MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE June 12, 2009 Taken before D'Lois L. Jones, Certified Shorthand Reporter in Travis County for the State of Texas, reported by machine shorthand method, on the 12th day of June, 2009, between the hours of 9:03 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., at the Texas Law Center, 1414 Colorado, Room 101, Austin, Texas 78701.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody ready to get going? All right. Welcome to another meeting, this time at the State Bar, which has the longest conference setup known to man. I need binoculars to see Jackson down there, and Roger.

We've got a new project for the subcommittee that deals with Rule 18, which is recusal and disqualification. In light of the Supreme Court -- U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Caperton vs. Massey, which most of you are probably familiar with, but deals with recusal when it intersects with campaign finance contributions, and you may recall -- some of you may recall 10 years ago we studied that very issue and spent a lot of time on it and then sent it to the Court with our recommendations. Justice Peeples also did some independent work with the chief judges and came up with a report himself, independent of ours, and sent it to the Court; and shortly after that the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Republican Party of Minnesota vs. White case, which dealt with an initial speech and whether or not the so-called announce clause of one of the Canons of Judicial 23 Conduct was constitutional, holding that it was not, and 24 that a judge could announce his position on public issues, but in the -- in an opinion by Justice Kennedy,

coincidentally, the author of the Caperton decision, Justice Kennedy raised the issue of recusal when a judge announced a position that then came before his or her court so that our Court, the Supreme Court, thought that we should re-examine recusal in light of the White case, and that thought has been lingering now for several years without a formal request from the Court for us to do anything.

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Now, in light of Caperton, the Court is asking us to go back and re-examine our Rule 18 dealing with recusals and disqualifications and take into account both Caperton and the White case and discuss it in full committee and then make a recommendation to the Court So the lucky draw on that weighty topic goes to Richard Orsinger's subcommittee that covers Rules 15 through 165a, and the members of that committee are the vice-chair Frank Gilstrap, Alex Albright, Elaine Carlson, Nina Cortell, Professor Dorsaneo, Carl Hamilton, Tommy Jackson, Pete Schenkkan. If anybody else is interested in that issue, those are the people to contact. Having said that, it's time for the status report from Justice Hecht.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: First let me 23 welcome Justice Johnson, my colleague here this morning. He's here to help us with judicial foreclosure rules, and let me just go over a little legislation that passed and a whole lot that didn't so we can be in a celebratory mood this morning. There is a bill that requires the Supreme Court to adopt rules taking into account privacy of parties in litigation. We have that recommendation from the committee under submission, so we're still thinking about that. That's one new bill that requires rule-making, and the only other one is a bill that amends the Property Code to require some particular hearings in justice courts and a requirement that we promulgate rules by January the 1st to accommodate that, and I don't think that will be too difficult for us to do.

In sessions past we have had a number of bills that required Supreme Court rule-making, but this session those were the only two that passed. Other bills that did not pass that would have required rules, Senator Wentworth's bill on jury charges regarding the question of taking notes and the jurors asking questions during the trial did not pass, and so we have the committee's recommendation on those issues, and I think we will take action on those recommendations by the fall.

Senate Bill 992, Senator Duncan's court reorganization bill, a very good idea. As usual any reorganization of the Texas courts would be a good thing, but it did not pass. Senator Wentworth had another very good idea, which was to look at the jury selection process

in 254 counties and come up with standard rules governing the selection of the venire in every county. 3 Unfortunately, we think that would take quite -- quite a bit of time and resources, probably a full-time person for 5 at least a year, and while it's a very commendable effort, it requires resources that the Legislature did not 6

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commend.

Senator -- I mean, Representative Hartnett's bill to change the process server process did not pass. 10 You may know that we have a Process Server Review Board instituted by the Court that looks over private process servers, looks at their qualifications and decides who can automatically serve privately civil process in the courts. 14 That didn't pass. Some other interesting legislation, Representative Dunnam had a bill to require this committee's recommendations and the Court's actions on them to be approved by a resolution of the Legislature 18 before they take effect. That was not voted out of 19 committee. The bill has been introduced before and got to various stages in the process, but this time it stalled in committee.

Senator Corona and others had a bill, again, 23 encouraging protection of personal information of litigants in the civil justice process, so we need to take a look at that, even though it didn't pass. Senator

Watson would have required the Supreme Court to announce its votes on petitions. It was voted out of committee, but did not pass the Senate. There was a bill in the Senate to abolish the Court of Criminal Appeals. It did not pass. There was a bill to change the way judges are selected in Texas, and unfortunately it did not pass, which would impact our response to Caperton, but it didn't pass. There was — there were three bills on substantive issues on which the Court did not have a position. One bill would have reviewed — would have changed the way the burden of proof is allocated in mesothelioma cases, did not pass.

Another bill would have changed the Court's decision in the Entergy case, which has to do with who is a covered employee on a job site; and the third bill we refer to as the Fleming Foods bill, introduced by Senator Duncan, which would changed the Court's unanimous decision in 1999 that says that in interpreting a recodified statute you do it the same as you would any other statute, and you take first its meaning on its face. The recodification procedure bills all say that no substantive change is intended, but the Fleming Foods case says, well, maybe one is not intended, but the public has to go by what's in the books and not by what's in the archives. The Legislature has attempted to change the decision in

the Fleming Foods case a couple of times. This time the vote was only 147 to nothing in the House of Representatives and 29 to 1 in the Senate, and Governor Perry vetoed it.

Then there was my personal favorite, House Bill 4548, which would have amended the Government Code to require judges on the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals to recuse in any case in which during the past four years the judge had accepted a political contribution of a thousand dollars or more from a lawyer in the case or anybody in the lawyer's law firm or any employee of the law firm or the party or any employee of the party or any PAC that had anything to do with the party. We were very much in favor of this bill because it was going to give us some downtime and help us — help us employ the retired judges, but it didn't pass, despite our best efforts.

We made a minor change in Rule 6.06 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure to ensure that the opinions of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals are published and available for lawyers in the grievance process, and, of course, that's very important to those lawyers. And we are currently engaged with an enormous number of other people in a review of the entirety of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Justice

Johnson is the liaison for that. Kennon is working with him on that. The Court is plowing through those changes, which have been very thoroughly debated by a number of committees of the Bar and others, and we hope to finish that process end of the year or next year as soon as we I believe that's it. can.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How about the appellate e-filing?

Yes, the appellate HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: e-filing on which we worked assiduously the last session has hit a little technical snag in the development of the software programs necessary to implement it. contractor working on those programs has changed, but we are still moving ahead as quickly as we can. At the same time we are looking very carefully at the rollouts of electronic filing in the circuits. The Tenth Circuit went to electronic filing about six months ago, the Fourth Circuit about four months ago. Now the Fifth Circuit is going to electronic filing. I think they have a comment period until August of this year, and then they will begin to require e-filing in those courts.

So we're still pushing ahead on that, but we 23 have deferred further work on the rules that we presented at the last meeting until we get a good idea from the technical people what direction we're going to go and what our timing is. A lot of the work on this general matter of electronic filing in the appellate courts has been -- has already been done in the Federal system, but just to make this brief statement about it, they have a different situation in that they have -- they're working to good success for a long time on electronic filing in the trial courts, and so the electronic filing in the circuits is a smaller step.

We have been working on electronic filing in the trial courts for a long time, but we have a long way to go because of the diversity of our courts and the difference in the resources available to them and the difficulties in coordinating that effort, but the electronic filing in the trial courts is moving ahead. It's in 30 counties, 70 percent of the cases or something.

MS. PETERSON: 32 counties, uh-huh.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 32 counties, 70 percent of the population or something like that is covered, so we've made a lot of progress, but we still have a little ways to go.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you,

Justice Hecht. Just one thing about scheduling, at 10:00
o'clock this morning my phone is going to ring, and it's
going to be a Federal judge from Arkansas who insists on
talking to me at 10:00 o'clock, so Justice Hecht will take

over the presiding of this, and then we're going to take a little shorter lunch break than usual today, probably 45 minutes, so that we can recess at 4:45 this afternoon.

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Having said that, the first item on our agenda is the Judicial Foreclosure Task Force proposed amendments to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 735 and 736, and Kennon Peterson is going to take us through that. This is Judge Yelenosky's subcommittee with Lamont Jefferson, Frank Gilstrap, Judge Lawrence, and Pete Schenkkan serving on it, and we have -- I would like to say distinguished guests with us today, Mike Baggett and Tommy Bastian, who also will weigh in on this. So Kennon.

I'm just really going to turn the floor over to Mike and Tommy, but before I do, I wanted to mention one other bill that would have required rules if it had become law. It's House Bill 1976, with a companion by West, Senate Bill 237, and House Bill 1976 would have amended the Property Code to require the Court to adopt rules establishing expedited foreclosure proceeding for use by property owners association in foreclosing an assessment lien of the association. So there would have been more work for this task force to do that is already on its third meeting to work on these Rules 735 and 736, and with that I'll just turn it over to Mike Baggett and Tommy Bastian.

MR. BAGGETT: Okay. You should have before you several -- one is three pages with a border around it. I'm going to go to those first, and it says "Rule 735-736 history." So if you have that, that's what I'm going to be going down. Kind of sad when we come here and we have to talk about history, but these rules have been around for a while, and Judge Hecht just told me they've never been appealed, and I said "Good, maybe they'll stay that way." So, anyway, these deal with foreclosure. They're as much about the foreclosure process as they are what happens in this proceeding, so probably a little bit of that will help understand how it all fits.

when the voters in Texas for the first time approved home equity lending. We were the only state in the union that didn't have it, so we got it. As a part of that approval in the Texas Constitution there was a requirement for the Texas Supreme Court to draw the rules to have — result in an order that allows you to proceed with foreclosure, and so we did that back in 1996, '97, '98. We had a task force then. That task force, like the one that continues, is very diverse. We have representations on the consumer's side, the lender's side, the Bar, pro bono. In fact, many of the pro bono lawyers participate actively in this. The mortgage companies, title companies, it's a

very, very broad-based committee that we try to get every possible interest that might be in there under the tent so we can get it all done together and everybody will agree on it so we can make a recommendation here after all those various components have weighed in.

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One of the things that we're going to be -we have to be very careful about is we've got 150 years of law, real estate law on titles to property, et cetera. Obviously foreclosures impact those titles, so we've got to be very careful that we don't do anything that interferes with the certainty and marketability of titles, however we come out, and I think everybody on those committees has agreed with that. So basically what happened on 735 and 736 originally back in the home equity, the only issue that we have before us is whether you get an order. That's the only issue, and the order, all the order says is that you proceed with foreclosure, and you do all the things you would have done anyway. it's an extra order on the front end to make sure people know what's happening, they get notice, they get a chance to come in and fuss if they want to and so forth. we're doing is adding to the process, not taking away from it.

And if there is a contest of a foreclosure, in this case what this really does contemplate is if you

1 get a volume of these and there's no answer filed, you don't want to clog up the dockets and create problems, but if somebody has a real issue with anything, they can file a lawsuit in another district court that -- and they file a notice of that in the court where this order application is pending, it's automatically abated and dismissed without prejudice, automatic, and you flip over there to the court that's got all the normal issues you've got in a foreclosure. So it's designed in essence to help with the dockets and so forth, and what's happened is we've gotten a lot of judges, a lot of clerks, coordinators, presiding judges, and so forth to get involved in this so we'll know mechanically how it's working and not working for the benefit of moving it through the court and the people who are affected by it. So those passed and became 16 law back in the '96, '97, '98 time frame.

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The '98 Legislature then came along and added to it reverse mortgages; and if you have a reverse mortgage and you want to foreclose on it, we added to the Rules 735 and 736 the applicability to reverse mortgages, still the same concept, the same structure, and the same process.

And then as we went along we started seeing issues and so forth, so we -- ad valorem taxes is what this is really triggered by. It's going to be added to

it, so if you have a foreclosure of ad valorem taxes you've got to go in now and get an order first from the court allowing you to go forward with foreclosure, and now it's being applied to ad valorem taxes, so after we finished home equity and reverse mortgages we got the committee back together again and worked on ad valorem taxes, and the interesting part about ad valorem taxes — transfer of tax liens, okay.

The interesting part about that is these ad valorem taxes have priority on other liens, and if they're coming in and being foreclosed and the other lienholders, the lenders or whoever who would otherwise be first and prior, are primed by these liens. So there's a real need to give a lot more notice to make sure everybody knows that and they can come in and take care of it. They used to be totally judicially foreclosed, but that got changed to nonjudicial like the rest of them, so this is going back in and adding -- all we're doing here is adding an order again now applicable additionally to ad valorem tax liens that have a priorty on the property. So that's really what we're doing. That's sort of the history and how we got here.

Now, the second page for the rules committee, at the top talked about a little bit to give you a little background on foreclosure and how they fit

with all this. Texas has nonjudicial foreclosure historically, which means the judiciary doesn't really get involved in it. We got involved in it under these rules, home equity, and as I talked about, reverse mortgages and 5 now ad valorem tax liens, but basically it's covered by 51.002 of the Property Code in the contractual documents. We've had that for 150 years. Now, as I said earlier, all we're doing to this -- this whole process still has to proceed in the same fashion it has for 150 years, just on the front end you've got to go get this order, and all the order does is allow you to proceed with foreclosure.

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The reason I emphasize this is a lot of judges who see this think when they sign that order, that's the foreclosure. It is not the foreclosure. it is is an additional order you get to allow you to go through the process that we've been going through for 150 Obviously when the economy gets bad and homeowners are more at risk of defaulting, et cetera, the judges, everybody, is more concerned about that because they don't want the newspapers obviously coming down to say, "Why did you do this" and "Why did you do that," but most of them didn't really understand that all we're doing is adding more due process, more protections by doing this, and we're not taking anything away from the old system we had already.

And to give you more of an idea, the bullet point, the way it works on foreclosures, big picture, 3 Tommy has got a lot more detail about all the notices that $4 \mid \text{have got to be given and so forth, but basically the way}$ it works, you have a contractual relationship, you have a note, and the deed of trust, and there has to be an event of default. If there's an event of default, sometimes monetary, sometimes not paying taxes, whatever it might be, that event of default triggers the right to start the foreclosure process, but you've got to have that event of default first.

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Texas, we're a lien state, not a title state. You cannot -- a lender can't do anything to the 14 property unless there is a clear event of default that allows the process to start, so the way this works is 16 there's an event of default, whatever it might be as defined by the documents. Once that happens and you want to proceed with a home equity, reverse mortgage, ad valorem tax lien, you've got to file this application under 735 and 736, and you'll see a lot of detail in those rules, and what we've done to a certain extent is extend the details in the papers that have got to be filed.

And if you'll look at all those materials, more than half of that is just the form, and the form covers all the things that a lender needs to do in order to establish that default to proceed, and it's really protecting the borrowers more than anything else, but we had a lot of input from the court coordinators, the clerks, the presiding judges, how do we do this the best way we can possibly do it to facilitate it, not clog it up, because the judges, a lot of them don't understand how it works and they don't want to be reading about it in the paper, which I thoroughly understand. So you'll see more detail in what's filed, and if what's filed is properly done, then they just -- should just issue this order, and the order, all the order says is you can go forward with the right to proceed with foreclosure, period. That's all it is, and that's what this rule says.

So once they get their order, they do what they do normally otherwise, and that's what it's all about, and a lot of the confusion and angst about it from the judiciary was "If I sign this and you go out and foreclose on the house tomorrow, I'm going to read about it in the paper." Well, that's not factually what happens. In fact, we're helping the process, giving more notice and so forth, so all that's very important.

So once that order is done then you do what you normally do, and most of you probably know this, you give notice of foreclosure on the first Tuesday, 21 days notice. Then you go out and have it at the courthouse and

you foreclose, but it's after there's an event of default, which has got to be sworn to in this paper. The order is issued and then they give another notice that the foreclosure is 21 days before the first Tuesday of every month, so none of that's changed.

So big picture, 735 and 736 are working. I think this has helped make them work better with a lot of different input from different people, and I guess we do too good a job, Judge, and maybe we don't want to keep adding orders all the time, but that's kind of what's happened, and as we add them, every time we go back and we see all the constituents that are involved and get their input and clean it up a little bit more as we go along, so that's what's happened.

In the ad valorem taxes in particular, it's very important that there's really good due process notice sent out, because these ad valorem taxes statutorially have priority over other liens and deed of trusts against the property. So you've got to give very good notice to other people who -- other lenders who have a lien on that property, and they have a right to come in and do whatever they want to do to protect their liens, and so it's very important that you do that. That's one of the issues we spent a lot of time with, so I think it's working.

You will see the changes that we made. The

committee was unanimous with all the these various components, and it took a long time. We've been working on this for about two years, and the problem is, is we wanted to get everybody in there and get everybody to agree and agree to go forward, and we wanted the input of about how's it working and what can we do to make it work better and improve it and so forth. So that's what you've got today, is the third iteration directed by the

Legislature to go forward with these rules. I do think they're working, and I do think they help the courts and facilitate the process, but they add — add some expense, some notice, some due process, but, you know, we need that, and that's kind of where it is. That's what we did, and it's an overgeneralization, but that's what it is.

You want to add anything, Tommy?

MR. BASTIAN: No. No, we will certainly answer any questions, because as you see, it's a 26-page rule, though I will tell you that 14 pages of that are promulgated forms to try to channelize the process. So again, this rule works on the premise that the applicant, which is basically the lender, is going to get their order to go forward with the foreclosure if the borrower never files a response. If the borrower files a response then there is a hearing. Mike didn't talk about that. There is a hearing, though the only issue to be considered is

whether you can proceed. The borrower always has the opportunity any time in this process up to the Monday before the foreclosure sale to go file a lawsuit in district court, Federal court, wherever it is, that automatically abates this order. So there's all sorts of protections in this particular rule. It doesn't change the process in foreclosure like it's always been done. It only adds this one little piece right after the loan has been accelerated that you have to go get the order, and you get the order only if the borrower doesn't file a response or if they've had their day in court the judge overrules them, so that's how this rule is set up.

You have this colored -- basically a Power Point slide. We talked to lots of judges, lots of court coordinators, lots of clerks. It was very interesting that a lot of the court coordinators told us -- and Mike kind of hit on this -- a lot of judges thought when they signed that order that was the foreclosure, and so that's why we have this colored chart to show or try to emphasize everything that you see in blue is the normal foreclosure process. Then you get down into the green triangles, that's where this particular rule comes into play, and then it goes back to the regular foreclosure process. So this hasn't changed Texas law in any fashion, except for this little piece where you have to get the order to go

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Now, I think I would like to kind of put some more meat on the ad valorem taxes that Mike was talking about. That's probably -- well, let me tell you how the process really works. A taxpayer hasn't paid their taxes, a -- and I'm going to use the word "investor," because that's really who is doing this. Investor can go to the taxing authority and he can find out all of the people who hadn't paid their taxes. Immediately there is a telemarketing campaign or there is a print campaign to everybody on that list, and these investors say, "Hey, I've got a deal for you. The sheriff is going to come out and foreclose your home if you don't pay these taxes, and my deal for you is I'm going to go pay your taxes," and that's exactly what they do. the permission of the taxpayer they go pay the taxes.

Let's say the tax bill is \$5,000. They pay the taxing authority \$5,000. The taxing authority has to come up with this fancy little receipt that's required by the Tax Code, goes and gets it recorded in the real property records, but behind the scenes the investor who loaned the \$5,000 to the borrower to go pay the taxes has that tax lien transferred to him or her, but the borrower now signs a brand new note and a deed of trust, and that's what gets foreclosed. It's not under the Tax Code. I

mean, if a taxing authority had to do a foreclosure, it would have to be a full blown judicial foreclosure because they have this new note and this new deed of trust, and they can come in and do this nonjudicial foreclosure under the power of sale under that deed of trust.

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Now, the interesting thing is the taxing authority was paid \$5,000. Lots of times you'll see the note that the borrower signs, 7,500, 8,000, \$9,000. Borrower doesn't pay. When he doesn't pay, that taxing -that investor tax lien or transferred tax lien, property tax lien, is called a bunch of different things, and they come in and foreclose. When they come and foreclose, it used to be that they could foreclose and wipe out a first lien that had been on the land title records for 10 years before because they have this priority. That's what this rule is trying to get at. If you have one of these transferred tax liens, one of these property loan liens, you can no longer foreclose without getting a court order from the court. You also have to have personal service on that first lienholder that would have no reason in the world to go back and look at the land title records to see that somebody came in, paid this taxpayer's taxes 10 years later, and now has a lien that's superior to theirs. That's why there's personal service on the first lienholder.

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So you can kind of see how all the pieces
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            It's really a transferred tax lien of the ad
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  fit in.
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  valorem tax lien. If it stayed over here as an ad valorem
  tax lien, you would have to have a judicial foreclosure.
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  This treats that situation where there is this new note
  and this new deed of trust with the borrower that has the
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   power of sale sitting over in the deed of trust that lets
   you come in and do a nonjudicial foreclosure. Now you
  can't do that. You have to get an order, just like you
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10 have to do in a home equity, home equity line of credit,
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  or reverse mortgage.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Tommy.
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   Justice Johnson, any --
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                 HONORABLE PHIL JOHNSON: I think they did
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  all right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Yeah, they did fine.
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   Kennon, you were involved in this process at some point,
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   right?
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                 MS. PETERSON: Yes. Very recently got
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              I went to the meeting, the last meeting of the
20 involved.
  task force on May 26th, and assisted with incorporating
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   the edits at that meeting.
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                 MR. BAGGETT: You had a -- Kennon did a
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   great job.
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                               Absolutely.
                 MR. BASTIAN:
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1 HONORABLE PHIL JOHNSON: She understates what she does, significantly. 2 3 MR. BASTIAN: She had the computer. 4 MS. PETERSON: Yeah, I made the mistake of 5 bringing my laptop to the meeting. 6 MR. BASTIAN: One other interesting point that you might be interested in for this committee, the clerks are going to have to serve this notice. They serve it by simply preparing a citation, sending out the notice by regular mail, but somehow I got tagged with the 11 responsibility of going and explaining how this rule was 12 going to work to the county attorney and -- or county 13 clerk and district clerks association, and I understand you-all have had some interesting times talking to the clerks. For about three hours I was in a hot seat like 15 you'll never believe, but the most interesting thing after it was all over and they had a lot of input in this rule 17 was that, you know, "Somebody came and talked to us," and 18 they were very complimentary that we went and talked to 19 20 them about this rule. I just pass that on. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great, thanks. 22 MR. BASTIAN: So there's a whole lot of input from clerks. Lots of them have different opinions. 23 Let's see, what are there, 254 clerks? About 254 24 25 different opinions.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Thanks, Tommy. 2 The subcommittee has not -- Kennon, has not looked at this 3 yet; is that right? MS. PETERSON: It has not gone to the subcommittee separately from the full committee. Well, unless 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. anybody wants to make comments now, having just received these things, I think what we'll do is ask the subcommittee to look over it. They probably won't have any comments, but that would be unusual given this crowd 10 of lawyers, and then we'll bring it back for discussion 11 12 for the full committee at the next meeting, and we would love to have you guys here if you're available. Carl. 13 I just wanted to ask one 14 MR. HAMILTON: You said if the tax was only \$5,000 and the 15 l question. investor made him sign a note for eight, does the first lienholder have to pay the full eight to protect his lien 17 18 or just the five? 19 MR. BASTIAN: The full eight plus all the 20 foreclosure expenses, all the other expenses that get 21 tacked on. Regular foreclosure, if a regular attorney was doing a foreclosure -- or basically the foreclosure mills, 22 it costs about a thousand dollars to do a foreclosure. The foreclosures that you see that the transfer of tax 24 lien folks may be 3, 4, \$5,000, so the lender, if they 25

want to come in and protect them they have the right to When they come in and redeem they have to pay all 2 3 of the things, that's the \$8,000 plus all the foreclosure fees, plus the 25 percent premium or the 50 percent 5 premium depending when they come in and redeem. Oh, I forgot to tell you that the statute 6 7 says that the transfer of tax lien can charge up to 18 percent on these liens by statute. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Frank. 10 MR. GILSTRAP: Just one general comment that 11 might be helpful to air at this time. The thing that strikes me about this rule is it's so doggone long. I 12 13 mean, Rule 736 is already the longest rule in the rule This is going to kick it out to 12 pages in the rule book and be about half as long as the Rules of 15 16 Evidence for one rule. I just -- and it seems to me the result is kind of -- while the goal is due process, it's 17 kind of an opaque rule because there's just so much of it. 18 I'm just wondering if maybe any thought was given to maybe moving the forms into an appendix or something like that. 20 21 Would that tamper with the goals? 22 MR. BASTIAN: No, not at all. 23 No, not at all. We would have MR. BAGGETT: no problem with that. 24 25 MR. BASTIAN: The reason for the promulgated form is -- and this is kind of interesting. The Court ordinarily has told us what typically happens when one of these got filed. The court coordinator was instructed by most judges, "Well, you go get the rule and get the pleading and you look at them and you go off your checklist and if it meets the rule, then bring it to me as the judge." Then the judges -- and really we didn't have that much problem until you started seeing all the foreclosures in the headlines. Then things kind of changed.

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There is, I believe, 442 district judges.

Our law firm or part of our law firm does foreclosures, and so we kind of have to keep up with all the judges. We have a matrix of 103 judges that have their own special requirements that they add to the rule that they won't even consider one of your applications unless it meets these other requirements. We were told by Judge Davison and Judge Priddy, those are the two judges on our thing, "If you give me a promulgated form, I mean, where it's set out, and basically I can come in and say, okay, did the applicant follow the form, it has all the stuff in there that it's almost a summary judgment proof as far as the application and the declaration, then I'll feel comfortable in signing it because you've locked down all the loopholes to keep that newspaper or the media from

coming in and saying I foreclosed on somebody's house."
So that's why the rule is so specific.

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There's also a portion to this that's -that kind of underlines the rule. Securitization has changed the whole world of lending. Most folks are still in the world when the bank and the local savings and loan made the loan, where they made the loan, they originated it, they serviced it, and they foreclosed it. In the days of the world of securitization the loan is originated, and it's now stuck over in a security with a special purpose entity that nobody even knows anything about. This rule comes in and takes care of that and puts it into the real world, how it works now with securitization, and it even has a definition of "investor." The investor is actually the person who is going to suffer the risk of loss instead of that owner or holder of that note. That concept is almost obsolete in today's world with securitization. This rule takes care of that.

Texas is the first state that basically said we're going to change our foreclosure process so that it's the mortgage servicer that does the foreclosure, because in the real world that's who does the foreclosure. It is not the person who owns the note or the holder of the note. You can't even find out who that is. Michigan has followed that so that in Texas we don't have the problems

you're seeing in all these other states where they're having problems with foreclosures because you have to plead it is the owner and holder of the note, and nobody knows who the owner and holder of the note is because it's securitized, and most states are now going to the point of it's the mortgage servicer that does it. This rule is going to be leading all the other 50 states on how you do a foreclosure in a securitization.

MR. BAGGETT: Securitization, the long and short of it, you take a hundred different loans, put them in a pool, and they're administered by a servicer. That doesn't fit any of our old processes and so forth. This rule, the reason it's that way, is it makes sure that you cover those bases so that servicer knows what's going on, and otherwise you can't even find who the holder or owner is because it's got a hundred properties in it sold all over the world.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay, great. Thank you very much. Great report. Yeah, Judge Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I just have a couple of questions of the task force group. I see here in 736.15 that the judge has to state a reason why they're denying the application, and I'm -- I don't have a problem with that. I do that already, but that usually then lets the mortgage company amend to cure whatever it is I saw as

a defect. You're not letting them do that under this rule, is my reading of it, so they're just going to have to file an entirely new proceeding if, for example, they forget to attach the nonmilitary affidavit. Is that my understanding of how it works?

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MR. BASTIAN: That is correct, because after you turn them down two or three times they're going to learn, well, maybe we need to follow the rule instead of doing sloppy lawyering. That's the bottom line.

me as a waste of judicial resources if all it is is the failure to include one document that they then send in and then I can sign the application, that, you know, we have to close the file, we have to reopen the new file, we've got to serve everything again, just for the failure of one document that is easily corrected. So I just wonder why the committee thought that that would be better.

MR. BASTIAN: Because it is a promulgated rule that says this is what you've got to do, and if you can't do it, then pox on you, because that's the self-discipline. If you say you're going to have to do it again, they have to do it three times. They're going to have clients on their back and say, "Why am I having to redo it because you didn't attach this?" Then your job is going to be taken care of, and you're not going to have to

go back and hold somebody's hand and say, "You've got to do this extra." That's the real reason behind it. mean, you have a great argument, but that's the flip side, is if you're told exactly what to do and you can't do it, then you need to suffer the consequences. Accountability That was part of the basis of was part of this rule. this.

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Is that covered in here?

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And then I saw 9 in here that you included a provision of what happens when the person dies, which is good, because that had been a hole in the previous rule, but I -- maybe I just missed Is there anything in here about when the property has already been sold? Because sometimes we'll get these foreclosure proceedings, and the property has already been sold, and so I'm not really sure why they're attempting to foreclose on a debtor who has already sold the property.

Well, in that particular case MR. BASTIAN: it's not part of that dead person's estate to begin with, and number two --

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, no. The debtor is still alive, and they sold the property, and they're still coming in trying to foreclose.

MR. BASTIAN: Well, in that particular case has the person been released from their obligation?

Because the way the rule is set -- I mean, the way foreclosure is set up, everybody who is obligated for the debt, even though you've sold the property to somebody else, you have to be named as part of the pleadings. You may have sold it to somebody else, but if you're still obligated for the debt, you're going to be served with this order because you're still obligated for the debt. That lien wasn't released. Now, if the lien was released and somebody is suing you then it was a mistake and somebody -- it's just a mistake.

wasn't clear. My question is -- and perhaps I was wrong in how I view this -- if the property has already been sold to a third person, it seems to me that the third person needs to get notice of this expedited foreclosure proceeding, and they're not giving notice --

MR. BASTIAN: Well, they will if they're obligated for the debt, but if they aren't obligated for the debt, no, they won't, because the lender won't know -- you won't know about that.

MR. BAGGETT: But if you sell property the liens stay in place against the property. They don't get released, and they've got to go get a title policy. It will show all those liens, and they know just because it's sold doesn't impact the liens against the property. It's

sold subject to those liens, so it doesn't really impact 2 it, just a sale. 3 MR. BASTIAN: You'll see it two ways. Somebody can assume the note. If they assume the note, 4 5 but that -- the person that they bought it from still may be liable on that note; and under the foreclosure process because it has to be so specific, that person who is still obligated for the debt has to be made a party to the foreclosure process because they're still obligated under 10 the deed of trust; and this new person, unless they assumed that obligation they don't get notice because they 11 aren't obligated for the debt. That debt was in the real 12 property -- really what happened is probably some title 13 company missed it or it was a deal that wasn't closed at a 14 15 title company. Somebody sold it to somebody else and never told them, "Well, wait a minute, you also got to 16 17 take care of that lien that's still sitting out there." What you're talking about is really the rescue scam folks 18 19 that are coming in and doing nasty stuff. 20 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. Well, 21 and I don't know how it ends up, but sometimes the property is sold and the lien is not taken care of, and I 221 always thought that you should notify the new buyer of the property, but you're telling me that they don't have to 24

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here.

1 MR. BASTIAN: Because that person isn't 2 obligated for the debt. If you sued that person they weren't obligated for the debt. Now, you've violated Fair 3 | Collection Practices Act, because you're trying to collect 4 5 from somebody who is not obligated for the debt. They're going 6 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 7 to get to foreclose on the third person's property, without notice. 8 9 But when they buy it, they're MR. BAGGETT: 10 going to get a title policy. They're going to run the records when they buy it. They'll get all that. 11 Yeah, they have constructive 12 MR. BASTIAN: knowledge that that loan is in the land title records, 13 14 that third person that you're talking about. Now, whether 15 they know it or not, they have constructive knowledge 16 because that lien is recorded in the real property records, and it has not been released. 17 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 18 Oh, no, no. 19 know that the original mortgage company has the right. 20 just thought you had to give notice to the third person. 21 If you're telling me I don't have to then that's okay. just thought that was a hole in the old statute that 23 doesn't seem to be corrected in this new proceeding. 24 MR. BAGGETT: You don't have to. 25 MR. BASTIAN: That's basically foreclosure

law for 150 years.

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MR. BAGGETT: Yeah.

MR. BASTIAN: You only give notice to the person who's obligated for the debt.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well,

that's -- when you -- I mean, I see people that the third

parties get brought into the lawsuits all the time, so

someone's giving them notice, but if you're saying we

don't have to that's fine.

Well, to be safe, I mean, MR. BASTIAN: again, you don't want to have any title -- it's simpler to do notice if you know about it than getting into a I mean, that's really what it comes down to, but lawsuit. the law is very clear and for 150 years, you only give notice to somebody who is obligated for the debt except for in the transferred tax lien situation where that first lienholder that had that lien on the property didn't even know about the transferred tax lien that appeared 10 years This Rule says you get notice, because there wasn't any reason in the world for you to go look at the land title records. If you buy property from that person, you're put on notice that you need to go down to the land title records and find out the state of that property. you're -- you know, out of ignorance or whatever it is, if it went through a title company, title company messed up

because they would have pulled that lien and said, "That lien hasn't been released. You've got to take care of it."

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. And then the last question I had was in terms of this certified mail that the clerk's office is going to be sending out.

MR. BASTIAN: It's regular mail.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought it was certified. Under the old statute they send them out certified mail, and a lot of times they'll attach notices that clearly show that the homeowner has — is gone, all right, so the notice never actually went to anyone because it will say "unclaimed" or "moved, no forwarding address" or whatever, and if that evidence is in the file, what effect does that have?

MR. BASTIAN: Well, there's two ways we tried to attack that, and basically we adopt what happens in eviction, the property gets served. So if somebody is living in that house they are going to get served. That's going to trip the wire that somebody better go pay attention because this house is about to be foreclosed. So if that's a tenant that didn't know anything about it, that property is going to get served.

The part about the clerk, though, is there

is a Supreme Court case that says it is better service to send somebody -- United States Supreme Court case -- it is better to send somebody notice by regular mail than certified mail because what you see a lot of times, they've gotten so many certified mail letters from lawyers they ignore. One of our members did a test, and he had I think it was 38 cases where it looked like nobody had responded. He had the -- he had his court coordinator send out notices from his office about this hearing for the home equity loan, and what you thought was nobody was responding, I think 18 people showed up.

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That's why the notice comes from the clerk, not the law firm that is initiating the foreclosure. is coming from the clerk in the clerk's stationery regular So you have two ways to try to get to what you're doing, is it's coming from the clerk and then also the property gets served.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: What happens if the letter comes back and shows up in the court's file as a returned letter?

MR. BASTIAN: You're talking about the Jones case out of Arkansas, and we went around and around and 23 around and around and around on how a practical matter to do that. Part of the problem is in Texas foreclosure is so quick, but because the time -- you get that unclaimed

letter, many times in Texas the foreclosure process is 1 2 already done. Because it goes through the -- I don't know 3 if you've fooled with the green card stuff, because what happens, there's a whole set of rules from the post office on what happens if they attempt delivery, and those tape things that you see that says "unclaimed" or all of that, 7 what you probably don't know is those don't appear until the person has been gone for 18 months. If that person who moved gave a forwarding address to the post office, 10 the post office automatically under their rule sends it to that new address. 11 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Tommy, hang on for a I'm going to yield to Justice Hecht here for a 13 second. 14 few minutes, and I will return to you guys in progress. 15 Thanks. Sorry, Tommy. 16 MR. BASTIAN: Judge Christopher, since 17 you're the administrative law judge in Houston --18 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Oh, no, just 19 civil, civil administrative judge. 20 MR. BASTIAN: Well, your input would be very nice on this, because we're trying to make this rule work. 21 22 I mean, it still comes down to a kind of business by If we can head off 90 percent of the problems 23 exception. with this rule, then we've hit a home run. If there's aberrations like you're talking about then they'll just 25

have to come up -- you know, there's just no -- if you 2 tried to take care of every aberration it would be a 3 hundred pages long. 4 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well --5 MR. BAGGETT: We don't need a hundred pages. 6 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, for 7 example, there's a brand new Texas Supreme Court case that 8 talked about certified mail, which is good unless it shows 9 in the record that it wasn't accepted, so I just -- it seems to me it's still a hole. 10 MR. BASTIAN: Wasn't accepted or it was 11 I mean, there's -unclaimed? 13 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I can't 14 remember which it was truthfully, but they reversed a default recently on that point, and I can't remember 15 exactly what the notation said, so I just -- because this 17 is kind of a weird hybrid, it seems to me that we should address what happens if the letter does come back. 18 19 Let me make this suggestion. MR. BASTIAN: HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's all. 20 21 This chart, this tells you --MR. BASTIAN: this is kind of a -- it's kind of the business practice of 22 23 the mortgage servicing industry, but if you'll go through there you'll see how many times that borrower has been 24 contacted because this loan has been in default. One of 25

the reasons people ignore it is simply because I've gotten so much stuff, and they just -- it's unclaimed 3 because they already know what that is, and so they're not going to claim it. Yes, ma'am. 4 5 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: But the problem with 6 that is that the trial judge that's signing this is not going to be concerned about the other notices that the borrower got. They're going to be concerned about whether the borrower got the notice of this proceeding, and so what are you-all contemplating, if you're going to have 10 service by first class mail, what are you contemplating 11 equates to what you describe as the return of service? 12 Just that it's been placed in the first class mail and a 13 14 certain number of days has passed and that counts as a 15 basis for --16 MR. BASTIAN: The way it works is --17 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: -- completion of a form that says "return of service" or something like that? 18 19 MR. BASTIAN: The way it works is the clerk prepares a normal citation. The clerk mails it just like 201 21 they mail anything else. The 38 days and the next -- and 22 the next Monday starts running from the date that they put 23 it into the mail. They have mailed it first class mail. They have control of the notice process instead of the 24 25 applicant or the lender's lawyers.

1 There was a real concern on a lot of judges' parts that maybe some of the folks weren't really sending 3 the notices to the borrowers. I mean, we have a number of consumer plaintiff's lawyers. Fred Fuchs is on there. 5 Judge Priddy, who, as many of you probably know, was the guy who represented ACORN in the home equity litigation. I mean, he's a judge member, too. I mean, all those people were involved on trying to figure out how do we make sure people get good notice so that it meets due process, but it also doesn't bog down everything. 10 11 But you as a judge can deny MR. BAGGETT: the order. 12 That's exactly right. 13 MR. BASTIAN: 14 MR. BAGGETT: It's without prejudice. 15 can file it again, try it again, so just deny it. 16 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well --17 MR. BASTIAN: I mean, if you have a concern about sewer service, deny it and make somebody do it 18 19 again. You might just say, you know, "I suggest in this 20 particular instance because of some circumstances, maybe 21 Mr. Attorney, Miss Attorney, you might want to do this to assuage my concerns about whether there's good service." 22 23 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: totally support and understand the frustration of this 24 25 group that you're dealing with 442 district judges that

1 are -- or however many we have -- that all have different 2 peculiarities and --3 MR. BAGGETT: Only 103. 4 MR. BASTIAN: Only 103. 5 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 6 making a really long rule, and it seems to me that we 7 ought to cover all bases, and that adding in another 8 sentence or two about what happens if that does show back up into the court's file wouldn't hurt anything, and that 10 way you wouldn't have some of us saying it's okay and some 11 of us saying it's not okay. 12 Well, frankly, there isn't any MR. BASTIAN: -- there isn't any certified mail service on anybody 13 14 because the clerk is the one who serves it. 15 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, but still, like, for example, when my -- when we mail out notices to people, sometimes they get returned to us because it's a 17 bad address or the guy has moved or whatever, and it comes back, and it's in my file. The envelope comes back to me 19 and, you know, shows that it was not served. 20 MR. BASTIAN: You have a lawyer that hadn't 21 taken and shown you the U.S. Post Office rules that says 22 -- I mean, everything depends on whether that borrower has 23 actually given the U.S. Post Office a new change of 24 25 address, because that's kind of the key, but when -- for

18 months, the first 18 months after somebody has moved and given that change of address, the post office 31 automatically -- or they're supposed to. I mean, their rules say you send it. It only kicks back where you start getting that -- the notice "moved," "no address" or something like that, it only comes up after that 18 Now, if it comes back unclaimed, it just means 7 months. that the person refused to either go -- just refused to take it. That's a different story. 10 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, I'm 11 talking about our regular mail notices that we send out to 12 lawyers or pro ses right now, just regular mail, which is what this rule contemplates. Sometimes the envelope comes 13 14 back, and I can't imagine that that won't happen at some point, and I just think we ought to address it. 15 16 all I'm saying. 17 MR. BASTIAN: Okay. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Tom Lawrence. 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There's another 19 problem related to that. A lot of these foreclosures that I see, the evictions after the foreclosures, the tenant 21 shows up in court and the question is, "Did you know that 22 23 your landlords have been foreclosed on?" 24 "No, I didn't have any idea, but we did

receive a lot of mail, but we didn't open it," or "We just

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threw it away, it wasn't addressed to us," and they don't know anything about the foreclosure until they get a 3 three-day notice to vacate because the true owners are living somewhere else and have rented the property. 5 MR. BASTIAN: That's covered two ways. Number one is that property is served on their front door 6 that is addressed "to the resident of," doesn't say "the debtor." It says "the resident of" that property address. That's on the front door, so that tenant has that notice. It says "resident." It doesn't say "debtor" or anything 10 like that. 11 12 Number two, for every Federally related 13 loan, whatever that really means, is there is a new U.S. provision that says the -- you have to have -- the tenant has to have 90 days notice if you have one of these foreclosures before they have to move out. It's no more three days or the 30 days if you're a tenant. That is a 17 new Federal law. It's pretty badly drafted, and I think 18 it's S896, but for every -- and just about every loan now 19 is going to be a VA, FHA, Freddie Mac -- a Freddie Mac, 20 Fannie Mae loan, so that new law is going to affect it to 21 protect those tenants. 22 23 Hey, Tommy --MR. DOGGETT: HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But I'm not sure 24 that the -- I'm not sure that anyone knows that there is a

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tenant in that property necessarily, because in some cases
   the owner will have rented and moved off and not told
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  anybody.
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                 MR. BASTIAN: Oh, here is Robert. Robert
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  knows that rule better than anybody.
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                               I was just going to say, it
                 MR. DOGGETT:
   applies to all loans, and it means that a foreclosed
  property, the tenant gets to live out their full term of
  the lease. If the lease is up or expired, they still get
  90 days, just so you know. The law is even broader than
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   what Tommy is talking about. In other words, it's not
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   just Federally-related. It's actually any, any, mortgage
  loan whatsoever. The law does sunset, though, in 2012,
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  FYT.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Dee Dee is going need
  you to identify yourself for the record.
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                 MR. DOGGETT:
                               I'm sorry. Robert Doggett.
                                                            Ι
   do whatever Tommy says.
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                 MR. BASTIAN:
                               Yeah.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Any other -- yes,
   Judge Christopher.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Sorry.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          Again.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Just reading
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   over the rule, the clerk sends by first class mail, then
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the applicant does regular service and -- under 736.6 to
   the property address, right? And both of those returns
  have to be on file before I can sign the default.
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                 MR. BASTIAN:
                               That is correct. You'll have
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   all this whole litany of citations there so you can check
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   them and make sure it's done.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: So that's more
   due process than is currently given.
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                 MR. BASTIAN: Absolutely.
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                 MR. BAGGETT: Right.
                 MR. BASTIAN: With the clerk sending out the
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   notice instead of the way it is right now where the
   applicant's attorney or the applicant sends out the
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  notice.
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                 MR. BAGGETT: And the clerks have agreed to
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   this.
                 MR. BASTIAN:
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                               Yes.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Okay, and so
   if we're going through that process, you know, the hearing
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   won't be held within a short period of time because it
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   takes a while to get service, real service, as opposed to
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   just mailing people stuff, so it's going to delay things.
   I mean, as long as everyone understands that, I'm okay
   with it.
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                 MR. BASTIAN:
                               Well, what happens is --
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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's going to be a lot slower than the current system.

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MR. BASTIAN: The notice that the clerk sends out is 38 days and the next Monday. The notice that is posted on the property, I mean the property gets served, it's 20 days from -- and the next Monday from the date it was served, and so it may not slow down the process. Right now it's 38 days if the lawyer sends it out. Clerks say you're going to give me -- this rule also says the lawyer has to supply everything that the clerk needs to do these notices so they don't have to have somebody sit down and try to figure out, okay, who is the last known address, all of that other kind of stuff.

Clerks said "Give us that information," and they're going to get that under the rule so they can just prepare the citation. It goes out almost the same day. They told us, "We think we can send out the citation the same -- if you give us this information, we can send out the same day that application is filed." Then that means under this rule 38 days and the next Monday is when the response date is. Under the old rule it was 38 days and the next Monday when the attorney supposedly mailed it, and then if nobody files a response you can go on and sign the order.

So I'm not -- you're right, it may. It may

only because somebody didn't get on the ball until my process server or the sheriff or the constable didn't go 3 out and get that property sold the same day they got the citation from the clerk or from the attorney who had the 5 clerk prepare it and then send it to the process server under 103 to go get it served. 6 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Richard. 8 MR. MUNZINGER: I was looking at the definition of "investor" means for "a loan agreement that 9 10 is securitized." There is no definition of "securitized," which is not a verb that we would find in Webster's, and I 11 12 understand -- I think I understand what it means. just curious if you gave any thought to whether that verb 13 or some synonym for it should be defined and whether the 14 absence of a definition could create problems of a 15 substantive nature. 16 17 MR. BASTIAN: Of course. I mean, I quess we 18 get back to I think most folks kind of understand what 19 security -- I mean, we can go around and around on that. 20 MR. MUNZINGER: I don't mean it as a criticism. I was just asking you whether you-all debated 21 it and looked at it and --22 23 MR. BAGGETT: Oh, yeah, we debated it. 24 MR. BASTIAN: This rule has gone -- it started out because very few people even understand

securitization. They don't understand all the pooling, they don't understand the special purpose entity, they don't understand the GSC and how all those people fit in the process, and this rule tries to bring us into the -in the 20th century of lending, and securitization is this kind of amorphous idea of you pool all these loans and then you sell the right basically to receive the income stream that's coming off of those loans, and that's what we're trying to get at. I mean, one of our definitions would have taken up a half a page on "investor."

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MR. MUNZINGER: Are there Federal regulations that apply to these, either existing or contemplated? I was under the impression they were contemplating some.

MR. BASTIAN: Well, if it is a private label securitization you've got to record everything with the SEC. I mean, there will be a prospectus, there will be a pooling and servicing agreement. Everything that has to do with that particular securitization is filed with the SEC. Now, if it's a Fannie or Freddie, they don't have to file the stuff with the SEC, but their website --I mean, all of their documents are basically the same. 23 You can go on their website and pull up a sample of every kind of securitization that they do.

MR. MUNZINGER: Which is one of the reasons

-- I mean, I don't work in this area, but it just occurred to me that I think we all know what securitized means, but it was odd to me that the word is not defined and that it can have, I would suspect, substantive effects; and if a 5 purpose of the rule is to avoid problems, perhaps a 6 definition would be helpful; and I mean no criticism at all to the prior work. I'm just doing what I'm supposed to do. 9 I mean, if that's -- we've MR. BASTIAN: spent so much time we want it right, and if that's going 101 to be a problem, I think we debated it and didn't think 11 that particular term, again, because it is kind of this 12 generic term didn't need that kind of definition, because 13I really the key to that definition is who suffers the risk 15 of loss and who gets the money. Because that's what it's all about, who suffers the risk of loss and who gets the 16 money, and that's the investor. 17 18 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Any other 19 questions, comments? Okay. Well, this will go to the 2.0 subcommittee and back at our next meeting, and we thank Tommy and Mike and Justice Johnson for their efforts. 21 22 MR. BASTIAN: And Kennon. 23 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And Kennon. 24 MR. BASTIAN: Kennon with the computer. 25 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And we -- just

another note on the process, we had a similar task force, I think Mike was on it, Mike Baggett. I mean Mike --2 3 MR. BAGGETT: Tommy. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 4 No. 5 MR. BASTIAN: Barrett. 6 MR. BAGGETT: Yeah, Barrett. Barrett. 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Mike Barrett was on it, and -- but the whole idea from the very beginning was 8 to get people who are involved in the process to structure 10 the rule that works, so we appreciate this input, and we'll be back with details at the next meeting. Thank you 11 12 all for being here. You're welcome to stay or go. 13 MR. BAGGETT: Thank you. 14 MR. BASTIAN: Thank you. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 15 The next item on the agenda is poverty law issues, and just a word of introduction, the -- as part of the Court's continuing 17 interests in access to justice issues, the Court has a 18 hearing periodically to hear from those who are active in 19 those efforts about progress that's being made, problems 20 they're encountering, and what can be done to help. 21 the last meeting last fall it was suggested that there might be a couple of rules changes that would help with access to justice, and so we encouraged people -- someone 24 l 25 to write in about those issues to us, and when we got that

1 letter I referred it to the committee back in April and asked the committee to take a look at it. Meanwhile, the State Bar has done some looking at some of these issues, and Chuck Herring, an alumnus of this group -- is Chuck Yep, an alumnus of this very committee, has been involved in this, and we'll hear from Chuck. 6 7 I think MR. HERRING: Thank you, Judge. survivor of the committee is how I view it, and actually, 8 Pete Schenkkan I think is your subcommittee chair who is 10 going to raise some questions on this proposal, but I did I think survive 11 years on this committee in the Eighties 11 and Nineties, and it's a little disturbing to look around 12 and see people who were here then still here, but I am 13 glad that I'm not. It's wonderful work that you do, but, 14 boy, it's a lot of time and a lot of labor. What I've 15 been doing the last few years is serving on the Legal Services to the Board and Civil Matters Committee of the 17 State Bar, and that's why I'm here today. We have a 18 proposal before you on behalf of that committee and the 19 State Bar, which the State Bar board has adopted the same 20 proposal and recommended it for your consideration. 21 22 I'm speaking only on my -- on my own behalf today, but at the request of the committee, at the request of the chair, Andrew Strong, who is the new general 24 25 counsel of Texas A&M system, and on behalf of Judge

Livingston, Laura Livingston, who, of course, is the local district judge here in Travis County who is an expert on legal services and has spent a lot of time on this and is on the ABA standing committee and has worked on this.

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Here is the proposal. I'm so glad to come after that long rule that just has been proposed because we're talking 20 or 30 words. In my experience on the committee, we can only spend two or three days talking about 20 or 30 words, but the idea is this. We have sanctions rules that permit certain monetary penalty sanctions, and the idea of this proposal is to give an Those monetary penalty sanctions now go into the option. general fund of the county. You'll see there's some question about why, but that's what happens to them, is to give an option that is explicit in the rules that just says in the alternative, another alternative, another option, the court may direct those funds to the benefit of legal services to the poor in civil matters, and we have a number of different options, and there's not -- from our committee's perspective -- a great deal of magic in which option to consider, but we have provided one, and then Randy Chapman from the Texas Legal Services Center here, who has spent huge amounts of time at the Legislature working on the legal funding issues this session, is here and has -- always has some important insight.

In the materials that I hope have been handed out, the State Bar resolution is on page one, numbered page one of those materials, and you don't need to read all the "whereas" clauses, but the bottom part of that, the last paragraph really lays it out, and then the language that we have proposed is on page two. And the rationale, just for a moment, and all of you know this very viscerally because you're involved and sensitive lawyers in the community, I can't state it any better I think really than Justice O'Neill did in her recent opinion piece during the session, and the Supreme Court deserves huge credit from the legal services community for the work that the Chief Judge and the other judges did in helping to get a general appropriation from the Legislature, which, subject to that bill being signed, has passed, and we hope that we'll have those funds.

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Judge O'Neill, Justice O'Neill, said in her recent opinion piece during these tough economic times

Legal Aid can help people housed and employed and keep family's stable. More than a hundred thousand low income Texans are served by Legal Aid providers annually, including victims of domestic violence, the elderly and disabled. It's a safety net in Texas. Without it they might never recover. She also points out that for every dollar that is spent on legal services for the poor,

according to the Perryman study, there's a multiplier effect, and the overall annual gain to the economy is \$7.42.

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However, she says the Texas Legal Aid system is in danger of being decimated, and we all know that in general terms the numbers are incredibly startling. 2007 the projected revenue from IOLTA was going to be \$28 million. We have an eight million-dollar shortfall. There's 20 million. That's 2007. Interest rates, as you know, plummeted after that. The IOLTA revenue in 2008 was down to 12.2 million, and the projected revenue for this year from that 28 million projected in 2007, projected revenue is 1.5 million on IOLTA, so nine percent decrease. Huge impact on families, on individuals, on legal services She in her opinion piece recommended a general providers. appropriation of \$37 million, and darned if we didn't get It's 20 to 22 million, depending on a a large one. contingency, but we're still 15 million to 17 million short of what it was viewed as necessary.

So we have scrambled, and I'm on the funding subcommittee of the Legal Services to the Poor Committee, and we have scrambled to come up with as many creative ideas as we can to try to bridge the gap as much as we can, and that's why we're here with this proposal. I've spent an unhealthy amount of time on sanctions practice in

the past. I chaired the Supreme Court's statewide Task
Force Sanctions with Justice Pemberton. We wrote the West
Discovery Manual with Professor Albright as well, and
annually for some reason I do the sanctions talk for the
advanced discovery and evidence course, and I end up
reading hundreds of sanctions decisions. I don't know why
I ever got into this, but I want to mention just a little
context for this proposal.

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There are lots of sanctions rules and statutes in Texas. Most of them aren't used a lot, but there are quite a few. There are four I want to mention, and they are pages 5 to 12 of the materials. I put the key ones in there that I want to talk about. Rule 215, as you know, is general sanctions rule for discovery abuse. It has multiple subdivisions, which is part of the problem, and then Rule 191.3, that's the rule we adopted in 1998, the 1999 "new" rules as we call them, still do. That's the discovery certification rule, which says every time you sign a discovery request or a response you certify to certain things, basically that there is a reasonable basis in fact and law and no improper purpose, and the rule has its own sanction, Rule 191.3(e), and that says that when that certification is false without substantial justification, a sanction may be imposed under Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

That's the frivolous pleading statute in the Civil 1 2 Practice and Remedies Code. 3 Then we have Rule 13, which is, as you know, the groundless bad faith or groundless for harassment sanctions rule for pleadings in the Rules of Civil 5 Procedure, and it incorporates the sanctions out of Rule 6 7 So Rule 13 allows the same sanctions as in Rule 215.2(b). 215.2(b). Rule 191.3 allows the sanctions as provided as 8 in Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and 9 Rule 215 itself is very broad, and as you know, 215.2 says 10 "sanctions." It has some itemizations for the type of 11 violations addressed, says, "orders as are just," very 12 broad authorization. So that's sort of the background. 13 14 Chapter 10, Civil Practice and Remedies 15 Code, has, as you know, two sections of sanctions. One is 16 in 10.002(c), sort of the convoluted legislative 17 compromise we ended up with, and then section 10.004(c), 18 and (c)(2) is the provision that says one sanction a court 19 may levy if there is a violation of those certifications 20 under Chapter 10 is a penalty paid into court, penalty paid into court, because 191.3, the discovery certification rule, incorporates those sanctions; 23 therefore, a penalty paid into court could be a remedy if 24 there were a violation of 191.3, the discovery certification. So that's the background. Those are the 25

basic rules.

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None of the rules, of course, at present mention anything about legal services to the poor.

Probably Rule 215.2(b), which is so broad, "such orders as are just," is broad enough to permit that now. It has been construed in the case law to permit fines. Nothing mentioned about fines in that rule expressly, but it's been construed to permit that. The idea behind this is to create an alternative to sending that money to a penalty paid into court, which goes to the county general fund, does not benefit the courts directly, and certainly doesn't benefit legal services to the poor, but in an appropriate case to permit a judge to make that monetary award to benefit legal services to the poor in one of the various options that we have set out.

The language that's in the resolution and the language that's on the first option that we've set out ties into the statute that exists that permits the payment -- requires the payment of pro hac vice fees into that particular fund, that the -- it's called the basic civil legal services account of the judicial fund. That's where pro hac vice fees are paid to by statute for lawyers that come in to get pro hac vice admitted now in Texas, so we used that same language because courts are familiar with it, the administration is pretty obvious, and that's

the particular option that we have initially suggested, 2 though, as I say, there is no magic to that. 3 Pete Schenkkan, who if I make any errors, they are all his fault because I took heed in law school 5 and taught me how to do this. Pete is a great friend. know he's in charge of your subcommittee that's looked at 7 this and has raised some questions, and, Pete, do you want to articulate those or do you want me to try anticipate 8 the ones you've sent to me? Whichever you prefer, Chuck. 10 MR. SCHENKKAN: 11 The only clarification I need to make immediately is I'm 12 not the subcommittee chair. It's Judge Yelenosky, but he 13 couldn't be here today. I was just the one who worked on this particular issue. Our subcommittee was tasked with a 14 bunch of other things that Judge Lawrence and others will 15 16 be --17 MR. HERRING: I stand corrected, as so many times before. 18 MR. SCHENKKAN: But other than that, you 19 20 know, you handle it as you think best, Chuck. 21 MR. HERRING: Let me try and anticipate sort of the big issues that Pete and I have exchanged e-mails 22 on and talked about, and then Pete can chime in as he likes. One question is, well, do we need statutory 24

authorization to do this? We would have to have a statute

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that will allow the Court to have this sanctions remedy that could be devoted to legal services to the poor in civil matters, and our belief as we looked at it was, no, we didn't. Pete has a little different view or at least raises the question.

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The reason we thought we didn't is, number one, there is precedent already in one sense for the Court under its very broad rule-making authority, which I'll talk about in a moment, but there's precedent already to have a monetary sanction that is directed to a government What is that? Rule 191.3(e). When we adopted -the Court adopted, this committee recommended -- in 1998, 191.3(e) it incorporated the statutory remedies in Chapter 10, but it had no separate specific statutory authorization. So in effect the Court said, "Hey, if there's a discovery certification violation, the court may impose a penalty," one of which is a penalty paid into the court which goes to, which we'll see, the general fund of the county. So the Court by rule without any underlying specific statute has already adopted a remedy that directs payment of monetary sanctions to a state fund, a government fund, and that's the general fund in counties the way it's administered at least in most counties, but not all. So we've already done it back then in one sense. Secondly, we set out to -- on page, you

know, 15, what you know, which is the underlying statutes that authorize the rule-making authority of the Court, and as you've read those in the past, those are very, very broad statutes, as is the constitutional provision, but when the Court adopts a rule it stays in effect until and unless the Legislature changes it, and that's exactly the language from the statute.

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Well, it seems unlikely that the Legislature as busy as it has been in attending to state business is going to care too much about this rule, which doesn't increase sanctions, it doesn't change conduct to sanction or anything. It's just which government fund does the money potentially go to, subject to the discretion of the court, of the judge, and it's sort of hard to think about how you challenge that. "Judge, I don't want to be sanctioned in the form of a penalty that would be paid to the legal services designated fund. I want to be sanctioned with a penalty that would be paid to the general fund of the county." I'm not sure where that gets you if you're in front of a court to make that argument.

The -- again, under Rule 215.2(b), our case law in Texas, and this appears in Justice Gonzales' concurring opinion in TransAmerican, goes all the way back there, and as Elaine knows, TransAmerican, the birthday is next week, seven days from today it will be 18 years old,

and I'm sure she'll still have a party for it, but in that opinion, in a concurring opinion of Justice Gonzales, he 3 recommended you can have a -- he recognized you can have a fine. There have been other cases, Clark V. Brass and 5 Citibank and others that have recommended you can have a It's a monetary sanction that is fine. What is a fine? 7 It's paid to a government fund. What's the directed. government fund? The general fund of the county where the 8 money sort of disappears into ether.

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And then, of course, we have a wide -- now, after Chambers V. NASCO, also decided in 1991, and In Re: 12 Bennett, decided by the Texas Supreme Court in 1997, and those progeny -- we have lots of inherent power sanctions And as you know, inherent power is the interstitial doctrine that applies for bad faith conduct in litigation when there is no specific rule that addresses it; and those cases, many of those cases, have addressed fines and monetary penalties. Again, no specific statutory authorization, but that is, the courts conclude, part of the inherent power of administering the judicial system.

And then, you know, Pete really focused on another argument or another point that I think is pertinent, and that's this, and I really don't want to get bogged down into the detail, but we asked the question --

we started looking at this. We said, well, where did the money go? If there's a penalty, if the judge imposes a financial penalty sanction under 10.004(c)(2) paid into court, what does that mean? You write a check to the judge, the court, county or what? And we talked to the district judges, a couple of them here. They said, "Well, it goes into the county, the general fund." You know, we got -- very kindly, David Escamilla, who is our county attorney for a couple of decades now here, researched that for us and said -- we asked him, "Well, how come? Why does it go there?" And that's a good question as to why it goes there.

He has said this, that traditionally there were salary funds; and way back when, and it's still true in some areas, some of those penalty funds go to support the salary of the employees; and we have in the materials we've handed out page 17 and following are the statutes that his office has relied upon to say when somebody has a monetary sanction, goes to the general county fund, general fund of the county, you'll see these sections.

I'm not going to go through them in detail, but they don't mention sanctions, court sanctions, at all. Don't even mention fines. They mention fees, commissions, funds, and other monies belonging to a county.

And then the last section we cite there,

what happens in the urban counties he says -- he confirmed this last week at the -- whatever the conference was, the county attorneys -- the urban counties provide by this last statute, Section 154.007 of the local Government Code, that that money gets transferred into the general fund. It doesn't stay in the salary fund, so we don't self-fund for those officers who collect those penalties and fines. And I said, "Well, David, that doesn't really seem to talk about court sanctions or penalties or even fines. How does that apply?" And he said, "Well, it's like a lot of county law, it's very ambiguous, and that's what we do." So one could argue there's a legal challenge right now to what happens under the existing 10.004(c)(2) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code or 191.3(e) when it tracks that.

But the point is we know under 10.004(c)(2) that there can be a penalty paid into court. Pete raised the question, which I thought was excellent, well, court, how do you pay to a court? Is that the judge? Is that the particular court? It would suffice, presumably as the Court construes the word "court" to say "a court-designated fund," which is what happens now. The court-designated fund by default has been the general fund of the county, but there's no reason for the Court not to say "paid into court" also includes as an option payment

into a designated fund. So that's sort of our shorthand or longhand, I guess, analysis of do you have authorization to do it. Yes, we've done it before. We've done it in similar settings, inherent power, Rule 215.2(b). We think it can be done legally and properly.

Another alternative, though, let me talk about the alternatives, and we have some alternative language set out on pages three to four, and that's just other language as to where the money could go, if you're not going to use the language that's out of the pro hac vice statute, that particular fund; and the other provisions in there, one of them — and our committee doesn't really care. It just wants to get some legal services funds in the Court's discretion if the Court wants to. One of the options is just to say "pay monetary sum to a nonprofit provider of legal services to the poor in civil matters." That sort of leaves it up to the trial court to pick wherever, may or may not be a good thing.

Another option is "pay a monetary sum to a nonprofit entity selected by the trial court from a list compiled by the State Bar of Texas of providers of legal services to the poor in civil matters." I kind of like that one myself. Pete has raised the question, well, once we do that, aren't we using government funds for private benefit, and isn't there an issue there? And I'm not

going to go back through the Sterling decision unless he raises it, but the Sterling decision in essence said if you have 10.004(c)(2) penalty paid into court, you can't designate it after you've done that, and it says to -- under that you can't designate for the benefit of the minors in the case, which was what was done in that court.

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This is different in our view. I think Pete joins issue on this probably, but in our view that's a reason to create this option, is so it doesn't just have to be a penalty paid into court. It can be a penalty paid to another designated government fund or other -- or these first two options are nongovernment funds, just legal service providers, nonprofit entities.

A third option -- well, let me actually mention at this point an issue -- well, third option, then I'm going to get Randy Chapman to speak on a particular option. The third option is payment of a monetary sum to the State Bar of Texas for providing legal services to the poor in civil matters. The State Bar is defined under the Government Code under the State Bar Act as "a public corporation and administrative agency of the judicial department of government." Any of you who have ever litigated with the State Bar know that it's sort of a quasi-governmental entity in some settings and perhaps not in others, but it is clearly a department of -- agency of

judicial department of government.

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Randy Chapman, who spends huge amounts of time and understands far better than I ever would how the money flows in legal services in Texas has raised the question about the fund we had proposed, the pro hac vice fund. That's the language in the first option and said, "Well, you know what, that actually takes a statutory appropriation authorization each session for that money to come out of that fund and to be expended." Otherwise, it would just accumulate. So we're sort of back in the boat that we collect it to go in there for that designated purpose, would have to be spent for that purpose, well, we've got to get a legislative act each time on the appropriation end.

The reason we ended up with the language, the pro hac, was the analog to the pro hac vice statute fund was that when one deals with the State Bar and the Access to Justice Commission sometimes there are different perspectives on how things operate and should operate and how funds should flow, and this was sort of compromised language that everyone was familiar with. It doesn't mean that's the way it needs to be done, but, Randy, you want to mention your option, the other language you had as to how you would have the money flow?

MR. CHAPMAN: Certainly. Thank you, Chuck.

And looking at page one -- I'm Randy Chapman, Texas Legal Services Center Executive Director. Good morning. 3 other option that basically would simplify it and would provide additional oversight and not raise the issue about the judge deciding on one nonprofit provider versus another, if you look at the resolution of the bottom paragraph there, "for be it resolved," my suggestion is where it says "permitting an award to be paid into" and then just scratch the rest of that language and say instead "to be paid to the IOLTA grant fund administered by the Texas Access to Justice Foundation."

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MR. HERRING: And for clarity, he's used the resolution, but that would be the language you'd substitute in the rule that's on the next page or instead of the rule, option language we have on the following pages. Just a different designation. Instead of to the pro hac vice designated fund it would be to this, and you've cleared that with the commission and foundation and --

MR. CHAPMAN: Yeah. The rationale here is the foundation, which is overseen by the Supreme Court, 22 has two thoughts of money. One is public funds that come through the appropriation process, and the other are the IOLTA funds and some donations and miscellaneous items that come in. The IOLTA grant fund is overseen. The

problems are monitored. They make decisions that kind of clears up that issue about a judge picking a particular entity, and the funds therefore become immediately available as opposed to waiting for the appropriation process and then sending someone like me over to the Legislature to get them to add an appropriation rider to take care of this issue. So just for simplicity that is my recommendation.

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MR. HERRING: And the committee and the Bar 10 board to my knowledge have no problem with that, and really, that's a detail that really we prefer to leave up to the Court and to you, but you have a number of options that accomplish the same purpose within the context that I'm sure Pete will lay out of the legal issues.

The next question Pete asked was is this going to raise much money, is it going to matter? the short answer is we only meet about 20 percent of the legal need now for Texas indigents as we know. folks work on shoestring budgets, and we have a couple of Legal Aid lawyers here today from Rio Grande Legal Aid I know to work on another issue, and they are in my mind saints, nobel, and both of those guys have devoted careers at very, very low pay to just doing this. They can do huge amounts with small amounts of money, and this isn't going to change what most courts do, in my view, for

sanctions, and I've done a lot of sanctions cases. don't like them, but I have worked on some. sanctions are paid to compensate for attorney's fees and expenses, and that's just what judges mostly do. are very few reported decisions that actually have monetary penalties.

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Would judges be a little more amenable to doing -- to designating money in that direction instead of the county general fund? Perhaps. But I think the largest sanctions case I worked on was the Kugle/DaimlerChrysler case, million-dollar sanctions basically at the end of the day. Every penny -- and egregious conduct. The lawyer, chief lawyer, got disbarred as a result of that case. I worked on that, too. Egregious misconduct, as the Fourth Court of Appeals said in its en banc opinion. Egregious misconduct, fabrication of evidence, suborning perjury, coercion of 18 witnesses. You name it, lawyers did it, as reported in the opinions. Not a penny of penalty. Just commiserate, and that's going to continue to happen. That's what most judges do, and if you think about the politics of it you can understand that as well, but in some instances there are these, and we have listed on page 13 to 14 examples of, you know, large sanctions awards ranging from millions of dollars, and most of those are Federal cases elsewhere.

A couple of million-dollar awards in Texas. Low V. Henry, the Texas Supreme Court's landmark decision in 2007, addressed \$50,000 in penalty sanctions.

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So there are some instances where it happens, and some of that money in an appropriate case a judge might decide would be better directed in this direction. One reason for that is if you look at Low V. Henry, the Texas Supreme Court decision that addressed the sections under Chapter 10, that was the lawsuit that got filed against a bunch of folks. A lawyer withdrew the same day it was filed. Two of the doctors who were sued had never prescribed the medication at issue and got sanctioned \$25,000 apiece. Supreme Court ultimately remanded and said, "Well, we need to know how you got to that penalty amount" and set out some standards; and in setting out its standards it went back to the concurring opinion of Justice Gonzales in TransAmerica, which in turn had quoted from the ABA standards under Federal Rule 11, the Federal rule analog to Rule 13; and it lists all those factors; and some of those factors address the conduct of the injured party.

Did the injured party contribute to all these expenses that were accumulated, that sort of thing, and there may be an instance where a court says, "You done bad, Respondent," either lawyer or party or both, "but I

don't think all that money should go to the other side."

In the Federal case law the example that comes up occasionally is the pro se litigant. You can't give attorney's fees under Federal law to the pro se litigant in a sanctions case. So what do you do if the other party has abused discovery? So there's some instances when it -- when I think it does make sense, when it's possible. I don't think this is going to raise a huge amount of money. Every little bit helps, and we are in a time of dire, dire need.

The last question, specific question that I have written down, and Pete and I had a number of discussions, but is should the Court -- or should you recommend, should the Court adopt, guidelines for how to divide money, either penalty money or monetary sanction money, either on the one hand expenses and attorney's fees contrasted with penalty money or penalty paid into the general fund, if that's where it's supposed to go, versus penalty money that would be paid for legal services to the poor.

My answer to that, and I've worked on sanctions a long time on this committee, my answer is no, not now certainly. We have a lot of guidance from the Court. I mean, TransAmerican is a great, great decision, and I would say that even if Justice Hecht were not here.

I mean, it truly was. It solved a lot of the problems that we had, and it continues to be the landmark. I read over 300 sanctions decisions a year, wade through them to do my sanctions talk, and it's because we have broad, good, principles that require a specific factual application, but they're good principles.

Low V. Henry, which itemized these factors under the ABA standards. There's a lot for litigants and courts of appeals and trial courts to work with if there is a situation of abuse or to evaluate how to do that, but it has to be fact-specific. I think it's very difficult to draft guidelines that would say, well, here are the specific considerations you should take into account if you're thinking about money to the legal services to the poor fund versus penalty paid into court. I think that's very difficult to do, and think about all of the other sanctions we have in the ABA guidelines. Again quoting Justice Gonzales' concurring opinion, there are 12 categories of sanctions that are considered authorized under our rules, from reprimands to the fines to orders to do this and do that. All kinds of sanctions.

In a particular case the trial court, it seems to me, must have discretion, broad discretion, to address how to fashion those sanctions. In *Braden V. Downey*, decided the same day as TransAmerica, the Supreme

Court said creative sanctions, we do not disapprove of In fact, we encourage creative sanctions. And you may recall one of two sanctions in Braden was an order that a lawyer engage in 10 hours of community service with the Harris County protective services agency, and we have -- we have cases that have required lawyers do CLE, to do pro bono, to do all kinds of things.

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It seems to me as the Supreme Court has encouraged creative sanction use by trial judges is to be -- is the way it should be, and to try to write specific guidelines that would be applicable to this one setting is difficult, and I would say let's try it and see if there's any abuse. I don't think there will be. Ι don't think you're going to see a lot of sanctions. think you'll see some that go in this direction. think it will increase sanctions, no new conduct involved; but I think it would be very, very salutary; and for those reasons, you know, our committee, State Bar board, we respectfully request your favorable consideration at least of the proposal. I've talked too long, but thank you.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Thanks, Chuck.

22 Pete, I guess it makes sense to hear from you.

At your pleasure and the MR. SCHENKKAN: pleasure of the committee, but did you want to take our 25 morning break at this point first or would you like me to start up?

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HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Maybe it will help us move along if you go ahead and then we'll take our break.

MR. SCHENKKAN: Let me say first that our subcommittee was just tasked with this only a few weeks ago, and so our -- we saw our mission on this issue as simply to try in the short time we had to identify the issues that this committee would want to talk about rather than really make a strong push for a particular answer. In looking at our proposal in addition to the document that Chuck handed out, what you need is a document that was available over at the sign-in desk that's entitled "Initial SCAC subcommittee report on problems and proposals of poverty law section," and most of that is 16 about the other items we were tasked with, which will be taken up later today. For the part that's relevant to the issues we're talking about right now, that begins at page 14 of that document, and so in effect I'm going to be working through beginning at page 14 of 17 of our document.

The proposal is to add to two rules, 23 193.3(e) and 215.2(b)(2), the language that's underlined there, and it's the same language. "In monetary sanction to be paid into the basic civil legal services account of

the judicial fund for use in programs approved by the Supreme Court that provide basic legal services to the indigent," and as Chuck -- Chuck's materials point out, that language has been preblessed. It is taken from a different statute, the pro hac vice statute, and that statute says what the comptroller is supposed to do with those fees, and so what the proposal is, is to take this language that the Legislature used in the Government Code for that type of fee for the comptroller to do with that money and put it in these two sanctions rules and say when the court is ordering sanctions under either of these two rules it has the additional option of ordering as a sanction money to be paid into this same fund. 13

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And while we didn't talk about it in any great detail at the subcommittee level, I think that's because inside our subcommittee we think it -- assuming you want to do this at all, assuming the Court wants to have additional penalty sanction authority to trial courts in the rules and you want that money to go to legal services to the poor, which again seems a perfectly reasonable concept, if you want to do that, this is a good way to do it, because the -- the basic civil legal services account of the judicial fund is one in which there is an established process for dividing up the money appropriately to the programs that provide basically civil

legal services to the poor. You don't have to reinvent that wheel, and you've got an established process that has, you know, proper people in charge of it and systems for taking applications from programs that are worthy and then citing how to allocate the scarce resources. So we are not raising any question about if you want to do this is this a good place to send the money.

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The first question that we have is do you need statutory authority for a monetary penalty sanction to be put anywhere other than to the injured party in the lawsuit, and we think that's a fair question because of general law that's quoted at the beginning of page 15 of 17 of our memo. Under the Texas Constitution and some case law there is a legitimate question about whether anybody other than the Legislature is supposed to decide where public funds go. Now, we didn't dig very deeply into this, and Chuck rightly points out if the Texas Supreme Court exercises its rule-making authority and exercises it in a way that sends some money to an account that looks pretty reasonable for a purpose that a lot of people might think is reasonable, it may be that nobody ever challenges this as a practical matter, and it may also be that if anybody ever challenges it, they lose. But it is a fair question, and it started out as -- in my mind, as a big question.

I've gotten a lot more comfortable with the answer to the question being that we already have the statutory authority in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 10.004(c)(2), which Chuck has already pointed out to you. Now, that is a statute, and it is a statute about sanctions, and it says in it in (c), it says that one of the options in addition to a language -- a version in language in the statute of the traditional option of paying the injured party, it has in it that the court has the option of ordering an order -- of issuing an order, quote, "to pay a penalty into court." I was concerned when Chuck and I were talking about this that that might not be adequate because Chuck was telling me that David Escamilla said there's a statute that says "court" as used here means county treasurer, and if that's true then I think we're stuck with the statute. If the Legislature has defined "court" for this purpose to mean "county treasurer" then that's the end of it, that's what it means.

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But I've now -- we didn't have before our subcommittee finished our work the statutes that Chuck understood David understood said that, and they're in the materials that Chuck has handed out, and I don't think they say that. I don't think those statutes are about the definition of "court" in Civil Practice and Remedies Code

10.004(c)(2). I don't think they're about the definition of the word "court" at all, and so I'm presently of the 3 view -- though, a lot of people in the room with a lot of different kinds of experience may have thought of some other aspect of this situation, but if this is all we've got, I think where we are is the Legislature has decided that trial courts in Texas can order a penalty paid into court, and there is no definition of "court," and who better than the Texas Supreme Court to decide what we mean by "paid into court." Thus, I think probably the Court does have the statutory authority to decide what we mean by "a penalty paid into court," with one exception that is worth at least pausing on.

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That statutory authority is in 10.004. 10.004 is not unlimited in its scope. It is not about all possible sanctions. It is about sanctions for specific kinds of sanctionable conduct and specifically signing a pleading or motion that contains a certificate that is false in certain important ways, and that's an important category of sanctions, but it is not the full universe of sanctions. Chuck described the Daimler case where there was some, you know, truly outrageous conduct, some of which probably didn't involve signing false pleadings or motions, others of which might have; and so if all we've got in the way of statutory authority is Civil Practice

and Remedies Code 10.004, it's going to allow penalties to be paid into court and the Texas Supreme Court to say what we mean by court, meaning the basic legal services account of the judiciary fund, if they decide that's a good idea for situations in which either the statute defines this as a signing of a pleading or motion that's false in these ways or where by rule the Court is fairly implementing that same statute and applying it to a context that is also a signing of a false motion or pleading, and we've already crossed that bridge in Rule 191.3.

the trial court can order a sanction under Chapter 10, that's under Chapter 10 for a violation of the rule that is about signing things, signing disclosures and discovery responses. I think the Court's already crossed that bridge in that context. So I'd certainly -- when we get to it I want to, you know, have a wide open discussion about is there a statutory authority problem, but I think -- I now think with what Chuck's provided, probably not, as long as we're only talking about sanctions that are fairly contemplated by Chapter 10.

The next question is do we need -- if the Court's going to do this do they need -- should they supply standards for these sanctions, and that may tie to the third question, which is is this thing a good idea as

a policy matter. They tie because, as Chuck points -correctly states, as far as we know now there are no significant numbers or dollar amounts of Chapter 10 sanctions or Rule 191.3 sanctions. By the time we had done the committee report I had found four appellate cases addressing such sanctions. I think three or maybe all -two or maybe all three of them reversing them on grounds irrelevant to this, and a -- I've since found a fourth and a fifth in which they were reversed on ground that the sanctionable conduct occurred before Chapter 10 was enacted, so it didn't apply, and no Rule 191.3(e) court sanctions; and I think that's probably because as Chuck -who I defer to on this certainly because he has this enormous array of practical experience with the sanctions context, what normally happens is that trial court judge orders some amount of money paid to the injured party or takes some other action, like striking a particular defense or prohibiting admission of a particular exhibit or whatever to address the problem. Well, why isn't that good enough? Maybe it

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Well, why isn't that good enough? Maybe it is. But what TransAmerica said and what one of the reasons why TransAmerica is such a landmark case in sanctions is it reigned in a world of abuses that were going on in sanctions before it was issued, and it did so not by referring to a list of 13 factors to be taken into

account in deciding the sanctions. It did so by saying sanctions should be limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the purposes of sanctions, and those are to punish the guilty and deter repetition of the abusive conduct either by the quilty or by anybody else who might be tempted to do the same and that the court needed to demonstrate that it had thought about and had chosen the sanction that was the minimum necessary to achieve those worthy goals; and then, of course, having done that, you want first in some of the rules and statutes, including Chapter 10, requiring the trial court to think about compensating the injured person. So if you're going to order a sanction that's the minimum necessary to achieve the goals and you're going to compensate the injured person then you don't have any money left over to be paid into court unless the amount required to compensate the injured party is less than the amount required as a minimum to achieve the goals. If it is less, then you can perhaps just, you know, order the full compensation first and then whatever is leftover goes to the court, but maybe that doesn't follow automatically, and of course, the question of what's needed to compensate is not self-evident either. So the standards question that I am raising

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for the full committee's discussion and for the Court's

benefit is the question should the Court through any such rule equip the trial courts with some kind of guidance as to when you do something other than just order the attorney's fees or nonmonetary sanctions having to do with the evidence or pleadings that are sufficient that they are the minimum required to achieve the goals of sanctions. And if you are, what are they going to be, and with respect to Chuck, I think this may be the thing we disagree the most about it. I do not think the ABA list of 13 factors is of any use whatsoever on that. list of all the different kinds of things you should consider, but the court in Low vs. Henry was careful to say it's a nonexclusive list and we do not require the trial judge to show that the trial judge has considered all of them. It's just something you might want to think about.

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And that takes us back to the policy question. If that's all we're going to have, think about this list of 13 factors and any others you can think of and decide about dividing up the money between these two purposes any way you want, and then the only other thing that we've required, write up something about it, then that decision is going to be reviewed on appeal under abuse of discretion standard; and, as you know, that means did the trial court act without reference to find the

standards and relevant factors or did the trial court act with reference to those. As long as the trial court writes, "I considered some of the 13 factors, including one and five, and in light of those I've decided this much money to the injured party and a million dollars" or "a 5 hundred thousand dollars" or "\$10,000" or whatever the number is "to basic legal services fund" at least on the face of the abuse of discretion appeal review standard, that's bulletproof. Maybe it won't turn out to be in a particular case, but I would regard that as an invitation to some of the dangers that the Supreme Court had to deal 11 12 with in TransAmerica, and this time it would be a lot harder to back down on because this time the money would 13 be going to a cause that would be as worthy as one could 14 15 ask.

If it's not going to raise any money anyway to speak of, if the fundamental problem of the legal services to the poor in civil matters is it is a basic part of the judicial function of our society that any person have access to legal services or at least essential legal services in need, is it the right answer that one or another of the legislative -- or one or another of the levels of the government legislative branch appropriate money for that function rather than add a small token through this with these other uses. So that's the policy

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question at the end of the day that ties to the standards issue.

members of our subcommittee -- Judge Yelenosky was actively involved in this, but he couldn't be here today, and that's the only reason I'm presenting this portion of it, but there were other members of our subcommittee, and I don't know whether they feel like I have adequately covered our discussions as opposed to the discussions I've had back and forth with Chuck, and then I think after that Chuck needs a chance at rebuttal, because I'm quite sure I've left out some stuff from our discussion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge Lawrence, and then Chuck.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, I only had one comment, and that is the mechanism by which this would be done in the rules. There is a potential conflict with the Code of Judicial Conduct on the way these different options are structured on pages three and four. There's a Canon 2(b), which says, "A judge should not use the power or prestige of his office to advance the public or private interest of another," and that's the canon that judges who say that someone has to go to a particular bondsman or go to a particular defensive driving or as a term of probation or deferred adjudication have to contribute

money to a specific charity, that's the code provision 1 that they're sanctioned under because judges are not 2 3 supposed to select certain providers or certain charities and earmark those, and there's a long history of judges 5 being sanctioned for that particular activity. So I would say that if the decision is made to do this, that on page 7 three, for example, the top option, just to pay it to a nonprofit provider where the judge would presumably be 8 able to select from a number of those and just pick one, I think that would cause a potential conflict. 11 No. 2, where they would pay it into a list compiled by the State Bar, really the same issue, the judge is using their discretion to earmark one. Now, the 13 14 last one where they just pay it to the State Bar or the options on page two where it is determined in the rule 15 where the money goes, I think that avoids the conflict. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Chuck, any last words 18 before we take a break? MR. SCHENKKAN: Well, I think maybe Frank 19 20 had --21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, Frank, sorry. MR. SCHENKKAN: Frank is on the subcommittee 22 231 and is part of our discussion. MR. GILSTRAP: Well, let me just talk about 24 the elephant in the room, and that's this. I think I

wasn't alone on the subcommittee as having, you know, real concerns about whether this is an appropriate use of the 3 rule-making process and an appropriate rule for the judiciary. Now, that's not our call. You know, we don't wear the robes, we don't stand for election, we don't sign the opinions. We work for the Supreme Court of Texas, and 7 if it's not our purpose here to talk about those concerns, then, you know, maybe we say so, because it's a huge 9 issue. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've talked about that 11 issue before in connection with many other rules, so it's 12 totally an appropriate topic in my opinion. 13 MR. GILSTRAP: It's totally inappropriate to 14 talk about it? 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is appropriate to talk 16 about it. MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. All right. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Chuck. 18 MR. HERRING: Yeah, a couple of comments. 19 concur with the judge's comment, and that's why I had the 20 reservation about that first option. I think that's good. 21 The more you take it out of the specific selection of the judge's hand, I think it's better for appearance of propriety, or impropriety, avoiding that, and I think if 24 25 you use one of these general funds, state funds that the

Court designate, that solves that problem. Of course, the courts now in theory give the penalty money to local government, which indirectly could benefit the judge, but clearly that's permissible and has to go somewhere, and it has to go somewhere that is permitted by statute -- by statute alone.

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Pete's first point -- and I'm not going to talk all of his points. I think he laid out the issues well, and he said, well, the 10.004(c)(2) permits payment into court. The Supreme Court can certainly identify what is an appropriate way to do that, what an appropriate court fund is, but beyond that statutory authorization perhaps there is more question. Well, again, coming back logically, the Court's already done that, because under 191.3(e) the Court said by rule in this other setting -and Chapter 10 doesn't apply to discovery. Section 10.001 applies to -- as it says, applies to pleadings and 191.3 applies to discovery. So the Court by motions. rule has said "We like those remedies, those sanction remedies, applied to discovery in the 191.3 settings." The Court's already done that. We've gotten over that hurdle or at least done it in the past. So I think that's logically that same issue has already been addressed.

In terms of, well, how much will this raise, and, you know, no one knows, and it hasn't been used much

in Chapter 10. That's certainly true. There aren't many Chapter 10 decisions, which is a little bit, I think, the 3 function of how Chapter 10 came about, which was a compromise, and, of course, Rule 13 was addressed at the 5 same time. Rule 191.3 was added as the analog in 1998 to Federal Rule 26(c), I guess, but the basic certifications track Rule 11, Federal Rule 11. There are thousands of decisions, as anyone who has looked at the case law in Rule 11 knows, addressing that kind of certification. 10 When I've given talks on sanctions I'll often ask how many people know how many decisions there 11 12 are under 191.3. Hardly anybody asks a question like that, but I do, and there are none, there are almost none, 13 14 where I get these hundreds of decisions under Rule 215 because most of us grew up with Rule 215, and that's what 15 you see in the discovery sanction arena. So I think in 16 the future we will see more use of 191.3; and if you ever 17 18 look at it, it actually has some better uses than 215, some broader applicability, so I think there will be some. 19 20 I think he is absolutely right. Judges are going to 21 continue -- most sanctions money is going to be compensatory for attorney's fees and expenses, but in some 22 23 rare cases we do see judges that impose monetary sanctions, and this is just better than it disappearing 24 25 into the ether of the general fund of the county, I

respectfully submit.

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In terms of guidance, I think Pete's point there really addresses Low, and what the Supreme Court held in Low is there's not adequate explanation or analysis by the trial court of why it reached these 25,000-dollar penalties for each of these defendants, total of fifty, here are some factors for the trial court to consider. In 1996, I believe it was, on this committee we came up with a set of extensive proposed comments to Rule 215 of the sanctions rules, the idea being we would put some more quidance in the rules, and we had long debates about that and finally decided, you know, TransAmerica is a pretty good decision. So much of that is so fact-specific it's best to allow that to be fleshed out by case law, and in terms of further guidance, that's exactly what the Texas Supreme Court did in Low. It said, "We're not going to say this is exactly how it works, but here are factors to consider, " and that's I think the way sanctions law must develop and must be applied in trial courts.

Whether it's appropriate rule-making, I think that's a very valid question, but we've already made rules, and we've already made rules that give money to one government fund. This is a worthy government fund, and in some cases would be an appropriate one, and it would have

a very salutary effect in an area of dire need right now 1 2 in our justice system. Thank you. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody interested in a morning break? 4 5 MR. HAMILTON: The court reporter is. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I bet the court reporter 7 is. Let's take one. Ten minutes. 8 (Recess from 11:12 a.m. to 11:32 a.m.) 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Pete, you got 10 anything else to say? 11 MR. SCHENKKAN: Maybe just one thing that's about Rule 191.3. I think we ought to be focused on the extent to which the Court has already crossed the bridge 13 14 there and be specific on what bridge they've crossed and what one they haven't. 191.3 that has (e) in it that says 15 16 that sanctions can include -- in addition to the other kind of sanctions can include an appropriate sanction 17 under Chapter 10, which therefore includes both the compensatory sanction and the penalty sanction. That's in 19 a rule that is about the signing of disclosures, discovery 20 requests, notices, responses, and objections; and it 21 starts out, "Every disclosure, discovery request," et 22 cetera, "must be signed"; and then it has a provision about the effect of the signature and that the signature 25 constitutes this kind of a certification. So the bridge

that's been crossed is Chapter 10 says "pleading or motion," and Rule 191.3 extends that to something that somebody might argue is not a pleading or motion, but it certainly is a signed document that, you know, takes a position, either seeks relief or responds that is signed and has a certificate like that.

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So I don't think it's a very big step, and all I was really saying about that, and I want to be clear, is that's not the same thing as an inherent powers sanction by a court that says, you know, you've sworn perjury or whatever and, you know, on that I'm with the sanction, but this -- I think Rule 191.3 is easily defensible as an extension or reading of the term "motion or pleading" in Chapter 10 that's reasonable, and that's different from carrying it onto some other context. That's the only additional comment I had. Otherwise I thought what Chuck said on rebuttal, if that's what it was, was very appropriate, and I agree with him.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments? Skip.

MR. WATSON: Well, just -- I was listening 22 to hear how much of the current financial crisis in Legal 23 Aid this was going to solve. I think I heard the question asked twice. I never heard the answer. I think the answer was "We don't have any idea." As Pete pointed out,

you know, it's going to have to be above -- at least I hope it's above the amount necessary to compensate the victim of the abuse, and I think what I finally heard at the end is the ultimate reason was we just don't want whatever it is disappearing into the ether of the county funds, but we don't have any idea of what amount that is. I suspect it's a minuscule amount above what's necessary to compensate the victim.

I mean, that's usually the garden variety sanction, "What were your fees" and bring in the motion to compel and "what were your fees" and bring in the motion for sanctions. "That's what I award." And it just -- I mean, this is just, you know, an initial reaction, but it sounds like we're biting off some very heavy potential rule-making problems here, not knowing what the risk benefit is. And that's my only comment. I just really wonder why we're going here to keep something from disappearing into the ether when we don't know whether it's worth a nickel's worth of time or not.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Justice Gray.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I'm going to pick on Judge Livingston since she's a recognized advocate of the service to be benefited by the proposed changes, but this to me presents -- the proposed change presents another point or basis to fight about venue and a whole lot of

other issues regarding the appearance of fairness, because if I'm a sympathetic plaintiff and I can get into Laura Livingston's court, who has now encouraged and will freely impose some sanction for marginally determinable inappropriate behavior to provide an ancillary revenue for her pet charity or purpose, which is the legal services to No. the indigent, did she abuse her discretion? it make a difference or give the appearance at least to the public that I got treated differently because of what court I was in, and what is -- in balancing whether or not we need to do this, what's the adverse effect on the public perception of the basic fairness of the legal system of, you know, did -- was this done for a particular purpose to serve a personal agenda as opposed to truly punishing bad behavior.

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I think funding of the legal services for indigents is a legislative issue appropriate for the third branch of government. If the Legislature wants to earmark a particular source of funds for a particular purpose, that may or may not be considered appropriate depending upon individual political or personal points of view. I also note that in response to the how are you going to challenge this, it won't be Justice Hecht or me on the court of -- or court of appeals that they bring this complaint to. It's going to be Mary Alice Robbins or a

local reporter, and they're going to ask them, you know, why did you do -- you know, they're going to come to the judge and they're going to stick a microphone in their face and ask them why they, you know, allocated money to, you know, their personal preference charity and -- or for use for that charity, and of course, the judge is not going to be able to answer that question under the canons. And then further, if it's a local reporter, they're going to follow up with the question, "And isn't it true that this would have otherwise been available for a pay raise for the sheriff's deputies or to -- for other local expenses?"

And then finally, I would ask that if we do this for this purpose and this worthy purpose, whose next worthy purpose is going to be in for a percentage of the punishment type sanctions, and so in case it wasn't clear from that, I would probably prefer to leave well enough alone and not get into the business of revising these rules for that purpose.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Just two cautionary concerns. One is the separation of powers issue that's been raised. This committee -- gosh, Buddy, you'll have to help me out here -- five or six years ago looked at the issue of where class action proceeds to unnamed members --

MR. LOW: Right.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: -- whether it might be directed to -- I think it was legal services. I don't recall.

MR. LOW: Right.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: But we had a pretty lengthy discussion of separation of powers and rule-making authorities, and it was the vote of that majority of that committee that that not --

MR. LOW: Right.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: -- we recommend to the Court they not do it, and whether directing this through IOLTA would cure that as far as being sufficiently governmental, I don't know, but I'm sure the Court would work its way through that issue.

The second thing, and I'm not sure about this, Pete, but my recollection is that Chaper 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code when it was enacted by the Legislature, the Legislature was I think dissatisfied with our court rule, sanction rule, Rule 13 at the time, which allowed a lawyer who had a pleading that was deemed to be inappropriate or frivolous to withdraw the pleading and amend it within 90 days, and I think the Legislature felt that was not sufficient in their view to address what they perceived as frivolous litigation, and my

recollection, again, Buddy -- you're the closest in age to me, it looks like here -- that the legislative provision in Chapter 10 is one of those odd provisions that says "and the Supreme Court may not promulgate any rule contrary to this chapter." I'm not sure, but I think it's in there.

> MR. MUNZINGER: It is.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: And the Court wants to be very careful.

MR. LOW: That is the rule we got in trouble over where the legislative act the Court wrote said "Legislative act such and such is unconstitutional," and after that the Legislature started frowning on our Court 14 and our committee. You're right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: I share the sentiments that are expressed. Nobody who has spoken to the need for this rule can give any of us any indication of how much money might go to fund poor legal services. There's no data, there's nothing at all. Everybody's experience tells you that the sanctions go to compensate the attorney. seems to me it's much ado about nothing. Why would the 23 Court risk involvement in the separation of powers issues, why would the Court risk getting into a fight with the Legislature over something that none of us know how much

money is involved? Raising money and determining who it goes to is a legislative function, so here we're going to tell the Court to enact a rule which says using section 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, you give this money to ACORN of Houston to help them do something for the poor. I can't imagine such a thing. I think we ought to move on to the next subject, and I so move.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's see if you get a second. Frank.

MR. GILSTRAP: Well, let me pile on here.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I take it that's a

12 second.

MR. GILSTRAP: Yes, we all know that revenue is supposed to be raised by the Legislature, you know, no taxation without representation, but we know that governments raise money in other ways, like user fees, and but at least those are set either directly or indirectly by the Legislature, and they go -- they have some, you know, rational connection to the service that's being provided, but they also raise money through fines and penalties, and that's always troublesome. You know, the classic issue is traffic fines. You know, we just saw this thing in the Legislature of red light cameras where cities are all saying, "We are so concerned about safety," you know, and everybody knows they're not. They're

concerned with raising this money, and, you know, we've all heard stories about -- I'm familiar with stories when I was younger where, you know, the city manager calls the -- is not raising enough money through traffic fines, and they have a meeting with the police chief and the municipal judge. I mean, the problem is that everybody is concerned.

There is a rational concern that the process, the judicial process, is somehow being skewed by the need to raise money, but nobody talks about it. Here we're doing something really unprecedented. We're talking about it. We're actually saying that we're -- we are doing this as a revenue measure, and while it might be something we can do under the law of the State of Texas, I have real concerns as whether -- when the courts are overtly raising money through imposing fines or penalties or sanctions, whether that really does implicate some issues, not only a separation of power but due process.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Justice Bland, and

then Lamont.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I was going to ask

Mr. Herring did the State Bar consider going to the

Legislature and seeking amendment of Chapter 10 or the

Government Code; and if you did, why did you-all opt to do

this -- go this route instead -- rule amendment instead?

MR. HERRING: You've addressed that to me?
HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Yes.

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MR. HERRING: Did the State Bar consider I'm not on the State Bar legislative committee, so I don't know, but my quess is no, and what happened this last year, as you know, because of the precipitous decline in the revenue, we've looked all over. There was a fairly aggressive, ambitious legislative agenda, which, again, the Supreme Court did a wonderful job with, and that's how we got this -- as Randy and his team -- the general appropriation, which actually surprised a lot of us that that came through, but this to my knowledge -- and Randy is -- he's really the whiz at the Legislature -- was not even on the radar screen at that time. What we saw was during the session we weren't going to get the money that's needed. Because money now is already going as penalties to other purposes, why not some portion of that That's potentially be available. That was the rationale. really all I can say, unless Randy knows something more. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont.

MR. JEFFERSON: I share a lot of the sentiments of what everyone is saying, but I think the one point that I disagree about is whether this is a pure separation of powers issue because I think the judiciary

has a very vital role to play in access to justice for the poor, and while I think this is a poor revenue raising measure, just because we don't have enough information to know how much revenue is being raised or what all the other implications are for it, I would -- I don't think this should end the debate about whether -- what role the judiciary ought to play in ensuring access to justice for civil litigants.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Just a couple of comments. I have gone the last five years on behalf of the State Bar to Washington during ABA days where we go and lobby Congress to continue funding for legal services. This is the first year in five years that the budget, the proposed budget, will have an increase in funding. It will get us to the level of about 1985 in dollars. With respect to the monies that was appropriated this year by the Legislature, it was asked as a stop gap measure to help during this year that we know -- where we know that the IOLTA funding is not going to give our legal services corporation the monies that will allow us to stay open. Ι mean, the truth of the matter is if we did not get this funding from locally, you know, we would have to close down three quarters of all of the legal services in operation across the state.

With respect to the obligation of the Court,

I think it's the obligation of the Court to provide a

system to have everybody access to the justice system. I

don't think this is a separation of powers issue at all.

I think it's an important issue that -- as I read the

proposal it's not mandating any court to do anything.

It's giving them an option to add additional sanctions if

they feel appropriate and giving them an option to send

them where they go. With respect to whether Judge

Livingston will get in trouble because she sends it to her

favorite -- to her favorite charity, well, that's

something Judge Livingston will have to meet with

the voters in her district.

I don't know -- you know, we discussed this outside a little while ago. Not knowing how much money is involved, I have a -- I have a concern about whether or not we'll -- the benefit will outweigh the harm that could come to the legal services system in terms of the perception that the lawyers in the state may get, but I don't -- I see this as an opportunity, and I think a lot of us that are not intimately involved with the provision of legal services to the poor -- and I am not in that field other than James Sales has gotten me to go with him for the last five years to Washington, but, you know, we've got to find somewhere, and I think the way this came

about is that people are looking to see how they can raise funds to keep -- to allow poor people to have access to the courts. Whether this is the best way to do that or not, I don't know, but I think it's -- that's what's behind the whole purpose of this rule, is it's an opportunity for judges to, if they feel it's appropriate, to do that.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Yeah, Roger.

MR. HUGHES: I would like to join with Mr. Rodriguez. I think it's a worthy goal. It may not get a great deal of money. I suspect it will be none less a popular option to give judges. I'm not so much worried about due process and separation of powers. From the legal perspective I think it's -- the ultimate problem is not a constitutional problem of due process, et cetera. The courts have the inherent power to sanction, and I'm not sure due process somehow requires that monies paid by the way of penalties must somehow by divine origin or something belong to the county, but I think there's a political issue there, and I think earlier it was put the finger right on it, is that local government expects that money to go into their coffers. They want it, and right now they're politically -- they have -- they're strapped.

Ultimately I think it may be of some advantage to have legislation in order for the judges to

at least talk to the local officials to explain why it is they have the option and what they can do about it, but I think as a goal, I think it's worthy, and I also think that the rule should specify somewhat. I do not think it should be left to the local judge for exactly the reasons that have been talked about earlier.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Justice Guzman.

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HONORABLE EVA GUZMAN: You know, I had a concern about if it is a popular option for judges and if judges are more willing to impose sanctions that then the propensity for larger sanctions and the fairness issue to the parties, to the litigants that are ultimately having to pay these sanctions, if it becomes a very popular option and the judge decides that I'm very passionate about legal services to the poor, and then there's a propensity for larger awards, and so the review of those awards, I guess the rule would really have to be very specific about ensuring — notwithstanding TransAmerica, that an award was proportionate to the offense and not motivated by a desire to make a difference in an area where action is truly needed obviously.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I agree with that. What we're talking about here is really a fine, not

a sanction, and if we're talking about a fine then it ought to be set out how much it is, if it's \$250, if it's a thousand dollars, whatever it is, because otherwise we're left -- we, the trial judges, are left in this sort of ether world of what is an appropriate amount.

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Secondly, if you fine someone or sanction them and require the payment to someone other than opposing counsel, I'm curious as to who is going to defend my order on appeal. Because what motivation would the person who got the sanction have to really fight it? It's not going to them. They're going to have to expend more money to defend my sanction.

Finally, what happens if someone doesn't pay? Who moves forward to make sure that money gets paid? The opposing counsel, again, has no incentive to move forward. Now, you know, normally in a criminal situation you have fines, and the district attorney moves forward to make sure fines get paid. We don't have that here.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard.

MR. MUNZINGER: The judge is a hundred percent correct. I'm passionately devoted to separation of powers, and the first of my clients that's sanctioned under a rule that gives a trial court unfettered authority to set the amount of money to fine me for having signed a discovery pleading or to fine my client, I'm going to take

it to the Texas Supreme Court, and I'm going to raise all the issues that Judge Christopher just raised, and the Texas Supreme Court is going to have to resolve the separation of powers issue. It's going to have to resolve the due process issue. It's a government that is taking money from citizens and from litigants. Government is saying "give me money," and they take it, and it's done because they wear a black robe and because they say, "Gee, I want to help the poor." Well, let the Legislature set the rules, appropriate the money.

Mr. Rodriguez went to Washington to lobby
Congress, not the Supreme Court, and people don't come to
the Supreme Court to raise money. That isn't the function
of the Supreme Court. The Court's going to -- there's no
way the Court can avoid passing upon the constitutional
issues that are raised in this discussion in litigation
sometime down the road. Why do you want to get into such
a fight? Why do you want -- why would this committee urge
the Court to get into such a morass? I think we are
personally working against the Court's interest in
suggesting the thing.

I mean no disrespect to anybody, but to me it's just as plain as the nose on my face that government is taking money from somebody and giving it to somebody else, and they're doing it as a court. What gives the

courts the power to do that for god sakes? 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we can all agree 3 it's a cute nose, but anybody else? Yeah, Gene. 4 MR. STORIE: I just wonder what trial judges 5 are doing now when they really think that both sides are being jerks, because a couple of people have commented on the fact that, you know, the victim should be compensated. I absolutely agree with that, but what is a reasonable 8 option when both sides are being jerks? Do you have to 10 let both go? And this, it seems to me, would be one other 11 option that would in some way promote professionalism without rewarding either of the jerks. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I was trying a case in Illinois, and both sides were being a little obstreperous, 14 15 and the judge said, "What's your favorite charity?" thought he said, "What's your favorite jerk?" 16 "I don't know, number five." He's smiling 17 at me, but his threat, which he never executed, was that 19 lawyers could pick their favorite charity and that he would fine you and then you would pay that money to your 20 favorite charity, but I'm not proposing that. I'm just 21 22 giving that as a war story. Buddy. 23 MR. LOW: Were you going to get a tax deduction if you do that? 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I was going to insist on

Yeah, Judge Christopher. it.

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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That was one more point I wanted to raise, that my understanding is if you award sanctions against a lawyer they have to report that in terms of their malpractice premiums, and so often I try to make an award just of attorney's fees and strike out any mention of the word "sanctions" in the order just because of that sort of unintended consequence, so just a thought.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, same thing if you're applying pro hac in some other jurisdiction, they'll always ask you if you've ever been sanctioned. Okay. Any other comments?

We probably ought to take a vote on this. How many people think that, without regard to the details, which we maybe should talk more about, but how many think generally this is a good idea? If you do, raise your hand.

How many think it's a bad idea? All right. The vote is six think it's a good idea, 18 think it's a 21 bad idea. Is there any further discussion about the versions of 191.3(e), assuming the Court think it's a good idea and wants our advice on that?

I heard somebody say that they thought that -- Judge Lawrence said that he thought the first two

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versions might conflict with Canon 2(b). Anybody else
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  have a thought about that? Anybody got a preference for
  these three?
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                 MR. HAMILTON:
                                I thought there was a
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   suggestion that that be changed to the IOLTA fund.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
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                                    That was --
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                 MR. HERRING:
                               I think you were out then.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Huh?
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                 MR. HERRING:
                               I think you were out then, but
   that was Randy Chapman's language.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
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                 MR. HERRING: And I can give you that
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              I'll write it down and give it to the Chair.
   language.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Did you-all
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   discuss the various versions of 215.2(b)(2)? Was that
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   discussed?
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               Pete.
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                 MR. SCHENKKAN:
                                 We moved over them pretty
             I think the one point that was made in your
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   absence I think that may be useful for your focusing any
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   further discussion in case the Court is interested in
   this, is if we do the way Chuck and the poverty law
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   committee originally proposed, that when we use the term
   "paid into court" we now mean by that paid to the basic
   legal services fund of the -- or account of the judicial
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          That's good because that's an existing system that
   fund.
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is policed, you know, that has a structure for appropriate people processing, appropriate applications to divide up the scarce resource for that very goal, and it gets away from this an individual trial judge choosing the particular recipient of the money.

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So I don't know that we discussed this much in terms of a consensus, but I didn't hear any objection to the notion that if the Court were to do this at all, that's the best way to do it, and then the only thing I would add that it seems to me has come out of our discussion just now that, Chip, that you might wish to see if there's a consensus on is I really liked what Judge Christopher said, that, again, if the Court is going to do it at all, why doesn't the Court by rule fix the amount so there isn't an argument about that and there's less concern about abuse. You know, if the amount is fixed at \$500 or a thousand dollars or whatever it is, then a lot of my concern about this is -- it doesn't go away because, you know, having -- being sanctioned has consequences independent of the amount, including the malpractice carrier and the, you know, legal specialization certification and the pro hac and all kinds of contexts, but it certainly goes down a lot if the dollar amount has been fixed in the rule. So those two points I think go to if you did this at all what would the language be.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. When you and Judge 1 2 Christopher were talking about fixing the amount, are you 3 saying that if there is a -- if there's a violation then it's always 500 or it's always 200 or maybe because --5 MR. HAMILTON: It could be up to 500 or up 6 to --7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Up to 500. 8 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: A thousand or, oh, 9 500. Yeah. 10 MR. HAMILTON: 500 or --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Do I hear 2,000? 11 MS. PETERSON: A million dollars. 12 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have one. It seems to 14 me aren't there sort of gradations of sanctionable I mean, some are a little bit sanctionable and 15 pleadings? 16 some of them are way sanctionable. 17 MR. SCHENKKAN: There certainly are. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But we're going to have a 18 one-size-fits-all fine? 19I 20 MR. SCHENKKAN: We're going to have one-size-fits-all for the part that goes to the public 21 fund, and then I'm assuming that the other part of the 22 sanction, which includes both compensation to the injured party and all of these kind of, you know, make the 24 punishment fit the crime in terms of the abuse here was

trying to make a particular exhibit look admissible when it's not or not admissible when it is, and we're just going to say that's been deemed, and we're going to give the other side their costs for having to go to the extra trouble to get there.

> CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

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MR. SCHENKKAN: So I think that that part is still controlled by the whole body of, you know, TransAmerica and Low law that's emerged, and I don't know how people feel about how good that is, but there wasn't a proposal to change it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay. So your suggestion is that we have an expression of support or not for a -- just to take a number, a 500-dollar --

I'm saying you might do two MR. SCHENKKAN: things. You might say, first, if the Court were to do it at all is everybody in agreement that to the basic legal services fund -- account of the judicial fund is the best language, one, and then, two, take a separate vote that said if you're going to do it at all should the public fund amount be set or capped in some number. those are two separate vote items that go -- that we've 23 had some discussion about and people have different or at least some views about.

> CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.

The set amount could be like five 1 MR. LOW: percent of -- you know, which would fluctuate depending on 2 3 like attorney's fees and so forth, and that would be more egregious than say, like, 10 percent in addition there to 5 the fund or five percent and just say up to \$500. I'm not suggesting that, but that's a possibility. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay. Frank. 8 MR. GILSTRAP: Yeah, the percentage approach I think solves Judge Christopher's problem. 9 In other words, I'm the person that succeeded with the sanctions, 10 and if I want to get it I've got to get the money for the 11 12 county, too. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody else have Okay. Pete, why don't you restate proposition 14 comments? 15 one, and we'll vote on that? 16 MR. SCHENKKAN: Proposition one would be that if the Court were to adopt a provision, extend a 17 provision for monetary sanctions to the -- for legal 18 services to the poor, that it be in the language that's 19 adapted from the Government Code, the "pay monetary 20 sanction into the basic civil legal services account of 21 the judicial fund for use in programs approved by the 22 Supreme Court that provide basic legal services to the 23 24 indigent." Was that amended for the 25 MR. JEFFERSON:

IOLTA deal? Or I got kind of lost on the IOLTA part.

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MR. SCHENKKAN: I was not proposing that. think what this does, as I understand it, what this does is put it into the account from which the established system divides it up among the various programs that provide basically the services to the indigent, so it seems to me that maybe I misunderstood the IOLTA amendment, but I thought the IOLTA amendment had to do with the difference in -- I had understood the comment about the IOLTA program choice to be if you were letting the trial judge choose, you're going to limit the trial judge to choosing one of the programs that receives IOLTA money. I'm not proposing that. I'm proposing that we put any of this money into this account and let it be distributed using the processes that exist for it being distributed there.

> Elaine. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Did I understand that that option would require legislative action, appropriation?

It would require legislative MR. CHAPMAN: 22 action, and the alternative that I mentioned, the IOLTA foundation, of course, which is overseen by the Supreme Court has -- basically administers grants. They -- the three big ones are IOLTA, which, of course, was created by

the Supreme Court under its inherent authority. Secondly, appropriated funds, which are general revenue, and then 2 the third is they also administer some crime victim services funds. Together they look at grant proposals, 5 they weed them out, and most entities -- most of the organizations receive money from each of these pots 7 because they go out and they look at one combined application and then they also go out and monitor based on 8 all funds, all funds that are -- that an entity receives, and there are various restrictions. 10 11 I think the -- to answer your question, to go back, there is authority in the appropriation language. I mean, it required a special grant to administer \$19,000 13 in Justice For All fees. It's in the state budget. 14 15 back and begin to estimate and create a line item for these funds would be I think -- it would be difficult, and 17 it would be slow. In the meantime they would just sit 18 there in the state treasury, so my suggestion is that they be treated like IOLTA funds, which were an entity created 19 by the Supreme Court -- by the Supreme Court to start 20 21 with. Thank you. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other 23 comments? Pete, you want to restate the --24 MR. SCHENKKAN: I don't, because now that --

I clearly misunderstood that IOLTA one, and I'm now no

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longer sure what I would be for if I were for this.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Well, how
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   about --
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                 MR. SCHENKKAN:
                                 I think somebody else needs
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  to take a crack at this.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, the one thing
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   that's a little easier is to have it set or capped at --
  maybe we ought to vote on whether it should be set at a
  fixed amount.
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                                 Yeah. As far as I know, I
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                 MR. SCHENKKAN:
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  think it would be appropriate to take a vote on that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Okav.
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                 MR. SCHENKKAN: And the cap, it might --
  given the point made that Buddy's percentage proposal, as
   Frank points out, does address one of Judge Christopher's
  concerns in that it ties the incentives of the party
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   getting compensated to the incentive to defend the whole
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  sanction and includes this fine part. I guess taking that
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   into account, instead of saying set at a fixed amount, I
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   would say set at a fixed percentage of any compensatory
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   sanction.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Okay. A fixed percentage
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  of any compensatory award? Yeah, Carl.
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                 MR. HAMILTON: I guess I disagree with that.
   If we're going to fine somebody, it ought to be like a
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criminal statute, which says how much the fine is so people know in advance what their exposure is if they do something wrong.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, maybe somebody will take a -- you know, take one for the Legal Aid team, just file some bad pleadings and know you're going to get a 500-dollar -- just facetious about that. Yeah, Skip.

MR. WATSON: As we are kind of morphing this from a sanction into a fine, I'm just -- just to be clear for my personal vote, are we saying that -- that this, what I will call a fine, just a fixed amount, whatever it is, is or is not subject to the TransAmerican criteria? Is this above the sanctionable conduct that is subject to scrutiny by the Court under TransAmerican, and so it's just a quasi-legislative enactment by the Court that we're proposing this fixed fine without any constitutional constraints, or is it to be carved out of the sanction that is to be imposed under TransAmerican criteria? I don't think that's a small matter.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Roger.

MR. HUGHES: Picking up on what was just said, the two problems I see, if you're going to start saying that what would be -- be given to charity will be a fixed percentage of the compensatory damages, one, if you're saying, well, we're really taking a portion of

compensatory damages and giving them to IOLTA, that is kind of a due process problem. It almost amounts to a tax of a sort. You're taking part of somebody's compensatory damages and giving it to somebody else.

The next thing is, is if it's not treated as a fine or something or other, not only is there the problem of, well, are you going to evaluate it under TransAmerica or not. It almost becomes more like a tax as opposed to anything else, which is going to bother some people. But I think if it's going to be anything, it's going to have to be treated as something according to a fine, which just is -- or the like that is -- and we're just happening to give the money to IOLTA instead of the county treasury. I think that's the only way it's going to fly, in which case it's going to have to be subject to the TransAmerica standards.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else?

All right. It's Pete's motion, and that is everybody that is in favor of having the amount fixed as a percentage of any compensatory award, raise your hand.

Everybody against? Three were in favor, 20 were against. Pete Schenkkan not voting.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Can I have a clarification of the vote, please? I want to make sure that people voting against were not just voting against

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the idea at all. Because my understanding of it is we
  have to put aside the 18 of us that said, "No way, we
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  don't like it," and vote on the idea of should we leave it
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   open-ended like it is or have it fixed in some way.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I assumed that, but
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  maybe I'm wrong --
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: So I'm asking
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   Jane if her vote was to say let's leave it open-ended, and
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   she says, no, she just doesn't like the idea of it.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        My vote would not
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   change this discussion.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Buddy.
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                 MR. LOW: Chip, one of the things, I wasn't
   voting that it be exactly, but set a limit not to exceed
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   so much, not just say it's automatic, but --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Judge Christopher,
   as a proponent of the thought maybe you could frame a vote
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   that would be more palatable to some of the members.
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                              I don't think so.
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                 MR. DAWSON:
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I don't think
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        Here's the vote. Here's the vote.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm trying to help you
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23 here.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Here's the
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          Here's the vote. Should the penalty sanction be
   vote.
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unlimited in the trial court's discretion or should it be
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   fixed in some manner?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right.
                 MR. HAMILTON: By rule you mean?
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You have to
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   pick either one of those two choices.
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                 MR. WATSON:
                              No, I don't.
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                 MR. JEFFERSON: And on that point if you
9 look at Chapter 10, there are two different provisions.
10 One is the compensatory provision and the other is the
   penalty, so I mean, if what we're doing is setting a limit
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   on the penalty I don't think it necessarily implicates the
   problem that Roger mentioned about taking compensation
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   away because a penalty is by nature not compensatory.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I feel like that
16 we're about to have a less filling/tastes great vote.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Should the
18 penalty sanction be unlimited in the trial court's
19 discretion --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or fixed.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: -- or should
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22 it be fixed in some manner?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Everybody for
  unlimited, raise your hand.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: How about limited
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by the trial court's discretion?
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Limited in the
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   trial court's discretion.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hang on.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Or what's the
   choice?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wait a minute.
                                                    People
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                Don't talk while we've got a vote going.
   are voting.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                              Okav.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The first vote is going
  to be unlimited. Okay. Everybody unlimited people, raise
   your hands.
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                 MR. DAWSON: I don't like the way this is
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   going.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And raise your hand if
  you think it should be fixed in some manner.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Clear vote.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, 10 were for
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19 unlimited, 8 were for fixed in some manner, and a number
   of people were sitting on the sidelines on this momentous
   vote. Pete, anything else you want to vote on? You did
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   so well on that last one.
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                 MR. SCHENKKAN:
                                 Yeah. You know, first
   withdrawing my own motion the first time and then standing
  out from my own motion the second time around, I'm really
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on a roll here.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, you're on a roll. MR. SCHENKKAN: But, you know, this is, in fact, a serious matter, and I am a little embarrassed at the way we're kind of ending this, and I think I want to at least see if there's some ground for the notion that the -- how should this be framed -- that the -- that if it was the Court's pleasure, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee would be prepared to address the question of what measures are within our sense of the Court's inherent powers and its rule-making powers that could be used for the purpose of improving the funding of access -- of legal services for the indigent in civil matters. I'd like -if we were to, you know, do that, and obviously it's only if the Court wants us to look into that, I would like us if we were asked that question to be asked that question in the most open-ended fashion. What is it that we think might be within the Court's inherent and rule-making powers for this purpose and might be a good idea, rather than narrowly limited to any one of these specific tasks? Now, you know, I've been down this road 22 before in previous decades. I remember writing a brief to the Texas Supreme Court myself individually urging mandatory pro bono. That may get me kicked off any committee that would be appointed to this if we considered

it, but that would be what I would be interested in doing if the Court were interested, a more open-ended, not 2 3 focused on the use of sanctions money to help fund this problem, but instead addressing -- seeing what is within 5 the Court's power and might be desirable to address what I think everyone agrees is a dire need, and there is some doubt as to whether the respective Legislatures will step 8 up and do their appropriate duty. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, we will --10 we will caucus about that and figure it out. Justice 11 Patterson. 12 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I want to second 13 that notion and also this whole concept of how the judges can best contribute to solving this problem, and I think 15 some sort of think tank, which I know you-all have sponsored in the past, would work, but we just need to be creative as well with the judges. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody else? 18 19 MR. LOW: Can I ask one question? 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 21 Did the committee consider instead MR. LOW: of the judge setting this or saying to whom it goes or doesn't go, was there any consideration of giving the 24

violator an option of, you know, go to the county or at

the option of the violator to IOLTA? Was there any

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1 consideration of that? 2 MR. HERRING: I don't recall that being --3 MR. LOW: But I'm going to pay, I don't care 4 which one. 5 MR. HERRING: I don't recall that ever being 6 suggested before you just suggested it. 7 MR. LOW: And that would take it off the 8 pressure of the judge and the county saying, "Look, we pay part of your salary, and you're giving away money that the 10 sheriff needs" and so forth, and if you left it up to the violator, I don't know if it can be done, but it would be 11 12 an option. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody else? All right. Maybe this happened while I was out, but I don't 14 think it did. We were referred the letter from Brenda 15 161 Willett for consideration, and, Kennon, have we talked about that yet? 17 MS. PETERSON: No. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 19 Okay. Who is going to lead that? 20 21 MS. PETERSON: I'm going to lead it, only 22 because Judge Yelenosky is not here, and so I'll give a little bit of background and then we'll talk about the 23 I issues that Judge Yelenosky focused on and then turn it 24 over to other subcommittee members who focused on other 25

issues. So the letter, just for the record, is from the poverty law section of the State Bar of Texas to the Court, Supreme Court of Texas. It is dated January 23rd, 2009, and it was written after the hearing that Justice Hecht referred to earlier today. It basically lists a total of seven problems and contains proposed solutions as well.

Judge Yelenosky grouped problems one through three and six together because he felt they were related, and those are the problems that he looked at, and again, for the record, problem one is "E-filing requires the payment of various fees for filing that can total more than \$10 per document. Fees are charged by the state, county, and service provider, and there is no exception for e-filing in forma pauperis. So the proposed solution is "The Court should issue a miscellaneous order enabling free e-filing access for poor litigants. This will provide important court access to poor Texans and avoid inevitable open courts and due course of law challenges."

And one of the discussions that the subcommittee had is quite similar to the discussion that the full committee is having today. It's about whether the Court can mandate TexasOnline and the electronic filing service providers to waive the e-filing fees, and as a reminder, I thought it might be helpful to reiterate

what was said at the last meeting. There are three fees associated with e-filing a document in Texas. There's a fee from TexasOnline, which is \$4. There's a fee from the county, and according to someone from Bearing Point, that tends to be anywhere from zero to \$5, with most county fees being approximately \$2, and then there is the fee that the EFSP charges, which is quite a broad range here, \$1.08 to \$10, and I think that that range is there in part because the fee structure will depend greatly on the services being provided and also on whether you've contracted for a flat annual fee or some, you know, per filing fee.

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So those are the basic fees, and if you look at the subcommittee report on page one, e-filing is addressed in the third paragraph and says a lot of what I've said already, spells out the problem, basically says that there are local rules now that have exceptions for pro se filers, but they don't have exceptions for indigents, and so the issue is that these individuals who are represented cannot go on and file without paying the fee, and another issue is just general access to courts, and so the big concern being that maybe the Court can't mandate waiver of the fees out there, what Judge Yelenosky has proposed on page two, the top paragraph, basically saying that the clerk must notify TexasOnline and all

certified EFSPs of the filing of the affidavit of indigency and of the filing of any order sustaining contest of the affidavit.

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And to put this into context, this is in Rule 145 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and I think it would probably make the most sense, if it's okay, Chip, to talk about the other recommendations as well because they all go to the same rule.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MS. PETERSON: So the other problems spelled out by the State Bar poverty law section, problem three is -- oh, sorry, two is included. Two, problem two, "While courts have allowed indigent clients to file new cases with pauper's affidavits and avoid the initial filing fees, some courts are not allowing final judgments or temporary orders to be entered until court fees are paid," and the proposed solution was the Court could issue a comment or modification to Rule 145 such as, quote, "costs addressed by this rule may not be imposed as prerequisites to entry or rendition of a temporary or final order or other activity in the case."

And then problem three is very related, I think. It's "Some court clerks are requiring clients who have filed an affidavit of indigency to pay court fees set out in Chapter 110 of the Texas Family Code, including for

the issuance of withholding orders, suits or motions to modify the parent-child relationship, motions for enforcement, notice of application for judicial writ or withholding, motions to transfer, motions for contempt in filing transferred cases," and the solution was to amend Rule 145(a) to say in lieu of paying or giving security for costs of an original action the new language would be, "or any other motion petitioner requests for issuance or service of an order" and then the rule as it stands now.

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And so what Judge Yelenosky has proposed instead is on page one of the committee -- subcommittee's report. In the last paragraph he proposes striking of "an original action" to make it clear that this affidavit of indigency applies not just to the fee for filing the case initially but to any fee that's incurred along the way; and, specified even more clearly on the top of page two, new language is, reading from the top, "Upon the filing of the affidavit the clerk must docket the action, issue citation," and here's the new language, "throughout the pendency of the suit unless and until any contest to the affidavit is sustained by written order"; and then he suggestions some other tweaks, "provide all customary services without charge." So these are the proposed solutions to the issues of filing fees being charged later on down the line and to the e-filing fees associated --

that are charged by TexasOnline, EFSPs, and the courts.

The final problem that Judge Yelenosky addresses is problem six, and that's on page four of the State Bar section's letter. It's "Courts are requiring indigent litigants to provide information in pauper's affidavits that is not only unnecessary, but intrusive." The proposed solution was the Court should modify Rule 145 and 749a and other rules allowing these affidavits so that it is clear that an affidavit calling for information such as this should be avoided, or in the alternative the Court should provide in the rules the actual form of the affidavit indigent Texans should use, and so Judge Yelenosky felt it would be more appropriate to basically say what should not be in the form.

He said on page one of the report, "Even if the rule were to provide a form affidavit, unless it prohibits this information it would not be clear to courts that they could not modify the form to require the sensitive information," so that is the reason why he went with basically saying what should not be in the forms, and that's on page two of the subcommittee's initial report. Basically adds a new sentence, "The affidavit must not contain a Social Security number, a checking account number, or a place of birth," and one thing I wanted to note about this recommendation is that if the Rules of

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Judicial Administration regarding sensitive data and 2 remote access go through it might take care of this problem without amendment to 145. 3 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's break for 5 lunch and come back at 1:15. 6 (Recess from 12:30 p.m. to 1:15 p.m.) 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. We're back on the 8 record at exactly 1:15. You heard Kennon's report about problems one through three and six, and does anybody have 10 comments on the proposed fixes for those things? 11 let's move -- yeah, Richard. 12 MR. MUNZINGER: May I ask a question? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 13 MR. MUNZINGER: Could someone tell me again, 14 15 refresh my memory of the structure of e-filing? I know we have private party electronic service providers with whom 16 we interface and they interface with TexasOnline. I don't 17 18 l know if TexasOnline is a government company, a private company, et cetera, because it would seem to me that 19 saying that people must accept indigent filings for free 20 may implicate contractual issues and other issues. 21 22 Exactly, and that's what I MS. PETERSON: was hitting on earlier when I said the subcommittee was 231 concerned about whether the Court can mandate either 24 TexasOnline or the EFSPs to waive basically what's called 25

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   the convenience fees for e-filing.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, EFSPs are private
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   enterprise.
                 MS. PETERSON:
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                                Yes.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: Is Texas online private
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  enterprise?
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                 MS. PETERSON:
                                It is through -- isn't it now
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   NIC? Bearing Point was the company before that handled
   the e-filing and now it's NIC.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: It contracts with
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  the state to handle all the e-filing.
                 MR. MUNZINGER: But it would seem to me that
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  were the Court to adopt then a rule mandating something,
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   that that would implicate the contracts with those
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  agencies --
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                 MS. PETERSON:
                               That's right.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: -- and those agencies'
   requirements to provide things for free. It's almost like
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   a taking.
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                                That's the problem, and if
                 MS. PETERSON:
   it's okay, Chip, I wanted to recognize Nelson Mock, who is
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   here to give a little bit more background about the
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   e-filing issue because he and I talked yesterday about
   this, and as I understand it, the recommendation stems in
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   part from problems that have been incurred in Travis
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County where e-filing is mandatory for a lot of documents, not all, but a lot.

MR. MOCK: That's right. I mean, and I'm -my name is Nelson Mock. I'm an attorney with Texas Rio
Grande Legal Aid, and I am also on the poverty law
section. I am currently the vice-chair of the poverty law
section, and I was involved in the letter that you have
before you that outlines some of our concerns about access
to justice issues and our clients. Many of our members
are legal services attorneys, but we also include, of
course, academics, private attorneys, people who practice
in the area of poverty law, but this issue has come up,
and it came up for me personally in Travis County, but
this issue is a statewide issue for anyone who is
practicing poverty law representing someone who is
indigent and would like to use the e-filing system.

And, you know, I remember talking to somebody about the e-filing system and saying, you know, this is the wave of the future, everybody is going that way, but truly this is the wave of the present, and Texas Courts Online reports that 72 percent of our population in Texas is now within a district that has e-filing, and in my example of Travis County, it is mandatory for many types of cases. That's a problem if you cannot e-file, and it's a complicated issue, but not that complicated.

There are three parties involved. the private parties, the service providers. There are -there is the state involved and, of course, the courts, but what we're asking for is direction from the Court to ensure that we have access as attorneys representing people who are indigent, have access to this court system which is going to be -- which is the wave of the present, but also, you know, where everybody is going. understanding is that the way that the Court directs e-filing is through the Government Code 77.031, which directs the Judicial Committee on Information Technology to create -- to recommend to the Court, you know, a process for e-filing; and my understanding is that the committee, in fact, it's one of their three big tasks at this point is to deal with e-filing; and, in fact, in 2004, May of 2004, these are -- this is from the Judicial Committee on Information Technology, from the website of the committee, and there's an FAQ from May of 2004; and one of the questions is in the FAQ, "What about people who are indigent," and they reported at that point, "The JCIT in coordination with the Access to Justice Commission has developed a requirement and processes for e-filing by and for indigent parties. Attorneys who e-file for indigent parties as well as indigent pro se filers will be able to file through a special service provider," and this may be

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where we need to go.

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JCIT's proposal to waive e-filing transaction fees is currently pending before TexasOnline Authority. I can tell you now because we have spoken with TexasOnline, we've spoken with private providers, nobody waives the fee at this point, and this puts us at a disadvantage. You know, as TexasOnline points out on the website, it's fast, it's efficient, it's cost effective both for the courts and, of course, for us. We talk about -- you know, your last vote addressed our scrambling for fees, and I almost -- you know, when I heard the first vote I almost thought I felt like -- I feel like Evil Knievel trying to jump the Grand Canyon here, but I know the Court is -- and I know you are. I know the Court is concerned about access to justice issues, and this is an access to justice -- access to courts issue. We, if we're going to use e-filing, have to pay for it, and so if we're talking about funding for legal services, we're talking about costs that we incur in order to be able to use this, and sometimes we just bite the bullet and we pay for it, and our clients have to pay for it if they can or we do.

There are a couple of other issues I'd like to raise, and that is, as is must be clear, if we follow down the path that we're following right now and the concern for the private -- you know, the private service

providers and such, if we're following down the path we're following right now, we are going to create -- we are creating a two-tier system, a system for people who have the resources to pay for filing fees and a system for people who do not have that, and since this is where we all are going, again, this is, you know, fairly an access to justice issue.

Now, I'm not quite sure what the fix is, and I think -- I think this is obviously a point of discussion you-all will be touching on, but there are a couple of possibilities. One is if we cannot touch the private service providers, perhaps the Court can order the state in the form of a miscellaneous order, the state and the courts, to waive the fees; and there is one option that could also be discussed, and that is the creation as in the JCIT of a separate service provider or allowing entities to be service providers. I had dragged along Robert Doggett because he -- I asked him a couple of years ago when this issue first came up to look into this issue, and he actually has a lot more knowledge about the process, and with your permission I'll let him talk more about that and anything else I've missed.

MR. DOGGETT: I think you've covered it, frankly, Nelson. E-filing, I mean, I practice in Federal court as well as state court, and e-filing for indigents

is easy in Federal court. You file your pauper's oath online from start to finish, and it's not a problem at all. So what we're trying to do is, you know, if the Federal courts can manage to get this done, I know that this state can get it done, and it's been five years since the JCIT recommended this get done. You know, we've been waiting, and many programs don't let you bite the bullet and pay to do this, and thus, we don't use it. I haven't gotten permission to do it, and I know that it would be very helpful if we could get it done, and I know there may be some issues involved with the private entities, but if we could find a way or take some direction to find a provider that would be willing to do this and work this maze, I think it's possible.

Rather than finding problems with why we can't do something I'm hopeful that this committee can help us find a way to do this, because right now indigents under Rule 145 are supposed to have their filing fees waived and other costs waived, and this is clearly one of those costs, and so we're hopeful with all of our expertise in this room that we can find a solution to this problem rather than just finding roadblocks on why we can't do that. I really hope for that being done.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, are you saying that indigents, even if they have a pauper's oath that is not

challenged, that today indigents are paying the fees or 2 not? 3 MR. DOGGETT: Right. We're not allowed to You have to go online with a credit card right now 5 to file anything. Let me give you my --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So they are paying. 6 7 If you want to use the system MR. DOGGETT: you have to pay, period. No other solution. 8 9 My experience in Travis County, MR. MONK: 10 this was like a year and a half ago when they first had their first order having to do with foreclosures, and I was dealing with a foreclosure. An emergency client came I had to file -- it was a Rule 736 procedure, and I 13 had -- I had an affirmative case that I was going to file 14 that would abate the whole -- the whole application 15 process, and so I was concerned about the local order because I had read it, and it was very clear that I would 17 have to ask for permission from a judge in order to file my affidavit of inability to pay and my affirmative case, 19 and there was confusion on the part of all parties 20 21 involved, because when I first went to e-file the day

Little did I know there was no way to do that, and I was on the line with ProDoc, I was on the line

before I thought "This is going to be easy. I'll just

e-file with the affidavit of inability to pay."

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with the district clerk's office, and everybody was pointing fingers. There was clearly no way to file online without me having to pay. The ProDoc, the person at the service provider suggested maybe I could ask for a reimbursement from the county after filing it, which I was not inclined to do. It's a problem, and especially as I think counties are -- and courts are going to be going towards mandating e-filing, and they already are in other states.

Washington, D.C., for example, has a required e-filing process, and I don't know the particulars of what the courts have done there, but I can tell you that Case File Express, which is one of our service providers, if you go onto the D.C. portion of their website, has — describes how they deal with people who are filing in forma pauperis, the pauper's affidavit, and there is a process that people have in D.C., Legal Aids have in D.C., to sign up for that and not have to pay and yet be able to e-file. So there's got to be a solution. We don't want a two-tier process, and I think now is the time to resolve it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Speaking of a solution,

Judge Yelenosky proposes language that says, "The clerk

must also immediately notify TexasOnline and all certified

electronic filing service providers of the filing of the

affidavit and of the filing of any orders sustaining a contest to the affidavit." Is that a solution? I mean, you just sent a notice to TexasOnline and they say, "Well, thanks very much for telling us that, now where's your ten bucks?"

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MR. MONK: That is exactly right. That is our primary concern. If the Court really can do absolutely nothing, that's better than absolutely nothing, but not much. Our real concern is that we're still going to be charged the fees, which puts us back into the same two-tier system.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Has anybody talked to TexasOnline about this?

MS. PETERSON: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh?

MS. PETERSON: Well, I've spoken with what was then Bearing Point and what's now NIC about the FAQ referenced earlier and what happened with JCIT's proposal, and the response I got is that if e-filing is optional, not just for indigent filers but across the board, it's unlikely that TexasOnline will either waive its fees or press EFSPs to waive its fees for indigent filers. Stated differently, if e-filing is required for non-indigent filers it is more likely that e-filing for indigent filers could be waived; and as I understand it, the reason this

is the case is because as of now, according to what's now NIC, e-filing hasn't achieved a break even on its 3 investment costs, so they're not making money; and until e-filing is mandated -- and right now we have it mandated in Travis County. I'm not aware of any other county in Texas, and I believe Travis County it's by local order, but until that's the case they just haven't had the type 7 of numbers they expected, even though you're hearing that e-filing is happening in Texas across all these counties. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 11 MS. PETERSON: The number of e-filings hasn't reached a point to be profitable for the parties Specifically this was Bearing Point, so I --13 involved. the message I'm receiving is until it's something where we 14 have more filings and we're making more money on this it's 15 hard for us to make the business decision to waive the 16 fees associated with it. And another thing I've heard is 17 it's a comparison to postage charges, that the e-filing fee is kind of like the charge you would incur if you went 19 to the post office and mailed something. I'm not 20 defending it. I'm providing it as information. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. How long has 22 Travis County been mandatory? Do you know how long Travis County has been mandatory? MR. MONK: For foreclosures I think it's 25

about a year and a half, maybe slightly longer, and then more recently I think in 2008 it was mandated for many other -- many other different types of cases. But, again, my focus is completely on the statewide problem, you know, rather than Travis County. I think the real problem -- and, again, with regard to the private service providers, it's more than a postage stamp when you have to pay filing fees, and when you're charging \$10 a document, that's a little more than it would cost in order to stick it in the mail, but what we're talking about is access to a procedure that everybody else has access to that is fast.

I mean, that -- you know, we all know the

I mean, that -- you know, we all know the benefits of e-filing. You get to file at 11:59 at night. You don't have to leave your office. It's cost effective. It's swift. You don't have to travel, you know, the 40 miles if you're in a rural county to the court in order to file; and to deny people who don't have money, you know, is -- it's creating a two-tier system.

The last thing I'll say is I think one of the issues about e-filing that -- and I don't know the numbers, but I would not imagine from a business perspective that we're talking about a whole lot of people filing affirmative cases or being able to file online with an affidavit of inability to pay. There are -- you know, I can get into all the specifics about access to justice

and how, in fact, if you look at real estate and property issues, and my law firm, which covers a third of Texas and is really the only law firm or one of the few law firms that provides services to the poor in that area for a third of Texas. There are 12 of us attorneys, so we're not talking about flooding the service providers with, you know, incredible fees. This is a small percentage of the number of people who are filing cases, and that's -- I think that would be a response to that.

MS. PETERSON: And I just want to -- because

MS. PETERSON: And I just want to -- because nobody from NIC is here, I want to provide more information from the response I got via e-mail. One of the statements was that it requires making and maintaining application and code changes, both of which add expenses, so there was a statement that it's not only the --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Loss of revenue.

MS. PETERSON: -- loss of revenue, it's what the fees you will incur and making code changes associated with this, just to give all the information.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Munzinger, and then Gilstrap.

MR. MUNZINGER: I think everybody in the room is sympathetic with your goal. Even though I spoke as I spoke the last time, I'm sympathetic with your goal. The problem is we have laws, and we have to address this

under the law. Why can't the Supreme Court just tell TexasOnline, "Do what you have to do to allow truly 3 indigent people equal access to your service?" Why can't we do that? The Supreme Court it seems to me can do that unless TexasOnline is somehow a creature of the state or 6 some kind of a private creature that is beyond the 7 authority of the Court to do that, because why can't the Court say "do this"? I don't know why they can't. 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I thought you said it was 10 a taking a minute ago. MR. MUNZINGER: Well, it would be if you 11 told an electronic service provider "You must take this filing." Clearly TexasOnline, somebody is going to have 13 to open up a portal for the people or the service 14 providers are going to have to agree to waive it or 15 somebody is going to have to litigate the point. I, for 16 one, if I were an electronic service provider, I would --17 not for the dollars but for the principle. Who in the heck are you to take my property? It's mine. It's mine, and you can't have it unless due process is honored. Okav. That's fine. 21 That So maybe we need to have a new portal. 22 solves that problem. Doesn't solve the problem of 23 identifying whether the person is or isn't truly indigent, 24 and that is a problem. That's a problem that has to be 25

solved, but if TexasOnline is the person that's receiving everything from all these electronic service providers and 3 is, in fact, a government agency, why can't the Texas Supreme Court just say, "You take them and you figure out how to do it"; and then the electronic service providers, these fellows, you're going to have to pay an electronic 7 service provider, which they can't do, or someone is going 8 to have to set up a portal for them to do it; and the Court doesn't have the power to appropriate the money, in 101 my opinion --11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank, then Judge 12 Lawrence. 13 MR. MUNZINGER: -- to do it. Everybody 14 loves your goal. The problem is how do you go about doing 15 it lawfully. MR. GILSTRAP: Let me just throw this out 16 here. I mean, aren't we talking about doing this for 17 18 justice courts? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we're going to hear 19 20 from Judge Lawrence on that. 21 MR. GILSTRAP: And it seems to me once you 22 get into justice courts the chances of a lot of, you know, pauper's -- electronic pauper's affidavits would go up dramatically, and simply because there are a lot of pro se litigants, possibly the chance of a number of spurious 25

1 pauper's affidavit. I mean, you know, look, I can file it free if I just press this button. Judge Lawrence could 2 probably answer that question, but I just wanted to raise 4 it. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It seems to me we've got two separate issues. One is where e-filing is 7 mandated, the issue of what to do about that, and then the second issue is should you give indigents free e-filing. 8 The first issue, why couldn't you simply attack it from the opposite way, and I'm assuming that mandatory e-filing 10 is done by local rule which the Supreme Court approves. 11 12 No? 13 MS. PETERSON: Travis County was not, I 14 don't think. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay, well, if it's 15 not done by a local rule you would have the ability I would think in the Rules of Judicial Administration or 17 18 maybe the Rules of Procedure to prohibit mandatory e-filing for indigents, wouldn't you? 191 20 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yes. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that to me is 21

access to file it by mail or a walk-up document is another

22 the more egregious problem. The other issue as to whether

23 or not you give indigents free e-filing when they have

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problem to me.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's a different issue. Justice Bland.

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HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, currently we -first of all, I don't think we have a huge problem, and this may be just me, and the other judges should comment. I don't think there's a huge problem with spurious affidavits of indigency. If anything, I think we have a bigger problem with district clerks sometimes contesting affidavits of indigency that they shouldn't be contesting, but that's just been my experience, but we currently have user -- people that need to proceed as indigents that need a reporter's record, need the clerk's record, all at some cost, and right now I'm quessing the court reporter doesn't get paid for the record. I think on the criminal side there is some kind of fund for the record, but why wouldn't whatever monies associated with the online filing be treated similarly to the kinds of monies that have to be expended to prepare the clerk's record and the reporter's record now for indigent people? And to me, unlike the earlier question we were taking up, this does seem something within the bailiwick of the courts to dictate.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.

MR. LOW: Chip, Judge Lawrence raises a good question, and then they say, well, the indigent don't have

the luxury of being able to file at 11:00 something and so When they get to court, they might not have the 2 luxury of hiring an expert that somebody does. We can't eliminate things like that. As long as we give them the vehicle to get to court, and if the court mandated that if they qualify, they can file like they always have then 7 they can't complain they're being kept out of court. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 8 Yeah, Hayes. 9 MR. FULLER: Three thoughts. First of all, do we know the differences between the Federal e-filing and the state filing and how are they different to where 11 this apparently is not a problem in the Federal system and 12 yet it is a problem with the state system? Is that 13 because the state has private providers involved or --14 15 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: No. The state -the Federal government owns the Federal filing system. And that answers that 17 MR. FULLER: Okay. Second issue is would it alleviate the 18 question. situation somewhat if the agencies that you are employed 19 by qualified as electronic filing service providers? 20 eliminates at least one of the three possible fees you're 21 going to get. 22 MR. DOGGETT: And we've actually considered 23 doing that, and the state said it still wouldn't waive 24 their fees. 25

MR. FULLER: Okay.

MR. DOGGETT: So we actually absolutely think that's the solution, is that if we've got this three-tier system, one solution is that we could -- all these different groups could collaborate and have one provider and then if TexasOnline, which is run by the state, Department of Information Resources, I think, the state has the key to this.

MR. FULLER: So the question is --

MR. DOGGETT: The state says, no, they won't do it, so we're needing help.

MR. FULLER: Who can tell the TexasOnline and the clerks to waive their fees? Okay, I don't know — the last point is as far as the electronic filing service providers are concerned, which you may have already solved that problem by becoming one yourselves, to hit the point that you said, if it was mandatory, they're making enough money that it's a profitable concern for them that they have an interest in keeping that contract, at which point the state can sit down with them and say, "You know, if you want this contract as opposed to you, you're going to have to waive fees for the poor." That addresses the takings issue, because then you've got the market regulating the debate there. It's like we want it so bad we'll waive those fees. You've got some negotiating

power. Right now I'm not sure -- it doesn't sound like
it's profitable enough to where if you add any more
constraints to it they can just say "none of us want it,"
but I don't know.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: David.

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There's an issue -- you know, MR. JACKSON: Judge Bland brought up something about indigency not being a problem. Going in if we know that someone is indigent it's not a problem. If they've filed their certificate and they've gotten their IOLTA certificate then the court reporters don't have a problem with that because they came in that way, we know they're in the system, and they're Maybe you could tie the e-filing with the IOLTA doing it. If they've gone through the process to get certificate. declared indigent, they have an IOLTA certificate, they could use that certificate the same way they use it to get their transcript at the end of the trial versus the guy who loses his lawsuit and is now indigent because he lost. He drives off in his Mercedes and wants a free transcript.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Kennon.

MS. PETERSON: I think -- and please, subcommittee members, correct me if I'm wrong. I think that the proposal on the table from Judge Yelenosky sort of does that. It's doing that in regard to the fee charged by the court, because there are three different

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fees, the e-filing fee charged by the court, the e-filing
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  fee charged by the EFSP, and the e-filing fee charged by
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  TexasOnline. I think this proposal would speak to the
  e-filing fee charged by the court, but like I said,
  subcommittee members, please correct me if I'm wrong, but
   the way it's worded it's talking about -- let me find the
   language. "All customary services," and this goes to
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   filing fees. I don't know why e-filing fees would be
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   treated differently under this language.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: You say "set by the
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   court," isn't that in essence set by the county, though?
   Doesn't the county set that fee?
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                 MS. PETERSON: The e-filing fee?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. You've got
   TexasOnline. You've got the fee that the county charges.
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   I thought the county set that, not an individual court.
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                 MS. PETERSON: It is a county fee.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And you've got the
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   service provider fee.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, can I -- I'm sorry,
   Elaine. Go ahead.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                     Yeah, I've got a
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              What's the current state of the law on open
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   question.
   courts provision and filing fees?
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                 MR. DOGGETT:
                               Broad question.
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1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I mean, am I mistaken that the courts have held that indigents have a 2 constitutional right under the open courts provision and, therefore, when you comply with the rules for establishing indigency, you have a legal right to have fees waived, 5 filing fees waived; is that not correct, or am I --6 7 I believe so. MR. DOGGETT: PROFESSOR CARLSON: Sax vs. Votteler or 8 9 something. I mean, litigation hasn't been 10 MR. DOGGETT: brought, but maybe it would be best to work this out 11 12 rather than --13 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Well, I'm just wondering about if there's mandatory e-filing and if that is the 14 state of the case law -- and I haven't looked at that in a 15 long, long time, since we looked at Rule 145 -- it seems to me that there is a constitutional issue there for at 17 least mandatory e-filing, unless Judge Lawrence's 18 provision or suggestion got picked up where you would be 19 excused from e-filing, and then it becomes a question of 20 whether you have sufficient equal access to the court. 21 22 MR. DOGGETT: We certainly considered it, but we think that since the JCIT five years ago thought that it was a good idea to do and Texas Equal Access to 24 Justice Commission and the providers that I've talked to, 25

the folks I've talked to, think that we could probably figure out a way to put together a provider, you know, have a provider do it, that the solution might be best and quicker if we could find an avenue to solve it, because the courts ultimately could declare the current situation to be unconstitutional, but we're still stuck with the problem of how we do it. PROFESSOR CARLSON: It might have an implication on the contract that the Court has with their 10 -- the legality clause in their contract.

> MR. DOGGETT: True.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland, and then Lamont.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Is the Travis County mandatory e-filing without exception? Are you saying that 16 now if a particular type of case has to be e-filed and you've got an IOLTA certificate, your plaintiff still must e-file, or does Travis County carve out the exception and you're just saying it puts you on unequal footing with other litigants in terms of convenience and access after hours and that sort of thing?

I mean, I think it always puts MR. MONK: you on unequal -- I mean, it's less convenient, you don't 24 have the same tools available to you, but in Travis County, and again, I don't mean to focus on Travis County

Travis County kind of -- the rules just kind of at all. 2 brought that issue to a head. 3 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Except it sounds like it's mandatory there, so I'm sure they thought through 5 this. It's mandatory, and there is a 6 MR. MONK: provision that allows for you to request an exception. doesn't specifically -- it's not detailed specifically for people without the ability to pay. I think it's for good cause shown you can ask for an exemption for that, but I 10 think there's a hearing required. It's not a -- it is --11 and to be fair to the district clerk's office, while they 12 were very confused about this at first, and we -- you 13 know, and when I was dealing with the service providers in 14 Travis County, now I show up -- I'm always a little 15 16 worried because they have a list, and they say, "This is an e-filed case." 17 But now I show up and they say, "This is an 18 e-filed case, " and I say, "I have an affidavit of 19 20 inability to pay on file," and they say, "Okay," hopefully; but, you know, for -- clearly that's not 21 22 consistent necessarily with the court's order; but again, I don't -- and I don't think -- and this is obviously my opinion and I think -- and I think probably a lot of our 24

younger lawyers would agree that I don't think that the --

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you know, allowing us to always hand-deliver filings is the answer, because I think where all of us are going is e-filing; and I can't stress enough, I think what we're creating here is a two-tier way of accessing the courts.

And I know that -- and I feel I was mentioning this at lunch. I think I'm kind of in the middle because I use books for research and kind of later was introduced to the whole idea of, you know, e-researching or getting online, and there are attorneys in our office who will always hand file and then there are attorneys in our office who all they want to do is e-file, but I think where we're moving is all of us are going to e-filing. You look at Federal court, you look at kind of where things are going, and I think this is where we all need to go as a fairness issue and an access to justice issue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont.

MR. JEFFERSON: Yeah, I was just going to underscore that point. You know, I mean, these two guys are the youngest guys in the room, right?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hey.

MR. JEFFERSON: Except for Justice Bland.

But, I mean, I think it is -- access to the court is

fundamental, and once you have the affidavit of indigency,

I mean, if you qualify, you should have the same access to

the court as any other litigant, and it really is a huge advantage to be able to file electronically, and we need to find a way to solve this. It's not like hiring an expert, Buddy. I mean, I appreciate that there are different -- I mean, if you have more resources you have a better ability to fight your case, but we're not talking about advocacy. All we're talking about here is access to the courts, filing, something that is fundamental to a piece of litigation, and there's just got to be a solution to this that puts -- that gives everybody who has access to the courts equal access to the courts and not some litigants, you know, better access to the courts. That's fundamentally offensive.

The notion that they suggested that I think is a really elegant solution is having even the threat to these service providers that there's going to be some other service provider out there that's going to do the free stuff and we're going to use that service provider instead of anybody who is unwilling to waive their fees, that, I think just the threat is going to bring them around, and they're going to say, "We don't want some other competitor out there that's going to offer, you know, services to folks." I mean, "We want to be the one" -- you know, "We'll do that and we'll market ourselves as being the service provider that does that,

and we'll get more business that way or we'll get more publicity that way" or whatever, but I think absolutely we've got to find the solution that allows everybody at least the equal opportunity to file stuff at the court. That's just a fundamental right to the litigant.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.

MR. LOW: But I wasn't just getting to that. I see it as having the court open to them. Now, I might drive a Chevrolet to get to court and one of my friends might fly a jet plane, but it's open to me, and it may take -- and I understand your point that now e-mail is not a luxury. That's just not really open unless you do. I see that argument, but I was using it in the sense that the courts are open if you're allowed to file it. It's just a question of the convenience and so forth. Does that make it really not open?

MR. JEFFERSON: Yeah, I think there's degrees of openness. You shouldn't be able to have an advantage in access to the court based on wealth. Everybody's access to the court -- and I'm not talking about, you know, how you get there, whether it's by car or by bus, but especially in this instance where all it's got to be is an electronic connection. An indigent person should have the ability to have an electronic connection just like anybody else.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger, and then Tom, and then Carl.

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MR. MUNZINGER: Rule 145 as presently written applies to every district and county clerk in the state of Texas, and it says that an indigent does not have to pay costs or put up security for costs, whether plaintiff or defendant, by the execution of a particular affidavit, which if it survives a challenge then applies to that case. Am I correct in that?

> MR. MONK: I think so.

MR. MUNZINGER: What distinguishes the problem at present is that TexasOnline stands between the district and county clerks and the litigant, and that is because of the unique arrangement that the state of Texas 15 has chosen to solve the problem of e-filing, whether it's 16 administrative or elsewhere. It does seem to me that a very strong argument can be made that the Texas Supreme Court has it within its authority and its rule-making authority to require that TexasOnline not adopt policies or insist on payments that preclude the application of Rule 145 in the electronic filing and the electronic practices.

That still doesn't solve the problem of a fourth portal, if I am correct in my analysis, which is that the Supreme Court would have the authority to say --

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it may be litigated, but certainly it passes more than the
  blush test in my opinion to say we have a situation in
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  which litigants are in a two-tier system. The gentleman's
   point is correct. It is a two-tier system or fast
   approaching that, especially so in Travis County where
   e-filing is mandatory.
                           It's a two-tier system.
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   right. We're all equal in the eyes of the law.
                                                    Supreme
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   Court says, "TexasOnline, change your rule. You stand
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  between the district clerk and the litigant, and it's our
   job to write rules that make litigants come to court
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   equally. Fix this."
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Mr. Due Process Taking.
                 MR. MUNZINGER: TexasOnline is a government
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            It's a government agency.
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   agency.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Here's God, and
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   here's the bureaucracy, somewhere kind of, and here's the
   Supreme Court of Texas. (Indicating)
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Tom.
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                             There may be an open access to
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                 MR. RINEY:
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   courts issue, but on a more pragmatic level I think it's
   undisputed from today from what we've heard that the
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   funding for legal services is down drastically, that these
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   folks are doing a good job with a very limited budget, and
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   we can make them more efficient and make their dollars go
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  farther if we can get them free online filing. We know
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that it's a tremendous cost-saver. Anybody in private practice knows that. It's also a tremendous cost-saver 2 for the courts, and what really happens is the Legislature 3 has failed to fund the courts properly to allow for 4 online, and we can't solve that today, but I don't have enough information about TexasOnline to know how we as a 6 committee can advise the Court how to solve that problem. I mean, I'm open to hearing, but I don't know if we've got 8 that within our power. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, can I make a 11 comment for just one second? It seems to me that we've 12 identified the problem, but I don't think that this rule 13 that Judge Yelenosky has -- or the language he's proposed 14 comes even close to fixing the problem, and so it seems to 15 me we have to think a little deeper if we're going to fix 16 the problem by rule, and I wonder, I mean, we're just 17 talking about a method of getting the papers from point A to point B. Could the Court by rule tell the post office 18 that as long as this affidavit is on file you can't charge 19 an indigent the cost of a stamp? 20 21 MR. LOW: Right. 22 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Yes, we can tell the 23 post office that. Well, we can tell them. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 25 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: But they won't listen.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We can tell them that. 2 MR. LOW: Can we effectively tell them? 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Can you tell Fed Ex or UPS that, "Hey, this package of pleadings, because there is an affidavit of indigency on file you can't charge So -- and we wouldn't think about doing that. It's just because electronic filing is a new thing, but 7 it's really just a method of getting stuff from point A to point B, and it is a problem if there's -- if there's mandatory. I mean, that's much more serious than if it's 10 not mandatory, but still indigents today bear the cost of 11 12 They bear the cost of any other method of postage. getting stuff to the courthouse, so is it the policy of 13 the Court to try to step in and fix that when they're 14 going to have to deal with a private entity, that 15 being NIC or Bearing Point, and a public entity? A pretty 16 serious issue that's going to be very hard to do by rule, 17 at least by Rule 145, it seems to me, and let me finish by 18 saying I'm very sympathetic to your situation, too. 19 last thing -- you know, you're trying to get a pleading 20 filed and all the sudden, you know, you've got to whip out 21 your own MasterCard to do it on behalf of an indigent, and 22 you can only do that so many times before you become 23 There were a couple of other hands up before 24 indigent. Jeff had his hand up. Somebody else. 25 you quys.

MR. BOYD: I just wanted to see if I could get clarification on Travis County, because Travis County has a local rule that governs e-filing and then has entered orders saying "The following kinds of cases are subject to mandatory e-filing, and you shall not -- you 5 shall not file paper copies pursuant to our local rule," but the local rule has this statement in it that says, "The district court shall handle electronically transmitted documents that are filed in connection with an affidavit of inability to afford court costs in the manner 10 11 required by rule -- Rule of Civil Procedure 145," which if I had read that yesterday, I would have thought, oh, well, 12 that means that even if it's mandatory under the order 13 pursuant to the local rule, if it's filed with an 14 affidavit of inability, then under Rule 145 you don't have 15 16 to pay, but you're telling me that's not how it actually works out in Travis County? 17 And if you look online there MR. MONK: No. is an order that specifically has to do with e-filing. Ιt 19 sets out the mandatory e-filing, and so --20 Right, but that's the order that MR. BOYD: I was -- the 2008 order that has that exhibit with all the 22 list of types of cases says "in accordance with our local 23 rule, " so that order is subject to their local rule, and 24 the local rule says if it's an affidavit of inability then 25

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it's subject to 145, so --

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2 The problem with -- the problem MR. MONK: 3 with the waiver of the fees for e-filing is that no one does it, and while it's possible that after -- I mean, I'll give you an example, because I went through this whole discussion with -- this is like a year and a half ago or whenever it was -- with the district clerk's office 7 and with the service provider; and the problem is you go online and it says, "What's your credit card number," It doesn't say, "Are you filing with an affidavit 10 of inability to pay?" And when I found that I said, 11 "Well, something has to be wrong here. Maybe there's 12 another way I can do this." You know, called up the 13 14 service provider.

Service provider says, "Well, no, we can't do that. You need to talk to the district clerk." I called the district clerk, and the district clerk says, "Well, no, if you're going to be e-filing that's the way you have to do it," and I never had to -- I was in a bit more of a rush, and so I ended up hand-filing it, which was a little bit of a problem at the time, but there is no mechanism by which you can do that.

Now, I suppose, as I mentioned initially, I could e-file, pay for it all, and then seek reimbursement. I would be the first person probably to do it in Travis

1 County, and I don't know how amenable they would be to us 2 always doing that, e-filing, and I think that there are 3 open courts arguments. I think that there are Rule 145 arguments. The problem is there is not a mechanism at this point by which we can do that, so we're stuck with --5 you know, we're stuck with paying, and --6 7 MR. DOGGETT: And all the local rules are --I mean, I saw a local rule, I was like, "Oh, good, I'll be 8 able to e-file," and I get on and look for the spot where I check "affidavit of inability," just like in Federal court, right? Federal court, same thing, you file an 11 affidavit, you check the thing, and it lets you go 12 through. I mean, I thought it was --13 Well, what that sounds like is 14 MR. BOYD: it's not -- it's not a problem created by the rules. 15 a problem created by implementation, inadequate implementation of the rules. 17 Knowingly, knowing we've asked 18 MR. DOGGETT: -- remember, TexasOnline has been asked to change their 19 systems, and they will not do it, and it's not just simply 20 postage we're talking about. Postage takes three days to 21 get there or four or maybe it never gets there. I don't know how many times you've ever filed a response to a motion for summary judgment three days before and hope it 24 gets there. I don't do it that way for my clients because 25

I really want to make sure that response gets timely filed. So I really care about my clients, and I really want to make sure something gets there, and putting something in the post office and hoping that it gets there and I can make the motion later if it doesn't get there, I don't know, maybe that's how you practice, but that's not the way I practice at all.

And I want to have the same ability that my opposing counsel has to file something and make sure it's timely filed, and, frankly, trial judges prefer it. They want it that way because they can look at their cases beforehand, and so they're going to be able to look at the other guy's motion and not mine, because they're not going to bring it home, not going to bring that file home. They can access it online, so, I mean, we're not talking about — this is not just postage. This is how it's fair, if it's fair for poor people not to have the same system as everybody else. This is not about postage.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Pete.

MR. SCHENKKAN: First I want to say that the discussion we've been having for the last whatever it is now, 30, 45 minutes, an hour, is the reason why our subcommittee's thing is drafted the way it is, because we worked our way through this too and concluded this is not clear that this is a question of the rule. It's a

question of who has the authority to make TexasOnline and 2 the private providers let people who are poor, defined by rule, not pay this fee, and it's not clear to us that this is a question of the rule. 5 It seems to me, if I can return to that in just a minute, what can we do by rule, now look at it in 6 terms of the problem, which is TexasOnline and the 8 electronic filing service providers. If they are allowed to increase the fee charged to those who are not indigent by enough to cover all the filing fees of those who are indigent, do they care? I would think not. So I believe 11 the practical question is what is the cycle and the 12 13 mechanism by which the deal under which the fee is set for the paying customers is up for review again? 14 authority over that and when, and then we're now ready to 15 return to the question of what we can do by rule, and I 16 think what we can do by rule is to say the first time it 17 comes up you've got to set the fee at a level for the 18 paying customers that will cover the cost of the free 19 ones, because that's the deal. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. 21 22 Only because we --MR. SCHENKKAN: 23 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I want to ask --MR. SCHENKKAN: -- because it is a matter of 24 25 open courts.

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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Whoa, whoa, whoa.
                                                       One at
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   a time.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
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                                        I was going to ask
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   David what makes a court reporter file a record when a
   party can't pay for it? I mean, I know they all do it,
   but is there some kind of enforcement mechanism or is it
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   just --
                               No, what happens, if they have
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                 MR. JACKSON:
   an IOLTA certificate coming in, we don't. I mean because
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   we know coming in --
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Right.
                 MR. JACKSON: -- it's a done deal.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I'm just saying it's
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   a done deal that you're going to provide the free record.
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                 MR. JACKSON:
                               Exactly.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: But why is that a
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               Is there something that governs the court
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   done deal?
   reporters that requires it, or, you know, I'm trying to
   figure out because court reporters are sort of independent
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   contractors that are quasi-state employees, but then are
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   paid for their time to prepare a record --
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                 MR. JACKSON:
                               Right.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: -- when the party can
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   afford it, but have to file it when the party can't, and
   how do we do that? How do we make them do that, because
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why would -- you know, if we're trying to find out how to
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   make it happen.
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                 MR. JACKSON: Well, if we didn't have to do
   it we wouldn't, but the Court tells us we have to do it,
   so we do it. But our problem with it is if they are truly
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   indigent we want to be part of that process to help them.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        Right. No, no, and
   when I was saying -- I wasn't saying that there weren't
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   any problems with indigency.
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                 MR. JACKSON: Oh, okay.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I was just saying
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   there are not a lot of problems about people lying in
   their affidavit if they get that far.
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                               Yeah, so --
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                 MR. JACKSON:
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: But my issue is I
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   know that if a court reporter who normally makes, you
   know, X amount of money for filing a record --
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                 MR. JACKSON:
                               Right.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: -- doesn't make that
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   money --
                 MR. JACKSON: And sometimes it can be a lot
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   of money, several thousand dollars. Yeah.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        Right. And so how is
   it that we don't pay the court reporter to do that when
   it's a case when someone has filed an affidavit of
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1 inability to pay? 2 MR. JACKSON: Because you've told us that's 3 what we're going to do, and we're going to do it. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 4 They're paid to 5 provide the record. If they don't do it, they go to jail. 6 MR. LOW: We had one that completed the 7 record in Beaumont in jail. That's how you get them to do 8 it. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Roger, then Carl. I think the court reporter 10 MR. HUGHES: example shows pretty much what the core of the problem is. 11 Court reporters are court officials. We have a section of 12 13 the Government Code, and they can eventually if they don't perform their duties be held in contempt. TexasOnline 14 unfortunately is not an officer of the court in any way, 15 shape, or form, and certainly the electronic filing 16 service providers are not officers of the court who can be 17 ordered on paying contempt to perform services. I can see 18 that perhaps the Court has the authority to tell the 19 district and county clerks "waive your fees," but until 20 I -- unless I were to study the statutes more, I'm not 21 sure what the authority of the judiciary is to tell 22 TexasOnline "waive your fees or else," and it may be that 23 this is a -- I'm going to use the word again, a political 24 thing where we will persuade the executive branch what the 25

benefits of doing this are, but as they say, sometimes you 2 have to have an alternative, and maybe the alternative to 3 take to them is, "Well, if you don't do it, somebody is 4 going to file a class action and you'll be refunding a whole bunch of money at the end of the day, so let's work 5 6 this out now," and I guess -- and so I end up with a 7 question of how would -- you know, how can we approach the executive and be persuasive about the need to do this now 8 rather than when things get desperate. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl, and then Buddy. 10 I assume that most indigents 11 MR. HAMILTON: don't have computers to file themselves, and in Federal court where it's mandatory I have to have some kind of a 13 code to even file anything, so how does an indigent in 14 Federal court file a pauper's affidavit? I mean, and 15 something else after that, don't they have to go through a 16 lawyer or somebody that's authorized to file to do that? 17 You just don't see many of them. 18 MR. LOW: I think at least in the 19 MR. WALLACE: Northern District the rules just exempt them from 20 e-filing, I think. 21 That's correct. 22 MR. RINEY: They just file like everybody 23 MR. WALLACE: -- they just do a paper filing, and that's according to 24 25 rule.

Buddy. 1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 2 These people, they like it when MR. LOW: 3 they see each district going to mandatory e-filing because that increases. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 6 MR. LOW: But what if the Court says, "Okay, 7 3(a) says no local rule can be inconsistent with these 8 rules. We're going to pass a rule in these rules that says it's not mandatory anymore, " and they say, "Well, wait a minute, maybe we'll consider" -- I mean, you know, because that's the only way, if the Court said that it's 111 12 not mandatory, no court can pass -- even though they've approved the rule, it would be inconsistent with these 13 14 rules. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, but you'd want to 15 add something to that. "It can't be mandatory unless you 17 provide." Well, I just meant they can figure 18 MR. LOW: 19 that out, you know, that "unless." 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 21 I'm talking about bargaining, and MR. LOW: that's all we have is bargaining power. 22 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. R. H. MR. WALLACE: Well, I agree with Tom while 24 25 ago saying we don't know enough. I mean, I think every

one of us here, if we had a client in our office saying, 2 "Here's a problem, how do we solve it," we would want to 3 know, well, what's your deal with TexasOnline, how long does it last, when can you renegotiate it, and who -- you 5 know, it's a business issue, like Pete said. It can be 6 TexasOnline will let them file for free. going to want more money for the people who do file. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 9 MR. WALLACE: So that's the answer, I think, 10 but I don't know who can do that. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, whoever it is it's It's not us, so it seems to me there are two levels here. One is if e-filing is mandatory, then is it 13 14 our recommendation to the Court that however they do it, whether it's by negotiation or by whipping them or 15 whatever, that they try to get some concession from 16 TexasOnline and from NIC to permit indigent e-filing upon 17 the proper filing, or is it broader than that? Is it our 18 recommendation that whether it's mandatory or not you want 19 to allow indigents to have the same access to electronic 20 filing that nonindigents have, and so we would recommend 21 to the Court that they try to negotiate down the line 22 whenever it's appropriate with TexasOnline and NIC to 23 allow indigents, whether it's mandatory or not? 25 MR. LOW: Right.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So how do we all feel
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2
   about that?
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: Chip, what's wrong with
   Buddy's idea?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Nothing wrong with it.
                 MR. GILSTRAP: It sounds like it's a great
6
7
          Just say, "No electronic filing unless you give it
8
   to -- free to indigent people."
9
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It can't be mandatory
10
   unless --
11
                 MR. GILSTRAP: Yeah, no mandatory filing
   unless you provide for free filing by indigents, and
   nobody gets it unless they do it.
13
                           And then they figure out if they
14
                 MR. LOW:
   have to up the rates or what, and it doesn't look like
15
   somebody is paying for somebody else's filing.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
17
                                            Gene.
                              You know, I don't know any of
                 MR. STORIE:
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   the details on this, but I think you've got to go through
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   the Department of Information Resources, because all of
20
   this electronic stuff, it's more than just the courts.
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22
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     Yeah.
                 MR. STORIE: And it's done as sort -- as I
23
   understand it, as sort of a centralized block kind of
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   program to get everybody everywhere onto the electronic
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mode, so you may need to start there.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Actually, I was headed right where he was going, that TexasOnline is not just the courts. It's this huge pipeline that is the interaction with all state agencies; and there's a contract, as I understand it, that is negotiated by the DIR, the Department of Information Resources, with what used to be Bearing Point, now I guess it's NIC; and so that is strictly a contract deal there.

What I was going to suggest, and this is based on my understanding that they come through the portal of TexasOnline, which is -- it's just a term for this pipeline that it comes through.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And it goes through that to the district and county clerks of the 32 counties that are in the system. My question was why can't we -- because OCA is an agency within the judicial branch that is not under DIR, why can't we do our own contract with some provider like NIC and say -- because I think we voted last time with regard to the TAMES project, and I say "we," me not voting for it, that it would be mandatory for the TAMES project in all of the appellate filings.

So, I mean, if that's an option with regard

to the appellate filings, it could be the same with regard to the county and district filings so that OCA makes a contract and we don't even use the TexasOnline portal, we do our own and take it out if NIC wants to negotiate it and -- but, again, that gets bigger than just writing a rule. It has to do with the contract provisions, but to go back to another comment, I think that Steve's comments and amendments to the rule address issues that are broader --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Right.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- than just the

12 e-filing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I agree, and we're going to get to that in just a second. Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: I think that electronic filing should be available to all indigents. I wouldn't limit it just to those that — where it's mandatory, and, secondly, it seems to me if the Court passes a rule that says if you have electronic filing it must be made available for free to those who qualify as indigents under the standards that we have, as a practical matter don't the people, whether it's TexasOnline or whomever, don't they then have to get in line and establish a procedure where it will be made free? Doesn't that put the burden on them to figure out how it's going to get done, and if the Court just — if

the Court is inclined, just issues the rule and then those 2 parties that have electronic filing, those entities or counties, however they have it, it would be up to them to figure out how to implement it, unless I'm missing 4 5 something. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let me see if we 7 can turn to page one of Judge Yelenosky's proposals and 8 look at 145(a), the affidavit. He proposes striking the language "of an original action," and Kennon before lunch 10 explained why that was proposed by the subcommittee. we have any comments on that proposal? 11 MR. SCHENKKAN: You need a motion? 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Did somebody say 13 14 something? 15 I was asking do you need a MR. SCHENKKAN: 16 motion? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not -- we don't, because 17 since nobody is saying anything I assume that that's okay 18 19 with everybody. 20 MR. LOW: Right. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So speak now or forever 21 22 hold your peace, and we'll recommend that with no dissent. Let's go to the second page. We've really been talking about the last sentence at the top of the second page 24 about notifying TexasOnline, but let's focus instead on 25

the proposed language. "Throughout the pendency of the suit, unless and until any contest to the affidavit is sustained by written order" and then striking some language, say "provide all customary charges without charge." Justice Gray.

"charge" changed to "advance payment" because that's the same language that's used in the appellate rule; and, in fact, at the end of the proceeding if the plaintiff hits the home run and they will pay as a result, it's actually the cost -- the payment is security for costs, and so "advance payment" covers that, and costs may be assessed against the loser.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Very good point. Anybody else? Okay. Any dissent, with the friendly amendment from Justice Gray to this language? Hearing no dissent, we will move on.

I think we've beaten this last sentence to death, and I'm sure the Court knows what the problems are, and I think there's consensus this sentence won't fix it. Unless anybody thinks differently let's move on to the contents of the affidavit. Judge Yelenosky proposes that we add the sentence, "The affidavit must not contain a Social Security number, a checking account number, or a place of birth." Justice Gray.

1 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: With regard to the 2 checking account number, the form that he attached as sort 3 of an egregious example I think had some account information beyond just the checking account, so I would make that after "Social Security number," "and account number" so that it prohibits all account numbers, not just checking account numbers, and I didn't remember a need for a date of birth as well in an affidavit of indigency. So if you're going to start talking about things that it requires to leave out, I would require that it also leave out a place or date of birth. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What is the reason for 12 including this information to begin with? 13 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: The problem, as I 14 understood it, from what Kennon had presented and what I 15 was reading is that the counties were requiring the inclusion of that information in the form affidavit that 17 they required the indigents to fill out, and therefore, 18 Steve was trying to figure out a way to keep them from 19 being able to ask that information. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but my question, 21 were they just doing it to be mean or because they're 22 I mean, was there a curious or being voyeurous or what? reason why they wanted -- Justice Christopher has the 24 25 answer to that question.

they confirm that they're indigent, with their Social Security number and their date of birth. That's how they can check to see that they're really getting government aid or they're really, you know, who they say they are. I mean, you have to give your Social Security number now when you file a lawsuit. So the idea that we wouldn't require it in the affidavit here seems wrong to me.

We have recently in Harris County, because we were having a lot of problems with our county attorney challenging every affidavit of indigency, we have recently done forms for people to fill out because those are not readily available. That was one of the suggestions of the poverty law person who wrote the letter, Ms. Willett, and I actually think that we should do that, that we should have forms that are in the rule book that are easy for people to get a hold of and know what they're supposed to do.

We have solved the sensitive data problem by indicating -- by basically you've got your affidavit of indigency with your financial information attached, and we don't file that financial information in the public records for people to come look at it. So that's how we're getting away -- you know, moving away from -- that's sort of our first step in protecting sensitive data. We

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don't file all of that information, but I would really
  recommend that we have -- that we have form affidavits for
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  this, because, for one thing, the affidavit for appeal has
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  different requirements than the affidavit for trial.
  They're slightly different. It's a weird -- you've got to
  have one -- you've got to have more information, less
  information between the two filings, and I just think it
  would be a lot clearer if we had forms in the trial court
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  rules and a form in the appellate court rules, so rather
   than piecemealing saying, you know, "don't include this"
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   let's address the issue head on and do a block.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Be careful, your
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   subcommittee's going to get in the middle of this.
13
141
  Richard Munzinger.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I don't think
15
   my subcommittee ever does anything that's good. Right,
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   Bobby?
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know, you're on
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19
   the agenda still today.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, but I'm
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   just like a visitor to that subcommittee. That's not even
21
   my subcommittee.
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                 MR. MEADOWS: She has a starring role on our
23
   subcommittee.
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25
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, you're going to be
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1 our roving subcommittee person. 2 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I'll be 3 glad to give you our affidavits to start with. 4 MR. MUNZINGER: I agree with the judge. Date of birth and Social Security number may be crucial to proper identity. I have a son with the same first and last name as mine. He's rich and I'm poor. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Other way around. 9 MR. MUNZINGER: No, he's rich, and I'm poor. I said that intentionally, but the truth of the matter is 10 those are pertinent subjects for inquiry to determine 11 whether the person is telling the truth, whether he's the 12 13 poor Richard Munzinger or the rich Richard Munzinger. Ιn the rush to do this you can't disarm the people who are 14 charged with the obligation to make sure that those who 15 claim to be poor are, in fact, who they claim to be. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Roger. 17 18 MR. HUGHES: I mean, I like the judge's 19 suggestion of having a separate form easily available. Μy only concern, and it's not one I like, but I know it's one 20 that might be raised is, you know, open records and sealed 21 I can still see somebody saying, "Well, if I 22 records. give you this information, I don't care where you put it, 23 somebody could make you turn it over because you can't 24 25 seal that court's record." And I fully understand this

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information is necessary to verify whether a person truly
   is indigent or not, but I could see the person turning it
   in going "I understand your need for it, but I don't want
   the whole world to have it," and then somebody, you know,
  newspaper, public-spirited person says, "I'm sorry, you've
   given this information in a government record, Rule 76.
 7
   If you don't like it, get it sealed." So I'm wondering if
   anyone sees that as a problem, or maybe since I don't do
 8
   Rule 76 work often there's something here I don't see.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, we're just
10
11
   violating 76. Sorry.
12
                              I sense it's practical, but --
                 MR. HUGHES:
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                That's just
14
   what we're doing at this point.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    It's actually 76a.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Pete.
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                 MR. SCHENKKAN:
                                 We were concerned about --
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   in the subcommittee about the privacy problem of having
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   this information available and not so much for either of
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21
   the things you identified, but rather from the people who
   do identity theft and who would go to the courthouse and
   just scrub the files down and take these numbers for
   everybody and do with them whatever they can do with them.
24
25
                 We were of the view, which could be wrong,
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1 and Judge Christopher explained why we might be wrong, but 2 it could be wrong that the problem that meant you needed 3 this information wasn't a big problem, and we were therefore prepared to run the risk that there were going to be some false affidavits. Once people knew they didn't 6 have to give their Social Security number, there were going to be more false affidavits, and we were prepared to run that risk as not being very big, if I remember our discussion correctly enough, Kennon. 9 Now, if the risk is, in fact, appreciable 10 11 and there are some people that are willing to put the time and energy into using the available information to check 12 to bring it still lower then I think we're in this effort 13 of trying to at least make it harder on the users by 14 having the thing that is filed of the public record not 15 have this information in it and the thing that is either kept confidential in violation of Rule 76a or is not kept 17 in violation of Rule 76a, it's just not made as easily 18 19 available. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's here 20 somewhere. 21 It's here somewhere. 22 MR. SCHENKKAN: HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's here 23 24 somewhere. 25 And if you want to come work MR. SCHENKKAN:

at it hard enough you can get it from us. That's my
question, is it seems to me we ought still to have
whatever is the publicly filed affidavit not have this
privacy information in it, because if you need this stuff
at all for checking, I have no opinion on that, we can at
least put it in the second tier and make it harder.

19I

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I mean, we're kind of back to our old problem of the sensitive data and what we're going to do with it in court records, and this is just one of the many problems we have in terms of our court records, especially now that they're all, you know, online for people to look at.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well --

think that rather than doing that the better thing would be to say the affidavit is going to be public, my affidavit that says I'm too poor, and the attached financial information that people need to look at to verify that, that the county attorney needs to verify that, in fact, they are poor, we make that a sensitive document somehow, some way, in some shape.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's -- let's take a quick vote on this language and then we're going to move on to problem No. 4, and everybody who is in favor

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of --
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Chip? Chip?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Respectfully I think
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  we're all saying the same thing, leave it out of the rule
   and put it in an attached affidavit. I mean, don't put it
7
   in the affidavit, but put it in an attachment if it's
   going to be anywhere, but we all would prefer promulgated
8
   form of affidavit.
9
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, if that's how you
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11
   feel then you're going to vote --
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      Okay.
                 MR. JEFFERSON: On the language in the rule,
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   though, where it says "the affidavit must not contain," I
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15
   think that's kind of the wrong -- the wrong emphasis here.
   I mean, we're not -- I think what we're trying to say is
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   the affidavit can't be deemed deficient if it contains
17
   this information.
                      I mean, you --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's not the intent of
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   the drafters, I don't think. The intent of the drafters
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   is to exclude this information from the affidavit.
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22
                 MR. LOW:
                           Right.
                 MR. JEFFERSON: Well, I thought the intent
23
  was to say that if you want to prove that you're indigent
24
   you're not going to put your Social Security number in an
25
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affidavit that you file with the court. You don't have to 1 put your Social Security number in an affidavit that you 2 file with the court. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that's not the way 4 this is drafted. 5 MR. SCHENKKAN: We actually meant "must" and 6 7 the reason is because it was our understanding in -subject to reality checks of people, but it was our 8 understanding that the problem was that clerk by clerk, some clerks were saying this is required to be in it, and 10 11 we're saying, no, you've got a statewide rule that you can't require that to be in it. 13 MR. JEFFERSON: Right, but that's not what This doesn't say that you can't require it to 14 this says. 15 be in it. 16 MR. LOW: No. It says it must not be in 17 MR. JEFFERSON: 18 it. 19 MR. MUNZINGER: Not so. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I sensed from the discussion that the intent was to tell the clerks you 21 can't require that, and without getting hung up on the 22 specifics of the language, because Lamont makes a good point, it's not exactly what it says, but can we vote on 24 the intent of the subcommittee? Is it a good idea with a 25

statewide rule to tell the clerks that they may not inquire about Social Security number, checking account 2 3 number, or place of birth? 4 MR. JEFFERSON: That's a slightly different 5 question, though, isn't it? I mean, are we talking about now what's in the affidavit or what the attesting party can actually get in the form of information? 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're talking about the 8 affidavit. 9 MR. MUNZINGER: The problem with that is, is 10 the affidavit just the sworn portion or does it include 11 material attached to it and incorporated by reference explicitly or implicitly that includes the Social Security 13 14 number, et cetera? Anything that identifies this person as the pauper that's used by the clerk to determine 15 whether the person is or is not a pauper is the affidavit 16 filed of record, so you're playing word games if you say, 17 "Don't include it in an affidavit but include it in a form 18 attached to the affidavit." It's a word game. 19 20 MR. LOW: Right. Right. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So we're not into 21 word games here on the rules advisory committee for sure. 22 23 Judge Christopher. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, again, I 24 still think this is a bad fix. The first sentence says,

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"The affidavit must contain complete information as to a
  party's identity." Social Security, date of birth, place
2
   of birth, that's complete information to a person's
   identity.
5
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 Absolutely.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
6
                                               So, I mean,
7
   that's what you need to show who you are.
8
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Okay.
 9
                 MR. LOW:
                           And if it has that, where can
   somebody say, "Look, this says I don't have to have an
11
   affidavit"? What tells you that you're entitled to that
12
   information at all? Because it implies it to me.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    That's right, I agree.
  Okay. So forget about the specific language, but
14
   everybody who is in favor of telling the clerks that they
15
  cannot ask for Social Security number, checking account
   number, or a place of birth, raise your hand.
17
18
                 Everybody that is against, raise your hand.
               By a vote of 13 in favor and 18 against,
19
   All right.
   that's the recommendation of the committee. Kennon, let's
20
   go on to problem four.
21
22
                 I'm sorry, did I say 13? I meant to say 3
23
   in favor, 18 against.
24
                 MR. SCHENKKAN: Our strength is the strength
25
   of 10 because our hearts are poor.
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1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It was -- the mistake was 2 understandable. It was ballot box 13 that only had three votes in it, at one point in time anyway. 3 4 MS. PETERSON: This is the part that Judge Lawrence I think will speak to; is that correct, Judge? 6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right, problem 7 four, in eviction cases, Rule 749a allows a tenant to appeal a justice court decision by filing a pauper's affidavit. However, there is no provision in eviction rules similar to Rule 145 to prohibit contests to the 10 11 affidavit when an IOLTA certificate is filed, and that is 12 true, there is not, and the reason I think is because the Legislature has spoken to this. Texas Property Code 13 14 24.0052 has some pretty specific provisions for a pauper's affidavit appeal in an eviction, and they require a number 15 of things that have to be in the affidavit, set forth the 16 They're not necessarily in conflict with the 17 procedures. Rules of Procedure that deal with appeals, but it's pretty 18 19 clear what the Legislature wants, and they make no provision for an IOLTA certificate or a 145 certificate of 20 any type to be filed. 21 22 They have their own specific mechanism, so I don't know that the Court can do much about this, but, 24 however, assuming the next question that will be asked is 25 if we thought it was a good idea what would the change be,

I think that you could simply add to paragraph 749a, in paragraph (3) add a No. (4) and track the language in Rule 2 145 to allow that. That would be the fix, that would be the easy fix if the Court wanted to and felt they could do 5 I don't know how you get around the Property Code, 6 though. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard. 8 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, I am opposed to a rule that would forbid a party from contesting somebody's pauper's affidavit because they had been screened or 10 11 certified to have been screened by their own lawyer. 12 don't understand that. I do understand that those offices 13 that provide free legal services are required to screen 14 their clients and what have you, but why should I as a litigant be required to accept their screening? 15 trust them. I'm saying that -- I'm saying that for 16 purposes of argument, why should I trust you? Why should 17 I be deprived of a right that I have because you work for 18 a poverty law office? Go fly a kite. I'm a litigant in 19 I've got rights. That's a bad rule, has no place 20 Texas. 21 here. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you're against it. 23 In your effort to help poor MR. MUNZINGER: people -- in your effort to help poor people you're 24 25 depriving other people of equal rights their rights.

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should I be deprived of the right to make you prove your
2
  poverty, for god sakes. "I don't trust these people.
  Let's see what it is, Judge." Takes an hour of the
   judge's time, 30 minutes of the judge's time or the
   clerk's time. That's no rule. We don't need that rule.
5
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Professor Hoffman.
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7
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: I have a different
            After the IOLTA crisis and now a bunch of the
8
   question.
   funding is coming from the Legislature, are there now
   programs that are no longer funded by the IOLTA program
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   because they're now funded by the Legislature and that's
111
   going to necessitate some clarification on that rule?
12
13|
   Does anybody know the answer?
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                 MR. DOGGETT:
                               Response?
15
                 CHATRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Yeah.
16
                 MR. DOGGETT:
                               The IOLTA program is the Texas
   Access to Justice Foundation is the IOLTA program.
17
18
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So if the money comes
19
   from the Legislature it --
20
                               It goes right into that
                 MR. DOGGETT:
             That's who's going to actually end up doing it.
21
   program.
22
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN:
                                     Never mind.
                                    Justice Bland.
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, to respond to
24
   Richard, I think that if they've got the certification
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that means they've already been screened. 2 MR. MUNZINGER: No, I understand that. 3 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: And so the whole idea is once they get one of these certificates they've applied 5 to the government for Legal Aid, and the government said, "You qualify," and so then we're talking about wasting 6 7 judicial resources to go through a whole other hearing about it unless you think they've defrauded Lone Star 8 9 Legal Aid or whoever. MR. MUNZINGER: I was being argumentative 10 11 when I said I don't trust them, but look at this for just 12 a moment. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: You were being 13 14 argumentative? 15 MR. MUNZINGER: Forgive me. It is a judicial function to determine whether a person may come to court and not pay costs. There are distinguishing --17 you are distinguishing between citizens. This citizen 18 must pay all court costs to seek justice in our courts. 19 20 This citizen need not because this citizen is a pauper. Who makes that decision? It ought to be the court or an 21 agency of the judicial department of the government that 22 makes that decision and not a law office or somebody else. 23 That's all I'm saying. How many people are going to 24 contest the certification of the law office? I don't 25

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But why would you on the front end of it deprive a
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   know.
   litigant of the right to contest that point? You want
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3
  people to be happy -- not happy, but at least accept --
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, wouldn't this
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  be --
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: Let me finish my sentence,
7
   please.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I'm sorry.
                                                     I'm so
9
   sorry.
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                 MR. MUNZINGER: You want people to be happy
  with the judgment of the court and to respect the process.
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   Why should I be deprived of my right to contest your claim
   in court, and when I'm told that I can't because the
13
   southern poverty law office has determined that this is a
14
   poor person and they're suing you for whatever it is that
15
   they're suing you and I can't contest this? "No, you
   can't."
17
                 Wow, seems to me the deck is stacked against
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        Just let -- I don't have a problem with the
19
   certification. Just don't take away my right to contest
2.0
   it and make them prove it to the judicial branch of
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   government, which is the branch you're in front of.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont, and then Justice
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24
   Guzman.
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                                 Right, I mean, I think the
                 MR. JEFFERSON:
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point is Rule 145 already says that, but it doesn't apply
   to the circumstance of the new rule, but Rule 145 says
   that an IOLTA certificate can't -- if you have an IOLTA
   certificate provided by an attorney it can't be contested,
5
   and so what this --
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Bad rule.
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7
                 MR. JEFFERSON: What this rule is designed
   to do is to make Rule 749a consistent with Rule 145 so
   that in justice courts you can do the same thing that you
   can do in district courts.
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11
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, we ought to amend Rule
12
   145.
13
                                 Yeah, well, maybe, but we're
                 MR. JEFFERSON:
   beyond that, but I think -- I mean, we talked about this,
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   and I think Judge Lawrence is exactly correct, that I
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   don't see how we get beyond the statute because the
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   statute doesn't -- there is a statute that specifically
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   provides what you have to have to proceed in justice
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   court, and it doesn't have an IOLTA exception to
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   contesting a pauper's affidavit. So we can make a rule
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   that provides for that, but I don't see how we can
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   overrule what the Legislature has done.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Justice Guzman.
23
24
                 HONORABLE EVA GUZMAN: I had a question
   about the Property Code, and, Judge Lawrence, I don't know
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if you know this, but is the criteria or the information substantially different from that that would be obtained in the -- from the agency people, the IOLTA certifying agency?

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the procedure for handling the pauper's affidavit appeal is essentially the same in the Property Code as in the appellate rules for evictions. The eviction rules do not specify the information. They just say "an affidavit of inability." It's the Legislature that came in with the specifics as to exactly what has to be in that affidavit, and I would point out that you probably remember fondly seven years ago when we worked on the eviction rules revisions. language in the Property Code was pretty much the exact language that this committee had adopted and sent up to the Supreme Court that was subsequently adopted by the Legislature in the Property Code. So this was actually the wording that we had to fix this, and we had some other things that we were changing. Number five we're going to talk about in a second, but the Legislature I think has essentially preempted the affidavit of inability for appeals.

Now, no one asked the question about appeals of justice court suits under Rule 572, but there's also no provision for an IOLTA certificate in that either. Now, I

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know anecdotally that some JPs accept the 145 IOLTA
   certificate and allow the appeal, and others may take the
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   position that, no, there's no provision for it in these
   rules. So I don't know if -- the Court could if they
   wanted to make 145 applicable, clearly applicable, to Rule
   527. It's not clear now that it is.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Other than
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   Richard's feeling about the last sentence of this
   proposal, are there any other comments to the proposal to
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   add the subparagraph (4) derived from 145?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Now, wait a minute.
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   The subcommittee is saying that it cannot and should not
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   be changed. This language is -- is sort of to anticipate
   the question, "Well, if you thought it was a good idea,
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   how would you change it," but the subcommittee doesn't
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   think that you can do anything to change Rule 749a in this
   regard.
17
                                    Sorry, I misread that,
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
   and I know we have at least one vote for not expanding the
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   poison of 145 to Rule 749, but what does everybody else
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   feel? Anybody else have an opinion about that?
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Assuming that it
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   could be done legally within the Rules Enabling Act,
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24
   should it be done?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Subcommittee felt what,
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1 Judge? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm sorry, I didn't 3 catch the question. 4 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Assuming that it could be -- assuming that the Rules Enabling Act allows the change and the modification in the Property Code and the Court thought that was a good idea in the abstract, 7 should it be done in the sense that is this a good idea in 9 749a? Well, if the Court 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 11 thought it was a good idea, then this language at the bottom of page 13 where we add a paragraph (4) to Rule 12 13 749a would be the way to do that. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's not the question. 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm sorry. 15 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: No, I'm asking, is 16 (4) a good provision? I mean, if you could make the law 17 any way you wanted it, would you add (4)? 18 MR. JEFFERSON: And I think that other than 19 Richard's comments, I mean, if we're going to accept 145 then I think we ought to change 749a if we've got the 2.1 ability to do it, because there's no common sense reason 22 23 why we wouldn't, why we would accept an IOLTA certificate in district court but not in justice court. 24 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray.

1 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: My only comment on that 2 is the same as I made back when we were talking about the change to 145. I wish that we would make it where once 3 determined to be indigent or accepted as indigent in a court it continues on through the appellate process as well so that we don't have to revisit it under Rule 20 again and again. I mean, it just -- until somebody comes in and shows evidence to the contrary, once indigent it goes through the system until that proceeding is over. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, in your 10 11 response to Justice Hecht's question, if you could do it, 12 would you do it? Well, personally, 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I would rather have the ability to have a hearing and 14 have the other party be able to present some evidence or 15 testimony to rebut it. I would like to allow the court 16 the discretion to rule on this, but I understand the 17 Court's already adopted 145, so I don't know what the 18 rationale would be to allow 145 in appeal on other types 19 20 of cases and not be used for this. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okav. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It wouldn't seem 22 consistent. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody else have any 24 reaction to Justice Hecht's question? If you could do it, 25

should you do it? 2 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I can think of one 3 argument each way. In favor of what Richard Munzinger says, I think it's healthy when people know that their decisions in a law office can be reviewed in court. 5 just has a healthy influence on their decision-making if they know, you know, I'm not making a total decision, I may have to justify what I've done in court. That's an argument for Richard. 10 On the other hand, this applies only when a lawyer is representing someone for no fee and no 11 12 contingent fee. How many times are lawyers going to do that unless the person really is indigent? So that's an 13 argument for carrying it forward, and I'm not sure where I 14 come down on it. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you feel strongly both 17 ways? 18 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Just trying to 19 look at all the angles. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. 2.0 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, and, you know, 21 22 the fact that the attorney filed the certificate means that the court is not without recourse if it's been forged or faked. I mean, the idea is here we have an officer of 24 25 the court filing this certificate because they've done the

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necessary screening, and there is an inordinate amount of
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   time spent by judges and their clerks on these issues, and
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   so if this has all been done and an attorney is willing to
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   represent that it's been done correctly, then, you know,
   that's a huge efficient -- from an efficiency standpoint
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   it saves a lot of time, and if they're lying about it,
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   they can be sanctioned and the trial judge can order them
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   to pay money to the equal access for justice fund.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's all coming around, I
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   can see that. Justice Patterson.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Another reason to
   allow it is because the process varies and practice varies
   so much among all of these courts, that for there to be a
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   statement that it's permitted I think it's a healthy
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           It's a bright line practice, and so I would favor
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16
   it.
                                    Okay. Any other thoughts
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                Okay. Who has got problem five?
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   about that?
                                          That would be me,
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
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   too.
                 MS. PETERSON:
                                Yes.
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22
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          All right.
   issue is in the appeal process in eviction cases a
   conflict exists between Rule 749b and section 24.0053 of
24
   the Property Code resulting in indigent tenants being
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unfairly denied the ability to stay in possession of their homes pending appeal. Well, the conflict is that in the Property Code if someone is granted a pauper's appeal then they are required to pay rent as it becomes due into the registry of the court, either JP court or county court, and under Rule 749b if the pauper's affidavit of appeal is granted they have to pay one month's rent immediately whether or not it's even actually necessarily owed again, but they have to pay one month's rent immediately and then another month's rent as it becomes due. So there is more of a burden on the indigent tenants to come up with more money for rent under the Rules of Procedure than under the Property Code.

I think frankly the Property Code provision makes more sense. They shouldn't have to pay rent until it's actually due. Now, there are a couple of ways to fix this. There actually is a provision in the Property Code, 24.0053, that has provisions for this, and it sets out that in the judgment in an eviction you have to put what the monthly rent is. You also have to put whether or not any portion of that is paid by the government, what portion is paid by the government, what portion is paid by the tenant, so that's all in the judgments now or is supposed to be.

What is not currently in the judgments is

the date the rent is due because that's not required by the Property Code, but in order to really give effect to what the poverty law section wants to do, which is have rent paid as it becomes due, you also need to know when the rent is due and what day it's due. It's not always due the first of the month. It's due at varying times. It depends on the lease agreement. So you have to, first of all, amend Rule 748, which is the judgment and the writ, to at least put the date in; but in my opinion, if you're going to go ahead and amend Rule 748 then you might as well go ahead and put all the provisions for the judgment that are already in the Property Code that are required, go ahead and put those in there also.

Much of the language in 748 and the other rules comes from the eviction revisions that we approved seven years ago. Some of the things that really didn't apply were taken out. You could argue, I suppose, that not everything that is in these proposals is really necessary, and it's not necessarily necessary to solve this particular problem, but you've got to amend Rule 748, then you have to amend Rule 749, and there are some other conflicts we have we can go ahead and very easily solve in these, but in 748 the essence of those amendments is to go ahead and require that the judgment contain the information that you have to have to make a provision that

the county court at law -- because it's a de novo appeal, make a provision that the county court at law may rely upon the findings of the justice court in their judgment as to how much the rent is and when the rent is due, but then would not prohibit the county court from making independent inquiry if they wanted to do that.

Then 749 we talk about the form of the appeal bond and the final judgment and that the appeal bond is not just an appeal bond. It may also be cash, it may be a surety bond, and the other manner in which the rules already permit someone to post an appeal bond.

749a, the affidavit of indigence, in essence the proposal would be to take the provisions already in the Property Code that we just talked about on a pauper's affidavit of appeal and go ahead and bring those into 749a so it's clear so that all of these rules are in one place, you don't have to refer to the Property Code and back to here, we just parrot that language so all of the rules for pauper's affidavit are in the same place.

And then 749c would have some language about the perfection of the appeal, which is something that has always been a problem. Now, this was done -- we had a short time fuse on this. I pulled this language out, and that's the proposal. If the committee says, no, that's too much, go back and just do the bear minimum, then I can

do that, but I think that if we adopted all of this -- and 2 most of this, I think almost without exception, has already been approved and adopted by this committee, but 3 if we just re-adopted that it would solve not only the problems in No. 5 but it would solve some other problems that we addressed seven years ago. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge, remind me, this language did look familiar to me, but has the Court ever 8 9 approved what we recommended? I don't believe so. 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that was -- that's what I thought. Yeah, Lamont. 13 MR. JEFFERSON: Yeah, we had a little bit of discussion in the subcommittee about this, and, I mean, I 14 think that the problem identified in the letter is the 15 five-day requirement, the having to deposit one month's 16 rent within five days of the date of the appeal, and --17 which does not tie that obligation to the lease. 18 if it's -- as Judge Lawrence points out, even if the lease 19 20 -- according to the lease rent's not due, you've got to deposit it in order to appeal, and so I think you can fix 21 that pretty simply just by taking out the language that 22 requires that deposit because the rule already says that 23 24 the tenant has the obligation to deposit -- to pay rent as 25 it becomes due under the terms of the rental agreement in

what was No. 2, the stricken -- or we can just strike the five days and say "pay rent as it becomes due under the rental agreement" in what is in the original subparagraph (2).

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The rest of the revisions I think raise complicated questions about who ought to be the one to adjudicate these things, whether it's the justice court or the county court, and the framework that I guess the past committee worked on calls for the justice of the peace to make a number of findings that the county court would then rely on to some degree or another in determining the amount of rent that's due, when it's due, what you have to pay to catch up, and other things that right now I think under the rule scheme now those are matters that are handled in the appeal at the county court level. You ask for a hearing in front of the county court judge, and he says what rent's due and what you have to do if you want to stay in the premises. I think the easy fix to the problem identified by the letter is just removing the five-day requirement because that's not in the statute or anywhere else. It's just in a rule, so we can remove the five-day requirement from 749b pretty simply and solve that problem.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. And Judge -thanks a lot. Judge Lawrence, that's a -- would you agree

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that that is a specific fix to the problem that was
   identified?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, except you
  don't know what day the rent is due, because that's not
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  required by the Property Code right now and it's not
  required by the rules, so the -- you know, there's no way
   to be able to calculate when the rent is due and when it
  has to be paid unless it's --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wouldn't that be on a
  case by case basis?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Pardon me?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wouldn't that be on a
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   case by case basis?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Well, the county
   court is going to have to hold a hearing, and there will
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  have to be a hearing held on that. I mean, if nobody is
   concerned about that then I quess you don't have to put it
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        It would seem to me it would make more sense to have
   the date the rent is due in the justice court judgment so
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   that it's clear when there's been a breach and when the
   appellee can move for a writ of possession because it
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   hadn't been paid.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Yeah.
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                 MR. DOGGETT: I represent tenants in
  various eviction cases, and, believe me, the landlords are
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aware of the rules, and if the tenant hasn't deposited the rent per the lease they will be the first ones moving in 3 court to default to throw your client out, so while the court and judge may not know when the rent is due per the 5 judgment, the landlord, the other party does, and so they 6 are watching the clock and making sure that we do what's 7 What brought this problem to a head, of course, is even if we didn't owe rent the rules required us to deposit it anyway under a standard possession, and this 10 fix I think is a good fix, but just so you know that while 11 the judge right now in the judgment doesn't say when rent 12 is normally due, the landlord absolutely does. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. Judge, aside from that, the additional language of 748, 749, 749c, 14 15 749a, is that ground that we plowed seven years ago? 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, it is. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I recognize some of this, although I wouldn't have said it was seven years ago. Is 18 there -- is there an imperative to replow that now by the 19 20 fact that we already did it or --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, no, it's not. 21 I mean, if you just want to solve this one specific 22 problem, then we can solve that in Rule 748 probably. You know, we've been talking about affidavit of inability 24 25 appeals in landlord-tenant cases. If you wanted to make

things a little clearer in the rules you would bring in those provisions of the Property Code into that section, and that would be another thing you could do if you wanted to. There are a number of other things that would solve other problems that we have with these rules that I believe are not that controversial. That's a dangerous thing to say in this committee but --7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 8 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But, no, we don't 10 have to do this, and we could do just a bear minimum to 11 solve that problem. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm happy to spend the rest of the afternoon on it if that's productive. 13 l charge we got from the Court was to address the specific 14 problems that had been identified, but if the Court wants 15 16 more on this then we'll keep going through it. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, we've got 17 this, and we know that recommendation, but we needed to 18 know about this, and I think that's enough for today. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 20 Okay. 21 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But I gather the landlords would not be in favor of this change to 749b? 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 749b? 23 24 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah, the proposal 25 on page four.

they would not be in favor of that because it would be easier to go ahead and appeal and get the case up to county court because, I mean, that's a little bit of a burden on a tenant to pay that rent, a month's rent, when it's not necessarily due. So I would say the landlords probably wouldn't favor that. I think that's a fair statement.

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MR. DOGGETT: If I could respond to that, I sent a copy of this letter to the Texas Apartment Association, and in fact, negotiated -- myself and Fred Fuchs, who worked on the foreclosure rules, worked on the Property Code provision that's here, 24.0053, and if you -- what we're asking is, that was a consensual, if you will, statute that was ultimately obviously agreed to by the Texas Legislature and the Governor. And, in other words, I would not at all be surprised if the apartment association had no problem with the suggestion here today because they -- they are very well aware of what's in the rules, and what was ultimately passed by the Legislature some years ago did not include that provision, and the apartment association is very much aware of our letter and request to the Supreme Court, and I will confirm that again, but I will tell you that they are very well aware of what we're asking and that is to make the rules

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consistent with the Property Code to alleviate this
  problem, and so I will tell you that it's very well --
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  very well may be, for example, one may not, but a fairly
   large one would not be opposed to this, but I will confirm
  to be sure this is not going on in a vacuum.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Yeah, I don't know
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  how they could really argue that much, because 24.0053
   already says they only have to pay the rent when it
   becomes due, so the Legislature has already spoken on it,
   so I don't know what their argument would be, but, of
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   course, Texas Apartment Association, that's just one of
                 There are a lot of other landlords in this
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   the players.
   state that are not a member of that, but, I mean, I don't
13
   know what their position would be. I haven't talked to
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   them about it.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Who's got problem
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   No. 7?
          Is that you again, Judge?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Well, Frank, you
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   want to talk about it or you want me to?
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: I've got it. I've got it.
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   The problem No. 7 is -- it's on page 12 of your handout,
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   and the problem is well-described on page four of the
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   letter from the poverty law section, and that is the fact
   that all courts aren't open all the time. This even
   happens in big cities. I can remember in Dallas, if you
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wanted to file you had to file and get there before 4:00
or you were out of luck. The problem comes that we're
dealing with here is in justice court where people have
the last day to file a document, like a document to
appeal, and they go to the justice court and find that the
sign is up, "Closed, come back tomorrow at 8:00," even
though it's 3:30 in the afternoon; and this apparently
happens in some of the smaller justice courts because they
just don't have the personnel to be open or maybe they're
closed for a funeral or something like that.

So how do you deal with it? Well, on the subcommittee we decided that we didn't want to reinvent the wheel, so we took — there is a provision like this in the rules now in the appellate rules, appellate Rule 4.1(b), which is in the middle of page 12, and it has a provision that says how you deal with the problem of the court being closed, and it says that if — and I'll get into the words of it in a second, but basically it says if it's closed during part of the day you can file the next day. Your filing date is extended by one day until the next day the court is open. So what we did with that was we simply took that language and took it almost verbatim and proposed a new draft, Rule 523a, because that's where it fits in the justice rules, and that's the bottom paragraph on page 12.

Then we thought, well, if we're going to do it there, maybe in the interest of uniformity we need to do it for all the rules, so at the risk of stepping on the toes of the rule -- Rule 4 committee, we went ahead and prepared a draft, adding it to the bottom of Rule 4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and if you adopt that you won't need 740 -- 523a, which appears on page 12. They read exactly the same. So the first question is, you know, do we do it -- first of all, do we do anything. Second, do we just do it just for justice courts or do we get ambitious and do it for all the courts, and finally, do we tinker with the language. The problem with reinventing the wheel here is that the wheel seems to be out of line and we don't have any road test data.

This rule was adopted -- Rule 4.1(b) was adopted back in 1997. I wasn't on the committee then, and I'm not aware of any litigation where that has been construed, and the language is problematic. Let me just kind of go through it here. It says -- and this is the same in all three drafts -- "If the act to be done is filing a document and if the clerk's office where the document is to be filed is closed or inaccessible during regular hours on the last day for filing the document."

Well, that's got to mean at least during some of the regular hours because if it's closed from 3:00 to 5:00

then that's exactly the problem we're trying to deal with, so that language has got to be read to mean -- it can't refer to being closed all day. It has to include being closed for part of the day.

Then it says, "The period for filing the document extends to the end of the next day when the court's office is open and accessible." Well, the next day when the court's office is open and accessible might not be all day, but I think that kind of the feeling we had on the subcommittee was, you know, you can't cover every situation, so if the people show up at 4:00 o'clock on the last day and there is a sign hanging up there saying "Gone to a funeral, open tomorrow at 8:00," they should be there at 8:00, even though the court might close early that day, too. So that's the practical problem with the language, and we decided not to try to tinker with it and simply throw it out for the committee's consideration the way it is.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Judge.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I have a minority view. The problem is that you have probably as many as 70 JP courts in Texas that don't have a clerk assigned to it at all, so it's just the judge. You've got 64 counties with only one JP in the county and 48 or so with only two. The -- neither the commissioner's court nor anyone else

dictates to an elected official what hours they work, so a lot of JPs in the smaller counties are part-time. have a full-time job, and being a JP is something because it's a limited case load that they don't do eight hours a 5 day, five days a week, so they have sporadic hours. I'm not sure if anybody actually knows what 6 hours the JP courts in Texas are open. I've done a -- I 7 did a survey in Harris County and found out to my surprise that of the 16 courts in Harris County mine is one of only six open from at least 8:00 to 5:00. Ten close at 4:00 --I'm in the at 4:30, or nine at 4:30 and one at 4:00. 11 12 process of trying to get some information about the 13 counties and the operations of the court to try to figure 14 this out, because I'm not sure that a court is necessarily open everyday. I'm not sure the hours are the same 15 everyday. I'm not sure that there's necessarily a sign 16 posted that talks about this, and if we're going to talk 17 about the problem with the 10th day to appeal because no 18 19 one is there on that date, are we also going to talk about the day to answer, the day to file a motion for new trial, 20 21 the day to ask for a jury trial? 22 There are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, 23 fourteen, fifteen other rules with the JP courts where 24 this same question is going to come up. So I'm not in 25

favor of this proposed draft, although I don't criticize
at all -- I mean, this is an impossible situation right
now. I think it's about the best solution to come up
with, but I'd like a little bit more time. I think
that -- I think that we can draft a rule that maybe under
the Court's judicial administration authority would
require the JP court to post a sign with the hours that
they were open. I think we can solve part of the problem
with that.

Part of the problem is we can allow -- if
the court is closed, allow it to be mailed on the next
business day. To do that, though, we're going to have an
issue with evictions, because you only have five days to
appeal an eviction, and on the sixth day you can come in
and get a writ of possession. So you come in and get the
writ of possession. If you mailed it on the sixth day you
may not get it for a couple of days later, so we're going
to have to do something with the eviction rules on that.
We're going to have to decide if we want to talk about
solving this problem for all of these other rules where
there is a limit on the day that they have to file that.
So I'd like a little more time to work on this one.

Now, I will say that although you --

intuitively you would think this must be a huge problem.

It doesn't seem to be. I called the -- I called the staff

at the JP training center and said, "Have you ever heard of this problem coming up, " and "no." You know, the staff 2 attorney has been there for 15 years, and she's never 3 heard of this being an issue, so somehow in these smaller counties where you would think it would be the most problem, somehow it gets resolved, and I suspect that when there's a deadline that they just informally let them 7 8 appeal it the next day they're open. I don't know that, but somehow this doesn't seem to be a big problem, but I 10 do think that we can improve it a little bit. necessarily feel that this proposal here today is the best 11 I'd like a little more time to work on that. 12 solution. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hecht. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: The reason we 14 changed -- the reason we put the provision in the 15 appellate rules and not in the Rules of Civil Procedure is 16 that in the appellate rules you only are dealing with 16 17 or 18 clerks' offices, 17 if you don't count Edinburg, but 18 maybe there's a couple of others sometimes in storms. 19 few offices. You put it in the civil rules, you're now 20 dealing with about 700 offices, 600, something like that. 21 If you put it in the JP rules, you've upped it to about a 22 23 thousand offices, so the problem does get bigger the more offices that you look at, and that's just the reason. 24 don't say it's not a good idea, but it does get to be a 25

whole lot more difficult problem to know when a justice of 2 the peace's office is going to be closed in a small 3 community versus when the First Court of Appeals office is going to be closed. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray. 6 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: This is both intended 7 as humor but also somewhat serious. How does e-filing impact this, because the JP office never closes for e-filing? 9 10 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And I was just looking at that in the Federal rules, and even though the 11 Federal rules are contemplating e-filing, they've kept the 12 provision in Rule 6 that the end of a period is extended 13 if the clerk's office is inaccessible, and I don't 14 remember any discussion about that. The same provision is 15 in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 26. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So there. 17 18 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But it's an 19 interesting question, why you would keep it if you're 20 doing e-filing. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, I think in 21 the e-filing rules for JPs, if I remember, it's considered 22 filed on the date that it goes through the portal and the 24 EFS gets it or something, if I remember, and I think that 25 the JP clerk has or the court has one day or two days or

something to reject it, otherwise it's deemed as being filed. So I think that if something is e-filed, this is not a problem.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, yeah, Frank. MR. GILSTRAP: Well, and it's not a problem for e-filing, it's not a problem for mailing, and I guess the question that Judge Lawrence I think appropriately raises, is it a problem in the real world? I mean, the poverty -- the poverty law section sent it to us, and they said, well, it is true that the JP courts aren't always open, but they didn't have any information that connected that to litigants who actually missed it. You can certainly imagine that litigants miss it, so, you know, you have to judge, you know, the magnitude of the problem in the real world, and then you have to judge the magnitude of the solution. Is this a bad rule? I mean, how is it -- I mean, I think Judge Lawrence was correctly saying this wouldn't just be notice of appeal. It would be every day, every filing. So how is this going to gum up the works? You know, I'm not sure that it does by just saying, you know, if it's closed you get another day. deal.

MS. PETERSON: And one of the issues raised at the subcommittee level was whether this will apply to JP courts that do not keep regular hours, because you have

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rule -- and this didn't convince Judge Lawrence, I don't
  think, but I'll say it anyway. Rule 523 of the Rules of
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   Civil Procedure provides "All rules governing the district
   and county courts shall also govern the justice courts
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   insofar as they can be applied." So if a JP court doesn't
   keep regular hours, I don't think this amendment would
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   apply.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Buddy.
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                 MR. LOW:
                           Yeah, I think --
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: What's a regular
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   hour?
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                 MS. PETERSON: Well --
                           Rule 6, doesn't the new Federal
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                 MR. LOW:
   Rule 6 provides certain instances where you can't extend?
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   It says there will be no extension like on certain things.
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   Do we have any specific rules in here that prohibit
   extension of time that you know of? They have -- Rule 6
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   makes some provision about that in Federal court.
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   not extend the time, and I want to be sure that we don't
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   have some rule mixed up in here that says basically the
                I don't know of any.
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   same thing.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, we have a
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   rule that --
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                 MR. LOW:
                           A new trial.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, this is a
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rule that says you can't extend for certain kinds of 2 filings. 3 MR. LOW: Yes. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And we have a rule 4 that says I think you can't extend for a motion for new 5 trial. Is there anything else? Professor Carlson would know, but I don't think that means that if the clerk's office is closed because of a hurricane on the last day you can't come in under the Federal rules and still file the next day it's open. 10 I don't know what it means. 11 MR. LOW: Ι 12 just know it's there. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 13 14 MR. LOW: And a lot of them I don't know 15 what they mean. MR. GILSTRAP: Well, it can't be extended by 16 the court order, but it can be extended by the rules for 17 extending time. I mean, if your last day for filing a 18 motion for new trial is Sunday, you get Monday. 191 20 MR. LOW: They do that. Federal Rule 6 does that all in one. The new Federal rule does it all in one, 21 but it has a specific prohibition that we don't have in our rules, but there may be certain rules, like a motion for new trial, we have that prohibition, and if we say that if a clerk's office is not closed, that might be --25

it's not open, that might be construed that then we have extended. I just raise the question.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Judge.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, under this draft if it talks about regular hours -- and Kennon has a case I think she found in one respect, but if a court closes at 4:30 everyday and someone comes in at 4:45 to file the appeal and it's closed, then he can file it on the next -- the next day. Well, how long would this go on? Some courts may only be open in the morning, so if someone keeps coming in the afternoon there's just this go in ad infinitum, and where is the finality of the judgment? When do you finally lose your right to appeal so that you've got a final judgment, and not all -- I'm not convinced that offices -- that all JP courts have hours that they're necessarily there the same time everyday.

MR. LOW: That's right.

MR. GILSTRAP: I think the answer is the intent of the rule is to give you one day. If you go and the court's shut and then you've got to be on your toes to get it filed the next day, and it's up to you. You can't obviously extend it day after day if the court is not open all day everyday. I think the intent of the rule, and it's not very clear, is to give you one day.

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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Well, if they're
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  not open on that next day --
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: If they're not open --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- or if they're
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  open only for limited hours and you don't necessarily know
   what hours they are and you come when they're not open,
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   does it go on another day?
                                          I think the
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                 MR. GILSTRAP: No.
                                     No.
  intention is if they're closed at 4:00 o'clock then you've
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   got to be on your toes and try to get it filed the next
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   day when they're open. Now, I guess what happens if
   they're closed is an -- all day long is another thing.
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                           You might have to run the judge
                 MR. LOW:
   down at a funeral, a domino hall, because these county JPs
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   they --
                 MR. GILSTRAP: You may have to learn about
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   filing by mail, you know.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The domino hall is the
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   first place to look?
                           That's one of the places.
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                 MR. LOW:
                                                       With a
   judge there in Jasper you go to the domino hall.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. We're going
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   to take our afternoon break, and when we come back, draft
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   Rule 265.1, juror questions, Judge Christopher.
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                 (Recess from 3:17 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.)
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. On the home stretch here, Rule 265.1, we've talked about it a lot, and Judge Christopher is back with more. But wait, there's more.

We've just made a couple of minor changes that we had voted on the last time, and we think it's a complete draft. Obviously the mandatory law didn't pass, so we think we're in a position of sending this to the Supreme Court to decide what they want to do with it at this point. We did get a couple of comments about the rule recently. One was from former Judge John Wooldridge, who didn't like the idea that we put in there "before voir dire," but that's something that we already discussed, so I don't think we need to talk about that again.

We've got another comment from Judge John
Delaney, who didn't like the word "about the testimony of
the witness," but we've already discussed that also quite
a bit. The only other suggestion that he made is that
jurors should be told to submit their question as a
question versus just kind of a comment or "ask him what he
meant by this," you know, to say "ask what did you mean by
this" versus asking what he meant by that, but he thought
that that's something that the trial judge could just
handle orally and that we didn't really need to change our

forms, but that was just sort of a comment, and as we discussed before it would be the sort of thing that would be good to have at sort of judicial CLEs, so I don't really think it would require a change in our forms or things like that unless we wanted to.

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So I really didn't have anything more about that, but then Elaine brought up a point, and I think Kennon talked to Justice Hecht about it and wanted us to briefly discuss some issues concerning juror questions during deliberation, and the reason for that was a recent Supreme Court opinion, Ford Motor Company vs. Castillo, that in that case the jury sent -- the jury foreman sent a note to the judge asking, "What is the maximum amount that The case promptly settled. Afterwards can be awarded?" the defense found out that the presiding juror just asked that question on -- I can't remember whether it was his or her -- on her own accord, I believe, rather than it being a question that came from the jury, and the case got reversed to allow discovery with respect to the presiding jurors, whether there was any outside influence that was brought to bear on the juror that made that juror sort of send that kind of rogue question. Because apparently at that point in time the -- several liability questions had been answered in favor of the defendant, so that's why circumstantially the defense thought there was some

hanky-panky going on.

Anyway, the Court reversed. In a concurring opinion -- I'm not sure who wrote it because I don't have a copy of the case here. I apologize. The concurring opinion thought that "The Court should set parameters for when the jury may send questions to the judge about the case during deliberations. The Rules of Procedure and the instructions to the jury should be amended to specify that only the jury can send questions about the deliberations to the judge. At a minimum the entire jury should know that a question about deliberations is being sent to the judge. This will preclude an individual juror or a group of jurors from sending a question to the judge under circumstances that suggest, as in this case, that the question was from the jury." So that's the comment in the concurring opinion.

So what we currently have in Rule 226a about questions during deliberations is nothing. There's nothing in the actual rule. By -- through the Texas Center on the Judiciary the judges have always given a little bit of instructions about electing a presiding juror, and in those -- in that set of instructions -- and those instructions are also in the pattern jury charge, the judge says currently to the jury, "As one of the duties of the presiding juror is to write out any

questions you have to be delivered to the judge."

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The proposed amendment that we have done for 226a that we talked about many, many times currently contains this language as to the duty of the presiding "To give written questions or comments to the juror: bailiff, who will give them to the judge." So we do not currently address whether the question has to come from the jury and what does it mean to have a question come from the jury as opposed to just the presiding juror asking a question. Now, I will say that I don't think that we should attempt to draft such a rule, because I think that there are a lot more problems with it, and we could go on and on and give the jury this complicated set of instructions as to, you know, when they can or can't send out questions, but in light of that concurring opinion from the Supreme Court it was suggested that we discuss the issue here, and if the consensus of the group is to try and write such a rule we'll go back and start working on that.

So some of the things that -- some of the talking points that I came up with on this issue is should questions only come from the presiding juror, what if the presiding juror refuses to send a question, should the others be allowed to send a question, should all questions be agreed to by the entire jury, perhaps just a majority,

10-2 vote. Sometimes only one juror or a minority needs an answer, the other jurors know what the answer is, but to make it easier they ask the judge.

In my opinion we shouldn't be getting into who needs the answer to this question and how many people need the answer to that question. In my opinion the problem with that case is that the lawyers assumed that the question was from the entire jury. Why did they make that assumption? There's nothing in the rules about it, and in my opinion, and watching trials for 14 years, it's not unusual to get a question that does not represent a majority viewpoint during deliberations.

What if only the presiding juror needs the answer? Are we going to allow the other jurors to veto the question, or are we going to make them put some note on the question? "This is not a majority question." Sometimes jurors skip around, which can be misleading to lawyers, too. Sometimes they won't answer the liability question. They'll move to damages and start talking about damages and send a question out about damages even though they haven't found liability. Well, that's misleading again to the lawyers who are listening to these questions. Should we prohibit that in some way, shape, or form? Sometimes jurors will ask sort of a devil's advocate kind of question. You know, should we prohibit that? You

know, "Only ask questions you really believe in at this
point."

I just think trying to put a set of rules on the jury as to what type of questions they can ask, whether it has to be from the majority, whether a minority can answer, whether we have to write down that it's a minority gets way too much into their internal deliberations, so that's why I come down on the point of we should leave it as it is, which is give written questions or comments to the bailiff, who will give them to the judge.

While we were discussing this I had a jury deliberating. Okay, it's the funniest thing, so the jury is deliberating. They send out a note on Question No. 11, which was an attorney's fees question, and the question was -- attorney's fees for the plaintiff. We had two attorney's fees questions, one for the plaintiff, one for the defense. The question was "Can the judge award a different amount on attorney's fees from what we award, and is zero an acceptable amount on attorney's fees?" So I wrote back my usual "Do not discuss nor concern yourselves with the effect of your answers, and please answer the questions as directed," and, you know, the plaintiff's lawyer was crestfallen, of course, thinking that he was about to get zero in attorney's fees. Two,

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three, four hours later, the plaintiff gets $470,000 in
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   attorney's fees, and the defendant gets zero in attorney's
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  fees.
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                 So, you know, lawyers should not rely upon
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  juror questions to truly inform them as to what the result
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  will be because things like that happen a lot. So that's
  my suggestion, is that we leave it as-is, but if anybody
  wants to discuss further we can discuss further.
                                                     But
  that's the concurring opinion. Maybe Justice Hecht can
   tell us who wrote it, because I don't think you wrote it,
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   did you?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Wainwright.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
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                                               Justice
  Wainwright wrote it. Well, he should have known better.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Gee whiz.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: He wasn't a
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   trial judge long enough. Sorry. Sorry. Just kidding.
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   Just kidding. Make sure my record is complete.
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                                           LOL.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON:
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's right,
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   LOL. We're laughing.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I got a jury note from
   the presiding juror that said, "Can we have a dicktonary,"
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   d-i-c-k-t-o-n-a-r-y. Didn't know what to read into that.
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                 MR. WATSON: And you said, "By all means.
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You can have mine."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Skip has one of those. All right. Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: Well, I guess I'll tell the story since you're telling stories. Years ago I tried this case in San Antonio, and it was breach of contract, damages, I guess causation damages on the breach of contract, and the rest were all fraud claims. They had like four or five fraud claims, and then there was malice and then punitives and all this stuff, so if you got past like question three it was bad for us. So they deliberate, deliberate, and deliberate, and at 5:00 o'clock on Saturday they say, "We're on question 21, and we're almost done. We want to stay."

Well, 21 was a punitive damage question, you know, for the plaintiffs, and so I tell my client, "You better go call PR, this is going to be ugly," and of course, what happened was they found breach of contract, awarded damages, but on all the punitive and all the fraud and malice they found for the defendants, and they were supposed to stop, but they didn't stop. They kept going, and so it would say, "Do you find fraud?" "No."

"And if you've answered 'no' then stop," but they go on to the next question. "Do you find malice?"

"No," and then they had zero for all the punitive damage

awards, but they answered them anyway, which they do, and 2 I guess, you know, my lesson is if you're trying to read 3 the tea leaves on jury questions, you do so at your own 4 peril. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Alistair, how much did 6 you pay? 7 MR. DAWSON: We did not settle until post-verdict, and we settled for something less than 8 9 the --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Professor Hoffman. 10 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So it was Justice 11 12 Johnson's opinion, and Justice Wainwright wrote the 13 concurrence. That said, I think I agree with what you said, that this seems like an issue, and you should -- you 14 know, you take your chances. You shouldn't try to do it, 15 except that the Court has now given Ford the ability to go back and discover whether or not there was some funny 17 18 business going on. MR. DAWSON: Well, that's a different issue, 19 You know, determining whether there was some 20 external influence is different than limiting what 21 questions jurors can and cannot ask. I mean, I think that 22 we ought to give them as much freedom to ask questions that they need for purposes of their deliberations, and we 24 ought not to tie their hands by saying it has to be a 25

majority or can only be this person or that person. If
one juror -- if it's important to one juror's vote, some
piece of information, and it's an otherwise proper
question then we ought to have a system that allows that
juror to obtain that information, in my opinion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hecht has a comment.

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HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But it's that kind of question that the Court was interested in. Not do you take your lumps or those kind of things, but should there be some standard process? I mean, should the judge tell the jury as he's sending them to the jury room, "You can ask questions and here's how you do it. You tell the presiding juror this is what you want to ask." Does it have to be a majority of the jury, can it be any juror? And I thought, I've always thought, we all sort of did it the same way. At least when I was a trial judge I was under the impression that we always handled jury questions pretty much the same, and I guess we told the jury you can ask questions, but I don't have a specific memory of that, but they all -- you know, they did if they wanted to, and it seems like they always came from the presiding juror, although surely there must have been questions that a minority of the jurors was interested in.

But, query, is it working okay? We just

l'm not sure how it is, or should we say -- now that we're going through the 226a instructions, should we say this needs more definition, that the judge should actually tell the jury something about how to do it, write it on a particular piece of paper or not, vote on it or not, or just leave it alone?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I've debriefed a lot of

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I've debriefed a lot of jurors after trial, and I think more often than not the presiding juror is sending a note that perhaps only one juror has this question about.

MR. LOW: Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And it's not -- you know,
I can't remember ever saying, "Oh, we all voted and we
wanted to have this question" or even "a majority of us
wanted this question."

MR. LOW: And then would you limit it to questions that would help you in your decision. I had a case where one juror, they knew they were going to have to find against me, the evidence was just overwhelming, and one juror said, "But we have the prerogative not to give them any damages." They said, "No, we don't." "Well, let's ask the judge." They already knew what they were going to do. They said, "Do we have to give plaintiff anything if we don't want to?" I mean, they're asking.

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It had nothing to do with how they were going to decide
              I withdrew my offer and got stuck over my
   the case.
  policy limits, but that was just a question of just
   information.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          There were
   discussions in the presentation of this case on appeal
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   that maybe the other jurors did not know what the
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   presiding judge was doing, so do --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Presiding juror.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Presiding juror, so
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   does the presiding juror have to tell the other jurors
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   that he's sending out a question, or can he do it
   secretly, or just all of the sudden there's this area that
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   just doesn't have any regulation, and maybe that's because
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   it doesn't need any or maybe it needs some more.
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   course, when the question gets out most judges do
   everything they can to not answer the question and say,
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   "You'll remember the evidence however it was, and I'm sure
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   if you continue you'll work it out," and, you know, but
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   it's the -- it was the procedural aspect of the question
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   posing that all of the sudden it occurred to us that maybe
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   nobody really knew how that worked.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Justice Patterson.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Well, I agree with
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   Judge Christopher that I don't think anything is
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necessary. I do think the better practice is to go. through the presiding juror, not so much so that they have 3 control, but just so that there's sort of notice, but I think once you start down the slippery slope of does 5 everybody agree or do you want to know, it does work to the detriment of the individual juror or the minority, or 7 it really increases conflict. And since we're telling war 8 stories, the best question I ever got was when I was trying an organized crime case in New York City, and the 10 jury minutes into its deliberation sent out a note saying -- we had tried it to an anonymous jury because it 11 12 was an organized crime case and there were murders 13 involved, and so they sent out a note saying, "Do the parties know" -- "Do the defendants know our names?" 14 was a good question. And they were not out that much 15 16 longer.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

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MR. HUGHES: I'll preface this with a caveat. I was the appellate attorney for Castillo in that case, and looking at this from the procedural question, which is what's been putting -- what I found out from my research, and this is just mine, that from those narrow range of cases that even address the question, the whole issue is that those few states and Federal decisions, that if one juror wants to know the answer to something, you

answer the question. If one juror needs help, one juror needs information to help deliberate, it's entirely appropriate for that question to come out, and it's -- I quess at that point it ought to be just a traffic cop type situation as to how does that juror's question get out of the jury room.

The Texas rule, as has been said earlier, all it does is say the questions come through the presiding juror, and that's it. You know, whether they're from one juror or five jurors, whether they all know or they don't, the rule just doesn't address. What I really fear is if we go too far down a rule here is we're going to be having a situation where groups of jurors can hold the other jurors incommunicado. The Federal cases I've found were usually Fed cases where minority jurors were trying to signal the judge that the -- you know, the white jurors were oppressing or trying to keep questions from minority jurors from getting out or they were intimidating the jurors in the jury room.

And so that's I think what we're -certainly nobody wants, but the other thing is, is it made
me when I sort of tried to think this through, is it made
me get back to what's the purpose for letting jurors ask
questions in the first place, and it was like as lawyers
we felt, well, the purpose of letting them ask questions

is so we all know what they think and how they're going to vote. That's the purpose of letting them ask questions.

It's like, no, the purpose of letting them ask questions is to help them make a decision, and we, the lawyers on the outside, get confused about what they're thinking because we can't figure it out. Well, that's an unfortunate byproduct of it.

So I agree with the comments earlier. I don't think we need a change for the rule, but if there were needed one, I think the only thing we ought to tell them is you don't have to vote. If one person has a question, the presiding juror needs to send it out. I think that's the only real change that might be needed, but I'm not sure that's a problem from what I've heard earlier, and that's it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland.

Christopher that I don't think we should squelch any juror's voice in the jury room, and it seems to me that the problem with the case that the Texas Supreme Court had is that the lawyers acted on information that was not binding. I mean, it's sort of like "Deal or No Deal," and they chose to make a deal, and the suitcase was, you know, what they wanted it to be, but, you know, I don't see how that would be a basis for changing our entire way of

handling juror deliberations that seems to have worked fine in the past.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hecht.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Again, the question came up in the concurring opinion only incidental to the The question is not directed at the case. question was just, oh, wait a minute, there's no rules here, should there be rules? Not to protect the one side or the other or more information or less, but just here we have a body, and if people are going to argue that the procedure was irregular or not or we should get to look at this over something else and there's no procedure governing how that's supposed to work, would it be better to have that or just use what we've got? And, you know, it's only come up -- it doesn't come up very often, but now that I think about it, I do think I used to tell jurors that they could ask me to have testimony read back if they disagreed, and they would always send me a note that said, "Would you please read back the testimony of such and so?" And I would send back a note that said, "I'm not going to read it back unless you disagree," and they would write me back and say, "We disagree." Rats. "Okay, we'll read it back," but, you know, that was just a fine point that I thought we -- maybe we all adhere to, 24 but maybe people don't, so irrespective of the case, just 25

should there be these kinds of procedures?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lonny.

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PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Yes. I was answering the question. My view is that the answer is yes, that although it turns out I didn't think the outcome was right, I thought that these lawyers made a deal and they should have stuck with it, and I was pretty surprised at the outcome of that particular case, that's really not what we're talking about now.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Right.

the byproduct of shedding light on an issue that maybe we should have been paying attention to a long time ago and haven't, and it turns out that maybe the most interesting issue in the case is not the presiding juror who is trying to influence the outcome, but the presiding juror -- by sending out a question, but the one that Roger raises, the one who tries to control by not sending out a question that maybe one or even multiple people wanted. So to me the answer to Justice Hecht's question is, yeah, we ought to write some rules here.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: I mean, it makes sense to have some kind of instruction on notices, and apparently we don't have one now, but the new 226, as I understand it,

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they've got language to address it. It's very general.
2
   "If you" -- you, members of the jury -- "have a question,
3
   write it down and give it to the bailiff," and I don't
4
   think we need any more than that.
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Alistair, what if you're
5
  a member of the jury, and you have a question, and the
6
7
  presiding judge doesn't give it? What recourse --
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Presiding juror.
8
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Presiding juror doesn't
 9
10
  give it.
11
                 MR. DAWSON: But it doesn't say in this
   instruction that it has to be done through the presiding
   juror. They almost always do it that way, but there's no
13
   requirement that it -- I've had trials when we've had
14
   different questions from different jurors, and we're
15
   trying to figure out who they are.
16
                 MR. LOW: And you think that's the foreman.
17
                              Pardon?
                 MR. DAWSON:
18
                           And you think that's the foreman,
19
                 MR. LOW:
20
   and I've been wrong on that, too.
                 MR. DAWSON: It doesn't have to be the
21
22
   presiding juror.
23
                 MR. LOW:
                           Right.
                 MR. DAWSON: The instruction --
24
25
                                      To be clear --
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN:
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Wait, wait, wait. 1 THE REPORTER: 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Whoa, whoa. 3 MR. DAWSON: The instruction as I understand it is, "You, members of the jury, if you have a question, 4 5 write it down, " and am I misunderstanding? Oh, I'm sorry. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: The way it is 6 7 currently drafted, the revised way that it is currently drafted, it's under a topic heading that says "Duties of presiding juror," and then it says, "Give written questions or comments to the bailiff, who will give them 10 11 to the judge." It doesn't say --12 MR. DAWSON: You have to write them down. 13 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: -- you have to write them, but it is under "Duties of presiding juror." 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Where, in 226a? 15 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Under our 16 proposed draft that's sitting at the Supreme Court. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. 18 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: The problem with the 19 Castillo case is not that an individual juror sent out the 2.0 question and the lawyers acted on it. The problem would 21 be if that individual juror acted the way she or he did 22 because somebody told her to or alluded to her that she 23 ought to do this to push it into settlement or if there 24 25 was some outside influence that was brought to bear, and

that's what the Supreme Court said, "Well, go do discovery 2 and find out if there was some outside influence," and that makes perfect sense, but that doesn't mean that, you 3 know, an individual juror asking a question is -- and who 5 is or is not the presiding juror, you know, is in and of It would be a bad thing if it was itself a bad thing. connected with some improper influence, and the presiding juror usually is the one that asks the questions as part of his or her duties, but sometimes delegates that job to the person with the best handwriting or to the person who is the person that's really interested in getting the 11 12 answer to the question because they can phrase the question exactly how they want the judge to see it. 13 So jurors take care of, you know, the manner 14 and means in which they deliberate, and they do a pretty 15 good job, I think, of managing their deliberations, and I don't think we can craft a rule that will make them manage 17 18 their deliberations better than they manage them 19 themselves. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 20 Richard. MR. MUNZINGER: I have a question before I 21 make my comment. Are we going to discuss 265.1 at all 22 23 today? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 24 Yes. 25 Okay. Well, regarding Rule MR. MUNZINGER:

226, I agree with the comments of the judges who don't want additional instructions to the jury regarding jury questions, and I disagree with those who want to have specific rules, principally because all the Castillo case did was to say there's enough in the record here to see if there's been improper influence, look at it and see if there has been. What happens if you start having these rules and then all of the sudden some juror comes out and says, "Yes, I wanted a question but the foreman wouldn't ask it" or "The foreman didn't ask it in the way that I wanted" or this or that or so forth.

Maximizing the chances that people will file motions for new trial or motions for hearing in the hopes of getting a settlement or something like that when the current law regarding new trials and jury misconduct really doesn't contemplate any of that. It's improper influence from outside the jury room, and so I don't think that there is any need to have rules that the foreman must write the question down or do this or that or so forth. We've gotten along pretty well all these years with just this one question, and that's my vote, but I do want to discuss or I hope that we will discuss Rule 265.1 before we adjourn, which I understood was going to happen at 4:30 or 4:45, something like that.

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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Something like that.
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   Gene.
 3
                 MR. STORIE:
                              That's what I wonder, is
 4
   whether the instructions might imply that the presiding
 5
   juror is some sort of gatekeeper, which I think we would
 6
   not want.
 7
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Part of the reason I
   kind of pushed to get this on the agenda is twofold.
   wanted to hear the collective wisdom of this group, and
   two, I didn't know how to teach this. I was like, well,
11
   what are the parameters, what are the practices? It seems
121
13
   to me at a minimum -- maybe it would be, but it seems it
14
   wouldn't be real harmful to include in that instruction
15
   "Any juror may ask a question. It's the job of the
   presiding juror to ask questions."
17
                 MR. STORIE:
                              Right.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland.
18
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, you know, I
19
   don't think we want to encourage questions.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                      I know.
21
22
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I mean, we want to
23
   be --
24
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                      I know.
25
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: You know, we want the
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jurors to try to decide the case themselves and only go to 2 questions as a last resort, and the thing about even the 3 instruction that we currently have, which I think is pretty similar to the one we're proposing, even that one, 5 for a jury that's having that difficult job of finding the facts, the first instinct is "Maybe we can get some help 7 from the judge," and so you'll get, you know, a couple of questions, and once they figure out that the judge isn't going to give them any help and that they're the ones that 10 have to come up with the answer on their own, they do. 11 But, you know, if we say anyone can ask a 12 question, I have this -- you know, instead of a couple of 13 questions and they get no help, and then they go "Oh, 14 we're going to get no help, we'll figure it out on our own," we might start getting, you know, lots of questions, 15 16 but maybe not. I mean, it just seems like we have the right balance in the rule as it exists, and we haven't 17 really had much problem with jurors managing their own --18 at least that we know of, and I think the rules are 19 purposefully, you know, geared toward us not really 20 knowing how they manage their deliberations. We don't 21 22 really want to know that, and so let's just let them 23 manage. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Alistair, Levi, and then 24 25 Lonny.

1 MR. DAWSON: Would it be helpful to have 2 language -- and I can't remember what language you-all 3 have -- that says if you have a question --THE REPORTER: Speak up, please. 4 MR. DAWSON: Add language "if you have a 5 question that may assist you in your deliberations" or 6 7 somehow narrow it a little bit. Would that be helpful? HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 8 I want to go back to what Roger said, and I prefer to test a little bit what Justice Bland said. I'm not really sure that we have the 10 right balance in our rules now, and I don't see what harm 11 12 comes from modification of the rules to clarify or encourage to make certain all jurors know that they have a 13 right to tender a question to the presiding juror and have 14 the expectation that the presiding juror will submit it to 15 the court. You know, if in a perfect system we would have 16 juries that have a wide level or wide degree of education, 17 income, ethnicities; and, you know, there's every chance 18 that one or more jurors will feel a level of intimidation 19 by some other juror or presiding juror; and you want the 20 least educated, the most intimidated juror, to feel like 21 they have a right to ask a question and to have the 22 23 expectation that their question will be submitted to the 24 court; and I don't know what harm could come from that. 25 Will it slow the system down? Sure it will.

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But maybe justice -- the perception of justice is better,
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   and just to touch on Alistair's concern or someone else's
   concern, if that juror gave an affidavit to someone
3
   post-verdict suggesting that they had a question that the
4
   presiding juror would not submit, that's not a necessarily
   improper or an outside influence. That's just a presiding
   juror who didn't follow an instruction, but that's -- you
   know, if the jury is polled afterwards, to the losing side
   it's sort of too bad, so sad that we didn't have a
   presiding juror that followed faithfully all of the
   instructions, but it's not a ground for new trial or
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12
   evidence of misconduct.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lonny had his hand up
14
   earlier, and then Judge Christopher.
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Both Richard and Jane
15
   both assumed that we have -- the system has worked fine.
   My question is why do we know that? How do we know that?
17 I
   How do we know what voices haven't been squelched?
18
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher, how do
20
   we know that?
                                               Well, the few
21
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
  times that we have had a lot of dissension in the jury
22
   room, other jurors write notes and give them to the
24
   bailiff. I mean, you know, that --
25
                                     They sometimes do that.
                 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN:
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And T

mean, we get notes in different people's handwritings, and 3 we'll get notes that say, "The presiding juror is not acting right," and we'll get notes that say, "They're not letting me talk." You know, occasionally things get heated in there, and we do get that. I will say we 7 actually do have two rules that are already in place about jury communicating with the court, one of which is on disagreement about the evidence. That's Rule 287, and the jury has to tell you they disagree about the evidence 10 before you read them back testimony. But the other one, 11 12 285, just says, "The jury will tell the officer in charge, who shall" -- "that they want to communicate to the court" 13 and then they may "in open court and through their 14 presiding juror communicate with the court either verbally 15 or in writing." 16 So the current rule suggests that the 17 presiding juror is the one who is supposed to be funneling the questions, which is why we have kept the instruction 19 under "Duty of presiding juror," but I think it's written 20 21 in such a broad way as to indicate that they can come from I don't have a problem with adding "If any juror 22 wants to ask a question, the presiding juror will send it 23 out," if that's what we think should be there. 24

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yes.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How many people think we

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need a rule?
                 Raise your hand.
2
                 How many people think we don't need a rule?
3
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: We should rename
   this the no rules advisory committee.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that foreshadows
   the election results. Three people think we should have a
6
 7
   rule, and 16 people think we should not have a rule.
8
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                     Thank you for humoring
9
   me.
                 MR. GILSTRAP: How about no rules after 4:00
10
11
   o'clock?
12
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, take a vote after
          Well, we'll caucus with the Court and see where we
13
   4:00.
   go from here. We do need to talk about 265.1 because
14
   somebody is eager to talk about it. Somebody over here on
15
16
   the right wing.
17
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 I have two questions.
  have we voted that we do want to recommend this rule to
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   the Court, notwithstanding that the Legislature has not
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20
   enacted the law that seemed to have prompted it in the
21
   beginning?
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard, my recollection
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   is that we were sort of waiting to see what the
24
   Legislature did before we crossed that.
25
                                 That was my memory as well,
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
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and so before we adjourn today I would hope there would be a vote as to whether we do or don't want to have such a 2 rule since the Legislature has not chosen to require it, and then the other question or comment that I have is that 5 there is a section in No. (6) on the last page, and I don't recall whether we discussed this or not. I'm sorry about my memory, but the last phrase of the first sentence of No. (6), "If the trial court allows a verbatim or reworded juror question, the trial court maybe either ask 10 the question or allow a party to ask the question of the witness." Did we discuss that disjunctive clause? 11 Because I think it could provide a tactical advantage for 12 13 the trial court to allow one or the other lawyers to read such a question, and if we're going to adopt this rule I would like to debate the wisdom of that provision and ask 15 that it be deleted. 16 Judge Christopher. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I could be 18 wrong, but I thought when we first started talking about 19 20 this juror question rule we voted in favor of a discretionary juror question rule. 21 22 MS. PETERSON: That's my recollection as well. 23 24 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Irrespective 25 of the legislation.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, you were in 2 charge of that, so --3 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I thought we voted in favor of a discretionary rule as a body when more 4 5 people were here, and then, secondly, I -- we did discuss allowing a party to ask the question of the witness 6 7 because the thought was that it -- Judge Yelenosky was doing it that way in Austin, and he did a very persuasive 8 discussion about it, and people said, yeah, that's a good option to put in, and so we put that in. I'm not sure if 10 11 there was an official vote on the option or not. 12 Judge, what we did discuss, I MR. LOW: mean, it's happening all over the state, and so we're 13 changing not what the -- it's happening anyway and going 14 to go on happening unless we have a rule that prohibits 15 it, and then we're going to have a role with the judges. 16 The judges like that, so I thought we did vote the first 17 paragraph discretion of the trial court, and that keeps 18 what's going and then my memory is consistent with what 19 Tracy said about the remainder. 20 Okay. What else? Other CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 21 comments about this rule? Anything further about 22 subparagraph (6) that Richard Munzinger is talking about? 23 Well, if we didn't vote, I 24 MR. MUNZINGER: would like to vote. If your memory is that we voted to 25

include that language and I've lost that vote once, I don't want to rehash it. If we didn't, I want to debate 3 it. 4 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I don't 51 remember a vote. I just -- I remember a fairly long 6 discussion about it, and we came back with this language, but I don't remember an official vote on having that 7 8 option. 9 MR. LOW: It was merely an option. 10 MR. MUNZINGER: Yeah. Well, I don't see any reason to have the option. If the judge rules that the 11 12 question is a proper question that can be asked, then the judge ought to read the question --13 14 MR. LOW: I agree. MR. MUNZINGER: -- as written or rewrite it 15 So now I've got a rule that says the judge can 16 himself. rewrite a question and let my adversary read it to the 17 jury and obtain whatever tactical advantage there is that 18 my adversary has cloaked as the person who solicited this 19 question on behalf of the curious juror. Bull corn. Let 20 the judge read the question and don't give advantage to 21

reading that question, even though he may read it
verbatim. There can be a tactical advantage to having
read that question and being allowed to argue that "You'll

22

either party. Who knows what a lawyer is going to do with

recall I read that question to you. Mr. Low is not interested in the truth. You'll recall -- you'll recall 2 that I read that question to you." Well, I mean, that's 31 the point. 4 5 MR. LOW: Well, it's the way you ask the question, I see now. 6 7 MR. MUNZINGER: There is no reason to give a 8 trial court the discretion to let his friend ask the question. 10 MR. LOW: So in other words you want to take out and just say the question if asked --111 12 MR. MUNZINGER: "Or allow a party to ask the question of the witness" deleted. 13 l 14 MR. LOW: Yeah. MR. MUNZINGER: I practice law in different 15 jurisdictions, and I've been hometowned a fair number of 17 times. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Even in El Paso, I might 19 add. 20 MR. MUNZINGER: No, but I work around the state, and I've been hometowned in El Paso, but my point 21 22 is there is some tactical advantage to -- possibly to asking such a question, and no reason for it to be 24 incorporated into a rule adopted by the Supreme Court of 25 Texas.

1 MR. FULLER: Richard, what about a 2 situation, though, where it's a question that could be 3 viewed as helping one side or the other? If it helps the other side would you rather the judge ask that question 5 and cloak it with the aura of by god this is the determinative question, or would you rather the other side 7 ask that question so that you can at least attribute it to 8 your enemy? I don't know. 9 MR. MUNZINGER: It is a juror's question. 10 It is a juror's question and is prompted by the juror. 11 MR. LOW: Right. MR. MUNZINGER: If the lawyers didn't ask 12 the question properly or if they've asked it but if the 13 judge wants it to be repeated or what have you, it is 14 still a juror's question. The rule says the judge is 15 going to read the juror's question. I just don't want 16 Buddy reading questions to the jury in a case against me 17 or somebody else. I see a tact -- there is a potential 18 tactical advantage to it. There are lots of ways of doing 19 things in court, and I don't think that -- I know of no 20 reason to allow a party to ask a question of a juror when 21 he failed to ask it or didn't ask it right the first time, 22 and now the judge is going to rule that he gets to ask it It doesn't make sense to me. 24 again? 25 Is Richard's position --MR. LOW:

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples. I'm 2 sorry. 3 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think Richard's got a good point. There are some venues where this could 5 be misused. 6 MR. LOW: Right. 7 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: And I don't think we gain anything by having it in there. A lot of times, you know, you'll have the bench conference, and one lawyer will say, "I can clear that up very quickly," and the 10 other side will say, "Fine with me," and it will be 11 agreed, so it will happen that way, but if there's an 12 objection to it, he's got a good point. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. How many people think that subsection (6) should remain as written, raise 15 l 16 your hand? And how many people think it should be 17 changed in the way that Richard Munzinger suggests? 18 Three think it should remain, and 13 think it 19 right. 20 should be changed in the way Mr. Munzinger suggests. 21 Judge Patterson. 22 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I'd like to 23 suggest just a variation, that "Upon agreement of the parties either party may ask," because it has now been 24 elevated to a juror question, so it comes within the rule, 25

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but it may be more appropriate for that witness' lawyer or
   whomever -- I mean, I can imagine some circumstances where
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   it might seem more natural, and I would like to leave some
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   discretion with the trial judge and the lawyers, but I can
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5
   see where it could be abused, but I'd like to see "upon
   agreement of the parties," and I think that would often
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7
   happen, but it can't happen once it becomes a juror
   question unless you have something that addresses it.
9
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                    Okay.
                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: So I didn't vote
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11
   either way.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're talking about
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                                   Any other comments about
13
   Munzinger's way. Anybody else?
   the rule? Yeah, Justice Bland.
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                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Picking up with
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   Justice Patterson, I was one of the dissenters on the last
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   vote, and the whole thing ought to be only with the
17
   agreement of the parties because of the big problem that
18
   is associated that we can't really solve with having a
19
   juror's question put into the trial, whether the judge
20
   asks it or a party asks it, and those people on the Texas
21
   Supreme Court that have this concern, hang tough.
22
23
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I respectfully
24
   dissent.
25
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          That person or
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those people, right. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Person or persons. Anything else on this rule? Okay. We're done with this rule. Elaine, I know you were itching to get to Rule 296. 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: No, I'm deferring to 6 Judge Peeples on Rule 300. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I know that you're both itching to do it. Anything you want to say in five 8 or ten minutes? 9 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, the problem 10 is this is I think a seven-person committee and two of us 11 12 are here. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 13 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Elaine and I. 14 other members are not. We've had a lot of conference 15 calls, and I don't think the discussion -- if you're 16 counting on the subcommittee to carry the ball very much, 17 most of them are not here, and that's Dorsaneo, Duncan, 18 Hatchell, Cortell, and Duggins, so we're without them. 19 20 can present the one I'm responsible for, which is 300. 21 MR. GILSTRAP: Chip? Chip? 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Frank. MR. GILSTRAP: Look, I've talked several 23 people about -- that have been here a long time about this 24 set of rule revisions, and they're all very pessimistic 25

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that we'll really do any good. It's been tried before.
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   It is a difficult problem, and I don't see how we can do
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  any good in 15 minutes or a half hour at this juncture.
 4
   really don't.
 5
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, I wasn't suggesting
  that we try to get through it. I didn't know if anybody
 6
  was just itching to get started, and I think we can defer
7
   it to next meeting, and maybe we'll have some more members
   of the subcommittee here then at that time. Is that okay
  with you, Elaine?
101
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Sure.
11
12
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay with you, Judge
13
   Peeples?
14
                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yes.
15
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other
   business?
              Yeah, Gene.
                 MR. STORIE: May I back up one?
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                                                  I was
   looking again at the subsection (6), and it says, "The
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   parties will be allowed to ask any follow-up questions."
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   Should that be "may," because I wonder if that's going to
20
   introduce the concerns that Richard had about sending off
21
   in some odd direction? I mean, are the parties then given
22
   an absolute right to ask follow-up questions?
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I don't think so.
24
25
   Judge Christopher.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Oh, I'm sorry,
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  I wasn't paying attention. I think -- I think we changed
3
  -- I can't remember whether we made everything "will"
  because that's more mandatory than "may," but I think the
  idea was to make it mandatory, but if we want to say
5
   "must." But we did find that we did vote before on
7
  whether the party can ask the question or not, and in
  February '09, 14 said judge only, 1 said lawyer only, and
8
   22 said discretion of the judge as to whether it should be
  judge or lawyer.
10
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So we're all over the
11
12
  map.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that will give the
14
15 Court some direction.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, but, you
16
   know, "will" or "must," "must" is probably a better word,
17
   because I think it was intended to be mandatory.
18
19
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Our next meeting
20
   is September 25th and 26th at the TAB again, not here in
   our football length table arrangement. Anything else?
21
22
                 MR. HAMILTON:
                                What month did you say?
23
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: September 25th I believe
   is the next meeting. Right?
25
                 MS. PETERSON: Uh-huh.
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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: September 25.
                                                       Thanks
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2
   everybody. Appreciate it.
3
                   (Meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m.)
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| 1 | * |
|----|--|
| 2 | REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION |
| 3 | MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE |
| 4 | |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand |
| 9 | Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported |
| 10 | the above meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee |
| 11 | on the 12th day of June, 2009, and the same was thereafter |
| 12 | reduced to computer transcription by me. |
| 13 | I further certify that the costs for my |
| 14 | services in the matter are \$1,799.06. |
| 15 | Charged to: The Supreme Court of Texas. |
| 16 | Given under my hand and seal of office on |
| 17 | this the 27th day of time, 2009. |
| 18 | • • • • |
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