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| MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE |
| May 6, 2005 |
| (FRIDAY SESSION) |
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| Taken before D'Lois L. Jones, Certified |
| Shorthand Reporter in Travis County for the State of |
| Texas, reported by machine shorthand method, on the 6th |
| day of May, 2005, between the hours of 9:03 a.m. and |
| 5:38 p.m., at the Texas Law Center, 1414 Colorado, Room |
| 101, Austin, Texas 78701. |
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--*-* 1 2 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. The meeting will come 3 to order. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Our parliamentarian has 4 spoken. This is going to be a different kind of thing. 5 No, seriously, Chip told me he wanted me to wear my best clothes, be on my best behavior, and speak as little as I could; and he thought things would go well, so the latter one is the one that I'm getting in trouble with. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Could you speak a 10 little faster, Buddy? 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But you-all stop me if I 12 talk too much. We do have a good agenda or a full agenda, and Bill Dorsaneo is going to lead off. I have gotten approval from everybody to have him start his stuff first because he has something he has to get away. So I hope we 16 can focus on the real main issues and not bog down in some 17 minor language changes, "in" or "into" or "about" and 18 19 "above." So with that in mind, I'll --MR. MEADOWS: Buddy, are you suggesting that 20 that's what we do when Chip is here as the Chair? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, I'm suggesting 22 that's what I do, and I have promised not to do a lot of 231 talking, so I don't want anybody to take my place.

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MS. SWEENEY: Mr. Chairman, ordinarily don't

we have a report from Justice Hecht at this time? 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Boy, I almost got fired 3 before I got started. My goodness alive. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Notice that the 4 demand for it just welled up. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Judge Hecht. 6 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, just a minute to say that we did put out the protective order papers that the committee looked at a couple of meetings ago, and I appreciate your turning to those. It was kind of a 10 rush-rush, but some of the work had been in the process 11 for a long time, and we may have to come back and look at 12 those again with changes in the law and particularly changes in e-filing, but for now they are out there, and so if you need -- if you run across people that need that 15 16 help, you might just keep in mind that those -- all of those papers are available on the Bar's website, 17 texashelplaw.com. And so they're easy to get and people 18 19 may want to make use of them. 20 We now have a full Court. Judge Johnson, I invited to come by and say hello to you today, but he's closing on the sale of his house in Amarillo, so he's 22 across the Rubicon as it were, and we look forward to 23 24 having him on board.

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There is a number -- there are a number of

bills pending that may require us to do some rule writing. I don't think it's going to require us to do so on an emergency basis during the summer as we had to do last session; but just so you'll have them in mind notably, there's a bill that has to do with the pretrial procedures and going to trial in asbestos and silica cases; and there is a provision in the bill that says we can write rules to implement that, which we may need to do or not do, I'm not sure, I haven't seen the bill. And there is a bill, again, urging the Court to adopt rules regarding the speedy resolution of class actions, which we thought we were through with a couple of years ago, but we may have to look back at that again.

Of course, there is the resolution urging us, requiring us to adopt rules to deal with filing in overlapping courts of appeals districts, and that's something that we're already talking about and I guess we will talk about today. So we're ahead of the ball on that, and that's passed both chambers, so I think that's all a resolution has to do, so it's probably the law.

And then we may have to write some rules with respect to some massive changes in guardianship services and how guardians are appointed, I think mostly for children, or maybe adults, too. I'm not sure. But that whole operation is going to be moved over from Health

and Human Services to OCA for reasons that we need political branches to explain to you, but I don't think --I think it's fair to say that OCA was not a -- did not volunteer for this duty and is not too excited about having it, but is willing to do its best to discharge it.

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So, anyway, there are those bills and a number of things that do not seem to be moving, so it looks to me as if in about four weeks when the session comes to an end we will have a little work to do, but not enough to require meeting during the summer.

And lastly, we've set the school finance case for argument July the 6th, which I think will be the last day of the Court's term before reconvenience in late That's all I've got. Any questions? Yes, sir.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Over the past several years we have voted out and sent to the Supreme Court several proposals, and I don't remember how many, and I think the vast majority of them we've never heard any action, and I'm wondering if you-all have dismissed them for want of prosecution or what's happening.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: No. Notably, the recusal proposals are still there, but the Legislature is far more receptive to the use of rules to change or implement policies that they're interested in than they 25 | have been for a long time, and I think it was mostly just

respect for that branch and its concerns about the rule-making operation that have led us to soft pedal some of these things, but we intend to dig them back out now that things are better, including all the stuff the committee has looked at, including the justice of the peace rules, especially those.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, some of the things that we have passed may not deserve to be implemented.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Right.

that they get favorable treatment from you-all, but it is a little bit frustrating from our end of it to just send something to the Supreme Court and never hear again; and the recusal rule, if the problem is that it, you know, had those -- the statutory provisions on contributions and so forth, if that's a problem with the Legislature, that can be ex -- you know, taken out of rules and we could have some clean-up that needs to be done.

thing is that problems with the Legislature are fluid, and so they seem worse at some points than others or at least different, and so waiting sometimes means that a better product will come out, but we have not -- the Court has not rejected the proposals that are still pending. We've

just been waiting for a good time to move on them, which we are -- we seem to be at now.

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Thanks.

MR. LOW: There have been a couple of things that we did that a decision took care of. You remember years back when you object and then Payne kind of took care of that, so some of those things.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But there is a lot of stuff we could do, and, of course, we have still got the recodification project that's very much in line, too, especially now that the Federal rules -- the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been restyled and will be in effect December of 2005 -- either this year or next year. I can't remember. But they have been completely redone, so I think that gives us more justification for rewriting our rules.

And, you know, it's a big change to go through there and change a bunch of numbers and a lot of provisions, but I think there is more -- there will be more taste for that after lawyers see the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I think people will be very happy with those rules. They're clearer, the references are easier to follow, and the notes are clearer. I just think people will say, "That's a good idea," and that would be a good reason to keep going on ours.

MR. LOW: Judge, bring the committee up to date like what you're doing. I mean, I see what Judge Rosenthal's group is doing is making -- they're really going into some major changes, and there could be some very major changes in the Federal rules which we would want to look at.

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HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, the restyling project, the Chief Justice of the United States okayed the project on the condition that no substantive changes would 10 be made in the rules as a result of the restyling, so that -- the committee was very careful to try to adhere to that mandate; and it's a little frustrating, because as you well know, when you start going through rules to rewrite them you just find a million things that are unclear and need to be fixed and inconsistencies and problems, and not being able to fix those while you're going through them is a little frustrating, but that project was not intended to, and I don't think it has, changed any of the substance of the rules.

However, the committee has just finished in the next few days changes in the rules regarding electronic discovery, and there are a couple of major changes in the rules in that regard, and if they are adopted by the standing committee in August and the judicial conference in September then I think they become effective in December of 2006.

Our rule that we, as I recall, wrote in the anteroom of Steve Susman's home in Galveston one Sunday morning with Alex Albright thinking it was a good idea and taking notes has been the basis for much of the work that's been done in the -- with the Federal rules, but their changes are going to be more extensive and more refined than the simple rule that we have in our book.

And I would be happy to tell you about them, but they're a ways off still, and maybe I can tell you at a break, but I hate to take us away from business for that.

MR. LOW: No. But there is a lot of objection, there is going to be a lot of controversy over that, because out of the panel that spoke at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference there was some strong opposition. So if we get into that, it's going to be a couple hours work. All right.

MR. ORSINGER: Per page.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Bill, if you would, let's go ahead and start on your agenda No. 5, get that out first. Okay. I'm sorry. It's from Chief Justice Radack, and she wants to amend 9.5 she says (d), but that's a typographical error. It's actually 9.5(e), that in the appellate procedure you have to list exactly what you've done when you served, and in our civil rules we say

we complied with the rules. She also wants to do away with certificate of conference on motions for rehearing, and basically the only certificate of conference we have 3 is in 191.2 on discovery in our civil rules. And basically that's it. 5 6 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: All right. I think 7 we've been through this. 8 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Bill, I was just 9 going to say, at one of our earlier meetings I think we already handled the certificate of conference issue and 10 took a vote on that to abolish it, so I think the only 11 issue that is left in the letter is the certificate of 12 service rule. 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, now, had we voted 14 on certificate of conference on motion for rehearing? 15 l 16 we vote on that? HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Yes, sir. We did. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. That's fine. 18 19 MS. SENNEFF: We were going to come back with a new draft, though. 21 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Oh, I'm sorry. the language you mean? 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Bill, it's yours. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I quess we 25 haven't prepared the new draft on the certificate of

conference on motion for rehearing. I don't think it would be a complex matter to say that a certificate of conference on a motion for rehearing is not required and 3 to put that in the motion for rehearing rule. I haven't run that by the subcommittee. I can draft that up, and it 5 6 won't be more complicated than that. 7 MR. LOW: Let's just see how everybody feels about that. Does anybody have any objection to handling it that way? 9 MS. BARON: Bill, I would put it in the 10 11 certificate rule, not the motion for rehearing rule, or both, but the requirement for certificate is only in Rule 9, right? 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 14 That's right. 15 might be better. I'll do it both ways. 16 MS. BARON: Okay. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, 10.1(a)(5) is certificate of conference on motions. 18 19 MS. BARON: Okay, I'm sorry, 10. 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And 9.5(e) is a certificate that -- where you say you've done all these So which one are you wanting him to put it in? steps. 23 10, where the certificate --MS. BARON: VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: How does everybody feel 24 about that? No objection? Sounds good, let's go. 25

MR. ORSINGER: Sure is different when you're 1 2 in charge, isn't it? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, till I get run out 3 4 of that door. Okay. 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So that leaves us to 6 talk about 9.5; is that right? 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, let me start out 9 by saying that 9.5 of the appellate rules, and 10 particularly 9.5(e), which gives certificate requirements requiring, as the letter says, the date and manner of 11 service, the name and address of each person served, and if the person served is a party's attorney, the name of the party represented by that attorney, differs from the 15 language of the civil procedure Rule 21a, which talks about methods of service and also provides for a 16 certificate showing service in the manner provided by Rule 17 21a, primarily because the appellate rule was written 18 19 subsequent to Rule 21a, and it was believed by this committee in 1997 that it would be better for the 20 certificate to provide more meaningful information than just a simple statement that everybody has been served. I actually think that this specific language 23 was drafted by Chief Justice Guittard with that view in 24 In 1997, if my recollection serves me correctly, 25 mind.

when we did the recodification draft we continued with 1 2 that same attitude, and the recodification draft's replacement of civil procedure Rule 21a in all probability 3 4 looks like 9.5(e), yet there is this difference; and as I understand the Chief Justice's letter that's a problem. She says, "If the two rules had the same requirements, we 7 believe that fewer nonconforming documents would be presented to the appellate courts." In some sense reading between the lines here, I think the Chief Justice's letter 9 10 is suggesting that problems that the First Court is having with things filed in that court are problems created by 11 the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure rather than by the operating procedures of that court. 14 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let me stop you. 15 you think what she's saying is that some people look at 16 the rule that said "I complied with the rule," and they 17 just think it applies on appeal and it doesn't? They get confused, and she says that it ought to be the same rule. 18 19 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes. Yes. that's the point. And probably -- and it's certainly my view that the rules ought to be the same. 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 23 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But the question is 241 whether they ought to be the same like 21a or like 9.5(e), is the real issue, and my view is it ought to be 9.5(e) 25

because that provides more information. I would echo what Richard Orsinger said a couple of meetings ago about the certificate of service and the need for it to provide meaningful information.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: She doesn't raise the point, but there is another difference. 21b provides for sanctions if you don't serve every party. The appellate rules have no such rule. That's not on the plate now, but that could come up. There is a difference there.

So what are you suggesting that we do, that we go and on your pleadings in trial court and so forth you list the five things? Because I think she's kicking out -- they're not filing what -- will that create a problem in the district clerk's office if they don't list the five things and they just say, "I've done everything," and they've got to kick it back, because we are creatures of habit?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let's just see what Richard has to say.

MR. ORSINGER: I don't think it will be a problem in the trial court, Buddy, because there is nobody monitoring compliance in the trial court like there is in the appellate court.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Oh, it doesn't matter what we say then.

1 MR. ORSINGER: Well, I guess what I'm saying is I don't think it's a concern for the district and 2 county clerks because they don't actually check the 3 legitimacy of the certificate, whereas the clerks of the appellate courts do, and I would support what Bill said. 5 I think that the appellate approach is better because it's 6 more meaningful and you can look directly to it and find out how you were served and how much time you have and how everyone else was served and how much time they have, and 9 that's not possible to know what service was on another 10 party unless you call them on the phone unless the 11 certificate says that. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. All right. 13 Is that Sarah? I can't see. You're in the wrong 14 sorry. 15 seat. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I was told to 16 17 move. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. 18 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And to speak more 19 loudly. The one difference I see is, you know, in 20 appellate court you're going to file maybe two briefs, maybe a motion; whereas in the trial court you may be 22 filing something everyday; and if you've got a case with 231 24 30 parties in it, your certificate of service if it is --25 has to mirror the TRAP certificate of service, could be 15 or 20 pages. And that's what I did anyway because, as Richard said, I wanted the information in my file, but I can see some clerks objecting, because until we get e-filing everywhere this is going to add a lot of paper in a big case.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: David.

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MR. JACKSON: From a court reporter's standpoint this is a problem on the certificate of service because we have disclosure requirements, some reporters have contracts with lawyers and law firms and parties to litigation, and without the information being on the certificate of service they won't know whether they have a disclosure issue that they have to address until they show up at the deposition, which is too late, and that's what we've used the certificate of service for as court reporters, is to make sure that those people listed on that notice we don't have an issue with and we don't have to do any disclosure.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It boils down to useful information versus too much paper. All right. Someone else? Yes, Steve.

MR. TIPPS: I think that Rule 21 could be improved by incorporating the provisions of 9.5(d), and one way to deal with Sarah's problem it seems to me would be to simply provide that these are the requirements

unless otherwise ordered by the court, because, I mean, in asbestos litigation or something in which you have 2 jillions of parties it would be a pretty simple matter to 3 get the judge to enter an order that in this particular case you don't have to provide as detailed a certificate 5 of service, but in the normal case I think this is not too 6 burdensome, and it would improve the overall quality of information shared by lawyers concerning how they're serving each other. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So would you just say 10 "unless ordered by the court"? 11 "Unless otherwise ordered by the 12 MR. TIPPS: court, the certificate of service shall provide such-and-such." 14 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But then would you give 15 the court discretion on going back to the old rule or just 16 discretion in whatever order they want it? 17 18 MR. TIPPS: I would give the court discretion to enter an order consistent with the needs of 19 the parties in that particular case. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 21 Okay. Well, I agree HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 22 with Sarah that it would be a huge paper increase in trial 23 courts to have to put this information on all of the 24 I 25 certificate of services, and the number of times that I

have had a dispute about a Rule 21a certificate of service has been maybe once in 10 years, so it is not a problem.

You know, we don't see problems with the current certificate of service.

A, once you start making orders then it destroys the idea that, you know, lawyers are -- cannot possibly read the rules and distinguish between a trial court rule versus the appellate court rule on a certificate of service, because you get lawyers or secretaries that -- you know, what if Harris County decides we want to save paper? So in every case in Harris County, you know, we want the old 21a certificate of service. You're going to have the same problem that you have now that there's two different certificate of services, so respectfully, I don't think that would be a good solution.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman?
VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And I mentioned Chief

Justice Guittard earlier, and I actually think that it's

not a difference between the 21a certificate of service

and the appellate certificate of service. It's a

difference between what people across the state regard is

the proper way to follow Rule 21a. I think that the

approach in Dallas -- whatever it may be now, I try not to

go to the trial courts and I don't sign certificates of service, but I think the approach traditionally was to provide more detailed information in North Texas than in So what we're talking about really is a Rule 21a Houston. that doesn't say what the certificate of service is meant to contain and different practices followed in different places as a result.

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If what we're really concerned with here is the appellate rule, I don't see any reason at all to change the appellate rule. There might be some reason to do something to clarify what 21a doesn't explain, but if we're dealing with the appellate rules, now, I think it's fair to say that our committee would recommend that we don't make any changes in 9.5(d) and (e) because they're fine, notwithstanding the fact that they might be different.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let's divide it down to Let's just take the appellate certificate of that. service requirement first. Any other views about that? Anybody feels that we should change that from the way it Let's take a vote. is now? All right.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Can I just 23 mention one thing? In your appellate briefs you have this big long list of parties, attorneys, you know, all the 25 information is there. So to the extent that you're

worried about not knowing who all the parties and attorneys and addresses are, that information is in their brief. So, I mean, I'm not on the appellate bench, but it just seems to me sort of unnecessary to have everything that's in 21 -- or in 9.5(d).

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: In other words, in the front of your brief you have to state who the parties of interest and everything is. All right. Kent.

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: I'm concerned about the trend line here.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: The what?

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: The trend line and the big picture. It seems to me the big picture question is are we headed towards making it easier to comply with the rules or harder to comply with the rules?

Judge Christopher raises a very significant point. I think she's been on the bench 10 years or thereabouts and has had, what, one issue that's come up. Now, that's a trial court experience, but when we've got other issues pending that I think have some relationship here, there are access to justice issues that we in this branch of government are trying to deal with. There are just questions of user friendliness that we are, I think, trying to grapple with. I think we've got to try to put this in context.

I think I agree in the abstract with the point that's being raised that I always think it's better to have more information, but what may be good in practice and may be desirable I think is probably a bad idea for an absolute rule, and I raise a couple of yardsticks by way of comparison.

One, what about the Federal rules? What about what other jurisdictions do? And I don't know that either the Federal courts or other jurisdictions require any real magic to certify that you've complied with the service requirements. Again, I think it's good in practice. I don't disagree with a notion that a good lawyer would want to do it, but I think it's a bad idea for the rule.

And I will make one practical suggestion, and it will be sort of the mirror image of what Steve Tipps suggested because I think the models may be a good idea, but I would suggest the flip of it, and it hopefully dovetails with Judge Christopher's experience, and that is in those rare cases where there is an issue and where someone, a party, suggests that they haven't been getting properly served then it seems to me perfectly appropriate for the judge to order under the specifics of that case that the service -- that the certificate of service requirements be enhanced, but that otherwise for 99.9

percent of the cases that are out there where it is never an issue, that compliance be simplified as much as reasonably possible.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So you're taking the opposite of what Stephen says. Stephen says you can order it up front, and you say that you can order if you're having a problem. In other words, and otherwise you don't be that specific, but if there is a problem then you can.

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: My whole point is

I think that the more we head towards a system in which to
comply with routine rules you need greater technical
expertise, you need greater and more specific familiarity
with the rules -- and our rules are complicated -- then I
think we're headed in the wrong direction.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Bill.

appellate lawyer alive would say that it's difficult to comply with the certificate of service requirement. It may be a little longer in some cases than in other cases, but this is not hard work. I mean, this is simpleminded, writing down somebody's name and identifying the manner of service. Every form book that's worth owning provides this information as copy work for power professional personnel to perform if they're properly instructed on the manner of performance. This is not a difficult thing to

do. If the problem is that things are being struck because they're not quite right then maybe we need a rule that says don't do that.

(Applause.)

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Can you record that as applause?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We can write down every alternative, and I can't write that much. Okay. Jane.

that you don't have to be an appellate practitioner or own a form book to be able to practice in the appellate courts, and we have a lot of people who practice in the trial courts and practice in the appellate courts and are not appellate specialists, and they have a rule, Rule 21a, that is after all the Rules of Civil Procedure that says all they need to do is certify that they've complied, in other words, that they have served the other side and does not require the specific and extremely detailed information that this other rule requires.

And I, you know, I heed your comments.

They're well-taken with respect to striking of documents, but the problem before us right now is that we have a Rule of Civil Procedure that diverges from a Rule of Appellate Procedure, and we have lawyers that practice in both sets of courts, and we're making it unduly complicated for

them. 1 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What would be your 2 suggestion to answer that? 3 To mirror Rule 21a in HONORABLE JANE BLAND: 4 the appellate rules. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Appellate rules, okay. 6 Judge. 7 My experience on the HONORABLE TOM GRAY: 8 Tenth Court is that frequently the certificate of service, because it does require some level of disclosure, reveals the problem that would be masked by a -- just a blanket 11 assertion, because the appellant is trying to comply with 12 the rule and he certifies that he has served a copy upon 13 the clerk of the appellate court, that's the only person 14 indicated that has been served, and it reveals the very 15 problem that it is designed to reveal, and that is that the other side is not receiving service. 17 To me the trend line needs to be that we 18 require greater disclosure when it is helpful either to 19 the court or the litigants. It is not uncommon that we 20 look to the certificate of service to try to actually 21 identify who the parties to the appeal are, have they 22 dropped somebody out of the process. We'll look at the notice of appeal, the docketing statement, the certificate

of service, all in an effort to try to identify who is

still in this appeal.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: In other words, from the original at the front of the brief they put who the party in interest and so forth.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, sometimes that's there, but that's also you get that in a brief. You don't get it in every motion and everything else that's filed.

That's usually only in the appellant's brief.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right.

in the days of word processing, the ability to change fonts, dual columns, you can compress it where it's necessary to have smaller -- fewer number of pages if that becomes a problem. I think there is ways to manage the paper end of it, but what you're really providing is information, and information is very important to just know what's going on in a case, and I strongly support the concept of putting Rule 9 over into 21.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Judge.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Let me make one comment. Interestingly, the Federal rules contain the same difference. Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure just says "all papers after complaint required to be served upon a party together with a certificate of service must be filed," et cetera. It doesn't say what

the certificate of service has to have in it or what it even looks like; whereas, in rule of appellate procedure -- Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25 it lists the details pretty much like they are in our appellate rule, for what that's worth.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It proves that the appellate rules were written after the civil procedure rules and are better, like ours.

MR. LOPEZ: I don't do anything in the appellate courts, so take my comments in that vein, coming from somebody who is only a trial person, but I'm not particularly offended or bothered or surprised anymore at the divergence between an appellate rule and a trial rule. It's just kind of the way it's always been for me. I'm aware that they're different, and if I were ever stupid enough to venture into that territory on my own I would know that I needed to do something.

So -- and I realize not everybody -- I mean, you're going to have pro ses, you're going to have all kinds of stuff, but I think if -- I kind of go back to common sense. I mean, if the certificate is worth doing, it seems to be worth doing in a way that makes it meaningful to whoever is looking at it. I can't cite very many examples because they're pretty infrequent admittedly, but when they do happen they're an issue, and

I remember one case that we -- there was a problem with service, and the way we figured it out was by looking at the certificate, and everybody went "Oh, it's been faxed to the wrong number." Because the certificate said where it had been faxed and we figured out that somebody had made a typo, and we figured it out by looking at the certificate of service.

I had a case yesterday where the trial court, we were in there arguing a motion, and the judge is looking at something that the rest of us didn't have, and we go back to our offices to try to figure out what happened, and we got a certificate of service that says, "You've been served in compliance with Rule 21a." We can't go back and do the homework to figure out where the glitch is. So it's admittedly not very often, but it just seems like if we're going to have it why not have it be detailed enough to tell us something?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Judge Patterson.

thorough irritation at certificates of service that merely say "served in accordance," but I've always looked upon that rule as self-enforcing, that if there is a problem the parties enforce it, clean it up, speak to it. I think I come to Judge Sullivan's school. Although I don't think it adds a complication I think we also ought to be a

little sensitive to changes in rules and that we ought to have a darn good reason to change rules. Otherwise, it is difficult for practitioners to keep up with amendments and rules, and so unless there is a true rationale that we can justify, I do despair at a change to address a problem that I'm not sure we're convinced is there.

And, you know, there's the old saying about what is the evil sought to be corrected and the means sought to cure the problem, and I'm not sure we have an evil here or effective means that we need to implement on the lawyers, and maybe the lawyers would be -- should speak up if there's been some problem in appellate courts. I'm not aware of any problem we've ever had on them.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Ralph.

MR. DUGGINS: I do both, mostly trial, but I do some appellate practice. I don't find the appellate rules difficult to comply with, but I don't feel real strongly about having quite as much detail as is in the appellate rule, but what I do think is important is for the certificate to at least say how it was served, whether it was faxed, certified mail, hand-delivery, because when you just say it's been done in compliance with the rules there is really no way to go back a month or two later and find out what your deadlines are, how it was served. I mean, that to me is an issue, and I see it come up a lot

in trial practice, so I do think whatever we do we ought to say how it was served.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Bill.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: One historical comment here. It may be that we need to look back at the practice before 21a was amended to be the primary vehicle showing service or delivery of things that were filed on the other party. My recollection is that former civil procedure Rule 72 is the rule that provided for delivery by mail, first class mail, not certified mail, of pleadings and other papers filed on other parties in the case. My recollection, although it's been a while since I've thought about Rule 72, is that that rule did require in the certificate of delivery more specific information about who the persons were who received things.

During Chairman Soule's regime we decided to eliminate civil procedure Rule 72 and 73 and have one type of service under Rule 21a, and we may not have done as good a job as we should have done in saying what the certificate could show. If it only dealt, as it did before, with notices of hearings and such it would tend to be more specific by -- more or less by nature, I think, and I may be stretching my recollection a little bit here, but if we're making assumptions about how we got where we are, that this was all kind of conscious planning, I think

that's really very unlikely. 1 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Tracy. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I would just 3 like to make one statement on behalf of the First Court 4 that's actually enforcing this rule. It is apparently a 5 problem, because a large portion of the things that get filed in the First Court do not comply with this rule. 7 I've forgotten what the statistics were, but it's a large percentage, and for you to say, "Well, why are they being 9 so picky in enforcing it," I mean, why have a rule unless 10 it's enforced. And if a rule is causing problems, you 11 know, it's just -- it's not -- in my mind it's not a good thing to say, "Well, the First Court shouldn't be so picky 13 about enforcing it." We either have a rule and it ought to be enforced, or if it's too hard or too picky then we 15 ought to make it more friendly, as Judge Sullivan said. 16 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You know, let me --18 Lamont. 19 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I've kind of gone back and forth on this argument, but I come down on the side that it's no big deal to comply with this rule, and 21 it does add something. I don't do a whole lot of 22 23 appellate work. I've done some. You mean the appeal VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 24 25 route?

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: To use 9(d) as opposed to 21a if we're going to try to make them consistent, and I think there is some benefit to making them consistent. Trial lawyers I think historically, at least as I recall, when I began practicing law everybody basically put all of this information in the proof of service, and then at some point someone came up with the idea 21a doesn't require us to put this information in the proof of service and they stopped. So now there are some practitioners who just say "I've complied" and there are some practitioners who put all of this information in their certificate of service. It's not that big of deal to just put this information in the certificate and make it consistent.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Skip and then Kent and then I want to hear from the -- we're going to come down to what the appellate judges on this committee feel about the changing, if any, the appellate rule and then go from there. All right. Skip.

MR. WATSON: Well, I see -- I mean, from doing it both in the trial court and in the appellate court, I see two big differences between the two, and I think they relate to the rules. First is that the consequences of blowing a deadline in the appellate courts are generally much more severe than blowing a deadline in

the trial court. As long as the trial court has plenary
power you're okay. In the appellate court, depending on
the court you're in and how the rules judge may feel that
day, your motion for extension may or may not be timely or
may or may not be granted, and all of us who have done
appellate work have had that knot in the stomach where we
have either been close to or missed something.

One of the ways, second, we miss those things is that there is a distinct difference in the type of service. This may go away with electronic filing. I haven't thought that through, but the Rules of Civil Procedure require that service by mail be by certified mail. The Rules of Appellate Procedure just provide that service is complete upon mailing and does not require certified mail of anything filed in an appellate court in Texas.

You have a green card that supplies the information that Rule 21 -- excuse me, Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. You know whether or not that person signed in the trial court for the pleading you've sent. You do not necessarily know that in the courts of appeals, and when that knot in the stomach comes that somebody is saying, "I didn't get it," you know, I mean, I had occasions where I didn't get opinions from the courts of appeals, not just from a party, and that's a bad thing

when you have a deadline on motions for -- I've had occasions where thank God a lawyer in Timbuktu would call me and say, "I got an opinion that I think may have 3 been -- should have gone to you. Did you by chance get one that was intended for me in envelope mix-ups?" 5 At that point being able to come in and to 6 7 go down a certificate of service, I know that the courts of appeals don't use them, but when that kind of thing happens it really is helpful if there is no green card. Ι just -- I'm sorry, I think if there is a problem in the 10 First Court it's because the First Court is trying to be 11 picky on enforcing stuff that really doesn't matter until the wheels come off. When the wheels come off and there's 13 a problem then you need this information. This is for when the bad things happen. I think that Bill's or 15 Sarah's, or Bill or whoever it was, initial suggestion of 16 just put it in, don't sweat it until there's a problem, 17 solves the issue. 18 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. All right. see. Judge Gray, how do you feel first about changing the 20 appellate rule? You don't want to change the appellate 22 rule, right, if it was just down to that? 23 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I would not change the appellate rule. 24 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Let's see.

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Sarah.
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                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
                                          No change.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, I'm sorry, Judge
  Patterson.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I'm really of two
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  minds.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Which one do we have
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  here with us today?
                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I need a couple of
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11 months. No, come back to me, please.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay.
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                                            Sarah.
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
                                          No change.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What do you say about
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   changing the --
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                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No change to the
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   appellate rule.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. David,
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19 you've been on the appellate bench. What do you think?
                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I would leave both
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   of them the way they are.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Okay. Who else?
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Can I ask, obviously
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24 I can't answer the question you just asked, but I want to
25| pose to Skip and to Sarah, what do you -- how do you
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propose the appellate justices -- what do you propose they should do when they've got a response or a reply brief and it represents that the others have been served and then they invest hours into the preparation of an opinion, only to find later that maybe somebody wasn't served? 5 that's -- and since I've never sat on the court of appeals and I don't --7 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Yes, you have, Levi. 8 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, I have sat 9 temporarily, yes, but you know, on the trial court, I mean, it's easy for me to say, you know, what's said here 11 really should have caused the other side to respond, and I get my clerk to get the lawyers on the line, but I just 13 don't know that the court of appeals are set up to do that and then you invest hours into the drafting of an opinion 15 l and maybe the other side didn't even get it in the first place. 17 What is your suggestion VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 18 19 as an answer? HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, I don't have a 20 suggestion, but Skip said, "Don't worry about if the 21 wheels are broken," but you know, that's after hours are 22 The wheels are broken after hours are invested, and it's frustrating.

MR. WATSON:

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You're saying, Judge, that a

party says that they didn't get the motion for rehearing 2 or they didn't get the court's opinion? HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: They didn't get 3 4 something the other side filed. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Wait just a We're fixing to go to the agenda that we started. 6 We're going to the appellate judges. I believe Judge Jennings is next. HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: As far as a 9 change goes, I would like to point out -- and I am a 10 dissenter on my court. I have been against the strike 11 policy, but I would like to point out that I don't think 12 Judge Radack's intent was to incorporate, you know, 9.5(e) 13 into -- because I think her point is we need to get rid of 9.5(e) because of the compliance problems in our court, and Judge Bland I think can correct me on this. I don't 16 think she wants to incorporate that same problem into the 17 trial court level. I don't know, but I think her point in 18 her letter is that we need to get rid of 9.5(e). 19 20 Having said that, I am a dissenter on my I have been against our strike policy, and I don't 21 court. see a need for a change. 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. 23 Jane, I tried to call you, and you were always on the bench. You work real hard. Now, what's your view?

there to be -- I'm with Terry on my court, but I think another way to solve the problem would be to have conformity between the trial and the appellate rules. It seems like because of the problems that people are talking about with having Rule 9 put into the trial court that it would make more sense to have Rule 21a put into the appellate court, but I don't really have a strong preference either way.

I would just like the rule to be the same because I think people do understand when they come to the appellate court that there is a different set of rules, and I think they look at those rules for appellate type things like briefing and extensions of time and those kinds of things, but I don't think to the common practitioner there is a triggering mechanism in their mind that says, "Oh, and the certificate of service rules are probably different." I don't think that happens, at least from what, you know, we experience.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Bob, I overlooked you.

I didn't even notice when you came in. What's your view?

HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: I was going to

say, we'll strictly enforce the rules only against Buddy.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Wait a minute.

HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: My view is if it

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ain't broke, don't fix it, and I don't think it's really
   all that broke.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: In other words, leave it
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   like it --
                 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: Leave both the
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  trial and the appellate rules alone.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Judge Jennings.
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                 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Are there any
   appellate judges here who are aware of any other
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   intermediate court of appeals that strikes documents
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   because they don't cross every T and dot every I in
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  compliance with 9.5(e)?
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Our court doesn't.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: We will on occasion.
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   It depends on the level of the infraction and whether or
  not I can get the second vote.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     There's an honest man.
                 MR. HATCHELL: Is that seldom?
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, seldom happens.
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                                     It appears that most of
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
   the appellate judges would not change the appellate rules,
   so let's have a vote. I mean, we've got to start
   somewhere. Let's have a vote of all those --
                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I'm ready to vote
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   for no change.
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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. So let's vote on how many people here vote to leave the appellate rule the way it is, 9.5(e). 9.5(e). All right. Are you counting them? I can't count that high. 24?

> HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 24. All right. many against? To four. Okay. We've solved that issue.

> Now, we're going to the trial rule. Bill,

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PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I think what I would like to do is to look at how we got exactly where we are with just one sentence in 21a talking about the requirement for a certificate of service, but without any kind of indication what the certificate should say. 16 know this committee voted when we did the recodification draft to follow the same practice that's in 9.5 in the trial court certificate of service rules. I know that's 19 how we voted in 1997.

I, as I tried to indicate earlier, believe that before everything was moved from other civil procedure rules into 21a there was more specific information about what the certificate should say, and I believe that was in civil procedure Rule 72. I'm not certain enough about that, though, to not want to check to

see about how we got to the point, as Lamont Jefferson says, that one day somebody decided we didn't have to provide any meaningful information in certificates, and now at least in Houston that's the way people do business, because I think that is a problem.

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So I'd like to wait a little bit and see what we decide to do. We're not going to amend 21a anyway if we recommend it to the Court. We recommended many changes, and they're all awaiting the right time for action.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Are you saying that maybe -- I mean, there's been some suggestion that you didn't have to put all the parties but just put method of service. There is different things you could require other than exactly like the appellate rule, and you want to look at it further?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I want to apologize for 18 not being prepared to be ready to talk about that in an intelligent way at this point. I think we -- I believe we got where we are by accident, and I don't think that where we are needs to be treated as with any kind of view toward there is a historic practice one way in the trial courts and another way in the appellate courts. I just don't believe that to be so.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right, Judge.

HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: With this caveat, I would say to Professor Dorsaneo, be careful what you ask 2 for, because, you know, people of good will can have good 3 faith differences over how to enforce these rules; and if you start making 21a -- if you start putting more 5 technical requirements into Rule 21a, you may get to the position where you have people of good faith who have a difference of opinion on how to enforce them, you may get to a point where you're creating a big problem at the trial court level where certain judges will enforce them 10 very strictly and others will not care so much about them, 11 so that could be opening a can of worms. So with that 12 caveat I would --13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So we have two choices. 14 15 Leave 21a as-is or send it back to the committee to study and see if it needs to be changed in some way, and if most people don't want to change it there's no reason to go 17 back to the committee. So why don't we vote and see who 18 would leave that rule as it is now? All those in favor 20 l raise your hand. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 21 Kent. Kent. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 13. 22 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: Oh, I would leave 23 She's right. Add me. 24 21. 25 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 14.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 14. All right. All those who want it to go back to the committee for further study? 11.

It's pretty close. I would say that we don't do it, but you can take a look at it and come up with something good, suggest it.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: All I'm going to do is make a report on how we got where we are and you can decide what to do.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. That's fine. Let's go to the next thing. I'm sorry.

MR. TIPPS: This is probably out of order, but I'll make it really short. I think something -- I think Jane is right, or whoever said it, that most lawyers who are not regular appellate practitioners know that there are a set of special appellate rules and they certainly know that there is a rule on how you write your brief, and they are going to read that rule for sure, and I think maybe Bill's committee should give some consideration to including in Rule 38.1, which has the requisites for the appellate brief, just a sentence that says, "A certificate of service complying with 9.5(e)," just as a way to refer people to that rule. And while you're at it you might also include in 38.1 some reference to the fact that the request for oral argument ought to be

on the cover of the brief, because people miss that one, 2 too. 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We've had a pretty close Would you do your report and then let's take a look at it on the change or how we got to where we are? 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Uh-huh. 6 7 MR. ORSINGER: Can you include in that a copy of the recodification draft that an earlier version 8 of this committee has approved? 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think I can. Yes. 10 MR. ORSINGER: That would be helpful. 11 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: John Martin 12 mentioned something that I think makes sense. This Rule 13 21a takes up a whole half page, and it's one paragraph. 14 It could be more reader-friendly. 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I will bring the 16 recodification draft, and you'll see it's a number of paragraphs with titles, and I'm probably out of order 18 here, but anybody who teaches from this rule book written 19 first in 1879 and carried forward through the Revised 20 Civil Statutes of 1925 and then put into the Rules of 21 Civil Procedure primarily by Roy McDonald without much 22 change will tell you that this is a terrible rule book. All right. It's terrible. That's why we redid the draft, 24 and you just point out one circumstance where the rule is

not written very well.

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: But even making no substantive procedural changes in it, it can be made more reader-friendly. That ought to be done.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Would you take those --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I will bring what we did before.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. All right. Next item is there is apparently going to be quite a difference in opinion on this. The precedent to be followed by a transferor court, and before I turn it over to Bill, I mean, the last time we met we discussed this, and it looked like many people wanted to follow -- or a few, or a number, wanted to follow the precedent of the court from which the case was transferred. Some were against that.

There were some that said you shouldn't divide from courts of appeals, there's only one body of The court should be free to do what they want to. There was some suggestion, or maybe it came out of my own imagination, that we do like the court of appeals. they can certify a question to the Supreme Court, and they certify that question and the Supreme Court takes it, answers the question, and then the court of appeals 25 answers then all the whole appeal and that if the court

that got the case found there was a direct conflict they could certify the question to the Supreme Court. circumvent the court of appeals, just send it up there for 3 that question, and then they answer all the others. 4 There was -- let's see, what was the other 5 Let's see. Oh, Judge -- well, that's a 6 idea, Bill? deviation of the first one that Judge Gaultney had given Can you think of other? Seems like there were about four things. 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I mean, the four 10 11 things -- I can think of three things and then there was Judge Gaultney's justification for the --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Law of the case. 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- for using the law of 14 the case doctrine as the logic for deciding whether you 15 follow the transferee court or the transferor court in the transferee court. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Oh, the other one was to 18 follow the law of the case of their own court, transferor court, transferee court. Any rate, go ahead and I --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, let me tell you 21 what we have. Does everybody have this March 23, 2005? It's not March. There is a later one. 23 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: May 2nd? 24 MS. HOBBS: 25 May 2nd.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: May 2nd. 1 May 2nd, 2005. 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: There may be some confusion because that wasn't on the list of 3 things on the agenda, and I didn't have it until --4 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: They're over there on 5 Does everybody have one? 6 the table. 7 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: What is it? MR. SCHENKKAN: Looks like this? 8 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, let's see, yes. 9 Memoranda -- well, no. Yeah. 10 Sharon McGill's cover letter? 11 MR. LOPEZ: VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: If anybody has a 12 question whether they have it, go ahead and get one from 13 the table. 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let me tell you what 15 I mean, it really is a -- and I don't think that 16 this is. the prior draft was presented at the last meeting. 17 wasn't here at the last meeting, but I think that's right, 18 isn't it, Lisa? 19 MR. ORSINGER: It was the meeting before 20 that I think we discussed it, wasn't it? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. 22 But we didn't have a draft at all, and this draft which I have, just for 23 24 the sake of getting something down on paper, identified as an administrative rule; and the reason I did that is it's 25

very difficult to fit any new rule into the appellate rules because of the way that they are constructed. would be somewhere in the vicinity of Appellate Rule 56 if -- I think, if we tried to put it into the appellate rules, but I just made it an administrative rule because I 5 couldn't figure out how to put it into the Rules of Appellate Procedure in any kind of a convenient way without splitting it up and putting a piece here and a piece there so it wouldn't look clear from top to bottom. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Bill, you've got it 15. 10 I think we had one other proposed rule on something else 11 that we called 15, so I don't know whether it --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 15. So this might need 13 I don't expect it's going to be an administrative rule anyway. 15 I understand, VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 16 but last time we had a suggestion of Administrative Rule 17 14 and 15, and so we might need to change the rule. 18 19 mean, go ahead. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I don't know if 20 this is going to be -- if it's going to be a rule at all, I don't know if it's going to be an administrative rule or some other kind of rule. That's unimportant to me. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 24 25 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The beginning parts of

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it, 15.1 through 15.4, are either verbatim or
   substantially verbatim provisions taken -- I think it's
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   Government Code, Chapter 73, isn't it?
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Right.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Which provides for the
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   authority to transfer, and all of the rest of this other
   information that I've incorporated in 15.1 through 15.4,
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   with the idea being that the -- those statutes would
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   either be mimicked by the procedural rule or they would be
   superseded by the procedural rule. I will say that the
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   authority to transfer process, I learned this week, is
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   somewhat more complicated. It says the Supreme Court may
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   order cases transferred from one court of appeals to
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   another, but as I understand it, the Legislature by
   providing a rider to an appropriations bill actually
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   suggests to the Supreme Court --
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          Mandates.
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                 MS. HOBBS:
                             Mandates.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mandates. Well, if you
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   read it, it kind of says mandates.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          Well, you can
   either do it or not have any money, so....
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes. So without regard
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   to how the rider is worded, the Supreme Court takes it as
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   a directive, so it isn't just the Court doing this.
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the Court doing what the Court is mandated to do by the rider to the appropriations bill.

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Now, when we get down to the part that we need to talk about, 15.5, the pedigree on that is first -the first alternative comes from a draft that Mike Hatchell did after one of our meetings, with a slight addition at the end as a way to deal with this transfer problem; and if you just look at it, "In cases transferred from one court of appeals to the other the court may when it issues its opinion, and must on rehearing, state whether the outcome would have been different had the court of appeals applied precedent of the court from which the case is transferred, " so that the transferee court does what it wants to do and states whether the outcome 15 would have been different if the precedent of the 16 transferor court would have been followed; and then there is a second part where the Supreme Court would take action on a petition for review because precedent of the transfer court was not applied; and that's (a), (b) and (c), and I think Mike's provision had (a) and (b) but not (c). seems to me that (c) is --

MR. HATCHELL: Well, I never wrote anything down. I just said it.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, it came to me in written form.

MR. HATCHELL: Probably Lisa.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. Well, I thought you had written it all out because it came to me in written form.

MR. HATCHELL: I just said it.

approach to this problem, and I guess that's the approach where the transferor court follows the law as it sees it and then probably on motion for rehearing, but perhaps earlier, makes a special effort to say that we've considered the transferor court's precedent and did not follow it and the outcome would have been different if we had done so, so here you go, Supreme Court, take whatever action you can consider to be appropriate.

That differs from the practice of just certifying it to the Supreme Court without the court of appeals doing anything on its own to begin with. It doesn't authorize the court of appeals to simply pass the buck. It says decide the case as you see fit and then put it in shape to have the possible conflict resolved.

The second alternative is one that I drafted, which attempts to be the alternative -- the primary alternative approach where similar procedures are followed. "In cases transferred by the Supreme Court from one court of appeals to another, the court of appeals to

which the case is transferred must" -- and I have an internal choice here -- "consider and give due regard to the view held by the transferor appellate court of Texas law as reflected in the decisions of the transferor court" or "decide the case in accordance with the view held by the transferor appellate court as reflected in the decisions of the transferor court and state whether the outcome would have been different had the transferee court applied its own or another court of appeals' precedent or view of Texas law."

That may be a little bit overcomplicated, but it's meant to be something close to the mirror image of the first alternative with the statement being whether the outcome would have been different had the transferee court applied its own or another court of appeals' precedent or view of Texas law. Maybe that language more closely matches "decide the case in accordance with" than "consider and give due regard to," and then the Supreme Court takes the appropriate action after that. Decide the issue for itself, grant the petition, resolve the actual or apparent conflict, and if necessary remand the case to the court of appeals or deny or refuse the petition.

Again, the purpose of getting something down on paper is to get something down on paper for discussion purposes. With respect to alternative two there are more

things I would say about it. If the transferee court is going to decide the case in accordance with the transferor court's precedent, there could be various ways to think about that by using doctrines with which we're already familiar.

David Gaultney recommended that we think about and perhaps add some language analogizing this subject area to a law of the case thinking under which you would follow the law of the transferor court unless you thought this was just wrong, clearly erroneous, or whatever language you might choose to take from the law of the case cases, like Briscoe vs. Goodmark, which says at one point "The Court has long recognized an exception to the case doctrine that if the appellate court's original decision is clearly erroneous, the court is not required to adhere to the original rulings." You know, something like that could be built in as a standard for the transferee court to use as an exception to any requirement that the transferor court's precedent be followed.

Sarah Duncan's opinion in this area -- you can probably speak better about it -- certainly could speak better about it than I can -- makes, I believe, an analogy to choice of law principles; isn't that right, Sarah?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yes

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So there are ways that more could be said or this could be, you know, engineered to be user-friendly, but that hasn't happened yet in this draft.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But let me ask one Choice of the law is usually where law of question. Louisiana, Texas, and some -- and would choice of the law work where you have just one state or those factors? I'm sorry. anyway. Go ahead.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's all I have to say about it. I didn't get any feedback from our appellate rules committee, and I think my certificate of service says that they all got one, a copy of it, but I'm not sure, because it's a fairly opaque certificate of 15 service, whether they actually did.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I got mine e-mailed and the certificate of service said you had 18 mailed it.

MR. HATCHELL: They struck it and sent it back.

Okay. How does VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: everybody feel about, first, the approach that we follow to some degree -- I'm not saying -- it might be with some different changes or something, the law of the court where the case -- from where it was transferred? All right.

HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Could you state that again?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I mean, I'm trying to

see how people feel about the different approaches. You can use different language on all of these, but the basic concept is whether we would to some degree, with exception or with no exception, follow the law of the court that transferred the case, where the case was tried.

The problem -- and let me raise this first, a question that came up to me. What if a case were tried in Waco and they tried the same kind of case in Dallas? I mean, this could happen. It probably would not. The case is transferred from Dallas to Waco. All right. There is a conflict. Does Waco write an opinion that says, "Okay, this was tried in Waco, this is the law. Well, no, this is tried in Dallas, so that's the law." Same kind of identical thing. Does the same court come up with a different result? I guess if you had clearly erroneous you could get around it, but anyway, Carlos.

MR. LOPEZ: No, I was ready to vote.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Oh, okay. All right.

22 Richard.

MR. MUNZINGER: I addressed this the last time I spoke about this, and I would like to address it again. Some years ago there was a case, the Caller-Times

case, that was appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. It was an antitrust case, and it was the first time the Court really addressed substantive antitrust law under the 1983 Texas statute, and the court of appeals had addressed the question of what conduct was predatory and had ruled that the conduct was predatory and had affirmed a judgment.

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The argument was made in one of the appellate briefs that you could have a rule in Corpus Christi which would be different from the rule in El Paso. Let's assume that we had a case in El Paso where the El Paso court of appeals has held certain conduct to be violative of the Texas Free Enterprise & Antitrust Act, whether it's price fixing or whatever it be. That would be too clear, but let's just assume for a moment that the El Paso court of appeals has once held that conduct is prescribed by that statute.

A case arises in El Paso. It is tried, and it is tried in accordance with the El Paso court of appeals' rule on that point. On appeal the case is transferred to Houston. The Houston court is now addressing a situation where the substantive rights of a competitor in El Paso are going to be resolved by the Houston court's view of what the antitrust law is. If the Houston court's decision is contrary to the El Paso court's decision you now have two competitors in El Paso,

one subject to rule A and one subject to rule B.

That's entirely possible if you don't require the transferor court to apply the law of the -- I'm sorry, the transferee court to apply the law of the transferor court. These opinions affect the substantive rights of parties, so if I'm going to be in the district governed by the El Paso court of appeals, until the Supreme Court of Texas annunciates the law then I ought to be under the same law as my neighbor or as my competitor.

I see the same problem arising in discovery cases. Some years ago there was a dispute, not a dispute, but a difference in the courts of appeal as to how you handled supplementations of answers to interrogatories and whether or not interrogatories had or had not been properly supplemented and if they had not been properly supplemented could a person call a witness; and if you can't call a witness, you can't prove your point; and if you can't prove your point, you lose your case. So in El Paso we had rule A; elsewhere we had rule B.

Is a litigant to be confronted with a different set of rules and is that fair? Can I honestly advise my client as to what the law is within my district? And I feel very strongly that it would be a mistake to allow appellate courts to cause this problem to citizens in their various districts unnecessarily. I think it is

unnecessary to allow this, and I recognize that appellate court justices have their oaths that they take that they are required to do their best, in their best lights to obey the law, to honor the Constitution, et cetera. However, if the Supreme Court of Texas were to annunciate a rule that states you will apply the law of the transferor court, that becomes the law which that justice must honor in accordance with his or her oath, and it removes the problem from that standpoint.

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It doesn't remove the intellectual problem, but the intellectual problem and the good faith and the 12 conscience problem can be resolved by a paragraph or two or three pointing out "I sure as heck don't like this I think it stinks to the high heavens, but I am duty bound to honor it and I do, but I sure hope the Supreme Court will take a look at this case." I won't say anything else.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Jan.

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: The two big complications are -- the first one, as Richard says, is the litigants file their case with certain expectations under the law of what they consider the land. The second problem comes in if the case is reversed and it's sent 24 back for retrial or remanded. It becomes an additional complication, and under what law would you send it back?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It's the law once --1 2 under the law of the case. I mean, that is the law of 3 that case. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Well, I 4 5 understand. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I don't care what court 6 7 takes it. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: But you're sending 8 it back to El Paso in his example, and how can that as a 9 practical matter -- you know, that just adds an additional 10 complication there. 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, if you follow the 12 13 Briscoe case, I mean, unless you want to say it's clearly 14 erroneous. Sarah. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Let me just 15 16 l conclude my point here. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: It honors the 18 litigants' and the lawyers' expectations when they file 19 their suit to follow the law of the transferor court. 2.0 Now, all the appellate judges really want is a decision in this area because there have been a lot of really good discussions. And there was a split of authority, primarily Eastland and Corpus Christi followed the 25 transferee court system, and so I sent this rule around to

them and to some others; and we have had a wonderful dialogue about it; and the two main concerns of those who follow the transferee, one, we just need to know what the rule is because in fact it doesn't occur in very many cases.

And second, a lot of the judges didn't realize that it was a problem. So it's a healthy thing to talk about it, but the other aspect of it is that the ones who follow the transferee court are not necessarily wedded to it, and Judge Gray can speak to this I think as well, but there are two main reasons that they like that system. One is that they have a sense that we're an independent judiciary, we follow our law, and nobody can tell us what to do. However, they have been advised and they understand this complication of the expectation of the litigants, and they generally are coming around on that view. That's not something we've talked about very much before.

The other thing, and the real worry, and I was just talking with -- Justice Gaultney is going to be here this afternoon, and Judge Hinojosa, his concern and the concern of the Corpus court was if we decided under their law, the transferor court, then it becomes precedent in our court; and that's what they wanted to avoid, is creating precedent where you're following somebody

else's -- we all know there's one law, but following somebody else's law is a problem for them because it 2 creates bad precedent. So we can deal with that by the rule and --4 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Sarah. 5 I'm sorry, qo 6 ahead. 7 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: We can deal with that by the rule, but also we have been talking about very often in these transfer cases we don't say, "This is a case transferred from. We are deciding under our law or their, " and so we have had good discussions about being 11 express on that so that it doesn't create precedent in 12 your own district, that it is decided with due regard to 13 the transferor court, something along those lines. this has had a very healthy discussion, but the big ticket 15 item is which law to follow, and then the rule flows from that, I think. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Big ticket item is what? 18 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Is whether you're 19 going to follow the transferor or the transferee. 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: That's kind of the 22 big ticket item and then the form of the rule flows from whichever one. 24 Right. Sarah. 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think Jan and I have the same point. I don't think it's a problem creating precedent for the Fourth Court of Appeals district if I say in the opinion "I'm applying the law that's annunciated by the Fourteenth Court."

I would only point out that my opinion was a dissent and certainly not the majority view, but it remains my view; and when Michael first proposed this procedure that's now alternative one of the 15.5, I thought, you know, I could go with that; and I could still live with it; but I was thinking about it this morning and I thought, you know, I can't keep up with my case load deciding a case once. Don't tell me I have to decide it twice.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Lamont, I believe.

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Yeah, I'm just kind of surprised at the way this discussion is going. It seems to me that there is only, as Jan said, one law, and it's not pronounced by an appellate court. It's great that we can sit in here and get on Westlaw because here is this Willy vs. McCain case, which is a 1964 Texas Supreme Court decision that says, "After a principle, rule, or proposition of the law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court" -- and that's referring to the United States Supreme Court -- "or the highest court of the state

having jurisdiction of a particular case, the decision is accepted as binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties."

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That's what stare decisis is. It's not -and what an appellate court has to do when a justice is trying to decide what is the law of the state, if it's not -- if it is pronounced by the Supreme Court, by the Texas Supreme Court, easy call. If it's not pronounced by the Texas Supreme Court then you have to make a decision based on the precedent that's out there what the law of the state is. You don't make the law. All you're doing is saying what you believe the law to be, but it makes no sense to me to say there is precedent that works in Austin that doesn't work in San Antonio or any place else.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, are you saying then that there's conflict between two courts of appeals and case is transferred, and no matter who gets it, where it came from or what, they should look at it and ignore Austin on it, Houston, or what, and just try to analyze what the law is? Supreme Court hasn't answered the question.

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I don't think you ignore anything. I think you look at everything, but I 25 don't think you should give deference to the fact that the case came from a particular locale.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I expressed it differently than you did, but what you're saying is just look at what you think the law is, look at each decision, weigh it and see and then make decision from there.

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Exactly.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Carlos.

Wait, is there anybody on this side of the room? I have been looking over here. I have been waiting on Richard to say something, so I'm going to call on him whether he says anything. So I don't mean to ignore this side of the room. Richard. Richard is next. He hasn't spoken, and I'm fixing to take a break, and he can't go.

MR. ORSINGER: Let me comment on the general philosophical proposition that Lamont put on the floor. I have some detailed comments here, but it's been an issue of philosophy of government for centuries about whether there is one law out there, and we're all just like the three blind men and the elephant. We're all feeling different parts of it and think it's a rope or a wall.

I don't really feel like we're going to be able to resolve that on this committee. If we are then let's publish it. But in my view the simple case is when the Supreme Court has decided something and then that is binding precedent on the inferior appellate courts and on

the trial courts, but also in my view, courts of coordinate jurisdiction are not -- their rulings are not binding on the others. So if the First Court makes a decision based on its best judgment, it's not binding on the Fourteenth Court even though they're in the same appellate district. It's not binding on any other courts of appeals, and I think that's good. I don't think that the first time three judges look at a problem in one case is necessarily the best time to make the binding precedent.

as big as some regions in the United States. We have fourteen courts of appeals. Many states have one, and we have a lot of different -- we have oil areas, we have agricultural areas, we have sea coast areas, we have, you know, forest areas. We have -- there is so much diversity in Texas and different perspectives, and of course, along the border we have immigration from other countries and whatnot, and I think it's healthy to respect the rights of the courts of appeals to have different perspectives based on whether they're Democrats or Republicans or whether they're rural or urban or whatever.

And then over a period of time trends will emerge as the different court of appeals address the same issue over and over again, and if they reach a conflict,

that's the time for the Texas Supreme Court to step in.

And up until about 15 years ago, those of us who practice family law lived in that world because the Texas Supreme Court didn't even have jurisdiction in family law appeals unless there was a conflict between court of appeals or a dissent in that particular case, so we frequently would wait for years while a trend was developing at the court of appeals level, and then lo and behold, someone would come along and hand out a decision to the contrary of the others and then the Supreme Court would grant review and then they would resolve the issue.

And I can remember one of the most significant decisions in family law in the second half of the 20th Century was in the Aguilar decision when the Texas Supreme Court decided that the Constitution prohibited divesting separate property in a divorce, and there were six court of appeals decisions that said that was okay and then finally one said it was not okay, and the Supreme Court granted writ and in a five-four decision we discovered that the Constitution prohibited something we had been doing for a long time.

I don't think that there is anything wrong with different courts of appeals having different views.

I think that's healthy, and I think that it's only over a period of time that the validity of the first impression

from the First Court of Appeals is either validated by other court of appeals or the trend goes the other direction, and if the trend does go the other direction it's time for the Supreme Court to step in.

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So I'm not offended by the idea that different court of appeals have different decisions or different views of the law. However, I do think that if you're trying a case in a district court that's under the direct control of a court of appeals whose rulings are binding precedent on the trial court, in my view, it's a geographical concept, that it's really not wise to have an entire court proceeding and even the briefing sometimes done -- or does the assignment always occur before briefing, the re-assignment? Does that always occur before briefing?

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yes.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No.

MR. ORSINGER: It always does?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No.

MR. ORSINGER: It doesn't? So sometimes you might even be briefing to one court of appeals and then get assigned to another one, and to me that's an inefficient way to run your system because you're not following the guidelines that you -- everyone expects are binding.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman? 1 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Wait just a minute. 3 Would you go for then -- are you saying some system of 4 certifying a question to the Court to resolve it? 5 MR. ORSINGER: No, I don't think the Supreme 6 Court is going to grant much of that. I think --7 MR. LOW: It took a constitutional amendment for the court to even get, you know, from the Fifth Circuit. That was -- Bill. 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Except for the very last part Richard said, which I think, as I'll say in a 11 12 minute, would be a very bad policy choice, I'm not troubled by the fact the courts of appeals are going to 13 interpret the law differently. All of us interpret the law differently, and it could be interpreted differently 15 in different trial courts, but this was drafted with an 16 attempt to make it plain that there is really only one 17 Texas law and maybe different views about what that law is 18 from place to place. 19 20 With respect to your comments about geography in trial courts, and I would say that the better policy analysis and the one that we've sometimes not always followed in Dallas County is that the decisions of the Beaumont court are with respect to trial courts in 24 Dallas County of equal precedential value with the 25

decisions of the Dallas court or the San Antonio court and they are meant to be given due regard, and that means to me also that the Dallas court is not empowered to ignore the decision of another court of appeals on the same subject about what sue or be sued means in a particular statute, and that's how we get these things worked out. That's how these things are worked out.

This is drafted in order to get the appellate court that's going to decide the case to explain that the other courts' decisions were looked to, they were either followed or not followed, and the outcome would have been different if we had taken a different course of action, so it's your turn now, Supreme Court. We have done the best we can do on this, and it's the Supreme Court's job to resolve the conflict, and it's to set up that. That's what we're dealing with.

That's different from what Lamont says where he just says, well, we're not going to deal with this.

Okay. We're just going to say it's one law and it's only the Supreme Court's precedent that is binding on the trial court. The courts of appeals precedent being, you know, binding, although potentially in conflict. This is a way to try to deal with it, whichever alternative you pick, and it does preserve the idea that there is one law, although interpreted differently, and it sets up the plan

that this needs to be resolved as quickly as possible.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But, see, the problem is that apparently some courts of appeal are saying you follow the law of the one court. Some are saying the other, so, I mean, that's going to happen if we do So do we have a rule that says you're not bound, nothing. you should have -- this is one body of law and you should consider everything and not give more precedent necessarily to your own than the other; or do we have something that just says, okay, if there is a direct conflict, I mean, can't distinguish, it's just black and white and between this one and that one, do you follow the law of the court from where it's transferred? And some of those things are happening now, and the question is, how do we answer that? Richard, I believe you had your hand up.

MR. MUNZINGER: I just would want to point out that I'm not sure we're solving or being asked to solve any kind of basic philosophical questions about courts having different views of the law. The rule is to be applied in that situation where an appeal comes from one district which has already annunciated a rule which is different from the district to which it has been 24 transferred, and no matter what we say about the philosophy of law or what have you, we still end up

impacting the rights of citizens and litigants, and it can be -- they can be critical rights of citizens and litigants, whether it's in a trial or whether it's in business.

And for those of you -- and I've heard several say trial judges aren't bound by what their court of appeals says. Tell that to the trial judge when you're in El Paso. "Well, wait a minute, your Honor, the court of appeals of Dallas says so-and-so."

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"Yes, sir, but the one that's going to handle your appeal says X." There are not too many dadgum trial judges in El Paso, Texas, who are going to ignore precedent from the court of appeals of El Paso, and I suspect that's true of most places around the state, unless someone has made some kind of an egregious error, and I don't know about that.

But, again, whatever rule is annunciated here is going to have an impact on citizens and litigants. It is more than a philosophical question that is addressed to can we all have differing views of the law until the Supreme Court rules. Yes, we can, but until the Supreme Court rules you are annunciating rights of citizens, and 23 you are affecting their rights, and it can be something 24 that is extremely important to them in business, their lives, fortunes, and sacred honors. I don't mean to be

dramatic about it, but by god, that's what you deal with.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Let me call on the appellate judges here. Judge Gray, you're the first one. What do you think we should do?

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Probably not the best place to start, but from the general discussions I would add that you generally will not get a court to say that this is like X case and we do not think they reached the right result and so we're going to do Z, because the ability to distinguish or intellectually ignore other precedent in good faith is very real and it happens.

I mean, everybody has heard me talk about the Jaubert case before. It's just a classic case, and you can't say as one of the proposals proposed that if you already decided the issue you go with your law or if the other court has already decided it and you haven't you go with their law. The Jaubert case was a classic example of that in two regards. One was on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the other one was on disclosure of the intent to use extraneous offenses in the case.

That was a case that was transferred to us from the Second Court of Appeals. They had -- with regard to the second issue, following along what Richard was talking about, the Second Court had expressly decided the issue that if the extraneous offenses were only going to

be used in rebuttal, not in the case in chief, that it did not have to be disclosed by the state prior to trial. Our court looked at it, decided that they did have to be disclosed before they could be used, and reversed on that grounds.

And then also on ineffective assistance of counsel issue we had decided that it was an issue that had to be preserved. The Second Court -- we were the only court that had done that, and the Second Court continued to apply the old rule that it was a -- that particular issue did not have to be preserved and they would address them when raised for the first time on appeal.

While that case was pending within our plenary jurisdiction the first issue was resolved. We pulled it back. It was resolved against us, and so we pulled the case down and wrote on the second issue that I talked about, this disclosure of the intent to use the extraneous offenses; and it was crystal clear what the Second Court had done; but we had never addressed the issue, and we did not follow the Second Court, and there was a dissent.

But that was a question that under your clearly erroneous rule is going to fall out as they felt like, the majority did, that the Second Court was clearly erroneous; but that doesn't help the trial judge when this

goes back, because I have no doubt that if it had gone back and been tried again at the trial court level and the evidence excluded, which in that particular case it wouldn't have been because it had already gotten a notice by that point, but retried under the rule that we announced and it went up to the Second Court again on a state's appeal, they would have prevailed in the Second Court on the argument that we were clearly erroneous because we didn't apply the rule that they had so clearly articulated.

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symptom of another problem in the transfer of cases. It is not in and of itself a problem. I agree with Richard in everything he said about I think it's a good and healthy thing because different courts look at different things different ways. Different judges look at different things different ways. If we had a rule that said, yes, you apply it, the law of the transferor court, you're going to have some intellectual problems of I -- how do you really know what that law is and whether or not it's going to -- would impact this case.

So if you require a judge to try to say,
"I'm following the law of that court," you're going to run
into some situations where they think they are, but they
miss it. I mean, it's the Eerie doctrine, you know, that

we have in state court -- or Federal courts trying to apply state court doctrine. I mean, this problem has been around a long time. The problem that's unique to Texas is because we're transferring cases around the state.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We're going to keep transferring, so we've got to --

not. I mean, the answer to that is a question of redistricting that will -- is a political nightmare or changing, like the problem that Justice Hecht referred to on the mandatory provision that affects the budgetary rider that requires the transfers, which if that were removed we could do something like I mentioned once before, assignment of judges to different courts.

But, I mean, one other way to approach this animal that may or -- I mean, it actually occurred to me as Professor Dorsaneo was talking. One of the problems is you're trying to coordinate the law of three judges that are not sitting on another court, and while they should be rare, and I will be the first to concede these are fairly rare. In seven years, we are a heavy transferor court -- excuse me, transferee court. We get about a hundred cases a year transferred primarily from the two Houston courts. Beaumont has been a heavy transferor court to us. Houston -- excuse me, Dallas, and lately all of our transfers have

come from Fort Worth.

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So those are the four we normally get, and we get about a hundred cases a year, and this does not come up all that often, and I would like to see if there would be a way that you could change Rule 41.2, which is the decision by en banc court to throw us into -- on a motion into a decision to sit with that court and let the nine judges then of the Second Court and the Tenth Court sit together and resolve the issue if a majority of the judges of the two courts involved thought that the motion for rehearing en banc needed to be considered. That may be way overkill for a very small problem because it would generate virtually a motion for rehearing en banc in every transferred case, but --

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Do you have a favorite of the menu that we have before us right now, following the law, no law, or following the law of the other court?

Do you have a -- or just no rule at all?

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: If you're asking for my personal --

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- viewpoint, it is set out in the Jaubert opinion that I would follow the law of the transferor court.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. And I realize

that you're not necessarily -- that doesn't make you happy, but that's what you would do.

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: To me it's easy, it's fair to the litigants. It's just the cleanest answer out there.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And you just disclose in the -- I mean, if for some reason you don't want that same precedent in your court, you just say, "We're applying the law and this is not precedent for the Tenth Court."

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: David, what about you? You were an appellate judge.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think Richard Orsinger made good points when he spoke. It's healthy for 16 the law when these coordinate courts disagree with each other and hash out the law when it's unsettled. I agree 18 with those who have said that this doesn't happen very often that the transferee court has to apply a law or faces a case where the transferor court's law is different. It doesn't happen often, but for the reasons 22 expressed by Richard Munzinger, when it does happen it can be very important, and the interest of the litigants need 24 to be honored. You know, they tried the case under court 25 A and now court B wants to disregard that. That is a real

problem.

I think I like alternative one and think maybe it's the best we can do right now because basically what that says is it's not a problem very often, go ahead and write your opinions, but when this does come up, say so on a motion for rehearing; and the court has to say what it did and would it have made a difference; and that might help flag it for the Supreme Court, which really is the ultimate answer here.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: To help the Supreme Court take these cases when they happen and give us one rule, and from the Supreme Court's point of view, I think it is probably easy for them -- or it's hard for them to spot these issues in the mass of petitions that they get, but if the court of appeals has to deal with it on rehearing I just think that might make it easier for the Supreme Court to spot these and give us some guidance. That may be the best we can do.

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I favor alternative two, and Judge Gaultney, who will be here shortly, favors alternative two; and Justice Hinojosa from

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Jan, what do you say?

24 Corpus Christi and Terry McCall from Eastland like

25 alternative two because it may foster less collateral

litigation, which as you all may recall was one of our concerns, that we do this in as simple a way as we can and reduce the amount of collateral complication that we can produce.

Let me just throw out one sample of where this has come up and could come up. There were differences among -- and I think whatever we do we ought to protect the notion of one law, and it doesn't matter whether it's healthy or unhealthy whether the courts of appeals disagree because they do from time to time. There are some differences; and as many of you may recall, some of these basic differences were in the area of summary judgment; and there is a movement as we learn from one another and to look to one another's precedents, whether we're required to or not, but we do look to one another, but there are differences in summary judgment procedure over time.

Waco, for example, had a different standard than we did and some other courts on what could be attached to a no evidence summary judgment motion, for example. And the litigants ought to be -- I mean, how would that work to transfer a case like that to another court where we had a different procedure? So we just need to keep those in mind, and so I favor alternative two.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. We're going

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to take a break. The court reporter needs a break, and
                Back in 10 minutes.
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  then Sarah.
                 (Recess from 10:56 a.m. to 11:09 a.m.)
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     I need to take Richard
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  with me always. Okay. Sarah. Where is Sarah? We were
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  going to her next.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          She left.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Maybe that's why she
   left. We'll come back to her. Let's see.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Judge Jennings is next.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, Bob is.
                 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON:
                                           Ready to -- are we
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  over here?
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Okay, Bob.
                 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: On this issue
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   about the transferor or transferee rule, I agree with what
   others have said that it's a rare situation.
                                                  I'm not
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   troubled by the philosophical consideration about there
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   being one law and courts of appeals differing in some ways
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   in their interpretation. I think the idea of different
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   courts of appeals evolving different interpretations of
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   what the law is is implicit in the very notion of conflict
   jurisdiction, and that's just how things operate as a
   practical matter.
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                 I'm for a -- really a bright line rule to
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the effect. I think alternative two is the closest thing to it and just says in essence that the transferee court should stand in the shoes of the transferor court and decide the case based on the transferor court's governing interpretations. Now, I realize that's something that may conflict with the judge's personal views of what the law is, but we do that all the time in regard to higher state precedent.

So the one question or observation I would have just administratively, both alternatives refer to a requirement that where there is perceived to be a difference the court state what the outcome -- whether it would have been different, and I'm just wondering whether it's envisioned that we write in essence two parallel opinions or can we just say, "Austin court, we think you might have come out differently under our cases," string cite something, and that's enough.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, there's some question about when you're predicting what another court would do, but as long as the word "following the precedent of that court" -- in other words, just if the language just predicting what the other court would do, that's a difficult thing to do, but if you say "following the precedent" --

HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: Yeah.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It kind of -- that was pointed out to me a few days ago. All right. Let's see, where is -- all right, Terry.

HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Back on our previous discussion, it appears to me in having just glanced at it, alternative one seems to strike the balance between the two competing interests of, one, you want to have predictability; but, two, you also want to recognize the fact that judges do have an oath and they have to follow their conscience in saying what the law is or interpreting the common law in accordance with the way they understand it.

One thing that seems very problematic about alternative two, or at least one version of alternative two, is this idea that you have to blindly follow the precedent of the other court. The other court, if the case were before them, could always overrule their previous holding of decisions. They're not even bound to completely and totally follow their own precedent. They can come back, see that the common law has developed, you know, look at it from another perspective in other decisions that have been rendered by other courts of appeals, and may have a good faith change of mind and say, "You know what, we were wrong. We're going to overrule that part of it."

And to bind the transferee court to that precedent which the other court itself could overrule in an en banc opinion, that seems to be a pretty big inconsistency there.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Jane.

two because I think it provides a rule of decision for the appellate courts on a matter that is capable of repetition yet evading review, because if the Texas Supreme Court takes the case they can resolve the conflict on the merits, and I think it would do so rather than necessarily annunciating the rule of decision that ought to apply, and this way we have it, had a rule of decision that can be applied on a perspective basis.

I think that Justice Gray's comment about Gary Rail vs. Tompkins is a good one. The Federal courts that sit in diversity jurisdiction in our geographical region apply the law of Texas, and I think it's a similar rule of decision case, and that one, you know, was affected through the common law; but I'm not sure that we'll ever get a common law decision on this because it just seems to me that if the conflict exists, one court of appeals' view will prevail in the Texas Supreme Court; and why would they ever need to decide whether or not the court that ultimately was wrong on the substantive merits

should or should not have applied the court from which the case was -- the court's decisions from which the case was transferred; and I like a clearcut rule of decision. Ιt 3 seems like we've been pushing towards this for a long time. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You're similar to Bob. 6 What do you have to say? 7 Sarah. 8 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Most of what I have to say I've already said in one form or another. 9 10 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, a lot of us have 11 forgotten. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The -- what we are 12 talking about is a system of justice. It is supposed to 13 be a system that is to serve the litigants, not judges, but litigants; and I completely agree with Richard's 15 16 sentiment that litigants do have settled expectations and reasonable expectations; and to the extent administrative 17 convenience, which is what the transfer system is, trumps 18 litigants' settled expectations and justice for those 19 20 litigants, in my view is wrong. And in the IBM case in which I dissented I 21 obviously thought the San Antonio law, view of the law, 22 was correct. I was on the panel -- I don't know if I wrote the opinion, but I was on the panel that said you 24 25 can have a fraud cause of action even if what you're

talking about is also a breach of contract because they are different elements. I thought the Houston court's view on that issue was incorrect. To apply the law of --3 San Antonio law as the San Antonio court viewed it 4 completely destroyed those litigants' expectations and, 5 I'm sure, bamboozled the trial court who was trying to try 6 7 the case according to what he correctly perceived to be the law annunciated by the Houston courts. The bottom line is I don't think 9 10 administrative convenience for judges' egos should trump trying to do justice for litigants. That is not what the 11 12 system is set up for, and I guess --What would you vote that 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: we do? What do you think we should -- how we should 14 15 answer the question? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think the law of 16 the transferring court should be applied. What I don't want to do is also determine -- is to have to write more 18 and say why that would be different under the law. 19 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But we're going to -all right. We'll get -- I understand. 21 22 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: So I'm not voting for alternative two. 23 MR. ORSINGER: Did she say transferee court? 24 Transferor. MR. TIPPS: 25

MR. ORSINGER: She said transferor court. 1 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Can I just ask 3 a procedural question, perhaps to Justice Hecht? If court 4 one says the law is A and court two says the law is B and 5 court two is hearing the case and court two applies the 6 law of A and it goes up to the Supreme Court; and if the Supreme Court says, yeah, court A is the law or, you know, A is the law, do they then go and reverse court B's law or do they in the body of the case, even though B case is not really brought up in front of them? 11 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 12 13 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Okay. So you 14 would mention B and say B is wrong? 15 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah, I mean, if we 16 know about B. 17 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: If you know about B. You need to know about B. You need to know that 18 19 B is different. 20 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah. The parties usually raise it in a brief that there is a conflict and then if -- but they don't always, but then to the extent we're aware of any conflict we try to overrule or disapprove all of the cases so that it would show up in 24 25 the Shepherd's and all of the cite books and people won't

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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: So then it would be important for the court to identify the case they're disagreeing with.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah. One other wrinkle here that I hadn't thought of until just listening for a minute, but I mean, this doesn't happen very much. What -- the problem we're talking about doesn't happen very much to start with, but it could happen that if the Dallas court decided an issue a particular way and then cases involving that same issue got transferred to other courts and those courts would decide it differently, but now they're constrained to follow the law as stated by the Dallas court to prevent a conflict from arising. some respects you sort of lessen the chance that the Supreme Court is going to take the case and resolve it because it looks as if all the courts are in agreement when really all they're doing is what they were told.

Now, I suppose the court would -- the court would say, "Well, we're just doing this because we have to and not because we want to, and if we had our choice we would do this" and then that would flag the conflict.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But wouldn't the lawyer in their brief in saying you have jurisdiction say there is a conflict between this decision and these courts and

this court here that actually decided the case, that there is a difference in their own opinion, prior opinion? 2 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I'm just 3 saying that it's possible that the transfer system and this rule would reduce the conflicts because court of 5 appeals who might disagree can't disagree because they've 6 got to follow the law of the transferor court. 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Bill. 8 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: To the extent that this would extend -- arguably extend the conflict jurisdiction, 10 do you think we have a problem with the statutes? 11 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 12 No. I mean, of 13 course, we've not construed the 2003 amendments, but they seem to relax --15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm just thinking if alternative two was followed it says, okay, we followed the previous decision, but we think it's no good, but we 17 followed it anyway, and then it says it's conflict. 18 that be a conflict or --19 20 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: I don't know. don't know. But, see, that would affect interlocutory 21 appeals, but it probably wouldn't affect anything else. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Jane, you were next. 24 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, with respect to cases that originate from Dallas, had they not been 25 l

transferred presumably they would have been presented to the Dallas court of appeals, so I don't see that you're in any different position in terms of enhancing the, I guess, petition for review potential or the, you know, potential for conflict jurisdiction than you would be if the case had not been transferred. And if the goal is to treat cases that are transferred similarly to cases that are not transferred then I don't think that the fact that there might be less chance for a conflict for two cases arising out of the same jurisdiction should be a reason not to have a rule of decision.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Carl, and then Carlos.

Well, I don't know if it MR. HAMILTON: 14 would make any sense or not to allow the transferee court that had not yet decided that issue to decide it in spite of the ruling of the transferor court and have it only operate when there's already a conflict on the books between the two.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Carl.

MR. LOPEZ: I'm assuming you could fix administratively somehow the idea that it begs the larger question of if Justice Bland is sitting in a case and applying Fifth District Dallas law, if there is such a thing, that you administratively fix it so that they 25 really are sitting for the Fifth District because then

I -- then you even have another question of are the lawyers going to think that the Fifth District is going to give as much deference to its case that was decided by its justices as opposed to this hybrid case that was technically still -- I guess it's stare decisis on the Fifth District for their internal purposes, but it was decided by judges that, you know, aren't really on the Fifth District Court of Appeals. There's all kinds of, you know, little details, but it seems like a lot of that stuff could be ironed out by whatever the rule says.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: As I read what everybody is saying, it appears that of the different things we could do, a majority here -- and we're going to vote -- would favor some rule that requires following or suggests following or that applies the law of the court of appeals from which the case was transferred. Is anybody -- who is in favor of that, to some degree varying? I mean alternative one, two, or some variance of either one of them.

maybe hasn't been addressed, and this really tries to blend, I think, Richard's concern and something that Terry said, because the panel -- the transferor court wouldn't even be obligated to follow its precedent, so maybe where there is a -- there is some pet history, a pet denial,

then you ought to require the transferee court to follow the transferor court, but where there is no pet history 2 the transferee court ought to be able to write on a clean 3 slate. 4 Even though there has 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: been no -- you're talking about pet, writ history or --6 7 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Buddy, it changed a decade ago. 8 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I'm still decades 9 old, too, but all right. That's -- but are you saying 10 then that's another alternative, that if there's been no 111 pet history you're not allowed -- I've not heard that 12 being a problem, that the problem is if the opinion came 13 out of that court they don't care what the Supreme Court -- you know, unless it was overruled. 15 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Yeah. Well, I mean, 16 at my core I agree with Richard's view that -- and with 17 18 Sarah's view that the law exists to serve people and we have to be concerned about their expectations, but if the 19 20 transfererer court wouldn't be obligated to follow that opinion anyway then we need to make some adjustment, and 21 the only adjustment I can think of is one where there is 22 no petition for review. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, law of the case 24 could apply. It's clearly erroneous. Judge. 25

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Could I ask the 1 judges on the bigger courts, maybe Jane and Terry. 2 is not -- yeah, Sarah is back there. Do you have a 3 practice, either formal or informal, that like the circuit does, that a panel cannot disagree with another panel? 5 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Yes. 6 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Is that just informal or part of the local rules? HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: I'm not sure if 9 it's part of our internal operating procedures, but it's 10 so well in practice that I don't know if it's written down 11 anywhere, but if a panel wants to disagree with a prior 12 decision the case must go en banc to overrule a prior 13 panel decision. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Is that true in San 15 16 Antonio, Sarah? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It's the view of 17 18 some judges. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I will modify and say 19 20 that if it's -- if the court catches it, we have a 72-hour 21 full court review and unless, you know, it's an explicit 22 and express disagreement then it definitely goes en banc. If it's been abrogated, distinguished, or other courts of appeals have held something, the Texas Supreme Court has 24 held, I mean, like you said, the express explicit 25

conflicts are rare. 1 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Steve. 3 MR. TIPPS: I was just going to say, that's also the rule of the Fourteenth Court, and I know that 4 because I remember a relatively recent opinion that 5 Justice Brister wrote when he was the chief of that court 6 in which that was a big issue. Levi, back to you, I'm VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 8 not positive I understand. So the others here can vote on 9 whether -- I mean, I'm looking to see whether under some 10 11 form you would follow the law of the case from where the case was transferred, and I haven't heard you disagree 12 with that, but you disagree to the extent that if it's one 13 of the other hadn't had a petition, a pet in it, well, 14 then it wouldn't matter. You just do -- follow the law 15 that you want to; is that correct? It goes to Amarillo. 16 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Yeah. Trust me, 17 18 I --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I mean, I'm trying to 19 20 understand what you're proposing so I can present it to the people here, because I've only heard -- the body of 21 the talk has been to some degree they would have a bright 22 line or a dim line or some line that suggested following 23 the law of the case where the case was transferred from. 24

Well, I hadn't

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON:

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factored in the question raised by Justice Hecht, and now
   I'm more troubled or conflicted because of the reality of
  the circumstances that Sarah suggests that some judges
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   feel obliged to address a prior opinion of another panel
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   and some don't. That's just reality. So I don't know how
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   to -- I haven't blended all of this calculus, so I
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   don't -- right at this very moment, Buddy, I don't know
   where I'm at.
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                 HONORABLE TOM Gray: Are you of two minds?
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's what bothered me.
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   That's what I thought --
                 MR. WATSON: Buddy, lets's just vote on what
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   you originally proposed.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah, that's what I
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   wanted to do, but I think he confused me.
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                 MR. DAWSON: I think we voted on this
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   previously.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I didn't know what I was
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   talking about and he didn't either.
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                 MR. DAWSON: Buddy, I think we voted on this
   two or three meetings ago. I think that this discussion
   came up, and I remember there was -- somebody proposed one
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   solution where you actually go down and sit in the other
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   courts.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We're going to do what
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they do in South Texas, vote more than once. I shouldn't
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  have said that. I'm sorry. Hush me up, Judge.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                     Alistair, I think we
   took kind of a straw vote to give guidance to the
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   subcommittee.
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                 MR. DAWSON: Oh, okay. I stand corrected.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I would like to speak to
   alternative one. I favor alternative one for a number of
  reasons. First of all, because I think it allows the
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  judge to --
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Elaine, wait.
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   going to be sure that we are heading down -- that is a
   form of following the law, and that's one of the things
   that --
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Well, they all follow
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   the law, but I don't read alternative one as applying the
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   law of the transferor court.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Oh, okay. Maybe I
   misread it.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's right. That's
   just a crude characterization of it.
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Did you intend that to
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   be?
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It's supposed to be, but
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   let's make --
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PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It's following the law. Following the law, but 2 PROFESSOR CARLSON: not the law of the transferor court necessarily. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Right. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Buddy, I think I'm in the distinct minority that's going to show out, so let me 6 just throw out one last comment and --7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just don't confuse me. 8 I'm not going 9 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Okay. to confuse you. I don't disagree at all with what Bill Dorsaneo said earlier. I think we're saying the same 11 12 thing; and I also agree with Justice Gray who says, I 13 mean, the reason why this isn't going to come up so -- or it's not going to be obvious is because when you're being intellectually honest and you're trying to decide a case, 15 there are different ways to get to the outcome that you think is the right outcome; and so you're not going to --17

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ignore it.

So what we're doing here is if we go the direction that I think we're heading, which is basically saying that Dallas law is different than McAllen law and you have to follow the law of Dallas if the case gets transferred to McAllen or Beaumont or wherever, all we're

if you're looking at past cases from a transferor court

you can distinguish it. There are ways that you can just

doing is putting in place a philosophy that stratifies the state and that has no practical benefit. I think it's a huge mistake to somehow codify the notion that the law in various regions of the state is different.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. So you would be for just don't address -- don't do anything, right?

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: That's right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. That's something I do well, but I don't think that's what they want us to do.

MR. SCHENKKAN: Buddy, I have missed the previous sessions, and I apologize if I'm taking a couple of minutes here to make a pitch against what seems to be the drift of the room by repeating stuff that's been carefully considered and rejected before, but I don't think either of these rules is a good idea. I think when you're talking about three or four hundred transfer cases a year and whatever frequency a problem like this arises, what we're calling on the judges in the transferee courts to do is do a good job of being the judge, which doesn't fall in the category of saying this is a case with a clear conflict between the rule in the transferor court and my situation or nothing, no relevance at all of the jurisprudence of the transferor court. Very few cases are going to fall in that category.

Almost every case that matters is going to be a gradation of the law of the transferor court and some other court and Texas Supreme Court decisions and all the other law that's relevant; and one, but only one, of the relevant factors is what were the legitimate expectations of the parties who tried the case in the trial court that -- where the case is being transferred from. That's one relevant factor, but it's only one. I trust our judges to give that appropriate consideration in facts in the appropriate case and reach a sensible decision.

I think we're making a problem worse by layering another set of rules on the intermediate courts here and not getting anything useful out of it. So I'm against either rule based on what I've heard so far.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: The problem is it might be Richard's client that only has one case in his whole lifetime.

MR. SCHENKKAN: It may be, but that's the nature of the legal system, is we're trying to do two things. We're trying to get the law right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I know.

MR. SCHENKKAN: And we're trying to get to justice in a particular case, and those are in inevitable tension to each other, and all I'm saying is that I trust the appellate judges to weigh those considerations

sensibly in an appropriate case and try to make it come out right on both counts.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Bill was the next one raised.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, I didn't do a very good job of explaining these alternatives when we started out, and they were more carefully crafted than just trying to get something down on paper. And Elaine is right. I mean, this alternative one is meant to say, "Decide the case, Eastland court of appeals, the way you think the case should be decided under Texas law," but then it goes on to say, "but don't hide the ball from the Supreme Court with respect to the existence of a precedent that the transferor court probably would have used to decide the case differently."

And that's the key to this, is -- to this alternative one is to disclose, give due regard to, and disclose in your opinion this difficulty about different views of the law in different places. That's what this is about; and then it encourages the Supreme Court to grant review to straighten this out; but it doesn't allow the court of appeals to say, "This is your problem, Supreme Court, we're not -- you know, we're not going to do anything until you straighten it out beforehand. We'd like to certify it."

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Alistair.

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PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The second --

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm sorry.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The second alternative is -- probably I should not have had the first bracket, "consider and give due regard to." The second alternative is really if you're going to follow the transferor court's decision then what you need to state is that if you've done what somebody else did, what you did before, what you think ought to be done now, then disclose that, and it's just the mirror image. It's just setting up things for the Supreme Court to understand what the problem is if they want to resolve it, and that's what these things are for.

They are certainly not designed to encourage different views of the law. They are designed to recognize that there are different views and that those different views need to be reconciled, because that's what's necessary in order to -- for there to be one coherent body of law that we can all go by, which is the system we have, not the Federal system which involves just a lot of different views about what the law is from place to place and, frankly, a lot of confusion.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Alistair, I believe you 25 had your hand up first.

MR. DAWSON: And I think the best solution would be to end transfers, but for political reasons that's probably not going to happen, and as long as you're going to have transfer of cases it seems to me that the appellate courts that are receiving cases, in particular, need guidance on which law they're supposed to apply to the extent that there is a conflict.

If the transferor court would reach a result that's different from the result under the law of the transferee court, to me I agree with Richard, it is fundamentally unfair not only to the litigants but to the trial judge to say, "Well, we understand that were this being decided by the El Paso court of appeals they would have gone one way, but because we are the X court of appeals we're going to rule a different way and we're going to reverse" when the trial judge made a decision based upon the case going up to the El Paso court of appeals.

That's unfair to everybody, and I don't see that there's any justification for allowing that to happen, and I agree it's probably a limited number of cases that that happens, but you know what, if it only happened in one case there ought to be guidance to the parties and to the judges that are impacted by it.

And, you know, as to Lamont's point that

this further stratifies, I don't think it does. extent there are differences in the law or interpretation of the law in various court of appeals throughout the 3 state, that stratification exists, and all you're really doing is telling the courts where there is differences in 5 law and there are --6 7 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I'm saying defer, though, to a court of equal jurisdiction. 8 MR. DAWSON: Yeah, but where the Supreme 9 Court has not definitively ruled on a particular issue and 10 the courts of appeals are trying to determine what they 11 believe the law under that circumstance would be there can 12 be differences in how -- and there are differences in how 13 different courts look at different things; and until those 15 issues are resolved by the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals have to deal with, you know, one court viewing it 16 one way versus another court viewing another way. 17 So I strongly advocate regardless of the 18 19 limited number of circumstances under which this may arise that the courts of appeals be given guidance, those that 20 are a receiving court or receiving cases, that they should 21 apply the law of the transferor court to the extent 22 that -- just that they should apply that law. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm going to call on 24 Jane, then Tracy, and then we're fixing to vote. 25

tell you-all what we're going to vote on, but we're going to vote.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I think that this rule is important for the more than 90 percent of the cases that do not get pet granted. I think for the cases where pet is granted -- and it seems like we're drafting a rule to set up the conflict so that the Supreme Court will take it, but the parties can't always afford to take their appeal to the Texas Supreme Court or choose not to. The Texas Supreme Court has to weigh, you know, a lot of factors in deciding whether to take a case. If they take the case, it will -- the conflict will be resolved, so that is not an issue.

The issue is for all the other cases that they don't take; and the City of Houston, a common litigant, could possibly be bound from conflicting decisions from the First Court of Appeals, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, and some other court of appeals to which their case was transferred; and it may be some issue unique to that litigant who is a common litigant and it may be an issue that has arisen three times with respect to the City of Houston as a litigant but would never arise with respect to any other litigant across the state, you know, thus maybe not making it that attractive for Supreme Court review. And then you've got not only neighbors, as

Richard was pointing out, but the same party potentially having to be -- having to follow inconsistent decisions.

And when we're talking about the stratification of the state, right now we are -- we have these various geographic regions, and I agree with -- and I think everybody agrees with Richard Orsinger that that's a good thing, and that they're -- you know, it's a good thing that we have this percolating through the system, but when we're talking about stratification within the geographic region and, you know, potentially with respect to one particular litigant or a couple of litigants if they sue each other a lot, it makes less sense.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Tracy.

with Pete that we shouldn't have to do anything. Trial judges face this issue all the time. You will have conflicting opinions -- well, in Houston you will have conflicting opinions, in my opinion, between the First and Fourteenth Court of Appeals, and you have to make up your mind. I followed a First Court of Appeals opinion when there was a Dallas court of appeals opinion that I thought was a better reasoned one, but I followed the First Court of Appeals opinion, the litigants probably expected to be affirmed by the First Court of Appeals, but they were not. We were both reversed because the First Court of Appeals

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decided to reverse their old opinion. That just happens.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. We're going to
2
  first vote whether we have any rule at all. There's been
3
  some suggestion that we just not do anything.
4
   anybody here want to have just no rule, just leave as it
5
6
   is?
 7
                 Nine for no rule at all. Who wants a rule
   of some type? I'm sorry.
 9
                 15.
                      So I think it's -- all right. Now, as
  far as a rule, it appears that we have a choice. I have
101
   not heard anybody express that we follow the law of the
11
12|
   case to where it's transferred, and if you think so, don't
13 l
   say so now.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I didn't understand it.
14
   I didn't understand it.
15
                 MR. ORSINGER: Transferee court. No one is
16
   advocating following the law of the transferee court.
17
                 I've heard that around the table.
18
                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That's exactly
19
   what alternative one says.
20
                                      No, it's not.
21
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, almost.
                                                           It
22
   can if it wants to.
23
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes.
24
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Wait. Wait.
25
                                                    But see,
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you don't know how I'm dividing up the votes yet. 1 2 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Budddy, we need to vote on transferee/transferor to make that clear. 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. 4 Because, see, when it comes to the court from which it came, I'm 5 going to say do you just suggest they follow that or do you say they must follow it, other than just the law. You know, if it's the exception under the law of the case, like clearly erroneous or something, so we're going to just go step by step until we get there and then we're going to decide the different wording. Okay. 11 Then let's have a vote. 12 All right. wants to follow the law to some degree, suggestion or 13 mandatory, of the transferee court? 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Transferee or -or? 15 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Transferee. I think that would be easier. 17 18 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: They must follow 19 the transferee court? MR. ORSINGER: No, he said "must or may." 20 He's not weighting it yet. 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Suggesting they do. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Just basically decide 23 it the way they would like to decide it. 24 25 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Throw me in there,

too. MR. ORSINGER: You've got lots of wavers 2 3 over here. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Raise your 4 hands again. 5 Who wants to follow the law of the Eight. 6 transferor court? 7 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Must or may? 8 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: We're going to get to 9 10 that. 11 MR. ORSINGER: We're not deciding that yet. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 17. All right. 12 the next question is to what degree do we follow that? 13 Now, realizing that -- I mean, there is the exception in the Briscoe case, and I realize also that Judge Gray says 16 you can distinguish. One of them was a man 50 years old and this kid was only 30, he's a minor, so you apply 17 different law to him. You can distinguish to some degree, 18 as you've all seen, if a court wants to distinguish a 19 So we're not dealing with that. We're dealing with 20 a clear conflict between the transferee court and the 21 transferor court where it's just a conflict, got to be recognized. 23 24 All right. Now, who wants to have a red -or a bright line, I believe as Bob put it, where that is 25

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the law you will follow; and the other is whether you want
   to do a modified version of that, like alternative one,
2
   where it says you should consider that; and I'm not going
   -- it's a one versus two deal, but each one may be
 4
   modified, their language. We're not bound by their
 5
 6
   language, but the concepts in one versus two. Okay.
 7
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
                                      Buddy, so that I can
   get a grip on how much you're talking about one versus
 8
   two, where would you put the Eerie doctrine? One or two?
 9
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I mean, I put --
10
   you mean, bound by -- I choose Eerie, I thought Eerie was
11
   where Federal court had to follow the law of some state.
12
   I consider Briscoe being the law where you don't have to
13
   follow anything if it's clearly erroneous, and that's just
14
   point-blank. So I don't even know how to deal with Eerie.
15
16
                                I would answer his question
                 MR. ORSINGER:
   by saying option two is closer to Eerie than option one
17
18
   is.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay.
                                            Then Richard is
19
20
   right because -- okay.
21
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But are you asking us,
22
   is it an option two, follow it even if it's clearly
   erroneous in your view?
23
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     No.
24
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Or option two, follow
25
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it unless you think it's clearly erroneous?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We can get down to that when we get to option two. I just think that if something is clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court says stupidity doesn't apply to the courts and they shouldn't be stupid. You just can't -- I mean, their own decisions, but you have to follow the Supreme Court's decisions but not their own.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But alternative two could be, you know, the hard and fast deal that you just follow it.

MR. ORSINGER: He doesn't want to get there yet. He wants to find out how many people really prefer the two approach, either very extreme or moderately. We can debate that later.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Then when we get to two
I'm going to -- we're going to divide two things. We're
going to keep dividing things until we won't know where we
are, but any rate, we're going to go somewhere.

Now, on how many of them favor -- and again, I don't mean to make light of it and certainly clarify I don't want somebody voting and not knowing what we're truly voting on. I'm trying to express, alternative one, which the language changes, or alternative two, which may be some exceptions to alternative two or it may be just

have to, you know, a deadline following it. Now, we're 2 not to two. 3 Which one would favor one or two, with two different versions of two? Does anybody not understand? 5 l Bill. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I understand. I'm 7 voting. 8 MR. ORSINGER: What are you voting? 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm voting in favor of 10 number one again, regardless of whether two is hard or 11modified. 12 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. All in favor of one as limited? Wait a minute. People are raising 13 their hand after I counted. Everybody got his hand up? Eleven, I believe. Is that correct? 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Picked up two. 16 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. And two as 18 may be varied, you know, two not just exactly. It can be a hard line or with the exceptions. Who is in favor of two? All right. Twelve. Well, we've got a hard decision. 21 MR. DUGGINS: Would the Chair have to vote? 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Do the modified two and 23 24 see who would signal for that. 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. If it's two,

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if we come down on two, where -- who is in favor of two,
2
   just you just plain follow it?
3
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        Wait, wait.
   I -- you said there is two, you just plain follow it; two,
4
  you follow it with exceptions; but I see those two things
5
   as much more hard line than two, which is consider and
   give due regard to.
7
8
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, that's a third.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        That's a third one,
 9
   and that's the one I prefer because to me that is the same
10
   -- or at least tries to articulate the same amount of
11
   deference that a panel of that own court would have to
12 l
13
   give an earlier precedential --
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      That's supposed to be
14
         I mean, that language needs to be in one.
15
16
   supposed to be in one.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Oh, in that case --
17
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You give due regard to,
18
19 but you don't necessarily follow it.
20
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: You want to change your
   vote? Come on, Jane.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, no, because one
22
   says that you would decide it that way, but then say, "But
23
   I would have -- if I had been in the court it was
24
   transferred for, I understood it would have come out a
25
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different way, " and I see two as you decide it the way the transferor court -- or you consider and give due regard to the precedential value of the opinion from the transferor 3| court, which is, I think, enough, and then if you depart, you know, you've given as much due regard for it as 5 someone or as -- presumably as a panel sitting in the 6 transferor court would have given. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I repeat, that's 8 supposed to be in one. That's supposed to be the mindset 9 10 of this one. 11 MR. TIPPS: That's not what one says. 12 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's not what one says. 13 MR. TIPPS: VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Hold on a minute. Bill, 14 you state -- and it's probably my fault. You state what 15 concept you are hoping -- trying to portray with one and the concept you're trying to portray with two. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 18 Okay. 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And if you think either one of them can have -- be divided, and we'll go back, because I certainly want everybody to understand what we're voting on because when we get there then we're going to try to draw a rule that complies with what we voted on. 23 All right. What do you say -- everybody 24 25 listen. What do you say one are you trying to -- the

concept you're trying to portray?

appeals decides the case the way it thinks the case ought to be decided under Texas law, notwithstanding the fact that the Dallas transferor court might have a different view under its precedent. But built into that by definition is a consideration of the Dallas court's view, and although the language "give due regard to" is not in there, in my way of thinking it is in there, and it ought to be put in there.

I mean, it's like you decide the case the way you think, but you don't ignore what everybody else thinks, and you particularly don't ignore the transferor court's decision, although you decide not to follow it, and if you decide not to follow it you say so; and that's one. One is, as I see, the way things ought to be done now.

Two, in my drafted form was a follow the transferor court's precedent, even though you probably wouldn't have because you would have followed your own precedent, somebody else's precedent, or just decided it differently to begin with; and really when I put "consider and give due regard to" in this alternative two I wasn't thinking straight because that really fits in with one. It doesn't fit in with two.

Two is transferor, despite what I would have 1 2 done if I wasn't bound in some sense by the transferor court's precedent, and -- but Buddy added in and Judge 3 Gaultney added in the idea that, well, for alternative two 4 we might have an exception. If it's clearly erroneous 5 then maybe -- and that's a standard. It's not just some 6 "I disagree with it." If it's clearly erroneous --HONORABLE JANE BLAND: 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- on the basis of its 9 age, other cases, other precedent, then I don't follow it. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We might not even have 11 to do that. That's the law that exists by the Supreme Court, so we might not even have to mention that. I just 13 mentioned it. So let me --HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: May I ask a 15 question? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. 17 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Professor 18 Dorsaneo, if we were to take out the language "consider 19 20 and give due regard to" --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Which one are you 21 22 talking to? 23 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Alternative two. If you were to strike that language or move it to 24 alternative one and just look at alternative two with the 25

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language, "decide the case in accordance with," does that
2
   mean that you could not have a dissent in the transferee
   court, that the transferee -- each member of that court
3
4
   would be bound by the law of the transferor court, and no
   one on the transferee court would be entitled or be able
5
   to write a dissent?
6
 7
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Not on that point.
   take it it means the whole court, not just --
8
                 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: You're stuck with
 9
10
   it. You can't even write a dissent. You're bound by it.
11
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: No.
                                           The dissent has
   still got to be able in that situation -- I mean --
                 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Well, if I'm
13
  bound --
14 l
15
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You disagree that that
16
   is what the holding is --
17
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                Right.
                                                       Right.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- of that court.
18
19
   That's where you're going to start having a dissenter
   distinguish the holding of the other court.
                 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Well, what if you
21
   agree that that is the holding, but you disagree with the
   law? You can't write a dissent.
23
                 MR. ORSINGER: You can write a concurring
24
   opinion if it really bothers you.
25
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HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: I'm sorry? 1 2 MR. ORSINGER: You can write a concurring 3 opinion if you want to explain why your vote appears --HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: But does that --4 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Wait a minute. Let's 5 one talk at a time. 6 7 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: -- give me a right to write a dissent? Isn't there an inconsistency there? 9 MR. ORSINGER: You've got the same problem 10 11 if you disagree with something that the Texas Supreme Court wrote. You can write a concurring opinion and say you don't agree with it, but it's going to control your vote. I mean, if we're going to be honest to the whole 15 system. 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Carl has been trying 17 to --Yeah, I would just like to MR. HAMILTON: 18 ask, in Bill's definition now, going back to alternative 19 one, what's the difference in that and what we now have? It seems to me like that's no rule at all because the 21 court now considers it with due consideration from other 22 23 opinions. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What we now have is some 24 25 courts that feel like they're just bound to follow the law

of -- to number two, just deadline have to follow the law of the transferor court. 2 3 MR. SCHENKKAN: Buddy, that's not the only The other difference, as I understood Bill's difference. 4 pitch for alternative one, is it's a disclosure rule. 5 6 MR. ORSINGER: Right. It says that at least on 7 MR. SCHENKKAN: motion for rehearing you must say you would have decided it the other way had you believed you were bound to follow the precedent of the transferor court. Now you've got to send up a flag. I mean, that's a difference. That's not 11 the rule right now. That may be proven practice. 12 may be responsible in terms of doing justice to the 13 individual litigants who have been prejudiced by your deciding it the way you think is right rather than on the precedent, but nobody is under that obligation. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And justices don't 17 necessarily like to do that and they don't want to be 18 19 reviewed. 20 MR. SCHENKKAN: They darn sure don't like to do it, I'm assuming, so that would make it a change even 21 in alternative one. 22 But, see, what I was 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: trying to get to is we voted that we do want a rule. So 24 l 25 to some degree we want to follow the law of the -- or

suggest or give priority or precedent or something to the law of the transferor court; and without studying alternative one and two and the details, what you put in a motion for rehearing and all that, I interpreted number one to read that you can follow whatever you think the law is but should give some precedent or consideration to the law of the transferor court. It doesn't say you have to follow it.

And I interpreted number two without the language saying some other things, as saying, no, you follow the law, not just consider it. You follow the law of the transferor court. Now, the other thing, the confusion came in maybe by something Judge Gaultney and I raised, and maybe we don't even need to talk about that, because even under the law of the case if something is clearly erroneous and courts of appeals know that, they would say, well, their own opinion, we're not bound by it if it's clearly erroneous. If it's the law of the case, we're not bound by it, so maybe we don't even need to deal with that. Maybe that could be addressed in a footnote or something like that.

So I want to get down to a vote of those two concepts because we can mix and mingle and come up with Johnny Cash's Cadillac, too, parts from 25 years; but unless we know which concept we're going to follow, it

will be difficult, if not impossible, to draw a rule that we could tinker with. So, again, let's talk about just 2 the mandatory following the law of the transferor court; and the other vote is going to be a form of number one, alternative one, which you can follow or whatever you want 5 to, just the Texas law, but gives some due consideration 6 to the law of the transferor court. 7 Now, is that clear? Who wants to make that 8 just -- and, again, I don't include this clearly 9 erroneous. That's going to be taken care of. Who wants to follow the law, just say you're bound to follow the law 11 of the transferor court? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Transferor court? 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I mean, yeah, the 14 15 transferor, the court from which the court case came where it was tried. 16 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Must follow the 17 transferor's court whether you think it's right or wrong. 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Clean up their 19 20 opinions. All right. 2.1 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 13. wants the other version, that the court is kind of free to do what they want to, but they have to give lip service or 23 consideration --24 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I can't teach this. I 25

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cannot teach this.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Strike "lip service."
2
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, that's what I
3
   call --
                 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: Professor Carlson
5
6
   just retired.
7
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What?
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Due regard to.
8
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You have to give some
9
   recognition of the consideration let's say. All right.
101
   Who would go for that?
11
                 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS:
                                            Due regard?
12
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Due regard.
13
                 MR. SCHENKKAN: Lip service.
14
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: The form of alternative
15
   one that I have tried to describe inadequately.
17
                         It looks like we favor just --
                 Eight.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I'm sorry,
18
19 l
   what was the vote?
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 8 to 14.
20
21
                HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Thank you.
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON:
                                     12?
                                          No, 14?
22
23
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     14.
                                          All right.
24 now, Bill, does that give you some guidance so you can
25 come back with a form of the mandatory, whether you want
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to put a footnote in there or something like that? 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Uh-huh. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 3 Jane. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I think it should be 4 more than a footnote, and I don't think we need to say 5 "clearly erroneous." 6 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I don't mean --HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I'm talking about a 8 tilt, you know, and I voted against the mandatory even 9 though I favor a tilt. In other words, that they ought to 10 look at it, they ought to consider it and give due regard; 11 and, you know, I think that that doesn't require -- I 12 would like the transferee's court, it seems to me, to not have to be bound any more strongly than a panel of the court to whom it came -- from where it came, and that 15 isn't an automatic rubber stamp. That's something less 16 than an automatic rubber stamp. 17 So --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just give me the 18 19 language. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, I like 20 "consider and give due regard to," but what the 21 alternative one did was say "consider and give due regard to and explain, you know, that you're not going to follow 23 it, " and I would say the tilt should be "consider and give 24 due regard and explain that you would have done it 25

differently," but I guess I'm talking about a higher form 2 of consider and give regard to than --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It's difficult to do 3 4 unless you build in a scale, and we can't do that. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, I like it 5 better than -- "consider and give due regard to" better 6 than "decide the case in accordance with" because I don't think that leaves any room for doing what a later panel of the same court might do. 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You like kind of a 10 stare decisis or full faith in credit kind of thought 11 process rather than a law of the case concept. 13 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Right. Which you follow it 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 15 unless it's clearly erroneous. I can try to do that. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Precedential value 16 concept, and precedential value is different than having 17 to determine that some earlier decision was clearly 18 Thank you, Professor Dorsaneo. 19 erroneous. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Give Bill whatever views 20 you need to help him --22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That was very helpful. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: A rule, the latter one 23 that was favored, and he will draw accordingly. 24 25 Steve.

MR. TIPPS: Well, I was just going to say I voted the other way from Jane, but I think I feel the same way. I don't have the magic words, but I think the rule should be that the transferee court should follow the precedent of the transferor court unless it genuinely believes that the transferor court would not itself follow that precedent.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I tell you what. We can have some versions of this. Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: I want to say that I'm very troubled by the loose language in alternative two about the view held and things of that nature, because it tends to walk you into overt dictum. I think the stare decisis concept is what we ought to be following, and we ought to be following and be bound by holdings because even my own court is only bound by its own holdings, not by its own dicta.

Furthermore, stare decisis can be changed for changed circumstances. If the precedent from the First Court that transferred is pre-World War II and we are considering --

HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: What is this, pick on First Court of Appeals day?

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Let's say the Third Court. The point I'm making is that stare decisis can be

changed by the same body that issued the stare decisis, depending on changed circumstances, changed constitutional provisions, changed statutes. I think we have a stare decisis concept here, not a law of the case concept, and all the exceptions or the policies for when stare decisis can be changed should apply.

So if I'm on the court of appeals and I'm looking at a 1943 decision out of the transferor court and I'm bound by it, I shouldn't be bound by it if that court itself wouldn't be bound by it. So I think we ought to latch onto the stare decisis concept, restrict ourselves to holdings and not dicta, and recognize that stare decisis changes over time.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: One of the problems is that a majority felt like -- I mean, they wanted something -- if there is a clear conflict, and we haven't written the rule, but there is a clear conflict, they wanted the parties and the trial judge and so forth to be able to say, okay, this case is going to be decided just like it would have been decided by that court. Now, I realize there are exceptions where that court could change and so forth, but we're going to go -- I mean, if you have any aid to Bill to draw a rule like that we voted on -- and, of course, there can be exceptions, stare decisis, there can be clearly erroneous. Judge Gray.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It's been a long time since I have looked at the Eerie doctrine because it doesn't come up at our court very often, but I thought the Eerie doctrine was very much like what Richard Orsinger just described and stare decisis concept that if the Federal court can define what the state court would hold under those circumstances, that is what they're supposed to hold. That includes the concept, as Richard just described, that if that precedent is now wrong for some reason it can be corrected, but the court must in its opinion explain why that previous decision is being overruled or not followed.

That's the whole concept of stare decisis, and I think it's exactly as Richard explained, that that's what we need to latch onto here, and there is some very clear Supreme Court precedent of when you can overrule it. That would address the people's concerns that you document in the opinion of what you're doing and where the difference is. If there is a conflict -- at that point you are setting up the conflict whether you want to or not just by rendering your opinion, but you are following the common law of the jurisdiction from which it came, which includes the ability to overrule your prior decision, but you've got to explain in your opinion why you're overruling that prior decision.

MR. SCHENKKAN: Buddy, I think you've correctly described what I gather the sense of the portion of the rule that I'm not in favor of having a rule on this is being based on, the need to have a transferee court follow the clear precedence of the transferor court. That is not what alternative two says; and I would be a lot less unhappy with alternative two if it did say that, if it was limited to "you're bound by the clear precedence of the transferor court." Thus, when we are often, as I believe we will far more often be, in a situation where it's not really clear what the transferor court's precedents are or how they apply to this case, that this doctrine does not apply or at least doesn't apply in its full force.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. What I was getting at is that you start out with one premise, that you're going to follow the law, not just refer to it. You're going to follow the law of the court from which the case came. All right. We voted on that. We have not voted on the details of the rule, and I gave an example. Certainly we are not saying that if the decision is clearly erroneous, I'm not getting -- I didn't get into and I don't disagree about what's been said about the Eerie doctrine, those kind of things.

That's something we have to write, but we

have to start out with our major premise before we can ever get to there, and there are going to be many different views of that, and anybody that has a view of what should be an exception and that, certainly should write to or e-mail Bill so he and his committee can when we come back come up with something that they think meets what we want, and then we can vote on and change, if we want to put Eerie in it and so forth, but I don't see how we can write the details of that rule beyond the fact that we start out with that premise and instead of the premise that we just look at it and say, well, it's just there and we should, but here are reasons.

And as Judge Gray pointed out, you can often distinguish -- I mean, you know, if you want to. You can't get around that. So if anybody has any suggestions about the exceptions or details of the rule, and I'm not even saying, just start with Bill's suggestion of the alternative two. I mean, it can be a starting point. I'm not voting on the details of that rule. So let's go. It gives him some guidance as to exactly where we're heading and what.

I wanted to get to one other thing before lunch, but I guess it's going --

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Well, you got to it, Buddy. We just didn't get to talk about it. We're to it.

1 MR. ORSINGER: He wanted to get through. 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, to sum up, we 3 voted down alternative one and we've accepted alternative 4 two, except now we're backing away from alternative one, more back toward one -- backing away from two, but moving 5 6 back toward one. 7 MR. MUNZINGER: No, I don't see that at all. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. There are some --8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I heard what you said. 9 10 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Nice try, Bill. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. All right. We're 11 going to give Bill a break for just a little bit before We're going to go to something I think maybe Levi 13 had it or I think was interested in, and that was jury 14 shuffle or doing away with it. 15 MR. ORSINGER: Buddy, how long are you 16 setting aside to discuss this? 17 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Not a long time, because 19 when we start -- I start repeating myself I'm going to tell myself to be quiet. That's already started. 21 MR. ORSINGER: We're about to start on a long discussion. 22 23 PROFESSOR CARLSON: It's going to be a heated discussion. 24 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, then you want to

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take lunch and maybe everybody won't talk too much?
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                I think we ought to take it
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  up after lunch. We're changing many, many years of
  procedure.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     All right. Let's go.
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                 (Recess from 12:16 p.m. to 1:16 p.m.)
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                VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Richard and Lamont.
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   Who's going to --
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                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Oh, I can start.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Just to remind you-all, this
   is the e-filing issue. It has nothing to do with privacy
   or public records on the internet.
                                       It has to do with
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   filing stuff with the clerk electronically and then
   serving it on other lawyers in the case electronically;
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   and we have here with us against the wall, not all of them
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   are in the room, but I'll tell you, Mike Griffith, who is
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   with Bearing Point now; or, no, who is he with now? He's
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   now with the entity that's performing the electronic
   interface between the court system and the public; and
   then we have Dianne Wilson, who is with the Fort Bend
   County -- county clerk or --
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                             I'm county clerk.
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                 MS. WILSON:
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                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Yes, and she spoke with us
   before, and they have had electronic filing now for how
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many years?

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MS. WILSON: January of '03.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. And then we have Yolanda Aleman, who is the chair of the JCIT, Judicial Committee on Information Technology, which is a subpart of Office of Court Administration; and they have been appointed by the Legislature to oversee this process; and then we have Ted Wood, who is with the Office of Court Administration; and then Mike is not here right now. They are here as resources. They have already spoken to us generally about the topic, and I hope that you-all can remember that, and what our job is today -- and we have very clear instructions from our committee chair to get this accomplished with celerity. We are to look at the proposed rules that would adapt existing rules of procedure to accommodate electronic filing.

You will remember, for example, that last time we talked about Rule 4 on computation of time and that if you serve notice on another party by e-mail you add three days to whatever time they have to respond, just like with fax; and then last time Judge Christopher and about four or five other people, all speaking simultaneously, wanted to know why are we adding three days for fax; and that's a very valid question, but Buddy says that's not a question we're going to resolve today.

We will revisit the question of whether we should add three days for fax when we have the issue of fax service on the agenda. What he wants to do in order for us to get finished and get a product out is to just confine ourselves to the way we're going to handle the e-mail part of it and then revisit otherwise the wisdom of the rule on another occasion of it.

Okay. In that context, the first change that's proposed on Rule 4 is to treat e-mails just like faxes and that if you serve notice of a motion or a discovery request or whatever by e-mail, then just like fax you add three days to the other side's time to react or three days before they can set the hearing. Whatever the timetable is, if it's e-mail add three days. Yeah.

MR. DAWSON: And I apologize. I wasn't here last time so I don't know if this was covered, but it seems nonsensical to me that if I hand-deliver something to someone, give it to a delivery agent or somebody is going to walk it across town, they don't get the extra three days, but if I e-mail it to them and they get it long before the hand-delivery will show up then they do get three days. That's nonsensical to me, and I don't know why you would do that. I mean, frankly, I think you ought to eliminate the three-day extra for faxes as well.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. See, that's exactly

what we're not permitted to talk about today.

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MR. DAWSON: Take it one step at a time and say that e-mail is deemed on the day of delivery the same as it would be hand-delivered.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That is something that can be addressed, and this will be taken back if that's the way it is, but right now we're trying to make it where the rules that apply you just can e-mail, electronic notice and so forth, and then Richard or his committee can look and see and people can make notes of the things we need to change, the deadlines. The main thing what we wanted to do is we want e-filing. It's not listed in there right now.

Rule 9.5 calls for electronic service by fax but not e-mail. Lisa tells me none of them are set up to receive it anyway, but we're trying to make this where -- now, as to rewriting these rules, how many days and those kind of things, that may need to be readdressed, but we addressed them at one time with regard to fax, and we've gone through all that, and we're trying to make this a part of the rule, and what needs to be changed we'll just have to change. You have a valid point. I don't disagree. All right, Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So then the question

becomes what this subcommittee, which is external to our -- actually, it's an external committee has proposed, is that for the time being let's just treat e-mails like That's kind of consistent throughout this. Since faxes. we're adding three days for faxes, without regard to how legitimate that is, let's go ahead and add the same three days to faxes because e-mails are probably analogous to faxes as opposed to hand-delivery. I pointed this out earlier. MR. DUGGINS:

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10 There is one difference, though. If you get an e-mail to your computer and your computer is personal and you don't let others have access to it and you're out, your secretary is not going to see it; whereas, a fax comes into your office, your office gets it; and I think that's a real problem; and in my own situation, my computer is not accessible by others, so I may get an e-mail notice of a hearing, but if I'm not in there to open it nobody else is going to see it, so I don't think it is analogous.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But, I mean, somebody on this committee, I faxed them something and then I had to e-mail them. They said the faxes get lost.

MR. ORSINGER: Ralph, are you saying that you should have more than three days for e-mail or are you just against e-mail service at all?

> MR. DUGGINS: I'm not against it. I'm just

saying I don't think it's equivalent to a hand-delivery, and it's not exactly the same as fax because a fax is a physical document in the office that if you have anybody 3 besides yourself, a secretary, they're going to see it, and an e-mail may come just to my computer. 5 6 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. What do you want to do about Rule 4? Do you want to add more than three days for service by e-mail? Do you want to have three days like this recommendation is, or do you have some other 10 approach? No, I'm okay with the three 11 MR. DUGGINS: I'm just giving a reaction to your statement that 12 days. 13 they're equivalent. 14 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. 15 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But for now we're kind of treating them that way, and it may be wrong. We've got 16 to treat it like something. 17 I'm okay with that. 18 MR. DUGGINS: MR. ORSINGER: It's not e-mail? What do you 19 20 mean it's not e-mail? 21 MS. HOBBS: I think even e-service is -- I mean, it comes through as an e-mail to you, but it's not 23 like somebody is just hitting "send" on an e-mail. They're sending it to Texas Online. Texas Online is 24 25 sending it to the clerk and sending it your address, any

e-mail address you want to give them. You can give them your secretary's e-mail address if you want to, but it's 2 not like -- someone is not just attaching a document like we attach documents to send to this committee. Is that correct? 5 MS. WILSON: Yes. 6 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But it gets there the 8 same way, doesn't it? 9 MR. ORSINGER: But doesn't it come -- it comes into your e-mail software as an e-mail. You could give them -- you could 11 MS. HOBBS: make up an e-mail address for where you get it, so it's 13 service-at-whatever-your-law-firm-is dot com. Okay. That's another rule. 14 MR. ORSINGER: 15 Can we just defer the where we're going to serve to later and just confine ourselves right now to whether we want to have an additional three days added onto your response 17 time if service is by electronic transmission instead of 18 by fax, mail, or hand-delivery? 19 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I thought we -- did 20 we not vote about that, vote on that before? I mean, I --21 I think what happened is we 22 MR. ORSINGER: ended up in a big debate about whether we ought to have three days added for fax and we didn't get a vote on it. I remember that we 25 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON:

1 had a big discussion about it, and then as I recall the record -- and I am, frankly, in favor of treating it like a hand-delivery. I have the same issues of did you get the delivery whether it's a hand-delivery or whether it's sent electronically, and there are ways that you can handle both of those situations, but I thought that the 7 last time we talked about it Nina Cortell made an argument about a quality of life issue or something that seemed to 9 carry the day. 10 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Lamont, I am informed 11 that we did vote on it and approve it. So --12 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I think you're right. Elaine. 13 14 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Is this optional with counsel or is now counsel under an obligation? 15 16 MR. ORSINGER: If you look to Rule 21a, and 17 we're not ready to get there, but just to answer Elaine's question, "Service by electronic transmission to the 18 recipient's e-mail address may only be effected where the recipient has agreed to receive electronic service or 21 where the court has ordered the parties to electronically serve documents." So it's consensual. 22 23 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Are we supposed to have 24 this? 25 MR. ORSINGER: Yes.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Carlos. 1 2 MR. LOPEZ: Well, that answers my question to some extent. 3 4 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah, me, too. 5 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Then, all right, let's move on to Rule 11. Now, does anyone have a record that 6 7 we voted on Rule 11 already and approved it? HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We did not. 8 We did not. 9 10 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Now, Rule 11, this 11 started another huge debate that ate up an hour of time, which is the proposal is to take the current Rule 11 about written agreements incident to litigation have to be in 13 writing and signed and filed, and then this committee, not mine, but this other one, has said -- added on the 15 following sentence: "A written agreement between 16 attorneys or parties may be electronically filed only as a 17 scanned image." And, remember, we had a large discussion 18 about whether an exchange of e-mails can constitute a Rule 19 11, can you electronically sign something, or does it have 20 to be, as Pete Schenkkan called it, a wet signature with ink on paper, and we did vote on that. Okay. 23 was the vote? 24 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No. 25 Well, I'm looking at the MS. SENNEFF:

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transcript from January 7th, page 12,368, and Chip says,
   "For those of you who just returned, we're going to take a
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   vote on adding a sentence to Rule 11 that says, 'A written
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   agreement between attorneys or parties may be
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   electronically filed only as a scanned image of the
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   agreement.' So the words 'of the agreement' are being
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   added to the subcommittee's proposal. So everybody that
   is in favor of adding that language to Rule 11 raise your
   hand." And then "That fails by a vote of 9 to 13. 9 in
   favor, 13 against."
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                 MR. DUGGINS: Move to reconsider.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Did you say 1226?
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                 MS. SENNEFF:
                               12,368.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So was the rule voted
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   down or was the amendment voted down?
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                           Richard, the amendment was voted
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                 MR. WOOD:
          Okay. And it was sort of left for -- Rule 11 was
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   down.
   still sort of open for discussion, but you never got back
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   to it, and that's where the discussion ended.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Okay. Let's assume
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   that that was a nonbinding -- or I quess none of them are
   binding, but an inconclusive vote. So now the proposition
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   before us today is --
                 MS. SWEENEY: Wait.
                                      I don't want to assume
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          I'm sorry. I mean, point of order. Are we just
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   that.
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going to revote because we're here again? 2 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I think, Richard, we 3 didn't vote on that sentence. There was a suggested 4 amendment to that sentence that added the language "of the agreement" to the end of the sentence. 5 6 MS. SWEENEY: Okay. If that's what you 7 meant, Richard, then I withdraw my whine. 8 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. What I'm saying now is the proposal today, unless somebody else has another 9 objection to it, is whether we're going to add to Rule 11, 10 "A written agreement between attorneys or parties may be 11 electronically filed only as a scanned image." Lamont. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I think that the term 13 "a scanned image" is ambiguous, and in the Western District the courts have just approved an electronic filing rule which calls for filings to be done in PDF format, which is a lot more precise than just "as a 17 18 scanned image, " and so I would suggest that we consider "PDF format" as opposed to "a scanned image." 19 20 MR. ORSINGER: But you can scan in different formats. 21 That's right, but it 22 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: has to be filed in PDF, would be my suggestion as opposed 23 to as a JPEG or --24 25 MR. ORSINGER: Well, let me ask a technical

question. If you're trying to file something through our interface and it's an attachment of a document that's been scanned, does it get converted to some standardized scan, 3 and what is that? What kind of file is that? 4 5 MR. GRIFFITH: It does. It gets converted 6 to PDF. All documents that are attached get converted to 7 PDF. 8 MR. ORSINGER: It doesn't matter whether they're a PDF or a TIF or a JPEG or a JIF or a word 9 processing document, they all -- all the attachments get converted to PDF. 11 12 MR. GRIFFITH: That's right. So we don't need to 13 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. standardize at our level. They can standardize at their 15 level. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Well, but the issue 16 here was the signature issue, and I think the idea was can 17 you count on a signature being filed if something is 18 merely scanned, but I think it's ambiguous the way it's 19 20 written in the proposal, that the agreement be 21 electronically filed as a scanned image. 22 MR. ORSINGER: Well, I guess what you're 23 saying is, does signed mean signed with a pen on paper that you then scan or can you, quote, electronically sign 24 25 something in some way that last time we decided we

couldn't agree on what electronic signature was in the context of exchanged e-mails.

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That's where we ended it. MR. LOPEZ:

MR. ORSINGER: Right. And so are you raising the question of whether we would continue the requirement of signed, and if so, can you electronically sign something? Is that what you're saying?

Well, and I think MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: 9 that's the issue. I'm not really saying anything, but I 10 think that this sentence doesn't answer the question that it's trying to solve, which is what is a signed agreement or what is the manifestation of a signed agreement.

MR. ORSINGER: Let's go to our technical resources here. What does signed mean in this context? Let's assume we vote in favor of this. How do you sign it or can you sign it electronically, and what does that mean?

You could have your signature MS. WILSON: electronically in your computer where it can just attach to a document without a pen and ink. That is correct. The majority of people don't do that. What they do is actually sign with pen and then they scan it through a scanner and then it's passed to Texas Online. don't want is to identify like PDF, because at some point technology is going to change and it could be XYZ and then we would have to come back and say, well, PDF is no longer -- that's old technology, now it's something else, and so Texas Online would be responsible for maintaining the most accurate language, whatever that is at the time, and could change it internally to be of the Texas Online rules rather than the rules committee.

MR. ORSINGER: Can I ask this? Are you envisioning that in any event there will be something that looks like a piece of paper with at least two signatures on it?

MS. WILSON: The way the JCIT committee is recommending to you is we went the least change of current procedure in hopes that as technology evolves you could then go in and as the discussion in January was more electronic, digital signaturing and everything. Right now a majority of people are signing with a pen and scanning it and sending it to us. That's what 99.99 percent are. At some point that evolution will change, and that's where this committee or a committee will then start looking at changing that scanned image to digital signaturing and whatever other technology comes along.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, in your view does this amendment to Rule 11 permit digital signatures, or will that require additional rule change to permit digital signatures?

Let me address that, if I could. 1 MR. WOOD: The word "sign" is already in Rule 11; and so I think that 2 3 whatever is going to constitute a signature between parties is going to be valid; and as Dianne said, that's 5 generally going to be a wet signature, but it doesn't have It could just be someone's signification of 6 assenting to the agreement. And, again, we're talking about a word that's already in the rule, what does sign We didn't attempt to redefine that. 9 mean. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But the rule as it 10 11 stands now says nothing about electronic. It just says it 12 must be in writing and signed. 13 MR. WOOD: Right. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: If we want to make this 14 rule apply so that it meets the requirements of this rule 15 and we can do it electronically, what have we got to say? 16 17 Digitally or otherwise. MR. LOPEZ: VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. I mean, don't sit 18 19 Answer. What do we have to say, because I'm 20 wanting to hear the answer? Well, if you go to UETA, which 21 MR. WOOD: has been -- it's a uniform rule that's been adopted by the Texas Legislature, it's in the Business & Commerce Code, 23 it defines electronic signature; and it defines it very 24 broadly to include any kind of a symbol or even any kind 25 l

of a process that shows assent to an agreement.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So you're saying that if we want to make this apply electronic, all we've got to do is say "may be transferred electronically" or something because there's nothing in here that says "electronically" unless you get down "agreement or writing between" or "may be electronically filed."

MR. ORSINGER: But, Buddy, they don't want to because the concept of what constitutes a signature -- the concept of what constitutes a signature will evolve over time. They don't want to define signature to mean X. They want it to be kind of open. For most of us it's going to be pen on paper, but maybe for two people it might be electronic signatures.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But I thought he said the Legislature had defined it.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, they defined it for some purposes, but that definition of the Legislature isn't binding on Rule 11, is it?

MS. WILSON: No. UETA, actually when the state adopted that it said each agency then can set up what they're willing to accept; and so we didn't want to go so far as to assume that you were going to open that up to everything at the beginning; and so in our request to get e-filing going in the state of Texas, we left that --

what we think is clear, but we didn't want to open it all the way up yet because that could be something you-all could decide at a later date as to what does sign mean.

Right now it can be anything the parties agree to.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Ralph.

MR. DUGGINS: I was just going to bring that issue up about UETA because at the January meeting we talked about this and what a can of worms this was going to open if we didn't define sign, and I think we can live with that language, or I can live with that language, but I do think at some point we're going to have to define what sign or signature means because of the confusion that that creates and what is and isn't a signature.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Tracy.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, in the draft that we have in Rule 21 they define a signature in the case of a pleading, plea, motion, or application that is electronically filed; and they define it as the use of a confidential and unique identifier; and in my opinion, a Rule 11 agreement ought to be able to be signed in the same manner as a pleading, plea, motion, or application.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So in other words -HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And to the
extent we need to put that language into Rule 11, I don't

25 know.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, wouldn't it be
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   there if we just stopped and said "may be electronically
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   filed"?
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                 MR. LOPEZ: No, because the filing doesn't
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   necessarily --
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I know, but -- all
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   I'm looking for is language to cure it so we can get to
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   the next thing.
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON:
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                                         I'm not sure you need
   this sentence at all.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY:
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                                       Thank you.
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   somebody tell me what the sentence adds to Rule 11?
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, the way it reads,
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   it might lead some people to believe that agreements have
   to be the old way and you can't have an electronic
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               It doesn't tell me in there you can, and so
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   agreement.
   that's what I'm looking at.
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: If you start trying to
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   go to every rule, though, and add where you can do
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   something electronically, if you miss one, by implication
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   you've got a problem and --
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                                      But that's generally
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
   handled by a broad rule that says that, but when it comes
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   down to something specific, we want agreements between
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   attorneys to be sure it's not something that is casual.
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mean, it's signed in writing and agreed to. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: That's not what that 2 added sentence says. 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. The added sentence 4 5 says "a scanned image." I don't disagree. All right, 6 Tracy. 7 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, again, if you look at the draft, looking ahead you will see the exact same language that I just read to you from 21 put 10 into 21a, put into 57; and, you know, frankly, I think we ought to instead of trying to change every single one of 11 12 these rules, is to have just a separate rule on electronic 13 filing and signature. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I agree with that. 14 That's my point, too. 15 MR. DUGGINS: HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And then 16 whenever it says in this rule, you know, "signed and 17 filed" it means this. 18 19 MR. LOPEZ: Yes. Second. 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Paula. 21 MS. SWEENEY: We're talking about two One is what's a signature, but the other is why are we carving out this special distinction for Rule 11 that these have to be -- these can only be scanned, and I 24 l would like to focus on that for a minute. What is the 25

worry with Rule 11 that makes it so much more important than any other pleading? Because, I mean, there are many other outcome dispositive pleadings that could be tampered with, if that's what we're worried about.

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MR. WOOD: Let me tell you, what we were thinking of here was a situation where you have a pleading and attached to that might be a Rule 11 agreement, and we didn't want to have a Rule 11 agreement with just blanks for the signatures because there is two required, okay, two parties and one person filing the document. we have this language that has been referenced here that you see repeatedly about "a unique and confidential identifier," that's when a document is filed with the e-filing system; and a Rule 11 agreement or something like that that calls for signatures besides the filer's signature, we anticipated, like Dianne said, 99 percent of the time be wet signatures on paper; and we anticipated taking a picture of that or scanning an image, if you will, and attaching it to the filing; and that's why we carved out a different rule for Rule 11 agreements and also for pleadings that have to be verified; and that's the existing rule. And so we said, well, you need something extra than just putting your confidential identifier on it. That's the thinking behind it, be it right or wrong.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: The same would apply to an agreed order where you've got six parties that have to sign the agreed order, and a lot of times what happens is you end up with six signature pages, all six of which have five blanks and one signature in the designated blank, and they all get stapled on there, and you have an agreement; but it seems to me that we're -- I think we're assuming fraud here or the risk of fraud where there is no such risk; and, I mean, if somebody pretends to sign my name to a Rule 11, I'm not worried about that. I'm not worried about someone pretending to forge other lawyers' names. Why this extra sort of complicated hurdle? And I still am not hearing why.

MS. WILSON: We didn't anticipate fraud.

What we were trying to think of was if you had two parties and they are in different locations and they could sign it, fax it to the other, sign it, and then scan that image into and then transmit it to the clerk. We were just trying to figure out and we didn't want to assume that you would then get into electronic signaturing or no signature on Rule 11 because it was done electronically.

We were still in one hand not jumping that leap yet and thinking more in a paper world, getting that paper; but you're right, there are agreements to where you

have five blanks and one signature and then all the way That could be done, and I like the idea personally of just identifying a signature as something and not put it in every rule. That would work, too. That may be the easier way to go. We were just trying to keep it in a paper world right now because the majority of people still understand that, and a lot of people are still a little not quite sure about the electronic filing. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let me stop you just a Lisa has something to say she's been trying to minute.

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say and I haven't recognized her.

MS. HOBBS: Paula, if you and I entered into a Rule 11 agreement and I was going to send it to the court, my signature would be a digital signature with my password when I e-filed it to the court, and so the court would see that my signature was on that, but it would never show up with your signature because unless you put it on a piece of paper and sign it and then scan it then when it gets to the clerk's office it really just has Lisa Hobbs' signature on it and never gets Paula Sweeney's signature on it.

Well, there should be a way MS. SWEENEY: electronically to accomplish that so that if I'm sitting in my office and you're sitting in yours and Bobby is sitting in his, if we're doing this electronically why do

we have to revert to paper because we want to file it, and it seems that we ought to be able to he stamps his electronic signature in his office and I do mine and you 3 do yours and we're not going through the arcane step of scanning. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Lamont. 6 7 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: The notion of an electronic signature isn't what we think about. I mean, it's not like you send an e-mail and you punch a button and now it's got your signature on it. We talked about this last time that just an exchange of e-mails has the 11 digital signature of each party, whether there is actually 12 13 something handwritten on it or not, according to the EU --14 MS. WILSON: UETA. 15 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I mean, so there really is no reason to insist upon -- and that's something we have no control over. I mean, it's a recognized 17 The law recognizes it as a signature, so why 18 signature. shouldn't it bind the lawyer whether it's an e-mail 19 20 exchange or --I would like to see --21 MS. SWEENEY: 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just a minute. Sarah is 23 trying to speak. Sarah. 24 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I agree with you. 25 I think that should at least be an option. I just got an

e-mail at alfred@courts.state.tx.us, which anybody that's in the court system and has an e-mail address knows that was not a legitimate Texas judicial system employee's e-mail address. What are you going to do, Lamont, when somebody goes into your e-mail address and enters you into an agreement that you didn't intend to enter?

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: But the same thing I would do if someone signed my name to a piece of paper. I mean, if they're going -- if someone is going to try and defraud me by forging my signature then I've got other remedies, but the law -- UETA says that if I enter my computer with my password, password protected, I get on my system. I send you an e-mail and you get it through your system. You respond to it after you've entered your password to get on. We have a signed document just as if both signed a piece of paper. It's the same legal effect. That doesn't stop someone from breaking into your computer and sending an e-mail, but --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But that's what I'm saying. This guy didn't break into the Texas judicial system's server, I feel quite sure, but I remember Bill Pataka at Fulbright, he -- and I was just asking David how you do this because I don't know, but Pataka used to send e-mails with not his e-mail address but somebody else's e-mail address, like Gibson Gates, and I'm just -- so it's

not that they would have to break into your computer. 2 Somebody can ghost your e-mail address, and I don't know how technically it happens. These guys do, but --3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Carl. 4 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I'm just asking what you're going to do. 6 7 MR. HAMILTON: May I ask a question about if someone files a document using this confidential unique identifier for a signature, I quess, and I go to the 9 courthouse and I want to look at that document and see who 10 signed it, what do I see? 11 12 MS. WILSON: Right now, since we have been e-filing since January of '03, all the documents we have 13 received, if it has a signature it's a wet signature where they scanned it in. The documents that do not require the 15 signature or the judges have agreed the person can just 16 put their Bar number and just put an S where their 17 signature might have been, and they are accepting that. 18 l The others, we've not received an electronic 19 coded signaturing yet. That technology is coming and is here now, but we've not received that document, so I can't 21 answer that for you. I don't know of a county yet that 22 has received the electronic type signaturing that 23 technology allows. 24 25 MR. WOOD: Let me just ask for clarification

on your question. Were you talking about just a regularly filed document electronically by this unique and 2 confidential identifier? 3 MR. HAMILTON: Right. 5 Okay. Dianne, did you understand MR. WOOD: the question there? Could you answer it that way? 6 mean, Dianne has received many e-filed documents that have no wet signatures on them at all, and so I think what the 8 question is, is if he came down to the courthouse to see that document, what would he see in the signature blank? 10 11 Anything? Nothing. You would not -- but 12 MS. WILSON: it would be coming through Texas Online, which has 13 validated that that is an authorized filer through the 14 system, and so that information the courts can look at to 15 know that that is the person who sent it or they've given 16 the authority of someone to send it; but the majority of 17 18 our documents they have signed it and they have electronically scanned it into a scanner, which then turns 20 it into whatever format, and then Texas Online is changing that into a PDF file. 21 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: As a practical matter,

though, say Richard and I enter into an agreement, Rule

He ultimately is going to get a copy and he's going to

11, and we don't sign. I've got -- I've got to serve him.

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look at that and say, "Well, he is crazy. I didn't agree to that." And he's going to call the court and call me and say, "We don't have an agreement," and it's going to be stricken, I mean, you know, because we don't have an agreement. I mean, that's the only protection that I see. I mean, is that -- yes.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, it seems to me like the security issues and the protection issues are issues that are better dealt with by the technology people than by our rules, because we're not familiar enough with the technology and how it works; and to require a wet signature, given the rapid advancement of this technology, seems to me that, you know, our rule will become anachronistic; and if the parties -- if Paula and I enter into a Rule 11 agreement and in that agreement we say, you know, "It will be valid when both of us electronically file a copy of it," you know, why can't that work? I'm not saying that that's the way it has to be done, but I don't think our rules should foreclose it either.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, Richard, first thing I wrote Richard was that, you know, e-filing is here, and the first question I have is whether it will mechanically and electronically and otherwise work the way we have it written, and I can't answer that question. And so what we've got to do is get our language consistent

with what the technology is, and not knowing what the technology is, I have extreme difficulty.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, it seems to me if we define "signed" somewhere as an electronic signature, that cures our problem with respect to Rule 11, and we'll work out the mechanics as we go along on it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. You suggested something earlier that maybe we ought to have one general rule about electronic signing or something like that so that we don't just deal with it on each rule and then overlook one. Was that your suggestion?

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right.

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Well, I thought you pointed out, and I think our guests have pointed out, that there are rules that say what constitutes a signature when you're filing something through Texas Online. What this rule is designed to govern is what constitutes a signature -- or what it's designed to do is require that there be a signature not when something is filed with Texas Online but when something is exchanged between lawyers.

I don't think that we have to -- for purposes of passing this rule I don't think we have to do anything to Rule 11. I mean, Rule 11 already says it has to be signed, and then the question about what is a signature is answered either in the UETA or you actually

see a signed instrument, and if it comes up, you resolve If someone says, "It's not my signature," but Rule 11 agreement already says that an agreement between 3 4 lawyers has to be signed. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You would leave it like 5 it is? 6 7 Leave it like it is. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: 8 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. And are people going to think, well, I can't have a Rule 11 agreement electronically? How are they going to know they can do that? 11 I don't know if MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: 12 they're going to think that or not, but all of this 13 14 electronic signature stuff is new. I mean, I wouldn't necessarily think that, but someone who has never used 15 e-mail before might think that they can't have a, you 16 know, signature without a wet signature, but I don't think 17 we have to address that here. 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. So you move 19 20 that we leave Rule 11 as-is without the underlying 21 language? 22 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: And, yeah, just one other point there. I think Paula has made this point before, and it may be a little off base, but I don't know. 24 l I mean, lawyers don't need all this protection. 25

lawyers can protect themselves. It's kind of silly that we have to have a rule that says what's an agreement between lawyers and how do you evidence that agreement 3 when we don't have that between private parties, so the 4 interests that we're trying to protect with Rule 11, I 5 think we're spending, you know, too much time talking about what is an electronic signature and what is not. All it is is a manifestation of agreements between lawyers. 9 10 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I guess it doesn't --Who all is in favor of taking out the 11 all right. underlying, the written agreement -- the language underlined and added to Rule 11 and leaving Rule 11 just 13 like it is? 14 15 Man, we've made it through Rule 11. 16 MR. ORSINGER: The record needs to reflect 17 it was basically unanimous. Was there anyone opposed to that? 18 19 (No response.) 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman? 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah. 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I really like the idea 23 of having one rule, if we could have one, that explains 24 l this information in a way that we can understand it. When 25| we had that sentence we had a scanned image of something

that I don't know what it was a scanned image of.

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We voted down "of the agreement," and that really is a puzzling bit of information with respect to this record, and then we ask the question of -- or Carl asked the question of, well, what is this thing going to look like, unique identifier when electronically filed; and I thought I heard the answer be something like "We don't know what that is," and that's -- and if I'm wrong, I apologize, but that's -- I need and the lawyers who are reading these rules need to be able to understand what they mean; and it's not sufficient that it will work for you people. We need to know what they mean and how we can comply with them, not that this makes electronic filing as it is now or as it may become something that can be accomplished.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Are you saying that we should have a rule that says "Requirements for electronic filing. Unless otherwise specifically addressed and so stated are prohibited herein, this shall apply. Signature is this, that," and so we just have an electronic filing rule that -- not make it inconsistent with what's there. Don't make it conflict with something else we've done that is specific but is not covered through that. All right. What committee wants to take that on?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, the problem is the subdivisions to that rule is going to be as lengthy as the rules we're amending, because we're changing -- we're governing judicial signatures, we're governing lawyer signatures on agreements, lawyer signatures on pleadings, what kind of oath, and what kind of things have to be done in the conventional wet signature way if they have to be under oath and stuff.

By the time we finish with that rule, Bill, it's not going to be any shorter than this probably, and why does that make it easier to understand? What that means is you have got to now go to the electronic filing rule and find the subdivision of that that relates to some other rule and figure out what effect that subdivision has on the general statement of the rule. Why isn't it easier to put the electronic application in the rule that deals with the underlying requirement? You see what I'm saying?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I understand what you're saying. I don't know whether that's the way it will turn out or not.

MR. ORSINGER: We can look -- as we go through here you'll see it will be very difficult to write one rule for all of this.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There seems to be considerable repetition in it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We're fixing to go through them. Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: I think that we ought to address the situation of what constitutes a signature in the electronic world, because I think just taking the Rule 11 as an example, if we all know and we're all familiar with Rule 11 agreements, if somebody sends me an e-mail that says "This constitutes our agreement" and I write back "agreed," is that an enforceable Rule 11 agreement? I would think it would be, but there may be some people that would interpret the rules to say, no, it has to be signed and since it's not signed it's not enforceable; and to clarify that ambiguity I would recommend that whatever committee -- and maybe it can all be done in one rule.

I do agree with Judge Christopher we ought to have one rule on electronic service, what constitutes electronic service, as opposed to putting it in all the various rules that it applies to, but we ought to include it somewhere in the rules the circumstances under which an electronic signature constitutes a signature under the rules.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Or maybe in Rule 11 just as long as electronically, you know, it shows that, you know, one after the other you agreed and it comes from you. I mean, why should it be in writing if you agree to

The thing that gave rise to -it? 2 Well -- go ahead. MR. DAWSON: I'm sorry, 3 Buddy. 4 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: -- Rule 11 was lawyers would agree to things in the courtroom or something, 5 "Judge, he agreed" -- "I didn't agree to that." Lawyers 6 in the heat of battle, so they say it's either on the record or sign it, so the courts didn't want to referee fights when one lawyer calls another one a liar and the other one says, "No, you're the liar," but maybe it could 10 be handled that way. 11 12 MR. LOPEZ: One suggestion that is a little bit off the course we're on is that, I mean, we're 13 marrying ourselves to the word "signed" and we're marrying ourselves to all the problems that we have and may have in 15 defining it or in dealing with the fact that the 16 17 definition may change, and we may just have to put it -start with a type that says "it's enforceable if." And we 18 don't have to marry -- we don't have to use the word 19 "signed" if there's some better, more modern way that's 20 going to be more flexible eventually to define the assent, which is really what it's about. Signed is just a vehicle 22 for the expression of the assent. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That was before we had 24 25 (e). Sarah.

reading about digital signatures because I've been curious what exactly is a digital signature, and I'm reading about asymmetric with the system and hash functions and hash values, and they're getting through to me that a digital signature is not a signature as any of us think of a signature. It is far more secure than Lamont sending me an e-mail saying "agreed"; and frankly, if that's going to be the law, I'm going to state on the record right now that just because you get an e-mail with my e-mail address on it saying "agreed" doesn't mean I've agreed to it; and we need to know what we're talking about before we go down this road, I think, and --

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What should we do? I mean, I don't mean --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: What these guys tell us to do. No, I'm not willing to say that a Rule 11 agreement is forum when somebody sends an e-mail saying "Here is our agreement" and they get back an e-mail from their intended recipient apparently saying "agreed." I am not willing to say that.

I am willing to say that if it's digitally signed, has hash functions in the right place, then that's a Rule 11 agreement; and I completely agree with Paula, and maybe we speak from our own individual situations, but

I think the fact that there are two people in this room that have very similar individual situations is indicative of where the world is going. We should not tie people to conventional work situations by our rules; and if they are able to put a digital signature on a document in the Yukon and the Caribbean at the same time and they both intend to be bound, our rules shouldn't prevent that. It should at least be an option.

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But these amendments are using signature and signed as though we were back in Shakespeare's time when I don't think -- we're just not living in that world So don't ask me what we should do, other than anymore. generally speaking.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, would you say that the parties have to file with the clerk, each party, some unique identifying thing that couldn't be copied so that when you see that that's the same as your signature, or in each case?

I'm finding places HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: where I could download digital signature software for free, and, you know, I don't see why we don't just say "digital signature as defined by the American Bar Association in Introduction to Digital Signature Guidelines tutorial." I mean, these things have definite 25 meanings, and apparently digital signature technology has

been around for a decade, and it's basically completely secure, so let's not screw around with "signed" as 2 Shakespeare used the term. Let's use 2005 terminology and 3 say "a digital signature." 4 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, in other words, what you would say, we just voted on it so we're not going 6 back to it, so just for purposes of illustration, that "An agreement between attorneys may be electronically filed by digital" -- or, you know, "and parties signed by digital signature"? 10 Uh-huh. I wouldn't 11 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: require an attorney to have a scanner in order to file a Rule 11 agreement, if they've got digital signature 13 software. 14 15 MR. ORSINGER: We just voted unanimously not to require that. 16 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. And we're not going back to it, but, I mean, there was the suggestion that we 18 have some general rules or something; and as I read what 20 Sarah is saying, where anything required signature it may be done electronically by digital signature. Is that kind 21 22 of what -- under as a general rule? All right, Richard. 23 MR. MUNZINGER: I think the basic question 24 is Buddy sends me an e-mail, "Dear Richard, do you agree 25 to allow my witness Smith to testify by affidavit?"

That's an e-mail. And I send an e-mail back to Buddy, 1 "Dear Buddy, yes, of course." Is that a Rule 11 2 agreement? The e-mail that Buddy sends me has Buddy Low's 3 name, address, telephone number and that, but just the 4 5 standard thing. No sexy, fancy secret code or anything else, just Buddy Low. It's an e-mail, and mine back to 6 7 Buddy is identical. 8 Question, is that a written agreement under Rule 11? Question, has the agreement been signed? 9 That's 10 the basic question here, what constitutes an electronic signature. And I think that's what Sarah is saying as 11 12 I don't know enough about computers to have one with me, but this digital signature that these people are 13 14 talking about it seems to me is one that is some kind of 15 secret code registered with Texas Online, verified by 16 Texas Online, and therefore considered valid by a 17 recipient clerk. I may be wrong in that. 18 The discussion of UETA is, is my sending an e-mail a signature? And I think the answer may be "yes," 19 20 but I don't know that for sure, and I'm not sure anybody 21 in the room knows that for sure. So when we talk about 22 signature, Sarah's point is what is it -- I think this is 23 her point. What is a signature? 24 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Would it be helpful 25 to -- of course, I am sort of drifting this way, but is it helpful to know from the committee whether we should just try to bring the rules in line or make them consistent with what the Legislature has already defined as an electronic signature for everybody else if they want to, or do we feel like there may be some instances where we need to do something different?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Well, I would favor the electronic -- the legislative -- all right. Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: I'm reading the same thing,

Justice Hecht. I mean, this doesn't tell me anything. It
says that an electronic signature is an electronic sound,
symbol, or process attached to or logically associated
with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record. And I'm sorry, but that -maybe I'm just not an electronic whiz kid or anything, but
that doesn't tell me anything.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And that's out of the statute?

MR. DAWSON: This is -- according to what I'm reading, which is actually Judge Benton's, but it's section 43.029 of the Business & Commerce Code where they attempt to define electronic signature. They then go on in a different section to state as a matter of law that any law that requires a signature that an electronic

signature suffices, but that definition in response to your question of should we just adopt what the Legislature has done, I would respectfully submit we can do better.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, and I guess, you know, the rest of the world doesn't have any choice basically, although the statute says that you can decide whether to go with it or not. But if we don't then the recommendation is a very conservative one that we should just use scanned documents, and there was some call for liberalization of that, so I'm not sure how to overcome any of that.

MR. ORSINGER: On that very topic, further, if, in fact, the rest of Texas society is following the definition that he just read except for court practices, that's not a good place for us to put the court system. We have a lot of people who are pro se, and if it becomes conventional for people to take out car mortgages and sign contracts in this electronic fashion and it becomes routine, why should we be the only people that have some type of arcane concept that's contra to the commerce that's going on in our state?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Can we do this? Go
through these rules as they are, and where it has
"signature" we leave that open for answer later as to what
constitutes a signature? I mean, not all of them are that

way, but we do need to get to the rules and put in the rules where they have specific things that it can be done by e-filing. So the dispute I've heard about is signature and what constitutes a signature. So any of the rules that have that, let's leave that part of the rule open for answer by, as Tracy said, some general definition, and ignore that and go to the other rules as they apply to electronic filing? Can we do that?

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MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. The next rule is 19a, 10 and it's contra to what you just said, Buddy, but we're going to have to deal with it. It's a new rule, and it has to do with defining electronic signatures by judges, and it says, "A judge signs an order by applying his or her handwritten signature to a paper order or by applying his or her digitized signature to an electronic order. digitized signature is a graphic image of the judge's handwritten signature." So now for the court orders we're going to have to have a graphical reproduction of the judge's signature electronically attached to the electronic order.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. I'll hear what people have to say, but to me that's going to have to be addressed signature of judge or lawyers. All right. Tracy.

> HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, that's

my point. We should not have 19a. We should define "signature" somewhere.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah. So that's one we probably better skip, because that's -- and we'll come back to that and treat judge's signature and signature to have some general definition of what constitutes and make certain from the people that know what we're doing that the language meets the technology. That was my other question, Richard, is any -- well, okay.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, let me just say in response that I do not necessarily agree that the standard for court orders is the same as Rule 11 agreements or motions.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, no. I don't either, but --

MR. ORSINGER: And I would like to see some kind of self-evident manifestation of the judge's intent to sign something.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. What bothers me is the meat of this thing ends with the word "handwritten signature." That's what bothers me, and we -- and so if the rule is redrawn to take that out then we can deal with the rule, because -- and I don't -- I mean, if we don't want that requirement that it have the judge's signature 25 or something, but when we start defining signatures it's

going to have to be that applies to all electronic. MR. ORSINGER: See, I don't agree with that. 2 I think that you can justify a distinction between 3 ordinary people and ordinary commerce indicating their assent by singing in response to a singing e-mail, but if 5 you're going to have a judge sign an order or a judgment, 7 I would like to see something that even an ignorant person can see that it's a judicial act. 8 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: In other words, I would 10 know it's a judicial act. 11 MR. ORSINGER: Well, in other words, all I'm saying is if I get a court order that forecloses on my 12 13 homestead, I would like to have something that's signed by a person and -- okay, so anyway, I don't want to stop the 15 process. All I'm telling you is that --16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, no. All I'm saying is you said handwritten signature. I mean, how do I have 17 a handwritten signature by an e-mail order? 18 MR. ORSINGER: What this rule would require 19 is that the judge have signed something at some point and that it be scanned and is now residing electronically and It's like the it just gets affixed to the order. 22 electronic equivalent of stamping it with a stamp. 23 24 HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Like a rubber 25 stamp.

MR. ORSINGER: Like a rubber stamp, only 1 it's an electronic stamp and it's a facsimile of the 2 3 signature. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, why does 4 a rubber stamp make you feel better? 5 MR. ORSINGER: Better than what? 6 7 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I mean, seriously. I could understand your wish to have a real signature, but if I'm allowed to, you know, sign 9 something, scan it, and have it rubber-stamped on all of 10 11 my electronic orders, you know, why does that make you 12 feel better? I mean, if you really want a signature, you should have us print out a piece of paper and sign it and 13 scan it. 14 MR. ORSINGER: I don't have a problem --15 16 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You really want a signature? 17 18 MR. ORSINGER: I don't have a problem with 19 somebody signing the judge -- stamping the judge with a rubber stamp or graphically. What I have a problem with 20 21 is a court order that does things that are really significant like taking people's children away permanently 22 and stuff like that based on some kind of digital 23 assumption that it was done by someone with authority. 24 25 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: But if I'm

pressing a button that says "rubber-stamp it," how is that any different from any button that I press that says 2 3 "digital signature"? 4 MR. ORSINGER: Because I can see it with my I can see something that looks like a human being 5 eyes. 6 signature on it. 7 But anyway, I don't want to stop the I'm just saying that I'm not buying into the 8 idea that signature for all purposes is the same as signature for signing judgments and orders. 10 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm not saying it 11 12 wouldn't be. I'm just saying to speed things up so we can at least get to first base that we -- where the word 13 "signature" appears that we kind of skip over that and go 14 to the other, and then where those places where the 15 signature appears that are different, you think different 16 and would apply differently, let's -- we'll deal with that 17 either with that rule or if we've suggested a general 18 19 definition. All right. 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let's go to 21a because 21 the next rule, 21, is one of those ones you don't --22 MR. ORSINGER: Well, no, 21 is a different 23 The idea on 21 is if you do electronic filing, that by virtue of electronic filing that you are 24 l certifying that you have made service in accordance with 25 l

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the rules. It's like a deemed certificate. On a piece of
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   paper the rules require you to sign a certificate of
             Rule 21 says that if you file electronically
   it's deemed that you're also signing a certificate of
   service.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Does anybody have a
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   problem with that? I don't -- that's -- all right.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: I mean, so that's unanimous.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, no, no.
   have a problem.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't see that as
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   different from the signature.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, no. I'm asking who
   has a problem. I want to hear what the problem is and
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   then let's vote on it.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't see that as any
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   different from deciding what's going to count as a
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   signature.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Right.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And the first time I
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   see that we're not talking about that is in 21a, except
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   for the part toward the end that says "the case of service
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   a certification is deemed." That's signature again.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: But, Bill, this says you
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   don't have to have a digital signature on your certificate
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of service, that if you file something electronically and 2 it's served electronically through this system we've set up, it's deemed that you've signed a certificate of service. 4 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: When I file a pleading and I assume that everything I'm saying, these things are 6 true, not false, it's kind of deemed. 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That depends on how we 8 define signature. If you define it as by using a unique identifier, which I still thought I heard that they know about that but they don't have any yet, then that's the 11 12 definition of a signature really. 13 MR. ORSINGER: But this rule is eliminating 14| the requirement of a signature on the certificate of 15 service if you file electronically. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 16 No. MR. ORSINGER: It's saying that if you 17 choose to file electronically you are held to have 18 acknowledged that it was served electronically or served 19 20 properly. 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It's the same as if you signed it is what he's saying, even though it's not 22 23 required. Terry. HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: Well, I want to 24 25 say this as a confirmed Luddite. There are more reasons

other than just, you know, for the sake of a feeling of goodness of having a wet signature, and one of those reasons is, is whenever I sign something I go through a ritual. I read what I'm signing, I make sure it says what I want it to say; and by the act of requiring a wet signature you're forcing someone to go through that analysis, to make sure what they're signing they're bound by. You know, there is a certain ritual and a certain significance to making your mark on something, and as a 10 Luddite I just want to say that and have my peace.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Tracy.

MR. LOPEZ: I think he's suggesting we go back to wax.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I disagree with Richard on Rule 21, because the language used there is the exact same language that they use on Rule 57 when it's defining what a signature of an attorney is; and if you deleted that, what is left is "The party or attorney of record shall certify to the court compliance with this rule in writing over signature on the file, pleadings, plea, motion, or application"; and so, you know, again, "over signature" is the issue because you define signature as "the confidential and unique identifier."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This sentence doesn't dispense with the certification. It says the

certification is deemed to be signed, not that a certification is deemed to be included. It still says "the certification," but it's deemed to be signed by the use of this confidential and unique identifier.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But it's like if I say, okay, you make this check you mean it's deemed you've signed it. I mean, it's in lieu of, and if you understand that, why can't that be? I mean, if you agree and the rule says that if you take this method, I mean, and use that method, then you've agreed to these rules; and the rule says you're agreeing that you treat that just as if you've signed it even though you haven't signed. That's what Richard's telling me; isn't that right?

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. I mean, in a sense we're arguing about whether we're going to deem that the certificate of service is signed because the pleading is electronically signed or whether we're going to come back here to the signing of pleadings in Rule 57 and say that when you file with your unique identifier you're signing not only the pleading, but also the certificate of service. I mean, you could get to the same place by saying that if you file using Texas Online with your unique identifier, that is deemed signature by the attorney whose name first appears in the pleading

signature block and also deemed a signature of the 1 certificate of service. 2 3 Well, do you put that under Rule 57, which only has to do with signing the pleading, or do you put 4 that under Rule 21, which has to do with signing the 5 certificate of service? Where do you put that digital 7 signature of the certificate of service? 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You put that in the 9 separate digital signature rule. 10 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. And since you 11 volunteered to write it, we just won't worry. 12 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Tracy has been trying to 13 speak. 14 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, no. Ι 15 think you put it in a separate rule. 16 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Is it true that there's 17

a difference in the signature of someone who uses this system as a filer and the concerns that we would have about the signature of another attorney or a judge who is not initiating a filing, who doesn't have the confidential and unique identifier with the highly --

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MR. ORSINGER: Right. Those other people that you just mentioned, they don't fit in this system at They're not going through the system. They don't 25 have a unique identifier. If you and I have a Rule 11

agreement, I don't have a unique identifier. The only person who has a unique identifier is somebody who files 2 something with Texas Online. 3 4 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Right. 5 MR. ORSINGER: And it's for purposes of what 6 they just filed, and since it's coming off of my machine with my unique identifier it doesn't have your unique identifier. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Be quiet and let Judge 10 Hecht speak. 11 MR. ORSINGER: Oh, I'm sorry. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Is it important to 12 lawyers that someone sign the certificate of service other 13 than the person who signed the pleading? 14 You said you didn't do it earlier. 15 said, "I don't sign certificates of service," and I just 16 wondered is it ever important that you would feel that you 17 authored a pleading and you were going to sign that 18 19 certificate, but you were going to leave it to somebody else -- sign the pleading, but you were going to leave it 20 21 to somebody else to make sure it got served and you wanted whoever that person was to sign it? 22 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I think that is often 23 important. You compose the document but your local 24 25 counsel -- or you're serving in some other limited role

and you're not the one who wants to be responsible for making sure everybody gets it who is supposed to get it.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And I suspect that you can't put two identifiers on these documents. There will just be one.

MR. ORSINGER: That's right.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: So you couldn't have a -- and if you made electronic signature the particular code of the person who is filing it wouldn't necessarily be -- it would have to be the same for all parts, and maybe that person would not want to endorse all parts.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But, Judge, one of the things is that like I will be local counsel helping somebody in a case and they send me, physically, a pleading they've signed and want me to serve everybody, well, then, I will; but if he could just do it by e-mail there would be no reason for him to come through me. He would just -- yeah.

MS. HOBBS: What about a partner and an associate? Like a partner will sign the pleading, and the associate will actually make sure it gets served, and the associate will have the signature on the certificate of service.

MR. ORSINGER: What about a proposal that

you'll deem the person who has the unique identifier will have signed it unless someone else's signature is scanned and attached to the certificate of service so that you've 3 preserved the right of the primary lawyer to be seen as the primary lawyer, but you preserve the right of the office to delegate to someone else the right to sign the certificate of service, and it will be conventional. will be pen on paper, scanned, and attached to the back of the pleading. 9 10 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And it seems to me 11 that this problem will come up in different contexts, 12 because I suppose you might want to file a motion for summary judgment with affidavits attached, and it would be 13 14 important to you to put them in the same document, but the people who are signing the affidavits may not be the 15 people who were signing the motion or the certificate of 16 service. So there might be four or five signatures in a 17 single document, and there would have to be some way to 18 19 accommodate that. 20 MR. ORSINGER: Well, the concept is where an 21 affidavit is required that it has to be a scanned image. 22 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah. 23 MR. ORSINGER: Of a wet signature. Is that not right, guys? An affidavit? 24 25 MS. WILSON: Yes.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And I was 1 2 anticipating that there might be a move away from that. 3 MS. SWEENEY: Why are we back to that again? 4 I mean, who files fraudulent affidavits? 5 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: A lot of 6 people. 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right, Skip. 8 MR. WATSON: Judge, I think -- I may have 9 missed this, but I think in the proposed change to Rule 57 they're addressing the idea of different attorneys signing a pleading; and as I read it it's saying, regardless, I 11 mean, presumably, you know, comes out from let's say an 12 associate's computer who has their unique identifier 13 attached, but it's deemed that the first named attorney is 14 15 the person signing regardless of whose identifier the 16 computer is attaching as it's sent, if I read that 17 correctly. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Sarah. 18 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I read it the same 19 way, and it concerns me, because that may not be true; but 20 why couldn't -- why does it have to be in the same 21 22 document? If I'm filing a motion for summary judgment with affidavits, why can't I file the motion with my digital signature and the affidavit with the affiant's 24 digital signature or file a certificate of service as a 25

separate document referenced in the certificate of service, "This is the certificate of service for that document that was electronically filed a few minutes ago," but because the associate is the one charged with ensuring that service occurs, it will be digitally signed by the associate.

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You can file it. MS. WILSON:

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Won't that work? So I think we should get -- this is part of what I was saying earlier. We shouldn't get stuck into this scanned image thing when technology is already so far beyond that, and what I'm reading here is so much more secure than that; but when I read a graphic image of my signature is going to be good enough for an order, you can get a graphic image of my signature at Central Carolina Bank because all of our checks are online; and if you just sit there long enough you can figure out how to get into our account and you've got a perfect graphical image of my signature.

Now, Richard, is that really going to make you feel better when they come and take your client's kids away because there's a graphical image of my signature on that order when I have no -- I know nothing about this? And that's what I'm saying, is the digital signature is 25 not a graphical image of a signature, and it is a billion

times more secure.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. We're on 21. How many people believe that 21 means what Richard says and it's okay and we don't have to put that in the general category of the signature stuff we're going to draft? agrees with Richard and who thinks that should be accepted as it is, as distinguished from putting that in the other category of to be done with the signature? Richard, you agree, don't you?

I don't really care where you MR. ORSINGER: put it, but if you want to put it in the signature rule I'm okay with that.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I'm just asking 14 how they feel about it. Judge Hecht.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, again, I mean, it seems like we're drifting that way, but it might be helpful to know if there is any sentiment remaining to mean by signature in the Rules of Civil Procedure anything other than what's meant by a signature under state law, whether for orders, pleadings, affidavits, or whatever; and if there is then we need to work on that.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But if there isn't, which it sounds to me like we're all resisting that but sort of drifting closer and closer, then that might

resolve about two-thirds of these issues. 2 MS. SWEENEY: I move we adopt state law. PROFESSOR CARLSON: In which court of 3 4 appeals? MS. SWEENEY: All of them. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Who agrees we should 6 7 follow state law? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Whose law do you 8 want to adopt? Would that be First Court, FourteenFourteenth Court? 10 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just a minute. 11 I think the real MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: 12 hesitation here is the newness of this electronic 13 signature thing, and no one knows exactly how it works. No one has read UETA and no one really understands how this is going to develop in commerce. What we could all 16 l agree, I think, is that a signature, a handwritten 17 signature, whether it's scanned, in whatever format, is a 18 19 signature. I mean, I think, no one would disagree about 20 that, so we could solve a lot of these questions and get a rule in place that would allow electronic filing if we just said that, that you had to have a handwritten signature in some form on whatever gets filed and not an 24 25 electronic signature, that an electronic signature isn't

good enough. So and then whatever gets transmitted to Texas Online it gets transmitted as a PDF or something that has someone's handwritten concerns, which addresses Justice Jennings' concern, which I agree with. There is -- you don't feel like you signed a document just because you logged onto your computer, but you have.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And that's the whole thing about all of these rules. The rules are designed, as Richard drew them, to make electronic filing permissible and put it in the rules, and the thing that's bogging us down is every place there is a signature and the problem is what does that constitute and what do you want and how do you know that it's your signature, and if it's just a sign I haven't read it, and I only read when I sign in pen and ink.

So I think we're not going to be able to get much -- I mean, the mechanics I think are no problem. I mean, there might be some, but the main thing is the signature. Don't you see that, Richard? The main -- so what do you think we can accomplish?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, let's decide whether or not we're going to fix this issue of a deemed signature in the signature rule. If we are then we will and then let's move on to methods of service.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Are we going

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to fix -- who wants to fix this deemed signature,
   incorporate that in the general signature rule?
           Instead of -- or who wants the rule as written?
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                 MR. ORSINGER: We have got to have the
  number on that.
                    It was like four.
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                 MR. LOW:
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                           No, I'm telling them what the vote
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   is, what they're voting on. All right. Who favors --
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                 MR. DUGGINS:
                               The question is whether or not
  we're in favor of a general rule defining what a signature
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   is?
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Whether this rule would
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   come within the general rule of signature, whether we fix
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   this rule in that general rule; or do we accept this rule
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   as stated, where you don't need that, it's a deemed
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   signature when you file it. Who wants -- who is in favor
   of Rule 21 as written?
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: As written?
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                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Without the signature
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   rule or with the signature rule?
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: As written. As written.
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: As it's in the books?
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: As Richard has presented
   it.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, as written by
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   Richard.
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1 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Okay. That's different. 2 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Who wants it only -- who wants that to be taken care of in the general signature rule? 5 6 All right. There is no need to count, just 7 the majority want to take care of it there. All right. MR. ORSINGER: Okay. The next one is Rule 8 9 21a, and Rule 21a permits service of pleadings, motions, 10 and whatnot on other parties either in person or by courier, receipted-delivery or by certified and registered 11 mail or by fax, and then they add "or by electronic transmission to the recipient's e-mail address." This 13 authorizes e-mail service. 14 Now, later on in the rule, the next 15 16 underlined sentence, says that electronic transmission 17 service may be effected only where the recipient has agreed to accept it or the court has ordered it. Okay. 18 So in the context, this is either based on your consent or by court order that you can't do anything about, then 20 e-mail is one available method of service of pleadings and 21 22 motions. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: In other words, you 24 can't do it unless the court orders or you consent. 25 That's written into the rule that you've written, right?

MR. ORSINGER: That's right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So the alternative would be that it's just automatic, I guess, that you don't have to -- that the court doesn't have to order it or you don't have to agree to it that it would be done electronically, right?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, if we don't make any change at all there is no authorization for e-mail service, so we've got to authorize it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I understand.

MR. ORSINGER: The proposal is to authorize it only as against people who have consented to receive service that way or where the court has ordered it, and I can tell you from personal experience the judges that have electronic filing also order electronic service because they're trying to get away from paper. So this can't hurt anybody that doesn't want to play along unless you're in a court that forces you to do it, and there's nothing you can do about that anyway, but without an amendment like this there is no authority for e-mail service except under local rules of judges who have adopted e-filing.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let's keep going.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All or none. Anybody

24 opposed to 21a? So far.

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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Wait, wait,

wait. 1 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, there's more. 3 MR. ORSINGER: But, no, you know, the more 4 is going to get us into the deemed signature part, so why 5 don't we just see if people pass on this? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, there's a little 6 7 bit more than that. 8 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Bill, go ahead. 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: In this sentence that 10 we had trouble with earlier, "the party or attorney of 11 record shall certify to the court compliance with this rule in writing or over signature, " now that general 13 statement, if that will work, covers more territory, 14 including "the recipient has agreed to receive electronic service or the court has ordered it." Now the certificate 15 16 of service that's not informative about what it means covers more stuff, and I'm just pointing that out. Okay? 17 18 It seems to me, though, that in the case of 19 "service by electronic transmission is deemed" that that's 20 in the same category as the other stuff that would go in 21 the signature rule. So I'm happy with this if that "in 22 the case of service" sentence, "a certification is deemed" moves to the general rule and if everybody understands 23 that this -- the certificate of service sentence that we 24 dealt with before has more to it now.

Well, all right. 1 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Tracy. 2 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: My only 3 suggestion with respect to the first underlined change, "or by electronic transmission to the recipient's e-mail 4 address," I anticipate that in some law firms people will 5 set up an e-mail address for everybody versus a personal e-mail address, and so the only thing I might add to this is to say "to the recipient's designated e-mail address" or some language to that effect to show that it's the one 10 that they agree to accept pleadings at. 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Do you have any objection to that? MR. ORSINGER: Not at all. But let me 13 clarify something in the record. I am not on the committee that wrote this, I didn't write this, and I 15 16 can't agree for the committee to change this. There are people over there that did participate in that and maybe 17 we ought to ask them if they have any problem with it. 18 l 19 MS. WILSON: No, that's good. We're fine 20 with that. 21 MR. ORSINGER: You're okay with that? 22 MS. WILSON: Yes. MR. ORSINGER: Okay. They say that the 23 24 committee has no problem with adding "designated." "To recipient's designated e-mail address." 25

1 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Just go ahead and consider that as in there. Richard, you had 3 your hand up. MR. MUNZINGER: It seems to me that it would 4 5 be a convenient way of indicating one's consent to be served by an e-mail address to have this rule provide that 6 an attorney may indicate his consent to be served by an 7 e-mail address by adding the same to his signature line as required by rule whatever it is that says every pleading has to be signed with your name, address, and telephone 10 number, so that if I add my e-mail address under my 11 12 signature it is automatically assumed that I have 13 consented to be served at that e-mail address. Then you don't have to have agreements and wait around for it. 15 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's a good 16 idea. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That sounds like a good 17 18 suggestion. Carl. Yeah, is electronic transmission 19 MR. LOPEZ: defined anywhere? I mean, I've had people send me a Word 20 21 Perfect document that they thought was in good shape and it was a disaster. 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I don't know. 23 24 MS. HOBBS: I have a question about that. My understanding -- and the e-filing folks can correct me

1 if I'm wrong. My understanding was that I sent my document to Texas Online and Texas Online filed my 2 document with the court and sent my document to the party. 3 4 That's a very different thing than if I'm at 5 my desk and I e-mail the other party, and I'm just wondering what the JCIT's position is on which of those --7 those are two different things, and what is your intent? Because if it's the former, I think you need to add "or by 8 electronic transmission through Texas Online to the 9 10 recipient's designated e-mail address, " if that's what you 11 intend. 12 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You do need 13 that. 14 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: That's a very good 15 point. 16 MR. ORSINGER: Well, let me just ask, I 17 mean, are we saying that if I file a motion conventionally 18 that I cannot serve it by e-mail even if somebody has 19 agreed to accept service by e-mail? 2.0 MS. HOBBS: That's a good question. I mean, because I do that 21 MR. ORSINGER: 22 right now all the time, and we don't have this, but they 23 agree to do it and nobody fusses over it, so we're just 24 off in our own little universe. But you're now making it 25 impossible to conventionally file and serve by e-mail, and

I don't know if we want to do that. 1 2 MR. LOPEZ: That's kind of what I was 3 talking about. 4 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: No, we're just 5 asking. 6 We anticipate that it could be MS. WILSON: 7 either way. It's up to the parties. If they want to do it strictly through Texas Online, they can; or if they want to do it on their own between two e-mails, they can. It could go either way. Anything that comes into the 10 court through the clerk has to come through Texas Online, 11 though. Now, the service itself can be done through Texas 12 Online or can be done among the parties through an e-mail 14 and does not have to go through Texas Online. 15 anticipated both. 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Richard. 17 MR. MUNZINGER: I have a question as to whether Texas Online automatically serves the people who 18 19 are identified in the certificate of service. understanding of Texas Online is I send my petition to 20 21 Texas Online. It's registered with Texas Online and sent to the district clerk of Dallas County, Texas. 22 Does Texas 23 Online -- let's make it not a petition. Let's make it a motion for continuance. Does Texas Online send it to all 24 25 persons who I have certified in my certificate of service?

MS. WILSON: Only if you have checked that 1 you want that service and you have paid the fee for that 2 3 service as part of that filing. MR. MUNZINGER: Me, the sender? 4 5 MS. WILSON: Yes, sir. MR. MUNZINGER: But there is no indication 6 7 in that that the recipient has consented to service by e-mail with you or anyone else as yet? 9 MS. WILSON: Yeah, you may want to do that 10 one. 11 The way the system works is MR. GRIFFITH: it is elective on the recipient's part. If they register 13 with Texas Online as willing to accept electronic service 14 then we can serve them. Otherwise it has to go through a 15 traditional method. MR. MUNZINGER: So I'm attempting to serve a 16 17 Luddite and he doesn't register with you. How do I find out that I didn't get service to him? Will you send it 18 19 back to me and say --20 MR. GRIFFITH: What you'll actually see when you select electronic service is those parties who have agreed to accept electronic service. If his or her name 231 does not appear on there then you have to serve them some other way. 24 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let me interrupt, and

it's my fault, but there are some people that have scheduling problems, and I know you do, and we don't want to lose you, but we're going to lose some of the people 3 that want to participate in this jury shuffle or doing away with the jury shuffle; and if I spend about at least 30 minutes talking about that, whether we resolve it then and come back to it, I need to do that so everybody is heard. When do you have to leave? Yeah. I'm talking about the four over on the back. 10 l

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MS. WILSON: We're here.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Forgive me, and I apologize.

Some of them live in Austin, MR. ORSINGER: 15 but Dianne lives in Fort Bend County.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. But I apologize, but I really do because we're fixing to lose some people, and it's my fault for letting this happen, but would everybody -- Richard, you hold your place there, and let's switch gears and go because this is a topic a number of people are interested in, and I want to be sure those with scheduling problems have a chance -- whether they're here when we vote or not, have a chance to be heard, because there are probably several people want to address the issue.

We were first assigned the task of determining whether or not and if so how we would shuffle the jury electronically, and there are a number of statutes and so forth talking about electronic selection of jurors, if the county signs onto it, and electronically doing all this. We've gotten letters from several who want to do away with the shuffle.

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Now, before we start I'll tell you that the shuffle came about before the new rules in 1941. It was 10 amended in '90 or '92 so you could only get one shuffle, 11 no matter who requested it. There was a law review article written about it in '94, a Texas Bar Journal article, questioning how that would affect your -- oh, what's the --

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES:

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Batson strikes, yeah. There is a case, the Supreme Court of Texas, in an opinion by Judge Denton in 1972 -- let me get that. At any rate, 1972, that where the bailiff just took the people as they came and he put their cards there, you know, nothing; and they said that was okay and it wasn't error not to give a shuffle.

There is a case in 2002 by the Court of Criminal Appeals which held that it's not error. So 25 basically there are already two cases from a high court in

Texas that holds that it's not error. To do away with it would mean then you couldn't do it. As I see the law now, the judge has a right and probably would not be reversed 3 if he didn't give it. Now, that's giving you my own 4 opinion, and I'll give you the cases for the record if 5 6 you -- let's see. What number was that? Eight. 7 right. 8 The Ford vs. State in 73 3d 923, three judges dissented. That's the criminal appeals case. 9 Rivas vs. Liberty Mutual is in 480 S.W. 2d 610, written by 10 Judge Denton. So with that, who wants to take -- Bill. 11 12 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I have two things to I think the understanding in civil cases is that the 13 say. shuffle is required and that Rivas is no longer the law for civil cases. I don't know what the Court of Criminal 15 16 Appeals has held. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I can't -- I saw no case that overruled that. 18 19 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, our case book has 20 such a case in it. I just don't remember its name right now; but the other point is that this Rule 223, as I've 21

So when we're talking about really small --

always understood it, doesn't apply in counties that

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juries.

aren't governed by the laws providing for interchangeable

we're talking about one-court counties. We're not talking -- really, you know, smaller counties we're not 2 talking about a shuffle being provided for under the rules 3 That kind of seemed backwards to me, that you 4 anyway. would want to have a shuffle, if you wanted to have one at 5 all, in the smaller counties rather than in Dallas County or any county that has I think as many as two district courts or two courts that use something amounting to a central jury room. So it's just to those points, but otherwise I don't have anything to say at this point. 101 11 MS. SWEENEY: Mr. Chairman? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. I did not do 12 extensive research on this. I found -- and you tell me Rivas has been overruled by Texas Supreme Court you think? 14 15 Or maybe by legislative action? 16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, I think it's been 17 -- I mean, I know there is case law and I think it's 18 l Supreme Court case law that says you're entitled to a 19 shuffle when the list gets to a particular court, in civil 20 cases anyway. 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Then disregard that. The Court of Criminal Appeals case still 22 23 stands, doesn't it? 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm embarrassed to say 25 I don't read the Court of Criminal Appeals opinions.

MR. ORSINGER: He teaches civil procedure, 1 not criminal. 2 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I don't teach either one of them. All right, Paula. 4 5 MS. SWEENEY: Buddy, I think there is two issues on the table, and it might help us to move forward to decide which one we're going to talk about first, and what started all this was the letter from Judge Christopher about modifying the shuffle procedure to ensure that it could be done electronically and just 10 changing the rule to make clear that we don't have to put 11 the pieces of paper in a hat, that we can do it on a So that's what got us on this road, and the 13 subcommittee has a pretty good working draft of a proposal 14 to that effect. 15 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Let's do that. 17 That's the way it's actually listed on the -- but I wanted to state the whole thing, even though apparently part of 19 what I stated was inaccurate. Go ahead. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think so. I'm not 20 21 saying you're inaccurate. MS. SWEENEY: You-all have an e-mail that's 22 on the table over there of the most recent draft of the 23 24 proposal to work on the existing rule. The separate 25 question that will require, I think, more considerable

discussion is whether to retain the rule.

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As to the content of the existing rule,

Judge Christopher's suggestion was that we allow some
other process of random selection, be it computer or
otherwise, and that has been written into the rule. So it
says the jury panel is to be shuffled by computer,
manually, or by other process of random selection. Jeff
Boyd suggested the addition of the phrase -- instead of
"or by process of other random selection," that it say "or
by other process that ensures a completely random
selection," either of which I think is fine, and I think
his language is probably a little better.

We spent a lot of time on the subcommittee debating exactly how to phrase when voir dire begins for purposes of establishing that the shuffle has to be before voir dire begins, which is the rule. So we tried a variety of different ways to phrase that and ran into the issue that you have when you've got a questionnaire, the issue that you have of when the panel is brought in, and essentially at this point have said we can't get all that into this rule; but it does say "prior to the beginning of voir dire"; and the parties in each individual case will have to ascertain when voir dire begins, at least as it is currently left.

So right now the rule has remained silent on

when voir dire begins, and particularly we came to that because of the jury shuffle issue because -- I mean the jury questionnaire issue, because sometimes you get the questionnaires a week before you ever come to the courthouse to where the jurors are, and the issue is then at what point can you command a shuffle in that instance.

Some of the courts before granting leave to use a questionnaire will tell the parties, "I'll give you-all a questionnaire, but you can't shuffle," and that's the quid pro quo for being able to use a questionnaire, so that's already being addressed on a case-by-case basis. But in any event, the subcommittee thus far has not come up with a proposal to redefine what is the beginning of voir dire. The rule just says "prior to beginning," so that the gist of what's before you in terms of fixing the initial proposal or suggestion by Judge Christopher is can we now say "shuffle the names of all members of the assigned jury panel in the cause by computer, manually, or by other process that ensures a completely random selection" or "by other process of random selection."

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So, basically, in other words, I know some of you might want to do away with the rule, but assume the majority doesn't. Let's treat this as to how we're going to handle the shuffle and then we

can get to the question of if we do away with it then what we've done there is moot. Levi.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I don't know that I'm prepared to accept that a majority of the committee would like to retain the shuffle, and I think perhaps it might be worth the effort to take at least some straw vote initially before we invest time debating the nuances of a rule, if we have a rule, to first determine whether a majority would like to retain the rule. I confess I missed part of Paula's initial comments having a conversation with Justice Bland.

MS. SWEENEY: You should have been listening to me.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: And but I think she said something along the lines of how this was teed up. I can see this was teed up initially by Judge Christopher's letter, but -- and I don't think I misspeak here -- even Judge Christopher joins me in my effort to get the rule abolished.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: See, the thing is that we have on the schedule that came to me and it came out, your letter was in there, but it says about the jury shuffle. We're going to get to whether we do away with it, but first we're going to determine what this committee's work -- and if it's wasted effort, it's wasted

effort, because they have spent a lot of time doing that. 1 2 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Fair enough. can't control the Chair here in this proceeding. 3 (Laughter.) 4 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I haven't had any cases in his court. 6 7 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: And if it's the Chair's desire to waste the jury's time, so be it. 8 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You tell your juries 10 that? 11 MR. DAWSON: Buddy, I'll be your local counsel. 12 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. 14 MS. SWEENEY: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 15 what Judge Benton is saying; however, we don't have the 16 power to abolish the rule or keep the rule. We only have 17 l the power to make a recommendation to the Court, and the Court has asked that we address the content of Judge Christopher's proposal. I think we also have to address 201 the other proposal, which is whether or not to abolish the rule, but I don't think we can just say, "Well, we blew 21 off the rule so we don't have to do the homework on the 221 content of the draft." So I do think that this committee 231 24 should vote on or discuss whether or not we're going to 25 allow computer shuffling, and frankly, I recommend it, and

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I think the rule works as it's written.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And also, if we vote to
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   do away and the Supreme Court doesn't want to, they're
  going to want this. So we've got to address it.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               I respectfully
  like it the way we have here, which on the e-mail is just
   "or by other process of random selection." That language
  came straight out of 35.11 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, and I just think we should have a mirror image
10 between those two rather than adding in extra words, so
   that's where I came up with it to begin with, "or by other
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12 process of random selection."
                 MS. SWEENEY: And that's fine by me.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Anybody else have
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15 anything to say about the language used in -- as drawn
16 here?
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman?
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Yes.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm looking at what
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   Carl has, the most recent shuffle rule proposal, and it
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   consists of these three separated sentences, right?
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                 MS. SWEENEY: "After assignment to a
   particular court" and "prior to beginning"?
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      Yes.
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                 MS. SWEENEY: Yeah. That's it.
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PROFESSOR DORSANEO: All right. 1 I follow Does it -- in the current rule that "after such 2 assignment to a particular court" is in a proviso. 3 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Eliminated the 4 "provided, however." 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So is this meant to 6 7 apply to all courts or only to counties governed as to juries by the --8 9 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's going to be in that rule. It's just like a separate paragraph in 10 that rule. 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 223, the first sentence 12 says it's only interchangeable. That's what the rule 14 says, isn't it? 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, but if you take 16 the proviso out I think you create a potential ambiguity 17 because the rule is kind of an odd rule anyway. I mean, the proviso is normally what we think of as the main part 18 l 19 of this rule and has this other stuff up at the beginning, and my question is do you mean for this to be applicable 201 21 to all courts or only in counties governed as to juries by the law providing for interchangeable juries? 23 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, since it's only in 223 I thought that's where it -- I mean 24 25 that's the title of 223.

1 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe I'm wrong, but I think if you take it out of the proviso it looks like it might have broader application than what is in the 4 proviso. 5 MS. SWEENEY: There was no intent to do anything other than change the procedure in wherever it's allowed now, that it's still allowed. The only difference is you can do it by computer instead of putting them in a hat. That's the only intent of the change intended by the subcommittee. 10 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Actually, I think if it 12 l applied across the board it would be a good idea. 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, we haven't considered that. 14 MS. SWEENEY: You would like it to apply in 15 16 every county? 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I've never seen why it 18| doesn't apply in every county. Well, the Government 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 20 L Code addresses the interchangeable juries. Let's see, 62.016 and 017, but I can't say that I remember. 21 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: They're right here. 22 23 That's why I left. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What? 24 25 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: The reason I left

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was to go get 62.016 and 017.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I know it applies.
  don't know what it is.
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: It's counties with
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  three or more district courts.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's one of them, but
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 7
   there's another one.
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                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: That's 016, and 017
   is two or more district courts.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Right.
                                             Yeah.
                 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: So perhaps what we
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   ought to do is just make it applicable to counties that
13 have two or three district courts.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What about more? What
15 if you got -- what if it's four?
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                 MR. ORSINGER: He doesn't want it to -- he
   doesn't want it at all.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I know where he's going.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: He's trying to limit it.
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                 MR. DAWSON: He's secretly trying to limit
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   it.
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                 MR. LOPEZ:
                             It's not so secret.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: If you think
24 the proviso is important, leave it in there.
                                                  I just
25 thought it sounded sort of old-fashioned and backwards, so
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I took it out, but --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I agree it is 2 3 old-fashioned and backwards, and this rule needs to be recrafted, and it needs maybe to be entitled instead of 4 "Jury lists in certain counties," "Jury shuffle" and have it be a rule that somebody could find and understand where it applies without having to read a sentence that's about 7 65 words long. 8 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Does anybody know why it 10 only applies to those counties, I mean, you know, with interchangeable juries? 11 12 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Probably because it 13 said that since 1879. 14 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I mean, I've always kind 15 of just overlooked that and said it applied in every 161 county. I know no history. Nobody here knows the history of it or why it's only those counties that -- with 18 interchangeable juries? Well, if we retain -- if we 19 MS. SWEENEY: 20 use the rule as drafted here and change the title to "Jury shuffle," does that solve your problem, Bill? 21 22 particular problem? 23 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It improves it. All I 24 was trying to do was to ask what your intent was. 25 MS. SWEENEY: That was it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Paula, I think we have to -- your committee decided not to change anything other than to make this rule as exists work with electronic shuffling.

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MS. SWEENEY: That's right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: If we need to take a look and see if this rule needs to be changed and not limited to interchangeable juries and so forth, your committee can take a look at that if we vote. So would you take a look at that? Well, let's don't expand it here because your committee hasn't even considered that.

MS. SWEENEY: We'll look at that and we'll see if we can figure out how that started and what relevance it still has in this century.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah, because I just don't understand. I underlined "interchangeable juries" and then until I looked at the Government Code I didn't know what they meant and then when I read what they meant I didn't know why. Levi.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: If we have the rule, then I would like the rule to expressly make a reference to questionnaires and provide that voir dire, the voir dire examination, effectively begins with counsel's receipt of answers to questionnaires if -- even if they 25 haven't visibly seen the panel, and I think that -- I

don't have language to suggest, but that seems to me would 2 be consistent with Rule 327, which serves as the basis for new trial upon jury misconduct, giving an incorrect answer on voir dire examination. So if they've incorrectly answered in response to a questionnaire, that would be a grounds for a new trial because of misconduct. to me then consistent with that, voir dire effectively begins once you get the answers back, and so your right to shuffle is lost after you get the answers back. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I understand what you're saying about the questionnaire. I don't relate that to

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327, but Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: The subcommittee looked at 14 that, and the problem is, is that the procedures vary 15 across the state on the circumstances under which questionnaires are used, when they're delivered; and as Paula said, it's my recollection that in Travis County, 18 l for example, you get the written guestionnaires back a 19 week or two weeks before you even go down there to conduct 20 voir dire. And so because there was such diversity in how the procedures were handled, we felt it better to let individual courts deal with that issue, is my recollection --

MS. SWEENEY: Right.

-- rather than trying to write MR. DAWSON:

one rule that would in effect deprive litigants in some parts of the state from having a shuffle, which might be my esteemed friend's ulterior motive here, but so we just didn't think that was workable.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: A lot of times questionnaires the lawyers request, ask questionnaires, and the judge gives them to them and that's not even the order they're in. I don't know whether they're all the -who is where. I mean, you know, but all right. Go ahead.

But you'll have the answer when MR. LOPEZ: you get the order. So you know that these six are the ones you most dislike based on substantive answers. get the list and you see that they're in the front row, you ask for a shuffle.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I know, but see, when I 16 get the questionnaire -- I had this case with John O'Quinn, and we had 95 questionnaires, and I got those and looked -- I don't know what order they're going to be in. 181 19 l I don't know. And so how can I say that all the bankers 20 | happened to end up -- well, it wasn't all the people who were interested in giving a thousand million dollars ended up in the first three rows.

I don't understand HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 24 how you would not know, because there has to be some order to the distribution and the collection of the

questionnaires. 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It is. They collect 3 them as they come in, but they're not numbered then how they are going to be seated on the jury, so I don't know. 5 MR. ORSINGER: I recently had a 350-panel questionnaires, and we would just go by the district 6 clerk's office every two or three days and see which new questionnaires had come in, and we would take them back to the office and look at them. They were not sequenced in 10 advance of showing up in the courtroom. 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Me neither. MR. LOPEZ: What's your definition of 12 questionnaire? Are you talking about a jury information sheet? 14 No, I'm talking about a 15 MR. ORSINGER: questionnaire that the lawyers are putting --16 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's the term that was 18 used. 19 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: All right. 20 MR. ORSINGER: They come in at random, and many of them won't answer them at all, and they come in some on some days, some on another. There is no order to 221 23 l it. 24 MR. LOPEZ: That doesn't answer my question, 25 I mean, you take the information, you digest it, though.

you figure out who you like and who you don't like, or at least begin to form an idea of who you like and who you Then when you find out the order they're don't like. in --

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But we find out when VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: they let us know or we see them we find out what order, but I don't know that --

But then you can ask for a MR. LOPEZ: shuffle at that point.

MR. DAWSON: I think the point, Buddy, is that once you've had a questionnaire and had time to study it, you have a lot more information upon which to base your questionnaire as opposed to just seeing the panel and getting the court information sheet so you could base your request for shuffle on a variety of other factors other 16 than you just don't like the way it looks, you don't think 171 it's a random selection, there's -- you know, it's a med 18 mal case and there's 15 doctors in the first 20 seats, you 19 l know, those kind of issues. It gives you more information from which to make your decision, and some people think you shouldn't have that information before you request a shuffle, right?

And if that were workable uniformly across the state I don't know that there would be a lot of disagreement about that, but the problem is, is that the procedures vary so much from county to county that it's not -- it's not -- we weren't able to write one rule that would apply across the state.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Tracy.

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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: e-mailed a lot about this. I wasn't really familiar with how all the other counties did it, and I agree with Levi that we should try to define when voir dire begins, but ultimately decided to punt it because really all I want is the ability to have the computer shuffle in the rule and have that passed so that I don't have to keep asking permission of the lawyers and putting it on the record to not put the names in a hat.

MS. SWEENEY: And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to, if we could, focus on that and let's just decide this computer shuffle issue. Then if the group wants us to go back and decide what to do about questionnaires and any other issues, we would be happy to -- part of the reason we punted it is because it wasn't our job, so we just slid it off the side of the table. If you-all want to make it our job we'll go do that.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm ready.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. I have a question. Is 24 there going to be any regulation or oversight on the software that is supposedly random? Is it going to be

issued by the Office of Court Administration? district and county clerk going to have their own software, and how are we going to know if it's truly 3 random? 4 5 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I'm sorry. Say that 6 again, please. 7 MR. ORSINGER: Is every district or county clerk going to design their own software, and if so, how 8 do we know it's truly random? Or is the Office of Court 10 Administration going to design a truly random program that everyone is required to use? Bonnie has an answer. 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Bonnie. 12 MS. WOLBRUECK: The Government Code already 13 dictates to the randomness of the jury list, and the 141 computer programs then would have to be designed 15 l accordingly with the Government Code, and they're already 16 there because of the criminal shuffle. 17 L 18 MR. ORSINGER: So you would use the same randomness that's now mandated by statute --19 l 20 MS. WOLBRUECK: Exactly. MR. ORSINGER: -- to do this shuffle? 21 22 MS. WOLBRUECK: That's right. 23 MR. ORSINGER: And who verifies the 24 randomness, by the way, under the current practice? 25 MS. WOLBRUECK: Under current practice

usually you can get verification through your computer 2 software provider. There are methods for doing that. 3 MR. ORSINGER: But if I show up in a small county in South Texas and I want to find out whether it's 4 truly random, would I just get a copy of their software in 5 advance and give it to a computer analyst? 6 7 MS. WOLBRUECK: I don't know, Richard. 8 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We're going to go back 9 to a similar vote. All right. Kent, did you have your 10 hand up? 11 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: I was just 12 following up on Judge Christopher's point. I was going to 13| ask for a show of hands for those who wanted to continue 15 to use hats. 16 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Because we all 17 know how random that is. 18 PROFESSOR CARLSON: It says "acceptable." 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let's vote on adding -get the other language, the electronic language that has been suggested by Paula and Tracy. All in favor of that raise your hand. 23 MR. JACKS: What are we voting on, Buddy? 24 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just raise your hand. 25 It's okay.

MS. SWEENEY: Can use computers. 1 2 MR. JACKS: Thank you. 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Is there anybody against 4 that? One person. Everybody. It's unanimous. Now, is the feeling of the committee they 5 6 want the committee to go back and address those issues we've talked about, when voir dire starts, whether or not it should apply just to interchange of counties or -- and 8 9 they need to research that because there's got to be some 101 reason that was there to start with. I don't know, 11 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, I'll say for the record that at least one of us -- no, I'm sorry, two of us did make some effort to find some historical 131 14 information about the rule, but we --15 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Give it to 16 us. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: We didn't find it. 17 MS. SWEENEY: There is, I'll tell you, one 18 law review article written by, shockingly, Michael 19 l Gallagher, but it's not the Michael Gallagher that 20 L immediately comes to mind. I hadn't seen him write that 21 22 many law review articles. But it's a 33 St. Mary's Law Journal 303 in 2004. It's by a Federal judicial clerk, 23 l which I thought was intriguing, and it has about as much 24 footnoting and historical information. So if anybody 25

wants to dig in and get that or I will e-mail it to you, and you can spring from those sites. He wants to do away It's kind of a polemic, but at least there is Federal law clerk footnotes in it that you can start with. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just a minute, Bill. Are there any other things we want that committee to look 7 at and address other than the items I named? 8 MS. SWEENEY: I've got three things. 9 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I want to suggest 10 to the committee that you use the term "prior to the commencement of voir dire" and allow it to be developed by 11 l case law. 12 MS. SWEENEY: 13 Okay. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just a minute. Bill, I 14 15 believe you had your hand up. 16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Did we already vote on this language, Buddy? 17 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. No. What we're --19l we have voted to make this the language that makes it electronically possible and so forth, but some of the 20 other language we've not. They're going back, and we're 21 now deciding what else we want them to look at, like when 221 23 voir dire starts and that kind of thing. 24 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Buddy, there is 25 something else I'd like to --

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Wait. Let me 1 answer Bill. 2 3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Because I just was comparing 223 with the language, and the word "random" 4 doesn't appear in 223, and I wonder if it's supposed to 6 end up being random. 7 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It doesn't, 8 and I wanted it to correspond with the Code of Criminal Procedure shuffle rule. 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Does the Code of Criminal Procedure as interpreted mean that the result 11 12 needs to be random or only that you need to kind of take a shot at becoming random? Not everybody in the first row 13 14 wearing ties? 15 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That I don't 16 know. 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: They don't address the 18 result. They just address the process. Okay. I'm sorry, 19 Levi. 20 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I'd like to propose that the committee also go back and do two things: 21 22 go back and bring up to date and memorialize for us the historical basis for the rule in the first place. 24 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I tried to do that, and they referred me to a statute that's been gone 50 years.

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I did, too. 1 There are about three law review articles and a handful of It's easy enough to do. I did it in about a half 3 an hour, and it's not all that useful. We've got the 4 system here, but it's very easy to follow up on, and I 5 want to propose that Paula has an agenda. She has three 6 items, and the committee -- we haven't heard the committee report, have we? 9 MS. SWEENEY: Yeah. 10 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: You missed it. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 11 No, the 12 committee report is this language. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I mean, don't you 13 14 have a list of things that you That is our report on what we 15 MS. SWEENEY: were asked to do, but all these other issues have sprung 16 like mushrooms around our issue, and so I'm making a list 17 l which includes why does the rule say only counties with 18| interchangeable juries, what do we do with the 19 questionnaire issue, what do we do about when voir dire 20 starts, noting your suggestion, and Levi wants me to write 21 a brief on historical significance, which I will of course 22 23 tender by electronic service to everybody. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Within 30 days. 24 25 MS. SWEENEY: So that's four things, and if

there's something else I will write it down. 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let us know. 3 MS. SWEENEY: Oh, he said two things. What's the other? 4 5 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: The other is perhaps the committee ought to just revisit the issue of whether or not we should even maintain the shuffle, unless we're going to do that here today. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I'm prepared to do whatever you-all want to do. We can put it in. I can put 10 it to a vote today or have that committee -- I guess the 11 committee has not really addressed that. 121 MS. SWEENEY: We talked about it, but we 13 14 have not made a decision or a vote or made a 15 recommendation. 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Procedurally I quess it would be more appropriate to at least have the committee 17 consider that before we just put it up to a vote, but if 181 19 l the group wants to vote I'm here. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Buddy, you 20 know, I'm pretty sure the committee is going to be about three to five against abolishing, so I mean, so sending it 22 back to the committee -- and they just included me. 23 24 not even on the committee. They just included me because I was the one that brought this up to begin with.

there are a few people that are actually on the committee 11 2 that want to get rid of it and the rest of them are firmly 3 in favor, so... 4 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Does anybody here object to bringing it up and voting on it to today? 5 Anybody that feels we shouldn't? Well, then let's get 7 with it. All right. Let's talk about it. 8 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Did anybody not get my e-mail letter on this, because I've got some copies 10 if you didn't? Okay. MS. SWEENEY: And Judge -- for everybody to 11 12 know, Judge Peeples has made it clear that he does -- he does want to propose that the rule be abolished. 13 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That the shuffle 14 15 be abolished. MS. SWEENEY: That the shuffle be abolished, 16 17 sorry. I didn't spam your e-mail out without your consent, but it does contain his briefing points, and 18| everybody should have it on his briefing, so I guess maybe 19 20 it --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: David, why don't you 21 tell us why you think --HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I was on this 23 subcommittee, and we frankly had trouble meshing the 241 rights of the shuffle with the questionnaire problem and 25

finally just decided let's don't do that, and it occurred to me to see what other states do, how did they do it; and I called the National Center for State Courts and I said, "Can you tell me some other states that have this shuffle. I want to see if I can find out how they work it with a questionnaire," and they said, "I think you're the only state that has it, but I'll get back to you" and then they sent me some things.

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And then I called a Federal courts
magistrate that's a friend, and she said, "We don't have
it over here," and the bottom line is the other 49 states
and the Federal courts do not have the shuffle in the
courtroom; and what they have and what I think we ought to
have and what I will -- am militant about is there needs
to be randomness on the front end; and if there are small
counties that don't have it, we need to be sure that they
do.

Randomness on the front end I think is one of the fundamental fairness, due process elements that we need to be sure we've got; but once there is randomness at the initial stage it seems to me what goes to the courtroom is random and people shouldn't be able to look at it and decide, "You know what, I like the spares better than I like the first 24 from my own personal view for the case I've got" and have it shuffled in the courtroom. And

again, nobody else does that in this whole country and I think the world; and the question for me is should we continue it; and I think that if you grant my premise, which I want to make a premise, which is randomness in the central jury room, the assembly room, or the one courtroom where it happens in a one-county court, once that happens you ought to take what you get.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Instead of looking at it from your own partisan standpoint, thinking, "I can improve this if I could mix the spares again."

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Alistair.

MR. DAWSON: Yeah, and I guess, with all due respect, Judge Peeples, I don't think it's all about randomness. I think that we have lots of procedures and lots of rules and lots of laws that are designed such that every litigant is given as much opportunity as possible to see a fair and impartial jury. It's not about the randomness only. That's part of it, but it's a fair and 19| impartial jury, and that's why we have voir dire, so that people that are not appropriate for the case are excused either by the court or by the parties.

That's why we have recusal and disqualification of judges, because there are some judges that you know are not well-suited for a particular case,

and I think that we as litigants and we as officers of the court and we as judges and rule-makers, we have an obligation to do everything we can to assist in seating the most fair and impartial jury that one can sit or seat in a particular case, and I recognize that under modern technology in most of the places where all of us operate there are pretty good procedures in there for getting a randomly selective group of 40 or 60 or whatever the number is, but I think we ought to keep the shuffle for For many reasons, but here are a couple. two reasons. One is sometimes the system doesn't work. Sometimes you get statistical anomalies. Sometimes -- and this is particularly true today, because there was an article in the Houston Chronicle about the fact that because we only pay \$6 a day for jurors, the percentage of 15 l higher income people that are showing up for jury service 16 l is much, much higher than lower income people. income people can't afford to get paid \$6 a day, and so if you're a plaintiff and you come down and the first 20 19 people on the -- let's use an absurd example. The first 20 20 people are doctors and this is a med mal case. That's a statistical anomaly. The first 20 people, that's not a

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random selection of the population at large. So sometimes

because of the problems we have in the jury system today.

the system doesn't work, and that's particularly true

The second thing is -- and I don't have any firsthand knowledge of this, but I understand that in some parts of Texas the jury pool that's allocated to a court is not entirely random. Let me put it that way, that it's subject to abuse; and if that's true then you need -- as a litigant you need something to try and protect against that; and so I say, well, okay, what's wrong with the shuffle?

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Well, it seems to me there's two issues that I've heard. One is it's inconvenient. Well, you know, that's not a good enough reason in my book to get rid of something that may improve the chances of getting a fair and impartial jury. Then the second reason I've heard is I've heard some people say, well, it can be abused and a shuffle can be racially motivated, and if that happens I would say that's wrong. You shouldn't be able to shuffle for racial means, but I submit that there is a better solution than eliminating the shuffle.

If a particular trial judge thinks that it was racially motivated, I suspect, although I have not studied, that the trial judge can say, no, I don't think -- you know, "I don't think that you're allowed to shuffle because I believe, you know, that you're doing it for racial reasons" or whatever or you sort of have a Batson-like challenge, if you will, to the shuffle. I

1 recognize that that creates some issues. It may prolong voir dire; but that's not going to come up very often; and I suspect, and I would be curious to hear from the trial judges in the room, that the number of times when they believed that the jury shuffle was being used inappropriately for racially motivated reasons is exceptionally small, if at all.

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And if that's the case then I don't see a --9 and the fact that there are 49 other states and the 10 | Federal courts don't have it, again, respectfully is not a good enough reason to get rid of something that can and does help us seek the most fair and impartial jury in a particular case.

> VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Levi.

MR. DAWSON: Levi wishes to announce that he 16 agrees with everything I just said.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I really think 18 Alistair's argument makes my case. Nothing about having 19 an opportunity to see what the venire panel looks like or 20 to read about them is consistent with impartiality. It is intellectually dishonest to suggest that justice is blind, 22| but it's only blind after I get to see what they look like or where they come from. Now, nothing that I have ever 23 l said to Alistair privately or informally or that I have 24 said formally on this issue would ever suggest that I 25

wanted to see this abolished because of inconvenience.
That is not a reason, it's not an issue.

The truth of the matter, my motivation is about promoting blind justice. Alistair's arguments about the statistical anomaly really just translated is one side or the other wishes to use one socioeconomic group or another as their pawn. I love Alistair, but that's one translation of your words.

MR. DAWSON: Well, that's your translation.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Now, he says the shuffle protects against abuse. I respectfully suggest that's bullshit. How does it protect against abuse? If a district clerk is going to be corrupt, the district clerk is going to be corrupt, and nothing about the shuffle is going to change that.

So I wish I had the ability to be statesman like David Peeples, others on this committee. I don't know how our predecessors got to this rule. It is not consistent with blind justice. It doesn't make the panel any more or less random, and I really -- I wish the Court would, even without permitting us to conclude debate on this, abolish it.

HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: I just would like to make a point between -- there is some discussion here about why is 223 different than 224, and just one thing

that occurs to me is when you look at Rule 223, of course, it's talking about counties governed as to juries by the laws provided for interchangeable juries, and then it goes on and further talks about juries that are selected for service in one court can be basically put back into the general panel after service.

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Of course, the other rule, Rule 224, you don't have that mechanism. You just have the assignment to the court. So maybe what the drafters intended in Rule 223 is that, well, after you've had jurors assigned from the general panel to a specific court and then either rejected or whatever, sent back to the general panel, that maybe some of that initial randomness that Judge Peeples is talking about has been taken out of the mix, and maybe there is a reason for allowing a shuffle after someone has been to that court and then rejected and put back into the system again, that maybe that's why they were having a shuffle. And if that's the case then it occurs to me that there's really today no need for a shuffle, and maybe that's why we're such an anomaly and the only state that allows that to happen.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Jan.

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I'm curious whether anyone recalls whether this was an issue of the jury task force about ten years ago.

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MR. ORSINGER: No, it was not.
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                                                  I was on
   that task force, and we were confined to jury definitions,
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   instructions and questions, and how to preserve error. We
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   didn't discuss this issue.
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                 MR. BOYD: I'm actually reading it, and that
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  report does suggest the issue.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, then my memory is
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   failing.
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                 MS. SWEENEY: Yeah, because I agree with
10 Richard we didn't discuss it.
                 MR. BOYD: Is this the one that Frank Newton
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   led?
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                 MR. ORSINGER: No.
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                 MS. SWEENEY:
                               No.
                 MR. ORSINGER: No, it was not.
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                 MR. BOYD: Here is a report from five years
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   ago or seven years ago.
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                 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Justice Cornyn, I
  think.
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                 MR. BOYD:
                            Right.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, there was a Supreme
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   Court task force --
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                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That's what she's
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   asking.
                  (Multiple speakers.)
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THE REPORTER: Whoa, whoa, whoa. I can't get this.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let him finish and then speak. All right. Jeff, what else do you have to say? MR. BOYD: It's the Supreme Court of Texas jury task force final report --

> HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: That's it.

MR. BOYD: -- dated September 8th, 1997. looks like Frank Newton headed it up; and in short, their response or their recommendation on that issue is that you ought to abolish it except in cases in which a jury has been re-assigned to a different court following voir dire having already occurred in the first court.

That's a different task force MS. SWEENEY: than the Supreme Court task force that Richard and I were I mean, this ground has been plowed before in terms of handling juries, but the task force that the Court appointed did not cover this issue.

MR. LOPEZ: I have a couple of, I guess, comments. One is with regard to what Alistair said. It's not -- I don't think it's statistically correct to say that just because you have ten doctors that one in a thousand cases are going to have ten doctors in the first Statistically one in a thousand cases are going to row. 25 have ten doctors in the front row, and if you have the bad luck to be that one in a thousand, it means you have bad luck. It doesn't mean the process wasn't random, statistically random.

So, I mean, either -- I don't know whether it's random. I don't know. I don't have the information to be able to know, just like Judge Peeples said, whether it's random on the front end or not. What I do know is that if it's random, it's random, and it doesn't get any more random the second time, just philosophically. I've always had an uneasy feeling about a rule that lets you look at the panel and then for apparently no reason at all be able to change it, a presumably random panel, again begging that question.

HONORABLE TERRY JENNINGS: It's no longer random after you changed it.

MR. LOPEZ: So, you know, it all depends on where you look at it. I mean, the defense attorney in that med mal case with those ten doctors on the front row probably doesn't think it's very fair to have it shuffled. I mean, so it kind of depends on how you look at it, but I just have a real issue with it if -- you know, if we have substantive information about them then the argument is voir dire has begun and we really shouldn't be able to shuffle it because we don't like their answers. If we're shuffling it before we know anything about them other than

what they look like, that's probably even worse.

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So I'm kind of -- as a practical matter, I don't really care because it doesn't happen very often, but I think philosophically speaking, unless somebody can give me a better reason than I've heard so far, I think we should do away with it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right, Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: If we really wanted to do justice we would do it like they do in the criminal system and just question each juror until everybody agrees, but we don't do that, so we're stuck with 24 people. Now, in a lot of counties, Webb County, Starr County, some of these South Texas counties, the lawyers and the parties know 50 percent of the people sitting on the jury. They know their occupations, they know their prejudices; and if there are people on the first 24 that we know are going to be prejudiced, we don't want them on there; and that's a reason for the shuffle, because we're not going to have a fair trial with those people.

The second thing is that, as Judge Peeples said, we want a truly random system. Well, the only way we have to safeguard that we get one is with the shuffle because in some counties you think you may get a random selection, but it really didn't turn out that way when they're all seated, and so it probably would cost more to

build a system to try to undo that problem than it would be just to allow the lawyers to shuffle. 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I asked several of the 3 trial lawyers in my area, and one of them put it to me 4 this way, that said, you know, they have all kind of 5 procedures when you pack a parachute. It's packed right and it's certified to that, but wouldn't you want a reserve chute in the event it didn't work? And that's the way they -- you know, kind of if the system failed and everything is stacked that this is something that they put 10 that didn't harm anybody. It took a little time, but at 11 any rate, that was what one of the lawyers told me, and I 12 asked a couple of the judges there in Beaumont, and they 13 didn't really feel strongly, but didn't feel it should be 15 done away with. JUSTICE HECHT: You might give the reporter 16 a break. 17 Oh, I'm sorry, excuse 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 19 We need a break for the reporter. I forget. (Recess from 3:31 p.m. to 3:42 p.m.) 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Those of you-all that 21 are interested in this be seated, and the ones that aren't go on with your conversation because we're going to hear from about three more people, unless somebody can give me 24 some reasons we haven't heard. Everybody has his own 25

view, and why it's bad, why it's good, and so forth; and before we start losing people we may as well vote unless somebody has some reason we haven't heard. I have heard a number of reasons why we should, why we shouldn't. Paula has not had a chance to voice her view, and I will ask her to do so now.

MS. SWEENEY: One, there has been zero evidence of any kind of abuse of this rule. None, nada. Two, it is an important safety valve for those cases where the panel, however it gets there, whether randomly or intentionally, is inappropriate.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Paula, let me stop you just a minute. We're going to be voting pretty soon.

Anybody that has to leave, if you want to leave a vote I'm going to allow you to do it. You've heard this argument, you know what you're going to do.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Now, that would be a very interesting departure from prior procedure, but I don't control this proceeding.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: This is an interesting discussion, but I think it's not fair for somebody who has heard just about every argument you're going to hear, and then because of a scheduling problem -- and if you object to that, well, then that's fine. I just think it's fair. If anybody doesn't want me to do that I will tear it up.

All right. Go ahead.

MS. SWEENEY: Two, it's an important safety valve in cases where a panel is for whatever that case inappropriately constituted; and three, and most importantly, for some reason we are using the term "random" as a synonym for the term "fair"; and those are not synonymous terms. Random means unaffected by the hand of man, but random does not mean fair. Tsunamis are random; they are not fair. Lightning strikes are random; they are not fair.

You can get a random panel that is utterly unfair in a given case because of the nature of the case and the composition of the panel. This rule allows the intelligence in the hands of the lawyers to say, "This is unfair in this case," and although the parties may disagree on whether it is good or bad, or they will agree on whether it's good or bad for a given side, they're just going to want to have it as litigants pull it in the direction they can. That's an entirely different thing. On the one hand you're doing the best you can for your client. On the other hand you're looking at the panel saying, "This is not random in this case," and the shuffle allows the intelligent application of the discretion to fix it, and I would urge you-all to keep it for those instances where a panel is not fair under the

circumstances of the case.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Tracy.

all, I don't think we know that there is no evidence of abuse in connection with the jury shuffle because the jury shuffle can be requested for any reason. So, you know, if you wanted to keep the jury shuffle, you should at the very minimum put restrictions on it. For example, you should not be able to shuffle a jury panel to change the racial mix. You should not be able to shuffle the jury panel to change the male/female mix. Those things are not allowed in terms of peremptory challenges, and they should not be allowed in terms of the shuffle.

Paula says random does not equal fair and that I am entitled to a fair jury. If you have unfair jurors, they will be challenged for cause. You are entitled to a random jury, and the unfairness is dealt with through the challenges for cause. This shuffle does not make a fair jury. You do it to make a jury that favors you, and that's why people do it. They do it to --they do it for racial grounds. I've seen it. They do it to get jurors that favor them, they think, because of economic reasons or -- well, usually economic or occupational reasons, and a third reason they do it is to waste time so that they can spend the time doing research

on the jury, because in a case that's big enough and I have a biq enough panel and there are investigators 2 sitting there, they will take that jury list, they will 3 run out and do a thorough investigation of every juror that's there, and putting in 30, 45, an hour, it will be a 5 lot shorter now if I ever get the computer provision 6 passed, during that time period they do research on the 7 background of the jurors. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Richard, you tried to 10

raise your hand several times, and I apologize.

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MR. MUNZINGER: Well, all I would say is it's been part of our jurisprudence for a long time. have practiced law 39 years, and we did it when I started practicing. I don't know that it's always done for racial reasons or bad reasons, but one of the things that advocates do is attempt to obtain juries that are open to their arguments, and I think Paula's point that sometimes you have a jury that may have -- may or may not have been randomly selected and is not necessarily one that is fair from your client's perspective, that's what we as trial lawyers do, and it's our task to do that.

That we are the only state that does it, I think it's proof of sanity and intelligence that we're different than Massachusetts, for example, but that's no reason to change a rule that has served Texas trial

lawyers.

Judge Peeples says that the operative 2 assumption is randomness. Huge assumption, Judge, in all 3 due respect, a huge presumption. I've picked juries in 4 South Texas where my clients have come to me and said, 5 "That panel is not random. That panel has been jury 6 rigged." And these are people who lived in that community, who work in that community. They were of the same race and the same background of that community, and 9 they insisted upon a shuffle, and the panel was several 101 hundred people. I'm a stranger to South Texas. 11 live there and I don't practice there, but I'll guarantee 12 you that if everybody in this room thinks that everything 13 is on the up-and-up in every jurisdiction in Texas, you're dreaming, because it isn't that way. 15 16 And the -- I try some cases. I don't know how often I have had a shuffle. I have probably had a 17 shuffle asked against me as often as I have asked for one. 18 I am very reluctant to change our jurisprudence because --19 I don't mean to be disrespectful, because it 20 inconveniences judges, or juries, for that matter. We pay 21 too much attention to time constraints on our dockets. 22 Trials are searches for the truth. That's the truth of 23 Trials are searches for the truth in two or three or 24 Ιt four contesting views of different fact circumstances. 25

takes time to learn the truth. It takes time to ask deliberate questions.

That someone researches the background of a jury to make their jury selection more intelligent is not unlawful, shouldn't be unlawful, ought to be encouraged. Now, whether it's done with a shuffle, I'm not sure of that. Maybe we ought to give people more information earlier about the juries. But before you go and change your jurisprudence in a hurry, I think you need to be careful.

Paula's point there is no evidence that this is done for racial reasons, I join it. It is one thing to say it's done for race. It may be, or it may not be. I haven't done it for race. My daddy was a German immigrant. He couldn't get a job because he couldn't speak English. He supported himself pretending he was a deaf-mute piano player in 1912, 1914, during World War I. I wasn't raised where race or national origin meant something. My dad would have kicked me around the room if I felt differently, and I haven't acted that way in my life, and I haven't tried cases or picked juries that way in my life, but I don't think you ought to take away a weapon from a trial lawyer.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Richard Munzinger and Paula talk about no evidence of abuse. One reason

there is no evidence of abuse on shuffles is the intermediate courts, and I believe the Court of Criminal Appeals, have expressly said that Batson doesn't apply to shuffle, so we don't have any body of law about abuses.

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On your argument that this ought to be about some jury panels being rigged. Richard, here is why you ought to join me on this issue. Where there is a rigged jury panel we ought to motivate and inspire people to put their allegation on the record, to put it to the proof, because if you believe you've had a panel that's been rigged, you'll ask for a shuffle and you'll go on. Instead, make your record, force yourself to go to the district attorney and the U.S. attorney. We've got statutes dealing with getting people through the courthouse.

Now, once you're in Starr County or Hidalgo County or Harris County, once the panel is assigned to you you don't have a right to say, "I don't like this panel. Let's shuffle panels, send it back to the central room, give me another panel." Once a case is assigned to the 215th in Harris County you don't have the right to say, you know, "Something about Benton I don't like. Refile my case, please. Give me a chance to go to Christopher or Sullivan." It's wholly inconsistent with blind justice.

Now, this issue of fairness, well, I don't

understand how you conclude that changing the distribution to put those with socioeconomic factors out of the seats you want others in is fair when the other side wouldn't agree it's fair. If we're going to have a shuffle then it ought to say if one side requested it, the other side ought to have the right to reshuffle after they see what they look like. That would be fairer. Giving one side or the other but only one shuffle per case isn't fair because one side or the other is going to go away feeling aggrieved.

I'll save the rest for cocktails.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Richard, and then I would be really interested in somebody that has a real argument that hadn't been given two or three times for or against, something new but not repetitive, if there is such a thing. Yeah.

it may be off topic, but I did want to note it in passing, and that is one of the main concerns that resonates with me in favor of maintaining a shuffle is some prospect of corruption.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right.

HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: It is, however, a very limited weapon against corruption, and I at least wanted to note, as a practical matter if that is one of

the main concerns, don't we have to think about some more comprehensive solution down the road, one of which that's readily available, I think, although it would certainly take effort and resources, is to try and ensure that you draw jurors from a sufficiently large geographic area. One of the reasons in large counties why I think it's impossible to stack the jury pool is not because the clerks or the court personnel are all angels. It's the fact that no one knows anybody else. Everybody is, for all practical purposes, a number. The prospect of a problem arises probably most often where you're in parochial circumstances. smaller the area from which the jurors are drawn, the more 13 probable it is that everyone knows everyone else, the more possible it is, I think, for some manipulation to occur, and we've all heard at least anecdotal evidence of such 16 things, and I just think it's something worth noting. 17 It's not something we can vote on, of course, but that 18 seems to be at least something that underpins part of this 19 discussion. 20 Call the question. MS. SWEENEY: VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Richard. I want to hear 22 Richard. 23 24 MR. ORSINGER: I also personally, like

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Richard Munzinger, have experienced picking a jury in

South Texas where I felt like the jury was not randomly positioned, and I requested a shuffle, and the shuffle was on paper in front of me. I have now lost that today. Now it's going to be shuffled in some computer, but if that jury panel comes out and it looks just as bad as it did the first time then I might make an objection and then make the effort to spend the money to find out how the computer program determines randomness.

But for me as a litigant, as a lawyer, randomness is not as much in the method by which the people get there as it is whether the jury is really randomly mixed; and the way this system works, either side can request a shuffle, but no one will request a shuffle if it looks randomly mixed, because you don't gain anything by if it's randomly mixed, you mix it again, you're back where you started.

The only time anybody wants a shuffle is where it doesn't appear to be random in result, not because of any deception, but because in a bell curve most of the juries are going to be in the middle where there's a big arch, but there are going to be some of them that are down there at the lower end of the bell curve where they're going to be lopsided in terms of the way it ends up, even though the method of selection may have been random. And if you're on the plaintiff's side of the low

edge or the defendant's side, or if it's family law, the mother's or the father's, or the state or the parent who is being terminated or whatever, if anybody feels like the panel is not really well mixed they can require it to be mixed again, and it's most likely going to trend to the That's why I think you don't see a lot of these shuffles, because most of the juries come out and they are pretty well mixed and you couldn't improve on it by shuffling.

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So I think that we should not have our eyes closed to the possibility that in smaller counties, particularly where there are factions in the lawsuit and the factions include people in the courthouse, and that happens in the small counties and I've been involved in litigation like that, then we do have to be concerned about the honesty of the system.

And then secondly, even a randomly selected jury panel can sometimes be at an extreme, and mixing it one more time moves it back to the middle; and giving either side the opportunity to say, "Man, this is too extreme against me, I want to mix it again" I think is good for the system and the parties.

MR. LOW: The reason I didn't go to the district attorney is because he was on the other side. So 25 the district attorney in a lot of these little counties

can practice law, and so I felt like I wouldn't be able to get very far. That question was asked, why not going to the district attorney, but it's not always answered.

Okay. Judge, I believe you had --

the second one is not any more -- the second seating is not any more random than the first seating and that I think the tools for fairness or whatever are good. That's why I kicked around the idea with some folks at lunch that thought it was a good idea, some others thought it wasn't, that we take this rule away and give everybody -- or give each side two more jury strikes, peremptory strikes to, in effect, allow them greater opportunity to identify and eliminate the problem jurors.

MR. MEADOWS: I'll take that.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And -- see, there is some balancing there.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. There is, but our problem here, we've got to take one step at a time. It's been before us what we do with this. It doesn't prevent us from coming back and say let's change. I don't disagree with you. All I'm saying is it's like money in the bank. It sure looks good, but I can't get to it. And, I mean, you know, we can't get there right now. Somebody just walked out, and I don't want to call for a

1 vote. 2 Well, no, Alistair, and I'm not going to count his vote with the other, but he voted by paper, and 3 I was going to state to the Court how he voted. 4 5 MR. ORSINGER: Just put it in the record 6 when the vote comes. 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Huh? MR. ORSINGER: Just put his vote in the 8 record when the vote comes. 9 10 MS. SWEENEY: Let's vote. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. Well, we 11 generally haven't done that, and some may object. I just felt it wasn't fair for somebody to be here all day and 13 hear all the discussion and then --MR. LOPEZ: Sounds like he made his view 15 16 pretty clear when he spoke. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So I won't count it when 17 I do that, but I'll say, "plus Alistair left his 18 handwritten vote" and the Court can consider that however 19 20 they want to. Bonnie. 21 MS. WOLBRUECK: I was just going to make one All of you have talked about jury shuffles and 22 23 reasoning for and against it. Just as an anecdote, we had one attorney that practiced with us that asked for a jury 24 25 l shuffle every single time because he was superstitious.

He had won a case because he had shuffled the jury, and he believed that he had to have the jury shuffle. 2 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I believe I would do that if I had won a case. 4 5 MS. WOLBRUECK: So there is a lot of reasons why attorneys ask for jury shuffles. 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's the best reason I've heard. All right. Skip, go ahead. 8 9 MR. WATSON: Just a quick question to 10 Justice Hecht. I think I remember that Rule 223 was 11 l amended in 1990, and what was that amendment? Was that when they knocked it back to one shuffle? 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: One shuffle, right. MR. WATSON: The last sentence was added? 14 So 15 years ago the Court or someone looked at it and at 15 16 least had the opportunity to go through all of the 17 balances we're trying to do today, is that correct, and 18 came up with limiting to one shuffle? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I was on the committee. 19 20 Do you know what --HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Go ahead. 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. People were 22 thinking that if you got a shuffle then the next person 23 24 I got a shuffle. 25 MR. WATSON: No, I remember it. I practiced during that time, too, and remember it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And so the question came and they said, well -- the discussion was that, you know, the shuffle ensures the randomness, and although our system is designed to be so fair and blind and everything, that this -- in some counties it's blinder than it ought to be; and so we decided, the committee decided, that you should just have one shuffle. The court -- either party could have and that was it.

MR. WATSON: Thanks. That answers my question.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right.

number of the proponents of the shuffle have made comments about things that happen in smaller communities. If the Court wants to leave it in those counties where -- you know, say populations of less than 150,000 people, I'm okay with that; but it does seem to me to be a real redundancy in counties like Dallas, Harris, Travis, Bexar, where you're not going to have the service -- first, there is no allegation of jury rigging that's been made, and you don't have the problems that others have expressed.

Final observation, Richard Orsinger and others have talked about there is no evidence of abuse.

The rule doesn't require the district clerk or any person

to keep -- it doesn't require written order, so we don't really know how frequently shuffles are occurring out 2 there. 3 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. I'm fixing 4 5 to have to stop, because we're going to -- we're beginning to repeat ourselves, and I think it's important that we 6 have the people here, we've got everybody here that's 7 heard all of this. If you have something that hadn't been said, I mean, like my preacher, he just keeps talking to me and talking to me and really hadn't done much good so 10 far, but we just need to know which direction we're going, 11 and that's what he tells me. So let's bring it to a vote. Now, what Levi 13 suggests sounds very good, but we don't have that before us whether we eliminate -- that hadn't been studied, eliminate it in certain counties. We have the vote here. 16 Do we just point-blank do away with it, or do we retain 17 it, and that's the vote? 18 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: Mr. Chairman? 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yes. 20 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: Is it possible 21 that we could get some indication from the vote as to whether that's a point of interest for some further research, that is whether it would be --24 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, if it is retained 25

and somebody wants the committee to consider certain things, just like we did earlier, it certainly can be 2 considered, but all we have before us today is whether it 3 goes or whether it stays, and so that's the vote. All in 4 favor of --5 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I have one last 6 Does this issue split out differently between lawyers as opposed to judges? 8 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I really haven't polled, but from what I have heard it generally has, but not in --10 11 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Because the 12 only --VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I haven't run my own 13 14 poll, so I don't know. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I would like for 15 us to at least be aware of the notion that some issues are 16 17 more important to one segment than to another, and I just wonder whether this is more of a lawyer's issue and maybe 18 19 a clerk's issue than a judge's issue. 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm going to tell you hearsay because I try to get that in in trial all the time 21 and can't, but I heard somebody else that told me somebody 22 23 else heard that the lawyers were for keeping it and the judges were against it. Now, that's triple hearsay, so 24 25 that makes it admissible.

Okay. All in favor of doing away with the 1 2 shuffle rule please raise your hand. Twelve. All in favor of retaining the shuffle rule 3 raise your hand. Twelve. 4 Twelve to twelve. 5 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And Alistair's vote is 6 7 off the record. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I didn't vote. 8 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm sorry. 13. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Can we have a voice 10 vote to be clear? 11 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I might just state for 12 the record, whether the Court wants to receive it or not, 13 Alistair, who heard the argument, he is for keeping the shuffle rule, whether that counts or not. 16 MR. ORSINGER: Buddy, can I also put in the record that I looked around the table, and I didn't see 17 any judges vote in favor of keeping the shuffle rule. 18 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: I did. 19 MR. ORSINGER: You did? Okay. Then one. 20 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: One appellate court 21 22 justice. MR. MUNZINGER: Did the Chair vote? 23 MS. SWEENEY: And you also had two 24 25 abstentions among the judges.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, when I voted I 1 thought it was tied, but the vote would have been tied. 2 It would be 14 with me voting. Yeah. No, I didn't vote. 3 13 to 12, but if the Chair had voted I would have voted 4 for keeping it, would have made it 14. And Alistair's 5 would have been 15. 7 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Though it might not be the issue before us, so we don't have to return to this unless the Court expressly asks us, might we take a vote on modifying the right to a shuffle so that it applies only in counties with populations of less than some 11 number? 12 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No, I can't take a vote 13 I can say that if someone has a suggestion for 14 on that. the committee to consider on modifying that, in other 15 16 words, not doing away with the rule but modifying it to certain extent, well, then let's have it. Let's give it 17 to Paula and have the committee consider it, but what would -- all right. I'm sorry, go ahead. 20 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: That would be my 21 request then to have the committee --22 MS. SWEENEY: Counties of how much do you 23 want it? HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: What is -- let's 24 25 see --

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: We've talked about 1 this for an hour. How about just change the proposal just 2 a little bit and see if that changes the mix? 3 strongest argument made here was South Texas and some 4 corrupt counties. 5 MS. SWEENEY: Well, I didn't make the 6 Panhandle argument, but it applies in the Panhandle, too, 7 the other way. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: The problem is the 9 committee hasn't even studied that. It hasn't come before 10 the subcommittee, and so we already did the same thing. 11 So let's go through the process we ordinarily go through 12 before we change things. We went through the process to 13 determine whether we keep the rule. We went through the process on the language, and that's the beginning, so 15 we'll begin there. If somebody has something to suggest 16 to Paula then I asked that that committee consider those 17 modifications, whether they would recommend them or not, 18 and we can vote on it. 19 20 MS. SWEENEY: I've got a list of six things, and I'll ask you if you want me to add a seventh, but I think it is fairly generated by the discussion. One is look at the issue of why it's only counties with 23 interchangeable juries; two is the questionnaire issue; 24 three is when does voir dire start; four is the brief for 25

```
Judge Benton about the historical basis for the rule; five
   is -- well, no, five is the one I'm going to suggest so
   I'll do that next. The five, other is counties less than
3
   some number, and I'm going to suggest that we debate
4
   whether it can be drafted subject to Batson, that shuffles
5
   may be made subject to a Batson challenge because I think
6
   there is a legitimate concern there, and if Batson
 7
   objections were appropriate that might cure some problems,
   so I would like the subcommittee to talk about that.
9
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Tracy, did --
10
11
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That was going
   to be my request.
                                     That's what I was going
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
13
            You had not just that but you had others.
                                                        Were
14
   there others you suggested?
15
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I think if we
16
   have a Batson protection on the shuffle that would go a
17
   long way, so that was going to be my suggestion.
18
19
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Good cause, I mean, show
   or something. I don't know. All right. Go ahead.
20
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
21
                                        There is a case
   called Miller, et al, the U.S. Supreme Court.
22
23
                 MS. SWEENEY:
                               Yeah.
24
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: And in that case they
   were critical of the Texas jury shuffle in connection with
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a Batson challenge. In that case they reversed the Fifth Circuit's denial of a certificate of appealability in a habeas corpus case, and in part they reversed the case because they thought that the Texas prosecutor's use of the jury shuffle could be included in an analysis as to 5 whether the Batson challenge was valid. 7 I say that for two reasons. One is I think this vote was very close, and I don't know exactly what the tally was and who was voting and who was not voting, but -- and I also say that in response to that, you know, 11 there is simply no evidence of abuse, because I think the United States Supreme Court concluded at least in one case that it was something that merited looking at. 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What was the date of 14 15 that? HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: About a year or 16 17 two ago. 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: There is a law review -not a law review. A State Bar Journal 1994 article that questioned the jury shuffle and Batson. I think it was a '94 article, and I can't remember who wrote it. 21 MS. SWEENEY: In the Bar Journal? 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Pardon? 23 24 MS. SWEENEY: In the Bar Journal? 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Uh-huh. 1994, and they

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talked about Batson, and they also mentioned David's point
   about we were the only state that was right.
                                                Or, no, that
2
   we were the only state that did that. Okay.
3
                               We will meet and report back.
                 MS. SWEENEY:
4
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
5
                                     Okay.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Out of curiosity, is the
6
   criminal shuffle process similar to the civil shuffle
7
8
   process?
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          Yes.
9
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Okay. All right.
                                                         Let's
10
   get back to where we were.
11
                 MR. ORSINGER: About e-filing?
12
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Back on the front
13
14
  burner.
                 MR. ORSINGER: We're back on Rule 21a, and I
15
   think we had without vote but by kind of consensus decided
   that we will not have a deemed signature on -- of service
17
   and instead we will have a signature requirement that's
18
   already in the rule and will define signature elsewhere.
19
   That's the first underlined change on the second page.
20
   These are not numbered, mine aren't, but 21a.
21
                 Now, after that is a sentence that says
22
   "Every certification of service by electronic transmission
23
   must include the filer's e-mail address, the recipient's
24
   e-mail address, and the date and the time of service."
25
```

```
So, I mean --
1
2
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What page are you on?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, mine is not numbered,
3
4
   but it's Rule 21a, and it's the last underlined change.
5
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Oh, I see.
                 MR. ORSINGER: The second to last underlined
6
7
   change I think we have developed a principle that we're
   going to leave the signature requirement in the rule as
   originally designed, and we're just going to deal with
   electronic signature separately, and that would have
10
   uniform application.
11
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. You're talking
12
  about line four from the top, which says "signed."
13 l
                 MR. ORSINGER: You know, Buddy, I don't
14
15
          My version and your version are looking different.
   If you would look at the last underlined sentence --
16 l
17
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                      "In case of service by
   electronic transmission certification is deemed to be
1.8
19
   signed."
20
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                No.
                                      That's not the last
   underlined sentence in my draft.
21
22
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: What rule are you
23
   looking at?
24
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                 21a.
                                            I'm with you.
25
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                      21a.
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MR. ORSINGER: Okay. The last underlined 1 sentence merely requires that the sender include in the 2 certificate of service the sender's e-mail address and the 3 recipient's e-mail address and the date and time of 4 service. Is there any controversy about that? 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Sarah. 6 7 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Did we change the previous -- on the previous page, the sentence where it was the recipient's designated e-mail address? MR. ORSINGER: Yes, we -- I think kind of by 10 acclamation we put "recipient's designated e-mail 11 address." 12 I didn't realize we 13 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: finished with that sentence. I think it needs to say 14 something more like "the e-mail address designated by the 15 16 recipient for service under Rule 21a." VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Richard, did 17 you hear what she said? 18 19 MR. ORSINGER: I'm sorry. I missed it. 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Repeat it so he can --21 I'm sorry, Sarah. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: What people had 22 23 said on the second underlined sentence in 21a was "recipient's designated e-mail address." 24 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. He did agree to 25

that earlier. 1 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think it needs to 2 be "the e-mail address designated by the recipient for 3 service" because, as Tracy pointed out earlier, I thought it was a good point, I imagine law firms are going to have 5 one e-mail address that is their designated e-mail address for service, a lot of law firms are. So I think the same change should be made to this in the certification. 8 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Might want to fix 9 10 that just in the next underlined sentence where it says, "Service by electronic transmission to the recipient's 11 e-mail address may only be affected where the recipient has agreed to receive electronic service." Maybe insert there "has designated an e-mail address for purposes of 14 15 service" and then go onto the rest of the sentence. 16 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: pleadings? I mean, we have to show where it's going to be 17 designated. 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Let's be sure Richard 19 follows. 20 21 MR. ORSINGER: The problem with Lamont's fix there is that wouldn't apply when the court orders it. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Then you need to put it --24 25 MR. ORSINGER: Why don't we have a separate

```
sentence that we add on saying that "e-mail service may be
2
   effective only to the e-mail address specified by the
   receiver."
3
                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY:
                                            "For service."
4
                 MR. ORSINGER: "Specified for service."
5
6
   Otherwise --
7
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Carl has the answer,
   Richard.
8
                 MR. HAMILTON: I have just got a question.
9
   My question is if you have a law firm that has one common
11
   e-mail how do you designate a particular lawyer's e-mail
12
   address other than the firm's address?
13
                                It's up to the receiver, but
                 MR. ORSINGER:
   if you're the receiver and you choose to have all your
14
15
   e-mails come to your receptionist, you know, for the whole
16 l
   law firm, that's your choice. If you want the lawyer's
17
   incoming e-mail to go to the legal assistant, then you
   specify the legal assistant's e-mail. If you want them to
18
19
   come to you personally, you specify your e-mail.
20
   your choice.
21
                 MR. HAMILTON:
                                Okay.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. You have the
22
23
   language to give us and where you put it. You would put
24
   it in a separate sentence?
                                        I would suggest that
25
                 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah.
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rather than try to put it in -- or debate about whether to
  put it in two or three places that we just add a sentence
   that says e-mail it -- "service by electronic transmission
 3
   shall be to the e-mail address designated by the
   recipient" -- what did you say?
 5
                 HONORABLE DAVID GAULTNEY: "Designated for
 6
 7
   service."
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. "To the e-mail address
 8
   designated by the recipient for service." Okay. So the
 9
   thought is, subject to the JCIT wanting to put it in a
10
   different place in this rule maybe, is just to say
11
   "service by electronic transmission may be only to" or do
12
   we say "shall be"?
13
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, "may be only" and
14
   "shall" are both mandatory, aren't they?
15
                 MR. ORSINGER: "Shall be to"?
16
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's a shorter way to
17
18
   say it.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Are we going to decide
19
   right now where we're going to put it? Is that what you
201
   want to do, Lisa?
21
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Let's keep going.
22
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Then let's move on to
23
24
   Rule 45.
25
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Wait, wait.
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I'm sorry. I had a question on the -- on the "every
 1
   certificate of service by electronic transmission must
 2
   include the filer's e-mail address, the recipient e-mail
 3
 4
   address, and the date and time of service." If I am
   serving -- choosing to serve through Texas Online, will
 5
   Texas Online give date and time of service? I mean, how
 6
 7
   am I going to know -- I know date, but how am I going to
   know time of service from Texas Online?
 9
                 MS. HOBBS:
                             That's always been my problem
10
   with that sentence, too.
11
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I mean, if I'm
   just personally sending it I know what time I sent it,
13
   but --
                 MR. ORSINGER: Don't you get an e-mail?
14
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: -- if I'm
15
   going through a provider for service --
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: Don't we get an e-mail
   indicating the time of the service?
18 l
19
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, they're
   supposed to give you an e-mail, but I couldn't certify as
   to what time that was. I mean, Texas Online sends me an
21
   e-mail after the fact saying that they did it, but I
22
   couldn't include it in my certificate of service.
23
                 MS. HOBBS: It also seems like this is a
24
25 move towards more specificity as opposed -- I mean, it
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kind of goes back to our conversation earlier of how much
   specificity do we think we need in the certificate of
2
  service.
3
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, do we need -- do we
4
  have date in an ordinary certificate of service?
5
                 MS. HOBBS: Date, but not time.
6
7
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Yes.
                 MR. ORSINGER: We do have the date, but not
8
          So we don't need the time. Does everybody agree we
9
   time.
  take out time?
10
11
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, if you can't give
   it then how are you going to do it?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Then that's a simple
13
14
   one. Ready to go on to Rule 45?
15
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     All right.
16
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON:
                                        Well --
17
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You're going to back us
18 up?
                             I ran it by him first because he
19
                 MR. LOPEZ:
20
   can say it better than I can.
21
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Carlos had a good
   point, and that is we've all been in a situation where,
   you know, either pro se litigant or whatever the situation
   is where the original information you got for service is
24
25
   no longer good, and it might be the same situation here
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where if there is a -- you're trying to serve through making electronic service to the designated recipient's address, but for whatever reason it doesn't work, and you know it doesn't work as the server, either their computer is down or you get a rejection notification back or whatever.

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6

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I mean, could we account for that -- or the e-mail address changes or the server goes down or their ISP provider isn't -- you know, it's not their fault, but you can't effect service, and you as the sender know that you're not getting service.

MS. HOBBS: What do you do when the fax 13 | machine won't pick up?

Well, what do you do? MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: You sent it to the address specified that they've designated or you served it in the manner that they've -but you know it's not effective. You don't know it doesn't work.

MR. LOPEZ: The difference is if the fax doesn't go through, you don't really have proof of that. If the e-mail rebounds from their server because the mailbox is full, you know it's their fault. And I know that sounds harsh, but if we're going to talk about constructive receipt at some point, I mean --

MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I don't know what the

answer is, but I think it's a legitimate issue to try to solve; that is, if you send the e-mail and it doesn't go 2 3 through for whatever reason. It's not always the recipient's fault. It may be that the ISP was down. 4 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Where we don't have 5 6 answers we're just going to let Richard take a look at it, and we're going to go on. If we have got a problem and we have answers we're going to change it with language, but that will be one thing he will have to look at. 9 10 MR. LOPEZ: One other technical issue that I think is valid, but maybe someone who knows more about 11 technical will tell me I'm wrong, is that depending on how good their server is, your records may show it was sent at 3:00 p.m., but their record is going to show it was 14 15 received at 9:00 p.m., and that may make a -- you know, 16 that date may make a difference. I don't know how you deal with that. 17 18 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We're going to deal with 19 it when it happens. 20 MR. HAMILTON: Because we've got that one rule that says if it's received after 5:00 it's considered 21 the following day. 22 MR. ORSINGER: We have a similar problem 23 24 when you start the fax at 4:59 and end it at 5:20. 25 that before or after 5:00? We'll have to consider that,

and just for clarification, it's not always because you haven't emptied your e-mail. Sometimes if the attachment 2 is too large it will bounce because it's too large and you 3 don't even know it's bounced. 4 MR. LOPEZ: Or if it has a virus. 5 6 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So I quess we'll have 7 to consider putting that in somewhere. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah, problem No. 2. 8 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Rule 45. Under the 9 current rules of procedure there are certain prescriptions for a pleading, but right now it includes a requirement 11 that they be in writing on 8 1/2 by 11-inch paper. That has to be changed if we're going to have electronic 13 14 filing, so what the JCIT did was to say that it would -on (d), 45(d), it would be "on paper or electronically 15 16 filed with the clerk by transmitting them through Texas Online." So that adds electronic filing as an additional 17 method of filing. Jane. 18 19 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Can we just say "on paper or be electronically filed with the clerk"? Do we have to say "by transmitting them through Texas Online," because --22 23 MS. WILSON: Yes. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, okay. 24 we define Texas Online somewhere, because Texas Online is

```
a vendor.
1
2
                 MR. ORSINGER: No, it's not.
3
  government agency.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: State of Texas.
 4
          It's a government agency that's not anywhere
5
   Okay.
   defined in these rules.
 7
                 MS. HOBBS: It's defined in the statute.
   It's defined in statute.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Its short name is
 9
  Texas Online to be used -- okay.
10
11
                 MS. HOBBS:
                             I think so.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Do we need to tell
12
   somebody where to go to get to Texas Online?
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: You know, if anybody is going
14
   to do this they're going to call an electronic service
15
   provider who is going to handle all that. You don't
   actually file it with Texas Online. You subscribe to some
17
   of the vendors and then they kind of handle it.
18
                 That's true.
19
20
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You do.
                                                        You
   don't send it to Texas Online.
22
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I know.
                                                 So then why
   do we need to say through Texas Online, or do we --
23
24
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Because that's
   the only one the court is going to accept.
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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Like if you tried to e-mail the district clerk directly, that does not count as electronic filing. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I understand. And what I'm trying to say is for all of the people in the state of Texas that are not as savvy with all of this stuff and as informed, is there a way to inform them? 7 mean, if you say through Texas Online, that is not necessarily going to clue somebody in that they need to 9 get a subscription service and get it filed through Texas 10 Online. That's not going to give them any helpful information. 12 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Stephen has got the 13 14 answer. Well, I don't know that it's the 15 MR. TIPPS: whole answer, but should we have a comment to Rule 45 that 16 17 provides some basic explanation concerning what Texas 18

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Online is and where you go to find out more information about it?

I don't think we owe it to MR. ORSINGER: the lawyers of Texas to tell them that. If they want to electronically file they need to go to a CLE conference or call up the guys that are bombarding them with advertisements. I mean, how much technology do we need to explain in the Rules of Procedure?

MS. HOBBS: I mean, was there at one point 1 confusion about what a telecopier machine was? 2 assuming so, but we didn't write our rules as "Here is how 3 you fax something." I mean, at some point you have to 4 assume a level of knowledge. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What's your next rule, 6 7 Richard? MR. ORSINGER: Okay. I just want to point 8 out that the preservation of the paper requirement is the 9 same as it used to be, but it's now in a separate 10 paragraph, and then you've come over here to try to 11 address the same formatting issues about the 8 1/2 by 11 12 page, and the effort here is to say that if you do file 13 electronically it has to be formatted so that if printed 14 it comes out on 8 1/2 by 11-inch. 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Why don't you say "must 16 17 be approximately 8 1/2" instead of "shall measure" and 18 make "shall be" "must be" in the first paragraph you 19 mentioned? 20 MR. ORSINGER: Well, the paper pleading is "shall measure." 21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, that just sounds 22 23 like a stupid way to talk. MR. ORSINGER: Well, okay. You want to 24 change both of the rules, or do you want them to state it 25

```
stupidly one time and --
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You say "must" or
 2
   "shall." Somebody tells me either one I figure I've got
 3
   to do it.
 4
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: "Must be" will be fine
 5
 6
   in all places.
 7
                 MR. ORSINGER: Bill, you're probably the one
   that wrote the old language. It's just it's in a new
 8
   paragraph and you don't like it.
10
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      No, this language was
11
   written by somebody who wrote a statute many, many years
12
   ago.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. We'll accept
13
14 your language. Write it down. What's the next rule?
                 MR. ORSINGER: Oops, I better write it down,
15
   Buddy, unless somebody else is making a record of what's
   going on. What are you saying?
17
18
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm saying in the first
19l
   paragraph after the (a), (b), (c), (d), say "Paper
   pleadings must be approximately 8 1/2" and "must be
21
   signed."
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Why does it --
22
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And electronic at the
23
   top of -- well, we may not be formatting the same way.
24
25
                 MR. ORSINGER: Formatted for printing, must
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```
be formatted for printing on a --
 2
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      Yeah.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, paper is either 8 1/2
 3
   by 11 or it's 8 1/2 by 14, right? I mean, we're not
 4
   approximating the paper size, are we?
 5
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON:
                                        But the formatting
 6
   thing doesn't make any sense. I mean, you can print
   anything on 8 1/2 by 11 paper.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. It could be just
 9
   real small.
10
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON:
                                         Yeah.
11
                 MR. ORSINGER: I quess the point is that if
12
   the clerk is one of those clerks that prints it on paper
13
   it needs to print out on 8 1/2 by 11 paper, not 8 1/2 by
   14 paper.
15
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: But that just depends
16
17
   upon how they set their printer set up.
18
                 MR. ORSINGER: No, we don't want the clerks
   to have to reformat the document. When you do a word
19 l
   processing document or when it comes in from whoever it
20
   is, it should come in on something that prints on 8 1/2 by
21
22
   11 page, right?
                 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Everything prints on
23
   8 1/2 by 11 page. It just may be more pages, but it will
24
25
   print.
```

MR. LOPEZ: It may be legible or not. 1 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: If the clerk is doing it incorrectly I think it will be corrected. I don't think 3 we ought to talk about how far is the margin and how far to the top you're going to go and how far to the bottom 5 and have a --6 7 MR. ORSINGER: Dianne, give us some help I mean, is this -- what is life going to be like 8 without this? 9 MS. WILSON: Because there is still a lot of 10 11 judges in Texas that require the paper to be printed out and we don't want someone to set their margins up that could take an 8 1/2 by 14 and then everybody prints it on 13 8 1/2 by 11 and then your print is so small that you can't 14 read it. So it needs to be legible. 15 16 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: If it has to print so that it's a certain font, that's a different question than 17 18 what size does the paper have to be that it's printing on. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The paper change was 19 just to reflect the change that we made some years back 20 21 for file cabinets, and it doesn't really explain what we 22 mean by 8 1/2 by 11. 23 MS. WILSON: Well, following the Federal 24 guidelines of 8 1/2 by 11. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What language should we 25

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use there so that it will conform to what is happening?
                 MR. LOPEZ: "Formatted such that it is
2
   legible when printed in the 8 1/2 by 11 format."
3
                 MR. ORSINGER: Aren't we being overly picky
 4
   here? I mean who doesn't understand this?
 5
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Everybody understands.
 6
   Just change the "shall" to "must" and we'll be fine.
 7
                                Okay.
                                       Thank you.
 8
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. That's good.
 9
                 MR. LOPEZ: Let the record reflect it's
10
11
   Friday afternoon.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's the best
12
   suggestion I've heard all afternoon.
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. On Rule 57, this has
14
   to do with -- the first underline has to do with
15
   including, if available, your telecopier number and e-mail
16
17
   address. We are probably going to have to rethink this.
   If the listing of an e-mail address constitutes your
18
   consent to being served by e-mail then you should not
19
   mandate an e-mail.
201
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So this whole thing,
21
   signing of pleading --
22
                 MR. ORSINGER: No. You're skipping to the
23
   second point. The first point is that we have now decided
24
   that putting the e-mail on the pleading is going to be
25
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your way of indicating consent to receiving service by e-mail. We, therefore, cannot mandate that everyone put an e-mail address on their pleading, so we basically have 3 to take that off and have another rule somewhere else that 4 says if you voluntarily put your e-mail address there by 5 your signature block you're consenting to service at that 6 7 address. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Actually, you wouldn't 8 have to do that, Richard, because you just said the 9 operative phrase, "if you consent to service by e-mail." 10 If that was inserted immediately after the word "and" it 11 would be much like "and, if available, telecopier number." 12 "And if you consent to service by e-mail, your e-mail 13 address." 14 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's good. 15 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: That is good. 16 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Great suggestion. 17 Now, the next sentence is another signature deal, 18 Okay. and we've decided to move that off in the signature rule. 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Skip it. Skip it. 20 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Rule 74, we move away 21 from the use of the term "papers" to the use of the word "documents" because obviously electronic documents are 23 documents but they're not paper. Richard. 24 25 MR. MUNZINGER: What do you mean by "on

electronic media" in the last sentence as distinct from just saying "submitted electronically"? That's the only 2 time I've seen it so far in the rule, and I didn't 3 understand what you meant by it, "on electronic media." MR. ORSINGER: Let's ask the JCIT what that 5 significance is. 6 MS. WILSON: 7 Where? HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Rule 74, the last 8 sentence. 9 10 MR. ORSINGER: I can tell you that one possible electronic media would be a disk, and so if the 11 judge says, "I want all your pleadings on disk" --12 MS. WILSON: Correct. Or FTP or USB or any 13 of the above means of electronically giving you the 14 document. They could bring it in on a hard drive and the 15 judge or the clerk could put it into their computer and download it into the system. 17 18 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Now, what is the rationale for not letting judges to accept e-filing 19l directly with judges? 20 MS. WILSON: We didn't want to bypass the 21 clerk of court, and currently the -- all electronic 22 filings come through the clerk and then it's submitted to the judge either electronically or by paper, and by doing 24 that that would bypass and you may not have a public 25

```
record then of that record, of that document.
2
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Judge Hecht.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: How often does it
3
4
   happen, let me ask the clerks, two clerks, that someone
   files directly with a judge?
5
6
                 MS. WILSON: Electronically they don't.
7
   paper they have. At the time they're in the courtroom,
   they'll hand the document to the judge.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But outside the
9
10
   courtroom?
                 MS. WOLBRUECK: Not outside the courtroom
11
   normally.
12
                 MS. WILSON: Not that I know of.
13
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: You could do it
14
  outside the courtroom, can't you?
15
                 MS. WOLBRUECK: You can file it outside of
16
   the courtroom, but normally it's done inside the
17
18
   courtroom.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: I know, but you can
19
20
   go find a judge --
21
                 MS. WOLBRUECK:
                                 Yes.
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: -- and if he'll
22
23
   take it --
                 MS. WOLBRUECK: Yes, the rule allows it.
24
25
                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But how often does
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that happen?
                 MS. WOLBRUECK: I've never known it to
2
3
   happen.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I've done it myself.
4
5
                 MR. LOPEZ: Judge Evans does it. He will
6
   accept it.
7
                 MR. MUNZINGER: The use of the word
   "pleadings" on the next to the last line, above you've
   said "the filing of pleadings, other documents," and now
   you've limited the submission of pleadings only to the
10
11
   judge, and I would suggest that you ought to be uniform.
   What we're talking about may be requested court charges,
   motions for directed verdict, or something like that that
   he wants electronically, but the use of the word
14
15
   "pleadings" seems to me to limit the scope of the rule
16
   unnecessarily.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Can we substitute "documents"
17
  for "pleadings"?
18
                                 Yeah, I mean, but then
19
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
   again, you've got pleadings and documents to distinguish.
   You've distinguished three types of filings, pleadings,
   documents, exhibits.
22
                             Say "other documents."
                 MR. TIPPS:
23
                 MR. ORSINGER: Why don't we just take
24
   "pleadings" and "exhibits" out? "The filings of documents
25
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as required by these rules"? "The filing of documents as
   required by these rules"?
2
                 MR. MUNZINGER: There's almost -- I'm not in
3
  favor of distinguishing -- I mean, of doing away with the
4
   significance of pleadings. I think pleadings is a word of
5
   art and has significance to the practitioner.
                                                  All I was
6
  pointing out was, is that the way this rule is written,
   it's -- I don't want to say it's inconsistent, but it can
   create a problem. If you just have the same phrase, "from
9
   accepting and considering pleadings, other documents, and
10
   exhibits submitted on electronic media during trial" you
11
   don't have a problem with it.
12
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just add that instead of
13
   taking it out of the others.
14
                 MR. MUNZINGER: Yeah. I wouldn't change the
15
   word "pleadings." I think that is significant.
16
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Just add it and leave
17
18
  pleadings in there.
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                               Is there a
19
   reason "during trial" is put on there at the end of the
20
   sentence, "during trial"? I mean, what if they sent me
21
   things before trial?
22
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I don't know.
                                                    Richard,
23
24
   do you know?
25
                 MR. BOYD: Like courtesy copies.
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HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, courtesy copy.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What, Jeff?

MR. BOYD: I think what we're really talking about is the difference between filing the document and giving the judge a courtesy copy of the document; and I know, for example, in Travis County there is this standing order on discovery docket; and that standing order requires that you send a copy of your document to the judge who is assigned the discovery docket for that day, that week, that upcoming docket. So we don't want to do anything, I don't think, that makes it sound like you can never submit something directly to the judge. We just want to be clear that what we're talking about is that by doing it you're not, quote-unquote, filing the document.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It doesn't relieve you of the filing of it and service. All right.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I think we should eliminate the last sentence, because to me it confused the -- what does a judge -- what is "a judge accepting and considering"? What does that mean? I think we should only have judges, you know, consider things that are filed; and we allow filing with the court clerk, we allow filing with the judge, and I guess the only time outside

the courtroom I could think of is when there are temporary or emergency hearings and the judge might have accepted for filing documents.

But I don't -- this last rule to me seems to indicate that we're going to have this other category of documents that judges can consider that aren't courtesy copies, because courtesy copies are copies of things that are filed, and that judges can consider them; and I think that's -- then that raises a whole host of problems about whether these things that were accepted and considered are part of the appellate record. You know, if they're not filed, they're probably not.

MR. ORSINGER: What if we -- the first underlined sentence, what if we said that "a document electronically transmitted to the judge is not filed," or words to that effect, or you can only electronically file with the clerk and then say nothing about how you give copies to the judge?

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Actually, you've already said you can only electronically file with the clerk in 45(d). That was part of the JCIT's statement over here as to why they added that language on 45(d).

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I don't have a problem with "A judge may not accept electronically

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transmitted documents for filing."
2
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Okay.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        Because I don't think
3
   we ought to have to rely on judges to receive an
4
   electronic copy of something and then put that burden on
5
   them to forward it to the clerk for filing.
6
7
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Right.
                                        I agree.
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: But I don't think we
8
  need the second sentence, because that seems to indicate
   that there's going to be this other category of documents
10
   that are not filings that judges can accept and consider.
11
                 MR. ORSINGER: You know, I don't interpret
12
   the language to prohibit it anyway, and by saying it
13
   doesn't prohibit it it creates more problems probably than
15
   it cures.
                 MR. LOPEZ: If they're considering it then
16
   it ought to be filed.
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: I agree we ought to take it
18
19
   out.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Take it out.
                                                     There's a
20
   bigger problem, though.
21
                 MR. ORSINGER: What's that?
22
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: When you go back and
23
24 look at 21, the first paragraph in 21, it says, "Every
   pleading, unless presented during a hearing or trial,
25 l
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shall be filed with the clerk of the court in writing" and that is, you know, a little bit redundant with the first sentence of 74, but I think it may point out that it doesn't say in 21 "may be filed electronically." It just contemplates in the thing we're going to worry about later that the filing will be electronic, and this just points up a problem that we have with these rules not meshing very well, and they just don't. Maybe we ought to try to clean that up some at least.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, if I can respond, Bill, Rule 21 is the general rule about how you file with the clerk, and Rule 74 is an existing rule about when you can file with the court. Nobody wants to change the fact that you can file paper documents with the judge directly. That's already there. We're not changing that. All we want to say is, "Although we're permitting electronic filing with the clerk, it is only permitted with the clerk. We are not permitting you to electronically file with the judge," and so we probably should say that so that people won't think, "Oh, hey, electronic filing substitutes for paper filing throughout the rules, so I can just e-mail this to the judge under the authority of Rule 74."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. Let me respond this way. Am I wrong about the first paragraph of 21 not

```
saying anything about electronic filing?
1
                                It doesn't.
2
                 MR. ORSINGER:
3
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So it's wrong, if we're
  going to allow pleadings to be filed electronically?
4
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, it just
 5
   says "shall be filed."
 6
 7
                 MR. ORSINGER: Why is it wrong?
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It says "shall be filed
 8
  with the clerk of the court in writing."
                 MR. ORSINGER: What's wrong about that?
10
   Because we're considering an electronic document to be
11
   written. It's not signed, or maybe it is, depending on
12
   what the rule says, but it's certainly in writing.
13
                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Then why did we take
14
15
   "in writing" out of 45(d)? I think we should take "in
16 writing" out of the paragraph that Bill is talking about.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Or just say in -- I
17
18 think "writing" and I don't think electronically is
19 writing in the same sense that the term has been used in
20 all of these rules.
                                Then we better say "filed
21
                 MR. ORSINGER:
   with the clerk of the court on paper or electronically."
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Just eliminate
23
   "in writing."
24
25
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                                Okay.
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MS. HOBBS: How do you file something
1
2
   orally?
3
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, I mean,
   file -- you can't file something orally.
4
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And beyond that, 74 and
5
   21, which was, you know, rewritten pretty substantially
6
  along the way, do overlap. 74's first sentence is not
   just about you can file things with the judge.
                                                   It says
   "the filing of pleadings, other documents" and other
   documents aren't dealt with in -- "all other documents"
10
   aren't dealt with in 21. "Shall be made by filing them
11
   with the clerk of the court, " which is a --
                 MR. ORSINGER: Can we get clarity on Tracy's
13
   suggestion that we say "shall be filed with the clerk of
   the court" and delete "in writing" so that we don't get
15
16
   balled up in argument?
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Somebody needs to just
17
   look at this and see where --
18
                 MR. ORSINGER: But, Bill, we're moving --
19
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- the contradictory
20
21
   language --
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                               -- through this part today.
22
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We're doing it now.
23
                 MR. ORSINGER: So simple fix is to take "in
24
   writing" out of the first paragraph of Rule 21 because you
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can't very well file an oral statement, and then we don't
  have to worry about whether an electronic document is
  written or not. So couldn't we just take "in writing" out
3
   and eliminate the technical problem and not lose anything?
4
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Where is the general
5
  rule that says you can file any document electronically?
6
7
                 MR. ORSINGER: On the very end of Rule 21 is
   your general authority to file electronically. Oops.
   That's not right. Excuse me. I withdraw that.
9
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      It ought to be in
10
   this -- if we can, it ought to be early. Say it, and it
11
   ought to be said early on and not left to Rule 74.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     In other words, maybe we
13
   put it with the rule talking about signature, maybe just a
   general rule, "document submitted otherwise."
15
16
                 MR. ORSINGER: No, it needs to be in Rule
   21.
17
18
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
                                 Doesn't 45(d) say that you
19 file electronically, "pleadings shall be" so-and-so?
20
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, that's only pleadings,
21
   though.
                                     That's only pleadings.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
22
                 MR. ORSINGER: Why don't we -- you know,
23
   it's inferential in the last -- in the underlined part of
24 l
25| the second to last paragraph of Rule 21 where it says, "in
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the case of a pleading, plea, motion, or application that
   is electronically filed, " so that implies you can do it,
2
  but it doesn't exclusively say you can do it.
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      I think that's one we
 4
5 were going to move to the general rule anyway.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Well, no, but we're moving it
6
   to the general rule because of the signature requirement,
 7
   but we still probably need an unqualified straightforward
   statement that you can electronically file it.
 9
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     Right. Tracy has
10
11
   been --
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I think
12
   that I've -- I'm taking back the idea that we should just
13
   delete "in writing," and I think we should put in the
14
   first paragraph of 21 "shall be filed with the clerk of
15
   the court on paper or by" -- "or be electronically filed
   with the clerk by transmitting through Texas Online, " just
17
   like we did in 45.
18
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That certainly improves
19
20
   it.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                      It improves it enough
21
   that you would approve of it?
22
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I've already said that
23
   I don't approve of this whole rule book, that it's in bad
24
   shape, and tinkering in this other stuff doesn't improve
25
```

the bad parts. 1 Buddy, I did 2 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: have one other comment. If we're making changes, can the 3 Court eliminate "him" and "he" for judge to the extent 4 5 possible? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's a good thing. 6 7 Carlos. 8 MR. MUNZINGER: Why? 9 MR. LOPEZ: At some point I think -- I may be wrong about this, but I think we may have to harmonize wherever it is in the Government Code that says that Judge 11 Evans can accept it on the courthouse square by putting it 12 in his hands. T mean --13 PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's in Rule 74. 14 15 MR. LOPEZ: Well, no, there's a Government Code provision that says judges can accept filing. 17 don't remember how it works, and it just says "filing" probably. It doesn't say electronic, it doesn't say 18 19 paper. We may need to just make sure to look and see how that reads to make sure it's still consistent with 20 21 whatever we end up doing to this. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Richard, 22 would you write that on the general thing when we're -- to 23 l look at the Government Code on that specific part? 24 I wish I could remember the 25 MR. LOPEZ:

section. I think it's 72 or 74. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: We don't have it before 2 us now anyway, so --3 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. We've got a special 4 request here to consider the proposition of proposed 5 orders being submitted directly to the judge as opposed to being filed with the clerk. What do we want to do about Do proposed orders have to be filed with the clerk with a copy to the judge? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Wait a minute. 10 proposal to do what now? 11 MR. ORSINGER: A proposed order. Right now 12 ordinarily proposed orders are sent to the judge because 13 you never know whether they're going to be signed or not; and then if they're signed they show up with the clerk; 15 and if they're not signed, they don't. That's my I don't know how anyone else practices, so the 17 practice. question becomes can you send a proposed order 18 electronically directly to the judge, or if you're going 19 to send it electronically do you have to send it to the 20 clerk and let the clerk submit it to the judge? 22 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I think it should be 23 handled like every other filing, and the judge should 24 consider filings, and proposed orders sent to the judge

may never make it into the file. I mean, if they were

25

sent to me they would probably never -- but parties like to have what they proposed to the judge in the file so 2 3 that --MR. ORSINGER: Well, then they can choose to 4 file them with the clerk if that's what they want, but if 5 they don't -- and I don't. I just would rather have the real order in there and then I will file an objection to it if I don't like it. So if I want it to be in the clerk's office, I file it with the clerk, but if I don't, I just mail it to the judge or drop it by. 10 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: But since when do we 11 say filings of the court, whether or not they become part 12 of the record turn on whether the litigants want them to 13 be part of the record? Anything that the judge sees ought 14 to be available to both parties. If you send -- both 15 parties and anybody else who comes to inspect the file. 17 MR. ORSINGER: Well, you're wanting to rewrite the rules on paper then, because the paper rules 18 don't require that right now. 19 20 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well --MR. ORSINGER: 21 Do they? 22 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: You know, if you're saying you're submitting things to the judge that don't go 23 through the clerk's office --24 25 MR. ORSINGER: Happens all the time. Ιt

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happens all the time. They mail them to the judge, they
  mail a copy to me, and if I don't like it, I've got three
  days to respond. Maybe I'm the only guy in Texas doing
3
  that, but I have lawyers on the other side doing it.
4
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Sarah has had her hand
5
  up. Go ahead, Sarah.
6
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: If you're going to
7
  add the sentence, the general permission to file
   electronically in 21, then you need to have some reference
   to 74(b).
10
                                To what?
11
                 MR. ORSINGER:
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 74(b).
12
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     74 (b).
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: Some reference in 21 to
14
   74(b)?
15
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: If you're going to
16
   add a general statement "may be filed on paper or
17
   electronically" it needs to be "electronically if
18
   permitted by 74(b), "because otherwise you've created a
   conflict between the two rules.
21
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 74(b) says "Documents
   that may not be electronically filed."
22
23
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So is the rule is
24 l
  every time there is an exception to the general rule, the
   general rule needs to state and cross-refer to the
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exception? 2 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: When they are 50 rules apart, yes. 3 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Well, I don't think 4 that's the policy we use normally. Normally we state a 5 general rule and if we have an exception we create the 6 exception. Well, generally 8 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: when you have a general rule and you have an exception in 9 this committee the exception has been in the same rule and 10 11 immediately followed the general rule. We don't generally 12 create a general rule in one rule and an exception in another rule 50 rules away. You think? 13 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's a 14 15 problem. 16 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We had a long discussion about Brian Garner not creating an exception in 17 a separate sentence, and that bothered a lot of people, 18 19 including me, but here we're creating an exception 50 20 rules away. 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm sorry. Carl. 22 MR. HAMILTON: I have two problems with Rule 23 The first one, it says, "a judge may not accept documents," and I'm not sure what the judge has to do to 24 25 | not accept if they're sent. Does he have to send them

back? But shouldn't we just say "the parties shall not attempt to file stuff with the court"? 2 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. That's 3 4 better. It's not filed. 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: MR. HAMILTON: Not what? 6 7 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It's not filed. MR. HAMILTON: Well, then the other problem 8 is the last sentence. It says, "The rule doesn't prohibit .9 judges from accepting and considering pleadings submitted 10 on electronic media during trial." Does that mean they 11 can bypass the clerk's office with the filing of that 12 pleading? 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: No. We talked about 14 15 that earlier and about that, that sentence, and when it was really started is it says it's basically a judge can't 16 accept something for filing. In other words, you just 17 say, "I'm going to give it to you and you file it." 18 the other was, the other sentence originally was put in 19 there "but a judge may consider certain things," but the 20 first it's prohibiting him from being the one you file it 21 22 with. 23 MR. ORSINGER: But, see, now Jane has said why don't we forget this argument by taking the sentence 24 25 out --

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I thought we did. 1 2 MR. ORSINGER: -- and we don't really need this sentence to make this work, and we can't eliminate 3 4 this debate by taking it out. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. And that was 5 what we decided to do. 6 7 MR. ORSINGER: So let's take it out. If you take it out will there 8 MR. LOPEZ: still be something explicitly that explains to them that just because you hand it to the judge not only doesn't 10 mean that it's filed, it's never considered filed? 11 It says right here. Is this 12 MR. ORSINGER: "A judge may not accept electronically explicit? 13 transmitted documents for filing." Isn't that enough? MR. LOPEZ: I would say change it to say 15 it's not considered filed. I mean, the judge is going to 16 hold his hand out if he wants to hold his hand out, but 17 that doesn't mean it's considered file so that it doesn't 18 turn on whether the judge decides physically to accept it 19 or not. 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Sarah. 21 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: To me the problem 22 is that this sentence is concentrating on what a judge may 23 or may not do --24 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: -- instead of on 1 what a party may and may not file. The sentence is fine 2 with me if you just changed it to say, "A party may not 3 electronically file documents with a judge." 4 5 MR. LOPEZ: Right. 6 MR. ORSINGER: But the previous sentence, 7 Sarah, says a judge may permit paper documents to be filed So it's elective with the judge on paper, but it's not elective with the judge electronically. Is that I mean, we're giving -- we're talking about 10 a problem? what the judge can and can't do on paper, but you don't 11 want to talk about what the judge can and can't do 12 electronically? 13 14 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But, Richard, I have no way of not accepting an e-mail with an attachment from a party in an appeal pending before the court. can't not accept it. It just comes in and it sits there. 17 So don't tell me I can't accept it because I have no 18 choice whether to accept it. Tell the party that the 19 party can send me e-mails with attachments all day long, 20 but that's not filing. 21 22 MR. LOPEZ: Right. MR. MUNZINGER: Good point. 23 MR. WOOD: If you'll go back to Rule 24 25 45(d) --

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 45(d)?

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MR. WOOD: 45(d), as in dog, we talked about "Pleadings in the district and county courts shall be on paper or be electronically filed with the clerk by transmission through Texas Online." That is the only way to file through Texas Online that will get the document to the clerk. That's the only place it goes. You cannot electronically file through Texas Online and have the document end up with a judge, and so to the extent that you have an attachment to an e-mail that goes to a judge, that's really not electronic filing as the rules perceive it.

That wouldn't even be electronic filing to a clerk, and all we're trying to do in Rule 74, "Filing with the court," is that we realize in the paper world that generally documents come into the clerk, but there is a rare occasion -- Professor Dorsaneo mentioned it -- where he filed himself. He found a judge outside of regular hours and filed, and we're trying to say here that since that rule is out there let's make it clear that electronic filing only works with clerks. It doesn't work with judges because Texas Online just isn't set up with judges.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 45 pertains to

pleadings. What about motions or briefs and so forth?

MR. WOOD: Yeah. We should -- the problem

here is that Rule 45 from the get-go says "pleadings," and Rule 74 talks about "pleadings and other papers," and 2 we've tried -- we had that problem before we started, but 3 I agree that a fix to it is to try and include pleadings 4 and everything else you can think of as traditionally on 5 paper and put that into the rule. 6 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And put that in 45? MR. WOOD: I think that would be an 8 improvement, yeah. 9 Let me just say that 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: where 74 and 75 and related rules about papers are 11 located, they're in the general rules on pleadings, and 12 they're really -- I don't know how they started out to 13 read, but they're about other papers beyond pleadings. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It would be better from 16 an overall organization for them to be in -- for rules, 17 including all filing rules, to be in the general rules, 18 and we could do some minor work just by moving some things 19 around that you wouldn't miss in the pleadings that would 20 go better in the general rules. Obviously not their fault 21 because this is the way it was organized when they got it to work from. 23 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's the problem. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But it's terrible and 25

should be improved to the extent we can do it without redoing the whole thing.

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VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right, because I can think, if I file a brief I don't really think of that as a pleading. I mean, maybe it is, but I don't think of it that way, so maybe there should be some, in one of these rules, general thing that includes all these things, and then you don't have to --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The place to put them 10 would be in the general rules of practice in district and county courts, which is where the motion rules are and where the service rules are. We don't have a filing rule exactly. We've got it talked about here and there, and that makes it difficult to put electronic filing in here.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And then we don't have to put what a judge -- maybe we talk about what a party may file, but do we need something in there that the judge can't consider? We've got something in there now that he can consider electronic media. I don't know what that means, but would we strike that sentence out or what would we do with that?

22 MR. ORSINGER: You're talking about the last 23 sentence in 74?

We talked about VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah. striking out.

MR. ORSINGER: We've struck that. The question that Sarah has on the floor is whether we ought to prohibit a party rather than a judge and then Bill is saying that this is all really in the wrong place in the rules. So what we're talking about now is not how to introduce electronic filing to the rules, but how to rewrite the rules involving paper and electronics so that they make more sense. Is that what we want to do?

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's what it sounds like to me.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I'm thinking about what if you're in trial and somebody -- you use the judge's e-mail and they send something to you and the judge's clerk gives it to you, and you're in trial, copies to him and the other lawyer, a brief on a point of evidence or something. The judge, he can consider that. I mean, you would give it in your argument. Couldn't he consider that?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, we don't have to say he can consider that any more than we have to say that if I give the judge a trial brief or a copy of a case he can consider it. I mean, we know he can consider it, or she, I guess, can consider it.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. But -- okay.

MR. HAMILTON: Buddy, you did raise one 1 other point, though, and that is if we say that the party cannot file anything with the judge electronically that 3 may be construed to prohibit you from sending a brief to the judge that he asks for electronically. 5 6 MR. ORSINGER: Could we say the sentence 7 that "a document electronically transmitted to a judge is not considered filed"? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yes. 9 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Must be filed with the 10 clerk. 11 MR. ORSINGER: We don't need to say that 12 because everything else on their requirement must be filed 13 with the clerk. This is just in the gate filing with the So couldn't we put a sentence -- instead of this 15 sentence couldn't we say, "A document electronically transmitted to a judge is not filed"? 17 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: But we don't want to get 18 into, I mean, you can file something or send it to the 19 judge and not send a copy to the other party or something. I mean, maybe just ignore that and say the right thing and 21 22 then have Bill's suggestion that we put --MR. ORSINGER: Well, we have an ethical 23 constraint about ex parte communications that normally 24 saves you from writing letters to the judge and calling 25

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him on the phone.
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2
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                     I know.
                 MR. ORSINGER: And neither one of those are
3
  protected in here, but if somebody abuses it, let's just
4
  take their law license.
5
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I understand.
6
                                                    I just
7
  don't want to give rise to something in here that --
                 MR. ORSINGER: I tell you what, we're
8
  violating -- I had an instruction from you not to rewrite
10 the entire Rules of Procedure, but just to try to fold in
   electronic filing. We're now rewriting the Rules of
11
  Procedure.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Just a little bit.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Just a little bit.
14
15
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Disregard what I said
   and remember what I said this morning. Let's go.
16
17
                 MR. ORSINGER: How about -- Sarah, are you
   still with us?
18
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
19
                                          I am.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. What if we were to
20
   take that sentence and say, "A document electronically
   transmitted to a judge is not filed or "is not considered
23
  filed"?
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: "Is not filed with
24
  the clerk."
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HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: "Is not considered 1 2 filed." MR. ORSINGER: Are you okay with that? 3 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Uh-huh. 4 I am. MR. LOPEZ: "Submitted only in electronic 5 form is not considered filed." 6 7 MR. ORSINGER: No, we don't have to worry The paper handles itself. about that. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Wait just a minute. 9 MS. WILSON: You had asked the question 10 about what we meant by electronic media. Some of the 11 courts, because of their setup electronically with all the 12 media in their courtrooms, that could be a DVD, a CD, a 13 video, anything like that. We didn't want to prohibit that from being presented in the courtroom. 15 l 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. All right. Proceed. Remember what I said this morning. Let's go 17 back. 18 19 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Let's move on to Important concept here that the time of filing 20 74(a). with the court system is considered to be the time that you transmit the document to the EFSP. We had a lot of talking about that, but they decided that the filing time 23 would not be when the electronic transmission reaches the 24 25 l clerk of the court, but it's when your pleading reaches

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the EFSP; and if there is some technical breakdown or
. 1
  whatever, it doesn't hurt you because your filing time is
   fixed when you get it to the party who interfaces with
  Texas Online.
4
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: And then if there is
5
   some date or other thing, we consider that later.
6
 7
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Is everybody okay with
 8
   that?
 9
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, but I want to
10 talk about the next one.
11
                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. What's the next one?
12
                 MR. DUGGINS:
                               Whoa, whoa.
13
                 MR. ORSINGER: Not okay.
                 MR. DUGGINS:
                               Well, you say "to an
14
   electronic" -- I mean, "to an electronic filing service
15
   provider," but it doesn't say for whom. Shouldn't that be
   "for Texas Online"? Suppose you send it to your private
17
   EFSP.
18
19
                 MR. ORSINGER: We could sure say that.
   don't know where EFSP is defined. Is it defined in state
   law anywhere?
21
                                     It's under the Texas
22
                 MS. WILSON: Yeah.
  Online, isn't it, Mike?
23 l
24
                 No, it is not. Sorry. We're just using
25 that term.
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MR. ORSINGER: Do you want to say "an EFSP
 1
   for Texas Online"?
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 3
                 MS. WILSON: Well, the EFSP is an
   independent vendor hired by the filer. It could be
 4.
 5
   anyone, and then they have --
                 MR. ORSINGER: Do they have to be approved
 6
 7
   by the state in order to do business?
 8
                 MS. WILSON: They have to be approved by the
 9
   Texas Online.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Why don't we just say
10
   "approved by the state," or who is it approved by?
11
                 MS. WILSON:
                              Texas Online.
12
.13
                 MR. DUGGINS:
                                No. "To an approved
   electronic filing service provider."
14
                 MR. ORSINGER: Who does the approving?
15
                 MS. WILSON: Texas Online.
16
                 MR. ORSINGER: Is "approved" okay or do we
17
   want to say "approved by Texas Online?" Just say
18
19
   "approved"?
                 MS. WILSON: "By Texas Online."
20
                 MR. ORSINGER: At the end of it, "service
21
   provider approved by Texas Online"?
221
23
                  MS. WILSON: Correct.
                  HONORABLE TOM GRAY: So is that why we knew
24
25 the date and time of service back in Rule 21a, is because
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that is defined over there as the time that it is provided
   to the EFSP?
3
                 MS. WILSON: Correct.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Bill, what's wrong
  with the next one?
5
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, (b), "when a
6
   clerk accepts," I don't like the idea of acceptance
   consistent with your idea that it's considered to have
9 been filed with the clerk.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Why don't we say "receives,"
10
   "when a clerk receives"?
11
                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
                                      Yeah.
                                             Something like
12
   that. Just to take the notion out of here that we could
13
14
   be prevented.
                 MR. ORSINGER: That it's discretionary.
15
   "When a clerk receives."
16
17
                 MS. WILSON: We have rejected one in our two
  years, two and a half years, because it was sent to the
18
19
   wrong county.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: How is that going to
20
21
   change it?
                 MS. WILSON: We just rejected it, and it
22
   went back to the Texas Online that it was sent to the
23 l
   wrong county.
24
25
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, then do we want to
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change that? MR. ORSINGER: What if it happened in the What if the district clerk opens an envelope and 3 mail? it's sent to the wrong county? What do they do? 4 MS. WILSON: We reject it and mail it back 5 If the filer sent it, they -- it's a drop down to them. box on Texas Online, and instead of selecting Travis 8 County they selected Fort Bend County or whatever it was, and so we rejected that document. It would be the same if 10 they mailed it to us and it should have gone to Harris County. We would give the reason rejecting and mail it 11 back or fax it back saying "You have in here that you wanted this to go to Harris County instead of Fort Bend." 13 14 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So you're saying we 15 should keep the language as it is? MS. WILSON: Well, we just used the word 16 "accept" because that's been the normal process in the 17 clerk's office. 18 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: It's not if you reject it, and it's been received, but not accepted. 21 MS. WILSON: Correct. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think it's nice that 22 you tell them that they've sent it to the wrong place, but 23 I don't think you need to reject it. I don't think that 24 25 that's your job.

MR. ORSINGER: But, Bill, if they receive 1 2 it, they're required to stamp it, and that establishes the date of filing. Read the rest of the sentence. So if 3 it's in the wrong county we don't want them to treat it 4 like it's been filed and stamp it and have a bunch of 5 deadlines operating based on it. So we have to preserve the idea that you haven't completed your filing job if you 7 haven't sent it to the right clerk. 8 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: He'll withdraw his 9 objection to that. 101 11 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Then the last one, you cannot initiate or commence a civil suit on a Sunday electronically except for injunctions, attachments, 13 garnishment, sequestrations, or distress warrants. 14 Is 15 that consistent with the rule otherwise? I'm not aware. 16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's Rule 6. 17 MR. ORSINGER: That's rule what? 18 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Rule 6. Then let's go on. 19 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: 20 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So we're okay with 21 that? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah. 22 23 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So if you do try to 24 file it electronically on Sunday it will be deemed as if 25

guess be filed Monday morning. Okay. The following documents are 2 categorically ruled out as electronic filing material: 3 juvenile cases, anything relating to a juvenile case, 4 anything relating to a mental health case. Chapter 33, is 5 that a termination under the Family Code? 7 MS. WOLBRUECK: Parental notification. MR. ORSINGER: Okay. That's the parental 8 bypass on abortion. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Hold on just one second. 10 111 Richard. 12 MR. MUNZINGER: Are the words "juvenile cases" and "mental health cases" words of art that 131 14 everyone knows what they mean, or are there statutory 15 l descriptions such as "Chapter 33 of the Family Code" in subsection (c) that should be used for the sake of 16 l I'm not sure that I know what a -- I mean, I 17 precision? have a general idea talking informally about what a juvenile case is and what a mental health case is. 20 is a mental health case. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Yeah, but it's not up 21 yet. It's not on the docket. 22 23 MR. MUNZINGER: But I just wonder if there 24 isn't a more precise definition that can be given to those 25 categories.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I believe all juvenile 1 cases will fall under a certain either title or subtitle 2 or chapter of the Family Code. I don't know about mental 3 That would be under a statute. health. 4 5 MR. MUNZINGER: There is a Mental Health Code, I think, as well, but obviously, my point is, is don't we want to have a better definition than what we've got? 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's an excellent 9 10 point. MR. ORSINGER: It seems reasonable to me. 11 So we'll make this more precise. We'll define the statute that covers juvenile and we'll define the statute that 13 covers mental health. 14 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Just so we'll have 15 it for the record, why do we have this list? Why, for 16 example, affidavits of inability to pay, why can't they be 17 18 filed electronically or subpoenas? MS. WILSON: At this point in time Texas 19 Online has not set up for a pro se or an indigent person 2.0 because there are fees associated with the filing, and 21 until we're able to change that whole structure, inability to pay would force them to pay up-front, then have the judge sign the inability to pay, and then a refund would 25 have to be issued. So that's why we put that in there.

1 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: It seems like it would be easier if you could let them file through Texas 2 3 Online and if they can afford the fee you could deny the indigency. 4 5 MR. ORSINGER: That's like a Catch 22. 6 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: But what about --7 just out of curiosity, what about subpoenas? Yeah. 8 MR. WOOD: Judge, this list is arbitrary. It's really your decision on what to recommend should be 9 something that can be electronically filed or not. mean, mental health cases, there's no reason inherently 11 12 why that wouldn't work in the system. They simply have a confidential nature to them, but just because they have a 13 14 confidential nature doesn't mean they can't be 15 electronically filed. So it's really for historical 16 reasons. That's the way we did the pilot project in the local rules, but again, it's very arbitrary. MR. ORSINGER: If we have like in adoption 18 19 cases required by law to be kept out of the public eye and 20 whatnot, is that privacy requirement guaranteed under the 21 current structure? 22 MR. WOOD: It's really two different issues. 23 What is confidential can be e-filed and it can be 24 confidentially e-filed. 25 MR. ORSINGER: So there is nothing about

e-filing that would make it difficult for the clerk to 2 follow the statutory requirement of nonpublic information? 3 MR. WOOD: Exactly. There is nothing about e-filing that somehow makes a confidential document not 4 confidential. 5 MR. ORSINGER: Then there's really no reason 6 7 to treat these as exceptions because filing electronically is the functional equivalent of filing in paper, right? 9 MR. WOOD: Exactly. And so that's why I say it's an arbitrary list, with the exception of perhaps 10 something like a will just because the whole idea of a 11 probate proceeding is proving up the signature on that will, and you might consider that differently; but yes, 13 juvenile proceedings and mental health cases, it's just an 14 arbitrary item on this list. 15 16 I would suggest we take the MR. ORSINGER: whole list off of here. 17 18 MS. WOLBRUECK: I have a point. MR. ORSINGER: Bonnie, what did you say? 19 20 MS. WOLBRUECK: The Chapter 33 of the Family Code, the reason that's on there is because of the time 21 element, and understand that there is this 24/7 filing and 22 because of that two-day limit on these parental bypasses, so that if it's electronically filed over the weekend, 24 then getting it to the judge in a timely manner may limit 25

that opportunity. MR. ORSINGER: Are those rule deadlines or 2 statutory deadlines? 3 4 MS. WOLBRUECK: Statutory. MR. ORSINGER: So we're going to basically 5 say that they can't e-file, but could they fax file over 6 the weekend and start the timetable running, or is the fax machine on? MS. WOLBRUECK: It depends upon -- fax 9 filing is different from county to county, and there are 10 some counties that have 24/7 fax filing and some that do 11 12 not. MR. ORSINGER: And what about the counties 13 14 that -- like Dallas County I think you can file 15 mechanically. They have a little window there where you 16 can get your file stamp. MS. WOLBRUECK: I don't know what they do 17 18 with these in Dallas County, because these are so 19 time-sensitive, along with confidentiality sensitive, to where -- it's the time-sensitive document. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Richard. 21 MR. MUNZINGER: Did I understand you to say 22 that there are some filings under the Family Code that the 23 law requires that there be 7-day, 24-hour --24 25 MS. WOLBRUECK: No.

MR. MUNZINGER: -- availability for filing? 1 MS. WOLBRUECK: No. Richard was talking 2 about fax filing, and some counties have 24/7 fax filing. 3 MR. ORSINGER: And what she's saying, 4 Richard, is that on the parental bypasses they have to 5 react so quickly that if it gets filed after everyone 6 leaves on Friday afternoon somebody needs to act Sunday 7 afternoon, but there is nobody even knows it's there. 8 by saying you can't do it, that means you can't have it happen on a weekend so that a judge can see it before the 10 time runs, which might be a reason to leave that one in 11 there, but what's the reason for the rest of them? 12 Why couldn't we review 13 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: that and see what really just can't be done, either by 15 statute or in practical under the category of things that I covered? And we're apparently going to have to have 16 some kind of list, but the problem is then if you leave 17 something out, you know, and --18 19 MR. ORSINGER: Well, is this nothing we can resolve today? I mean, like, for example, the danger of 20 fax filing a will is that you don't have the original in 21 the courtroom and somebody objects to authentication and 22 it gets sustained, you're dead. You bring the original to 24 court, right? 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I mean, I would say

everything that's practical at this time within technology and requirements of the law, and the law in a will, you know, you can't do that in a will, and let the lawyers figure it out, because we just list each thing, we'll overlook several things. I mean -
MR. ORSINGER: What do we do with the list?

MR. ORSINGER: What do we do with the list?
What do we do with this list? Do we drop it? Do we
debate it? Do we --

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I would suggest that we review that and try to substitute some general language of what -- you know, so that something that can't be done or that the law prohibits or something, I don't know, maybe there are some things that because of the requirements of the law you couldn't do it. I don't know. What do you think about that?

MS. WILSON: We really when we wrote this it was during the pilot project, and there were a lot of judges that were concerned during the pilot, and that was why this list was put there, and then under the Chapter 33, because of the time line we didn't want someone to think that their request was going to be responded to on a weekend, which is why we put that in there.

As Mr. Wood said, we have no problem with eliminating those. Anything can be filed electronically.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, I would -- the

committee needs to kind of study that because once you give a list, I mean, then you're going to overlook something that maybe should be in the list. That's -- I 3 don't know the answer. What do you think, Richard? 4 MR. ORSINGER: Is it acceptable, Judge 5 Hecht, if we just send this back to the drawing board? 6 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yes. MR. ORSINGER: And leave the record as-is? 8 Then let's move on to Rule 93. 9 Okay. MR. MUNZINGER: Richard, before you go there 10 can I ask a quick question? We spent a lot of time at the 11 last meeting talking about various things that were not 12 going to be available for online access, people's Social 13 Security numbers, this, that, and so forth. How does that dovetail with electronic filing, and is there anything in 15 here that addresses that? 16 MR. ORSINGER: Well, if we implement this 17 before we implement that then the Brazoria County clerk is 18 going to have all of this on the internet. So we better 19 implement our noninternet publishing restriction before we 20 give them all of this electronically. They may be e-filing already. 22 MS. HOBBS: HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: They're 23 already doing it. 24 25 MS. WILSON: I'm already e-filing, and all

public records on my website are out for the public. 2 MR. ORSINGER: There you go. MS. WILSON: But if it's a closed record 3 like juvenile or mental or a sealed case, we have the ability to just click that that's a closed record, and 5 it's not available to anybody. 6 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What about, I want to file some discovery or something that I want sealed and I 8 want a temporary sealing and so forth, but I would have to describe it in my papers more than I want, so I don't want that to be -- I want that to be sealed temporarily. 11 12 do you handle --MS. WILSON: We actually had one of those 13 It was a document that the come through electronically. 14 l attorney wanted sealed until reviewed by the judge, and so 15 we immediately took that to the judge. He ordered it sealed, and it was never put out on the internet. They 17 I put that -- there is a comment field in an electronic 18 19 filing. 20 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Okay. MR. ORSINGER: And what does that comment 21 field determine? MS. WILSON: Well, it could be a message 23 24 back to the clerk on something. MR. ORSINGER: So if I file something that I 25

don't want on the internet I could just put an X in that box and --

MS. WILSON: No. That's a public record. What you could say is "Before you scan this" or, you know, "Would you please let the judge review it? I'm asking the judge to seal it." We actually had one document in the two years.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Richard.

MR. MUNZINGER: Her comments prompt this question in my mind. If I have a -- pretend I have a case under Rule 76a where I have to have some documents that are reviewed by the trial court in camera to determine whether they are or aren't public. Now, if I file all of those documents electronically, how is it brought to the attention of the clerk, if at all, requiring a response from the clerk who receives them, that they are, in fact, to be considered confidential, et cetera, not available to anybody electronically or otherwise other than the court in camera, and how do they get there? I don't understand how that's going to work, and I don't understand if it can work.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, you've asked the wrong person. Maybe you ought to ask --

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: No, it can work.

25 But tell us how the lawyer designates.

MS. WILSON: Well, currently the local rules do not allow anyone to electronically file an in camera document.

MR. MUNZINGER: Local rules?

MS. WILSON: The local e-file rules. Yeah. 74b(d), does not allow in camera documents to be filed electronically. If you eliminate that from the rules as proposed then people would be allowed to file the in camera, and in that comment field you would have to state that this is an in camera or we would have to have a box that you check that this is in camera and then the clerk would then know that that was not to be made public.

MR. MUNZINGER: The way I have it in my mind, if I file an ordinary pleading that doesn't have any of these problems with it, clerks are really not doing anything. These things are all being shoveled electronically, put into the files electronically, clerks don't do squat, but if I come along and I say, "Here I've got this volume of papers here that you better determine whether these are public or not public." This is a public hospital and we're going to get into medical staff affairs, we're going to do this, that, and so forth; and I've got 50 pounds of documents; and I do that electronically.

Now, how do I get the clerk's attention to

address that I've got 50 pounds of documents, or so many million gigabytes or whatever it is, of documents that no one should be looking at other than the judge; and how do I get them to the judge; and how does the court assure the practitioners, the public, and the parties that all of this is done, because sometimes this stuff is very sensitive?

MS. WILSON: We would have to go back -since that currently under the local rules that's not even
considered, we would have to go back to Texas Online, and
they would have to reformat as part of one of the issues
that you would address, and you would have to check that
those documents were in camera, which would then
automatically seal that from everyone.

MR. MUNZINGER: Well, the reason I raise the question is that the tendency here was we were going to throw out (a) and (b), and now we come down and we find that we can't throw these things out quite so easily.

VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, maybe you've raised a pretty good point, and we -- you know, when we tell everybody we can file, that e-mail is good for the world, or e-filing is good for the world, but then not really, we may have to look at a list like this; and if we overlook something, well, I guess we'll learn about it.

MR. ORSINGER: But, see, I mean, the fix

here is to make Texas Online obey our procedures. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 2 MR. ORSINGER: Not to formulate our 3 procedures so that Texas Online doesn't have to change its 4 software. 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Right. 6 MR. ORSINGER: And so if we're asking for 7 something that's humanly impossible, okay, well, then that's fine. Let's not request it, but if we want juvenile cases and mental health cases and parental bypasses not to be public, then we have a rule somewhere 11 or a contract change or a directive from the Supreme Court 12 or something saying "Don't make this public." Wouldn't 13 that work, and then they just go change their software, 15 right? MS. WILSON: Well, it wouldn't be public 16 17 under current law, juvenile or mental. It wouldn't be, 18| but the in cameras, those normally go right to the judge 19 in the courtroom. If you were to electronically file it then Texas Online would have to change the screens to 20 allow for an in camera document not to be open to the 22 public. MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Is that technically 23 feasible then? 24 MS. WILSON: Yes. 25

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MR. ORSINGER: Okay. And whose permission
1
   do we need to require them to do that? If the Supreme
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   Court wants to write a rule, do they have the authority?
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                 MS. WILSON:
                              They're a state agency, so they
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   have to follow that rule.
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                               So they could issue an
                 MR. ORSINGER:
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   administrative order saying "Formulate Texas Online so
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   that it permits in camera filing"?
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                 MS. WILSON: Correct.
                 MR. ORSINGER: And then Online would have to
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11
   do it?
                              Correct.
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                 MS. WILSON:
                                To me that's the better fix.
                 MR. ORSINGER:
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Do it.
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                                 It's commonplace.
                 MR. MUNZINGER:
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   you do it frequently in discovery fights and what have
         It's not limited to Rule 76a cases. You've got
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   trademark cases and --
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's the best way.
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               I think the last thing, Richard, is --
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   All right.
                 MR. ORSINGER: Rule 93. Rule 93 has to do
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   with the verification of certain pleas, and if you look at
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   the next to last one on subdivision (b), it's only
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   verified if it's scanned.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Well, that goes in the
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general rule, doesn't it?
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                                Does it?
                                           It does?
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                 MR. ORSINGER:
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW:
                                      Yeah.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Put that in the
 4
   signature rule.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right.
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe you ought to have
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   a separate filing -- a signature rule and a filing rule
   and put those up in the front in the general.
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                 MR. ORSINGER: What would be the filing
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11
   rule?
                                       It would be a
                  PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
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   combination of some parts of 21, 74, 74a, 74b.
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                 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
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                  MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Now, subdivision (c),
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   assuming we dump this in the signature rule, subdivision
· 16
    (c) says that a court can require someone to file an
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18
   original document if a scanned image was filed raising one
   of these affirmative defenses that have to verified.
19
20
   Tracy.
                  HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, the only
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22 thing that worries me about that is if someone brings the
   hard copy to a clerk without some directive, they're just
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   going to scan it and throw it away, which is, you know,
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25 the current plan. So there has to be something more to
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that rule if the idea is to present it to the judge in hard format for the judge to look at, for people to look 2 at, because the intent of the clerk's office is to get rid 3 of the paper file; and so just the way it's written here, 4 "promptly file the document in a traditional manner" 5 doesn't tell you anything, because the current plan of the 6 clerks is anything that's filed in a traditional manner 7 will be scanned and thrown away. MR. ORSINGER: Well, then that's a problem 9 we have with paper filing, too, isn't it? Right now. 10 11 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yeah. -- which is fine, but I think the idea behind this rule is 12 that someone wants to actually look to see that it was 13 They want to see the hard copy. verified. Then we have to change not MR. ORSINGER: 15 only the electronic filing rule but the paper rule to say 16 that either automatically or on court order they won't 17 throw away verified pleadings or something? 18 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We would have 19 to do something, because otherwise that's the current 20 21 plan. Well, that problem exists for 22 MR. ORSINGER: paper as well as electronically filed documents. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. Ιt 24 25 does.

MR. ORSINGER: It doesn't seem realistic to 1 have the clerk search through the file and see what's 21 verified and what's not before they scan and destroy, 3 4 right? 5 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I'm just 6 saying I think that the rule should be written, you know, if the judge wants to see the actual -- well, I don't know what we're going to do with the paper ones that are verified that people file as paper unless there is some rule that says you've got to keep the hard copy until the 10 judge says you can get rid of it. You know, I don't know 11 what to do with that. 12 MR. ORSINGER: Well, we already have a rule 13 in here somewhere -- Bill, maybe you remember where it is -- that if you're filing a copy, if you're filing a fax 15 copy of something or some other kind of copy, you've got 16 to retain the original and produce it upon request. 17 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's right. 18 I think that would be better, you retain the original and 19 then you produce it at some point if somebody needs to see 20 it. 21 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah. 22 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Why don't you find that 23 24 rule and put that? 25 MR. ORSINGER: That's already in these rules

of procedure about something. I don't know which one it is.

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MR. WOOD: It's 45, Richard.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: We might need to say that with respect to paper documents, that you shouldn't be filing the original with the clerk anymore if the plan is that they're going to scan everything and destroy the hard copy. You know, if you want to preserve the notarized original, you don't want to send the original will down there and have it get destroyed if you need the original will for some reason.

Okay. Right now under Rule MR. ORSINGER: 45 the lawyer has the election of whether to file the original of a pleading or a copy. "When a copy of the signed original is tendered for filing the party or his attorney filing such copy is required to maintain the signed original for inspection by the court or any party incident to the suit should a question be a raised as to its authenticity." So you're not required to file originals, right? We can file copies, and if we do, we have to retain originals.

That's what we do right now before we even have electronic filing. Why couldn't electronic filing be 24 the same way, that you retain the original subject to somebody saying "I challenge the authenticity of this" and

then the lawyer must produce the original of what was electronically filed. 2 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: That's fine. 3 But it doesn't cure the paper problem if you filed the 4 original. 5 Well, the paper problem has 6 MR. ORSINGER: to do with the paper destruction policy, and if you're 7 worried about that then start filing copies of everything and keep the originals. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Why not just 10 require filing of the copy and retention of the original? 11 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Because we're talking 12 about electronic filing, not paper filing today. 13 14 MR. ORSINGER: Man, I tell you, I would rather file the original and then not worry about it. 15 get all the originals out of my office as quickly as I 16 17 can. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The whole idea of an 18 original and a copy and this whole thing just doesn't make 19 20 any sense. 21 MR. ORSINGER: Especially if signature no longer means that we sign a piece of paper. What's the 23 difference between the original and the copy? So are we going to try to create a similar fix for that? 25 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah, right.

(Laughter.) 1 MR. ORSINGER: Move on to Rule 167. Okay. 2 Rule 167 says that a party can move, and for good cause a 3 court can order, electronic filing and service other than 4 ones that are prohibited under Rule 74b. So this allows a 5 judge in a case to mandate that all filing in the case will be electronic unless it's on the list of 7 prohibitions. Richard. 8 9 MR. MUNZINGER: Why do you have a good cause 10 requirement in there and what does it mean? I mean, just 11 because you're smart and you want to be efficient and 12 you're modern, that ought to be enough. MR. ORSINGER: Why does it have to be on 13 14 motion of a party? HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 15 Right. 16 Shouldn't be. 17 MR. WOOD: We wanted to suggest that that 18 first clause be stricken. MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Everybody dislikes it 19 20 anyway. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Hold on, hold on. 21 There's a fee associated with filing online. Why are we 22 going to allow the mandatory ordering of filing online? 23 24 MR. ORSINGER: Because we're trying to get

25 this whole program off the ground. The people who are

doing it right now it's being mandated, and if you don't 2 like it then you can --PROFESSOR CARLSON: No, she's saying the 3 4 opposite. 5 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I'm saying I want to 6 go for, you know, no fee, file my motion with Judge Christopher in the 295th, and I don't want to have to pay \$10 to file it and however many extra dollars to serve it, and I understand that that may not be a good economic decision because it might have been cheaper in the long 10 run for me to just file it electronically, but I think 11 there should be some access to the courthouse that doesn't 12 require you to pay money, extra money. 13 14 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. But here is the If you create that exception then 15 problem, Jane. everybody who wants to continue to paper file will invoke 16 17 the exception, and you'll never get electronic filing off the ground. In the courts where electronic filing has 18 happened it's because the judge says, "I won't let you 19 file anything unless you file it electronically." 20 "Well, then I've got to pay Lexis \$25 a 21 year." 22 23 "Well, that's tough. If you're in my court you file electronically." That's what's going on right 24 25 now, and that's what this is all about statewide.

exceptions if a judge is ruling. 2 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: What are we going to do 3 on --MR. ORSINGER: Is that right or wrong? Did 4 I misstate that? 5 MR. MUNZINGER: Well, what is the cost right 6 I have people in my office that do all this. 7 does it cost somebody to file electronically today? I'm Joe Schmoe, the sole practitioner with a limited budget. What does it cost me to file? MS. WILSON: There are five or six EFSPs? 11 There are six EFSPs, electronic filing service providers. You could contract with any of them. Depending on what 13 you work out on a contract, the fee could be from \$1 to 14 15 10, \$15. 16 MR. MUNZINGER: Per filing? MS. WILSON: Per document. That could be a 17 one-page document or a thousand page document. It's \$4 to 18 file through Texas Online and \$2 to file with the county, 20 so your minimum might be \$7. 21 MR. MUNZINGER: Per document. 22 MS. WILSON: Per document. VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Costs off 23 the table now, what are we going to do with 167? 25 MR. ORSINGER: I think that's the whole

philosophical issue here. Are we going to authorize a court to require everyone to use electronic filing, or are we going to make it subject to a good cause exception, 3 which is not defined and we don't even know how you get 4 appellate review of that? 5 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: You can't. You can't 6 have -- I mean, you're just not going to be able to do 7 8 that. MR. ORSINGER: You want submit the exception 9 for pro ses who are indigent, or anybody who is indigent? 10 MS. HOBBS: Or just a pro se who doesn't 11 want to contract with -- I mean, because for a law firm it makes sense to contract, but a pro se may not want to 13 14 contract. MR. ORSINGER: So you want to except pro ses 15 here and just say except -- write in an exception for pro 17 ses? VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Maybe it's so that they 18 19 have to do it unless authorized otherwise by the court, 20 and the court decides. Because you're going to have a mixed system. How are you going to get everything and --21 22 it's just not going to work good. MR. MUNZINGER: Judge Bland has a good point 23 about access to justice. I mean, everybody in this room 24 -- all of these people have got computers. I've got one 25

that someone knows how to work, but there may be people that don't, and there may be people that don't have the money or don't want to spend the money that are not just 3 It's an access 4 curmudgeons. I mean, they have a problem. to justice point. I know we're in a hurry, but at the 5 same time I think we need to be careful. It's our justice 6 7 system, citizens' justice system. People handwrite 8 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: motions all the time and file handwritten motions all the time. 10 11 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You get down to the courthouse, you know, and you need a motion for Bam, there it is. 13 continuance. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: There it is. 14 15 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Oh, wait. I can't do I've got to go over to my ESPN and get it filed. 16 that. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: You don't need 17 to worry about it because we're going to have wireless 18 19 internet in the courtroom, so you will just bring your 20 computer with you and do it. 21 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: I have to walk back around the corner to my office. 22 l 23 MR. ORSINGER: No, that doesn't apply They have an automatic gate now. 24 anymore. 25 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Why did you tell that?

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Oh, I'm sorry.
                 MR. ORSINGER:
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Go ahead.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, maybe we
   should say, "A court may order electronic filing and
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   service of documents" and then do a, you know, "parties
   for good cause shown can request to be exempted from that
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   rule."
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        Yes.
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And then that
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   could be the pro se. I mean, I'm not going to order it in
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11
   a pro se case. I'm going to look at my files before I
   would start making a blanket order to that effect.
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Anybody have
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   a better suggestion than that?
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                 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You're going to make it
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16
   mandatory electronic filing?
                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No. A court
17
18 may order it, may order electronic filing.
                 MR. ORSINGER: And what's your exception,
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   Tracy, or what's your statement?
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                 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                Well,
   basically, "A party may request to be exempt from this
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   order upon good cause shown."
                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: That's the second
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   sentence.
              All right.
                          Carl.
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MR. HAMILTON: I think that rule ought to be 1 deleted, and for another reason, we've already got all 2 these rules that say you can do all kinds of paper filing. 3 Then we're going to come along and say, but if the judge 4 wants to change all that he can say it's all got to be 5 electronic, and I think it ought to be optional with 6 7 whoever is doing the filing. MR. ORSINGER: You're in front of the train, 8 Carl. Get out of the way. 9 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: There are 15 cars 10 already run over you. Levi said, "I hope the train hasn't 11 run." 12 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That kind of reminds me 13 of when I'm eating ice cream and say, "I'll eat a little 14 bit" and then say, "I'm just going to eat the whole damn 15 thing." 16 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. I tell you 17 what, everybody sleep on that. All right, go ahead. 18 l I just wanted to say that if you 19 MR. WOOD: strike the first clause it still says "a court may order" 20 and it's completely up to the court in every individual 21 So, Judge Bland, if you never want to order 22 electronic filing, this rule will allow you never to order 23 it. Judge Sullivan, if you want to order it in every 24

case, you can, and anywhere in between.

25

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: I'm not concerned 1 about that, that the judge can or cannot. I'm concerned 2 about a judge saying "For every case filed in the 281st I'm going to require electronic filing, " and what is a litigant when faced with that option to do other than 5 electronically file? They ought to be able to have some 6 out. 7 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: So then our thing is to 8 make it mandatory with an exception that the judge some 9 way -- or some language, because otherwise it's not going 111 to be electronic. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, Fred Edwards 12 and a few other judges across the state have been --13 l what's-his-name in Beaumont? Mehaffy. MS. HOBBS: 15 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: Tell me about it. 16 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: How are the pro ses 17 or others getting around the Edwards, Mehaffy, so-called 18 19 mandatory rule? 20 MR. ORSINGER: I think they ignore it, and they just go paper file and then nothing bad happens to 22 them. 23 MS. HOBBS: I don't think Mehaffy has too 24 many pro se litigants. 2.5 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: How can you not have

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pro se litigants? I can't imagine that Beaumont is pro se
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   free.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. Tomorrow
   we're going to take up anybody that has any suggestions on
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  that last, we'll get to that in a couple of minutes.
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                                                          Then
   the court reporter records, exhibits, appellate rules,
7
   Bill, and then --
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                 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Appellate rules ought
9
   to go first because it's alphabetical.
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                 VICE-CHAIRMAN LOW: All right. We'll take
11
   them up tomorrow.
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                  (Adjourned at 5:38 p.m.)
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| 2 | CERTIFICATION OF THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| 7 | | I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | the above meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | on the 6th day of May, 2005, and the same was thereafter | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | reduced to computer transcription by me. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | | I further certify that the costs for my | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | services in the matter are \$ 2484.00. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | Charged to: <u>Jackson Walker</u> , L.L.P. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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