempt 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: power period would be a question that some on the task 15 force would raise, because we've got some things built 16 into appeals to extend the time limits in some 17 circumstances, but, yeah, there would be a point at which 18 the remedy to appeal was exhausted, and it might be that 19 the completion date of the repair is after that time to 20 appeal and then the issue would be do you hold them in 21 contempt or not, and the landlord wouldn't be able to 22 appeal possibly at that point if the date of completion 23 was far enough out. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You could appeal the 25

1 contempt. 2 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Habeas. 3 MR. WATSON: You can always appeal a contempt order. 4 5 That's what I'm saying. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 6 Skip. 7 MR. WATSON: Tom, other than you, is there a problem with the justice courts not knowing that they can enforce the judgments or not knowing how? What happens when somebody comes in and says, "Here's your order, they haven't done it, I need you to do something"? 11 Most of contempt in 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: JP court relates to truancy cases. That's where contempt 13 is used more than anything else, is in the enforcement of 14 truancy cases on parents, and it's done frequently. 15 also use contempt on writs of repair -- or writs of re-entry rather. We're probably going to be using it on 17 writs of restoration of utility services coming up in 18 19 about five more weeks, but that's mostly --MR. WATSON: But the question is do they 20 know how to do it or not? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. Yeah, we 22 There are forms in the 23 have -- there is training on that. JP desk book. If you talk to the general counsel of the 241JP -- of the training center, they'll tell you that they 25

get calls all the time from judges asking about that, but so, I mean, it is generally known how to do that. The education is there. They're exposed to it. Now, you know, whether every individual JP does it right every time, I don't know.

MR. WATSON: Well, that's not the question, is if they know that they have the duty to enforce their judgments and they know how to do it, I'm not sure why we're putting it in a rule to say in this particular instance you should do it.

opinion, there's going to be controversy about this, because the other statutes that are similar to this, the writ of re-entry and the writ of restoration of utility services, that provide -- that are similar to the order to repair specifically provide for contempt, and this does not. It's not in the bill, and it's not in the statute. I'm concerned that JPs are going to look at that and say, "Well, we don't think the Legislature intended to give us contempt powers for this because it's not here."

Now, if you think that that's not a problem then I guess you can just not address it, but I believe it's going to be a problem, if there's not something in the rule one way or the other.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Fair enough. Richard

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Orsinger.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Judge Lawrence, is there a
   general statute about what the contempt powers of the
3
   justice courts are?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. Well, 21.001
6
   and 21.002.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, the district courts,
   for example, there's a statute that limits you to a
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   500-dollar fine and six months in jail maximum per
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  violation.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Isn't that 21.002?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Does that apply to justice
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   courts as well?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. It's three
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   days in jail and a hundred dollars.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: That's in another statute?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, it's the same
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   statute, except that the writ of re-entry does not have
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   any limitations. It's contempt, jail until you fix it.
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   So there are some other contempt provisions other than
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   21.002 that the Legislature have provided for that are
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   different than 001 and 002.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Is there a time limitation or
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   a fine limit in those other statutes?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          No.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So, and another
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  question --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There's no fine.
  You just go to jail till you do it.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay, so it's coercive.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: And for -- first of all, has
  anybody ever been held in contempt for something? In the
  whole history of the state of Texas has a justice court
  put somebody in jail for something?
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                 (Judge Lawrence raises hand)
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Now, do they
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   generally --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let the record reflect
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15 | Judge Lawrence has raised his hand.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Do they generally get out of
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   jail by appealing, or do they get out of jail by doing a
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   habeas corpus, or do they get out of jail by complying
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   with the order?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Complying with the
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   order.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay, thanks.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Get of out of jail, but
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   it's not free. Justice Gray.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm assuming that we're
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going to come back to (a) and (b) because I've got some problems in understanding how we're going to serve this order and who we're going to serve it on.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Justice Gray, I was going to suggest in a minute that we take a vote, since we haven't voted all morning on anything, on contempt or not --

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- contempt.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: With regard to the contempt, we've mentioned -- and Judge Yelenosky mentioned it I think first -- the concept of coercive contempt versus punitive contempt, and what is in this statute is punitive contempt powers; whereas, what Judge Lawrence has referred to in the other statutes, as best I understand, is in the nature of coercive contempt. The distinction being without regard to whether or not the contempt is ongoing under subsection (c)(4) as proposed, the justice would still be able to impose it; whereas, the coercive contempt is to put the person in jail or make the person pay money until they purge themselves of the contempt.

To remedy the failure of the landlord to comply with the order, which seems to be the objective here, coercive contempt is much more effective than a 25 hundred dollars fine or three days in jail, because you can stay there essentially indefinitely under coercive contempt, or the fine is so much per day until they purge themselves of the contempt. So this would seem to me to, one, be different than the statutes — the right of re-entry and the other one that Justice Lawrence had referred to, and I would tend more towards the use of coercive contempt and making it clear that they can use that in this rule like the other statutes rather than what is punitive contempt.

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Because I got into this issue with regard to the chief's counsel on court reporters not giving us records timely and what we could do, and I know that at some point you trigger the whole range of due process rights of right to counsel and stuff if you are going to potentially incarcerate in a punitive fashion the court reporter for failure to deliver the record. In this instance are we going to trigger that range of due process protections by the possibility that the landlord could go to jail for three days and lose his liberties as opposed to coercive contempt where that's not necessarily a problem.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is your reading of 21.002(c) that it is criminal or coercive or both?

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: You have to read (e) as well.

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Can I get back to you 1 on that? I'll take it under advisement. 2 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Justice Gaultney, and then Richard Orsinger. HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: I think it's 5 6 criminal. It appears to track the 21.002 criminal provision, and it -- one argument could be made that since 7 it only provides for criminal that the statute doesn't --8 or rule doesn't intend coercive. I think -- I think 10 the -- I think there is a question about whether under some circumstances you could be imprisoned for a debt, but 11 that it would seem to me to be a separate issue, and I 12 l think it might be better off just leaving the Government 13 Code like it is. In other words, if the justice court has 14 the authority under the Government Code to either 15 16 coercively imprison or under appropriate circumstances criminally sanction, the Government Code is already in 17 18 place, already gives that authority. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is your read that 21.002(c) is the extent of a JP's ability to find somebody 20 in contempt criminally, but that (e) gives them broader 21 22 rights for coercive contempt? HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: I think that's 23 24 correct. That's the -- (e) says that despite anything 25 else you can still use civil contempt.

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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So under this
  reading, if a judge wanted to -- if a JP wanted to assess
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   a criminal contempt, it would be limited to no more than
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   three days in jail and a hundred bucks, but if he says
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   "fix that" -- "fix that leaky toilet" and the landlord
   says, "I ain't going to do it" then under (h)'-- (h) --
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                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY:
                                           (e).
                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: (e). (e).
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: (e).
1.0
                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: 21.002(e), until
   such time as you can fix it or there's a limitation,
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   actually, of no --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, (h) limits (e).
                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Right.
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                                                       It's a
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   limit on coercive.
                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: Right.
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   months.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So that would be -- it
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  would be (h)(2) is what I was looking for. So that would
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20 be coercive contempt of 18 months.
                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: I mean, that's
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   the way I read the Government Code 21.002 as far as the
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   current power is concerned. I think if you write in just
   criminal contempt then one argument could be made that
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   that's the exclusive -- that's the exclusive contempt
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power. 2 Now, I think there is a question -- one of 3 the comments earlier is they question whether you should be allowed to throw someone in jail on this type of order. 4 Well, I think that starts to talk about imprisonment for 5 debt, which, you know, you may have some constitutional 6 restrictions on. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: I'm not sure we 9 10 can answer that. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Here we can't. Judge Lawrence, just so I can get straight in my mind, is 12 your reading of 21.002 the same as Justice Gaultney's, 13 that for -- that (c) limits your power of criminal contempt to three days or a hundred bucks, and/or a 15 hundred bucks, but that under (e) you can toss somebody in 16 17 jail for up to 18 months for failure to obey an order? 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, that's not the 19 way that JPs typically understand contempt. We understand 20 contempt to be a maximum of three days or a hundred 21 dollars. Except for those other specific statutes. That's the way we interpret it. 22 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: If that's true 23 24 then a district court is limited by subsection (b), which

states our criminal contempt limits, and we know that's

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I mean, 21.002, other than the Constitution, is not true. the same place the district court gets its coercive civil contempt powers, and they are absolutely parallel on coercive contempt between the JP court and the district It's only with respect to punitive contempt that they differ, and so the only question seems to me to be what we say in this rule, and the argument for saying it in this rule is the same argument you gave me earlier when I asked why do we have to say in a rule that when a party doesn't show up and they have the burden you can dismiss the case, and your answer was -- and I think your answer is here because JPs need a road map, and some of them aren't lawyers. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger and

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15 then Orsinger. Richard the First and Richard the Second.

MR. MUNZINGER: If I understood the judge correctly, the same Legislature that enacted this statute regarding safety and health repairs enacted a statute relating to the provision of utilities, and that statute regarding the provision of utilities specifically includes the power of contempt.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And also the writ of re-entry, the same thing, yes.

MR. MUNZINGER: So here we have the same 25 Legislature adopting two statutes giving JPs the power of

contempt, but in a third statute not giving JPs the power of contempt, and God forbid that the Legislature not do 3 something unintentional. That's contrary -- that's contrary to all of our law, so now we're sitting here and 5 we're asking ourselves the legal question did the Legislature intend to give JPs the power of contempt to enforce their statute. I don't know. I don't think anybody knows until that is litigated, and the interpretation of the rule by the committee, if adopted by the Court, arguably becomes an advisory opinion of the 10 Court because the Court didn't have a dispute of parties 11 in front of it when it did so. Now, they may have that 12 power to do so under the rules. I've never briefed the 13 issue, but it's not quite so simple if two statutes in the 14 15 same Legislature give a power, a third statute doesn't, what's the legal effect of that. 16

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, and there's a third issue, too, and that is that this rule is drafted -- apparently the task force believed that the JPs were restricted to only contempt under subsection (c), which is at odds with what Justice Gaultney thinks or Judge Yelenosky.

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MR. MUNZINGER: And I think Judge Yelenosky is correct. I mean, how could you take such a position when the statute doesn't distinguish between subsection

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   (c) and (e) and (h)?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, it's a mess.
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   Orsinger.
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                 Well --
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                                   Now it will get clear.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. You know, I think that
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   if there is inherent authority for a justice court to put
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   somebody in jail for -- on a coercive basis, it would have
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   to be under 21.001(a), which talks about all courts having
   the power to enforce their lawful orders, but -- and I
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   haven't done a recent study of this, but in the world that
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   I travel in, almost every time that somebody is held in
   contempt for an action outside the courtroom that's not
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   disruption of the proceedings or disrespectful directly to
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   the court, it's based on a rule or a statute.
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   know that that's always true, but that's certainly been
   the history in family law litigation, which is where 99
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   percent of contempts go on, and I'm a little troubled that
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   there's not a statute that explicitly gives justice courts
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   the power of coercive contempt.
                  And you look down here at (e), and it says,
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    "This section does not affect the court's power to confine
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   to obey a court order," but then it doesn't grant that
   power either. It just means that this statutory
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   provision, .002, doesn't impair it. So I'm still looking
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around for where the grant of authority is. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How about 21.002(a)? 2 3 MR. ORSINGER: Well, punish for contempt. You see, a direct contempt is a contempt that occurs in 5 the court's presence, which I think is part of the inherent power. An indirect contempt that occurs outside 6 the courtroom that the judge is not judicially a witness 7 of, I'm not sure whether this contempt is talking about 8 the inherent power to enforce the court proceedings or whether you're talking about an allegation that some 10 statute or rule was violated outside of court. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy's got the answer. 12 13 MR. LOW: Judge -- no, I don't have the I have more questions. Did the committee 14 consider contempt -- you say okay, "I'm ordering you to 15 repair. If you don't repair within two days or so, you're 16 in contempt, and for contempt your rent is going to be 17 reduced to \$2 a month." 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, that's not --19 you can't do that under the statute. The reduction of 20 rent is separate from the order to repair. You can do 2.1 either or both, but you have to have a separate order to 22 repair and a separate order reducing rent, if that's what 23 you're asking. 24 25 MR. LOW: Okay. Well, that's what I'm

asking.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray. Then

Frank.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: With regard to the advisory opinion or the taking the issue under advice while ago, I now agree with Justice Gaultney on the interpretation of the 21.002, but I disagree with Justice Gaultney on whether or not we should or should not include something in the rule regarding it, and this is in answer to Richard the First's comment. In the Legislature what's different about this statute is the Legislature assigned the Supreme Court the responsibility to make the rules. In the other two statutes where they included contempt powers they did not assign that responsibility, and that's what makes this one different than those and why we should include it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Frank and then Judge Yelenosky and then Richard the First.

MR. GILSTRAP: When I read, you know, section 21.001 and 002, if that's correct, if that's the right numbers, you know, I come away from that and say JP has the inherent power and then -- but then when I read the statutes involving the justice court, it bothers me a little bit that the Legislature expressly gave them powers in certain situations, but then when I go on and read the

Rules of Civil Procedure and find they're just laced with provisions that the Court has imposed allowing other courts to hold people in contempt, I mean, I just don't think there is any kind of inference we can draw from the structure.

I think what happened was that a lot of these contempt provisions were in the old statutes and were just passed piecemeal and then put in the rules, and I wind up being real comfortable that we can put a provision in the rule allowing the JP courts to enforce it by contempt, and we probably need to because of what Judge Yelenosky said. It's a joke, if you don't have that.

agree with that. I mean, it just seems odd to me that we would be debating whether a court could enforce the order that the statute says it can issue. If all a JP court can do is say, "Fix the toilet or I'm going to start reducing the rent," then the statute would say you can order them to fix the toilet, and if he doesn't do so, reduce the rent. What the statute says is the JP court may issue an order to repair. It doesn't say you can fine him. It isn't an order to repair unless it can be enforced, and all this concern about, well, we don't want to be putting people in jail, that's always a concern with contempt, and you can say on one extreme you're ordering somebody to

jail because they don't have the money to fix a roof that's going to cost them a hundred thousand dollars. 3 There's a defense to contempt based on inability. We hear that all the time in child support. Defense may be 5 appropriate, but if you're saying they don't have the authority to enforce by contempt, including coercive 6 7 contempt and putting in jail, you're also saying when they tell them to fix the blockage in the sewer and the 8 landlord says "no," all you can do is reduce the rent. 10 You can't put that person in jail for simply being obstinate, and to me that just is not consistent with the 11 12 statutory authority to make the order. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger and 13 then Gene and then Roger. 14 MR. MUNZINGER: Here is a hypothetical, 15 which I think comes within the intent of the Legislature. A tenant has a condition that threatens health or safety, 17 goes to the justice court, and the justice court says, 18 "Fix it." During the period of time that the health and 19 20 safety has existed the tenant has the right, if the judge says so, to pay reduced rent and that power to pay -- or 21 right to pay reduced rent exists until the condition is 22 resolved, and the judge may include that in his judgment. So far am I correct? 24 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, sir.

1 MR. MUNZINGER: He may also issue these 2 penalties and what have you. Now, then there's an order 3 that says, "Fix this on or before June the 10th because that's when I've calculated your rent reduction." So far am I still correct? 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the order to 6 repair would have a completion date. The order to reduce 7 rent is contingent upon the condition being repaired. 8 MR. MUNZINGER: On the condition. If I 9 10 don't do -- meet that completion date as a landlord and my tenant remains in the same property, my tenant has a new 11 121cause of action on the day after the completion date. Now, I'm a landlord, and I'm Carl Hamilton's friend, and I 13 think to myself, "My God, I'm going to spend \$10,000 on a 14 roof for a piece of property that makes me when I net, 15 net, net everything out \$200 a month. The heck with this. 16 Move out and go to a different place. I'm going to shut 17 18 the dadgum thing down." 19 Here we are, we're giving a court the power 20 to make a fellow do something to his property, and in all this circumstance the Legislature enacted two statutes 21 22 specifying the power of contempt, but didn't in this one. 23 I've got a problem with it. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Gene and then --MR. STORIE: I think I have a similar 25

problem because both the statute and the proposed judgment that Judge Lawrence gave us talk about "reasonable action to repair or remedy the condition," and when we're holding people in contempt we're supposed to tell them, I think, 4 5 exactly what they've got to do to comply with the order. If you're going to turn on the electricity, by golly, turn 6 on the electricity, and we know what that means, but if you get into a structural problem and you think it's going to cost a certain amount or take a certain amount of time, and your repair guy says, "Oh, no, baby, this is way worse 10 11 than you thought," what are you going to do then? I mean, 12 and alternatively how can you set somebody up for 13 contempt --HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But that's 14 15 always an issue of contempt, whether the order was 16

always an issue of contempt, whether the order was specific enough to be enforced by contempt. That is not an argument against the authority to enforce by contempt. It's an argument that the order needs to be specific and may not be enforceable.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger, and then Justice Hecht.

MR. STORIE: If I may, just for a second, I mean, I think the question is does the statute give you that kind of authority to make that kind of order, because it doesn't say fix the toilet presumably. It says, you

know, look at the toilet and see if you can fix it for 2 under \$10,000 or for some reasonable amount. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger. MR. HUGHES: Well, I hate to say it, I 4 flipped ahead, and I looked at the appeal section, and if 5 I read the appeal section right, in order to appeal you don't put up a bond at all under this section. You just file the notice of appeal, and the notice of appeal is a 8 stay of any repair order, and I guess I'm kind of 10 wondering when are we going to have a landlord who is so upset with the order to fix the toilet or rebuild the roof 11 12 that he will rather go to jail than plop down a piece of paper and stay the order to repair? 13 14 I mean, I tend to agree on the question of whether there is any specific contempt authority under the 15 new statute at all, so I tend to lean in that way, but I 16 17 quess the next thing of it is if we're going to say that all you have to do is flop down a notice of appeal, you 18 19 get de novo review in the county court at law and all of the repair orders are stayed. I'm wondering when contempt 20 21 is going to come up. Well, it won't come 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: up in the justice court if you appeal. It's going to be 23 up to the county court then to enforce it. 24 25 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It's going to come up

when the landlord misses his notice of appeal deadline. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that's when it's 2 3 going to come up. Justice Hecht. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I had that 4 5 question, and also, just to get a read from the task force, how likely is it to come up when the other penalty 6 is you don't get any money until you make the repair? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's the 8 alternative in this, is that you can just not issue an order to repair and reduce the rent down so much that it becomes painful, and the landlord either fixes it or the 11 12 tenant is living there virtually rent free. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And is there an 13 idea that that's not a strong enough incentive to obtain 14 the just result and, therefore, you need contempt? 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think it is 16 a strong incentive. Now, whether or not that's -- we 17 didn't look at it as an either/or because we were charged 18 with trying to write the rules for all of it --19 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: No, I'm just trying 20 21 to get a feel for the practicality of it. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But I think I 22 commented one time in the task force meeting that if you don't hold somebody in contempt, if that's not an option, 24 25 then the real option here is reducing the rent, and the

rent is reduced down to whatever level it's going to be reduced consistent with the condition, and at some point the landlord is going to fix it or let the lease run out and terminate the lease and move the tenant out when he 5 can do so under the law or under his agreement, and the tenant decides that, well, we'll suffer this condition for 6 a reduction in the rent of X number of dollars until our lease runs out, and the tenant may be happy with that. 9 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Just I'm, again, 10 trying to look at the policy here. Wouldn't it be better from the tenant's perspective to have a reduction in rent 11 rather than having the recalcitrant landlord in jail? And 12 the sheriff generally do not like these kinds of people in 13 his jail, because he likes to save room for rapists and murderers, but would there -- is it your experience from 15 truancy and other situations that this would be likely to 16 happen or not so likely, or what's your anticipation? 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think you 18 19 always have the possibility of getting a hard-headed landlord that just refuses to do it and says, "Hold me in 20 contempt." It's easier from the tenant to have a 21 reduction in rent. If it's an order to repair and the landlord doesn't do it, the tenant has got to file another 23 motion with the court, get a hearing, and prove the 24 25 landlord didn't fix it right or fix it at all. On an

order to reduce rent the burden is on the landlord to come into court and to prove to the court it's been fixed so the rent can go back up.

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MR. DOGGETT: Your Honor, just to respond to that from the tenant perspective, keep in mind that some landlords feel like, hey, yeah, let them live there for free without the blank, without the toilet working, without the -- so judges very well may just say, "Look, we can -- I've already done that. Now you're going to go to jail." I used to bring these cases on behalf of the city. The original version of the statute was a city could bring these cases against landlords, and it had injunction in there, but there was never any question that the district court was going to hold them in jail and warned them many times, you know, "Bring your toothbrush to the next hearing," and I brought a lot of those cases, and not one ever actually did go to jail after many times of asking, but, you know, the judge looked over their glasses, looked over their glasses, "Bring your toothbrush." No one ever went to jail eventually.

But I will tell you judges in my experience did like having that tool available to get their attention, because sometimes landlords don't have any problem. They paid for the property. Losing their rent is not a big deal. You'll be gone soon anyway.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.

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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I was going to echo on that. We've all seen -- this is just anecdotal evidence, I'll have to admit. We've all seen the stories on the news about the landlords who just won't fix things, and if you don't have the ability to put them in jail because they just won't fix things then the tenants are living in a horrible condition, and, remember, we're talking about health and safety issues here. We're not talking about not health and safety issues. know, and we're all well enough off that if we're in an apartment complex and the air-conditioning isn't working, we leave. Okay. We break the lease. We pack up and move someplace else. Well, a lot of these people, they don't have the money for a new security deposit. It's been put with this one landlord. Yeah, they can move out, maybe, if they have the money to move. That costs money. don't have cars, you know, to pack up their stuff, move someplace else, presuming they can find someplace else that's, you know two, three hundred, you know, 500 a month, whatever it is, the minimal amount of rent that they're paying.

This is a health and safety issue. I mean, JPs did not have the power -- it's my understanding you don't have injunctive power, so they were never used to

thinking to themselves "I have the power to hold somebody" -- you know, to put them in jail until -- in coercive contempt until they comply with my order. Well, now the 3 Legislature has given them essentially injunctive power, 4 ordering the landlord to make these repairs. We have to 5 give them the ability to put the landlord in jail, and if the landlord doesn't like it, appeal to county court where 7 8 the county court has that ability. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard Munzinger, 9 10 and then Judge Lawrence. MR. MUNZINGER: That's a policy argument, 11 12 and it's the correct argument if the decision is a policy 13 decision. The problem is courts are creatures of the Constitution and to an extent the Legislature. Why didn't 14 15 the Legislature give the power of contempt in this statute when in two other statutes it did so? There must be a 16 They're not stupid. Judicially speaking. 17 reason. MR. DOGGETT: Richard, you're kind of 18 misstating the facts, is the problem. That's not exactly 19 correct. What you're saying is not actually true. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What's wrong with what he 21 22 said? The Legislature didn't look at 23 MR. DOGGETT: this statute and then give it to them in two others. 24 That's just -- what happened was, as Frank was talking 25

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about earlier, you're trying to make this argument that it's not over here, so therefore, this -- they didn't intend for it to be over here. That's a clever, good lawyer argument. What happened was the writ of re-entry has been in place for a very, very long time. I think it predated the Property Code. I'm not sure which version, but the writ of re-entry has been there a long, long time, and it was a free-standing passage of that right. other words, when you've been locked out, a JP was given the authority to order somebody to get them back in, and the Legislature put something in there special. It was a 12 free-standing statute.

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Now, the right to repair, it's a much larger It's subchapter (b) of the Property Code. There's lots and lots of sections in there, and there was one section in there that says a justice of the peace doesn't have the ability to order repair. So that particular provision was struck, so to suggest that sort of the Legislature some many years ago had this writ of re-entry, it's been there for a very long time, and then here just last session decided, hey, let's get rid of that line, those don't mix. It wasn't a comparison made. These were free-standing things. In other words, the bill you see before you is a removing of language. It's not a new act that the -- giving the JPs this new power.

a deletion of a line that's been there for a long, long 2 time. 3 MR. MUNZINGER: But it was an expression of legislative intent on the question under discussion, the 4 5 power of a justice of the peace. MR. DOGGETT: That clearly was not before 6 7 the Legislature. The power of contempt was never discussed. MR. MUNZINGER: So it was not in this last 9 101 Legislature? MR. DOGGETT: Absolutely never discussed, 11 and, frankly, as we all know, legislative intent is pretty 12 hard to get your hand around. I will tell you that --13 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Some would say. If there's ever any 15 MR. DOGGETT: legislative intent, I will tell you all the testimony was concerned about giving justices of the peace the power to 17 hold someone or the power -- injunctive power. 18 testimony was whether or not we should give the justice of 19 the peace this new power, and the Legislature said, yes, 20 ultimately yes. So if there was ever any discussion, if 21 you listen to any of the tapes, or watch them, actually, you can see them online, the only discussion that was ever 24 made about this law that passed was "We're concerned about giving justice of the peace this new authority," and the 25

answer to that question was "Let's do it." I mean, bottom line that's the intent. If you're going to take off anything else, that's the only intent that's out there, that they wanted to give them the new power.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Robert, what I think is animating Richard's comments, and I'm sure they're shared with others, is that we have as a committee -- and I know the Court as well has tried to be very careful about not intruding on the Legislature's role, and if there is a policy matter that is within the ambit of the Legislature, we try very carefully not to cross the line and by rule, you know, make a policy. So I think that's what is animating the concern, but I wonder, Richard Munzinger, about the comment that was made earlier, which was here the Legislature did expressly delegate to the Court the -not only the power, but the request to make rules by a very -- by a very tight deadline, and even if your argument has validity, maybe that would be some expression of the Legislature that the Court within some parameters has some leeway to deal with that issue. I don't know.

MR. MUNZINGER: My only response would be that the Legislature said here is a discrete subject, make rules concerning the discrete subject. The discrete subject does not include the power of contempt. The committee's proposal does include the power of contempt.

1 That's my point. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 3 MR. HAMILTON: I think there's a big difference in re-entry and turning on electricity. I assume that those orders don't go out until the bill has 5 been paid or the tenant's paid the rent and the landlord's 6 got to let him back in. So it doesn't cost the landlord anything to turn on the power or unlock the door, but in this case we're ordering the landlord to dig into his pocket and come up with \$10,000 or whatever to fix the 10 roof, which he may or may not even have. So, you know, to 11 argue that they can defend that on a contempt charge, I 12 mean, why put the landlord through all of that grief of 13 being charged with contempt and having to hire a lawyer and all of that. I just think it's improper to -- it's 15 kind of like a debt. It's kind of like putting somebody 16 17 in jail because they can't pay their debt. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Debtors prison, it's been 19 Judge Christopher. done. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: The current 20 21 statute --22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not in this country. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: -- allows for 23 24 this lawsuit in county and district court. disputes that county and district court would have 25

coercive injunctive power. The Legislature says now you 1 2 can bring this case in JP court. Why is it different? 3 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: And you can bring it up to this limit. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont. 6 MR. JEFFERSON: The original bill, if I'm reading this right on page seven, where the original bill 7 did have a -- an option for injunction included the sentence, "The justice court may only require the owner to repair or remedy the condition." I'm not sure if that --I mean, it seems like there was at least some discussion 11 12 about the limits of the ability of the court to command a 13 response from the landlord. So, I mean, I don't know where -- I'm not sure where to go with that. 14 It's not in 15 the bill that was passed, which suggests to me that maybe the court has more power than only requiring the owner to 17 repair or remedy the condition. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I feel like voting. 18 19 So everybody that is in favor of Option No. 1, which includes language regarding contempt, raise your hand. 20 21 All those opposed, raise your hand. Option No. 1 passes by a vote of 16 to 12, the Chair not 23 voting, and let's have lunch. MR. MUNZINGER: Chip, before you close, take 24

a look at that title, "Landlord's order." It's really a

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court order, order requiring landlord to repair. 2 title ought to be better. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I agree with that. 4 We haven't voted on the whole rule. We're going to go 5 over the language after lunch. 6 (Recess from 12:42 p.m. to 1:37 p.m.) 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So, Judge, I think the -we have voted in favor of option one that has the contempt feature in it, and now we'll take comments on .10, option one, from the crowd. And, by the way, everybody has 10 commented to me over the break how well you're taking the 11 abuse that is being heaped upon you by our members. So 12 comments on .10, option one. 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right, (a), 14 we're on page 23, form and content of the order. 15 order must be directed to the landlord and state the names of the parties to the proceeding, address of the leased 17 premises where the conditions are to be repaired or 18 remedied, in reasonable detail the actions the landlord 19 must take to repair or remedy the conditions, and the date 20 by which the landlord must repair or remedy the 21 conditions." 22 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any comments? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (b). 24 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You want to go through

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them all and then --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Whatever you want
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  to do.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It's kind of a gnat,
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  but in (a)(2) why would you say "leased premises," because
  a lot of folks think of it as rented premises. Can we
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  just say "premises"?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We're using the
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   language that they use in the Property Code. We're trying
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   to make all the terminology consistent with the Property
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   Code.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It just makes it
  easier for everybody to understand, we think.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments
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   on (a)? Yeah, Harvey.
                 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Should it state the
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   dollar amount that has to be spent on repairs or "not to
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   exceed" or --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's in
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   the -- that's in the judgment. Well, let me see where --
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   well, you're going to -- you're going to state that it's
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   not going to go over $10,000. Let's see, I can't remember
   if we put that in Rule 8.
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                 MS. WILSON:
                             Yes.
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1 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Is this going to be a separate order or part of the judgment? 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It could be either way. I mean, it could be done either way. There was --4 you know, we didn't talk about that on the task force as 6 to whether or not a court is going to have a separate order in addition to the judgment or just put all of it in 7 the judgment. What I have drafted sort of puts all of it 8 in the judgment, but it could be done differently. 9 10 Harvey, to answer your question, we could 11 put that in there. 12 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I mean, it just seems that there might be some judges who aren't 13 experienced, since this is fairly new, and that might be 14 kind of helpful. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. And don't you 16 think, Judge, going back to the comment that was made 17 before lunch that we ought to strike in the title 18 "Landlord's"? It should just be "order." It's not the 19 landlord's order. It's an order to the landlord, but it's 20 not his order. 21 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, you mean the 23 title of .10. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, we can do

1 that. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just make it "order." 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. (b), 6 issuance, service, and return of order. "The justice shall prepare and issue the order. The order may be 7 served on the landlord in open court or by any means 8 provided under Rule 21a at an address listed in the petition, the addressed listed on any answer, or such 10 other address the landlord furnishes to the court in 11 writing. Unless the justice serves the landlord in open 12 court or by other means provided in Rule 21a, the person 13 serving the order on the landlord shall file a certificate 14 15 of service of the order." I anticipate that most of these the judge is 16 going to write out the order and hand it to the landlord 17 in open court, but you're also going to have defaults 18 where the landlord didn't appear, so you have to have some 191 mechanism to deliver it to the landlord then, so this is 20 what that's all about, how the landlord gets the actual 21 22 order. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: But if the landlord is 24 represented by an agent, it won't be adequate to serve the 25

order on the landlord's agent for service of process or representative if that representative is not the landlord. 2 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think maybe you could argue that under Rule 6 it would be. If the 4 5 agent is representing the landlord then I think you could give the order to the agent, who is essentially standing 6 in the shoes representing the landlord there, but that is 7 But I think that's what the task force 8 a question. intended, that under the representation rule that since the person is there representing the landlord, that that 10 would be sufficient to give the order to him or her. 11 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine. PROFESSOR CARLSON: What is meant in the 13 last sentence, "the person serving the order"? Who is 14 15 that? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it may be 16 that this might be given to a sheriff or constable 17 I would anticipate that often the clerk of 18 conceivably. the court is probably just going to mail it out, but it 19 could be done another way. We didn't want to preclude 20 other possibilities. 21 22 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Since you've got "landlord" defined in the Property Code and that's what 23 you've been dealing with, I would suggest that you expand 24 (b) to be the landlord or his agent, because under 92.002, 25

2 -- 01, too, it expressly excludes the agent of the landlord unless it's the manager, agent, purports to be the owner, lessor, or sublessor, and I'm just concerned that the handing of it to the property manager is not going to be deemed ultimately adequate if you have to serve the landlord, given that the landlord is the defined term.

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that a representative may represent the landlord or the tenant for that matter in court, and we allow evictions to occur where the tenant doesn't show up but a representative of the tenant shows up, and they're not even given an order in open court. It's just a judgment that they've -- where the eviction occurs later, so I think it's consistent with that.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm just pointing out a potential land mine.

to actually give it to the landlord then that's not going to occur on that day. That's something you're going to have to mail later under Rule 21a, and if the -- if you're trying to expedite the process, which is what the Legislature seems to infer by this, it would be faster. The landlord has authorized this person to represent them, I would think that would be suitable or adequate to --

1 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And don't get me wrong. 2 I'm not going to argue with you that that's suitable or 3 adequate. I would just expand the language of who the order can be served on so that it is clear --4 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, I see, okay. 6 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- that you are 7 including the landlord or his agent who appeared in court. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. That's fine. 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, you would just put in the second sentence, "The order may be served on the 10 landlord or his agent." 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 12 Yeah. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And then in the last 13 sentence "Unless the justice serves the landlord or his 14 15 agent in open court." HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. I agree. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher. 17 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I don't think 18 19 we should have a separate order from the judgment because 20 then that will confuse the appellate timetable and, you know, which order you're appealing. I just think that it 21 needs to be in the judgment, and so I just think we need to rewrite it, because you've got it here as part of the judgment, but then you have it as a separate order or it 24 could be a separate order. I don't see the advantage of 25

that separate order. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if you just changed 3 (a) to say "form and content of the judgment"? HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, we 4 5 already have -- .8 is already judgment. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, this section 6 doesn't deal with the entire judgment. It just deals with 7 8 the order to repair only. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, that's 10 right. 11 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: But, see, I don't think you should have -- I mean, why would we want a 12 separate order? I mean, we've got this expedited 13 procedure. Everything should be in one judgment that then 14 is appealable within a certain period of time. And so, 15 you know, to the extent you need to put this information about what needs to be in the order to repair then it 17 should be put into the judgment, in my opinion. And then 18 put No. 10, just "landlord's failure to comply with the 19 judgment that includes an order to repair" and then move 20 on from there. I mean, you have to serve a judgment on 21 22 them, too, don't you? 23 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we would -they would get the judgment in the same way they get any 24 25 judgment.

1 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: They would be 3 mailed a copy of it. 4 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Or if they're 5 in court, you hand it to them. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. 6 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Same thing. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Richard. 8 9 MR. MUNZINGER: The order to repair is part of the final judgment. It's not a preliminary or interim 11 order; is that correct? 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's part of the final judgment, that's correct, but you may not -- the 13 judgment may not -- you may not find that an order of 14 15 repair is granted. It may not be granted or pled for, so you could have a judgment without an order to repair, but if you have an order to repair, yes, that's part of the 17 final judgment disposing of all the issues. 18 19 MR. MUNZINGER: It would have to be part of 20 the final judgment. 21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (Nods head.) Now, 22 whether it's a separate form or included in the final judgment, the task force didn't have any position on that. 24 Whatever the Court or the committee prefers. I drafted the -- the draft judgment I drafted with it in there

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because it think it makes more sense to have everything in
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   one piece of paper personally, but we didn't contemplate
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  having the rule address that, but we can.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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                 MR. HAMILTON: I don't understand.
   you get an order to repair if that's not part of the
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   judgment?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I'm saying it
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  is part of the judgment, but you could have a judgment
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  without an order to repair.
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                 MR. HAMILTON: Then it isn't part of the
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   judgment.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Could you have an order
   to repair without a judgment?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: It may be a semantic
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             "Judgment requiring a repair." I think that's
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   part of the problem. The use of the word "order" as
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   distinct from the word "judgment," which includes an order
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   to repair, is what may be causing the problem under
   discussion here. People are reading the order -- I mean,
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   the rule as if there are two separate documents or two
   separate orders, when, in fact, a judgment requiring
   repair must be a final judgment, otherwise, I've got no
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   right to appeal. I can't appeal to the county court from
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an interim order, I quess, unless I do it by mandamus or contempt or something else, and I don't think that's what the Legislature envisions, and I don't think that's what 31 the group envisioned when they voted to say that we could 5 have justices of the peace hold people in contempt. It's a definitional problem. 6

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: So if you wanted to exercise as a JP jurisdiction over the repair, would you order the repair in so many days and maintain authority over the case?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Or is this set up that you order the repair and then you sign the final judgment, and you've got a short period of time in which the party will appeal? If they want.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, you're jumping ahead again, aren't you, because that gets to the question of how long the courts are going to have plenary jurisdiction over this order to reduce rent and order to repair, and we're proposing that we follow -- what was it, Elaine, TRAP rule -- you're the one that gave it to me. Help me remember. The TRAP rule that says that you have some continuing jurisdiction over certain issues after the plenary jurisdiction. So what we're going to propose is

that the JP court will retain plenary jurisdiction over the order to repair and the order reducing rent after the 2 normal plenary jurisdiction of the court would have expired, just in order to keep control over this, because otherwise you would have to do everything within the court's plenary jurisdiction or you lose it, and you can't 7 do anything about it, which, you know, doesn't seem to be the best way to handle this. We want to get this adjudicated and done, so but we're going to talk about that in a rule a little bit later. 10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So it could be a 11 judgment and then you have this enforcement ability down 13 the road over your --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, over the order 14 15 to repair and the order reducing rent. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger. 16 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, it seems to me what I 17 just heard is that a property owner can go -- can be 1.8 19 called into justice court. The justice of the peace hears of the problem affecting health and safety, tells the , 20 property owner, "Fix it." It's not a final judgment. The 21 property owner says, "That's unreasonable." 22 23 "Fix it." And I can't appeal because it's not a final judgment, so I can't appeal to the county The justice court has maintained jurisdiction of 25 court.

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this issue and can now tell me that I go to jail if I
  don't fix it while the case is pending before the justice
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  court.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. No, not at
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  all. There is an appeal.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And the appeal stays the
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   judgment.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: Pardon me?
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: There is an appeal for
  the landlord, and it stays the judgment.
                 MR. MUNZINGER: But that's not a judgment.
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    It's an interim order. There is no judgment.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard is saying it's
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   interlocutory.
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Sure. It's an interlocutory
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   order. I've got jurisdiction of the case. "Yes, Judge,
   and I want you to lower the rent, and I want you to enter
   the civil penalty, and I want you to do this, that, and so
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   forth." And the judge says, "Fine. We're going to sit
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   here until this is done. You've got six days to fix the
   roof."
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There is a final
   judgment, and there is a time to appeal, but it is
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  contemplated that the repairs may take longer.
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  repairs may take 30 days for whatever reason, or the -- or
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the order reducing rent may last for 30 days because the condition is not going to be repaired. The landlord is going to know what is ordered on the day of the trial. The judge is going to say, "Fix this, and the rent is reduced this much," and if you don't like it then you appeal on that day. If you don't appeal, then it's -- we presume the landlord says, "Okay, I think that's fair, I'm not going to appeal," and then the court is going to retain jurisdiction over the issue of repair and the reduction of the rent until that's disposed of.

MR. MUNZINGER: And the problem that I am bothered with is that the rule uses the word "order," not "final judgment," and Elaine just asked the question of whether the court would have continuing jurisdiction; and your answer is, yes, to enforce the judgment during its — the plenary power would be extended to enforce the judgment, but the rule contemplates the entry of an order, as distinct from a final judgment which orders repair, and the rules should not be that ambiguous if you're going to put people in jail for violating it.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the term "order" comes from the statute because the statute gives us the jurisdiction to order a repair, so that's why the term "order" is --

MR. MUNZINGER: And I agree with you. I

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looked at the statute, and the statute does, in fact, use
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   "order" and then two sections later uses the word
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   "judgment." And that's bothersome.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hugh Rice Kelly.
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                 MR. KELLY:
                             I think it's somewhat analogous
  to what you're talking about, but in administrative law
   cases, especially decades ago, one way to test an order
  was to refuse to comply, be found in contempt, and then
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   you would -- you would seek a writ of habeas corpus, and
   they appealed Railroad Commission cases that way. So the
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   JP ordered you to jail, you get a writ of habeas corpus,
   post a 200-dollar bond, and you're gone.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: And I understand that, but
   is that what the Legislature intended, and is that what
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   the rule that the Supreme Court of Texas wants to adopt in
   this circumstance?
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                             I'm just offering that as a
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                 MR. KELLY:
  piece of history, Richard, not suggesting it.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: No, I understand.
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   understand.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Yelenosky, then
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   Skip.
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                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, why
24 | shouldn't it -- Judge Lawrence, why shouldn't it just be
   judgment? A court always -- as we're discussing down here
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-- always has power to enforce the order beyond its
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   plenary jurisdiction, doesn't it? I mean, so you issue
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   the judgment --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I'm not sure
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   about that.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's like a
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   permanent injunction.
                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You have the
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   ability if they're no longer complying with the permanent
   injunction years after the case is over with to take that
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   matter up.
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                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: So you don't
  have to retain any jurisdiction explicitly over
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   enforcement. I mean, the way it would happen in district
   court is you'd do a temporary injunction, which of course
   you can appeal. There is an interlocutory appeal to that,
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   so we don't want to create something that would be
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   unappealable, and here it seems like it ought to be a
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   judgment. You don't lose the power to enforce it.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't think the
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   task force cares if we call it an order or a judgment.
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  tried to use terminology consistent with the underlying
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   statute, but the task force believes that there is a
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   potential jurisdiction problem with the court taking
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action after the plenary jurisdiction.

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, let's resolve that. I mean, is that a concern? What do people think?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it was to the task force, which is why we drafted the rules a little bit later to give us continuing jurisdiction over these two areas.

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, it's a concern, but if we can discuss it and people don't think that it's a realistic concern then there's no real reason not to make it a judgment, and it becomes appealable, and Richard Munzinger's concern goes away.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip.

MR. WATSON: I think we're assuming, and I think correctly so, that the Legislature is just loosely using terms, judgment, order. We get over to section 13, and it's the decision that's appealable. I think that rather than being bound to the statutory wording, we just need to start saying "judgment," and if we're talking about a particular order within the judgment, we say so. I would just suggest changing it to "the judgment containing the order."

D'Lois Jones, CSR (512) 751-2618

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gaultney.

HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: I was just going

to say the same comment, but I think Judge Christopher had 2 the solution, and that is to -- assuming it is the 3 judgment that's going to be entered, is simply if you've got the context problem in terms of the order, just move it to 737.8(a) where you refer to the order to repair and 5 just describe it at -- in the judgment rule what that 6 order should look like. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments about this? Okay. Why don't we get to subsection (c), 9 101 which is the fun part? 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 12 "Landlord's failure to comply with the order. If the 13 landlord fails to comply with the order, the failure is grounds for contempt of court against the landlord under 14 Section 21.002 of the Government Code. If the landlord 15 16 fails to comply with an order, the tenant may file in the justice court where the case is pending an affidavit 17 stating that the order has been disobeyed and describing 18 the acts or omissions constituting the disobeyance. On 19 receipt of the affidavit, the justice shall issue a show 20 21 cause order directing the landlord to appear on a designated date and time and show cause why the landlord 22 should not be adjudged in contempt of court. The order to show cause should be delivered to the sheriff or constable 24 in the county and must be personally served on the 25

landlord no later than three days prior to the hearing on order to show cause.

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"If the justice finds after considering the evidence at the hearing that the landlord violated an order, the justice may assess a fine of not more than a hundred dollars or confinement in the county jail for not more than three days or both such fine and confinement in If the landlord violates an order before receiving jail. the show cause order, but has complied with the order after receiving the show cause order, the justice may still find the landlord in contempt and assess punishment as provided for in this rule."

A lot of that comes from the writ of re-entry statute, which we've been working with for a 15 number of years.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Comments about this? Judge Yelenosky.

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah, it references the Government Code provision, but then it only incorporates the criminal punitive contempt and not the coercive contempt. So I would prefer we either just reference the Government Code and be silent, or if we're going to reference the punitive contempt, we also reference the coercive contempt.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think most

JPs feel that the JP has the power for three days and/or a hundred dollars and no more. 2 3 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But we 4 disagree. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, then I quess 6 that's up to the Court then, isn't it, to resolve that. 7 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah, but, I mean, I think the vote -- wasn't the vote on coercive contempt existing? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think the 10 vote was whether you can hold them in contempt or not. 11 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I don't think we voted on whether coercive versus criminal, but maybe 13

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Munzinger thinks differently.

MR. MUNZINGER: No, Judge Yelenosky is, in my opinion, correct in his interpretation of Section 21.002. The coercive powers afforded a justice of the peace in the ordinary reading of that statute are twofold, one, hundred-dollar fine, three days in jail; two, go to jail and don't pass go until you obey me. You've got both of them. If Judge Yelenosky's interpretation of the statute is correct, the Supreme Court is now amending — is denying that power to a justice of the peace by not referencing subsection (h) in its rule relating to this problem, and obviously the Court has the authority to do

that, I suppose, but do they want to.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why don't we -- as a possible alternative to this language, why wouldn't you just say that the justice may hold the landlord in contempt according to law or according to Section 21.002 without making a judgment about whether Judge Lawrence and all the other JPs are right or whether Yelenosky and Munzinger are right?

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Because they need guidance, I guess. Well, that's what we're told. I mean, I'm not being facetious.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I know.

MR. MUNZINGER: Chip, when you do come to a vote I do think we should vote on the question of whether or not the rules should use the word "judgment" and "order" to make it clear that the -- if that's what the committee wants, that the -- an order of contempt may only be included and enforced in a final judgment and not in a temporary judgment. I think that's a very important issue for the freedom of property owners, and then the second issue is what -- this issue we're discussing, whether subsection (h) is part of their -- of the justice's coercive powers, but I think there are two votes that are necessary.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: I think you mean

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subsection (e).
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: Sir?
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                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: I think you mean
   subsection (e).
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Subsection (e) as limited
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   by subsection (h).
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: Yeah, (e) refers to (h). I
 8
   apologize. It is (e) and (h).
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I agree. I
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   think we need to move 737.10(a), 737.8(a). Then we need
  to move issuance, service, and return --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hey, Judge Christopher, I
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14 don't think we got that last part. What are you proposing
15 again?
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Move 737.10(a)
17 to .8(a).
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Move
20 737.10(b), call it "Issuance, service, and return of
21
   judgment, " not "order, " and move it also under the
22
   judgment section of 737.8.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Turn 737.10
25 into just "contempt." Put subsection (c) as "Landlord's
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failure to comply with the judgment," and make that the
  beginning of the provision. Then the (d), modification,
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  needs to be combined somehow with 737.11. So it would be
   a motion to modify the judgment, which would include
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   either the reduction in rent or the repair order, and
   combine those two somehow.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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                 MR. DOGGETT:
                               Chip?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
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                 MR. DOGGETT: You've got to be careful.
                                                           The
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   reason why "order" was used and not just because of the
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   Property Code, but somebody doesn't comply with the
   judgment, the judgment may say, "You shall pay the tenant
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   $500." So I don't want a landlord to be guilty or
   possibly guilty of contempt for not paying some money.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      Why not?
                 MR. DOGGETT:
                               Well --
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                That portion
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   of the judgment requiring him to repair. I mean, I
19
   understand -- I agree with you, you can't hold him in
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21
   contempt for not paying.
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                 MR. DOGGETT: Because I'm not prepared as a
23 tenant advocate even to hold a landlord in contempt for
   not paying money.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We tried to keep 10
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and 11 separate because 10 we wanted to relate only to the
  order to repair and 11 only to the order to reduce rent.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yes, but you
   include in 11 more about order to repair and remedy.
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   So --
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, only to the
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7
   extent that it would govern when the order to reduce rent
  is terminated.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                              But, again,
   you have to modify the judgment. Everything needs to be
   in a judgment to begin with, and everything needs to be --
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   the judgment needs to be modified, I think. You know,
   miscellaneous orders floating out there is a problem.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, you don't
15 see it as a problem?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, she raised a
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   lot of different points there. I think that we need to
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   keep 10 only for the orders to repair and 11 only for the
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   orders to reduce rent. I don't think we should mix and
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  match those.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. But what about her
   other -- Judge Christopher's other organizational, like
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   (a) and (b)?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, moving (a) to
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   8, Rule 8 on judgment, is that what you said?
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1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think that 2 3 could work, I think. We just have to be careful that we restrict it only to the order to repair, but I think that could be done. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 6 Okay. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We can do that. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And what about the issue 8 of (c), subpart (4), where you have restricted it to that 9 one part of the statute and ignored the other part, (e) as 10 modified by (h)? 11 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I wish I could give you the cite for why I believe that, but that's 13 what is taught in the JP schools, I believe, and I believe 14 that there is some case law on that, but I'm not positive, 15 but that's always been the understanding of the limits of our contempt. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Jennings knows 18 19 the answer. 20 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: No, but I did want to point out under 92.0563, you know, they -- you 21 22 know, I quess everybody has recognized they do use the word "order" in regard to (a)(1) and (a)(2), and they do use the word "judgment" in regard to (3) and (4). 24 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah.

1 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Is it possible under the statutory scheme for an order to be entered and 3 for the landlord to comply with that order before you get to a point where you would want to enter a judgment for 4 5 the additional penalties? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that's what Richard 6 7 was asking a minute ago. HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Well, and it just 8 seems to me that you might want to give the landlord a 9 chance to comply with the order, minimize what they're 10 11 going to end up having to pay out in a judgment to minimize the tenant's damages, and I mean, there's got to be a reason why the Legislature used "order" in (1) and 13 14 (2) and "judgment" in (3) and (4). I don't think they 15 just mixed the terms up. 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well --HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Maybe they did, 17 but within the same subsection? 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It would be nice if 19 you could address the issue of the repair and have that 20 all finished before you render the rest of the judgment 21 because you don't know what the actual damages are going 22 to be, for example, if somebody has moved out, and they're still going to be out until it's fixed, but that's not 24 what the bill says. The bill says you try this 6 to 10 25

1 days. 2 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: The whole thing. 3 The whole thing? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It would have been 4 5 nice if we had that luxury, but that's not what the Legislature gave us, and we're trying to make these rules fit in what the statute and the bill says. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, isn't that an argument for Judge Christopher's proposal that you just have a judgment, you don't have an -- I mean, if it's 11 all a 6- to 10-day thing. I don't care if we 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: have everything in one judgment. I think that's fine. 13 That's the way I drafted the sample judgment I have. 14 That's the way I would personally want to do it, but the 15 task force didn't really address that, but I don't think there's any objection to that. 17 Elaine. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 19 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Once the final judgment 20 is signed, and assuming there is no timely appeal, you have enforcement powers, contempt and otherwise, right, 21 22 just by virtue of --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: For -- if everyone 23 buys this continuing jurisdiction concept then, yes, we 24 25 would have enforcement powers over the order to repair and

order to reduce rent. If you don't buy that then arguably we would lose jurisdiction at some point, and if the repair wasn't done then, you know, we're done with it. 3 4 don't know what happens. 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Well, wait a minute. 6 Let me --7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If I'm answering 8 your question. PROFESSOR CARLSON: Let me restate it 9 because it was not a very well-stated question. 10 a need to change the judgment after it's final because 12 with the expiration of plenary power you have the ability, the obligation to enforce the judgment if there's no 13 Judgment hasn't been stayed. Are you envisioning 14 appeal. 15 this continuing jurisdiction where you're changing the underlying judgment? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. 17 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Adding to it? 18 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, the only thing that would be changed would be the completion date and 20 maybe the scope of the order to repair and changing the 21 termination of the order reducing the rent. 22 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And that would have to 23 24 be done by a motion to modify within a very short period of time after the judgment is signed? 25 l

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the motion to modify the order to repair would have to be filed within five days --

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- after the judgment is signed. The order to reduce the rent, that would be taken up at such point as the condition was remedied or repaired.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Uh-huh.

know it seems illogical, but this 6 to 10 days is a real problem. That's why we're having to do this, to comply with that 6 to 10 days, and also, the issue of us losing jurisdiction over the case. I guess if we kept jurisdiction over everything until everything is finished and there would be no final judgment until the end, I guess that would solve it, but that didn't -- the task force didn't even really consider that, if I recall.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: If the idea is you have your final judgment, the judgment says, you know, "Repair the toilet by X date, and during that time period rent is reduced." Okay. So if the landlord finishes the repair earlier then he wants the rent bumped back up.

Well, I don't think we should have to have a motion to

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modify. I think we could include that kind of language in
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   the judgment. If the repair is finished earlier, the rent
   goes back up. You wouldn't have to modify it.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And how would one
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   determine that it was done early?
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, that's
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   -- you know, you always have your ancillary dispute about
   that if people disagree, but I don't think you would have
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   to go back in and actually move to modify the judgment. I
   think that's unnecessarily complicated. The more tricky
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   thing is you say, okay, repair by the end of the month,
   rent is reduced for that month, but it takes him two
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   months to do the repairs, and then what do you do at that
   point? And the question should be is it a new cause of
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   action for the reduction in rent for that month, or do you
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   somehow keep jurisdiction over the case during that extra
   month time period? If it's just a month, we're good.
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   Okay. Got 30 days, but -- right? You have 30 days for
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   your judgments?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          No. 10.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 10 days for
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   your judgment. Oh, okay.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those hungry
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   contractors out there are ready to work on 10 days notice.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's the problem.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: But you have
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  continuing jurisdiction over an order, so like if we're
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   correct, you do. If it's an injunction, if you're ordered
   to do something, normally my plenary power is 30 days, but
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   -- if no one has appealed, but I can still hold someone in
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   contempt if they haven't followed the order, what I have
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   told them to do in my judgment.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But you
   recognize --
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And I couldn't
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  modify the rent at that point.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But you recognize
   this is not an injunction. This is just a simple
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   judgment.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's the same
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   thing.
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                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: It's the same
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   thing.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: A quasi-injunction, I
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   think you said.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Jennings.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You order
23 somebody to do something that's an affirmative injunction.
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                 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS:
                                            I just had a
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   question. On the six days, are you getting that from the
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1 act, line (d)? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, whatever 1448 3 -- that's what it says. 4 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Well, it says, 5 "If a suit is filed in a justice court requesting relief under subsection (a), the justice court shall conduct a hearing on the request not earlier than the 6th day." Is that what you're talking about? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 9 Yes. HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: It doesn't say 10 11 you have to enter a judgment or anything like that. 12 just says you have to have a hearing, and it occurs to me 13 that, well, you can have a hearing and then the judge can enter an order for repair, but I don't see anything in 15 here that says, well, the court has to enter a judgment at that time. 16 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it was the 18 opinion of --19 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Then we have 20 this interlocutory order that you can't appeal that you ought to be able to appeal that is a problem. 21 22 MR. WATSON: Or he could take it under 23 advisement. 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It was the opinion of the task force that you need to try to dispose of this

within the 6 to 10 days, and that's what the rule -- what 2 it's based on, and that was a unanimous opinion of the tack force. Now, it's certainly possible to craft some type of rules that would allow us to not do anything finally until after it's repaired. 6 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Because, yeah, 7 I'm wondering if that's the legislative intent, because if you read the sentence it clearly says you have to conduct a hearing. Well, you could have your hearing, then the court could enter a repair order. There could be some time involved there to allow the landlord some time to 11 12 make the repairs and minimize their damages to the tenant, and then after the repairs are made you could have a 13 subsequent hearing, an evidentiary hearing on the damages, 14 and then enter a judgment. So I'm wondering if you could 15 16 read this and come to the conclusion that the Legislature meant this to be an order with its subsequent -- with its 17 separate remedy of contempt, and then after that's been 18 taken care of then go on and figure out the damages and 19 20 then enter a separate judgment. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sorry about that. May I respond? 22 MR. DOGGETT: 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, go ahead. 24 MR. DOGGETT: Remember, this is supposed to be essentially modeled originally on the eviction rules, a

little bit anyway. In other words the 6 to 10 days was no 2 accident. That's the current time line for getting into court if you want to evict somebody. The eviction process is supposed to be a short, quick way to get rid of a tenant that shouldn't be there. The rules there are 5 6 similar. Your tenant's not paying you, for example, so you're entitled to join a request for rent inside that eviction case and enter a judgment quickly. One hearing. Judge Lawrence has 2,500 of them. This is supposed to be 10 something simple and easy to do and not have multiple hearings requiring the parties and the judges and the 11 courts to have to continue to review something like this. 12 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: I could 13 14 understand it being simple, but I don't think it's analogous, because, well, what if you have pipes bursting 15 and it's going to take the landlord three weeks to, you 16 know, get somebody in there to fix it? 17 MR. DOGGETT: Well, and the idea is, though 18 19 -- it is somewhat analogous. How long is a tenant going to be there after the eviction occurs? The judge orders 20 21 them out, but they may appeal, who knows. 22 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: But there may be repairs that take three weeks or months to -- for the 23 landlord, and to penalize the landlord for something 24

beyond their control, I mean, I can see the analogy, yes,

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you want to move quickly, but maybe they recognized when they drafted this legislation that it's not quite the same situation and that maybe there's some flexibility here as far as you enter the order, give them a reasonable time to make the repairs, and then if they don't then hold them in contempt. Because it doesn't seem to be completely analogous.

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MR. DOGGETT: I would just say that we were confident that the justices of the peace are used to dealing with this scenario between these litigants and how much rent is owed, et cetera. The tenant may be there longer or shorter and may not owe the rent necessarily given future events. Similarly here, we don't know what the future will hold. The court is trying to figure out what has happened and enter a reasonable order to address the problem and give the parties an opportunity to come back to court if necessary to modify the order.

These are difficult problems, by the way.

This was discussed at length, but I want to try to at least defend what we discussed and how we came about sort of our decision on the matter, and that is that we have a procedure to allow an amendment in case of a problem, but if there is no problem then we reduce all the parties' time in court and the court's time as well. That's sort of how we -- we juggled the interests, you understand.

It's not a perfect solution, but it's how we got there. think that's fair to say, Judge.

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Exactly. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments Let me go back to (c)(4). It seems to me somebody has got to figure out whether or not the -- what apparently they're teaching the JPs and what the JPs believe, which is the extent of their contempt power is three days or a hundred dollars or both, contrary to what Judge Yelenosky and Justice Gaultney think is the reading of the statute, which, frankly, is how I read it, that you have more expansive authority. So somebody is going to have to look at that.

> That would be me. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That would be Justice So just like any first year associate at my firm, Hecht. look into that and get back to me. So Justice Hecht has got that one covered, and so let's talk about (d) real quickly, and then just so everybody knows, Judge Herman is here to talk about our agenda Item 4, and I don't want to keep him, and there's been some representatives of DPS here patiently waiting for longer than that, so when we finish this subsection (d) of .10 we'll take a little 24 break from this exercise and go to Judge Evans and the NICS disability de novo issue, so let's finish up this as 25

quickly as we can and then we'll go from there.

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. (d) is the modification of the order to repair or remedy. "Either party may move the justice to modify the order to repair or remedy by filing a written motion requesting a hearing with the court within five days from the date the justice signs the judgment. " It's anticipated that you're having this hearing on short notice. The landlord may come in. The landlord may not have had time to get a contractor in to really look at it to figure out what is going to be required. The order may be entered to repair something and the contractor gets out there and tells the landlord, "No, this is a big deal. This is going to take a lot more time" or "it's going to take a lot more money," so there needs to be some mechanism for the landlord to be able to come back into court to change the -- change the date of the completion or some other aspect of the order.

"If the justice does not grant the motion requesting hearing within 10 days from the date the justice signs the judgment then the motion is overruled by operation of law." And this is just the motion for a hearing or to modify the order to repair.

"If the justice grants the motion requesting a hearing, the justice must set the hearing no later than 10 days from the date the justice grants the request for a

hearing, unless the parties agree to an extension. If the justice does not grant a party's written motion for a hearing, that party may appeal the judgment within 15 days from the date the justice signs the judgment. A motion for hearing that was not in writing does not extend the time in which a party may appeal. A motion for a hearing under this rule that is not filed within five days from the date the justice signs the judgment is not timely filed and does not extend the time for a party to appeal. "The motion requesting hearing must show good cause for modification and why hearing is justified. The justice may modify the order to repair or remedy by changing the date by which the repairs or remediation must be completed, changing the actions the landlord must take to repair or remedy the condition at the leased premises, and changing any other conditions the court may find appropriate within the scope of the order. If an order is modified, corrected, or reformed in any respect, any party 18 19 may appeal within 10 days from the date the justice signs the amended order. The appeal must be filed in accordance with Rule 737.13." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any comments about 23 that? Yeah, Justice Gray. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm sure you know

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exactly why in each instance the word "judgment" or

"order" was used, but in going through that and listening to you read it and looking at the times that it uses the term "motion" or "order" -- I'm sorry, "judgment" or "order," that is very hard for me to get my mind around, and I can't imagine that pro se litigants are going to be able to draw that kind of distinction. That's why I go back to Justice Christopher or Judge Christopher's argument about getting these together. That's very difficult for me if they're not in the same document and with reference to the same at least piece of paper.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I've already discussed this with Judge Lawrence, but there's a problem with the timing Theoretically one could ask for a hearing and the judge grants it on the 9th day and sets the hearing for 10 days later, which would be 19 days out, which would be past the time for appeal, if he denies the motion. other -- so that has to be fixed, but the other question that I had was why would the judge deny a hearing on somebody's motion to modify?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, if he felt 22 there was no cause -- good cause shown for a hearing, if it was just a delaying tactic, if the issue might not have been with the order but was something else that was more properly appealable. Those are three examples that come

to mind. If they're asking you to do something that doesn't even apply to the order to repair.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And, Carl, on your first point, does (d)(6) fix that?

MR. HAMILTON: No.

right. He's pointing out -- and I don't know, I guess we overlooked this or something, but if someone files a motion to reconsider -- or, I'm sorry, to modify the order --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- and the court grants the motion for the hearing but ultimately decides not to modify the order, then the time to appeal would be passed. So we need to allow a time to appeal after that, so I think he's right, but we can fix that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Good. Any other comments? All right. Well, that will take us through 737.10, and let's take a little break from these rules now and go to the NICS, disability de novo rules, and Judge Evans has been working on this, and I think has been talking to Judge Herman and to DPS, and there is a fair amount of funding -- Federal funding at issue for our state regarding this rule. So, Judge Evans, tell us about it.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: All right. Judge Lawrence, thank you for wearing them down. Maybe I'll get a pass on this, I don't know. Judge Peeples has told me I shouldn't speak longer than five minutes and promised to put a red light out. Judge Peeples and Justice Gaultney and I were appointed to a subcommittee to work on this problem, and I'll just outline what I'm going to do. going to lay out the background as to how we got here and then point you toward the rule, but before I do I want to introduce Judge Guy Herman, our presiding judge in statutory probate courts; Mike Lesko with the DPS, and, Mike, why don't you tell them your position? I'm the Deputy Assistant MR. LESKO: Director for the Law Enforcement Support Services at DPS. I have all the crime records stuff, criminal history, AFIS, sex offender registration, UCR, interfaces with the Federal systems. HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: And he is accompanied by Louis Beaty, who is an attorney with the department. And this concerns the National Instant Criminal Background Check System known as the Brady Act and an amendment to that act in 2007 known as the Improvement Act of 2007, and the Improvement Act followed



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the Virginia Tech shootings and seeks to increase the

information available on background checks by allowing

people who are selling firearms to determine whether or not someone is prohibited from buying a firearm because of a prior mental health adjudication or commitment, and it's designed to keep the firearms out of the hands of those persons prohibited by state or Federal law from receiving or buying a firearm or having one transferred to them, and a person who is under one of these commitments is considered to be a person who has a firearm disability.

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Now, when they passed this law they required the states to come into conformity with it, and, of course, they tied -- they have a carrot to it, and a If you don't come into conformity with it you are stick. not eligible for grant money, and so it's very important to the department and to the state that we be eligible for that grant money, and it is significant money, and Mike is available to answer questions on that. So the Improvement Act required some changes by all states, and one of those -- and that was laid out in a memo that Carl Reynolds presented to us at the last meeting, and it's posted on the website as a 9-23 entry if you want to go back and look at that memo so you can understand how we arrived at this point.

House Bill 3822 was introduced during the last session. It became section 574.088 in the Mental 25 | Health Code and was designed to meet the requirements of the Improvement Act, and it was thought that it did a real good job of it. They had coordinated with the ATF, and they felt like that they had provided for due process, and I put together a very short memo with an attachment to it, and 574 of the Mental Health Code is attached to there, and you can see what the Legislature passed in order to meet the requirements of the Improvement Act.

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Working with the ATF, it was felt that it was unnecessary in Texas for us to have a de novo trial proceeding, one of the items outlined in the congressional act, because we were sending the petitioners, people who are trying to eliminate this firearm disability, back to the committing court where they get full due process, right to trial by jury, full appellate right. After the bill was passed and after the session was over, then everyone started applying to ATF, and they began to receive forms from the ATF which indicated a greater emphasis on de novo trial review than had been perceived by those persons who are going to have to implement it. So the Court was approached in what Carl called a rule-making exercise, and it certainly has been a little bit of an exercise, to come up with a rule to bridge this gap so that the state might be entitled to funds or apply for funds.

So first we thought we met the requirements.

Then we began to question whether we had met the requirements, and now I will throw one small matter in.

We've got a little history out there. Nevada has made an application. They don't have what we consider to be de novo -- what we would consider to be de novo review, and they were approved. So we're going to proceed on parallel tracks. The department will go ahead -- is considering and is likely to make an application without a rule. It may take six months to have that approved, but the department and the OCA would still like for us to proceed as we can to come up with a de novo review.

The committee met three times by telephone and had several e-mail exchanges in the process. We considered several options for a de novo review, review by the appellate courts. We discussed that. Review by masters, even transferring the cases to Austin, and finally we settled on the one that -- one of the other options that we discussed, and that was the assignment of a judge for de novo review.

It's pretty hard to do this within the confines of the rule-making power of the Court, and that's my five minutes, Judge Peeples, so I think I'm right there on time. And at this point, in the interest of time, what I'm going to do is turn over to the proposed rule, but — and I'm going to ask for comments, anything you want to

throw into it at this point. Judge Herman, is there anything you'd like to add as a resource witness at this point?

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HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: No, other than, you know, we've followed what we thought the ATF wanted us to do in the legislative process. They took two different statutes and put them together in this next Improvement Act, and what we didn't realize was they were also expecting an administrative hearing of some form, and it can be as little as a petition being filed with the court and the court denying it in administrative capacity and then a trial de novo. We did not realize that. thought the trial de novo, that you would come back to either the criminal court or a probate court and ask to have a rehabilitation hearing, that would be sufficient for them.

We then find out that it isn't, and we start 18 hearing from them -- and it's hard to pin them down -that they sort of expected our appellate courts to have a trial de novo, and we said, "That's not going to happen," and they said, "Well, you're going to have to come up with something," and then we find out a little bit later that maybe Nevada is going to do it similarly to what we had envisioned, and they approved it, yet we've been told that we have to have this administrative process. And then I

contacted Mr. Reynolds and said, "This is a problem,"
because Carl had world worked on this the whole way
through, and we both had misunderstood what the Feds were
asking or we had never been informed what they were
asking, so we're trying to come up with a process of an
administrative hearing and then some appeal from that to a
trial court for trial de novo.

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HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: What we have come up with as a committee I think I can outline. I think the rule as -- may be read and will give you just as much information. A committing court means the court which originally entered the order that led to the firearm In many -- most of our procedures that's disability. going to be a court exercising probate jurisdiction, and what we envision is a bench trial when the petitioner comes in for relief. If the relief is granted -- and the parties to the proceeding will be the state and the petitioner, because the state would have been involved in the commitment, and following the bench trial a petition for de novo review would be filed, and at the point that a petition for de novo review would be filed the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts would appoint -assign a judge to hear the matter de novo if the original committing court was a court exercising probate jurisdiction, and we track the language in the Government

Code, and in all other situations it would be the 2 presiding judge of the administrative region. 3 So the right to jury trial will come at the de novo trial. Both parties have a right to appeal it, 5 and then the final judgment, from a standpoint of 6 appellate review, if the initial proceeding bench trial is not appealed, that's the final judgment. On the other hand, if it is appealed by de novo review then the final judgment in the de novo proceeding will be the appealable 101 order to the appellate courts. And I open it up for questions, comments, corrections, grammatical or 11 otherwise. 12 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You say you want to make 14 this Rule 737, huh? 15 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: That was one we 16 picked. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: .17, de novo reviews for 18 guns if they don't fix the leaky faucet. Any other --19 yeah, Frank. 20 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, I guess we all have a problem with the idea that by rule we could come in and 22 l create a tribunal that would review the order of a 23 statutory court? I mean, I think that's what we're 24 talking about here. I mean, for example, could the 25 Supreme Court of Texas say, well, in all medical

malpractice cases we're going to create a -- we're going to have these submitted for de novo review to a judge, another judge, and in a separate proceeding.

I guess -- I don't know, but that seems to me like it might have problems. What if you, however, instead of saying that, you said, well, in this type of case we're going to keep it in the trial court, but we're going to have another judge come in and be appointed to review the trial court's ruling in that same proceeding. Would that maybe -- would that maybe remove some of the problems that this procedure would seem to have?

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: How the cause number might work, Frank, is unknown to me at this matter, which is a clerk function, but there will be -- when a judge is assigned to a case, it doesn't create a new case.

MR. GILSTRAP: It does not?

new case. Now, it could, because we're going to keep the original judge for all other matters, and there's, of course, a concept in probate law that's pretty common, and that's a final appealable order, and you know, you don't end up with this end all judgment in probate matters all the time. You have to determine whether it's a final appealable order, and we decided not to recuse the trial judge, remove the judge from whatever else is in the

court, but only have the petition for relief and the petition for de novo relief, have a judge assigned to it, 2 3 so we're not -- we are assigning a judge to it so --4 MR. GILSTRAP: You're envisioning it as the 5 same proceeding. 6 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: All of us in this group have tried to figure out how to stay within the confines of the Court's rule-making authority. We're not positive we've done it, and I couldn't argue that we have. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 11 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: But we have assigned a judge to the case as opposed to sending it to another court. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Roger. 15 MR. HUGHES: Well, I'm not sure whether these are wordsmithing or maybe substitute, but I would suggest first that subsection (h) state that the 17 affirmative findings have to make those findings that the 18 19 clear and convincing evidence shows that. 20 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Okay. 21 MR. HUGHES: It's best to have that in the judgment, I believe, in question. Second, section (e) 23 says, "The initial proceeding will be a nonjury trial," and then you provide for de novo review by an assigned 241 judge, and you don't really say that that judge's review

will be a bench trial as well.

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HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: It would be a right to trial by jury there.

MR. HUGHES: It would be?

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Yes. That's what we were trying to infer. Didn't do a good job of it.

MR. HUGHES: Well, I guess I'm not sure whether it should be a jury trial at all, and I guess that's my first question.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I don't think we can deprive a right to trial by jury.

MR. HUGHES: Well, but we're talking about a removing of a disability imposed by a Federal law. I kind of think we're talking about a proceeding that didn't exist in common law to begin with, but that's to be discussed. Well, then the next question is whether the de novo review is under clear and convincing standard or whether it's just wide open, and who has the burden of proof in that proceeding? I mean, if it's de novo, you're back to square zero, and I don't know, you know, who has the burden of proof. Is it — are we to conduct it like the earlier ones? It seems to me if it's de novo then basically once again the petitioner should have the burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence. That's just my suggestion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments? Yeah, Richard.

MR. MUNZINGER: Well, I hate to speak out of character, but I have a real problem with the Supreme

Court of Texas creating a right of de novo review because the Legislature stepped on a banana and missed the boat.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are you mixing your

metaphors?

MR. MUNZINGER: Well --

MR. ORSINGER: It was a banana boat.

MR. MUNZINGER: Any time you've got a tough problem, just close your eyes to what the law is and let the Court act. I'm going to be a person, let's pretend, who is harmed by this, and I've been denied my weapon, and I come now to the de novo appeal, and I make the argument that the Supreme Court of Texas does not have the right to create a right of de novo appeal because the right of de novo appeal was not included in the statute. You know, my goodness gracious, is the Court a court of law? Is it restricted by the Constitution and by the Legislature, or is it an agency to be used when there is a problem that came about because the Legislature failed in its task?

And I — to me it is a very, very dangerous

precedent for the Court to say because we have a problem that may cost us a great deal of money in Federal grants

we will create a right out of whole cloth. I can't imagine such a thing. You've got a Constitution, you've 3 got laws, or you don't, and if hard cases make bad laws then to hell with it. It doesn't make sense to me. 5 understand the problem. It's a problem of government, but it is -- it's a real bad precedent to say, well, we'll 7 just create a right of appeal here whole cloth because 8 we'll lose some Federal money, the heck with that. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So whatever Frank had is 10 catching, huh? 11 MR. MUNZINGER: You know, Frank's a good 12 guy. 13 Orsinger, you had a CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: comment, so walk back to you're seat and make it. 14 15 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. I would say an 16 argument could be made that de novo appeal is really just 17 the appellate standard of review of what the previous 18 trial court did. I mean, maybe that's a weak argument. The other thing is who is the adversary that's going to 20 raise the argument that Richard just said? I mean, is the county attorney is in there opposing these things, or who is the opposing lawyer? 23 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: We looked at it, and 24 you'll notice in (b) we stated that the attorney representing the state in the proceeding -- commitment

proceeding was a party who had to be served, and that would either be a district or county attorney, depending on the locale that this occurred in. 3 MR. ORSINGER: And you're envisioning that 4 5 they will come and oppose, just like to be the loyal opposition, they'll come in and oppose this and try to 7 make them prove their case and carry the fact-finder? 8 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I can't say --9 MR. ORSINGER: I mean, I think there's a 10 significant chance there isn't going to be anybody on the 11 other side. I don't know if that's a realistic assumption 12 or not. HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: The other issue is 13 the standard of review of de novo appeal occurred to me, 15 Richard, but the Federal law requires that additional evidence may be presented, and that was the hang-up we got into, a right to additional evidence. 17 MR. ORSINGER: That's a very weak argument. 18 19 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I would like to have done it the way you said. 21 MR. ORSINGER: Is this really going to be an adversary proceeding at all or ever or most of the time or just some of the time? Because it may be that there's 24 nobody on the other side. MR. GILSTRAP: You could see a controversial 25

You could see a controversial case where a quy 1 case. could have committed some crime. 2 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I think our 3 witnesses may be able to help us on that. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Herman. 6 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: I think a prosecutor would be remiss not to look at any application for rehabilitation. They're the ones that prosecuted the They're the ones that found that this person was likely to cause serious harm to self or others. 10 very aware of what happens with guns and people with 11 mental illnesses. Of course, it happens with people 12 without mental illnesses, but I think many prosecutors are certainly going to peruse the application, and I would think in most cases would just make sure that the required 15 proof was put before the court before the court made its 17 own decision. 18 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Carl. 20 MR. HAMILTON: What does (a) mean when it says "a person is furloughed from a court-ordered mental 22 health sentence"? HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: It means that I had 23 24 a lack of imagination and only tracked the Legislature. That's their language, and so I just went with that.

That's what we -- that sentence right there is the way in which 574.088 of the Mental Health Code identifies the persons who may petition, and so I --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Maybe Judge Herman could tell you what furlough means on that.

HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: In a civil commitment, which can be done by a probate court or by a criminal court when a person comes back from a state hospital or an outpatient facility on a -- they've been sent there on an incompetency to stand trial. They have been not -- they've been found by the hospital that they are still incompetent, will never regain capacity or competency, and they're shipped back, and there's a finding that they also have a mental illness, and so the criminal court if the charges aren't dropped, or the civil court, the probate court, if the charges are dropped, will conduct a hearing to see if they are committed. you're committed it's either for 90 days or for one year. During that 90-day period or during the one-year period you could be furloughed; that is, let out before the 90 Or you could be discharged before the 90 days. a matter of law at 90 days or one year you're going to be discharged, wouldn't be considered a furlough at that point, unless they bring new proceedings to keep you there longer, and that's the use of the word "furlough."

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think Justice Gray had his hand up first, then Judge Christopher, and then whoever is hiding behind Jeff.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Roger.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: With regard to de novo review, to me that seems to be a misnomer. I know it's a common term, but what you're really talking about is a de novo determination, a new determination, which seems to be inconsistent with what is in (m) when an -- what Judge Evans was referring to that the reviewing judge or the judge that's going to make the new determination has to It appears to give the assigned judge consider it. discretion to receive additional evidence, when it was my understanding under the Federal statute that the new judge or the assigned judge has to receive additional evidence if tendered, and the ability to give deference to the decision of the committing court also seems inconsistent with a new determination, not -- I agree that if it's a review, a true review, that's okay, but typically de novo, as I understood it to mean, is that that is a decision That is a new determination based upon either the record or, in this case under the Federal statute, additional evidence that may be received.

And so essentially what I thought we were

talking about was essentially a motion for rehearing, and you get a new judge and you start all over, and you can start with the record that's there, but anything that's properly admitted has to be admitted and has to be considered and that there is no deference. So I would have thought (m) would have to be reworked to eliminate the discretion. It will be "receive evidence as in any other case," and no deference would be given to the decision of the committing court.

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HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Justice Gray, I 11 would agree with you. That's my understanding de novo, 12 but when -- it's in Carl's memo. When you look at the requirements of the Improvement Act, the language is "the reviewing court may but is not required to give deference to the decision of lawful authority that denied the application," so that's where we parroted that language, and then it states reviewing court also has the right to review, receive additional evidence. Now, as far as -that's why we tracked it.

> HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: But as a vote, if 22 the committee said, no, wide open, can consider all new evidence and do a real de novo trial, I don't think our committee members necessarily have any problem -- well, I'd want to discuss it with them. I agree with you on the

definition of what I consider to be de novo, but we just 2 tracked that Federal law. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Could I ask 4 where "clear and convincing evidence" came from? 5 6 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Same thing. 7 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: The statute, 8 Federal statute. 9 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Federal statute. 10 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And then --11 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Do we have 12 that? HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: It was in Carl's 13 14 memo and it was in 9-23. I believe -- well, I'll ask 15 Justice Gaultney. Did we pull "clear and convincing evidence" from there, or is that another standard? 17 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: I believe it comes from the Probate Code -- I mean, the Mental Health Code 19 which uses -- the proceedings under the Mental Health Code 20 are by clear and convincing evidence. HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I'll need to find 21 22 that out, Tracy. 23 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And my second 24 question, on the de novo review, is that designed to protect the state or to protect the person trying to get

relief from the disability? 1 2 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: It's a one size fits 3 all Federal statute where they believe it was going to be an administrative proceeding. 4 5 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: But I thought 6 you said that -- what you quoted to me talked about 7 someone where the relief had been denied. That would only 8 be the person, not the state. 9 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: That's true. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: So it seems to 10 me that Richard's idea that, you know, people are going to 11 be unhappy that we've included this new provision would be unhappy if we gave the state the right of de novo appeal, 13 but probably wouldn't be unhappy if it's the disabled 14 15 person whose petition was denied who gets the de novo appeal. Although I certainly understand your point about 16 17 how we're stepping outside the bounds of our power, but I mean, you know, in terms of who's going to complain, if I'm the person under a disability and I get a second bite 20 at the apple --21 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Right. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: -- as long as 22 23 the state doesn't get the second bite. 24 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: The state may have -- I think that that solution was only framed because

we didn't want to have two jury trials, and we wanted to have one hearing without a jury trial, and so the state wouldn't have had a jury trial right on the first bite, and so we granted the state a right of de novo review in 5 the event that it was granted, and so, you know, if the first trial is a jury trial and the state is -- loses then that would give some symmetry to it. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger, did you have a 8 9 comment? 10 MR. HUGHES: Yeah. 11 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: That was the thought process behind it. MR. HUGHES: Basically they actually were 13 The first one was, talking about losing 14 questions. 15 Federal money, the Federal monies for what? 16 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Mike, can you help us on that? 17 18 MR. HUGHES: What would be -- what would the Federal funds be used for that we might lose? 19 20 MR. LESKO: Essentially the NICS Improvement Act is looking to improve reporting for dispositions to 22 the courts to enrich the database that that's using 23 currently to not deny people access to a weapon. 24 MR. HUGHES: Okay. And the statute --25 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: Hold on a second, if

I may interrupt.

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MR. HUGHES: Go ahead.

HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: There's also the component that they're going to take money from the criminal justice division of the Governor's office if we're not in compliance with the reporting requirements and having this procedure in there as a part of that by -and that's over a six-year period. They'll check you every two years.

MR. HUGHES: The next thing they talk about is relief from a firearms disability. Is that disability imposed by state law, Federal law, or both?

HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: Federal law. is there right now. The problem is we don't in Texas other than in felonies and in family violence and -that's it. We don't report people that are committed to the state hospitals. We don't report that information up to the DPS, which then gets up to the NICS computer. don't do quardianship to the DPS and up to the NICS computer. So anybody that's ever been committed to a state hospital can purchase guns. There's been articles. There's a person down in Harris County who recently had 23 been in a hospital, bought a gun, shot somebody with that. 24 Police officers shot throughout the country. We've had people -- we get reports. There's no way to check without having this information.

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MR. LESKO: Currently in the NICS index from Texas --

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Mike, the court reporter, it may help her if you could stand.

MR. LESKO: Just as a frame of reference, from Texas there are only seven individuals in the NICS denied person's file for mental health reasons.

MR. HUGHES: Well, all I can say is, you know, I've seen a lot of commitments from people who have severe drug/alcohol substance abuse dependency problems, and they may be able to clean themselves up enough to get out of immediate commitment, but I'm not sure I would want their firearms disabilities relieved just because they managed to get out of a treatment facility into an outpatient program, and the same thing goes for a lot of people who are convicted for drug and alcohol offenses or offenses related to drug and alcohol. They may not need to be in inpatient treatment, but I'm not sure I trust them with a weapon, I would want weapons in their hands; and the other thing here, I mean, I'm still not in favor of de novo review being a jury trial. Maybe that's mandated by the statute, I don't know, but I still think a 24 full blown evidentiary hearing in front of an assigned judge who is probably going to be a judge from outside

that county, that satisfies my notions of due process.

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HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I don't believe the statute does require -- I don't believe the Improvement Act requires a jury trial. We only assumed that state law required a jury trial.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Patterson, you want to --

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Well, I have some thoughts on that, but initially on (m), since you are going to be receiving additional evidence, I think what you want is to be able to consider the original evidence and decision by the committing court, and so instead of giving deference, I think it's sufficient that you "may consider the original decision and evidence considered by the committing court," and that's consistent with de novo review.

> CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Justice Gray.

If the rehearing court HONORABLE TOM GRAY: 19 has to make the same findings to grant relief as the original court and we've specified in there the findings that are required in subsection (h), do we need to specify 22 that in connection with the judgment of the assigned judge in subsection (n)? They've got -- I assume they've got to 24 make the same findings to grant relief in the de novo court.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: We tried to do that 1 2 with the modifying award proceeding in (g) by saying, "In determining whether to grant relief in any proceeding 3 under this rule, the finder of fact must hear evidence 5 about," and then "any judgment granting relief in any proceeding" tried to encompass both the initial trial, 6 7 Justice Gray, and the de novo review. 8 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: That was a subtlety that I missed, but if you think it's covered there. 9 10 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: No, I'm -- as you notice, I didn't say a word all morning because the last 11 time I talked I got this assignment. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That will teach you. 14 Lonny. 15 What was the answer to PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: 16 Richard's concern that this is ultra -- sorry, that this is outside the bounds of what the rules can do? 17 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Silence was 18 19 the answer. 20 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Can someone make the argument again why it is outside? This is -- you go back to the original judge who imposed the disability and 23 in effect get another shot at it. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Get a new trial in 25 effect.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah. And then there's a right to de novo review of that before a second judge. Tell me why that's ultra vires.

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PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: What Richard wants to know is where is the source of legislative authority that gives the -- that creates that right. So, I mean, take the example from what we've been talking about before, although I haven't been able to find it, I assume there is some statutory provision by which county and district courts have de novo review of JP court decisions. know where that is, but I assume it exists somewhere, and so the rules when they talk about in 749 and 750 they talk about de novo review, that it's derived from the statutory authority. Richard says but where's the statutory basis on which we're allowing a de novo review here. statute actually specifically only says that a person who has been furloughed can go to the commitment court and ask them to remove the disability, and then Richard says --Richard the Second says, well, maybe we could treat this as some sort of an appeal from that, but that does feel like a remarkable stretch.

MR. MUNZINGER: Well, the Texas Legislature did not create a right of appeal from the first judgment of the committing court of the original court and did not create a right to a de novo appeal, and so where does the

Supreme Court of Texas get the authority to create the right of a de novo appeal and, moreover, as this is drafted, set the substantive legal standards to be considered, and especially that one criticized giving deference, which denies the concept of a de novo appeal, but the bottom line is the Court is a creature of the Constitution. It doesn't make law. It doesn't create the right of de novo appeal, and the origins of this proposal to us come about because the Legislature — and it was stated specifically. The Legislature didn't do its job, so we're going to lose money from the United States of America, and it's a lot of money. Maybe we can get the Supreme Court of Texas to cure the money problem.

Does the Supreme Court of Texas want to be in the position and does this committee want to say, "We advise you, Supreme Court of Texas, to be in the position the next time that someone argues to you or you are asked from the bench, are we a court that creates law or interprets law?"

"Well, you created law in rules 574.998, your Honor. What's the difference between doing that? That was just for money. This is for reputation. After all a man's sacred honor is much more important than his property." What are you going to do? What are you going to say, and how are you going to look people in the face

and say, "We are a Court bound by a Constitution?" 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's not about money, it's about guns. Judge Patterson. 3 4 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Well, Guy, correct 5 me if I'm wrong, but I assume that when someone is convicted of one of these offenses there is a -- an automatic disability in Federal law or it's included within the judgment so that -- but by Federal statute there is a disability, so-called disability, a restriction 10 imposed, and that this is simply a mechanism by which someone can go back to the original court that imposed 11 that restriction to alter it? 13 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: Right. The -- this 14 rehabilitation provision only applies to the people who 15 have been committed to a mental institution. It doesn't 16 apply to felons, drug addicts, or anyone else who has a 17 disqualifier. Family violence, doesn't apply to them. There actually is one in Federal law. They can go up to the ATF and see if they could get a rehabilitation. usually is not very successful, but in order to have the 20 21 Improvement Act certain groups demanded that all states 22 have to have a rehabilitation for the mentally ill, and the idea behind it was there was a whole bunch of vets 23 24 that were going to be committed because of PSTD, and they 25 wanted them to have access to a way to get their guns

restored to them. 1 2 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: But is there 3 something in that original judgment --4 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: No. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: -- restricting? 5 6 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: The felony conviction automatically gives you the disqualification, the commitment to the mental hospital. We've had the --9 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Automatically. 10 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: Automatically. The 11 disqualification has been there. The problem is we don't give the information. So now we've been forced to give 12 13 the information, and the Federal government has said we're going to force you to give it, but you also have to have in place this rehabilitation for these mentally ill 15 16 people. 17 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: And how does 18 that respond to Richard's point? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I understand 2.0 21 Richard's concern about stepping out there, but we have 22 done it before when it involves procedure. Like, for 23 example, with the guardian ad litem rules we have a 24 section where we talk about review by right of appeal in 25 Rule 174, and we have other rules where we say this is

reviewable by mandamus, and so if we're doing this procedure as a gap filler because we're trying to effectuate the Legislature's intent, I don't see it as --I don't see it as doing violence to the substantive law, because I don't think that the intent of the committee's proposal is to affect anybody's substantive rights other than to maybe give them more due process rather than less. And there are a number of things that the 9 statute is silent on, like, for example, the court where 10 such a suit ought to be brought, and so the committee has drafted a proposal that says let's bring it back to the 11 committing court, the judge that's to hear it, the time 12 13 for appeal, and all of those things, and those are all basically procedural things that the Texas Supreme Court has from time to time stepped in to fill a gap where there 15 16 was one -- one in the statute when it was -- when everybody had a pretty good idea of what the Legislature 17 18 meant to do in passing a law. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Carl had his hand 20 up first and then Richard. 21 MR. HAMILTON: Could we -- could we have the language in the Federal act that tells us it has to be de 22

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novo? Could we have the language?

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: David, do you 25 have the Federal language for de novo?

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I have the Federal language for de novo both in the certification for form -if anybody has internet access, it is online on our website, and "The state must provide" -- it does say "de novo judicial review of the denial," Tracy, and it says "State must provide for de novo judicial review of relief application denials. De novo judicial review includes the following principles: (a), if relief is denied, the applicant may petition the court of appropriate jurisdiction to review the denial including the record of the denying court, board, commission, or other lawful authority; (b), judicial review is de novo in that the reviewing court may, but is not required, to give deference to the decision of the lawful authority that denied the application for relief; and (c), the reviewing state court must have discretion to receive additional evidence necessary to conduct an adequate review."

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You know, if the right to new trial didn't 19 have to depend upon newly discovered evidence it would come as close to this except for the need for a new -- a new adjudication -- a new judge on it, and that's -- you know, we could -- if we could modify the right to new trial in this area, it would be all right, but it would be pretty tough to do it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice -- wait a minute,

I was out of order here. Somebody else had their -- Roger did, Richard did. Roger, why don't you go and then we'll go to Richard and then to Frank.

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Well, in terms of the de novo MR. HUGHES: review, the comment I heard earlier was that we may be getting hung up on how the proposed rule is conducting de novo review. What I see here is this that after the initial judge makes the decision the person can file a petition for review, which might sound like a motion for new trial, in 15 days, which then turns around and suspends the judgment. The rule then makes the next judge's judgment the final judgment. I don't see this as much different than saying, look, the first -- if somebody timely files a petition or what might effectively be a motion for new trial, it effectively vacates the judgment and now we do it over again in front of the new judge using slightly different procedures, which -- so that we don't have a final judgment that's appealable until A, nobody files a petition for review or motion for hearing from the first judge's order, or if somebody does that, we don't have a final and appealable judgment until after the assigned judge makes a judgment. I think that gets rid of the problem that we're creating some new form of appellate review.

I mean, it's sort of like a -- you might use

a very poor and a loose analogy, a bill of review, which
we don't have a lot of problems with. We know how that
works, so consider it a kind of mini-bill of review that
before this -- the assigned judge's becomes final the
person files a motion, the original ruling is vacated, and
he gets to try it all over again. You know, I don't see a
procedural problem that we're creating some kind of new
animal. You may have to play with the terminology some,
but I think we're going to have to do something.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard.

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MR. MUNZINGER: My response, in all due respect to Justice Bland, is we're enforcing the intent of the Legislature, but the Legislature didn't speak to two hearings, didn't speak to a de novo appeal. It just was absolutely silent about the problem. It was their mistake, and I'm sorry they made the mistake, but to cure the mistake involves a basic philosophical judicial constitutional law issue, who in the heck can create the mistakes the Legislature -- can the Court do it, and are you willing to blink your eyes at the truth? The truth is the statute is silent, so we're going to call it a bill of review. Where did you get the bill of review? Next time I argue a case in front of the Supreme Court of Texas I'm going to say, "Yes, your Honors, and it wasn't in the statute, but look here, you did this in rule so-and-so.

Y'all created that out of that. That's precedent." We're arguing precedence, and that's a precedent. The Supreme Court of Texas wrote a rule with no authority to do so.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: On another topic,
David, I was wondering why the -- why 15 days. Is that
consistent with other kinds of time to file an appeal,
like a recommendation from the associate judge or a ruling
of associate judge, or I just don't -- we had this issue
with notices of appeal generally, how many days to file,
and if we can keep the days as consistent as possible then
there's less confusion among the Bar about how much time
they have.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Well, there's an area of confusion we haven't gone into, and that is we were trying to shorten that deadline so that because of we -- many of these people will be pro se. They could file all at the same time a motion for new trial, motion to modify and vacate, and a petition for review. Only the petition for review gets an assigned judge, but the problem is, is that many of these people have ongoing problems in the probate court that are more involved than just this issue, and so to take away the trial judge completely that's been dealing with them, we tried to segregate. This is so much of a work in progress, I

cannot tell you how much the committee members have a reservation, but we tried to shorten it for that reason, but we have real questions about the way we're doing that, too. David --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Frank, then Judge Christopher, then Judge Yelenosky, then Richard.

MR. GILSTRAP: Let's push this new trial analogy. I mean, the right to new trial, while it probably came from statute, is in the rules. That's where it came from. It's a rule. It's a Rule of Procedure, so why couldn't you create another Rule of Procedure that gave a right to new trial in this case, except that if the person asked for it he automatically got it and it was simply reviewed with deference to the old trial, and he could bring it -- to the first decision. He could bring in new evidence. Let's push it further. Is there anything in the Federal statute that says it has to be before a new judge?

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: We only imply that from this language that "the reviewing state court" and that seems to indicate an administrative -- a review of administrative decision. "Must have the discretion to 23 receive additional evidence," that was part of it, and then it's the part about give deference to the decision of the other court. I have to find that in here.

MR. GILSTRAP: Does it say "other court"? Because if I'm a judge I could sure review it and give deference to my earlier decision.

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HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: "Give deference to the decision of the lawful authority that denied the application for relief." Now, we did point out to ourselves in discussing it that on a motion for rehearing we think the judges give deference to their own prior decision, but we didn't think we could quite get away with that argument before you, but --

MR. GILSTRAP: Works for me.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: In the new trial analogy the court may -- I would think we would be on better ground, but -- and it would certainly be easier than assigning a new judge, but that's the real problem, 16 is whether we have to assign a new judge.

> Judge Christopher. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: That's the real guts of the problem if we have to replace the judicial, and these people are going to file claims that are going to have everything in the world joined with them. not going to be simple petitions, just petition for relief. There will be all types of things that could come with them.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I think since

the disability is imposed by Federal law then we are okay in imputing the Federal procedures into our state procedures in terms of removing the disability, so I would be against giving essentially the state the right to appeal by a petition de novo. So the way I would phrase it is if the -- what do you call it? If the petition is granted then the state can appeal at that point, just like a regular order. If the petition is denied, the Federal statute says there is a de novo review. But only when it's denied. So at that point you don't have to worry about who's got the burden and is it a shifting burden, because it's the same person who had the original burden having the same burden in the new de novo case, because 13 l otherwise, if it's suddenly the state appealing, you've got sort of this reverse burden, and it would be putting the petitioner to, you know, his paces twice, which doesn't strike me as right under the Federal statute, so that's how I would rework it. 18 l

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Yelenosky.

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah, I actually got to the same point a different way. thinking about -- and I don't remember it well, but I'm sure Justice Hecht does, the opinion, the recent opinion on motions for new trial, the discretion of the trial court in that regard; and without some support somewhere

it would seem to me that if the state had the right of appeal, somebody could make a pretty good argument that without -- with no state law and no Federal law supporting a de novo appeal for the state, where does that come from, and doesn't that violate my rights?

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HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: And all that would mean is we would need -- we have to address the one -- one of the issues we might want to address then is whether or not you think there's a right to jury trial for the state. And if that's fine then we can conduct two jury trials. Now, we may have become focused on the jury trial -- two jury trial issues unnecessarily, but that would be -- and that's certainly doable. We can get a jury in there and try that, but the state would probably be entitled to a jury trial.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard the Second.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay, I think maybe the conceptual problem that Richard Munzinger is having is because we're just assuming that this is an appellate process, and really it's a new trial process, because we're going to have new evidence. We may have old evidence. That's kind of irregular, but at least there's 24 new evidence, so this is really a new trial, and we probably -- maybe we shouldn't call it de novo review, but

we should call it trial de novo, and if we call it trial de novo then we're not going outside a constitutional 21 grounds because we know what trial court jurisdiction is and we know that trial judges can grant new trials and all we're saying is, is this is kind of like an automatic new trial, if you lose the first hearing, and then if we do that and just keep everything in the trial court then we don't really have this issue about constitutional jurisdiction.

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HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But we can only grant new trials on a limited basis.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, we're making up a special rule.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And we have to explain our reasons.

MR. ORSINGER: We're making up a special rule for this new trial. Now then, you've got to -- it seems to me if we're going to treat it like a new trial you should have a provision that you can introduce the record from the old trial, kind of like you do in administrative appeal to the district court. optional, it's not required. And then we have to give 23 deference to the first ruling, so you can do that in two ways. You can either say give deference or you could, for example, say whoever requests the new trial, in the new

trial it's their burden of proof to overcome the previous finding.

So if the state appeals -- pardon me, in the first case, the burden is on the petitioner for clear and convincing evidence to prove that they're entitled to have a firearm. If they win and the state wants a de novo trial, you could just reverse the presumption and say that whoever requests the new trial has the burden. That means that the previous judgment fixes the burden of proof, which is giving deference to it, and it's not really very irregular. This is the kind of thing we do all the time. So I think that if we could get away from the appellate paradigm in the language and more to a new trial paradigm then maybe a lot of these complaints go away.

And I'm not at all sure that I -- that the state shouldn't have the right to a de novo trial. I see that the statute, the effect of the mental health provision is suspended during this process, and I don't know if that means can somebody go out and buy a gun during the suspension period?

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: No, the idea or the concept we discussed was come up with language that if the initial decision is appealed, new trial, we need to -- we would want -- we want to look at the ability of the trial court to suspend its judgment until all appeals have run,

new trials have run, because if someone goes and buys a gun that may be an issue. We haven't dealt with that. That's one of those things we're still trying to deal with, but we did suspend the judgment so that -- the initial judgment granting relief so that they could not 5 6 buy a gun. 7 MR. ORSINGER: So, David, under your thing, 8 if there is a request for a new trial or de novo appeal --9 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I like new trial. 10 MR. ORSINGER: -- then automatically -- even 11 if the finding is favorable to the petitioner it's 12 automatically stayed, or is the trial court discretionary -- have discretion to stay it or not stay 13 14 it? 15 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: If it's granted? 16 MR. ORSINGER: If it's granted and the state is the one that's requesting the new trial. 17 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Well, I -- there's 18 19 no quidance from the Federal law, and there's no guidance from the state Legislature, and that may be a decision --20 21 MR. ORSINGER: Well, you see, if you don't suspend the effect of the first ruling then you're really 23 not getting a de novo new trial upon request. 24 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Oh, I know. 25 MR. ORSINGER: You're really giving, if you

will, adjudicatory weight to the first finding, even though we're wiping it out for purposes of the second trial. So it seems to me that if either side requests a new trial then there ought to be automatic nullification of any favorable ruling that would allow someone to go get a firearm, and furthermore, how complicated is it if they have the firearm, then the ruling goes the other way? Then who goes and gets the gun, under what order, and I feel sorry for the deputy sheriff that's got to go knock on the door at the house that looks like the Addams Family, you know, and get back the gun that they shouldn't have ever gotten.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How did the Addams Family get in this?

about suspending judgment, and I'm not sure "suspend" the judgment is the best wording, but "stay," "vacate the judgment" may be a better word, because, you know, when you look at the case law on de novo appeals from JP courts to county courts or from those rare instances where there is a de novo right of appeal from a county court at law to a district court in liquor licensing, that judgment is not enforceable once that petition for de novo review is filed in those courts, and so "suspension" is not a good word, is not the best word, and it needs some craftsmanship.

The question I might have for the committee, 1 2 and I'll just phrase it this way, and, Richard, the only thing I'd say is it's not "must give deference" but "may give deference" and I don't know if that's going to shape the answer on this question. Do we have to assign a new judge for de novo -- for a new trial? 7 MR. ORSINGER: If I lost the first one, I 8 would say yes. HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: What's that? 9 10 MR. ORSINGER: It's not really new if you've 11 already given it your best shot and you lost and you go back in front of the same --12 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Peeples, then you. 14 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I'm just asking, I 15 want to make sure --16 MR. ORSINGER: It's not novo. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Whoa, whoa, hang on. 18 Justice Hecht and then Judge Peeples and then Justice 19 Gaultney. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: What do we think 20 the Feds think about that, Judge Herman? Do we have any idea, or do they think we need --22 23 HONORABLE GUY HERMAN: Under their system they go from an administrative hearing over to ATF to a 241Federal judge, and it's de novo, so it would be a 25

different judge, and that's what we came up with, was to come up with a system of assigning, and the statute says it has to be in the court that caused the disqualification, which in the civil commitments would be the probate court, but if it's incompetency to stand trial it would be the criminal courts, so it would go there, and that's how we decided about the new judge and who did the appointment.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Since this subcommittee has to do some redrafting I want to be sure we've got some clarity on a few issues. I've gone back through the draft, and I'm glad that Richard Orsinger focused us on the term "trial de novo," instead of "de novo review." That's what the Feds said, was "de novo review," and we just kind of went that way. I see we use "trial de novo" in (j), but "de novo review" elsewhere, but "trial de novo" is what is meant here, and I think that needs to be very clear, trial de novo, not review, not de novo review.

Now, can we agree that -- I'm talking about focusing on the Court's rule-making authority. This is not creation of a new court, and it's not substantive law, so we don't run afoul of rule-making excesses on that.

What we've got is a second judge taking another shot at

what the first judge did. I frankly don't find that to be extraordinary. We do it in Rule 18a basically. years we've had 18a on the books where a judge number one can be replaced by rule by judge number two, and the Legislature, as I understand it, didn't do that. That's the Court did that, and I've not heard the argument that that violated the Court's rule-making authority, and I respectfully disagree with what seems to be assumed here by some of the remarks that this violates the rule -exceeds the rule-making authority. I don't accept that premise.

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If you agree with me, we're not creating a new court, not an appeal of some kind to some new body. It's not substantive law. It's just a procedural thing that's basically mandated by Federal law, and I think it's within the Court's rule-making authority, and it's trial de novo by a second judge. Admittedly that's not a widespread thing in our system, but I don't find it to be outside of the Court's rule-making authority at all.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gaultney. You've been very patient, although these other people were all in line ahead of you, believe it or not.

HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: I appreciate it. 24 No, I just wanted to jump in a little bit. The -- we started with the concept, I think, of a motion for new

trial, and we looked at some of the restrictions in terms of what we needed, a new judge it looks like, and maybe there needs to be a de novo, and it's not just new evidence that comes along. So then we thought in terms of an analogy to a recusal process because the statute sends the decision to the committing court. Okay. Now, this is the court that may be and likely is, in my view, in the best position to decide whether the disability should be released. However, the Federal statute talked about a de novo review of that initial decision.

So the way we thought of it was in terms of -- is an automatic recusal. Okay. The concept being that someone different from the person who is intimately involved in the process, maybe the Federal statute meant a different judge ought to take a second look at it. So if you think of it in terms of a motion for new trial with an automatic recusal and an assignment of the judge by your regional presiding judge or your presiding probate judge, that is kind of the analogy or the structure that was intended. Now, the rule does adopt the language of the certification, and so instead of using "motion for new trial" it uses "review de novo." Maybe the language doesn't need to do that, and maybe that does create conceptual problems when -- but to understand, that was kind of the thought process that went forward.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Wait a second. Richard the First is in queue and then Richard the Second.

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MR. MUNZINGER: If you use the word "de novo" and pervert its meaning in this context why not pervert it twice or three times or four times. If the Federal standard says a different forum must pass upon the petition to get this disability removed and now we are all pretending and doing word games that we're going to have a new trial but the new trial has to be in front of a different judge than the first judge, it just seems obvious to me that all these machinations are designed to cover a problem that the Legislature caused that is magnified by our Constitution, and you can call it whatever you want, but the truth of the matter is you're perverting what de novo means. Your statute itself that you're called upon to write a rule on makes absolutely no reference whatsoever to two bites at the apple, makes absolutely no reference whatsoever to an appeal, makes absolutely no reference to de novo, doesn't do any of those things.

It says the person can go to the court or 22 who has a firearm disability can go to court, get an order, and can appeal it. What is the effect on the Rules of Procedure or the statutes governing appeals of a final judgment under this when you have the de novo rule and

this rule. I don't know, I haven't briefed it. Is there an effect on the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Don't know that either, but it does seem to be apparent that what you're doing is engaging in word games to avoid a problem caused by the Legislature in the state Constitution.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well I'm personally going to call it "Lawyers, guns, and money." Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: It seems to me that the appealable order is the one that occurs after the second trial, and that's where you have all of your appellate jurisdiction. It also seems to me that this really isn't appellate review, because appellate review by its nature is not a fact acquisition process. It's a review of -get ready, Jane -- nisi prius tribunal that heard the original trial, and you review what they did, and you review the facts that they got, and you don't call witnesses yourself. All the things that are inherent in the appellate process are to review the facts and rulings from the first proceeding. In a sense we're kind of wiping them out, maybe allowing them to put up the same evidence, maybe they don't have to. To me it really isn't appellate, and I don't know if the feds thought it was appellate, but you know, we have a kind of a de novo review if you have a special master that's appointed under the Rules of Procedure and you get some kind of finding,

if either side appeals on that one you get de novo -- a trial de novo in front of the district judge, so there's a kind of a procedural precedent for it.

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As long as we're rewriting this, I'm thinking maybe we ought to discuss what the effect of a final appealable judgment under (m), (n), (o), and (p) is, because if you try to interface these with the supersedeas rules they don't fit very well. I haven't checked the language, but when you have a judgment that's other from money or the possession of property, recovery of property, you're off into a kind of a peculiar place when you're trying to decide who can supersede a judgment and how, and it seems to me like we perhaps should just automatically say or just say that automatically the ruling granting the license or the ability to apply for the license is suspended during the appeal to the appellate court, or if we don't do that, then how's the state going to post a I mean, who has the right to suspend the judgment bond? pending appeal and do you go to the trial court first and do you review that denial in the appellate court or do you file a motion. Maybe we ought to discuss that because the supersedeas rule is not going to work very good on this topic.

HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: That's true.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lonny and then Carl.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: And we talked about that, but targeting back to the source of authority, can the Federal Legislature give authority on which the Supreme Court can enact a rule? I'm thinking about actually a couple of years there was a controversy about a statute that didn't pass the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act that would have effectively directed that we tighten and make more mandatory and nastier our civil sanctions rule. MR. ORSINGER: Let me respond to that. Texas Supreme Court addressed that issue in Eichelberger vs. Eichelberger where at the time the Supreme Court of Texas had only conflict jurisdiction in divorce cases or a dissent in the court of appeals. They just didn't have general jurisdiction, and what happened was the Eichelberger case was decided by a court of appeals, and it conflicted with a U.S. Supreme Court decision, but it didn't conflict with another court of appeals, and it didn't conflict with the Texas Supreme Court, and there 19 was no dissent. So the question in Eichelberger was whether the Texas Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction when the Constitution said they have jurisdiction only with a conflict between the Texas courts or a dissent, and they -- justice --23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: One of those justices.

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Oh, gosh, well, I'll tell you

MR. ORSINGER:

in a minute. It will come to me. Wrote this long opinion about implied jurisdiction and inherent jurisdiction on 3 the Supreme Court, and they concluded that there was implied jurisdiction under the Texas Constitution and the 5 U.S. Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, which gave them the power to review it. So, by the way, that came up in the Court of Criminal Appeals, too, where the U.S. Supreme Court -- the Court of Criminal Appeals have ruled against the state on an appeal of a criminal 10 prosecution, and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Does anybody remember that? And the 11 United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal 12 13 Appeals, but the state doesn't have the authority to 14 appeal a -- a reversal under the state constitution. 15 So, as I recall and I was in law school at the time in Austin, almost half of the Court of Criminal Appeals was ready to vote that they were going to ignore 17 the Supreme Court ruling because the state had no power to 18 appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. That's a long way of saying the answer is, yes, I think that the Texas courts 20 have jurisdiction inherently if Federal law requires them to do something. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So, Lonny, that would be 23 24 Carl a yes. 25 And a day is gone. HONORABLE JANE BLAND:

1 MR. HAMILTON: To answer what Richard was saying, not aware that there's a statute either that 2 authorizes motions for new trial. They're Court-made rules, so the Court I think could make a rule fashioning a motion for new trial to fit this particular situation, and 5 6 I agree with Richard, that like injunctions, the trial court can issue an order maintaining the injunction pending an appeal, so we could also have an order maintaining the denial of the removal of the disability 10 pending the appeal also. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The courts also decide 12 evidentiary standards. 13 Okay. Judge Evans, you and your subcommittee are going to redraft this in light of these 15 comments? HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: Oh, yes. I think we 16 can draw them all together and make everybody happy. 17 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You think you can have a 19 little more enthusiasm? 20 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: I'm waiting for Richard to make a motion that I could second and take a way out, but that's fine. We'll work on it. We may wait 23 l for the transcript, just hopefully. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That would be fine. HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: In realtime. 25

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Seriously, thank you and 2 the subcommittee and our honored guests for their input. 3 Great discussion, and I hope you don't think we're nuts, by the way. 4 5 HONORABLE DAVID EVANS: As long as I did my 6 best. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's take our afternoon 8 break. 9 (Recess from 3:34 p.m. to 3:55 p.m.) 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. We are on 737.11, landlord's motion to modify the reduction in rent. 11 Judge Lawrence, let's see if we can knock all of this out 12 in the next hour or less. 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. "The 14 15 landlord may file a written motion seeking to modify the order reducing the tenant's rent within the time provided by Rule 737.10," and that is, of course, where you've got 17 an order to repair as well as an order reducing the rent. 18 19 "If the landlord does not file a motion with the justice court to modify the order reducing the 21 tenant's rent, the rent will be restored to the amount in the lease on the completion date of the order to repair or remedy if one is entered by the court." So it's going to 23 be automatic, no requirement for another hearing. You set 24 an order to repair with a completion date, an order

reducing rent. Until it's completed you don't hear from anybody, you assume everything is done, and on the date of the completion, after that it reverts back to the market rent.

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"If the justice does not order a repair or remedy of a condition then the landlord must request the court to modify the reduction of the tenant's rent. if the landlord has been ordered to repair" -- (a) and (b), (a) is where there's an order to repair, (b) is where there is not an order to repair that goes along with the order reducing rent. So (a), "If the landlord has been ordered to repair or remedy a condition and the landlord repairs or remedies the condition before the completion date of the order to repair or remedy, the landlord may request that the order to reduce the tenant's rent be modified." And what's happening here is that completion date is December 1st, the landlord finishes it by November 15th, and he wants the rent to go back up to the market rent, so he's going to file a motion to have the rent revert back to the market rent, and he has to do that because it's presumed by the court and everyone else that the rent is going to be reduced until the completion date on the order to repair.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge, why don't we just talk first about when the landlord has been ordered to

repair or modify and then get to -- and then talk about 1 2 (b) separately? 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does that work for you? 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 5 Sure. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody have comments on 7 .11(a)? 8 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Chip, would it be too much to ask to revisit the first sentence of 10(b)? Only 10 because it says, "The justice shall prepare and issue the I had it order," and I meant to comment on that earlier. 11 flagged and starred that if we don't change that, at the 12 appellate level when a lawyer is involved and prepares the 13 order and the justice signs it, the pro se party will be 15 complaining, because I get it even now in appeals, that 16 that order was not prepared by the judge, that was the order that the opponent prepared and the judge just put 17 18 his name on it, and I would suggest you don't even need that first sentence in that paragraph, but --19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 21 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I apologize for going 22 backwards. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not at all. Your comment 23 In fact, I saw Justice Hecht just make a note 24 is noted. 25 on your comment.

1 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Yeah, but what did it 2 say? 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "The stupidest thing I've ever heard." 4 5 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: That's what I'm afraid of. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, not at all, not at 8 all. 9 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Starred and flagged. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Back to if the landlord has been ordered to repair or remedy a condition. 11 12 Comments on that provision? No backsliding. Everybody was so engaged this morning. Is this perfect? 13 14 need to talk about it anymore? Judge Christopher. 15 we could count on you. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I don't think 16 we should have it in here at all. I think we should just 17 be silent on this point, and, you know, if the landlord 18 somehow manages to get the repair done a week early, let them figure out what to do rather than through some 20 Draconian procedure and notice in 12-point type, and et I just can't imagine that it's going to happen that often that they're going to get done early enough 24 that they're going to come back in and file a motion to change, you know, the rent for a week. Maybe I'm wrong,

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but I just say don't worry about it.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody else feel
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   that way?
                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, I just agree with
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   her. You asked if anybody else agreed with her, I raised
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   my hand.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okay. And Lonny agrees.
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                 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY:
                                               Me, too.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland agrees,
   Judge Yelenosky agrees, Bobby Meadows agrees, Jeff Boyd
   agrees, Justice Gaultney. There's a tidal wave here.
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   Lamont Jefferson and Skip Watson. So, Judge Lawrence, why
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   do we need this?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, because you
   -- you know, there's more than that part to part (a).
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   Part of it is if the landlord finishes early and wants to
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   get the rent restored. You may not think it's important,
   but I would suggest to you that landlords may think that
   particular provision is important, and they may want the
   opportunity to come back in and get the rent restored if
23 they've done something well in advance of the completion
24
   date.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Right.
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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There's also provisions in there that on the hearing that, you know, there be a hearing and there be proof. The tenant can contest the landlord's provision. It was just kind of a due process concern that if you're going to set this order that there be the opportunity for it to be modified — that both parties have the right to try to correct something if circumstances change.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We do a lot of orders. We do a lot of like future damages that may or may not occur, and nobody gets to come back and say, "Well, they didn't really, you know, have \$50,000 worth of future medical, so I want a refund." Let's just keep it simple.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, I was looking at this, it says if an order was entered, the last line it says, "order to repair or remedy, if one is entered by the court." So I guess that means that there can be an order reducing the rent even if you don't order repair.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's correct.

MR. HAMILTON: And so I went back to look at that, and it does say that, but it doesn't say when that rent terminates.

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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it does in
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  part (b). You have to have a hearing in that case,
  because otherwise you're not going to know when the
   landlord repairs something, so there's going to be a
  requirement for a hearing to figure that out.
                 MR. HAMILTON: But we're not talking about
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   repairs. We're talking about you don't order repairs, you
   just order a reduction of the rent.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, but the
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   reduction in the rent is based on the condition that needs
   to be repaired or remedied, and even if there is no order
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   to repair, the rent is going to stay reduced until that
   condition is fixed. With or without an order to repair.
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                 MS. PETERSON: And that comes from
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15
   92.0563 --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Yeah.
                 MS. PETERSON: -- (a)(2), which I think is
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   in the report.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: This is all part of
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   this Property Code stuff.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any more comments
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   on subpart (a)? Okay. How about subpart (b), if the
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   landlord has not been ordered to repair or remedy a
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   condition?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, then the only
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way that the court is going to know that something's been fixed and the rent should go up is if the landlord tells 2 the court and files a motion and there's a hearing on it to determine that, yes, it has been fixed, the rent should 4 5 go up. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments 7 Yeah, Elaine. on that? PROFESSOR CARLSON: I don't understand 8 what's happening in (b). I'm not ordered to repair. 10 reduce the rent because something isn't safe or healthy and then the landlord repairs something voluntarily they 11 weren't supposed to or weren't ordered to, or what's going 12 on here? 13 Well, that's 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: exactly right. Remember, there are five different things 15 that you can file a suit for under this rule, order to 16 17 repair, order reducing rent, actual damages, civil penalty, attorney's fees, and court costs. You don't have 18 to sue for all of those. So you can file a suit to reduce 191 the rent and get civil penalties, let's say, but not file 20 for an order to repair, for whatever reason, but you can 22 do it. 23 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But the order 24 reducing rent is premised on the fact that whatever this

condition is, is unhealthy or unsafe; therefore, the rent should be reduced in accordance with that, and you're going to order the rent reduced until that's fixed basically, if there's no order to repair. So there's got to be some mechanism to have the landlord come in and say "I fixed it. The rent needs to go back up to the market rent now." So that's what this is about. Hopefully there will always be an order to repair with the order reducing rent so you don't have to worry about this part (b), but there's no quarantee that there will always be an order to repair, so you have to have some provision to have the rent restored when it's finally fixed. And, no, the landlord is not going to -- he's not ordered by the court to fix it, but his motivation is that the rent is not going back up until he fixes it, so presumably he's going to want to get that fixed, notify the court, so the rent can go up.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Got it. Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, under what circumstances would you -- under one circumstance you can order it repaired and then when it's repaired you put the rent back. The other situation is you don't order it repaired, and it just -- the rent stays down until the landlord fixes it. So why even enter an order of repair? Why not just let it -- the rent stay down until the

landlord fixes it? Under what circumstances would you 2 enter an order and when would you not enter an order? 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, first of all, the tenant's got to ask for both of those. The tenant has to ask that there be an order to repair and has to ask 5 that there be an order reducing the rent, so assuming that they ask for both of those and there is a condition that must be fixed under the Property Code, then presumably the judge is going to order both of those, but who knows what a tenant is going to ask for. They may ask for only one 10 11 of those or neither of those possibly. They may just ask for damages and not for any of these, but they may just ask for an order reducing rent, for whatever reason. 13 can't tell you why they would want to do that, but it's possible under the statute that they would. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments about this (b)? You okay, Carl? 17 MR. HAMILTON: I'm okay, but I don't know 18 19 that I understand it all. 20 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Here, here. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're not board 21 certified in rent repair reductions. Okay. Well, let's go to 12 then. 23! 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Motion to set aside 25 default judgment or dismissal. "A motion to set aside

default judgment or dismissal must be in writing and filed within five days from the date the justice signs the judgment or order. A party may file only one motion to set aside a default judgment or dismissal for want of prosecution. An order setting aside a default judgment order of dismissal for want of prosecution must be signed within 10 days after the date the justice signs the default judgment or order of dismissal for want of prosecution.

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"If a written motion to set aside a default judgment or dismissal for want of prosecution is timely filed but is not granted by written order within 10 days after the justice signs the default judgment or order of dismissal for want of prosecution, then in order to perfect an appeal the party filing the motion must file a written notice of appeal within 15 days from the date the justice signs the judgment." Now, the 15 days is to cure a trap that currently exists in the motion for new trial and motions to appeal in the justice court rules. have five days in the justice court rules to file a motion for new trial, and that motion must be granted or denied and within 10 days, and you have to appeal within 10 days.

The lack of action on the motion for new 24 trial or the denial of the motion for new trial does not 25 extend the appellate timetable. So you're reduced to

1 having to call the court, "Did he sign the motion for new trial," and if you don't call and it's never signed then 3 on the 10th day you should have appealed or you have lost your right to appeal because it's not extended under the current rules. Also, since the five days is subject to Rule 4, which excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and legal 7 holidays, and the 10 days is not -- a good example is next If I sign a judgment next Tuesday, five days to 8 week. sign a motion for new trial. You start doing the calculations, and the fifth day is the following Thursday 10 because Wednesday is day one; Thursday, Friday, Saturday, 11 Sunday don't count; Monday is day two; Thursday is day 12 three; Wednesday is day four; and Thursday is day five. 13 So the fifth day to file the motion for new trial is the 14 15 next -- is the following Thursday. 16 The 10th day to file the appeal is the next day or Friday, so this is fixing that problem that 17 currently exists in the justice court rules so you don't 18 19

have that trap. So that's why you've got the 15 days there, and then (c) is when both the tenant and landlord appear for trial, no motion for new trial may be filed. That is consistent with the eviction rules.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland, and then Judge Christopher.

> Tom, if we have a HONORABLE JANE BLAND:

problem in the -- with the other justice court rule, why don't we fix that rule instead of creating a whole other rule for appeals of this special kind of case, or is that because we have to -- because of the statute? 4 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, it's not --6 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Because now we're going to have multiple appellate tracks in the justice courts, and that doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, now, whether 10 it makes sense or not, I don't know what to say about 11 that, but all I can tell you is that --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're moot on that 12 13 topic. 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All I can tell you 15 is that we want these rules to be as good as possible, and that should be fixed, so that's why these rules are like 16 17 this. Now, yeah, I think the other rules should be fixed, and we can take that up at a later date, but we're trying 18 19 to make these rules as good as we can, so we want to 20 remove that potential trap. 21 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Why are these rules 22 self-contained with respect to motions for new trial and 23 appeal instead of just referring to the existing rules for 24 that out of the justice courts? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The task force felt 25

with a great degree of unanimity that these rules are 2 superior to the existing rules, that these are clearer and 3 better. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Except now we'll have 4 two sets of rules for appealing justice court judgments, 5 6 depending on what the underlying claim is. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We already have a great diversity in justice court rules now with small claims and justice court. There are already differences 10 that exist. There are more differences that exist on evictions, so we have those conflicts now already, and, 11 12 yes, this will be a little bit different, but this is better. 131 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. And then Justice 15 Gray. 16 MR. HAMILTON: I think paragraph (b) needs 17 to be fixed a little bit. We say that "if the motion is not granted by written order within 10 days." Usually we 18 say something like it's overruled by operation of law, but 20 then we skip from no order to the time for appeal without saying what happens to the motion. Shouldn't we need to 21 say it's overruled by operation of law and then the time 22 23 for appeal? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think we 24

could do that. Yeah, that might make sense.

1 MR. HAMILTON: Because there's no connection 2 really between the failure to do the order and the time 3 for an appeal. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. I think 4 that's a good idea. 5 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Justice Gray. 7 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I feel relatively certain that if Professor Dorsaneo were here at this point 8 he would say this would be a good time to make that 7 days, 14 days, and 21 days, because of the multiples of 10 seven and not having to incur the problem of the falling 11 on a holiday or weekend. Would there be -- would that be 12 too long for those periods to not fall on 7, 14, and 21? 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know if it 14 would be too long or not. It's the -- you know, it's the 15 tenants that have the interest in moving this along as 16 quickly as possible. We tried to keep it as consistent as 17 18 we could with the existing JP rules. We changed it where we thought it needed to be changed, but the 5 and 10 days 19 is consistent with what the JPs are used to. That was 20 really why those time limits were selected, just 22 consistency. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Frank. 24 MR. GILSTRAP: Why do we only allow the court to set aside a default judgment or a DWOP?

I mean, is there -- there's no general right to a new 2 trial? I mean, why these two? 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we took this from the eviction rules in the interest of this being 5 Since there is no appeal bond to appeal, if you're unhappy you can appeal, but if it's a DWOP or dismissal, and there's some -- you know, some reason for that, it seems like somebody ought to get a bite at the apple and have their day in court without just having to 10 I guess the alternative would be no setting aside, just appeal everything, but you don't want to send 11 12 all of this stuff up to county court on appeal if you can handle it at the JP court level. That's where it ought to 13 14 be --15 I'm just wondering why there MR. GILSTRAP: might not be another grounds for setting it aside. mean, setting it aside if there's -- once you've had a 17 hearing as opposed to a default or a DWOP. 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we didn't 19 20 think that was needed because of the ability to appeal, at 21 least by the landlord, without posting an appeal bond. 22 MR. GILSTRAP: One more thing. Can you 23 direct me to the analogous provision in the eviction 24 rules? 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: For the no new

trial?

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MR. GILSTRAP: Yeah. Yeah. For this particular 737.12.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. Well, some of this is going to be found in 567, 566, 570, and some of the other part is going to be found -- well, let's see.

MR. GILSTRAP: That's fine. I don't want to take up any more time. Thank'you.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, somewhere in the eviction rules it says "no new trial," but I can't put my finger on it.

MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland.

these rules are better, but if they are better, we ought to just have one set of rules and fix the ones that we have or get rid of the ones that we have that are bad. We shouldn't have two sets of rules for appeals out of justice courts depending on what the nature of the claim is. Or we shouldn't have multiple sets. It sounds like we have more than two. We should be going toward simpler and fewer appellate tracks and deadlines rather than more, and if these -- and I'm sure these are better, and if these are better, we ought to just get rid of the ones that are bad.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Munzinger, you're not
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   going to be mad about these, are you?
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                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 No, no.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Okay.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 I just want to point out
   that you use the phrase "dismissal for want of
   prosecution" twice in 737.12 but do not use "for want of
   prosecution" in 737.7(f), which I assume is what you --
   they're the same order, and you ought to be consistent, I
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   think.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Okay.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Anything else
   on this .12?
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                Let's go to .13.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Okay.
                                                  This is
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   going to be almost as much fun as the contempt issue.
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   Appeal. Here's the way -- the statute says that an owner
   of real property who files a notice of appeal of a
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   judgment of a justice court to the county court perfects
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   the owner's appeal and stays the effect of the judgment
   without the necessity of posting an appeal bond. So the
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   owner of real property, the landlord, gets a free appeal.
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   It doesn't say that the tenant gets to appeal without
   posting an appeal bond. Statute doesn't say that.
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                 The task force was of the opinion, although
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   it was a divided vote, that -- that it would be fairer to
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allow the tenant the same rights to appeal, you know, meaning without posting an appeal bond. If you don't think that that's the way to go, there are two alternatives. Alternative one is that the -- you can't change the landlord. That's in the statute. So he's going to get an appeal by filing a notice of appeal. That really can't be changed, but you can require the tenant to post an appeal bond if you think that that's proper, and there are really two ways to do it.

One way is to track Rule 571, which is the justice court's civil rule, and that basically is they would have do pay twice the amount of the cost, would be the appeal bond. That's what a plaintiff has to pay who does not prevail. They have to pay twice the amount of the costs. Normally a defendant who has a judgment written up against them pays twice the amount of the judgment to appeal in a justice civil, but the tenant, who would be like the plaintiff, under Rule 571 would only pay twice the amount of the costs.

The alternative would be to base it on Rule 749, which is the eviction appeal where the justice sets the appeal bond as he sees fit. So those would be two alternatives to the way the task force has it written.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank.

MR. GILSTRAP: The first alternative gets us

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right back into the problem we dealt with when we first
  reworked the eviction rules, which was the problem that
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   you -- under the Constitution you couldn't require the
   posting of rent as a condition for appeal. I mean, I
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   think, Elaine, we were -- wasn't that what triggered all
   of that?
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I hate to admit this,
   Frank, but I was reading another rule. I'm sorry.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, all right, but we
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   had --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, pay attention.
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: You know, I think that was
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   what sent us down the road, was the determination that if
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   you're going to require people to put up money to appeal,
   that that violates the Constitution, and I suspect that
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   might have been one reason the Court didn't act on it,
   because I think it was a very unpopular provision with
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   landlords.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Other comments about
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   this?
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                 MR. HAMILTON: About 13?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Yeah, Justice
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   Gray. Then Carl.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There's the usual
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   problem of 10 days within the date the justice signs the
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judgment, if it's the -- the parties don't know when that happens. I know this normally occurs at the end of the hearing in these, but as I recall there was some recent round of discussion in this committee about the justice's ability to take issues under advisement and in effect issue an opinion -- or a judgment at a later date, so you have the how do we know when that 10 days starts.

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The Supreme Court has -- and with regard to the next sentence, "The perfection of the appeal will be considered perfected with the filing of the notice of appeal." The conjunction, "and the payment of a transcript fee in the justice court." I mean, understand that that is a dual requirement to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the next court, both of which must happen, and I think that's the almost identical language that had to do with filing -- and the filing of a affidavit of indigency, which I think it's Higgins and another case that we -- it's the filing of the notice of appeal that invokes the jurisdiction of the court and that the payment of a fee, in that case the filing fee, isn't jurisdictional. In effect, the filing of the affidavit is not jurisdictional, so basically I'm asking can we really tie the perfection of the notice of appeal to both of those -- I'm sorry, perfection of the appeal to both the filing and the payment of the transcript fee, or should we

only tie it to the notice of appeal filing? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we put that 3 in there to tip-off the tenant or the landlord that they've got to pay this, because the local Government Code 5 says that until I get my 10-dollar transcript fee that nothing gets sent up or that they do the affidavit of inability, the indigency. So that's there just as a tip-off to let them know that's got to be paid, because that's a condition precedent to me processing that appeal, local Government Code. So, no, it -- that transcript fee 10 doesn't have to be in there. We're just doing that to 11 help out the litigants. 12 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And is it only the 13 landlord that has to pay that fee? Did I understand that 14 15 correctly? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, all the 16 statute -- no. Anybody that appeals has to pay that fee. 17 All the statute did is say the landlord doesn't have to 18 19 post an appeal bond. It didn't except the landlord from paying the transcript fee. It didn't change the local 20 Government Code that requires that. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: So can the landlord not 22 pay a -- I'm sorry, can the landlord not use an affidavit 23 24 of indigency? 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, he could use

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an affidavit of indigency for the 10-dollar transcript fee
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   if he wanted to.
                     Sure.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.
                 MR. HAMILTON: I think my question has been
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   answered, but --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other -- yeah,
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   Justice Gaultney.
                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY:
                                            The Government
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   Code doesn't -- you're saying it just requires the payment
   of the transcript fee, so you can separate that out,
   right, and just if you wanted to inform them you could
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   say, "The appellant must pay the payment of the transcript
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   fee," and then it's perfected upon the filing of the
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   notice of appeal?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, yeah, we can
   take that out, but then that sort of sets up a trap where
   somebody doesn't know that they have to pay the transcript
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   fee, but it can come out. It just may cause some
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   confusion for the litigants. It's just there to help the
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   litigants, to tip them off that they're going to have to
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   pay that fee to get it processed.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I guess what I'm trying
   to focus on is, is that jurisdictional to the appeal?
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   that necessary to perfect the appeal, or is it only the
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25 notice of appeal, and sooner or later you're either going
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to have to pay the transcript fee or file an affidavit of 1 2 indigency? 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I didn't bring the section of the local Government Code, but I think the way it's worded is you have to get in the \$10 5 before you send the paperwork up to the county court, 7 before you process that appeal, I think is the way it's I don't remember exactly. But that's the fee to 8 worded. prepare the transcript to send it up to county court, so until you get the fee it doesn't go up to county court. 11 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Now, I don't 12 13 know -- I understand what you mean by perfecting the We're going to talk more about that a little bit 14 later in this rule. I don't know that -- I don't remember 15 if there's any case law that talks about the transcript 16 fee for protecting. There is case law that the payment of 17 the filing fee in county court, which is why we've got a 18 19 rule drafted a little bit later that's going to cover 20 that. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why did -- why did the 22 task force prefer this version of subparagraph (a) as 23 opposed to the alternatives in Footnote 5? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, and Wendy and 24 25 Kennon, correct me if I'm wrong, but I think they felt it

was -- if it was going to be a no appeal bond for the landlord, it was fair to have that same provision for the tenant. I think, Wendy, was that pretty much the only concern?

MS. WILSON: And I think, though, the reason we came to that determination is there had been -- I think Mr. Fuchs had said in our task force meeting that there was some equal protection case law out there that you couldn't have -- that if you had no bond posted for the landlord, that it would have to be the same for the tenant; and I think based on, you know, that supposition we decided that, you know, it should be the same for both.

You know, I know that from being involved in the drafting of it that it was intended that the -- certainly the landlords should not have to post a bond, and Mr. Doggett is not here, but, you know, I think that the idea was that the tenants would post a bond, but that the bond in this case would typically be much greater for a landlord, who is presumably going to have some judgment or order of repair that's significant in nature. But, again, we did decide as, you know, based on that possible line of cases dealing with equal protection that what's good for one is possibly good for the other.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: This was not a unanimous vote on the task force --

MS. WILSON: Right. 1 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- to allow the 3 tenants the free appeal. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right. 4 5 Anything else on (a)? Yeah, Elaine. 6 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I just want to say normally outside of the JP arena, you know, plaintiff doesn't have to put up any type of appellate security to 8 secure a take-nothing judgment. There's nothing to secure. But Judge Lawrence reminds me that that is not 10 the rule in justice court, that plaintiff who suffers a 11 12 take-nothing judgment, if I understood this correctly, is normally required to put up double the amount of the 13 14 costs. 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Costs. Rule 571. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. That was 16 alternative one, based on 571. 17 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And then alternative two is based on Rule 749, which would let the 19 justice set the appellate bond at whatever he thought was 20 21 proper. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: A majority of the task 23 force, however, was in favor of what we have here in 24 the --25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: A narrow majority.

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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So was it like 11 to 10
 2
   or --
 3
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We were a congenial
   group. We didn't take a lot of votes. We just --
 5
                 MS. PETERSON: Got a sense for it.
 6
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right. Gene,
 7
   sorry.
 8
                 MR. STORIE: Yeah, I just want to observe
 9 that if there's an equal protection issue on this then
10 wouldn't it will also be true of Rule 571?
11
                 (Sotto voce by Justice Duncan)
                 THE REPORTER: I didn't hear what you said,
12
13
   I'm sorry.
14
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's why Elaine
  and I think 571 is unconstitutional.
15
16
                 MR. STORIE: Yeah, that's the one in the
   footnote.
17
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: She and Elaine, speaking
18
19 for Elaine, think that 571 is unconstitutional.
20
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: That is what we talk
21
   about.
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh?
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: This is our world.
23
                                                         We
24
  talk about this kind of stuff.
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Bland is down there
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studying a case so that she can tell us about it.
1
2
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: It's 5:00 o'clock
3
  somewhere, Chip.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: She is thirsting for the
 4
5
  Four Seasons, I can tell.
                              Sarah.
6
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Judge Lawrence,
7
  where is the provision in the Senate bill that a notice of
  appeal stays the effect of the judgment?
 9
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it's not, but
  that's -- typically in any JP court appeal when the appeal
10
   is perfected, that's it. It's -- the case law calls the
11
12
   judgment a nullity, and it goes up to county court on a de
   novo, trial de novo.
13
14
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                   Okay.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Is that de novo review or a
15
16 trial de novo?
17
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stop it. All right.
  Let's go to subparagraph (b). Any comments on (b)?
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19
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right.
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But they're all
20
   stayed, is what you're saying.
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Any comments on
23
   (b)?
24
                 MS. PETERSON: Just a side note, the
   statute --
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1
                 MS. WILSON: The statute does say that it
2
  stays the effect of the judgment.
3
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right, but the rule
   doesn't.
 4
 5
                 MS. WILSON:
                             Oh, okay, that was your point.
 6
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But what Judge
   Lawrence is saying, and I don't know what rule this is, is
  that there's somewhere else it says that every judgment
   from JP court is suspended -- enforcement is suspended
10
   pending appeal. I don't know that to be true.
                                                    I'm going
   off of what he says.
11
12
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I think --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.
13
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I think Justice Duncan
14
15
  makes a good point. I think that should be in the rule,
16I
  because that's how the statute -- that the taking of an
17
   appeal -- when any party timely files a notice of appeal
18
   of the judgment of a justice court to the county court the
19
   underlying judgment is stayed without the necessity of
   posting an appeal bond. Don't you think the parties
20
   should know that?
21
22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What does subparagraph
23
   (b) say?
24
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's why we put
25
   (b) in there.
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1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Oh, okay, I'm sorry, I didn't see it. I thought it was not in there. 3 mind. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard. 4 5 MR. MUNZINGER: (b) still -- I'm not trying 6 to beat a dead horse, but remember we've discussed the problem of the use of "order" in one context and "judgment" in another --9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 10 MR. MUNZINGER: -- and this persists throughout the rule, which I'm assuming somebody is 11 addressing, because we're going to have all kinds of 12 l trouble with whether an order is the same as a judgment 13 and whether appeal suspends an order and not a judgment, 15 et cetera, if we're not careful with that phraseology. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Kennon has been taking 16 copious notes whenever that issue has arisen. 17 18 MS. PETERSON: Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: She's all over it. 19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That assumes 20 there's a difference. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. MR. HAMILTON: If we're going to appeal a 23 24 judgment, why don't we just say that instead of saying "repair or remedy as well as any other actions," whatever 25

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that means?
                Why don't we just say it stays the judgment?
2
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                           That's what you're
3
   trying to get at, isn't it? No?
                 No, I was thinking maybe you, Judge
4
5
              Weren't you trying to get at the concept that
   Lawrence.
6
   you're trying to stay the judgment, whatever it may be?
7
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: You have the
   judgment that's signed on the day of trial that sets the
   statutory penalty, the civil penalty, attorney's fees, and
                 That part of the judgment is a money
10
   court costs.
   judgment for the tenant that the tenant can levy and
11
   execute on. Then you also have these orders to repair and
12
   orders reducing rent. You -- it is known with finality on
13
   the day that the judgment is rendered in court how much
14
   the money judgment is going to be for the civil penalty
15
   and the statutory damages. What you don't know at that
16
   point is exactly what it's going to cost to repair or how
17
   much the order reducing rent is going to be.
                                                  So you
18
   need -- if you modify the order to repair, reducing rent,
19
   you need to give the landlord the opportunity to appeal
20
21
   that, and that timetable is not going to be the same as
22
   the date that the judgment was originally rendered on the
23
   trial date.
                That's what I was trying to get at.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Gotcha.
24
                                             Thanks.
25
   Richard.
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1 MR. MUNZINGER: But I thought that was the 2 problem that we had discussed at least to some extent. 3 the justice enters two orders, one for the 500-dollar civil penalty and what have you and the other, but then he 5 doesn't know how much it's going to cost to repair the 6 building, the landlord has no way of appealing an order to repair the building and doesn't know what he's appealing at all, and he -- but he can be held in contempt for it, be put in jail for it, and no one can review the order and 101 authority of a justice of the peace in doing this. 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I believe that he can appeal it. I believe that there are 12 13 provisions in the rules that he can appeal that. Well --14 MR. MUNZINGER: 15 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Even if it's treated as a separate order and he's held in contempt, he 16 would have habeas corpus rights. 17 18 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, he would have habeas 19 corpus for contempt, but let's forget for the moment just 20 contempt. "Munzinger, put a new roof on your apartment building, cost you \$72,000." I can't appeal it. 21 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I wouldn't be able 23 to enter a judgment if that's what it cost because you're 24 outside of my jurisdictional limit. MR. MUNZINGER: Okay, 9,999, same point. 25

It's my money, my property, I'm told I must do something, 2 and I've got no appeal for it. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Now, you're getting mad again. 4 5 No, I'm not. I'm not mad. MR. MUNZINGER: 6 I'm just emotionally labile. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But I believe that you can appeal. The landlord can appeal the order. He can appeal it when it's rendered on the day of trial. He 10 can appeal it if he finds out later that it's going to cost more than he thought. He can file a motion to have 11 12 that modified and then we're going to put in there that he can appeal that, so he's got at least two bites at the 13 14 appellate apple. 15 MR. MUNZINGER: But I thought this was the 16 problem that we have where the judgment is one document 17 and the order is another, and do we have the right to appeal from these because one is final and the other 18 19 That's the problem I'm having. It may be my fault. I may be stupid. I'm certainly not mad, but I may 20 21 be stupid. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're not stupid. MR. MUNZINGER: But I don't understand this, 23 that a justice of the peace has the authority to hold this 24 25 within his court and deprive me of the right to appeal.

It doesn't make sense to me.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. MUNZINGER: It may be the way the Legislature wrote the bill causes the problem with the 6-day and 10-day trial thing, but in essence what it ought to be saying to the litigants is come to court and know within 6 days or 10, whatever the time limit is, what the cost is going to be.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I think what I understood you to say, Tom, was that the judgment really is not complete because you don't know some things, so isn't that really just an interlocutory judgment?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: This is a difficulty with this statute and trying to make this all work. The elements of the judgment that are money damages are going to be known and entered on the day of the trial, and presumably it may well work out that if you have an order to repair and an order reducing rent and a completion date, that those are going to be finite numbers that aren't going to change because it's going to be fixed, you know, on that date, and you're going to know exactly how much it's going to cost. But we also had to build in provisions that if the landlord figures out that, oh, this is going to cost me a lot more, that they be able

to come in, and there's a mechanism to appeal if the judge doesn't grant him an order modifying the rent -- the order to repair, then he can appeal the whole thing, even though it may be separate and apart from the judgment based on the money damages.

You know, I recognize after all the comments that everybody is having great difficulty. I have to tell you the task force was able to separate these things out, and it didn't really cause us any concern, but obviously if it's causing this much difficulty, it's confusing, but we believe that the due process is built in. We believe that everybody has got more than sufficient ability to appeal both the initial judgments and modifications to the judgment all the way down the line.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I'm looking at -- now that I've read (b), where I see that the notice of appeal stays enforcement, then I drop down to (e). "If the appellant fails to pay the costs on appeal in accordance with 143a," and I go back to 143a. The problem has always been -- at least what I understand from the case law -- is the failure to differentiate between an appeal bond, which is to secure the costs of the appeal, and a supersedeas bond, which is to secure payment of the judgment; and what has gotten the Texas rules in trouble

before, and I think gets the JP rules in trouble, is that they merge the two, and they basically say that to appeal you have to supersede; and that's the reason for the double the amount of the judgment or whatever.

But there's nothing that I can find in 143a that says "pay the costs on appeal" means the costs of the appeal, and then I look -- and this may not make any sense, but then I look at 749, which says, yeah, you can appeal, but the justice sets the amount of the bond in eviction proceeding, and I go over to 752, and it says on the trial of the cause in the county court you can recover damages. What does 143a mean? Does it mean the costs of appeal or --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. No. 143a is -- this is a tricky little part of JP world where a party can post their appeal bond, pay their transcript fee, it gets sent up to the court, but they still must pay the court costs at county court under Rule 143a, and if they don't pay the court costs then that appeal gets sent back, and it's deemed to be no longer perfected, and the original judgment of the JP court is reinstated, so to speak. So that's the purpose of putting this here, is that it is a -- it is a trap, and, you know, it's crazy, but the judgment, the final judgment of the JP court, then it's appealed, and that judgment becomes what's called a

nullity. That's what the case law calls it. It's a nullity, and it's perfected in county court, but if you don't pay the court costs in county court then it's unperfected. It gets sent back to JP court, and it's reinstated.

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So part (e) is to take that into consideration, and that's why (e) is there. This is the law now, and you can find this if you go to 143a and then go to case law, but it's not clear from reading the JP rules, so we're just trying to put this in the rule so everybody understands what the law is.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But what are the costs of appeal? What are those considered to be? Is it filing fees?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, in JP court it's the filing fee and service fees and various other If you're asking under Rule 571, double the costs things. would be the cost in JP court, but we don't collect the county court filing fee. We collect the JP court costs.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I understand that. But 143a talks about -- first of all, 143 says that you can be required to give security for costs in any case, 23 but what that rule has been interpreted to mean is court costs, right, and that's -- that's because the clerk feels insecure about the ability to collect court costs, but

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143a just says, "the costs on appeal," not "of appeal."
  So I'm not sure that is just filing fees, and the bonds
  that the JP courts have required, like under the 751 type
  rule for double the amount of what the damages are, I
  mean, that's Dillingham vs. Putnam, and that's -- I don't
   understand (e). I understand (b), and I understand (a),
   but I don't understand (e) because it says "the costs on
   appeal," not "the costs of appeal."
 8
 9
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (e) represents the
  current status of the law.
                               That's what --
10
11
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Did you say (e)?
12
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          (e).
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: (e).
13
14
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: You just copied
15
  143a.
16
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 143a, and in
  essence some case law that explains what happens if you
17
   don't pay the county court fee.
18
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But that's what I'm
19
   asking, is what fees are we talking about?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The court costs in
21
   county court.
23
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The filing fees?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.
24
25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: But even then you can be 2 an indigent, right? 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, yeah. PROFESSOR CARLSON: And be excused from 4 5 paying. 6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, yeah. You can file an affidavit of inability and then you don't have to pay it, and you can file an affidavit of inability at JP court and be exempt from all of those. actually, I think once it's approved at JP court it goes 10 all the way up, but --11 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's talk about 13 14 real quick. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 14 "Discovery in trial. Reasonable discovery shall be 15 permitted." You can't have full blown discovery with a 6-16 to 10-day limit here, so we are tracking the small claims 17 court rules, which I think is a very workable set of rules 18 for this. "Reasonable discovery shall be permitted. 19 Discovery is limited to that considered appropriate and 20 permitted by the justice and must be expedited. In the 22 case of a bench trial the justice may develop the facts of 23 the case in order to ensure justice." 24 Now, in small claims court the justice can develop the facts of the case. The justice can summon

witnesses in small claims court if he wants to. So since we're going to have a lot of pro ses, we thought that it 2 would be a good idea to allow the court to develop the facts in a bench trial to get at what's really happening. "The failure of any party to respond to an 6 order of the court for discovery may be punished in accordance with Rule 215.2," which is contempt, and then that gets us to this little handout, the issue of a jury charge. Rule 554 says you can't charge the jury in civil Now, we charge the jury in criminal cases, but we 10 can't do it in civil cases under 554, so I started 11 thinking about this, and think about how the jury is going 12 13 to render a judgment on this type of case without some 14 information from the court, some charge, and I think it would be a good idea to allow the court to charge the jury 15 in these particular cases. So that's -- that's Rule 14. 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Comments about 14? 18 Justice Gray. 19 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm -- oh, wait, Richard did have his hand up, so I'm going to defer to him because he's probably going to talk about the Spanish Inquisition. 22 No, but the second sentence 23 MR. MUNZINGER: 24 I think is surplus. I think the common law says that any

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judge, jury trial or bench trial, can participate in the

1 proceeding to ensure justice. I'm not so sure in cases where a jury is requested and the parties are pro se that 2 3 you wouldn't want the same rule to apply so that justice is done, and my suggestion would be that we either say, 5 "The justice may participate to develop the facts of the case in order to ensure justice, " period, regardless of 6 7 whether it's a bench trial or not. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good point. Justice 9 Gray. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I was actually going --10 11 I assumed he would be really contrary to that, which I am. 12 I would prefer that the justice not become the advocate for anybody, or both sides, got no business participating 13 14 in the development of the case. Well, I would only 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: point out the Legislature has said for small claims court that that is permissible. 17 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Small claims, I just 18 19 kind of -- that's a group over there kind of by itself. just have a problem with the justice of the peace or any 20 judge becoming a person that's going to go out and gather up facts, even if it's just by inquisition of the parties. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. 23 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I don't think we 24 should have 737.14 about discovery in trial, and if

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there's rules about discovery in small claims court then
2
  let's just use those but not make some special discovery
  rules for this kind of claim. If we do make special
  discovery rules for this kind of claim, I don't think we
  should say, "Reasonable discovery shall be permitted," but
5
  we might say "may be permitted." For a case that's
   supposed to be concluded with as rapidly as these are,
  with amounts in controversy as low as these are, the idea
  that discovery shall be permitted to me seems burdensome.
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   I think it ought to be the exception where discovery is
   permitted instead of 'the rule.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else --
12
   yeah, Gene.
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14
                 MR. STORIE: I thought it was a little
   ambiguous as to whether the justice can send out discovery
15
   if the justice gets to develop the facts. I mean, I don't
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   think we mean that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Not intended for
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19
   the judge to send out --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No.
                                               No.
21
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- discovery? Okay.
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                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Does "develop the
   facts" mean anything other than may ask questions during
   trial?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's what
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we intend, may ask questions, try to understand what the 2 case is about. I think probably a lot of you that are used to trials with lawyers on both sides may not appreciate how difficult it is to understand what's going on with two pro ses before you and it's --6 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Been there. Municipal 7 judge. 8 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, that happens 9 in district court all the time for the judges to ask 101 questions. I'm just wondering if this gives power beyond 11 that. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We tried to track 12 the existing language in the Small Claims Court Act that 13 the Legislature has already promulgated that the JPs are familiar with, and that's why it's written like that, just 15 16 to track that language. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Okey-dokey. 18 Anything else? Yeah. 19 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: But, again, following on 201 David's point, you do that in other cases, in other issues 21 already, right, without a corresponding rule? Why do you need it here? 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I'm not sure 23 24 that -- I'm not sure it's always done universally in all cases in JP court. I know that it's done in small claims 25

court because the rule permits it, but if you look at the justice court rules, there's nothing there that would seem to specifically provide for this, so I'm not sure that that's universally done across the state by all courts.

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So would the promulgation of this rule and this specific kind of action then send the message to JPs in other actions that they lack such a power?

mean, there's a big inference there. I don't know that it would. I don't think that I would get that inference necessarily. We're only working with these rules. We're not amending the others. If we were amending the 500 series today, I would put this rule in the 500 series because I think this would be advantageous to have it in the existing civil rules, but, you know, for these set of rules I think this improves the rules and makes it more workable. It's to ensure justice, ensure that you get the story of what's going on, is the whole point.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, I don't think that a justice of the peace that wanted to find out what was going on would need this rule to do that, and to me it's going to start encouraging lawyers to ask for discovery in justice courts, which I think is a bad idea.

And this is a nonrecord court, right? 1 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 3 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: So we don't have any record to review or transcript of proceedings. The check 5 that is built in is the appeal to the county court trial de novo, and I just think that we ought not micromanage these sorts of proceedings, and let them proceed ahead, and if there's a problem then that will have to be handled with an appeal to county court, but when we're talking about \$10,000 or less at issue, cost becomes a giant 11 factor, and it's just not fair to burden these parties 12 with additional costs to get this relatively small dispute 13 resolved. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's have some 14 comments about .15, effective writ of possession. 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. "If the 16 judgment for the landlord for a possession of the leased 17 18 premises becomes final, any order to repair or remedy is 19 vacated and unenforceable." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Seems uncontroversial to 20 21 me, but --22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no, but go ahead. Any comments about it? Yeah, Frank. 24 25 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, we all know what final

judgment means, but do the litigants? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The task force 3 wrote this rule several different ways. One way we said it, "if it is not appealed." I don't remember. There 5 were several ramifications. This was considered to be --"becomes final" was considered to be the best way to do it because you didn't want to put a burden on the landlord to actually request and pay for the writ of possession. You just want the tenant's rights to appeal have been 10 terminated, or I'm not saying that right. You want his right to appeal to have expired. At that point the tenant 11 is going to be evicted, so the order to repair is kind of 12 pointless at that point. So that's the point of the rule, 13 but you don't want that to happen until the tenant's appeal has been exhausted, because if it goes to county 15 court on appeal then obviously this separate judgment of 16 17 the JP court is going to remain in effect while the appeal is -- of the eviction is working its way up. 18 19 MR. GILSTRAP: But it's not final. 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Tenant still has right to possession. MR. GILSTRAP: But it's not final. 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: What's not final? 23 24 MR. GILSTRAP: That separate judgment. 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, the judgment

under these rules is going to be final. The appeal of the eviction rules, once that becomes final and the tenant is 3 going to be evicted, then that stays the enforcement of the order to repair or remedy. But if the tenant perfects his appeal on the eviction -- and the eviction is going to 5 6 be a part of what's going on here. 7 That's what I'm saying. MR. GILSTRAP: the tenant perfects his appeal on the eviction, the order 9 for possession is not final. 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's correct. 11 MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's vacated. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Comments 13 14 on .16? 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: This is just for 16 county court. This is part of the statute, or part of the 17 "The suit shall be tried de novo in the county or bill. district court. Judgment shall be rendered. An appeal of 18 19 a judgment after justice court under these rules takes precedence in county court and may be held at any time 20 21 after the 8th day after the date the transcript is filed in county or district court." That's not really a JP 22 23 issue, but it's in the statute, so we put it in. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any comments on that? 25 Why do you say "a judgment MR. MUNZINGER:

shall be rendered"? I mean, that's what courts do. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think 3 that's what the statute says. I think that we took that from either the 700 rules or the 500 rules. That's the same language. Let me see if I can find that. It must be 5 6 in the 500 rules. 550 or something like that probably. We took it from 591. So that's why it's like that. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments about that? 9 Judge Lawrence, thank you and the task 10 11 force; and, Wendy Wilson, thanks for sitting here today. Really terrific job under trying circumstances, and you're 13 probably ready for a drink right now. 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm ready for an 15 adult beverage, yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. 16 17 (Applause) CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We are going to be 18 meeting tomorrow. We have a lot of really important 20 things to talk about tomorrow. I mean, everything is 21 important, but so make every effort to get here if you can; and one of the things that we're going to talk about, and if y'all have a chance tonight to read, it's the 24 Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System 25 and the American College of Trial Lawyers have come up

with some proposed rules and some case flow management 2 quidelines, and the purpose of our discussing it is twofold. One, the Court is -- you may recall, about a 3 4 year ago we had sort of an initiative with Jeff Boyd's subcommittee that we're trying to think of ways to improve 5 our system, and my read of these rules is there are some 6 ideas in here that are worthy of our consideration; and secondly, the institute and the college would like our feedback to them as they go about trying to talk about these -- this project and these proposals. The institute 10 is chaired by Becky Kourlis, who is a former justice at 11 the Colorado Supreme Court, and the American College 12 devoted a lot of resources to this project. So that's one 13 of the things we're going to go over tomorrow, and we're not going to have a lot of time to spend on it, but I'll 15 try to highlight some things that I think we should talk 16 about, and then next, our next meeting we can come back 17 and talk about it in more depth, and then we have the 18 recusal rule that we have to talk about. We've got the 19 civil cover sheets, and we've got the juror -- juror 20 21 questions during deliberations, so a lot of really 22 important things. And we'll see you tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock. We're in recess. 23 Thank you. 24 (Meeting recessed at 4:58 p.m.)

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2	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION							
3	MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE							
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6								
7								
8	I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand							
9	Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported							
10	the above meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee							
11	on the 20th day of November, 2009, and the same was							
12	2 thereafter reduced to computer transcription by me.							
13	I further certify that the costs for my							
14	services in the matter are \$1,960.00.							
15	Charged to: The Supreme Court of Texas.							
16	Given under my hand and seal of office on							
17	this the 8th day of December, 2009.							
18								
19	D'LOIS L. JONES, CSR							
20	Certification No. 4546 Certificate Expires 12/31/2010							
21	3215 F.M. 1339 Kingsbury, Texas 78638							
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