
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1 * - * - * - * - * 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, everybody, for 3 coming, and for those of you who weren't here yesterday, we're going to change the agenda around a little bit and 4 take up Bill Dorsaneo's issues, which are Items 9, 10, and 5 6 11 on the agenda. 7 MS. SWEENEY: He's got more issues than 8 that. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's true. We'll stipulate to that. And if anybody hasn't seen Richard 10 Orsinger's shoes, be sure to take note of them. They qo 11 quite well with his socks, I might add. All right. 12 So --13 MR. GILSTRAP: But he's a straight guy. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Should we take 14 15 certificate of conference first or --HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Chip, could I put one 16 thing on the record first? 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You bet. 18 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I made a mistake 19 yesterday in my discussion about the notices on the 201 exhibits. I had said that there was a notice requirement 21 that we did to the clerks that is done later, but 221 actually, it's Section 51.204 of the Government Code; and 23 on the issuance of the mandate in each case, the clerk 24 shall notify the attorneys of record in the case that 25

exhibits submitted to the court by a party may be 1 withdrawn by that party or the party's attorney of record; 2 and then the second part is that they will be destroyed 3 three years later. So it's actually in a notice to the 4 5 attorneys, not a notice to the clerk that I was trying to analogize to, so I just wanted to clear that up since I 6 had misspoken on the record. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Justice 9 Gray. 10 Bill, certificate of conference or something 11 else? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Certificate of 12 conference will be fine. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Chief Justice Sherry 15 Radack of the First Court of Appeals sent a letter on June 16 2nd, 2004, to Justice Hecht, and you only want me to deal 17 with the certificate of conference part, right? 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And in that letter she 20 respectfully requested the Supreme Court to revisit 21 appellate Rule 10.1(a)(5). I actually think it's 22 9.1(a)(5), but somebody who has a rule book can check. 23 Well, maybe I'm wrong on that, let's say 24 25 10.1(a)(5), certificates of conference on motions. In our

experience requiring a certificate of conference on motion 1 for rehearing is unnecessary and unproductive. And I 2 think it is 10.1(a)(5) now that I think about it. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is 10.1(a)(5). 4 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. And this went 5 6 before the subcommittee at some point back. I'm not completely sure what the vote was, but I believe the 7 members of the subcommittee thought that motions for 8 rehearing certificates of conference were unnecessary and 9 10 unproductive, but I'm not sure it was unanimous. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It was. 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 12 Huh? 13 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It was. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It was unanimous? And 14 I know the Supreme Court on other occasions when we've 15 suggested to them that these conference certificates are 16 not a good idea has required us to --17 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We've said it to 18 them twice, or three times. 19 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- do it any way. MR. ORSINGER: I might add, though, that 21 I've heard that as a matter of practice they don't require 22 these. Do you know anything about that, Judge? 23 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I think it's 24 required in our Court. I haven't monitored it. 25

1	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't think the		
2	Supreme Court enforces it.		
3	MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. I think the clerk's		
4	office isn't requiring it, although maybe I shouldn't say		
5	that outloud.		
6	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So in terms of the		
7	committee, that's my recollection of the committee vote,		
8	too. I guess I will move to modify 10.1(a)(5) to		
9	eliminate the necessity of a certificate of conference on		
10	a motion for rehearing, because there they are unnecessary		
11	and unproductive.		
12	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I'll second that		
13	motion.		
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any discussion on		
15	that?		
16	HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Are you sure you want		
17	to limit it to just motions for rehearing?		
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, what would you add		
19	to the list?		
20	HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I generally find that		
21	people don't agree to sanctions motions or to dismiss		
22	their appeal for lack of some procedural compliance; and		
23	while Richard is correct in the enforcement mechanism used		
24	at the various courts I think you will find varies		
25	dramatically, if it's there in the rule book as a rule I'm		

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inclined to endeavor to enforce it; and it creates a
 certain amount of problems if it's there and not enforced
 or selectively enforced.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other
comments? Well, let's stay focused on what's in front of
us, which is whether we're going to eliminate it for
motions for rehearing. It's been moved and seconded.
Anybody want to say anything else about it? Frank.

9 MR. GILSTRAP: Every time I've dealt with 10 this issue, for example, the local rules on eliminating a 11 certificate of conference for summary judgments, sometimes 12 judges have a different view, and I just wondered how the 13 judges -- I mean, I think from a practitioner's point of 14 view, it's pointless. I mean, why on earth would anyone 15 agree to the motion for rehearing? But maybe judges have 16 a different view, I don't know.

HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: Well, I'll chime 17 in too both as a former practitioner and as a judge. As a 18 former practitioner, you do have the occasional case where 19 the court makes a misstatement somewhere or an error that 201 both parties agree just got bollixed up, and you know, 21 I've actually had where we had agreed motions for 22 rehearing in one appellate court. It's rare, admittedly, 23 but it might happen, and it might -- there might be some 24 25 benefit conceivably compelling the parties to make that

phone call and see if they can fix it. Might apply one 1 percent of the time. That would be just one observational 2 3 experience I had. As far as how we enforce it, I've never 4 turned in a motion for rehearing to see if the certificate 5 is signed, if there is one, and, you know, I would suspect 6 that most judges would not find a motion to strike a 7 motion for rehearing for failure to contain a certificate 8 of conference. 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The problem, I 10 think, is not judges. It's clerks. As Chief Justice Gray 11 says, if it's in the rule book they feel compelled to 12 enforce it, and they will kick a motion for rehearing back 13 because it doesn't have a certificate. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carlos. 15 Paula and I were just joking 16 MR. LOPEZ: about I used to say I guess in seven years I never had 17 anybody agree to an MSJ against them, but she kind of, you 18 know, played devil's advocate and there was one time when 19 she for tactical reasons -- there was one defendant she 20 wanted out, so maybe it happens in one third of one 21 percent of the cases, but I never saw anybody agree to a 22 dispositive MSJ against them. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah. 24 25 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And just by

eliminating the requirement of a certificate of conference 1 in a motion for rehearing doesn't mean you can't have an 2 agreed motion for rehearing. 3 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: Right. 4 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It just means you 5 don't have to put the certificate of conference in there. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hecht, do you 8 want to comment? HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I was going 9 to echo what Bob said. I think it's more than one 10 percent, but frequently in our Court after opinions have 11 issued someone will file a motion and say, "You've got it 12 completely wrong, but No. 2, change this sentence; No. 3, 13 change that sentence; No. 4, you should take this cite 14 out"; and frequently the other side will agree to some or 15 all of that; and it's useful to know that, although you 16 can call for response, of course, but I guess we always 17 would. But it's not completely useless because you're not 18 always just asking the other side to agree to the opposite 19 result, but probably frequently you are. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Jane, what do you think? 22 Well, I think they're 23 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: unnecessary. I don't think that -- if there are going to 24 25 be substantive changes to the opinion then it's likely

that you would ask for a response and get it hashed out 1 that way, and it's one step that apparently the Bar has 2 some problems completing, and I just think it's 3 superfluous. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other Yeah, Nina. 6 comments? 7 MS. CORTELL: We did have a situation where 8 there was something that needed to be corrected in a Texas Supreme Court opinion, and both sides came together on an 9 agreed motion for rehearing. I suspect that would have 10 happened without the requirement, either in the way that 11 Jane just mentioned, which is one party does it, then the 12 other comes back, or you just call. So even though I've 13 seen it and been a part of it, I don't know that we need a 14 rule for it. I think that would have worked its way out 15 16 anyway. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Judge 17 Sullivan. 18 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: Some of the 19 appellate judges that I've talked to seem to have a very 20 strong opinion about it. I have personally been told not 21 to return to Houston unless this gets changed. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If it is changed or is 23 not changed? 24 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: No, if it doesn't 25

1 get changed.

2 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: See, now I changed my 3 vote if I don't want you to go back to Houston. HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: I do wonder if we 4 want a rule that everyone seems to agree -- in other 5 words, they really require in every case this be done, 6 this be done whenever it seems to agree it is the 7 extraordinary and very unusual case, which is infrequently 8 used. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland. 10 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: And Pam Baron is not 11 here yet, is she? At the appellate section conference 12 last June this topic came up during a panel of Supreme 13 Court justices, and there was quite a dialogue between the 14 audience and the Court, and the justices who were there 15 kind of said, "Well, you know, you don't -- we don't 16 really see why we" -- you know, and just the sense that I 17 got from the room was that the practitioners felt like it 18 was unhelpful and, you know, added an extra step, and I 19 think that --20 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Speak of the 21 devil. 22 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Pam, were you there 23 at the appellate practice conference last June when the 24 25 thing about motions for rehearing came up, the certificate

-- I'm sorry, the certificate of conference on motions for 1 rehearing? 2 MS. BARON: I know I was there. 3 You know, I've heard so many conversations about that subject. 4 5 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, because I was 6 trying to convey a sense of what the appellate Bar thought 7 of it, and I just said my impression from the room is not much, from the room at that conference was not much. 8 9 MS. BARON: That's absolutely correct, 10 because in 99.9 percent of the cases it's a meaningless It requires you to take an extra step to file a 11 qesture. motion for rehearing, which you already have only 15 days 12 to file. Counsel, I've never had anybody agree to a 13 motion for rehearing that I have filed to change the 14 judgment of a court of appeals. It's very unlikely it's 15 going to happen; and if they, in fact, agree with some 16 small problem you have with a court of appeals opinion, 17 they can write a letter and tell the court, "Well, maybe 18 you should fix that" in response to motion for a hearing. 19 So all those issues can get resolved another 20 way, and it has been a problem for many people in that the 21 court of appeals feel that they are obligated to not file 22 the motion for rehearing if it doesn't have a certificate 23 of conference, and it slows many cases down. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Stephen. 25

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1	MR. TIPPS: I simply want to note for the	
2	record that this seems to me to be so obvious that it	
3	simply proves that this group can debate anything for at	
4	least 15 minutes.	
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we haven't quite	
6	got to 15 yet, but I know we can get there.	
7	MS. BARON: I think last time we treated it	
8	as so obvious that we didn't need to debate it, and we did	
9	recommend it to the Supreme Court, and it was not included	
10	in the rules, so	
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we're back.	
12	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It was twice.	
13	MS. BARON: So this time we want to try	
14	extra especially hard.	
15	MR. LOPEZ: Called "padding the record."	
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Justice Patterson.	
17	HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I'm very sorry I'm	
18	late because I agree with Pam wholeheartedly on this	
19	issue, and that was exactly the problem last time, is that	
20	people viewed it as sort of a nonissue that it didn't	
21	affect anybody. If it affects anybody, it's and I	
22	apologize if I'm repeating this, but the clerks. It	
23	causes a lot of extra calling and paper work and follow-up	
24	on behalf of the clerks. They would like to get rid of	
25	it. It's entirely unnecessary, and I really do urge the	

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Supreme Court to change it. It's important to 1 practitioners and our court clerks. 2 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Are we ready to vote on this? Keep it under 15 minutes, so if anybody 4 5 wants to say anything more. There we go. Now we're talking. All right, 6 7 Bill. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe we ought to 8 suggest that it's possible for it to be done differently 9 in the court of appeals than in the Supreme Court in order 10 11 to avoid what appears to be Supreme Court hostility to eliminating the certificate. 12 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Pam. MS. BARON: Well, that's very ironic because 14 my understanding is that in the Supreme Court you can 15 actually file a motion for rehearing without a certificate 16 17 of conference. That's not true? That was my 18 understanding. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So that approach 19 20 would be laced with irony. 21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, at least the suggestion is on the record, and that's probably 22 sufficient. 23 Okay. Anything else? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 24 Okay. The proposition is to amend TRAP Rule 10.1(a)(5) by 25

deleting the requirement that a certificate of conference 1 be contained in the motion for rehearing. So everybody in 2 favor of deleting that requirement from that rule raise 3 your hand. 4 5 In a rare showing of unanimity, 24 to 0. 6 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: You didn't call for 7 the nays. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, because everybody 9 had their hand up. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I think Stephen 10 intimidated the vote, actually. 11 It was 9 to 14. MR. TIPPS: 12 13 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Chip, can I make one observation, that since Rule 49 specifically deals with 14 motions for rehearing, that it might be a better place to 15 put it there, is simply that the motion for rehearing does 16 not require a certificate of conference as opposed to 17 trying to create an exception over under Rule 10. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But then you're going to 20 have two rules in conflict. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: And we clearly know 21 22 that the one that is more specific deals with the problem. MR. LOW: Clearly? 23 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I never use that word. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bill. 25

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This has to be drafted, 1 and I think looking at 49 would be a good idea. 2 Maybe we 3 could work it together. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Here is something 4 5 that can get our blood racing, court of appeals transfers, 6 precedent from the transferring court. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Can we save that one 7 until last? 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Because I think that 10 you may find out that that is more exciting than you 11 12 anticipate. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no. I wasn't being I do think it will be a good discussion. 14 facetious. I would prefer to go to 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: the revisions -- proposed revisions of Rule 25 related to 16 Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(d) through 17 (f), and I did a memorandum that's dated December 30, 18 2004, building on the work that we did at the August 2004 19 meeting. Does everyone have a copy of that? I think 20 there are some on the table over there if you don't, but 21 to refresh your recollection, in 2001 the 77th Legislature 22 adopted a number of provisions at the end of Civil 23 Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014 providing a 24 procedure for a permissive appeal of an interlocutory 25

1 order that's not otherwise appealable.

The mechanics of the statute are not 2 completely clear on the face of the statute, although the 3 statute does provide that you get a district court order 4 for the interlocutory appeal, but the parties must agree 5 to that order and then within 10 days after that order is 6 made, the district court order authorizing the 7 interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals is requested to 8 permit the appeal to be taken from that order. So pretty 9 much all the participants in the process need to agree 10 11 that this appeal is appropriate.

12 There have been a number of cases, probably 13 seven or eight at this point, where counsel has attempted 14 to take an appeal under these provisions, and I don't 15 think anyone has been successful at least on the first 16 attempt, because the procedure does not appear in the 17 statute as to how you get permission from the court of 18 appeals, what you file, and how that process works.

I think many courts of appeals have said that we need a rule to explain the procedure so that the statutory language can be made, you know, meaningful. In August of this year I presented a draft to the committee which needed considerable remedial work as a result of what I learned at the August 2004 meeting, and this memorandum dated December 30, 2004, is a byproduct or a

result of me going back through the transcript and 1 following what this committee directed me to do at that 2 meeting. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 4 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And I think we can go through it pretty quickly, although I shouldn't say that 6 because that's probably the kiss of death, but the first 7 thing I'll say is please turn to Rule 12.1, and I don't 8 know whether this one is controversial. It's on page one. 9 10 Rule 12.1 is --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bill, before you do that, 11 let me just for the record clarify that the Civil Practice 12 13 and Remedies Code provision that we're dealing with is section 51.014. 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There is a typo both in 16 the agenda and --17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: My title, yes. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- on the title of the 19 memo. So it's 51-014. 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Thank you, Chip. 21 12.1 which provides for docketing the case in the court of 22 appeals doesn't yet talk about a petition for permission 23 to appeal, and I think Chief Justice Gray suggested that 24 12.1 needed to be amended to provide for the petition for 25

permission to appeal, so the suggestion is, assuming that 1 we go with the title "petition for permission to appeal" 2 in order to facilitate the appeals, permissive appeals, 3 under 5.104(d) through (f), is suggested to be added to 4 12.1. 5 "Upon receiving the copy of the notice" --6 it should say "of appeal" -- "the petition for permission 7 to appeal the petition for review, the appellate court 8 clerk must endorse on the document the date of receipt," 9 and basically docket the case. And I apologize for it 10

11 saying "notice on appeal," but I think that shouldn't have 12 distracted anyone too much.

13 So I don't know whether we need to take a 14 vote on that, Mr. Chairman. I don't necessarily think we 15 do. It seems to follow if we go ahead and do the rest of 16 it.

17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Anybody want to 18 discuss it or opposed to it?

MR. MUNZINGER: I don't want to discuss it. I just want to ask a question because I don't have the statute in front of me. Are the words "petition for permission to appeal," is that what it is denominated in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code?

24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No. No. In the Civil 25 Practice and Remedies Code 51.014(f) talks about an

application made to the court of appeals that has 1 appellate jurisdiction. It talks about an application 2 much in the same manner as many model acts call things 3 applications, and we could call this an application. That 4 wouldn't really offend me very much. It tends to be 5 called a petition in the Federal system, and it looks a 6 7 lot like a petition for review in the way that it would be 8 formulated, or would look that way.

My suggestion is to call it a petition 9 10 rather than an application for those two reasons. One, that whenever a statute says "application," it's kind of 11 not really saying you should call it an application. 12 It's 13 leaving the matter up to someone else to decide what to call it, and it looks more like a petition than anything 14 else, and why add in some other kind of thing. Jeff Boyd 15 said he wanted to call it an application, too, at one 16 17 point.

I'm not lobbying for either MR. MUNZINGER: 18 19 I'm just trying to make it clear to the word. practitioners who don't spend their lives in the appellate 20 courts that we now have this procedure for a permissive 21 appeal and that that's what this language refers to, and 22 that's why I asked if it was a word or term of art. It 23 might want to say "the petition for permissive appeal." Ι 24 just want to be sure that we don't cause confusion with 25

1 the language, and I don't want to spend a lot of time on 2 it, but --3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The language is the same language that I proposed to be used in 25.2, which 4 talks about a petition for permission to appeal. I don't 5 think there could be too much --6 7 MR. MUNZINGER: That's fine. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This is for clerks 8 anyway, and I don't think there could be any more 9 confusion than there normally would be. 10 MR. MUNZINGER: You've answered my question. 11 12 Thank you. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you know, as 13 someone who does this sometimes, I mean, you do want to 14 know what to call it. You know, when you're filing 15 something in court, what are you going to put in the 16 caption, and petition for permission to appeal is as good 17 as anything else. 18 MR. MUNZINGER: Sure. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there any contrary 20 label that is in -- I haven't seen one in 51.014, but --21 Chip, I'll comment. This 22 MR. BOYD: 51.014(d), (e), and (f), no offense intended to our 23 friends at the Legislature, it's just very confusing, not 24 well written, particularly when you talk about when it 251

1 refers to "the order," because it's very unclear which 2 order they're talking about, the one to be appealed, the 3 one from the district court allowing appeal.

I think this is going to cause a lot of 4 confusion if we don't give clarity in this rule, and my 5 view is in order to provide the most possible clarity, we 6 ought to track what the statute says as long as it doesn't 7 add to the confusion. So, for example, the statute says 8 that -- the statute refers to it as an application made to 9 the court of appeals for this order permitting the 10 11 interlocutory appeal. I think it's just clearer if we call it an application for permission to appeal and track 12 the language of the statute. 13

Sarah. Justice Duncan. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 14 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I agree, because I can see somebody out there having the statute in front of 16 them and having the rule in front of them and saying, 17 "Okay, the statute tells me to file an application. The 18 rule tells me to file a petition, so I'm going to file 19 both." So why not just call it what the statute calls it, 20 21 an application?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't really care that much, although I would wonder about such persons. Part of the reason to take --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's a nasty dig.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Part of the reason for 1 the language is it's monkey-see-monkey-do the Federal 2 3 language, which talks about petition for permission to appeal, and I think many people would look to the -- in a 4 5 sense, to the Federal body of law that deals with this in trying to work their way through it. Well, maybe not in 6 every part of the state they wouldn't, but --7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, I'm sort of with 9 Sarah on this one. You're going to look to your own statute; you're not going to look to the Federal statute. 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, this would be our 11 12 own rule, which is as good or better than the statute. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay. 13 Richard. 14 MR. ORSINGER: Are we prescribing any page limitations or anything like that? 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes. Let's do this 16 petition/application thing and then we'll get onto the 17 rest of it, if you don't mind me being slightly rude. 18 MR. ORSINGER: If we are going to treat this 19 like we do other petitions with the page limits and the 20 contents that are required then I think it's helpful to 21 have the name "petition" so that it takes the practitioner 22 to the concept of what the petition is for an original 23 proceeding or a petition for review from the Supreme 24 25 Court.

If it's not going to be a petition that has 1 the same kind of contents and page lengths then I think 2 that it may confuse people to use the word "petition" here 3 if we're thinking of application as much briefer and 4 doesn't contain the normal sequence of subparts. 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. I understand 6 7 your point now. The provisions of this proposed rule operate independently f1rom everything else. So in a 8 sense it doesn't need to be called "petition," but on the 9 10 other hand, what it really ends up looking like is a petition, particularly a petition for a review. I don't 11 think this is a huge issue, whether it's called petition 12 or application and would just as soon see --13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Move onto the others. 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, get my direction 15 whether to cross out one word and add another and just go 16 17 on. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Benton. 18 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 19 I'm in favor of calling it petition, and I'd ask the Court to just ask the 20 Legislature to change the statute since they're about to 21 I mean, it's that simple to have consistency. reconvene. 2.2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy. 23 How is this -- what are the MR. LOW: 24

25 procedures in line, and that just shows my ignorance on

the appellate process, but where you agree -- you know, 1 there was a statute before this where you and I can agree 2 that we should appeal, and the court -- you know, we've 3 got a question of law and neither one of us want to go 4 5 forward until that's decided and by agreement. What do 6 you call that, and are there rules in our present rules that say when things are due, and does the court of 7 8 appeals have to take that? Where the parties can agree. MR. ORSINGER: That is this procedure, 9 10 Buddy. We are writing those rules for the first time. MR. LOW: Okay. Because I did that, and 11 12 that wasn't the first time I didn't know what I was doing, but it wasn't real clear. We got it to the court of 13 appeals and they took it, but --14 Interlocutory without a statute? 15 MR. BOYD: There is a statute that says MR. LOW: No. 16 if both parties agree you can petition the -- it's been 17 there for several years. 18 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: It's not well 19 publicized. 20 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's this 21 statute. 22 MR. ORSINGER: We're trying to write those 23 24 rules. I thought this statute was one 25 MR. LOW:

where only one party can do it. 1 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 2 NO. 3 MR. ORSINGER: No. We are doing now what you said needs to be done. 4 5 MR. BOYD: We're doing now what you said you 6 did years ago. 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe I should correct 8 my statement to nobody has done this successfully to say that no one in a reported case has done it successfully, 9 10 but Buddy Low has. MR. TIPPS: Tracy and I have done it 11 12 successfully. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's get 12.1 out of the way. Are we going to call it petition or 14 15 application? MR. GILSTRAP: Vote. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or both? 17 MR. GILSTRAP: Vote. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan. 19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I was just going to 20 suggest maybe we should just go through all the rules so 21 that people would know what the procedure is going to be. 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Uh-huh. That makes 23 24 sense. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And then --25

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Then come back? 1 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah. I think that 2 3 would answer some of the questions that have been asked. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay, Bill, let's 4 5 go to the next. Let's go to 25. Well, the first issue PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 6 is where to put this animal, and it appears in the Federal 7 rule book as a separate rule, standalone rule. Our rule 8 book could treat the appeal by permission that way, but it 9 seemed mechanically better to me to try to load the appeal 10 by permission into Rule 25, and I don't feel strongly 11 about that, and that's more of a mechanical thing, but 12 13 that's where I put it. Now, that requires a small change to 25.1 14 and current 25.2. The change to 25.1, as indicated on 15 page two of the memorandum is to identify in 25.1 that 16 we're talking about appeals that don't require permission, 17 appeals to the courts of appeals as of right; and the 18 19 adjustment is made by adding that language to the subheading or the heading for 25.1. 20 Now, when I looked at 25.1(a) and I compared 21 25.1(a) to the Federal rule book from which it was taken 22 to begin with, it seemed to me that it would also make 23 sense to add the words that are underlined at the end of 24 the first sentence to make 25.1 parallel in the sense that 25

1 it talks about timing with new 25.2. So I added the words
2 "within the time allowed by Rule 26." That language, I
3 don't know if that was in our original draft of the rules
4 or not, but it's in the Federal rules, and it seemed to me
5 to make sense independently.

Now, of course, neither of these two things 6 are necessary, and they are preliminary, but these two 7 little changes are made in order to fit the appeal by 8 permission into the Texas rule book and make it look like 9 it's not what it is, which is a kind of latter day wing 10 11 added onto an architectural design that didn't contemplate such a procedure to begin with, and I don't know whether 12 that needs to be anything more than introduction, and I'll 13 just kind of go on. 14

The meat of the coconut is 25 point -- I 15 will add there is a 25.2 now, and that's criminal cases, 16 and my suggestion is to change 25.2 criminal cases to 17 I don't know whether the Court of Criminal Appeals 25.3. 18 would have trouble moving down in Rule 25 to .3 from .2; 19 and, frankly, 25.2 as proposed could be not only in a 20 separate rule, it could be in a separate subsection of 25. 21 Being a civil lawyer, I'm not too concerned about current 22 25.2, so I moved it down to 25.3, and I don't know whether 23 that's an issue or not. 24

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HONORABLE TOM GRAY: You keep looking at me.

As far as my preference is not to mess with the numbering 1 on 25.2 because we have a tremendous volume of cases --2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. 3 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- dealt with under 4 that rule, and I would prefer not to mess with that. 5 6 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I agree. I also 7 want to ask the question, by putting "within the time 8 allowed by Rule 26" in 25.1(a) doesn't that mean we're 9 going to have to also amend Rule 26? 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No. Because 25.1 only deals with appeals as of right. 11 12 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right. Okay. Never mind. You're right. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank. 14 MR. GILSTRAP: Will 25.2 ever be governed by 15 16 Rule 26? 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Only by cross-reference, so the answer really is no. 18 19 MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. Okay. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's part of the 20 architectural problem. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard. 22 I favor having a separate MR. ORSINGER: 23 24 rule for this. This is kind of a hybrid between an appeal and an original proceeding. It's not something you do as 25

a matter of right. It's something you have to have the 1 permission of the appellate court, and to me the Rule 25 2 on perfecting appeal suggests that you're talking about 3 something that happens as a matter of right, and this is 4 just the procedure you do to make the right mature and to 5 6 give you all the entitlements that are accompanying it. 7 I don't see that you're perfecting this I think you're making a petition for permission 8 appeal. to do something, and it's not -- it's sufficiently 9 distinct from appeal as a matter of right that I would 10 prefer to put it in its own rule and then we can eliminate 11 the issue about renumbering the criminal section. 12 That makes sense, but 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: in our Garnerized system, I think what's contemplated for 14 15 the addition of new rules is to add a new subsection 25, 16 or whatever number you're using, point something or another into the structure rather than going and making a 17 Rule 25a, point 1, et cetera. I'm not sure about that. 18 Justice Hecht, what do you think about the 19 design structure? And when I did the original appellate 20 rules I left some numbers, number gaps. I don't know if 21 we have any number gaps anymore, but I left some number 22 gaps where you would go from one section of the rules and 23 there would be some numbers not used, held in reserve 24 25 until you went to the next section.

I don't think that's the structure anymore. 1 The idea is that you're going to add a point something 2 else, and I don't mind adding this point something else at 3 4 the end of 25. Instead of 25.2 it could be 25.3. That's not a big issue if there are other concerns as expressed 5 by the -- by Justices Duncan and Gray. I mean, that's not 6 a big problem. Although it doesn't look as pretty to me 7 that way, it will be fine. 8 I think in answer 9 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: to that question, I think it would be better to put it as 10 25.3. I think it would be -- even though logically it 11 would be two, I think we ought to try to disturb the 12 numbers as little as possible. 13 14 I have another question, too, which is, architecturally I think we should not disrupt or be any 15 16 more different from the current procedure than we -- than is necessary so that everything we're doing is somewhat 17 familiar within the current scheme of things, and so I was 18 thinking about in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court we 19 follow -- you don't have that as of right, and so the 20 parties appeal as if they -- as if appealing to the court 21 of appeals and then they file a jurisdictional statement, 22 and the Court may or may not take the appeal either 23 because we don't think we have jurisdiction or because we 24 just don't want to take the appeal and we think the court 25

of appeals should look at it first, and I wonder if this 1 isn't -- if this new procedure isn't as similar enough to 2 that that it wouldn't be advisable to have the party file 3 a notice of appeal accompanied by a motion to allow the 4 appeal, and therefore, leave most of 25.1 like it is and 5 add something to 26 that says you've only got this much 6 7 time to do it in these kind of cases and draft it on that way rather than a separate section. 8

9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I thought about doing 10 it that way, and I didn't really go through and examine doing it that way. If I had a reason, if I can make up 11 one now, it would be because of the trial court mechanics 12 13 that require an order from the district judge authorizing the appeal to begin with, so you would be -- if you 14 started it with a notice of appeal then you'd have to have 15 the notice of appeal be somewhat different from an 16 ordinary notice of appeal, and I don't know how much you 17 save by reversing the order of the request to the court of 18 appeals being the first document that's filed or a notice 19 of appeal, but it certainly could be drafted that way. 20 That would be feasible. 21

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, the advantage is you would file a notice of appeal just like you always do on a different time frame, but then you would add on and say "but the notice must be accompanied" or "must be

followed by" or whatever, a motion or petition or
 application that sets out this stuff. I'm just wondering
 about that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard.

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5 MR. ORSINGER: What about putting this under Rule 28 for the accelerated appeals rule? Because this is 6 an accelerated appeal. It's just a special brand of 7 accelerated appeal, and the rest of the rules of 8 accelerated appeal will apply once it's granted, and it's 9 a more logical place to look because that's where you're 10 looking for the appeal of interlocutory orders anyway, and 11 wouldn't this be a better fit if it were a component of 12 13 the rule on accelerated appeals rather than a component of the rule for final judgments? 14

15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's a possibility, too. Now, first of all, Rule 28 says very little about 16 17 accelerated appeals. Okay. I mean, it doesn't really talk about how you perfect those appeals. It contains 18 almost no useful information, frankly; and if you wanted 19 to do that, I would change Rule 28 to talk about how you 20 perfected an accelerated appeal and remove some of that 21 material from 25 and 26 where most of that information 22 And the other issue that we had, which I don't 23 appears. know whether it was completely voted on at the August 24 25 meeting, is to whether this would be an accelerated appeal

or whether it would be an ordinary appeal with respect to 1 the balance and the timetables. 2 In this draft I put it down as an 3 accelerated appeal, but I'm not sure that that issue was 4 really ever resolved by the committee as to whether it 5 ought to be an accelerated appeal under an accelerated 6 timetable, slightly faster than the ordinary appeal. 7 8 MR. LOW: And under 12 it's a discretionary 9 appeal. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan and then 11 Justice Patterson. 12 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think that might not be a bad idea to put it under 28 because we've had a 13 lot of trouble with 28 and the paucity of procedural 14 provisions for procedural appeals. I just had a case the 15 other day where I think I ended up disagreeing with a 16 whole bunch of courts on whether you could have a motion 17 for extension of time to file a notice of appeal in an 18 19 accelerated appeal. So it might not be a bad idea to just put it under 28 and fix 28 now. 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, and I think I 21 22 could fix 28 with a day's work, but it frequently turns out that it takes more than that. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Patterson and 24 then Frank. 25

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1	HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: The other
2	advantage of that approach, that is putting it in 28 as
3	Judge Duncan also recommends, is that it avoids elevating
4	these interlocutory appeals to another category of civil,
5	criminal, and interlocutory; and I think that there's an
6	advantage to that because it's not as though we want to
7	elevate its status, encourage it, avoid all of our other
8	procedures. So I think atmospherically or
9	architecturally, as Bill says, I think there is an
10	advantage there as well.
11	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think I could put it
12	in 28. I think that would be a good idea. This is not a
13	big deal, and it's stuck right here in the middle as if it
14	is a big deal. So putting it in 28 makes sense and could
15	be done, but I think more would need to be done to 28.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank, then Stephen.
17	MR. GILSTRAP: Well, I think it is a good
18	idea, but I like also the idea you floated with it of
19	taking the information out of 26 about interlocutory
20	appeal where it's kind of buried and putting it over into
21	28 where it's accessible and we can find it.
22	I also like the idea of clarifying this
23	problem that Justice Duncan raised in the case she had and
24	the conflicting case out of Dallas, I think In re: DB that
25	the rules involving interlocutory appeals apply to all

1 interlocutory appeals, even the statutory ones that are so 2 much of a problem, and also clarify whether this really is 3 -- do the rules involving interlocutory appeals apply to 4 this procedure. I mean, it seems like we could -- it's 5 more than a day's work, but it seems like that would 6 really be a healthy thing to do to resolve those problems 7 by making this amendment.

8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, Mr. Chairman, the 9 only thing we need to know is whether the committee thinks 10 that this 51.014(d) through (f) should be an accelerated 11 appeal rather than an ordinary appeal. If the committee 12 thinks that, then moving it to 28 makes perfectly good 13 sense, although it will require a little more work to be 14 done.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen.

MR. TIPPS: Well, I like the way Bill has 16 done it for a couple of reasons. One, because I think 17 this basically tracks the way the Federal Rules of 18 Appellate Procedure address the issue; and the Texas 19 statute, while somewhat different from the Federal 20 statute, is clearly modeled on the Federal statute; and I 21 also like it because it seems to me that what we're 2.2 talking about here is simply a different way of perfecting 23 24 an appeal.

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Typically you perfect an appeal because you

have a right to take an appeal by filing a notice of 1 appeal, and the big ambiguity here is that, well, you 2 can't really -- you're not entitled to file a notice of 3 appeal because you first have to get the appellate court's 4 5 permission; and so it just seems to me logical to draw a 6 distinction between an appeal as of right on the one hand and an appeal by permission on the other and simply to 7 8 clock in the middle of Rule 25 the explanation for how you first go about asking for and securing permission from the 9 10 court of appeals to appeal; and then once you have secured that permission you then fall into the -- your appeal 11 becomes a normal appeal and you file the notice of appeal 12 13 and the briefing schedule is the same and that sort of So I like the way this is proposed. 14 thing. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: But why wouldn't 15 it always have some accelerated features, Stephen? 16 17 MR. TIPPS: I mean, I think whether it's accelerated or not is a separate question. 18 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, but --19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Go ahead, Justice Duncan. 20 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It is a separate --21 I agree with you, Stephen, that it is a separate question, 22 23 but it's sort of architecturally the question, because once we decide it is accelerated we would know where to 24 put it. Once we decide it's not accelerated we know where 25

1 to put it. So maybe we should just take an up or down vote on is this going to be an accelerated appeal, and I 2 would like to make it a pitch as -- you-all all know how 3 much I hate accelerated appeals, but I would like to make 4 a pitch that the whole purpose of this statute is to 5 accelerate the process in the trial court, so as much as I 6 hate it, I think it ought to be accelerated. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank. 8 9 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, it's also interlocutory I mean, clearly it's that. It is an appeal of 10 appeal. 11 something other than a final order, and the Federal courts don't have that. They handle the interlocutory appeals 12 under this collateral order docket, so --13 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, that's not right, 15 Frank. MR. MUNZINGER: 1292(b). 16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. And 1292(a) is 17 like our law generally with taking temporary injunctions 18 19 and the like. MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. It seems me to make 20 21 sense to put it in here where we already deal with an appeal of interlocutory orders in 28. Now, whether it's 22 an accelerated appeal or not, that seems to me to be less 23 important as it's an interlocutory appeal and ought to be 24 lumped in with all the others under 28. 25

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, that's what I was just thinking, was maybe -- I'm sorry. I'm having trouble seeing today. Maybe part of the problem is that 28 is entitled "Accelerated appeals in civil cases." Maybe 28's title should be "Interlocutory appeals in civil cases."

8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, there are a lot of Rule 28 issues, including the one we talked about last 9 10 time potentially about termination of parental rights, whether they're final orders or they're not final orders; 11 and there may be more to be done on 28; but, myself, if 12 13 this is going to be treated as an accelerated appeal, it ought to be treated in the accelerated appeal rule; and 14 maybe I didn't get that far in my mental process when I 15 was working on this before the end of last year; but 16 that's what I think today, that it would make better sense 17 to put it over in 28. 18

19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, 28.1 says, "An appeal from an interlocutory order when allowed will be accelerated," so that doesn't admit to any exceptions, does it? 23 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 28 needs to be redrafted. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

Okay. But it wouldn't PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 1 be that huge of a deal. Like that sentence. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 3 Right. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't know how 4 5 helpful that is, that sentence. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, but on the issue of 6 whether or not the permissive appeals under 51.014 are 7 going to be accelerated or not, this language would seem 8 to cover that, wouldn't it? I mean right now, today. 9 10 No? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But I don't know if 11 that language is very meaningful because you need to go 12 and read the other rules to figure out what it is you're 13 supposed to do. Okay. We have a lot of statutes that say 14 that things are supposed to go faster than other things, 15 and that doesn't necessarily mean anything. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy. 17 Isn't every appeal an appeal from 18 MR. LOW: an interlocutory -- every permissive appeal. If it's by 19 right it's by final judgment, so if it's first it's 20 discretionary. That's got to be from an interlocutory 21 order. If it's interlocutory then it's an accelerated 22 appeal by 28, and why wouldn't it go there? I mean, it 23 just follows. 24 25 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That makes sense, and

51.014 is about nonfinal orders from top to bottom. 1 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 2 Uh-huh. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher. 3 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, 4 certainly from a trial judges's point of view when they're 5 asking for our permission to appeal from an order, you 6 would want it to be accelerated because you don't want the 7 case to sit there for the normal length of an appeal. You 8 would want a faster decision to the question that you've 9 agreed to have them appeal. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Richard Munzinger. 11 12 Sorry. The way Bill has drafted 13 MR. MUNZINGER: this he has -- I think, and I don't spend a lot of time in 14 the appellate rules, but you have different timetables and 15 brief, number of pages, and what have you for an appeal by 16 permission than you do for other appeals; is that correct? 17 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah. 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes and no. I mean, 19 once it gets to be -- once you get permission then it 20 should be looking just like any other accelerated appeal. 21 Once you get permission, but there is this process built 22 in to do briefing --23 To get the permission? MR. MUNZINGER: 24 25 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- to get the

permission. 1 MR. MUNZINGER: And it's in the appellate 2 court and then it's treated like any other appeal. 3 **PROFESSOR DORSANEO:** Right. 4 5 MR. MUNZINGER: All right. Thank you. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Orsinger. 7 MR. ORSINGER: If I'm not mistaken, I haven't done one of these in the last year or two, but the 8 process of getting the record and the process of briefing 9 10 is accelerated for an accelerated appeal, but the process of disposition, the setting for oral argument and the 11 writing of the opinions is ordinary. Is that right, Judge 12 Gray, or is there an accelerated disposition once you get 13 There is an accelerated disposition? everything? 14 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah. 15 MR. ORSINGER: What does that mean? Are you 16 entitled to get scheduled for oral arguments earlier than 17 somebody who has been waiting a few months? 18 19 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Yes. MR. ORSINGER: All right. Well, then 20 this --21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm not sure the record 22 is clear on that. Justice Bland says you're entitled to 23 an earlier position. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But the appellate rules 25

aren't clear on that. 1 2 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: The appeal is 3 accelerated, and if it's an accelerated appeal, it moves to the top of the submission calendar as soon as it is at 4 issue. 5 MR. ORSINGER: Is that true on the San 6 Antonio court, Sarah? 7 8 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yes. MR. ORSINGER: And the Waco court? 9 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: No. 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The rules don't require 11 that or that would make perfect sense. 12 13 MR. ORSINGER: Well, I guess my point is --HONORABLE JANE BLAND: It would require that 14 the appeal be accelerated. I don't know --15 MR. ORSINGER: Well, apparently it depends 16 on the court, but be that as it may, not only do you have 17 an accelerated record deadline and an accelerated briefing 18 19 deadline, but in some courts of appeals you have an 20 accelerated submission and maybe a quicker turnaround on the opinion, which to me is salutary if what you're trying 21 to do is stop a case in the trial court until you get a 22 question of law resolved. We would rather have that 23 answer in 3 or 4 months than in 9 or 12 months. 24 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Whoa, whoa. I didn't 25

say that. We don't get the briefing at issue in three or 1 four months. 2 3 MR. ORSINGER: Well, on an accelerated 4 appeal you should be. 5 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: We should be, but --6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray. I just go back to the 7 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: 8 comment that I made in August and I won't belabor the point that we've got a tremendous number of places in the 9 statutes, the rules, the Constitution, interpretations of 10 what cases get what priorities; and every time you throw 11 another one of these in here with the label of 12 13 "accelerated" you are affecting the ability of an intermediate appellate court or other courts to deal with 14 15 their dockets in the fashion of balancing a lot, and I do mean a lot, of competing factors. 16 When does an accelerated appeal in a case 17 for money judgment take precedence over determination of 18 parental rights, over a mandamus, over a criminal case in 19 which someone has been -- is currently incarcerated versus 201 a criminal case in which somebody is out on appeal bond? 21 You've got a tremendous number of factors that you are 221 23 trying to balance when you are working on any particular case and then there's three different chambers working on 24 25 that.

At least in Waco I can tell you that 1 labeling it in one place or another will not materially 2 affect the time frame, but it will at least cause pressure 3 4 to be applied to move it around; and as I said in August, I ask for fewer of those impositions on my ability to 5 6 determine what I work on first as opposed to more, and so 7 I don't like the label "accelerated appeal." 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank. In this case I don't see that 9 MR. GILSTRAP: 10 these issues are quite as critical because everybody has If the trial 11 to agree before the appeal can take place. 12 judge thinks that he doesn't want to wait, you know, nine months for the First Court to rule, he just won't certify 13 If the Tenth Court says, "Well, we're already loaded 14 it. up now; we don't need any more of these," they just won't 15 take it. 16 That's what the Federal courts do. 17 The Fifth Circuit just won't take your case, and they don't 18 take that many. So I don't see that it's that much of a 19 problem with this type of thing where everyone has to 20 21 agree. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina. 22 I agree with Frank that it's 23 MS. CORTELL: the exception that we're going to have everybody agreeing 24 to an interlocutory appeal; but if everybody does agree 25

and the trial court agrees, then I agree with Judge 1 Christopher that it should be labeled and given precedence 2 or priority as a accelerated appeal; but I will also say 3 that my anecdotal experience is that you're only really 4 5 talking about a month or two earlier in disposition as a 6 general matter. I don't think you can get -- it's not like you get immediate turnaround, but I still would be in 7 8 favor of treating it as accelerated.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Benton.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 10 These last few comments caused me to think that the rule should include a 11 provision for the trial judge to withdraw his or her 12 13 permission and to have the case come back, and there are a number of reasons why you might want to do that. Let's 14 say another state has a similar statute and a court of 15 that state has construed it. That is but one reason I can 16 think of; and if you're in Waco and it's -- or rather in 17 the First Court and they're just not -- they haven't set a 18 date for hearing, quit mucking with my case and give it 19 back to me, you know. So I think there ought to be a 20 provision to say, let's stop, bring it back to the trial 21 22 court.

23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Bland. Justice24 Bland.

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HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Levi, can't the

parties if they think this is a fruitless effort can 1 dismiss it? 2 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, what if the 3 parties don't think it's frivolous, but --4 5 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Fruitless. 6 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Fruitless, but you 7 would still like to get the case disposed of. I mean, you can have disagreement amongst the trial judge and counsel. 8 I mean, if you'll just respond to that one example, let's 9 say Florida has a similar statute and finally the Florida 10 Supreme Court weighs in on it. It may not be four 11 12 corners, but close enough where you have some guidance to give you an opportunity to go forth, get a trial record, 13 14 and go on. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger. 15 MR. MUNZINGER: I would be very reluctant to 16 give a trial court the ability to take the case away from 17 the appellate court after I had spent a tremendous amount 18 of my client's money to get the case before the appellate 19 court to resolve a definitive question. There's no -- in 20 my opinion, and respectfully, I don't think it's fair to 21 the parties who once have obtained permission of the trial 22 court judge to spend all that time and money, to make 23 adjustments in their business activities or whatever it 24 It may not be an automobile accident case. It may be 25 is.

1 a trademark case. It may be a case that requires market 2 changes and what have you. It could have some 3 far-reaching effects, and to then suddenly have the rug 4 pulled out from underneath you, spend all that money, and 5 have made your business judgments because the judge says 6 the Florida Supreme Court ruled something I think is not 7 wise, in all due respect, Judge.

8 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: You're overruled. 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And you're 10 reversed.

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: If you look at how we 11 look at all appeals, there are often changes in the law, 12 13 Supreme Court, Texas Supreme Court decisions that apply to pending cases and sometimes pending cases that are on 14 appeal. We don't typically stop everything and do a 15 do-over because there is some change in the law. The 16 appeal continues, and the appellate court rules, and the 17 chips fall where they may, wherever the case happens to be 18 in the process, and I don't think you want to keep going 19 back to square one. You know, once you've already gone 20 down the road and the train has left the station, you 21 don't want to, you know, backtrack. Overruled. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Christopher. 23 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I 24 actually disagree with Levi, too, because the few times I 25

have tried to get lawyers to agree to this, that's usually 1 -- first of all, that's usually unsuccessful. It's 2 usually something that I would like to have a decision on. 3 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 5 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And so I'm 6 urging the lawyers to agree to this procedure, and I've only been successful once in getting the lawyers to agree 7 8 to the procedure, and that was because at the time we were going to appeal. They had a right to do an interlocutory 9 appeal on another order I was making, so it made perfect 10 sense to everybody to take both of those issues up at the 11 same time, so you have that first line of defense, Levi. 12 13 You don't have to agree to send it up to begin with. 14 So --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray and then 15 Mike Hatchell. 16 17 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Unless 29.5 is being tinkered with in this proceeding the trial judge has that 18 "While an appeal from an interlocutory order is 19 right. pending, the trial court retains jurisdiction and may make 20 further orders including one dissolving the order appealed 21 from." 22 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Except --23 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: "Except as provided by 24 25 law."

1HONORABLE JANE BLAND: No, there's2underneath --

3 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: "And if permitted by law may proceed with a trial on the merits, but the court 4 5 must not make an order inconsistent with any appellate court temporary order or interferes with or impairs the 6 7 jurisdiction of the appellate court or effectiveness of 8 any relief sought whether it may be granted on appeal." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Mike Hatchell. 9 That raises a whole other set 10 MR. HATCHELL: of issues as to when jurisdiction transfers and what 11 jurisdiction there is. That's interesting, but I was 12 13 going to say on the question that Levi raised it seems to me that since this is an appeal by permission, the court 14 of appeals would certainly have the right at any time to 15 say that that permission was improperly granted, and I 16 would think because the judge is part of the process, 17 Levi, that you could write a letter expressing why you 18 think they should exercise such a right. 19 Bill. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The statute has in (e) 21 this language, "An appeal under subsection (d) does not 22 stay proceedings in the district court unless the parties 23 agree and the district court, the court of appeals, or a 24 judge in the court of appeals orders a stay of the 25

proceeding, " so it's kind of meant to keep going, although 1 in my experience parties under these circumstances tend to 2 agree or frequently agree --3 4 MR. LOW: Right. That's what it comes up 5 generally, I mean, like a question of law. The one I had 6 is Louisiana says a certain agreement is unenforceable; Texas says it is. Well, which law is going to apply? We 7 didn't want to take a whole bunch of depositions and go to 8 Hong Kong and all that, so generally they do agree, the 9 lawyers agree to stop everything waiting on that. 10 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But it requires the district court, the court of appeals, or a judge of the 12 court of appeals to order a stay. 13 14 MR. LOW: To order it, right. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't know whether 15 that's a requirement that's going to matter much if the 16 parties agree, because they're just not going to do 17 18 anything. 19 MR. LOW: Right. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And if the judge just 20 acquiesces, that's going to be the normal -- probably the 21 I just wanted to point out that the statute 22 normal deal. tries to deal with this subject in maybe not a very 23 informed way. 24 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I think this 25

paragraph is directed to those instances such as an appeal 1 of an injunction or some procedure that one party may be .2 seeking a further delay and seeks an appeal either 3 incident to that or for that reason, and so the other 4 party wants to keep it going, but here you're going to 5 have by agreement, and presumably that's going to be part 6 7 of the deal by which they will structure their litigation below, but theoretically it keeps moving. That's a newer 8 provision. I can't remember when that came in, but it's 9 meant to keep things going and to avoid the delay incident 10 11 to an interlocutory appeal. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So, Bill, what do you 12 think? Where are we? 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, we're still 14 trying to decide, I think, on the question about whether 15 this would be an accelerated appeal or an ordinary appeal. 16 17 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: I quess I had not noticed that it's limited to the district court. 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think that's an 19 accident, but that's what the statute says. 20 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Which creates 21 another wrinkle here. 22 Can't hear you, Judge. MR. TIPPS: 23 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: It's limited to the 24 orders from the district court, the statute is. 25

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 51.014(e). 1 2 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: And so if you take that literally, which maybe we have to, although --3 4 **PROFESSOR DORSANEO:** It's (d). HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: -- to look at the 5 6 history of it, it creates an additional wrinkle because all these other rules apply to any trial court order, and 7 8 this would apply to only the district court. It raises a real problem in 9 MR. MUNZINGER: 10 El Paso because we have -- all our county courts at law have essentially coextensive jurisdiction of the district 11 courts, and the cases are filed and assigned to county 12 13 courts at law even though they're filed with the district clerk. We at one time were unique in that. I don't think 14 15 we are anymore. HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: You're not unique 16 17 in that there are other counties where the county courts have coextensive jurisdiction of the district court. Ι 18 think -- but I think you are unique in that the filing 19 system just randomly files cases with the district court 20 or the county court. 21 MR. MUNZINGER: Yeah. 22 Frank. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: MR. GILSTRAP: Well, I mean, that problem 24 existed before. I think the statute involving 25

interlocutory appeals of receivership orders used to apply 1 only to district courts, and -- although I don't know that 2 that's going to make a difference in what we do today. 3 You see what I'm saying? In other words, I think we've 4 still got this same problem; and, you know, Bill, you say 5 it's going to be an ordinary appeal or an accelerated 6 I mean, the only type of ordinary appeal is an 7 appeal. appeal from final judgment. 8

9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, I think of ordinary 10 appeals as having a track, okay, or two tracks; and then I 11 think of accelerated appeals as being on a different 12 track; and I think in terms of the rule book that whether 13 the track is different after briefing depends upon what 14 the court of appeals does with it.

MR. GILSTRAP: Well, isn't it true that all appeals from final judgments are on one track and all appeals from interlocutory orders are on another track under the rules?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I think it's more properly thought of as accelerated appeal is under an accelerated track, and those are usually appeals from interlocutory orders, but not always, and that what I call an ordinary appeal is governed by the ordinary tracks, you know, which we have a dual track system, stupidly, in order to complicate things for -- you know, for people

qenerally. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There's a ringing endorsement of the system. Justice Duncan. 3 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But I think the 4 5 İ Legislature has at least implied that it is accelerated by stating that the application has to be filed not later 6 7 than the 10th day after the date an interlocutory order 8 under (d) is --It clearly intended for 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 10 it to be, but the difference between accelerated and not accelerated is a matter of months. It's not a big deal. 11 12 I mean, it's like --HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It is in our court. 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, if you treat it 14 that way, it is, and I guess your other cases just kind of 15 sit there. 16 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's right. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Which is debatable 18 about whether you're treating it the right way. 19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well --20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe not in your 21 22 chambers it's debatable. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's a one-sided debate 23 in her chambers. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. 25

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: In our court if it 1 is an accelerated appeal or any other one of a number of 2 other precedential type cases it gets different treatment. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray. 4 5 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: It seems that I may be the only one here that's arguing against labeling it 6 7 accelerated, and I just say move on if I'm the only one 8 that's said anything about it. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I labeled it 9 10 accelerated. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: There's at least one 11 12 other. 13 MR. MUNZINGER: Doesn't Rule 28 mandate, 28.1 mandate that it be considered an accelerated appeal 14 15 by definition? First sentence. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That was the point Buddy 16 17 made. It says, "An appeal from an 18 MR. MUNZINGER: interlocutory order when allowed will be accelerated." Ι 19 don't think there is any choice about it unless you amend 20 Rule 28.1. 21 MR. GILSTRAP: Which we may do. We may do 22 that. That's what we're talking about. 23 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. Let's put it in 24 28 and just go onto what it is that we're talking about. 25

MR. LOW: Okay. 1 2 Is everybody okay with CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: that? That makes sense to me. 3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: All right. So that 4 5 takes us to whatever we're going to call it, petition for permission to appeal, application for permission to 6 7 appeal. 25.3, 28 point something. Okay. It's on page 8 four, and just put outside of your mind whether it's going 9 to be 25.2, 25.3, or 28, but I'm going to draft it to put it in 28, so it will be 28 something, and I guess we'll 10 11 have to decide whether it's a petition or an application. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: An "appition." 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Huh? What? 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: An "appition." Combining 15 the two words. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes, thank you for 16 (a) (1). Now, we talked about this a lot last time, 17 that. and I recrafted (a)(1) to make it plain that we're talking 18 about any party to the trial court proceeding being able 19 to file this thing. It's called a petition here for 20 permission to appeal with the clerk of the appellate court 21 that has appellate jurisdiction over the action. 22 Jane Bland I think suggested that kind of 23 That language also with respect to the 24 language. appellate court or the court of appeals that has 25

1 jurisdiction over the action is taken from the statute 2 verbatim, and to me the issue remains, although we voted 3 on it last time, as to whether we're going to let any 4 party to the trial court proceeding seek permission to 5 appeal even if that person won or whether we're going to 6 restrict it to losers.

7 I mean, if you don't want to debate that again or talk about it again, that's fine with me. I was 8 in the minority on that. I don't think anybody should be 9 able to do it, but arguably the statute without addressing 10 It just says "if application the question permits that. 11 is made to the court of appeals." It doesn't say "by 12 somebody aggrieved, " and who knows whether the Legislature 13 meant that anybody could do it or whether the normal 14 15 principles would apply.

16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Tipps has got a comment 17 on that.

MR. TIPPS: Well, I have a comment on that, but before I get there, I would suggest a change in some of the language, Bill, just because I think the way that it's written is a little confusing in that this first introductory material suggests maybe that you have an appeal as of right under section 51.014(d), which I know is not the case.

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To get to the point, I would suggest that we

1 replace the words "that is not otherwise appealable as of 2 right in accordance with," with the words, "pursuant to," 3 so that we're simply saying to request permission to 4 appeal an interlocutory order pursuant to section 5 51.014(d)(f). That's what we're talking about, and I just 6 found when I first read it I was confused by the language, 7 though I know you took that out of the statute.

8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. That's fine with 9 me. I took it out of the statute on the assumption that 10 that would provide clarity rather than confusion. If it 11 provides confusion rather than clarity I would certainly 12 agree with the change as you suggest as a change --

No, it doesn't change the 13 MR. TIPPS: I just found that to be an improvement. With 14 subject. regard to the substantive question that you've raised, I 15 agree with you that it seems odd that a winning party 16 would have the right to perfect a permissive interlocutory 17 appeal and that while some court someday may well come to 18 the conclusion that that's possible, I think it's probably 19 wrong for us to prejudge that issue by using the word "any 20 party" in this rule; and I would suggest that we replace 21 the word "any" with the word "a" and simply leave open for 22 decision by a court at some later day whether or not a 23 winning party has the right to perfect an appeal. I mean, 24 25 and I say that knowing that we voted before that a winning

1 party should have the right to do that, but I think we 2 should revisit that. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Patterson. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: I second that, and 4 5 did we actually have a vote on that issue? Because I 6 think that is the type of issue that may have unintended I could see how it could influence, extend 7 consequences. proceedings, and if you don't agree with me to appeal I'm 8 going to appeal anyway, and it's going to be a --9 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There was a vote on it. HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: There was a vote? 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And it was relatively 12 close, but I think it was something like 14 to 10. 13 14 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Well, I think the Saturday group is particularly devoted and conscientious 15 and inciteful, and I would urge that we revisit that. 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think it happened on Saturday last time. 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But she means this 19 Saturday. 20 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: It was a small 21 Saturday, though, when all the judges were gone, wasn't 22 it? That was the conference. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That may be it. Richard 24 25 and then Judge Bland.

MR. ORSINGER: I would endorse Stephen 1 Tipps' recommendation on saying that to request permission 2 under the provision fixes it because I'm concerned there 3 may be some statute somewhere that permits an accelerated 4 appeal that's not mentioned in the --5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There is not. 6 7 MR. ORSINGER: There is not? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Bland. 8 9 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: As one of the vigorous dissenters to that last vote, I think that 10 11 Stephen's suggestion is great because that leaves, I 12 quess, the argument, how untenable it may be, that the winning party could perfect the appeal, so we're true to 13 our earlier vote, but we don't incorporate it into the 14 rule that any party can appeal, win or lose. 15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm happy to change it, 16 and I will assume that the change means that only the 17 winning party can appeal, for the record. 18 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: For the record, I 19 don't think that's what it says, as one of the people with 20 that untenable position. The statute says it's passive. 21 It says "application must be made." 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: True. 23 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And let's just 24 25 leave it open and let the courts decide.

MR. GILSTRAP: I wasn't here for that 1 debate, but what difference does it make since everybody 2 3 has to agree? HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Right. 4 5 MR. GILSTRAP: It seems like it's kind of a 6 pointless debate. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And one could imagine, I would think, a circumstance where everybody agrees, the 8 9 parties agree and the judge agrees, and for whatever reason, let's say the losing party has got limited 10 resources on a contingency fee, and then to say to the 11 12 winning party, "Hey, you know, you're getting paid by the hour. You know, you've got the big bucks, why don't you 13 take the laboring oar on this thing" and --14 15 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: "You be the appellant"? 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh? HONORABLE JANE BLAND: "You be the 18 19 appellant"? HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: The applicator. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "You be the applier." 21 "You be the applicant." And you would say somewhere in 22 23 your briefing that, "Hey, we won in the court below, but we need to know whether this is right because we agree 241 25 with the losing party below that the case will be

materially advanced if you decide this question for us." 1 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Is everybody happy with "pursuant to section" blah-blah "a party"? I'm happy with 3 it. 4 5 MR. BOYD: Here, here. MR. MUNZINGER: Yes. 6 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Next subsection? The next subsection, the 10-day requirement comes from the 8 9 statute. 51.014(f) says that the application must be filed not later than the 10th day after the date an 10 interlocutory order under subsection (d) is entered, and I 11 12 think it's clear enough when it says, "The petition must be filed not later than the 10th day after the date a 13 district court signs a written order granting permission 14 to appeal" because that's what subsection (d) is about. 15 One court of appeals, the Dallas court of 16 appeals, I believe, in DB concluded that the 10 days would 17 run from the interlocutory order rather than from the 18 order granting permission to appeal the interlocutory 19 That seems clearly wrong to me on the face of the 20 order. statute, and I think all of the other courts of appeals 21 have interpreted the statute correctly to say that it runs 22 from the date of the subsection (d) order, and that's what 23 this (a)(2) is talking about without itself mentioning 24 subsection (d). And I think it's clearer not to mention 25

subsection (d) than to mention it, but --1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The next sentence, which is not on the face of the statute, really, I think 4 5 -- and Justice Duncan can speak to this -- comes from the Stolte case, the idea that an appellate court can grant an 6 extension of time for filing this petition, which I think 7 the Dallas court ruled otherwise, and I think at the 8 committee discussion last time, you know, at least the 9 vast majority of people concluded that if you file this 10 petition late that you ought to be able to move for an 11 extension of time under the ordinary rules. 12 Now, the ordinary rules don't exactly work 13 by cross-reference here, because 26.3, where the ordinary 14 rules appear, talks about a notice of appeal only; and it 15 was my judgment to just put it right here rather than to 16 cross-refer to 26.3 and to amend 26.3. Otherwise, this 17 is, I believe, identical to 26.3 because the language was 18 copied from 26.3, with the only change being to file the 19 petition rather than to file the notice of appeal. So 20 that's my recommendation for the timing of the filing of 21 the petition or application for permission to appeal. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, Pam. 23 MS. BARON: Bill, is this a larger issue 24 25 beyond this particular appeal?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Always. 1 MS. BARON: Well, I think that the Dallas 2 court of appeals in a number of different kinds of 3 contexts has said that if a -- there is a deadline in a 4 statute for an appeal, that you cannot get an extension 5 under the civil -- under the appellate rules. Is that 6 correct? 7 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: DB says that, yes. 9 MR. GILSTRAP: That's what I was referring When we rewrite 28 we need to make it clear that we 10 to. need to overrule those cases where if it's a -- no, I mean 11 If it's a statutory appeal where you only get 10 days 12 it. to appeal a termination or something like that and the 13 Dallas court says, "We're not going to give you an 14 extension," that needs to be changed, and we can do that 15 16 in rewriting that rule. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, we discussed that 17 last -- in August at least in talking about these 18 termination cases where game is over after the accelerated 19 timetable runs, 20 days runs. 20 MR. GILSTRAP: Yeah, 20 days. Yeah. 21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I looked at that, and I 22 planned to try to draft that, but I had too much else to 23 do and was not able to get that done, so I apologize for 24 25 not working on that some more. Maybe that's part of the

next project. 1 I don't think we have to 2 MS. BARON: Yeah. resolve it now, but I think we need to -- it is a problem 3 for a lot of people. 4 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: If anybody wants to 6 volunteer to do a draft of that and send it to me I would be perfectly happy to take the second leg of the race on 7 that. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sounds like Pam wants to 9 10 do that. MS. BARON: I'll do that. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Jeff. 12 13 MS. SWEENEY: That will teach you. MS. BARON: Yeah. 14 MR. BOYD: It seems to me that the question 15 of the right to permissive appeal under this statute and 161 proposed rule is not a question of the right -- not so 17 much a question of the right of the parties as it is a 18 question of the power of the court to hear -- to have 19 jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal; and you know, 20 if somebody takes an interlocutory appeal when there's no 21 right to do so, it's a lack of jurisdiction that keeps the 2.2 appellate court from hearing it; and the courts only get 231 the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the statutes, 24 all of which is to say I think that if the statute says 25

the appellate court may permit an appeal, but only if 1 application is made within 10 days, then we can't by rule 2 extend that period. I think the statute governs, and the 3 4 rule is not going to trump the statute. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, I think that's right. 5 And I think Frank's point was that the Dallas court of 6 7 appeals opinion, which had shortened time under the rule, 8 and --MR. BOYD: But what I'm saying is what we've 9 said in this rule is that the appellate court can extend 10 11 the time --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, I see what you're 12 13 sayinq. MR. BOYD: -- for 15 additional days. 14 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: He's agreeing with 15 16 the Dallas court's opinion. MR. BOYD: And I'm agreeing with the Dallas 17 court's opinion. I haven't read it, but --18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Oh, you would like it. 19 MR. BOYD: I think it's really a separation 20 of powers issue, and I think if the Legislature says you 21 have jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal if an 22 application is made that meets these requirements and is 23 submitted within 10 days, the court doesn't have power to 24 say, "You know what, it wasn't within 10 days, but we'll 25

go ahead and assert jurisdiction." 1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I see. I misunderstood. 2 3 MR. LOW: But that's not true. Anything that -- under the Government Code if we pass something 4 that's inconsistent with a state statute and the 5 6 Legislature does not do something within, what, 60 days, then what we do trumps the statute. 7 8 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: You can -- that's You can specifically overrule procedural statutes, 9 right. if you want to get them mad at you. 10 Well, now, wait. Now, wait. 11 MR. LOW: 12 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: That's kind of been our experience. 13 14 MR. LOW: Wait. We did it not long ago. I've forgotten, on something, but you go to them first. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We thought about doing 16 it. We haven't done it yet, but we went to the 17 Legislature and told them and asked them if that was okay. 18 But, Buddy, you left about 19 MR. PEMBERTON: 6:00 p.m. that night. Alex and I and some others were 20 there 'til about --21 Well, and maybe I went to deer 22 MR. LOW: 23 horn after that, too, but we have -- usually the process is to go to the leaders in the Legislature and feel them 24 out, and they don't care about that, just --that can be 25

1 done. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It should be done 2 3 sparingly, though. HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: Right. That was 4 5 my --MR. LOW: Yeah. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Judge Christopher. 7 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I'm not sure 8 whether we need to debate it that hard in connection with 9 10 this appeal since everyone is agreeing to the appeal. You can even ask the trial judge "Don't sign the order for a 11 few days, give me time to get my paper work ready." I 12 mean, in this context it's really not that big a deal. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan. 14 That was my point 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: in the Stolte opinion --16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Uh-huh. 17 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: -- is, okay, fine, 18 we say, as the Dallas court did, that you don't get a 19 motion for extension of time to file your notice of 20 appeal. So you didn't do it timely. We're going to 21 dismiss your appeal. You go back to the trial court, who 22 will sign a new order, and you will come back up, and that 23 to me just seems absurd. 24 25 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think the Federal 1 circuits are kind of split on whether you can do that or 2 not, but if we don't put it in here, we're just going to 3 leave --4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. -- this for court 6 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 7 determination, and I think if anything the courts of 8 appeals are asking the Supreme Court to provide a rule that will keep them from having to mess with all of these 9 details. 10 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I think it's 11 12 worthwhile since the Legislature is about to convene, to ask them to amend these provisions to include county 13 14 courts like the rest of 51.014 applies to and to provide for an extension of time. 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: If that's going to 16 be done, I think it would be helpful to get these on -- if 17 they are going to be accelerated, to get these on the same 18 track in terms of perfection that other -- because right 19 now we've got three tracks. We've got ordinary appeals, 20 accelerated appeals from other 51.014 orders, and then 21 this 10-day track, which is not in -- and then we've got 22 termination cases. I mean, that's a bigger project than 23 they want to take on, I'm sure, but if they could just get 24 the 51.014 appeals on the same track or let us put them on 25

1 a track.

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2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger.
3	MR. MUNZINGER: You could finesse the
4	jurisdictional issue by giving the appellate court the
5	power in this rule to amend to allow amendments or
6	supplementation of the petition with good cause or without
7	good cause, and that way you finesse the 10-day time
8	period, but you've allow the appellate court to allow full
9	briefing, et cetera, and you've not run into the
10	constitutional jurisdictional question which Jeff raises
11	which I think is right on. I think it's very clearly a
12	separation of powers issue.
13	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The problem is that
14	nothing was filed within 10 days, so there is nothing to
15	amend.
16	MR. BOYD: The appellate court can't do
16 17	MR. BOYD: The appellate court can't do anything.
17	anything.
17 18	anything. MR. MUNZINGER: I'm not sure that that would
17 18 19	anything. MR. MUNZINGER: I'm not sure that that would be true, though.
17 18 19 20	anything. MR. MUNZINGER: I'm not sure that that would be true, though. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I'm just
17 18 19 20 21	anything. MR. MUNZINGER: I'm not sure that that would be true, though. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I'm just talking about my case. Nothing was filed in the 10 days.
17 18 19 20 21 22	anything. MR. MUNZINGER: I'm not sure that that would be true, though. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I'm just talking about my case. Nothing was filed in the 10 days. It was filed like on the 12th day, I believe.

HONORABLE TOM GRAY: But the original 1 petition could be filed in days 11 through 25 with a 2 3 motion for extension --4 MR. BOYD: Right. 5 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: -- and then be 6 considered timely back to the first 10 days, is the way the mechanics of it have gone. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah, what was the excuse for not filing it timely in yours? 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 10 These were just ordinary people who were not Bill Dorsaneos or Chip 11 Babcocks, who were not overly familiar with the statute, 12 13 and they --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just missed the time. 14 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: They thought it was 15 just like an accelerated appeal, I think, but I don't 16 really know what they were thinking. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They didn't try to 18 They just said, "Here we are, and it's within 19 justify it. 20 days," and you said "No, 10 days." 20 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I said we're going 21 to imply a motion for extension for time under Berber. 22 MR. GILSTRAP: That's what often happens in 23 these cases with short dates, like termination cases. You 24 don't get appellate specialists, you get regular lawyers; 25

and in cases like, say, termination the consequences could 1 just be awful. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 3 Yeah. MR. GILSTRAP: I mean, we need to -- if we 4 5 can fix that, we need to try. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Jeff's right, though. Ι 7 mean, the statute does say "appellate jurisdiction." Ι mean, it's not fuzzy about it. It says "appellate 8 jurisdiction." Well, this is making my head hurt. Let's 9 take our morning break and be back in 15 minutes. 10 11 (Recess from 10:25 a.m. to 10:44 a.m.) CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bill, because the Court 12 wants some instruction on the other agenda item, which is 13 14 the precedential effect of decisions in appeals that are transferred, we've only got about 15 minutes to go through 15 this stuff, so let's focus on what we have not already 16 agreed on before, and then we also need to spend five 17 minutes talking about Chief Justice Radack's other request 1.8 about harmonizing the TRAP rules and the civil procedure 19 rules on certificate of service, and that's maybe not as 20 clear an issue as we might have thought, but --21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let me go onto (b) 22 then, putting aside this issue as to whether we can grant 23 an extension of time or whether that's by the board. Ι 24 25 think the Court already appreciates that issue in (a)(2).

We went through the contents of the petition at the August meeting, and that didn't prove to be very controversial at that meeting, but what I did in this draft is to simplify that a little bit. (A), (1)(A) and (B), come from the notice of appeal, the companion notice of appeal provisions, if you look at 25.1(d), and you could see the comparable provisions there.

8 (C) talks about identifying the district 9 court's order granting permission to appeal, stating the 10 date of the order and attaching a copy. (D) says that the 11 petition itself should state that all parties agree to the 12 district court's order. (E) identifies the written order 13 sought to be appealed by stating the date of that order 14 and attaching a copy.

(F) was the subject of a vote at our August 15 meeting, and it more closely tracks the Texas statute than 16 the alternative Federal language that we took up at that 17 time, but there was a vote to adopt this (F) language, 18 which more or less mirrors 51.014(d) without getting into 19 difficulties with respect to what orders we're talking 20 about. So the contents of the petition provision, which I 21 don't think is controversial, just gives a road map to the 2.2 parties as to what should be in the petition. 23

One issue that we did have last time that may be a subject of at least minor discussion here is how

long this petition should be, and in (c), form of papers, 1 2 number of copies, it's provided that unless the -- a court 3 rules otherwise except by the appellate court's permission, a petition or response or a cross-petition may 4 not exceed 10 pages, exclusive of pages as we normally do. 5 Last time around we had from the committee, 6 really from me based on discussions at the -- with 7 committee members, and maybe we did have a committee vote, 8 we had "may not exceed five pages." There was a 9 suggestion that we should go with the Federal approach, 10 which a paper may not exceed 20 pages, and we ultimately 11 ended up compromising at 10. I don't know if that's an 12 13 issue that needs to be debated at this point, but that's the explanation. 14 15 Mechanically, if any party timely files a petition, any other party may file a response. It says 16 "or a cross-petition," and I took that from the Federal 17 18 I'm not completely sure what somebody who agreed to rule. 19 this order would say in a response or what they would say in a cross-petition, but I think we want to leave open the 20 21 opportunity that somebody would want to say something back that perhaps would anticipate the merits of the appeal. 22 At any rate, this works mechanically. 23 (d) is new, "Submission of petition; 24 Appellate court's order," and I copied this from the 25

1 Federal rule, which provides that the petition and answer will be submitted without oral argument unless the court 2 of appeal orders otherwise. It says, "Unless the court of 3 appeals orders otherwsie, the petition and response or 4 5 cross-petition will be submitted to the appellate court without oral argument." I think that the appellate judges 6 7 would need to speak to that as to how they would want this submission to work. 8

9 The next sentence simply provides that a copy of the appellate court's order must be served on all 10 parties to the trial court proceedings. I contemplate 11 that the order would grant or deny permission to appeal, 12 13 dismiss the petition, or tell somebody to do something 14 else as in the -- as in some of these opinions and perhaps in the Stolte case; and I may not have gotten that 15 completely right; but that seemed to me to cover the 16 waterfront; and I more or less gratuitously added "No 17 motion for rehearing may be filed, " which you may want to 18 put in there, may not want to put in there. That's not 19 something we discussed at all. 20

The (e) part is the important part of our discussion in August. Justice Duncan and a number of other people wanted me to change the earlier draft, which said that you don't need to file a notice of appeal, to something like this: "Within 10 days after the entry the

appellate Court's order granting permission to appeal, in 1 order to perfect an appeal" -- and in my mind this is the 2 first time that an appeal would be perfected. That other 3 stuff is just preliminary. "In order to perfect an appeal 4 5 under these rules, any party to the trial court 6 proceeding" -- and I think it may be better to say "may" rather than "must," although I don't think it's a big 7 8 deal.

"May file a notice of accelerated appeal 9 with the district clerk or the clerk of the appellate 10 court in conformity with Rule 25.1 together with a 11 docketing statement as provided in Rule 32." And I added 12 13 here specifically "The provisions of 26.3 apply to such a notice, " indicating that you could seek an extension of 14 time to file this notice of accelerated appeal in 15 accordance with 26.3. There may be some controversy about 16 whether you can extend the time to file a notice of 17 accelerated appeal, but that's how it's drafted. 18

There's an alternative (e) with the idea of each one of these being that after permission to appeal is given then there's a notice of appeal that needs to be filed within some time period and we're back on track without having to rewrite everything about the balance of this proceeding into this rule. "After perfection of the appeal, the appeal may be prosecuted in the same manner as

any other accelerated appeal," and that pretty much --1 that pretty much covers my suggestion. 2 The alternative (e) is not really different 3 from the first (e) except it breaks things down. It may 4 be clearer, may even be better, but given our time 5 constraints we're not going to go through that and just 6 leave it for you to look at. 7 Is that sufficient, Mr. Chairman? 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Yeah. That's 9 great. The only thing that -- in the time we have that we 10 might want to talk about a little bit is about this "no 11 motion for rehearing may be filed." How does everybody 12 feel about that? 13 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I like motions for 14 15 rehearing. A lot of times they focus the issue that we may have missed, so I have no objection to one at our 16 17 level. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Munzinger. 18 MR. MUNZINGER: Originally I thought I 19 agreed with Bill, but having listened to what he just 20 said, what's the problem? 21 MR. LOW: What was the reason for that, 22 I mean no motions. I mean, it just moves it along Bill? 23 faster? 24 25 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I had two reasons, move

it along faster and if a motion for rehearing can be filed 1 then if it's -- then if it's silent, it's unclear, and 2 what rules govern it. And, you know, I suppose we could 3 go to, you know, appellate Rule 49 and say that governs 4 it, but it doesn't really govern it. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 6 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So I'm off -- it was easier to have no motion for rehearing than to build in a 8 rehearing procedure, and it also seemed to me that maybe 9 10 one would be not desirable. MR. MUNZINGER: Can you appeal this from an 11 appellate court to the Supreme Court? 12 MR. LOW: 13 No. MR. MUNZINGER: Because of the statute? 14 MR. LOW: Uh-huh. 15 MR. GILSTRAP: If it's an interlocutory 16 17 appeal you may be able to. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Only after 18 19 permission, right? MR. ORSINGER: Doesn't there have to be a 20 dissent or a conflict in this appeal? 21 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Are we going to be 22 23 getting opinions? HONORABLE TOM GRAY: At this stage you're 24 only talking about the --25

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1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Permission for appeal.
2	HONORABLE TOM GRAY: permission.
3	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think that's game
4	over if you don't get a mandamus.
5	HONORABLE TOM GRAY: Because the appeal of
6	the actual disposition of the issue would then be like you
[`] 7	were talking about under the traditional rules involving
8	interlocutory appeals, whatever they are.
9	MR. ORSINGER: Well, we're assuming that
10	we're just going to get a letter or a postcard or
11	something denying, not some kind of written opinion,
12	right?
13	HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right.
14	MR. ORSINGER: I mean, everyone is
15	anticipating that. What's the point in filing a rehearing
16	if you don't know what the court's reasoning is and you're
17	just saying "Would you look at our petition again?"
18	HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Right. No
19	motion.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard.
21	MR. MUNZINGER: One quick editorial point.
22	From time to time you say "district court" and then you
23	say "trial court." Because the courts in El Paso treat
24	county courts at law as district courts I would suggest
25	that it would be better if you always said "trial court,"

and that would leave the question up as to whether some 1 other court -- I know the statute I believe says district 2 court, but I'm not sure that the Legislature intended to 3 preclude county courts at law in El Paso from having the 4 same jurisdiction as a district court given our practice 5 and the statutes that authorize that practice, which I 6 understand have been upheld by the Texas Supreme Court. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think Justice Hecht 8 9 wants to ask them to change to it "trial court." 10 MR. ORSINGER: Well, see, if we say "trial court" and then they modified the statute then we don't 11 have to amend our rule. 12 13 MR. MUNZINGER: And that's part of the reason why I'm making that recommendation. 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Do you anticipate doing 15 something with this, Justice Hecht, before then? 16 17 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: I do. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I'd rather just 18 put the district court in as few places as possible. 19 Well, that's my point. MR. MUNZINGER: 20 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I could change it to 21 "trial court." 22 MR. ORSINGER: Why don't you? 23 I think if you change MR. MUNZINGER: 24 "district" to "trial" you've not affected the substance at 25

all, but you've accommodated a subsequent change in the 1 statute and left the issue up to the courts were it to 2 3 arise. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You want me to do that? 4 That's fine. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that makes sense to 6 Okay. And is the consensus that we're going to leave 7 me. 8 the sentence in here about "no motion for rehearing may be filed"? 9 MR. GILSTRAP: Yes. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that pretty much what 11 everybody thinks? Sarah. 12 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't know what 13 14 everybody thinks. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, I mean is that what 15 16 you think? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't see a point 17 for motion for rehearing on this, on whether to give 18 19 permission to appeal. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay. That's 20 good. Thanks, Bill. 21 The issue that was skipped over, and it's my 22 fault, I misunderstood what Bill said, Chief Justice 23 24 Radack's -- well, before we go to that, Bill, you're going 25 to bring this back on the agenda next time, and we'll just

finish the whole thing or -- because you've got some more 1 drafting to do on this, right? 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes, I need to make 3 these changes that you suggested and move this over into 4 5 28. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But I think this part of 28, I mean, I'm going to regard as a completed and at 8 9 least tacitly approved work product. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: When we get the redraft and put it into 28 people can look at it. We'll put it on 11 12 the agenda for next time, and if, you know, something pops out at somebody and they say we should have talked about 13 it, then we'll talk about it. Jeff. 14 MR. BOYD: But before we leave that issue, 15 there was one discrete issue. The statute talks about 10 16 days, about the application has to be filed within 10 days 17 after the trial court's order is signed. The rule says 18 after the order is entered. 19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No. That's 20 backwards. I think the statute says "entered" and the 21 rule says "signed." 221 23 MR. BOYD: Yeah. I'm sorry. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Uh-huh. 24 MR. BOYD: We ought to be consistent with 25

that, and I'm not sure -- I mean, there is a difference. 1 Technically, I quess, a judge can sign an order one day 2 and actually be entered a week later. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's true. 4 MR. BOYD: But I would think we ought to be 5 consistent. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We ought to stick with the statute, shouldn't we? 8 9 MR. GILSTRAP: We ought to stick with 10 signed. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: No, with 11 12 signed. MR. GILSTRAP: We ought to stick with 13 I mean, everything runs from the date it's 14 signed. There's all this law out there about the 15 signed. difference between signing and entering, but in all the 161 appellate rules it always starts from the date it's 17 That's something that was settled a long time 18 signed. ago, and we don't need to tamper with that if possible. 19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Trying to figure 20 out when an order was entered, I mean, in Federal court 21 entered is it. 22 MR. BOYD: Signed. 23 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But in state court 24 signed is it, and one reason that signed is it is because 25

1 it's knowable easily.

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2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm going to change (e) 3 to say signing, too.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Hatchell.

5 MR. HATCHELL: I would like to note for the 6 record just so we don't have a great debate about this 7 later on that the concept of marrying a cross-petition with the notion that this proceeds as in a regular appeal 8 9 has a tendency to exacerbate the briefing process enormously and implies that every party gets to be an 10 appellant and file an opening brief and an -- and then 11 12 they have to file an appellee's brief and everybody files I think our court of appeals judges ought to 13 responses. at least think that through and decide whether or not you 14 really want a multiple track system in this agreed motion. 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't. 16 I would specify between -- the more I think, I just want a 17 18 response. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The simple thing for 19 the court to do would be to just say "response" and strike 20 out "or cross-petition." 21 Jeff. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 22 MR. BOYD: Just to follow-up on the "signed" 23 and "entered" then, if we're going to the Legislature and 24

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recommend changes to this, that would be a change to

include on our list. 1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think it's already been 2 3 noted. Richard. 4 MR. ORSINGER: Don't we have the authority 5 if we specify a change to a statute, do we have the right to change or override it? 6 7 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: If it's procedural, 8 yes. 9 MR. ORSINGER: And so this question of signing versus entry is one that would be procedural, and 10 so maybe -- I would be uncomfortable that the rule of 11 procedure uses a date that is inevitablely shorter than 12 13 the statutory date because then there is going to be a lurking issue in the record on something that's perfected 14 on the 11th or the 12th day; and I would prefer if we're 15 going to do that and we don't get a fix out of the 16 Legislature but we do a repealer, which I think requires 17 us to specify this statute and invoke that authority, 18 19 riqht? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. What else? 20 21 Anything else? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No. Let's go onto the 22 23 next. I've got three things. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The one thing that was my 24 fault, I misunderstood Bill, but Chief Justice Radack had 25

asked us to look at harmonizing TRAP Rule 9.5 regarding 1 certificate of service with the Rules of Civil Procedure 2 service requirements; and apparently practitioners, at 3 least in the Houston court of appeals, some practitioners 4 are filing certificate of services that does not comply 5 with TRAP Rule 9.5 because they're used to doing it under 6 7 the Rules of Civil Procedure; and that's causing consternating, so Bill has looked at that and has a 8 recommendation. 9

10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, actually, our committee looked at it, and when we discussed -- and I 11 think we discussed it in the full committee before, and I 12 13 don't think Chief Justice Radack is taking a position on which rule book contains the information that should be 14 included in the certificate, but 9.5(d) is a certificate 15 that can actually contain information. The date of 16 17 service, the method of service, hand delivery or whatever, the name of each person served, the address of each person 18 19 served; and if the person served isn't the party's attorney, the name of the party represented by that 20 attorney. 21

That language does not appear in civil procedure Rule 21a, but it should, and if we're going to conform the certificate of service in the trial courts with the certificate in the appellate courts, I think the

better route of approach would be to use the certificate 1 that appellate Rule 9.5 calls for. That was done in the 2 recodification draft, I believe, but we never really quite 3 got around to getting that project accomplished, so maybe 4 we can make one small step in that direction and modify 5 Rule 21 or 21a, whichever one is appropriate, probably 6 21a, and I believe this is a subcommittee recommendation, 7 not just my own view. 8

9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Justice Bland, 10 what do you think, going the direction of the TRAP rule 11 and conforming 21a to the TRAP rule as opposed to the 12 other way around?

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Well, I'm open to
persuasion either way. I just agree with Chief Justice
Radack that the two ought to be the same.

16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So even though she 17 asked you to carry the water on this, you don't think that 18 they necessarily need to be harmonized?

HONORABLE JANE BLAND: No, I absolutely 19 think they ought to be harmonized. I just am open to 20 persuasion whether they ought to be harmonized with the 21 TRAP rule being the one that is the rule that is in both 22 or the civil procedure rule being the rule in both, but I 23 absolutely agree with Judge Radack that they ought to be 24 25 the same.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge Christopher. 1 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: In the effort 2 3 to save paper and space in our courthouses and/or on our computers, I ask that we maintain 21a and not list the 4 names of the parties, because in a complicated case where 5 there are -- for example, I have a case where there are a 6 hundred defendants. Listing the names of all 100 7 defendants on a certificate of service strikes me as an 8 incredible waste of effort, time, money, paper, computer 9 10 space. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Pam. 11 12 MS. BARON: Well, I think that is the big 13 difference, is that the appellate courts say that when you serve an attorney you need to say who they represent. 14 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: And their name and 15 their address and the method of service. 16 MS. BARON: Yeah, I think it's the name --17 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: There's a lot of 18 information that's required that's not required by Rule 19 20 21a. MS. BARON: Well, I think that where the 21 appellate court -- I mean, everybody when they have a 22 certificate of service, or at least my experience is that 23 you list the attorney they're serving and their address. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Not in Harris County 25

they don't. It's not really a certificate of anything 1 other than "I complied with the rules." 2 Is that right? MS. BARON: 3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah. But that's an 4 5 That's not statewide practice. So when you say anomaly. 21a means what you think it means, it's what it means in 6 7 Harris County. HONORABLE JANE BLAND: And in Harris County 8 it's usually "I served by hand delivery," comma, 9 "certified mail," comma, "and," slash, "or facsimile 10 transmission." 11 12 MS. BARON: To all parties? 13 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: "To all parties of 14 record." 15 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's just like 16 a verification that you complied with the rule. 17 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: It's just saying you complied with the rule by one of the means of service that 18 is allowed by the rule but doesn't specify the means, to 19 whom, much less their address or whom they represent. 20 MS. BARON: I didn't realize that. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray. 22 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: On filings at the court 23 of appeals in Waco we frequently get the one that has just 24 25 been referred to, "I certify this was served in compliance

with." Also, from pro se individuals particularly we get 1 a lot of stuff filed that simply says something on the 2 order of "I certify that this was" -- and this is even 3 when there's no certificate of service initially and we 4 threaten to strike the brief if they don't file a 5 certificate of service in compliance with the rule, they 6 7 will come back and say, "I certify that I hand-deliverred or mailed a copy of this to the clerk of the Tenth Court 8 9 of Appeals, " period, and doesn't say who else.

So I don't take a position one way or the other on which is the better practice. I just will tell you on the anecdotal evidence that by requiring the information we frequently know for a fact that the other party has not been served with a copy of the document. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: David Jackson, then

16 Frank, then Richard.

17 You know, just for my two MR. JACKSON: cents worth, I get a lot of information off the 18 certificate of service before the deposition ever starts. 19 I can plug in the parties that are going to be at the 20 deposition before they get there. So I use all that. In 21 Dallas they put all that stuff in there, and it's very 22 helpful to the court reporter ahead of time to get the 23 style all set up, the appearances all set up, and then as 24 25 the lawyers come in you're not wasting a lot of time

trying to get all that information. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank. 3 MR. GILSTRAP: My question was what's the purpose of putting the information in the certificate and 4 it's been answered. 5 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Meaning what? 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Orsinger. 7 MR. ORSINGER: I'd favor identifying who was 8 served and how they were served. I frequently get 9 certificates of service that say that "I've given notice 10 as prescribed by the rules to all parties," so I don't 11 know from looking at the certificate of service what my 12 responsive deadline is and neither does the court, and the 13 other side isn't really taking a position on what it is, 14 and frequently people --15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are you talking about the 16 trial court level or the --17 MR. ORSINGER: Trial court level, and so I 18 would prefer in the trial court that the lawyer who's 19 seeking the relief or triggering the deadline will put in 20 the certificate of service enough information that they're 21 certifying what timetable applies, and that works for the 22 respondents who have deadlines running against them, and 23 it's also a representation that for a starting point the 24 25 court can rely on.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.
2	MR. LOW: But one of the reasons for it in
3	multiparty cases sometimes there's a breakdown as to, you
4	know, who really or who has answered and answers may
5	cross in the mail, so one doesn't know that another one's
6	in, and I guess that way you can truly tell. I look at it
7	to see, you know, that I have and when I see the names and
8	so forth in multiparty cases, so I think it would be more
9	needed in multiparty cases so there wouldn't be a
10	breakdown and somebody is not properly served.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's just give
12	Bill some direction here. How many people think that
13	HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, Chip,
14	can I say one more thing? I think we have a heavy
15	contingent of appellate lawyers here that perhaps like the
16	rule the way it is with all that information in it, and I
17	really think it would be an incredible waste of paper and
18	effort to put that in on a daily basis on every motion, on
19	everything that gets filed in a trial court level. I
20	mean, even at the appellate level in your brief itself
21	you've got to list all the parties and their addresses and
22	all that information in your briefs all the time. Why do
23	you have to repeat it in the certificate of service?
24	MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Yeah, I was just
25	going to say about the same thing. At least at the trial

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court level you don't need it for everything. I mean, you 1 do need -- I don't know if this is the appropriate place 2 to address it, but you do need a master list and everybody 3 goes by a master list of who is representing who when --4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. -- and if there's a 6 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: change everybody changes it on their word processor, but 7 why you have to certify that every time you issue a 8 deposition notice or send discovery and list everybody 9 out, I mean, that does seem to me to be --10 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And then your 11 cover letter turns into a five-page document instead of a 12 one-page document, and your two-page response to a 13 pleading turns into an eight-page response and --14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Yelenosky. 15 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 16 -- it's 17 unnecessary. HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Are you 18 talking about the listing of the parties represented by 19 the attorney or just the listing of the attorneys? 20 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: The listing of 21 22 everybody. HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Okay. So you 23 find it cumbersome even to list the attorneys served. Ιf 24 25 the attorney is representing a hundred people, obviously

you only have to name that attorney if you drop out No. 3 1 of the TRAP rule, right? You just name the address of 2 each person, name and address of each person. 3 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 4 I'm just talking about multiparty cases. I mean, if you have one 5 attorney for a hundred plaintiffs -- but sometimes you 6 have a hundred defendants with a hundred attorneys. 7 8 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, I guess 9 in those instances, though, you could arrange, as you said, to have a master list. I'm a little bothered by 10 certificates of service that don't tell you anything at 11 They just say, "I complied with the rules," and I'm 12 all. sure that's pro forma, and so it doesn't tell me anything 13 when I see those. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, if I have a 15 certificate of service on my pleading that says, "I hereby 16 certify that I have served all of the parties of record by 17 hand-delivery this first day of April 2005" that --18 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But some of 19 them don't even say the manner as -- what's your name, Mr. 2.0 Orsinger -- as Mr. Orsinger just pointed out and, 21 therefore, you really don't know. 22 So you get discovery that's 23 MR. ORSINGER: due in 30 days, but they really sent it by certified mail, 24 25 so it's really 33 days, and so you have to go hunt down

the file and figure out from the cover letter or the 1 envelope or something how you received it. 2 It's just aggravating. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 4 Frank. 5 MR. GILSTRAP: Since we're about to get off of this and I just want to mention one other difference, 6 under 21a I think you have to have certified mail and 7 8 under the appellate rules it's regular mail. So that's another difference we'll have to -- if we're going to make 9 the two the same we're going to have to talk about. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Judge Christopher, I don't think we're going to decide anything today, so 12 this vote is not binding in the sense of a consensus. 13 We'll rally all the trial judges to the next meeting. 14 15 MS. BARON: Can I add one more point? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Pam. 16 17 MS. BARON: It may be that the difference is not so much the problem, but the appellate clerk's 18 reaction to the failure to comply with the certificate 19 requirement in the appellate rules may be the problem. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I think there may 21 be some judges on the courts of the appeals that think 22 that the rule is the rule and if you don't comply with the 23 rule then out you go. And that -- that's a problem 24 because, you know, because you didn't do some technical 25

1 thing on the certificate of service your whole appellate 2 timetable is going to be affected, which is going to slow down the appeal, it's going to cost a lot of money, you 3 know, so anyway. 4 5 Several questions. One, should they be 6 harmonized or should they be, you know, the trial court 7 has one method and the TRAP rules have another? How does 8 everybody feel about that? HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: We like 9 10 harmony. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We like harmony. 11 Everybody who thinks that it ought to be harmonized raise 12 13 your hand. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: It's going to 14 15 go the wrong way. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: It's a conditional 16 vote for yes. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody who thinks they 18 19 ought to be separate raise your hand. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I don't know about 20 ought to be separate. Are separate. 21 MR. MEADOWS: How about can be? 22 23 MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: Can be. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Can be. 24 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Take the other vote 25

1 first. 2 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What's the other vote? 3 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: About --4 5 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: 21a or the TRAP rule. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody that thinks that 9.5, which is the TRAP rule, is preferable raise your 8 hand. 9 MR. JACKSON: Tell me which one that is. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's the more 11 12 complicated. 13 MR. JACKSON: The more complicated. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's the one you like. The one I like. MR. JACKSON: 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You vote for this, okay. 16 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We just voted that 17 they should be different. 18 MR. GILSTRAP: Assuming they're the same. 19 MS. CORTELL: Is there a middle ground 20 21 where --(Multiple speakers at once.) 22 THE REPORTER: I can't get all this. 23 24 MR. GILSTRAP: She's having trouble here. THE REPORTER: I can't get all of this. 25

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: One at a time. 1 One at a 2 time. Orsinger first. 3 MR. ORSINGER: For the trial purposes I don't feel that an address is necessary, but I would like 4 5 to have the lawyers and the parties they represent and the manner of service individually listed. I don't care 6 whether the address is in there, and maybe that makes 7 8 Judge Christopher feel better, but I do want to know how people were served and when their deadlines are. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. The vote was 13 to 11 11 on that. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It was that close. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That close on whether or 13 not they can be different or they ought to be harmonized, 14so we'll take this up next time, Bill, and I don't think 15 we have much direction for you. We just have to discuss 16 it more. Judge Bland. 17 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Let me just say, no 18 matter what your opinion is about a certificate of 19 service, that certificate of service serves the same needs 20 for a trial court as it does for an appellate court; and 21 to have inconsistent rules in the trial court and the 22 appellate court is confusing to practitioners; and until 23 we get one rule for both courts that serves the same 24 purpose and the same needs we're going to have 25

certificates of service all over the map; and depending on 1 how you as a judge feel, either in the trial court or the 2 appellate court, you know, enforcement of those rules is 3 going to be difficult; and it's going to trip things up, 4 so, you know, I -- please, you know, we ought to try to 5 achieve agreement about what the certificate of service 6 should look like; but just because you're afraid that your 7 version might not carry the day on what it should look 8 9 like, please don't throw out the need for harmony because really we should have harmony in the two rules. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So we'll sleep on it for 12 a couple of months and I'm sure we'll achieve harmony by the time we get back. Justice Duncan. 13

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Picking up on what 14 15 Pam said and also what Judge Bland said, the appellate rule says, "The clerk may permit the document to be filed 16 without proof of service, but will require the proof to be 17 filed promptly." "May be," and I'm just throwing this 18 We don't need to discuss it today, but maybe we need 19 out. to think about changing that to "must file it, but will 20 require prompt proof." 21

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: If I'm going to be working on this I'd like to ask the judges who are in favor of or who recognize that there is a problem in big cases to try to think of some way to deal with those big

cases that would not kill so many trees that wouldn't just
 be a charade.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, okay. 3 Well, let me just posit this to you. If defendant is 4 sending interrogatories to the plaintiff, it would be 5 important to state the plaintiff's name and address and 6 7 method of service, but it wouldn't matter that he had sent a copy of those interrogatories to a hundred other 8 defendants, or you know, in terms of other than he sent 9 He's supposed to send them, but it wouldn't matter 10 them. when those other defendants got it for the certificate of 11 service point of view. Only the person who has to respond 12 to something would care when they got it or how it was 13 served on them. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina and then Munzinger 15 and then we're done. 16 MS. CORTELL: Can't we just include a clause 17 that says "unless the court otherwise provides" so that 18 when you have these mega cases like a royalty dispute or 19 whatever where you have 200, 300 parties, and the court in 20 that case can establish a protocol for the certificate of 21 I think we could work around it by giving the 2.2 service? trial court some latitude. 23 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's what I had in 24 mind for somebody to tell me, is how to fix the trial 25

court rule to deal with these complex cases which may not
 be extraordinary in Harris County, but they are certainly
 not typical of cases generally.

4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard Munzinger, last 5 comment.

MR. MUNZINGER: I would only just say that I 6 7 don't think we should have differing requirements for service in the trial court based upon the nature of the 8 9 pleading or instrument served. That's not simple. It's 10 not something that practitioners can follow easily, and it seems to me that Richard Orsinger's observation that the 11 key point is when was service accomplished and how was 12 service accomplished is what is important to courts and 13 practitioners because that determines when responses are 14 due and holds the person making the service to his 15 promise, which is prima facie proof under the rules. It 16 makes it enforceable. 17

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Chief Justice Johnson 18 from Amarillo raised an issue to Justices Jefferson and 19 Hecht about whether there should be a rule requiring a 201 court of appeals that has had a case transferred to it 21 from another district court of appeals to apply the 22 precedent of the transferring court to the extent it is 23 different than the law of the court to which it is 24 transferred. 251

1 So if I have a case in Houston where there 2 is a case on point that was dispositive to the trial judge in the court below and the case is transferred to Amarillo 3 and Amarillo has either no law on the subject or a law 4 that conflicts with the dispositive Houston decision, that 5 the Amarillo court would be required to apply the Houston 6 precedent. And Justice Hecht has to talk to the Chief 7 8 Judges tomorrow maybe and would like some of our thoughts on this subject. Bill. 9

Well, we don't have a PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 10 rule on this subject at all at this point, and it may be 11 advisable for us to study it to see whether we need a rule 12 13 that talks about that and perhaps some other things, and I don't know whether in the conversations that have been 14 held so far whether this is some sort -- this would 15 certainly apply to transferor court's interpretation of a 16 17 particular statute or consider that court's interpretation of a particular statute rather than going by, you know, 18 what maybe the rule in the court of appeals district where 19 the transferee court is. 20

My own view is that both courts of appeals that are just working on cases that haven't been transferred to them and ones that receive transfers need to take into account both their own precedent and the precedent of other courts of appeals on particular issues,

such as what the sue and be sued language in the local 1 Government Code means with respect to waiver of sovereign 2 3 immunity, and that's what makes the most sense to me. I don't think these issues come up all that 4 much to begin with, but I do think that it would be better 5 to deal with it carefully in a rule than to leave it to 6 the Legislature to try to figure out, you know, on its own 7 on the basis of testimony or whatever. That would be my 8 strong view about whether it should be a rule or a 9 10 statute. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So that's the 11 issue of whether or not it would be a rule or a statute. 12 13 On the substance it does seem to me to be odd that you file a motion for summary judgment in, just to pick, the 14 Harris County trial court and you rely upon a Houston 15 court of appeals decision from the First or the Fourteenth 16 which says, "Hey, summary judgment is appropriate here" 17 and the trial judge in reliance on that, feeling bound by 18 19 that decision, makes that decision. Then the case gets transferred to some other district, and that court of 20 appeals says, "Well, we don't think so, because out here 21 we approach that point of law differently, " so they 22 reverse the trial judge, and the trial judge, I would 23 think, would feel aggrieved as would maybe at least one of 24

25 the parties.

1	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That may be an anomaly,
2	but the law in Texas is not different in different places.
3	It's the same. It may well be that there are
4	disagreements about what that same law is.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm not talking about
6	statute. I'm talking about case law.
7	MR. ORSINGER: No, he's talking about
8	justice. He's talking about law in the absolute sense.
9	He's a positivist.
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Sullivan.
11	HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: The practical
12	problem is one of predictability in my view and certainty;
13	and the parties would have expected the Houston rule, in
14	your hypothetical, the Houston rules to apply; and it
15	seems to me completely inefficient and unfair to suddenly
16	inject a rule that would not have been predicted or
17	expected by anyone. I mean, you may as well for the
18	purpose of workload equalization transfer the case to
19	Alabama and let some Alabama court apply Alabama law, I
20	mean, because it is equally unpredictable in the contest
21	of the hypothetical that you've given. I just think it's
22	unworkable.
23	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The trial court should
24	have considered Amarillo law, too, not just Houston law
25	because Houston is not a separate country.

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MR. MUNZINGER: Well, I don't know what 1 happens if Houston and Amarillo are different on the same 2 And that happens. It happens fairly frequently. point. 3 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: And that was the 4 5 hypothetical. MR. MUNZINGER: I understand, and the point 6 7 -- Mike Hatchell and I were in a case together some years ago; and he, I thought, very persuasively made an argument 8 to the court that if the law is different in Corpus 9 Christi than in El Paso, you have parties who are confused 10 as to what the law of the state is; and so here I'm a 11 12 litigant in El Paso, Texas, and I file a motion. I go up to the court. The court transfers me to Dallas, and the 13

14 Dallas court applies the Dallas rule. I'm not being 15 treated the same as other litigants in El Paso, and other 16 litigants in El Paso are confused as to the value of the 17 precedent within the Eighth Circuit jurisdictional points. 18 It's a very serious -- I won't say it's a very serious 19 problem. It is a real problem and not something to be 20 laughed at or pushed aside, in my opinion.

21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carlos and then Frank and 22 then Justice Pemberton.

23 MR. LOPEZ: I'm assuming that Linda Thomas 24 -- well, I guess it won't be the court of appeal justices' 25 view on this, but I remember when I was on the district

court in Dallas it was pretty -- I don't know if it was 1 unanimous, but it was pretty well the majority view that 2 it was very frustrating that you didn't know if your --3 and back then they were transferring more often than 4 perhaps now, but, you know, it's pretty frustrating as a 5 trial judge to get reversed by the Eastland court of 6 7 appeals under Eastland law when you were right under Dallas law, and it's not a hypothetical. That's real. 8 9 It didn't happen to me. It happened to 10 another judge, but she was pretty upset about it. Ιt didn't happen very often, but if I were the litigant, I 11 12 mean, if it's fixable, why not fix it. Now, if I'm the court of appeals in Eastland 13 I'm not real thrilled to have to learn -- you know, go 14 back and do this sort of due diligence about applying 15 Fifth Court law, so I could see both sides of it, but 16 philosophically to me it doesn't make sense. Unless you 17 completely agree with Professor Dorsaneo that 18 philosophically the law is the law. If you disagree with 19 that then it doesn't make much sense to have, you know --20 or maybe there is a way to let the people know where their 21 case is going, and then you know --22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ahead of time. 23 And the lawyers can brief it. MR. LOPEZ: 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Before there is an 25

1 appeal. Frank.

2	MR. GILSTRAP: The practical problem is a
3	real one, and it's worse on the criminal side. There's a
4	case out of Waco, I think, Jaubert. Am I saying it,
5	right, Judge? Jaubert against state in which a 60-year
6	prison term, depending on which court the defendant wound
7	up was transferred to, but the fix that we're talking
8	about is a real problem. We're assuming that courts of
9	appeals, they often follow their own precedent, but there
10	is no rule of law requiring a panel in the Fourteenth
11	Court of Appeals to follow a prior panel opinion.
12	In the Federal courts where they have dealt
13	with this problem it's different. Let me give you an
14	example. And the circuits don't transfer cases, but the
15	district courts do. If I have a case that's filed in the
16	central district of California, governed by Ninth Circuit
17	law, transferred to the Northern District of Texas,
18	governed by Fifth Circuit. It goes up on appeal. The
19	Fifth Circuit is going to have a rule as to which law it
20	applies, and it may well apply Ninth Circuit law, but it
21	can know what Ninth Circuit law is because the Ninth
22	Circuit, and I think all the Federal circuits, are strict
23	stare decisis courts. A panel in that court cannot
24	overrule a prior panel decision.
25	If I go to New Orleans and I have a case and

1 I have a 1995 opinion and I cite it to the court and the other attorney pulls out a 1926 memorandum opinion that 2 everybody has overlooked and cites it, the Fifth Circuit 3 must follow the 1926 opinion or it's got to go en banc; 4 5 and if it doesn't, it's got to give a good reason why. 6 It's a big deal. It is not a big deal in state courts. As far as I know, and I may be wrong on this, state courts 7 8 generally don't go en banc to reconcile panel --9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Except in San Antonio. MR. GILSTRAP: What's that? 10 11 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I was going to say, we do. 12 13 HONORABLE JANE BLAND: We do, too. Well, I haven't seen much of MR. GILSTRAP: 14 15 it, and surely I don't think anyone will say there is any rule of law that says that panel A in the Thirteenth Court 16 17 has to follow a 15 year-old decision of panel B, and until we have that rule it makes no sense to say, well, when you 18 19 transfer that case to the Tenth Court you've got to follow the precedent of the Fourteenth Court because the 20 21 Fourteenth Court doesn't have to follow its own precedent. Until we fix that problem it makes no sense to impose the 22 rule on the transferee court. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Pemberton. 24 25 HONORABLE BOB PEMBERTON: We jumped a little

bit beyond where I was, but I was just going to point out 1 this transfer and the law changing, lack of 2 predictability, comes up and has happened to us as a 3 practitioner in appeals after a remand. You go up in 4 court of appeals A. You go down and you come back up in 5 court of appeals B, and arguably they conflict, and you 6 7 have law of the case issues, and so it's a real problem for practitioners on predictability of the law. 8 9 While there -- to respond to what Frank said, while there may not be a rule of law that one panel 10 on a court follows another, I would suspect most courts 11 like ours have strong traditions or just practices of 12 following their own opinions and such that I think it 13 would make sense despite the lack of that limitation to 14 have some kind of clarity. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I think Orsinger 16 has had his hand up for a long time. Buddy and Stephen 17 has and then Judge Benton and then Justice Duncan unless, 18 Justice Duncan, you have something that kind of fits right 19 20 here. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well --21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You want to yield to 22 Sarah here, Richard? 23

24 MR. ORSINGER: Sure.

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, just two

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One, our motion for en banc reconsideration
  points.
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  actually contemplates --
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3
                 MS. SWEENEY: Can't hear you.
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Our motion for
4
  reconsideration en banc I think implicitly contemplates
5
   that panels will disagree because it says one of the
6
   reasons for en banc reconsideration is a conflict between
7
8
  panel opinions.
                 No. 2, I actually have had this case, and my
9
  views on it are in my dissent, so I'll shortcut that.
10
                                                           Ι
   think it's terribly unfair to the litigants.
11
                                                  We
   reversed -- it was a --
12
                 HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
                                        Metro.
13
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: -- contort question
14
15
   on --
                 MR. GILSTRAP:
                                IBM case.
16
17
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
                                          The IBM case, and
   the trial judge was actually a Galveston case, was the
18
   trial judge in the Delaney case in the Supreme Court on
19
   contort issues, so he knew exactly what he was doing.
                                                           He
20
   had been upheld in a similar -- on a similar issue, a
21
   similar kind of reasoning, and the parties had no idea
22
   that they were going to go to San Antonio and briefed it
23
   for the Houston courts. Our court had disagreed with the
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25 Houston courts on that issue, and it wasn't even a San
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Antonio judge. It was a visiting judge that wrote that
 opinion.

3 I think it's terribly unfair. I think it's terribly unfair to the litigants, but I would also add 4 that from everything I hear from lawyers and other judges 5 and from legislators, there is an accountability question. 6 People feel like we elect our judges. We like what 7 they're doing, we re-elect them. We don't like what 8 they're doing, we unelect them, but we have no control in 9 10 Houston as a voter who you-all are going to get in San Antonio, and we wouldn't re-elect those people because we 11 didn't like what they did in the IBM case. So it's not 12 just fairness, which I think is paramount, but I think 13 there's also an accountability problem. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard. 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Thank you, Richard. 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Then Buddy. This problem is not escapable MR. ORSINGER: 18 with the First and the Fourteenth Court and you have 19 random assignments between those two courts, so we are 20 going to have to live with this problem occasionally when 21 those two courts disagree with each other. 2.2 We also have a case -- we have one personal 23 injury lawyer in Corpus Christi who has an arbitration 24 clause in his plaintiff's PI contract that the Corpus 25

1 Christi court of appeals says is not enforceable, but the 2 identical contract has been held enforceable by the San 3 Antonio court of appeals, so that lawyer has a contract 4 that's enforceable in the Thirteenth District and not in 5 the Fourth District, and there's nothing he can do about 6 that until the Supreme Court grants review and clarifies 7 that.

8 There seems to me to be an anomaly -- well, 9 I do not believe as a matter of jurisprudence that one court of appeals is bound by the ruling of another court 10 of appeals, and I think probably most judges would agree, 11 although if they don't, I'd like to hear about that. Ι 12 think that the whole idea of 14 courts of appeals with one 13 Supreme Court, particularly with our constitutional and 14 statutory history that the role of the Supreme Court is to 15 resolve conflicts between court of appeals, is that we 16 expect conflicts to develop and that we expect our Supreme 17 Court to resolve those conflicts and that Bill's view --18 and I admire Bill greatly and respect all of his opinions. 19 I think his view of the law being one thing is outvoted. 20 I think that 150 years ago that was the prevailing view. 21 I think this is a philosophical issue as to whether there 22 is one law that we all see or whether we're all developing 23 the laws as we see it from our own respective viewpoints. 24 And let me say that the anomaly to me of a 25

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1	court of appeals saying on a case we got out of El Paso
2	the law applies in this way, on a case we got out of
3	Houston the law applies this way, but in our opinion the
4	law is really something different on a case we get out of
5	San Antonio, so now you have one court of appeals that
6	says the law is two or three different things; and to me
7	that is also an anomaly; and I frankly think that making a
8	judge sign an opinion and decide the case on the basis of
9	law that they don't believe when they are courts of equal
10	jurisdiction is as offensive or perhaps to me more
11	offensive than offending the expectation interests of the
12	trial judge and the litigants.
13	MR. GILSTRAP: The feds do it all the time.
14	The Federal courts do it all the time.
15	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, but the Federal
16	system is a completely different system that's not a
17	system. It's an aggregation of different units
18	masquerading as a system. But we do have a system, and
19	there are two practical points from my perspective. One,
20	courts of appeals should conscientiously reconsider their
21	own views whenever another coordinate court has come to a
22	different viewpoint and not just simply say, "Those people
23	are in El Paso and we don't really count them as part of
24	this place anyway." I think that if it's some sort of a
25	shortcut to coming to a particular conclusion, we've

already been through that, that that's bad judging. No. 2, in a state as big as Texas if we start thinking that the law is different in different places and that's all right unless and until the Supreme Court resolves the problem then that's just a bad thing.

5 Court resolves the problem then that's just a bad thing. 6 It's bad for the public that may be involved in litigation 7 out in El Paso for the rules to be different in El Paso 8 than they are in Dallas or Houston when the parties may 9 not be from El Paso or have any other connection with El 10 Paso than some particular business interest.

I think it's not just some old time religion 11 that the law should be the same everywhere. It's a 12 13 fundamental concept of having one unified state with a system of laws that is applicable generally, and if I have 14 to I'll say it's Saturday morning and there aren't enough 15 people here to give this the right kind of consideration, 16 17 if that will work, because it would be a terrible thing to do what you're suggesting. 18

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy.

20 MR. LOW: I totally agree, because each 21 judge is sworn to uphold the laws of the state of Texas. 22 Now, in Beaumont we've got four new judges. Say there's 23 an opinion and they philosophically are different from the 24 judges we had before. Now, you take an opinion that was 25 written by some of their predecessors and they don't like

that, they don't think it's the law of the state of Texas, 1 are they bound to follow that opinion when it's some 2 judges they didn't agree with? 3 The Supreme Court, if they have written a 4 decision and I go up there, can I rely that the Supreme 5 6 Court cannot overrule a prior decision of the Supreme 7 Court? I mean, nobody can quarantee what a court ought to 8 do other than what those three judges feel should be and is the law and the right thing to do. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen. 10 Well, my two cents are that I 11 MR. TIPPS: think the paramount interest here is the interest of the 12 litigant, and the litigant pays lawyers and makes 13 decisions at the trial court level with the expectation 14 that, with the exception of the two Houston courts, he 15 knows where the case is going to go on appeal, and it's 16 really the system that's letting the litigant down when 17 cases get transferred because for whatever reason our 18 system can't accommodate the litigant's reasonable 19 expectations. 20 And while there's obviously some anomaly 21 involved arising from the fact that at any given point in 22 time we may well have the Waco court thinking that the law 23 is one thing and the Tyler court thinking that the law is 24 another thing; but it seems to me that the right 25

resolution here is to protect the legitimate expectations 1 of the litigant; and if the litigant has a ruling that 2 would be affirmed in Dallas and the case gets transferred 3 to El Paso, then I think the El Paso ought to think like a 4 Federal court thinks and realizes it's sitting in that 5 particular situation as though it were the Dallas court 6 and it ought to follow the Dallas court's precedence. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Benton. 8 9 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I agree with what Stephen said, but I think there is another solution. When 10 the Supreme Court transfers cases for work equalization 11 purposes they don't really care what case it is, and what 12 we ought to do is --13 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Let me just tag 14 onto that and say every effort is made to be sure that 15 cases are not selected. 16 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Right. 17 It's completely HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: 18 random, after the fact. 19 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Right. Okay. So 20 for that reason why not have a provision that lets the 21 parties represent to the transferee court that your law 22 and the law in the transferor court are in conflict. To 23 protect the reasonable expectation of the litigants, 24 25 transfer the case back and ask the Supreme Court to select

1 another case.

Well, I suspect 2 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: that will be the new rule rather than the exception. 3 MR. LOW: Yeah. 4 5 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I mean, they would have to -- excuse me, Justice Hecht, but they would have 6 to set out in the papers it's case X and case IBM which 7 are in conflict, and these issues are implicated in this 8 9 case. The transfer I 10 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: don't think is favorable of the litigants, is my sense of 11 They would always rather go where they live. Now, 12 it. when they're litigating in opposite sides of the state 13 14 maybe that's not true. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, but, I mean, 15 16 if a lawyer signs a paper that represents that these are -- these are the issues at issue and these are the 17 cases in conflict, one would hope that that would be a 18 candid and truthful statement. I mean, there are 19 consequences for signing papers that are not truthful. Ι 20 mean, that to me is an easier solution than the debate 21 we've had these last 30 minutes about what to do because 22 it's just the equalization is not -- there's not an 23 interest in a specific case. Let's just equalize the 24 workload. 25

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Where are we? I 2 think Munzinger had his hand up. Do you still want to 3 talk?

MR. MUNZINGER: Not really. Stephen said 4 what I want to say. I was speaking in response to Richard 5 Orsinger. I'm sensitive to judges and their oaths, but it 6 is the litigants' substantive rights that are affected by 7 the judgment of the court. This is a free country, and 8 people who come to court by God are entitled to have the 9 law enforced and their rights respected regardless, and it 10 troubles me that we might adopt rules that say, well, 11 we're going to worry about the judge more than we worry 12 13 about the litigants. Stephen is correct.

14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Gilstrap.

There is another solution, 15 MR. GILSTRAP: and that is for the Supreme Court to take more of these 16 cases in which there is this type of conflict, and there 17 has been a reason in the past why the Supreme Court I 18 think may not have been able to do that, and that is 19 because while we've had -- there is a jurisdictional 20 provision that talks about giving the Court jurisdiction 21 when there is conflict between -- in the courts of appeals 22 that also is applied to interlocutory appeal, and we've 23 qot a 50-year history of construing that statute very 24 narrowly so the Court doesn't have to take interlocutory 25

1 appeals.

2	That was changed in House Bill 4. Now
3	conflict jurisdiction is very broad under House Bill 4,
4	and it seems to me and that old law is no good anymore.
5	Now, I don't know what that's going to do to interlocutory
6	appeals, but it seems to me it opens the door now for the
7	Supreme Court to take a look again at conflict
8	jurisdiction and make that one of the prime indicators or
9	one of the prime things they look at when they decide to
10	grant a petition.
11	That's how almost every Supreme Court in the
12	United States works. If you've ever made it to the United
13	States Supreme Court you find that the reason you probably
14	got there was conflict among the circuits. That ought to
15	be the law in Texas, and I think with the new law that
16	could be the law in Texas. In Jaubert, the Court of
17	Criminal Appeals intervened and fixed the problem. I
18	think the Texas Supreme Court can now come in and fix some
19	of these problems when it might not have been able to do
20	so in the past.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.
22	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think this
23	discussion demonstrates that people have very strongly
24	held beliefs on this particular issue. In talking with
25	judges from other states, other states have rules telling

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1 judges, you know, you can't -- one panel can't disagree 2 with another, one coordinate court can't disagree with 3 another, or they have a method for getting cases in which 4 the opinions conflict to the Supreme Court other than 5 through a petition for discretionary review.

So given all of that, I would strongly 6 recommend that the Court undertake to look at how other 7 8 states are dealing with the problem. In some states, for instance, all of the court of appeals judges, wherever 9 10 they may be in the state, are a part of one court of appeals rather than different courts of appeals. That in 11 and of itself would, I think, cause the law to develop 12 13 differently when there are disagreements.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Our differences are accidental, not because they are meant to be different courts of appeals.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And that's what I'm 17 Maybe we should just be one court of appeals, and 18 sayinq. maybe there should be a rule. I'm not advocating this 19 because I don't think it's my view, but I've heard it 20 expressed around the table. Maybe somebody, maybe a 21 majority, would say there should be one court of appeals 22 and no panel of that court of appeals can disagree with 23 another panel of the court of appeals that has to go en 24 That is the way it is I think in California, is the 25 banc.

1 state that does that.

2	But I think all this discussion and all this
3	emotion says we do need rules on this. We need guidance
4	on this because it shouldn't depend on what three judges
5	you randomly pool from which court of 14 in a state the
6	size of Texas on issues that are as significant as the
7	issues in which this frequently arises, and I will second
8	what Frank said. It is more serious in criminal cases
9	because we're talking about people's right to appeal or
10	their liberty.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lamont.
12	MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: I totally agree with
13	Richard and Bill's comments. I think it's absolutely
14	unworkable to think that we should try to manage litigants
15	expectations based upon the panel that they're assigned
16	to. There is just one law of the state. It's like as a
17	litigant in a trial court. If I get assigned to Judge
18	Mireles I might have certain expectations different than
19	if I'm assigned to Judge Peden, but the fact that I get
20	moved from one district court judge to another district
21	court judge, even though it changes my expectation
22	shouldn't give me any substantive rights. I mean, they're
23	both doing the best they can to enforce the law of the
24	state. Whether it's a panel in Dallas or a panel in San
25	Antonio or El Paso or wherever, everyone is doing the best

they can to enforce the law of the state. That's what 1 they're sworn to do. 2 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Yelenosky. HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, but I 4 5 think this is getting to a really fundamental point, and 6 Sarah touches on it. I mean, what's the philosophical justification for requiring a trial court judge to follow 7 the appellate court of that area when there's another 8 appellate court that has an opposing view directly on 9 If there's one law in the state of Texas, what's 10 point? the justification for that? 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There is no 12 justification. 13 That's not the law. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: 14 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Well, I mean, 15 you're saying that within that jurisdiction this is the 16 law and within the other jurisdiction that's the law. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, I'm saying that the 18 19 law is in doubt. There are two coordinate courts of equal precedential value wherever a trial judge sits in the 201 state --21 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Right. 2.2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- that have different 23 views, so that makes it a hard one for you. 24 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Okay. But 25

you're saying within that appellate jurisdiction --1 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, I'm not. HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: -- that you're 3 going to get a ruling one way and within another appellate 4 jurisdiction you're going to get a ruling another way. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Could I butt in here for 6 7 a second? Bill, what if I'm litigating in Houston and I say to Judge Sullivan, "Judge Sullivan, there is a First 8 District decision that is right on point and you are bound 9 by this decision." 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You have just told him 11 12 something false. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that's what my 13 question is. You know, "I recognize that there is an 14 Amarillo decision that's 180 degrees opposite, but really, 15 Judge Sullivan, you ought to follow the Houston court." 16 That's not true? 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, not true. False. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not true. 19 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: As a practical matter 20 it might be true, but it's not true as a matter under the 21 law. 22 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: What's the 23 authority? 24 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: But you'll get 25

You know you're going to get reversed. 1 reversed. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Bill, what's the 2 3 authority for that, because that comes up a lot, and I agree with you, but I've never -- what's the authority for 4 5 it? 6 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There is no readily 7 ascertainable authority for it. MR. ORSINGER: It's his philosophical 8 9 opinion. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: The law is the law. 10 Exactly. MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: 11 12 **PROFESSOR DORSANEO:** That's the authority for it. 13 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 14 Okay. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carlos. 15 MR. LOPEZ: Chip, in that situation you're 16 basing your ammo on Judge Sullivan's belief, right or 17 wrong, that when the case goes up his reviewing court is 18 going to apply this law or the other law; and so you're 19 trying to convince Judge Sullivan, I think, or trial 20 courts generally with success, because most of them tend 21 to believe this, that the -- that they're going to be 22 reviewed by the Fifth Court and that the Fifth Court in 23 reviewing them is going to apply what the Fifth Court has 24 25 done in the past.

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1	So your ammo with the trial judge is "Judge,
2	you're more likely to get reversed if you go with Amarillo
3	than if you go with the First District."
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, is it just ammo or
5	is it more fundamental than that?
6	MR. LOPEZ: I have been looking. I thought
7	I had seen I thought somewhere in the Government Code
8	there was a provision that talks about it. I don't know
9	what it says, but I remember hearing it one time, and I
10	thought it was strange, that talked about what you're
11	supposed to do there, and I can't find it now, so I'm
12	looking.
13	MR. LOW: In the Federal court you see the
14	Fifth Circuit say, "We're Fifth Circuit bound." I've
15	never seen an opinion that says "We're First Court of
16	Appeals bound" or Waco court. Now, there are a lot of
17	them I haven't read and a lot of them I don't understand.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's a slightly .
19	different point than the one I was raising. My raising
20	was you've got a superior court that is the court of
21	appeals in whatever district and then you've got an
22	inferior court that is the district court. Does the
23	district court have to follow the precedent of its
24	superior court?
25	MR. LOW: You've got two equally superior

1 courts. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh? MR. LAMONT JEFFERSON: That's right. 3 MR. LOW: You have two equally superior 4 courts, and the district court should not worry whether he 5 will be reversed. He should worry about whether he did б the right thing as he's sworn to do. 7 MR. LOPEZ: But the right thing is -- some 8 trial judges believe in their philosophy that the right 9 thing is to do whatever the reviewing court thinks you 10 11 should do. MR. LOW: If they believe that then that's 12 what they have to do. 13 There are other trial judges 14 MR. LOPEZ: Ιf that think I'm going to do whatever I think is right. 15 16 I get reversed --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Carlos, I once argued a 17 18 Dallas case to you when you were sitting --I know. 19 MR. LOPEZ: PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- in Dallas, and you 20 didn't follow the Dallas court of appeals decision that 21 was just handed down. You followed the other decision 22 from the other court, and you were right as it turns out. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The Dallas case was 24 25 distinguishable, but --

I was persuaded by able counsel, MR. LOPEZ: 1 2 but --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It does seem to me that 3 it's somewhat fundamental as to whether or not in this 4 state the district judges within the appellate district 5 are bound to follow their appellate district's court of 6 7 appeals decisions. MR. GILSTRAP: You're not going to find a 8 case saying that. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, is there a case 10 saying the opposite? 11 MR. GILSTRAP: No. 12 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: What I'm saying, we 13 don't have any rules. 14 MR. LOW: The law of Texas. 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: In some cases it's 16 17 a question of efficiency. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I don't know who 18 19 had their hand up. HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: I want to go back to 20 what I thought was my excellent idea that got no traction. 21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, it did. It's being 22 remembered. 23 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: All right. Very 24 well. I was just worried because I thought it was a great 25

1 idea because, I mean, it's just an equalization. It
2 doesn't matter what case it is. Thank you very much. I
3 thought it was a great idea.

4 MR. GILSTRAP: It's too practical. It's too 5 reasonable.

6

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray.

7 HONORABLE TOM GRAY: I've probably spent 8 weeks of man hours on this issue in various -- attacking it from various points of view; and I have stayed out of 9 10 the discussion intentionally to see what some of the other comments were; and given that the purpose of this is 11 largely to give Justice Hecht a background from this group 12 to respond to the chiefs' inquiry next week, my comments 13 are mostly addressed to the rest of the group that there 14 seem to be two different premises that you-all are 15 approaching it from, either that the law is or ought to be 16 the same across Texas versus the premise that the reality 17 is that the law is different in different parts of Texas; 18 and whether you want to accept that and whether or not 19 that causes you trouble at night in sleeping, I can tell 20 you that it is a fact that rules will be applied 21 differently across the state. 22 And, in fact, it would be my argument that 23 the Supreme Court has recently validated that position 24

25 when they've enforced venue selection clauses because if

1 people can select the venue in which they're going to try 2 a case, they have inherently determined that that venue 3 offers them something that they want to be bound by as 4 opposed to randomly wind up somewhere else; and I would 5 suspect that if we don't do something about this we will 6 see venue selection clauses with regards to appellate 7 court decisions as well.

8 As far as -- I believe it was Stephen Tipps 9 made a comment that only in Houston do we have this That's not entirely true. In northeast Texas we 10 problem. have several overlapping counties. You do not know what 11 court you're going to, whether it's the Sixth, the Fifth, 12 or the Twelfth, until after the case is over with. There 13 14 is currently pending some efforts to authorize exactly what was commented upon, is a preselection of the 15 appellate court for resolving this very problem. 16

With regard to Levi's comment on the court sending it back, actually, now there is no prohibition against filing a motion to transfer the case back with the Supreme Court, but the constitutional jurisdiction for that transfer rests solely with the Supreme Court. That's where the motion would need to be filed.

The problem is that -- and I have a specific example with Jaubert being the case in which I was in the dissenting opinion and described this problem, and I think

Sarah Duncan and I have probably written on the issue the most in the state. In that case it was the identical issue coming out of Fort Worth. They had decided the case. A majority of our court -- our court had never addressed the issue, and a majority of our court decided that the Second Court was wrong and refused to follow the Fort Worth court.

8 The Court of Criminal Appeals actually had They granted review on it and then because, 9 this issue. as is inherent in these problems, once they decide the 10 issue it is no longer a conflict and, therefore, they did 11 not address which law should apply. We had not decided 12 So the parties would have been unable to brief the 13 it. issue and presented it to the CCA that there was, in fact, 14 a conflict between the two courts. 15

With regard to stare decisis and whether or 16 not I am bound by a prior decision of my court or 17 philosophically if I was on a court that had a panel 18 decision, I will have to confess ignorance. Today was the 19 first day that I thought in any way, shape, or form that I 20 was not bound by prior decisions of my court or that if I 21 22 had been a panel on a court that I would not have been bound by another decision of that court absent an en banc 23 review because of the common law principle of stare 24 decisis with which I certainly feel bound because that is 25

1 the law.

2	There are very there are some very good
3	case authority on what it takes to change stare decisis,
4	that it was, you know, wrong or situations have changed.
5	It was wrongly decided or the situation has changed or the
6	decision previously made was proven to be unworkable. So,
7	I mean, there is a lot of case law on that concept.
8	And in closing, I guess I will remind
9	everybody or suggest to everybody this is a problem that,
10	except for the overlapping jurisdictions, is caused by a
11	unequal workload at the courts of appeals, and there is a
12	for those of you-all that are interested in studying
13	the issue, there is a House committee on redistricting,
14	Texas House of Representatives interim report 2004. Joe
15	Crab was chairman, and it is an effort to equalize the
16	workload.
17	One of the things involves additional
18	funding for the heavily overloaded courts of the First,
19	the Fourteenth, and the Fifth, included in because the
20	whole concept of that redistricting is to try to equalize
21	the workload, we anticipate that there will be fewer of
22	these transfers required, and, therefore, the last
23	proposal in this the chiefs presented to Joe Crab's
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24 committee a redistricting proposal which included this

25 additional funding, and because we anticipate the number

of these cases to be drastically reduced, it was the 1 opinion of the chiefs as contained -- and I'll just read 2 it -- "In the rare instance that an appeal is transferred 3 from one court to another, the Supreme Court shall 4 determine which law is to be applied in addressing 5 potential conflicts between outcome determinative 6 7 precedent in the transferring and transferee courts and include such determination in the transferring order. 8 Ιt 9 is proposed that the precedent to be used be that of the 10 transferring court's last jurisdiction." 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. HONORABLE TOM GRAY: 12 Thank you. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've got to go because the people on my flight left 20 minutes ago, which is 14 making me nervous, but, Bill, the Court --15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think we need to 16 study the other jurisdictions and see what they do before 17 we do anything. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, and the Court would like us to continue working on this and come up with a 20 rule or a proposal, so we will take that up at the next 21 meeting, and thanks, everybody, for coming. 22 I want the record to show I've 23 MS. SWEENEY: 24 been here all morning even though I haven't spoken. Otherwise my -- · 25

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And before we go off the
2	record I'd like to note that twice in this meeting Judges
3	Bland and Christopher have disagreed with each other.
4	(Adjourned at 11:58 a.m.)
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2	CERTIFICATION OF THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
3	THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORI COMMITTEE
4	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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6	
7	I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand
8	Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported
9	the above meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
10	on the 8th day of January, 2005, Saturday Session, and the
11 12	same was thereafter reduced to computer transcription by
13	me. I further certify that the costs for my
14	-
15	services in the matter are \$ <u>1050.00</u> . Charged to: <u>Jackson Walker, L.L.P.</u>
16	Given under my hand and seal of office on
17	
18	this the day of formany , 2005.
19	D'Loio L. Jones
20	D'LÒIS L. JONES, CSR Certification No. 4546
21	Certificate Expires 12/31/2006 3215 F.M. 1339
22	Kingsbury, Texas 78638 (512) 751-2618
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24	#DJ-105
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