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10	HEARING OF THE SUPREME COURT
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16	COPY
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20	Taken before Anna L. Renken, a
21	Certified Shorthand Reporter for the State of
22	Texas, on the 14th day of June, 2002, between
23	the hours of 1:30 p.m. and 5:50 o'clock p.m.
24	at Southern Methodist University, Storey Hall,
25	Building #2. Dallas. Texas

1 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Let's go on 2 the record and get underway. MR. GILSTRAP: Do you want me to 3 whistle? 4 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: All right. 5 6 We're back on the record, and we're ready to 7 do FE&D or eviction or whatever it is called 8 these days. 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The popular phrase today is "eviction." 10 11 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: All right. 12 And we have guests. Let me get them to 13 introduce themselves. Judge, if you'd introduce yourself. 14 15 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Thank you, 16 Judge. I'm Sandy Prindle. I'm a justice of 17 the peace from Tarrant County, our 18 neighboring county to the west. Some of you 19 in Dallas County recognize our county over 20 there. I've been a justice of the peace 20 years. I'm immediate past president of our 21 22 state association of JPs and Constables. I am 2.3 chair of a committee formed as rule liaison to 24 rulemaking authorities like yourself.

Carl, of course I've worked with Carl Hamilton

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1 in years past with the Bar Association. 2 appreciate the opportunity to be here today. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Okay. 3 MR. NIEMANN: I'm Larry Niemann on a 4 revisit. I'm the attorney for the Texas 5 6 Apartment Association. I also wear the hat of 7 general counsel for the Texas Building Owners 8 and Managers. That's the office building 9 group, and the Texas Ministorage Association; 10 and I've been around in this business since 1965 in the landlord/tenant arena. 11 12 you. 13 MR. TEES: My name is Andy Tees. I'm with the Houston Apartment Association. 14 15 MR. DOGGETT: My name is Robert Doggett. I'm with Legal Aid of Central 16 17 Texas. I'm formerly from Dallas. I did eviction work for about nine years and now I 18 hail from Austin with Fred here. 19 20 MR. FUCHS: Judge, Fred Fuchs with Legal 2.1 Aid of Central Texas in Austin. 22 MS. SPECTOR: I'm Mary Spector with the 2.3 SMU Civil Clinic here in Dallas in this 24 building. 25 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Yes. All

right. Elaine, where are we? Tom? Who has got it?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Judge, you go ahead.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: At our last meeting which was the fifth time we had taken up the eviction rules, this is now the sixth time, we voted on a number of rules. We actually have and there was a handout and it was on the website the list of the actions and the votes that we've taken. So we voted on quite a few things. We still have some things left to vote on.

At the last meeting there was some discussion with among the representatives from the tenant's groups and the landlord groups about holding off on voting on several of the issues to try to give those groups the opportunity to meet with the subcommittee and try to work out some compromises and some language that everybody could live with and then come back and suggest that. I sent out a kind of a charge to all the participants; and the people invited were the Houston Apartment Association, Texas Apartment Association,

represents those people that have subsidized housing, the landlords, and then somebody from the Dallas group.

We had four landlord representatives show up including the Texas Apartment Association, Houston Apartment Association, San Antonio Apartment Association and the guy from Austin, Greg Hitt who represents some of the landlords with assisted housing.

All three, in fact all three of the people sitting over here now, Mary Spector and Fred Fuchs and Robert Doggett were invited.

They had conflicts. They weren't able to come; but they did send some comments, and then I talked to them after the meeting.

Well, I talked to Fred and Robert after the meeting also to kind of relay what was discussed. Judge Prindle was there and another JP from Waco, David Freya was there.

A couple of others that were invited weren't there. I was there. Chris Griesel of course was there, and then Elaine was there by phone. She was in the shores of Annapolis at the time.

We spent six hours straight from 10:00

a.m. to 4:00, no breaks, and talked about everything that we're supposed to talk about. Fred Fuchs and Larry Niemann and Judge Prindle had actually had a meeting. I had talked with Judge Prindle the week before and found out he was going to Austin and asked him to try to get together with Fred Fuchs and Larry Niemann to have kind of a preliminary meeting so they could start to work some things out. And they did, and they came out with a sort of a tentative agreement on a number of things. We used that at a basis when we started the meeting; and as I said, we spent six hours.

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And there were agreements between the JPs and the landlords. None of the tenants' groups were there. There were tentative agreements with the tenants on some things; but as it turns out by the end of the day we didn't really have a consensus among all three of the primary interested groups, the landlords, the tenants and the JPs on anything that we could take back to the subcommittee. We were sort of close. Some of the things that there were some tentative compromises on we had really already voted on or there were

some other difficulties with. So as a result of that the subcommittee met last week by phone, and then we came out with Version 8.5 which is the version before you. And you have two versions, actually the marked-up version and then a clean version just to see what it looks like.

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And the subcommittee is ready to go forward. There are 18 more rules left to vote on either in totality or in portions. In some cases we voted on 95 percent of a rule, and there's just one sentence left to be discussed. In other cases there are some things there are really not very controversial that I think we can take and get a number of those out of the way and be done with. Some of those were changes we were instructed to make at the last meeting, which we made those changes. We are ready to go on those.

The problem areas, there are eight rules, a total of eight rules and really about four different areas that constitute areas that are controversial where there is no substantive agreement in the rules; and the committee, subcommittee is prepared to talk about those

and go forward and seek a vote on those.

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I summarize the position of the parties; but I think the parties are all here today, and they probably depending on the will of the Chair can summarize their own or we can summarize their position. And but we're ready to go forward as the committee desires.

HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Well, of course, we're happy to hear from everybody within reason, as we have been in the past. So we have the principals present. We're just sorry we ever let you out of the jury room before you reached the settlement. But how do you propose to, where do you want to start?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Let us start with, if you would, with some of the things that are relatively uncontroversial that we've already talked about in some detail, and let's get those out of the way, and then we can move on to the areas that are going to take some more discussion.

HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The first deals with Rule 4 and then also Rule 739. We discussed this last time; and the problem here

we discussed in quite a bit of detail was that we need to include all of the rules that are underlined in the new version of Rule 4 in Rule 4 because the Rule 4 of course deals with the five-day period. And there was agreement to do that last time. However, there was a desire to add some language in Rule 739 which is the citation rule to make sure that it's clear to a defendant who has been served exactly what the five days mean. So we have added the language which is now the next-to-last sentence in Rule 739 to comply with the committee's dictates last time, and so we would ask that Rule 4 and Rule 739.

Now in Rule 739, the last sentence of 739

I'd like to hold off on. That deals with

discovery; but I think we're ready on

everything except the last sentence, and we

will get back to the last sentence on 739. So

we would move for approval of Rule 4 and then

Rule 739 with the exception of the last

sentence.

MR. HAMILTON: I've got a question on 739. You used the term "calendar day." Is that different than a day, just a regular

day? 1 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, --3 MR. YELENOSKY: Not on this planet. 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We thought that 5 was the more accurate way to say it. 6 MR. YELENOSKY: Just to make it clear 7 you're not talking about birthdays. 8 MR. FUCHS: Business days. 9 MR. YELENOSKY: Business days. 10 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Well, I quess 11 the time frames are so short where 24 hours, 12 whatever the next. MS. BARON: Yes. You don't want to say 13 14 it starts at 3:00 and then goes to 3:00 and then goes to 3:00 and then. 15 MR. YELENOSKY: So there is a difference 16 17. between a calendar day and a day, because a 18 calendar day is all of Monday until whenever I 19 guess the court closes as opposed to 24 20 hours. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: From 5:00 2.1 22 o'clock p.m. until 9:00 o'clock a.m. the next 23 morning is the calendar day, or transversely from 9:00 o'clock in the morning to 5:00 24 25 o'clock the next day would be a calendar day.

1 MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. 2 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Who else has 3 a question, Rule 4? MR. DOGGETT: I just have --4 5 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Yes. 6 MR. DOGGETT: -- an insignificant 7 concern. But the Rule 739 references a sworn complaint; but the rules jockey between a 8 sworn complaint and a sworn petition, and I'd 9 10 just ask that we pick one and do a word 11 change. 12 MR. YELENOSKY: Consistency. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Any other 13 problems with Rule 4 or Rule 739 except for 14 the last sentence? 15 MR. FUCKS: Justice Hecht, there had been 16 17 a concern and the tenants had expressed it to 18 the subcommittee. I assume by their silence 19 the subcommittee decided not to adopt it. 20 And that was to include a warning in Spanish 21 on a citation given the short time frames 22 telling someone who has been sued in Spanish 23 that their appearance date is going to be the 24 trial date. And I'm not sure what actually 25 happened out of the subcommittee with the

1	request that there be a warning in Spanish on
2	the citation.
3	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Elaine.
4	PROFESSOR CARLSON: We voted "no."
5	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Okay.
6	Anybody else? So there is a motion to adopt
7	Rule 4 as you have it before you and Rule 739
8	except for the last sentence. Are you ready
9	to vote?
10	MS. EADS: Question?
11	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Yes.
12	MS. EADS: Why did you vote against the
13	Spanish?
14	PROFESSOR CARLSON: I suspect the
15	consensus was if we started there, you could
16	do all the rules, 106 and
17	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 536.
18	PROFESSOR CARLSON: We really just didn't
19	feel it was within our subcommittee's decision
20	to say we're going to do this one in Spanish
21	or any other rule, and it wasn't within our
22	charge.
23	MR. YELENOSKY: We could move an
24	amendment to this that would include Spanish
25	and get a vote on the committee on it. Is

1	that appropriate?
2	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Yes.
3	Amendments are in order.
4	MR. YELENOSKY: I would move that
5	amendment to be included, because I do think
6	the short time frame; and there are a lot of
7	things that are different about eviction
8	rules. And so I guess one other difference
9	doesn't trouble me that much from just a
10	consistency standpoint.
11	MS. EADS: I second that.
12	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: All right.
13	Motion to amend by requiring in Spanish, so we
14	take the amendment first. How about the
15	Chair?
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We'll take whatever
17	you think.
18	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: We'll take
19	the amendment first. All in favor of does
20	everybody understand the amendment? All in
21	favor of the amendment raise your right hand,
22	raise your hands. It carries eight to five.
23	PROFESSOR CARLSON: Could you supply us
24	with an English translation?
25	MR. YELENOSKY: Sure. I assume you-all

1 proposed something. 2 MR. FUCHS: We have that. 3 MR. YELENOSKY: Me Espanola is esta bien. 4 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: All right. 5 Now on the Rule 749 except for the last 6 sentence and Rule 4, all in favor raise your 7 hand. MR. HAMILTON: 739. 8 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: 739. 9 I'm sorry. Yes. 12. It carries 12 zip. 10 The Chair is back. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. And I 12 apologize. This is all Tommy Jacks' fault. 13 He told me he had a cab waiting for us; but 14 15 apparently not. Where are we, Elaine? 16 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Do you want to take 17 up 740? 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. Let's do -- let's go to 747. This is a -- 747 is 19 20 the rule that says that if a jury is demanded, 2.1 the justice shall try the case. There was a 22 comment that when some JPs have a request for 23 a jury trial in some parts of the state that 24 it seems to take them too long to set that

case for trial. And there was some of the

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people on the, and I think Larry Niemann was one, was asking that there be a restriction put on that that it be done within X number of days; and I think two weeks was one of the things that was discussed. And that was really there really wasn't much discussion about this at the meeting we had on May 30th. I think we brought it up and nobody really wanted to talk about it much. So in essence the subcommittee has voted to leave the proposed language as it was except that we've added four words to the second sentence "If a jury is demanded by either party, the jury shall be impaneled as soon as practicable and sworn in." And that doesn't set an arbitrary deadline which is sometimes difficult to meet by judges to get juries into some areas; but it does convey the meaning that it's supposed to be soon. And that's the recommendation of the subcommittee.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any discussion? Elaine, do you want to say anything?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: You might recall that there was some discussion last meeting that the method and timing by which a JP can obtain

1	a jury really varies from location to
2	location; and that's why we were hesitant to
3	go to a hard number so as to leave local
4	practice somewhat in tact, but send the
5	message this is to be done expeditiously.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other discussion?
7	Anybody want to make a motion?
8	, HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I move adoption.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody second?
10	MS. EADS: Second.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All in favor raise
12	your hand. All opposed. It passes by a vote
13	of 13 to nothing, the Chair not voting. I
14	wish Sarah would come back.
15	MR. GILSTRAP: So she could hear you say
16	that.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
18	MR. ORSINGER: It wouldn't be "nothing"
19	anymore if Sarah came back.
20	(Laughter.)
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good point. Okay.
22	Where are we next, Judge?
23	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 748. 748 is a
24	rule that deals with what has to be in the
25	judgment. This was not one of the rules that

was on the table to be discussed by the ad hoc committee; but what we -- we have already voted on parts of this. On September 28 we voted to give JP judgment presumptive validity after the perfection of the appeal. We also voted to require the party appealing to pay the county court filing fee into the registry of the JP court. We didn't vote on this. There were about four or five rules we didn't vote on last time because we wanted to have one last pass through because there was some discussion at the last meeting that we wanted to try to look at the terms plaintiff, defendant, appellant, appellee, judgment creditor, judgment debtor.

So we've gone through these rules and changed everything that we could change to make that more consistent, and so we just held out 748; but we had discussed this in the past, have taken two votes on a portion of it. And we're ready to move forward on it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: You might recall in this rule there's quite a bit more that's going to be required to be included in the JP

eviction judgment. What our thought process 1 2 on this was, as you see in the last paragraph, 3 the county court can actually on an appeal by 4 trial de novo look back to a finding by the 5 justice court and rely upon them in making or 6 assessing certain determinations such as rent 7 to be paid when due although that is not binding if you look at the de novo 8 9 proceedings. 10 We are hoping in the long run that we can put together a form judgment. There are so 11 12

many of these cases that is won't be onerous for the JP court to enter a judgment with this much information.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hi, Judge, how are you?

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HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry. I came in before you got back to lunch, and I've introduced myself.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I'm sorry. I wasn't here.

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Okay. I have a letter that is before you as well as the other members of the committee. Our state

association is not opposed to this rule; but there are two or three little things that I'd like to ask you-all to consider in addition to the things being proposed. The first thing that is under subsection (c) at 740 -- I'm sorry. No. Not 740. Let me go back to the rule. Pardon me. Rule 748 on the third line of this rule proposal we're asking that a formula be presented for the judges to calculate the rent. And that is left silent; and for the sake of uniformity across the state we are suggesting that the back rent be calculated through the court date. This is also mentioned under (b)(5) of this rule as well. And we, the JPs in the state would like clarity and certain direction on this date. We don't think it's right for the judgment formulas to vary from one court to the other or one county to the other.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

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HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Number two is there is language in the same paragraph where it talked about attorney's fees being granted if sought. And we would like to request for clarity sake that the word "sought" be changed

to "pled for," and this would eliminate surprise at the time of the trial where a party would request attorney's fee when they did not plead for them. And as most of you know, attorneys are statutorily set forth in Chapter 24.006 of the Texas Property Code; but I really think "if sought" is a little bit ambiguous. We would really like the words "pled for" there.

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Next, well, actually let me see. I think that's just about all that I have got on this particular rule.

MR. NIEMANN: (a)4), Judge.

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I'm sorry.

Under (a) (4) this judgment would require the court to calculate court costs. This is unworkable, Mr. Chairman, we submit because it's impossible for the justice court at the time to know the amount of court costs that are going to arise later if writs of possession are filed for or abstracts; and customarily in our civil suits and small claims suits court costs are not calculated until the time the judgment is paid. And we ask that that be rescinded. And we think

these are just primarily housekeeping changes, 1 and I respectfully request that these issues 2 be considered. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If the court costs 4 under (a)(4) were just amended to says "court 5 6 costs" without requiring specification? HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: That's fine. 7 We're happy with that. 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: And also you 10 11 could have a contractual post judgment 12 interest that can vary statutorily. As you 13 all know, it's 10 percent; but contractually 14 we are allowed, the litigants are allowed to 15 recover up to 18 percent under Article 16 5069.105 or somewhere in there. And we 1.7 wouldn't have a problem with stating a specific amount of post judgment interest if 18 it varies from the 10 percent. 19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Thank 21 you. 22 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Thank you very 23 much. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, what 25 about the first issue of having a specific

provision about back rent through the court date?

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we had talked about this in the subcommittee a long time ago; and I guess our thinking was to leave it up to the discretion of the judge at the time as to when they awarded the rent. Some leases call for if there is a breach, the rent is, you know, it can be awarded through the end of the month. Some judges may award it until they think the defendant is actually going to be evicted on the writ of possession. Some judges award it through the court date. Our only thought was that we would just leave that up to the discretion of the Court as to when they felt that it was appropriate to award rent. That was our thinking.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the reason and Judge Prindle says that if you had it at a specific date like through the court date, then that would bring uniformity; and your answer -- across the state, and your answer to that is that some leases vary.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, this is

the first time I've heard of this, frankly. I didn't know we had a controversy about it.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, is there some reason why --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know why we necessarily need to have uniformity, why that is important. I don't have any strong feelings one way or the other.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there a reason why you might want to have more flexibility because the various rental agreements might be different?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, some leases call for rent to be paid if there's a breach and you're in there after the first of the month, that you owe to the end of the month, so that rental agreement may provide that rent is due to the end of the month if you're there past the first day of the month and you haven't paid right. Quite a few of them say that. So I would think that you would need to have that provision to allow the judge to follow what the rental agreement says. I mean, the judge I guess in their discretion can always award less. We were

just trying to leave it up to the discretion of the Court as much as possible.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What about -- Elaine, do you want to add anything to that?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: No.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What about the issue of attorney's fees? The language of this rule says "if sought." Judge Prindle says it should say "if pled for."

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, he referenced 24.006 I think of the Property Code. And actually what that provides for is that a defendant is entitled to get attorney's fees, and the defendant would not be pleading for attorney's fees and they don't have to plead for attorney's fees. The defendant gets attorney's fees if the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and the plaintiff prevails. So in that case you would be cutting out the defendant from getting attorney's fees then because there wouldn't be any pleadings for the defendant. I think that's why the subcommittee had the language "sought" instead of "pled" in there was because of the problem with the defendant's

1	attorney's fees.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine, do you want to
3	add anything to that?
4	PROFESSOR CARLSON: No.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What about the third
6	point about subparagraph (a)(4), court costs,
7	because Judge Prindle's point is that you
8	don't know
9	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's fine.
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: at the time of the
11	judgment?
12	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's fine.
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That makes sense to
14	me.
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh (yes).
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Carl.
17	MR. HAMILTON: On that first point what
18	Judge Prindle was merely asking for as I read
19	his letter is he wanted the calculation to be
20	through the judgment date; and I don't really
21	see anything wrong with having
22	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's
23	going to be the court date, of course.
24	MR. YELENOSKY: Right.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The same thing as the

1 court date. 2 MR. HAMILTON: The same thing. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But Judge Lawrence's point is sometimes your underlying contractual 4 5 documentation is going do provide for 6 additional monies beyond the court date, so 7 the judgment is going to have to reflect that, and you don't want to hamstring the JP into 8 putting a date down that conflicts with the 9 written documentation. 10 That is what Judge 11 Lawrence's point was as I take it. 1.2 MR. HAMILTON: Judge Prindle's point is 13 that would be granting anticipatory damages if 14 it's beyond the judgment date. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, can you --16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If you've got a 17 lease agreement and the least agreement says that if you're in there on the 10th of the 18 month and you've not paid rent, you owe until 19 20 the end of the month, I don't know that that's 21 anticipatory damages. 22 MR. HAMILTON: That wouldn't be. That 23 would be just contract damages. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. That's the

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point.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's my point.

MR. YELENOSKY: And you're saying that the language proposed by Judge Prindle would preclude you from awarding that because it would say through the court date and because -- I guess I'm not sure that that language would preclude that.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it would if the court date were the 15th of the month and the lease called for the rent to be, called for the tenant to have to pay the rent through the end of the month. Then you wouldn't be able to give the last two weeks of the month rent as I understand what you're saying. Correct me if I'm wrong, Sandy.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Go ahead, Stephen.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I was just -- I don't know. I mean, I'm not sure of the implications of it. But just literally to say to award the back rent due through the court date if it's the 15th of the month, what to do is through the end of the month even if, you know, you haven't reached it yet. So I'm not

sure that language would preclude you from awarding that; but I'm not sure what the pros and cons are between the two justices of the peace on that, so that's my only point.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's see if we -- are there any other parts of 748 that we want to talk about? Yes, ma'am

MS. SPECTOR: I'm Mary Spector. I introduced myself at the beginning of the meeting, at the beginning of the session. I would like to talk about a piece of 748 that really goes back to Rule 730(a), and that is the inclusion of the judgment of contractual late charges. And I understand that this may be a horse that was beaten; and --

MS. EADS: I'm sorry. We beat them again around here.

MS. SPECTOR: -- I would like to revive that for a small time so we can beat it again. But the inclusion of contractual late charges in the eviction proceeding I think is an unwise expansion and may be ultimately an unconstitutional expansion of the eviction rules.

The eviction rules are fast and they're

limited in a number of issues. The limitation on the number of issues and the speed are permitted just for those reasons. If you've got limited issues, you can have it fast. If want it fast, you limit the issues. And so there is balance there. And to allow the landlord to or the plaintiff to seek contractual late charges in addition to the back rent and in addition to the possession without giving the tenant or the defendant a reciprocal right to seek damages of one kind or another in the eviction case really is a fairness issue.

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There are also two legal reasons. One is that the Property Code rules Chapter 24 and Chapter 92 both expressly provide for the limitation of issues in the eviction proceeding. Chapter 92 under retaliation provisions provides for, allows a tenant to raise a defense in an eviction case on the basis of retaliation. That same chapter gives a tenant a remedy to get damages, but does not allow the tenant to seek damages in the eviction suit. The tenant is forced to file a new lawsuit to seek the damages. So arguments

1 about judicial economy seem to me to fall by 2 the wayside. It's economical for one, but not 3 economical for the other. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Your objection is to 4 5 the language "contractual late charges" in 6 748? 7 MS. SPECTOR: Yes. And that also is the 8 same objection to 738. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We'll get to --MS. SPECTOR: The first rule of 738. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We'll get to 738 in a 12 minute. But contractual late charges, Judge 13 Lawrence? 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we voted on June 15th of last year to accept this. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABOCOCK: Right. 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And the reason 18 that we voted to do it was that calculating 19 the late charges we felt that was inextricably 20 linked to the question of rent, and it didn't 21 make any sense to separate those. If you're 22 going to render a judgment for rent which the 23 rules provide for, the calculation for late 24 charges was not much more than that already. 25 There are a number of different

provisions in the Property Code and in the leases that allow tenants to sue landlords for other reasons and landlords to sue tenants. Certainly we don't intend to, have no intent to expand the rules to include all of these; but calculating late charges just didn't seem to the committee at the time we voted on it I don't think to be anything that was going to take a lot of time or would hopelessly expand In fact it's in the section. it. In most leases late charges is in the same paragraph as rent. Many JP Courts across the state already grant late charges because they consider that it is part of rent. not; but many do. And that was the thinking of the subcommittee; and again, we voted on it.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, okay. Elaine, anything to add to that?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Mary brought this issue up before, and I'm trying to bring to mind our discussion. It seems to me that we discussed the fact that you could -- the tenant could be evicted for not paying the late charges, that that could be -- it is

construed as part of rent. If you don't pay your rent, if you pay rent late, you owe back charges, you owe back rent. You therefore could be evicted. Our subcommittee really did feel that they were so closely linked as to essentially they were one and the same.

MS. SPECTOR: May I respond?

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, yes. Make it brief, because we on things we've voted on unless the Chair of the subcommittee wants to reopen it, we usually don't; but for the purpose of the record why don't you just respond real quickly.

MS. SPECTOR: You're referring to a common provision in a form lease that's widely used. The problem is landlords vary in the way they account, and it can be a very difficult issue to determine how the back, the late charges are accounted for on the ledger sheet. The parties can usually agree what the rent is; but the amount of late charges may be a highly disputed issue. And so I would disagree that it's not inextricably intertwined, that the rent is one issue. The landlords chooses, how the landlord chooses to

account for it may cause the tenant to be late on rent; but it does complicate the matters in which it's a complicated issue already, but it complicates it even further to add the additional issue in without a corresponding right of the tenant to seek any kind of damages.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: But the tenant could contest the late charges and validity against them.

MS. SPECTOR: Defend against them; but have no opportunity to offset them against any other remedies that you might be entitled to.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ms. Spector's comments will be in the record for the Court to consider. Anything else about Rule 748 that anyone wants to raise? Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Where it says "may enter a judgment for attorneys fees if authorized" I know we all know that means if authorized by law; but I'm wondering if it ought not to say "by law" instead of just "if authorized."

Authorized by who? By the judge or?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, what do you think about that?

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's fine. 2 Sure. 3 MR. HAMILTON: And then in the last --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What line is that? 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I got it. Nevermind. 6 MR. HAMILTON: And in the last four lines that starts with "except," if that exception 7 is not an exception to the preceding sentence, 8 9 I think we should put a period after "signed" and start a new sentence with "A writ of 10 possession." It's confusing to me as to what 11 12 it was excepting. 13 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I think Professor 14 Dorsaneo had the same observation. He 15 suggested that we put a period after "signed" 16 and put "if the defendant is leasing a 17 manufactured home lot subject to Section 18 94.203 of the Texas Property Code, a writ of possession may be issued only in accordance 19 20 with that provision. 21 MR. HAMILTON: That's better. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 23 MR. YELENOSKY: And I have one very minor 24 thing. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Stephen.

1	MR. YELENOSKY: And Judge Lawrence and I
2	I think maybe exchanged e-mails on this, and I
3	don't know if a decision was made or if it was
4	just an oversight. But (b)(4) refers to the
5	government and then it refers to the federal
6	government; but it's not consistent between
7	the two references.
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I thought I
9	changed it. Oh, no, I didn't.
10	MR. YELENOSKY: It has got "federal."
11	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think I
12	changed that.
13	MR. YELENOSKY: Maybe in the version I'm
14	looking at. I'm looking at the strike-out
15	version.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're right. You're
17	right. It should be "government" both
18	places. Right?
19	MR. YELENOSKY: Right. Because you could
20	have another entity. There are some TMHMR.
21	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: You're right.
22	PROFESSOR CARLSON: So strike "federal."
23	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I got that.
24	MR. YELENOSKY: Not TMHMR. A local
25	MHMRA.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does anybody else have 2 anything? Yes, Carl. 3 MR. HAMILTON: Well, this is a problem that I've seen throughout several of the 4 5 rules; and that is in the (d) part where it's 6 talking about the 10 days and it's talking 7 about enforcement of the judgment can only be 8 done after 10 days after the judgment is signed. And if the enforcement doesn't occur 9 10 within the 10-day period, --11 MR. YELENOSKY: Then it goes to county 12 court. 13 MR. HAMILTON: No. But then what if it 14 goes to the county court, and then the county court somehow dismisses it because the 15 16 pauper's affidavit or something is no good? 17 Then we're left with a hiatus of no 18 enforcement. But that appears in several 19 places that I think we need to talk about at 20 some point. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 748(d) is what you're 21 22 on now? 23 MR. HAMILTON: 748(d) and 749(b). 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And it's also in 25 750.

MR. HAMILTON: In other words, you might have a contest, for example, over something that is not heard for 15 days because it can be five plus five and another five extension, so you may have a decision beyond the 10-day period; but enforcement of the judgment cannot be had after 10 days.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, this is designed to correct a problem where you have an appeal of the case and the appeal bond is perfected. The appeal is perfected; but the defendant does not post a supersedeas bond. So you have to have the ability if the supersedeas is not posted for the landlord to get a writ of possession for that tenant to be evicted. Now if you wait until it's docketed in the county court, then that may be a delay of, I don't know, 10 days possibly. I don't know how long. How long do you think it would take, Andy, to get it docketed in county court once it's sent up?

MR. HARWELL: Not longer than 10 days.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Because the judge is going to certify the transcript and send all the papers up with the appeal; but

there is going to be a period of time where the landlord is not going to be able to get that tenant out unless he can get the writ of possession in justice court. Now after that period of time then he's going to go to county court because you don't want to have jurisdictions overlapping and two people able to do that. We thought within this time period that there was almost no chance that the county court would have gotten all that information and be able to docket it by then, so there would be a remedy for the landlord to get the writ of possession in the JP court at least within this initial period, and then after that they go to county court where the case is docketed.

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MR. HAMILTON: Unless the 10 days is up and the county court decides it doesn't have any jurisdiction because it denies the affidavit of the indigent or something like that.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, if that's the case, then if the appeal is not perfected, then the JP court judgment would prevail and the JP court would have the ability to issue a

1	writ of possession.
2	MR. HAMILTON: But not after 10 days.
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, they would
4	after the 10 days if the appeal is not
5	perfected.
6	MR. YELENOSKY: Yes, because it says "if
7	perfected."
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If the appeal is
9	not perfected, then the JP court judgment will
10	still prevail.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Are you
12	satisfied with that Carl or not?
13	MR. HAMILTON: I don't know. I'll have
14	to think about that and see how it all shapes
15	out.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Has anybody else got
17	anything else, any other issues in 748?
18	Mr. Niemann.
19	MR. NIEMANN: Really not a issue, but a
20	clarification, Mr. Chairman. Is it the
21	impression of Judge Lawrence, Judge Prindle
22	that they would need to keep the file at their
23	office during this entire 10-day period?
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know that the
25	rule addresses that.

MR. NIEMANN: Because if that's the case, it will slow down the eviction by five days.

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HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: This is also addressed in Rule 750(a); and I was going to comment on this a little later. And my suggestion was that if an appeal is perfected and a supersedeas bond is submitted at the same time inside of five days, I see no reason why the justice court needs to hold it for 10 unless there is something that you-all may think of that there may be a five-day period that we would have to hold it to give the plaintiff an opportunity to challenge the bond; but you know, I'm not sure that we need to hold it the full 10 days in every case, and the rule does not give us flexibility on that But that's 750, Mr. Chair, not 748. issue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MR. NIEMANN: My point was that for every day that the justice court keeps it beyond five days after judgment is adding another day to the ultimate resolution in county court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, but 748(d) only applies where there has been no

supersedeas bond filed in the JP court by the tenant, and we're doing this to help the landlords. Now if the landlords want us to take that out, we can.

MR. NIEMANN: No.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But that means that you've got to go to county court to get the writ of possession. Is that what you?

MR. NIEMANN: No, no. I just want everybody to remember that as a practical matter the cases are going to be --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Has anybody else got anything on 748, any other issues?

Okay. Here is what I see as changes that everybody agrees on: That the phrase "by law" is inserted after the "attorney's fees if authorized." That's number one.

Two, the language that Elaine suggested with respect to the lines talking about writ of possession issued in accordance with Section 94.203, striking the phrase "and in what amount" in subparagraph (a) (4) and striking the word "federal" before the word "government" in (b) (4). Judge Lawrence, and

Elaine Carlson, are those changes acceptable? 1 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh (yes). PROFESSOR CARLSON: Uh-huh (yes). 3 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Anything 5 else that people want to raise as issues on 6 Then in that event everybody in favor of 748 as --7 8 MR. EDWARDS: Are we voting on the clean version or the line version? 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're voting on the line version as amended. 11 12 MR. EDWARDS: Because in the clean 13 version part of the sentence is left out. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're voting on the 15 line version. Everybody in favor of 748 with 16 those amendments that I've just enumerated 17 raise your hand. Opposed? The vote is 12 18 nothing in favor, the Chair not voting. 19 Okay. What is next, Judge Lawrence? 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Let's take 748(b). I'm sorry. 749(b). Excuse me. 21 This 22 is the perfection of the appeal. We have 23 taken a couple of votes on this. On September 24 28 we voted. Excuse me. I'm sorry. On 25 November 2nd we voted to adopt the last two

sentences of the proposed rule; and there's been a little change in the nomenclature here; but basically what we voted on was that if the appeal does contest a judgment for possession and the tenant fails to post a supersedeas bond when required, the appellee may seek a writ of possession. The issue of possession may not be further litigated in the eviction action in county court. That's what we voted on November 2nd; and we didn't take any other votes on this in May.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Does anybody have any issues with respect to 749(b)? Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I have a question. This may relate to some of the others too; but this seems to all be directed at appeals by the defendant. But what if the plaintiff gets dispossessed in the case and wants to appeal?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: How would the plaintiff get dispossessed?

MR. HAMILTON: Well, if the Court rules that the defendant is entitled to possession and the plaintiff disagrees with that and wants to appeal it.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the

tenant, the defendant would be the person in possession, so the plaintiff wouldn't be getting dispossessed.

MR. HAMILTON: No, they're not dispossessed. Well, dispossessed in the sense that he doesn't get possession of it. He loses his case, and so he wants to appeal.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. Well, under 749 there is a provision for the plaintiff to appeal. The plaintiff even could in theory have to post a supersedeas if there is a judgment for attorney's fees for the defendant in fact. So the plaintiff would have to post an appeal bond. I'm sorry. Not an appeal bond; but a notice of appeal. And that's all provided for in 749 which we've already voted on.

And then 749(b) makes reference to 749.

If you look at the second sentence, the fourth line, when the plaintiff timely files a notice of appeal in conformity with Rule 749 and pays the filing fee required for the appeal of cases to county court or an affidavit of indigency is approved, which I don't see happening very often; but you have got to make

it available for both. Then the appeal by the plaintiff shall be perfected.

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So there is a mechanism for the plaintiff to appeal. It's not very costly for the plaintiff because they've already paid the court costs. There is no need to secure it. In all likelihood they're not going to have to post a supersedeas bond although they could in theory. So the appeal by the plaintiff is really pretty easy.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: That first paragraph of 749(b) does set forth distinctive methods for the defendant as opposed to the plaintiff. It's not all defendant.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. Both in 749 and 749(b) where we talk about the appeal and perfecting the appeal, I mean, there are different standards for what the defendant has to do and what the plaintiff has to do, and it's all set out in the rules.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other issues about 749(b)? Bill.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The next to the last paragraph of the last sentence I'm having a little trouble digesting that.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Was lunch not so good 2 today? 3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I thought it was 4 fine. It was Italian food, which is what you-all should eat more often. 5 6 (Laughter.) CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is this the sentence 7 that starts "If the appeal" does not 9 contest -- "does contest a judgment for 10 possession"? 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Is that always going 12 to be the tenant's appeal? 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, this 14 relates to the supersedeas and the eviction; 15 and the plaintiff would never be evicted, so really only it would relate to the defendant. 16 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The terminology is 18 what bothered me. I don't know whose appeal 19 this is, and then you use the term "tenant" 20 and then "appellee." HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. 21 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'd rather use 23 "plaintiff and defendant" or "landlord and tenant" or have somebody identified if it's 24 25 somebody rather than nobody, because you're

1	very familiar with what all of this is about.
2	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay.
3	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And I'm going to be
4	more like the people who aren't when I'm
5	reading it.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How do you fix it,
7	Bill?
8	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm asking him to
9	fix it.
10	(Laughter.)
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Do you fix it, Tom?
12	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm asking Judge
13	Lawrence to fix it.
14	PROFESSOR CARLSON: And the reason we
15	didn't use "landlord"
16	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We were trying
17	not to lose
18	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It might not be a
19	landlord.
20	MR. YELENOSKY: Well, you could say "If
21	the defendant does contest a judgment for
22	possession," and that's going to be the
23	tenant, "and fails to post a supersedeas bond
24	when required, the plaintiff/appellee may seek
25	a writ of possession."

1 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That would help me. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. I think 3 that's a good fix. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Say that again, 4 5 Stephen. MR. YELENOSKY: "If the defendant does 6 7 contest a judgment for possession and fails," just strike "the tenant," "and fails to post a 8 supersedeas bond when required, " and then you 9 could leave it "the appellee," or to conform I 10 11 guess you would say "the plaintiff may seek a 12 writ of possession." HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 13 That's a 14 good fix. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. What else on 15 16 749(b)? 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It would be better 18 to say "If the defendant appeals a judgment 19 for possession" rather than "contests." 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we got into that last time. 21 22 MR. YELENOSKY: We got into that last 23 time, because they could be appealing more than one thing. And so the question is among 24 25 the things that they're contesting in appeal

1 are they contesting the possession? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. All right. 2 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. MR. HAMILTON: That provision prohibits 4 the relitigation of the possession right of 5 6 the tenant unless he puts up a supersedeas bond on the appeal. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, if he's 8 evicted. He could also be evicted for not 9 10 paying rent to the registry of the court, so 11 there are two ways the tenant can be evicted. 12 And what this is saying is that if the tenant 13 gets evicted, then he can't litigate the 14 question of possession in county court. The judgment itself will go up on appeal; but the 15 16 question of possession would not be 17 litigated. It would be moot in essence. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That bothers me. 18 19 MR. YELENOSKY: This is your 20 motorcycle --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't understand 21 22 how you're appealing a judgment that's 2.3 primarily about possession, and then if you , 24 win, you don't get possession back. 25 bothers me somehow. That doesn't make any

sense to me.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: There's a whole line of cases, Bill, that say that.

COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I mean, I whole line of dead horses might, you know, be pretty impressive too; but it's not worth a damn.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right.

Mr. Niemann, Mr. Prindle and Ms. Spector, do you have comments about this?

MR. NIEMANN: Last time you-all sent
Fred Fuchs and I out in the hall to try to
work out some language to allow continued
litigation and the issue of possession in
county court even if the writ had been issued
or the defendant had voluntarily vacated
during appeal. We did work out that language,
and we did submit it to Judge Lawrence. It
would have allowed the tenant to continue to
litigate possession in the county court for
purposes of removing the justice court
judgment from the tenant's credit record and
rental history record.

One might ask why would the Apartment Association want the tenant to have that

important for the tenant to be able to continue that litigation because we think that we strongly feel that even the pauper should be putting up one month's rent or less as a condition to stop issuance of the writ of possession. So if they don't put up the rent, they ought to be able to appeal and get it off their record even if they don't get possession back. And I think Fred Fuchs agreed with me on that.

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MR. YELENOSKY: But it doesn't, if I can guess from what you have said many, many months ago, that doesn't solve the problem where you're representing a motorcycle company that gets evicted and wants back in. I remember you talking about that before.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Uh-huh (yes).

MR. YELENOSKY: If you don't post a supersedeas, you don't get to litigate getting back in. You can sue for wrongful eviction it's my understanding of the subcommittee's. That's what you're stuck with is a damage claim.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe you can sue for possession in the other action. Can you? Or this? This is?

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Larry, are you saying that this language is not faithful to the compromise that was struck?

MR. NIEMANN: No. I think Mr. Fuchs would agree with me that it does not reflect what we had asked the subcommittee to incorporate.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, let me point out the other two representatives from the landlords there didn't agree. Howard Bookstaff and David Fritche from San Antonio, they wanted the judgment to be final and not able to be appealed any longer if the tenant is evicted, and that was their position quite strongly. So there was no compromise that was reached at the May 30th meeting.

Now it's true that Larry Niemann and Fred Fuchs agree on that and maybe Judge Prindle too. I'm not sure. But there was an agreement of some of the parties.

MR. PRINDLE: Judge Prindle nods his head yes.

1 MR. YELENOSKY: So all the reasonable 2 parties agree is what you're saying? (Laughter.) 3 MR. NIEMANN: Let me tell you why the 4 5 difference. I strongly believe that under <u>Dillingham</u> and <u>Open Courts</u> the tenant needs to 6 7 be able to in order to make sure that the tender of rent requirement to stop the writ of 8 9 possession being issued I think it is 10 essential that the tenant needs to be able to 11 continue litigation of possession. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We talked about this 12 13 at some length; and then after the meeting in 14 the hallway the subcommittee went back and 15 looked at it, and this is what you came up 16 with and recommended subject to the language 17 that Stephen has talked about changing. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh (yes). 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So it reads "If the 19 20 appeal does contest the judgment" --21 MR. YELENOSKY: "If the defendant." 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm sorry. "If the defendant does contest the judgment for 23 24 possession and fails to post a supersedeas 25 bond, when required, the plaintiff may seek a

writ of possession, and the issue of possession may not be further litigated in the eviction action in the county court."

MR. YELENOSKY: And I was just offering that as wordsmithing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

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MR. YELENOSKY: My position actually would be to offer an amendment, which I'll do when we're done with that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So Stephen, you would say that the subcommittee was not right, and that the --

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, in light of what I have been told and what I saw on the other thing if Larry Niemann and the tenants' representatives agreed on a way that would allow a tenant to protect their records, that seems a reasonable thing to do here. It doesn't solve Bill Dorsaneo's problem about really wanting to get back in; but it does solve one problem where the tenant may be forever blacklisted because they have an eviction on their record for lack of a supersedeas bond. So I guess I would propose the committee take a vote on that proposed

agreement that Mr. Niemann and Mr. Fuchs were able to reach.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And Judge

Lawrence, your reason for, accepting that

there was no consensus because some of the

tenant groups opposed it, your reason for --

MR. YELENOSKY: Some of the landlord groups apparently opposed it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Some of the landlord groups. I'm sorry. Your reason for doing it this way was what?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, several.

One, we have already voted that early on that all rent be paid into the registry of the county court. And I think what Larry Niemann and Fred Fuchs and Judge Prindle were trying to do with their agreement was to craft a proposal, and this gets into 750(a) also; but what they would like to do is to craft a proposal that would allow initially rent not be paid into the county court, that one month's rent be paid into the JP court within five days after the judgment is signed or thereabouts, and that the tenants went along with that. And if you don't, you get

evicted. And the tenants went along with that because if, and correct me if I'm putting words in your mouth, but as I understand the tenants went along with that --

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MR. FUCHS: I think that's sort of a little different issue from my perspective.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, but it's really kind of tied in. If you could appeal the question of possession if the tenant had been evicted, so long as you could do that, because you're concerned about getting it off their credit history.

MR. FUCHS: That's correct.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The subcommittee just frankly didn't feel that the credit history problem was part of our charge or part of what we were to consider.

The other problem that we struggled with was if the tenant is out of the premises, if he's been evicted, we just don't know what the point other than credit of litigating the question of possession. There is no mechanism by which the tenant can be put back in possession. We discussed this in a lot of detail back in September.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

the tenant back in possession. He's out. He can't be put back in. What is the county court litigating? Now I know that Larry Niemann agrees with this; but David Fritche and Howard Bookstaff did not agree. They want this to be final. They don't want the tenant to be able to appeal. So we've got kind of a agreement among the landlord groups.

So we've got the Texas Apartment

Association that wants, that feels like they

want that language; but the other two don't

want it, and the subcommittee just doesn't see

the point of appealing the question of

possession if the tenant has been evicted.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, when we talked about credit, and I'm sure someone here can tell me, probably Mr. Niemann, aren't we really talking about a person's ability to rent again? Because when you say "credit" what you're saying is that they are then listed as having been evicted and will have trouble with some landlords being able to rent again.

1 MR. NIEMANN: That's true. Now let me 2 explain the difference between myself and Bookstaff and Fritche. I think it is 3 4 necessary for the tenant to be able to perfect the appeal and to continue litigation of the 5 6 issue of possession, not to get possession 7 back, but to get it off his record, okay, for 8 two reasons. Number one, I think it's 9 important to Dillingham and Open Courts, and also incidentally it's fair. But this is so 10 11 very related to the most important issue that you haven't reached yet, and that is 750. 12 13 think that if 750 is left alone the way it is 14 without incorporating what the tenants and the 15 JPs and the landlords all have agreed to in 16 the past of requiring even the pauper who has 17 signed a pauper's affidavit to put up one month's rent or less if that's the amount of 18 the judgment in order to stop the writ. 19 20 Otherwise you're just setting up the landlord to judicially have to give the tenant, you 21 22 know, two or three weeks more free rent; and 23 that's what the bottom line is. And it is so 24 important for us, for me in my mind to require 25 the tenant, even the pauper tenant to put up

one month's rent in order to stop the writ from issuing after he loses in JP court that I'm willing to do everything I can to make sure that <u>Dillingham</u> is satisfied, and I think that is important in satisfying <u>Dillingham</u> and I'm not afraid to give up on that.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You would -- this

language would be satisfactory to you I take

it if there was a period after "a writ of

possession" striking the language "and the

issue of possession may not be further

litigated in the eviction action in the county

court"?

MR. NIEMANN: No. We had worked on some language that would make it very clear that it could be litigated; but even if the tenant won or the defendant won, there would be no repossession. He could not get possession back; but he could get the blotch off his record so to speak. That's from their standpoint. From my standpoint it satisfied Dillingham that which is necessary in order for us to get one month rent even by the pauper.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Bill.

1 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: How much is this? 2 I'm still having trouble with this same I gather what it really means is 3 sentence. unless the defendant or tenant posts a 4 5 supersedeas bond, the issue of possession 6 cannot be relitigated at a county court. I 7 guess that's what that means in English. 8 So my question would be, or that's what 9 it should say rather than this more confusing 10 version of that. How much is the supersedeas 11 bond, Larry? Is it the one month's rent or is it more? 12 13 MR. NIEMANN: The supersedeas bond should be for the entire judgment plus attorney's 14 fees plus interest during appeal. 15 16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That is a Dillingham 17 problem. 18 MR. NIEMANN: I'm not asking for the 19 pauper to have to put up a supersedeas bond in 20 order to appeal. He can appeal on the 21 basis --22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's still a 23 Dillingham problem. You can appeal. But if

you can't win, there's not much of an appeal.

It would make sense to me from the landlord's

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perspective that the rent is paid, the one month's rent or whatever is paid as a condition to the appeal. I don't think that's a <u>Dillingham</u> problem. Okay? I think posting a supersedeas on a whole thing is a <u>Dillingham</u> problem.

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MR. NIEMANN: I hate to disagree and to my own detriment; but having to put up money as a condition of perfecting an appeal is a Dillingham problem; and I think anybody who read Dillingham would tend to agree. But having to put up money, having to put up money to stop enforcement of the judgment pending appeal is not a Dillingham problem; and I don't want the appeal to become moot. If it becomes moot, we have no basis by which to require one month's rent.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I could call it superseding, but make it one month's rent; and I don't think that's a <u>Dillingham</u> problem, because it makes good sense that somebody doesn't get something for nothing during this period.

MR. NIEMANN: Well, that's what the current rules end up allowing.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's bad, somebody 1 you know, not getting a chance to get what 2 3 they deserve; but that's the same thing. MR. NIEMANN: I think maybe --4 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe we could 6 adjust the supersedeas to say one month's rent 7 to stay in possession. 8 MR. NIEMANN: -- we could put that part of 749 on the table until you resolve the 9 750. 750 will tell you what to do with 749. 10 11 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That makes sense to 12 me. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other issues on 14 749(b)? Yes, Carl. 15 MR. HAMILTON: I can see the appeal going 16 forward by the tenant without a supersedeas 17 bond if the tenant indeed wants to regain possession. And if it's worded or however 18 19 you-all have it worded to where he cannot 2.0 regain possession, then it seems to me that 21 that's a moot question and there is nothing 22 for the court to decide on. 23 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Exactly. That's 24 exactly the position of the subcommittee. 25 MR. HAMILTON: So it ought to be limited

to a situation where the tenant wants to regain possession it seems to me.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And if it is the case that -- we need for the tenant to have the continued obligation to pay rent if there is possession.

MR. HAMILTON: Right.

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PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Continued possession. But that's a different problem from --

MR. NIEMANN: I was just trying to circle as many wagons as I could around one month's rent in JP court; and I'm willing to give up that to make it bulletproof.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Judge Lawrence, is it your inclination to vote on 749(b) now or to defer this rule until we talk about 750, or what is your pleasure?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we've -let's see. On 750 we voted on parts of 750.

I mean, I think what the proposal by Larry is
is to redo part of what we've already done,
that the writ not be paid into the registry of
the county court, it been paid into the
registry of the JP court. So if we want to go

1 back and, you know, review and revote on some of that, then I guess it's necessary to wait 2 3 on 748(b) -- 749(b). CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Well, we're 4 5 hopefully not going to vote on things we've 6 already voted on unless there is a real good 7 reason. So I take it then that you would like to vote on 749(b) now subject to the language 8 changes? 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I mean, 10 11 that's the subcommittee's proposal. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And people have 13 heard the debate here. So we can do it or Is there anything else about 749(b) that 14 we want to discuss before we vote on the rule? 15 16 MS. EADS: Vote on 749(b) right now? 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Before we vote on it, 18 yes. MS. EADS: I mean, I'm in favor of 19 2.0 looking at 750 first to decide whether or not 21 I'm content with what is here in 749, because 22 right now until I know that issue I'm not sure 23 I'm able right now to make that decision. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen, you share 25 that view?

1 MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. I think I'd like to look at 750 first.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm trying to understand. But maybe something in 749(b) or in the vicinity of that sentence that troubles me that says that the defendant's appeal does not suspend the county court on the possession issue, does not suspend defendant's obligation to pay rent or to deposit the amount of rent into the registry of the court or something like that, okay, if that's what the problem is or if that's largely what the problem is. And I don't see that as a Dillingham problem at all. Maybe I don't see Dillingham clearly enough; but to say you're supposed to pay rent as a condition of proceeding doesn't seem like an unfair thing.

MR. YELENOSKY: I think what that there may be two ships crossing in the night, because I think what Mr. Niemann is talking about is paying one month's rent as a condition regardless of whether or not the rent happens to be due at that point.

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's correct. 2 MR. NIEMANN: No. One month's rent only 3 in an unpaid rent case. 4 MR. YELENOSKY: In an unpaid rent case. 5 MR. NIEMANN: And even then no greater 6 than the amount of the judgment. 7 MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. But you are talking about that as opposed to what we talked about for a long time and everybody I 9 10 think ended up voting on that the tenant 11 should have to pay what they would have to pay 12 anyway if there were no eviction action going 1.3 on. That is water under the bridge, I think. We all agree the way this is drafted is that 14 15 even a pauper has to pay what they paid as a 16 pauper as the appeal goes along and there are 17 mechanisms set up for this. What Mr. Niemann 18 is talking about is not just paying, in a 19 nonpayment of rent case not just paying what 20 comes due --2.1 MR. NIEMANN: In the future. 22 MR. YELENOSKY: -- in the future; but 23 paying one month's essentially back rent or 24 one month's worth of rent at the time of 25 appeal even if the future rent has not yet

1 come due. They have to pay essentially some of the back rent. 2 3 MR. DOGGETT: That's right. 4 MR. YELENOSKY: Isn't that's right? Isn't that what you're saying? 5 6 MR. DOGGETT: That's right. 7 MR. NIEMANN: That's right. It serves 8 the same purpose as a supersedeas bond does assuring that at least some of the rent has to 9 be paid. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Linda, I'm going to 12 take your comment as a motion to suspend approval of Rule 749(b) pending 750. I'll 13 14 take Stephen's acquiescence as a second. So 15 let's vote on that. Everybody who wants to 16 delay approval or disapproval of 749(b) 17 pending a discussion of 750 raise your hand. 18 All those opposed? So that will carry. Did you raise your hand, Elaine? 19 2.0 PROFESSOR CARLSON: No. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So that will carry by 22 a vote of seven, zero. Should we then go on 23 to 750 right now, Judge Lawrence? 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, how about 25 749(c)? That ought to be quick.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's do 749(c)
2	quickly.
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That is the form
4	of the appeal bond.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Chair not voting on
6	the last one.
7	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That is the
8	phone numbers of the sureties. That was what
9	was requested to be added at the last
10	meeting. That's the change.
11	PROFESSOR CARLSON: Did we add this
12	(indicating)?
13	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, we have also
14	added some language about approval and
15	disapproval of the bond for the reason. There
16	is a request for that, so we put that in
17	there.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any comment about
19	749(c)?
20	MR. HAMILTON: My form doesn't have the
21	phone numbers on it.
22	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It doesn't?
23	MR. HAMILTON: Isn't it supposed to have
24	it under surety, signature of surety?
25	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.

MR. HAMILTON: Signature of surety?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. Not under the signature. Up in the body. We can put it in the signature.

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. I see. Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The location doesn't really matter. We can put it wherever you want.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments about 749(c)? Has everyone had enough time to look at it? All in favor of 749(c) raise your hand. That carries by a vote of 12 nothing, the Chair not voting.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay, 750. On September 28th we voted to require the tenant to post a supersedeas bond in order to remain in possession during the appeal. On May 18th we didn't take any other votes holding this subject to see what happened with the subcommittee, the ad hoc committee and the subcommittee. Now what we have done in order to aid I guess you'd say the readability is we have carved out of 750 all those provisions that talk about paying rent into the registry of the court and put that in Rule 751 and then

changed the form of the supersedeas bond that was 751 and made that 750(a). We thought that having the supersedeas and the rent all in the same rule was just too much and would be a little bit easier to read and understand to separate those. So that's the proposal of the committee. Really I think part of this discussion about, talking about Rule 750, I think really we may want to talk about 751 which is the rent issue, not so much the supersedeas bond issue.

Now on the supersedeas bond, Rule 750 we had a couple of comments that came up about that. One of the comments dealt with, one dealt with Steve's issue about federal government versus government. I think I made that change in 750 and forgot to make it in 749(b), so --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 750(e)(3) talks about the federal government.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. That's a negotiable obligation. I think that needs to stay in there. That is TRAP rule language.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: It's different.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The one thing

that did come up was in (h)(5). This is the lesser the amount. And this was Larry
Niemann's suggestion also; but he was concerned that the JPs there would I guess abuse that by setting the amounts too low or inappropriately, and that was part of what the ad hoc committee discussed. And that was brought up and really not much discussion about it.

I think that Elaine pointed out that this language is, and it is directly from the TRAP rule, and that's the reason the subcommittee put this language in there is that it did mirror the TRAP rule and we wanted to keep things consistent. And I think you had a comment about that at the ad hoc meeting, didn't you, about changing that lesser amount?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Oh, someone raised an issue on subsection (f). Right?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. Well,

(h)(5). Yes, (h)(5), the lesser amount, this
is setting a lesser amount on the supersedeas
bond if the judge feels that there is some
just cause to do that.

1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: This language came 2 out of the TRAP rule; and the TRAP rule I think tracks the statute on the Property Code 3 4 provision. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. That's it, the Property Code, yes. And the subcommittee 6 7 didn't feel like we wanted to mess with that. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Isn't this the Texaco amendment? 9 10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes. 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And I quess from 12 my standpoint I'd like -- I think the judges 13 need to have the discretion to lower it where the circumstances dictate it. 14 15 MR. NIEMANN: Mr. Chairman, I just want 16 to make our position clear. We're not against 17 the judges recording a lesser amount; but we felt there really just needs to be another 18 19 protection there. If the third party 20 government was not paying the rent, then we didn't think the lesser amount was justified; 2.1 22 and I think some of our language was to that effect. 2.3 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 25 MR. HAMILTON: I have a question about

the rule in general. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 3 MR. HAMILTON: This rule seems to be 4 directed at a tenant supersedeas bond, because it talks about the amount of rent and so forth 5 6 that has to be a part of the bond. And is there anyplace that tells us what the 7 plaintiff's supersedeas bond needs to be and 8 9 what it has to be? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the only 10 11 it would be the -- all right. (h) talks about 12 the amount of the supersedeas bond deposited 13 as security. 14 MR. YELENOSKY: The amount of the 15 judgment. 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, the amount 17 of the judgment. But (2) in particular would 18 be the amount of the attorney's fees; and that would really be about all a landlord 19 20 supersedeas bond would be plus maybe a \$5 jury 21 fee and that would be it. 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The landlord 2.3 wouldn't be able to evict by posting a 2.4 supersedeas bond. 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. All he

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1	would do is be able to appeal by posting a
2	supersedeas
3	MR. YELENOSKY: He would not be
4	superseding.
5	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: to secure the
6	defendant's judgment.
7	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: He wouldn't be able
8	to get a relief he didn't get
9	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right.
10	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: by posting a
11	supersedeas.
12	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: That's
13	right. Forestall
14	PROFESSOR CARLSON: Execution.
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Execution on
16	attorney's fees, execution on the judgment.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other comments
18	about this rule?
19	MR. YELENOSKY: And this rule, well, I
20	guess it's a comment. This rule under (j)
21	does what we voted on long ago and I was
22	referring to was in part was that for somebody
23	proceeding on an affidavit of indigence there
24	is no supersedeas.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We voted on that 2 in September I think last year. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Now Judge Prindle had 3 given us written comments on that. Is there 4 5 anything you want to add to that, Judge? 6 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Well, I'm glad 7 Professor Dorsaneo is not troubled by the 8 Dillingham issue on payment of rent during the pendency of the appeal. I'm not a landlord 9 10 and I hope no one feels that I have a personal 11 agenda on this issue. It's only an issue of 12 equity and fairness. And that is is that the 13 way I interpret (j) is that no rent has to be posted during the pendency of the appeal if 14 there is an affidavit of indigency. 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's not true. 16 17 MR. YELENOSKY: No. No. You have to pay 1.8 rent that comes due. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's not 19 20 true. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Well, I'd like 21 22 for the -- if it's posted somewhere, because I 2.3 saw in Rule 751 that they have to keep paying 24 rent; but it talks about the supersedeas

I didn't -- is there an affidavit of

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bond.

indigence paragraph in Rule 751? 1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Look at (c) in 2 751, 751(c). 3 MR. YELENOSKY: "Exists even if the 4 appeal is perfected by approval of an 5 affidavit of indigence" is the ending clause 6 7 there. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: 751(c). 8 9 MR. FUCHS: Page 30. MR. YELENOSKY: You have to pay rent as 10 11 it becomes due; and it goes on to say "even if 12 the appeal is perfected by approval of affidavit of indigence." And let me ask --13 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I stand 14 corrected. I withdraw my comments under (j). 15 MR. YELENOSKY: And your earlier comment 16 17 about, and I'll ask if I could, Bill Dorsaneo to respond to this. When you said, Bill, that 18 there wasn't a <u>Dillingham</u> problem with payment 19 20 of rent to remain in possession were you referring to payment of rent as it becomes 21 22 due? 23 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes. 24 MR. YELENOSKY: Because instead you might 25 think there is a <u>Dillingham</u> problem if in

1 order to remain in possession you have to pay 2 one month rent which might or might not be --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think that is a 3 <u>Dillingham</u> problem. 4 5 MR. YELENOSKY: That is a <u>Dillingham</u> 6 problem. So I just wanted to get that 7 clarified. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any time somebody 9 writes us a letter that says "Floodgates of 10 abuse" we want to talk about it. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I only read up 11 12 until where I thought the County Court at Law took over; and I apologize. 13 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think it might be 14 good in that sentence to put the "may" part 15 16 first. 17 MR. YELENOSKY: In the (c) sentence? PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes, in the (c) 18 19 sentence. 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's 21 751. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. We'll talk about 23 751 later. All right. Anything else on 750? MR. NIEMANN: Well, may I make my main 24 25 pitch then?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You can make your main pitch briefly.

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MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps the most important problem we have is the potential abuse by tenants who have lost at the eviction trial. Then they file an affidavit of indigence, and they will get a free ride all the way through the issuance of the judgment of the court of appeals. The affidavit of indigence can be totally spurious, totally false; but what is happening now and what will continue to happen is when they file the affidavit of indigence if there is a contest and they lose, then they will appeal that decision to the county It will take the county court 15 or 20 days to resolve that. Then it goes back down to the JP court. Then he sends it on back up to the county court for trial. The abuse is happening right now and it will continue to happen in the future. And if anybody disagrees with me, tell me where I'm wrong.

MR. YELENOSKY: Let me point out one thing. When you say "free ride" what happens is you have a tenant let's say who didn't pay rent for two months.

1 MR. NIEMANN: That's right. 2 MR. YELENOSKY: You go in and they get 3 eviction. MR. NIEMANN: 4 Right. 5 MR. YELENOSKY: They file an affidavit of 6 indigence. 7 MR. NIEMANN: That's right. 8 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. In order to 9 remain in possession they have to pay rent as The first thing that has happened --10 due. 11 MR. NIEMANN: As due in the future. 12 MR. YELENOSKY: Right, as due in the future. So while this stuff is going along 13 14 that you're talking about when rent becomes 15 due that landlord is actually in a position to 16 get rent whereas for two months he wasn't. So 17 all future rent is going to be paid or the 18 writ is going to issue and he's going to be dispossessed. The only thing that is the free 19 20 ride is the back rent that was awarded as judgment is delayed in payment. If it 21 ultimately has to be paid, that is delayed. 22 23 But any accrual of rent is subject to 24 immediate dispossession if they don't pay it.

No.

MR. NIEMANN:

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MR. YELENOSKY: Why not?

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MR. NIEMANN: Because there is a time line. You've already added five more days to the picture by the 10-day retention of the file. Then it has to go to county court. Ιt has to be docketed. He says it takes about 10 days to get docketed. Then you have to wait eight more days for a trial. Then after you get a county court judgment the statutes say you can't issue that judgment, that writ for 10 more days. So if you allow the case, a rent case to go to county court by affidavit of indigency with no payment of rent tendered by the tenant to JP court, the landlord is losing anywhere from 20 to 30 days worth of rent.

That is happening to you right now under your current rules. Judge Cercone told me to my face "I never even hear contest to affidavit of indigency, because I'm doing the landlord a disfavor because the tenants have gotten to the point where they know that if they file an affidavit and lose, then they will appeal that to the county court, just the ruling on the affidavit." It will come back,

1 and it will elongate the procedure even more. If they don't file a contest of the affidavit, 2 3 it will get there that much faster; but the mere filing of an affidavit of indigency 4 without a tender of rent gives that tenant a 5 6 free ride from that date until the date the 7 writ of possession is issued in county court, and that's going to be in most cases 20 or 30 8 9 days. 1.0 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, and I mean I guess 11 somebody else who knows the days should 12 respond, because I'm not sure what you're 13 describing is what is currently happening or what would happen under these rules, because I 14 thought the subcommittee tried to address as 15 16 best they could any gaps in the issuance of a 17 writ of possession. So maybe Judge Lawrence 18 can respond to that or tell us what the gap is. 19. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence, you 21 and your subcommittee have considered this 22 argument, I know. 23 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (Nods 24 affirmatively.) 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's, we'll think

about it one more time on a break which we're going to take right now. And when we come back Justice Womack is here with the Court of Criminal Appeals' report about the TRAP rules to us. We will do that right after the break, and then we'll get back to this world of FED. Let's take a break for about 10 minutes.

(Recess 2:58 to 3:15.)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Back on the record.

Okay. Shall we get going? Justice Womack has got some comments that he would like to make about the TRAP rules; and we welcome his participation and attendance as always.

Justice Womack, thank you.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Thank you for you interrupting what you're doing. I'll only take a couple of minutes, famous last words.

(Laughter.)

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Justice Hecht has been very patient and kind working with me on the Rules of Appellate Procedure changes. And I'm really here kind of to drop this packet off to him and to the members of the committee to let you know how things are going at my court.

The only rule that impinges on the civil side in any way I think is Rule 47 which I know that you have done mighty labor on the issue of publication of opinions and their citation as authority or something else. I have to report to you that our court is, we have discussed this, and the feeling is although it's not been a formal decision is that we want to retain the concept of unpublished appellate opinions in criminal cases. And the main rationale for that is there is kind of a disincentive on the civil side to bring a meritless appeal because it costs money whereas a lot of litigants on the criminal side they ask for an appeal whether a lawyer would say there is a chance or not. it may be that this is less worthy of citation and even distribution to the public. So I'd put in the Rule 47, just kind of basically put back in the part of the old publication rules for criminal cases only.

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I know that the plan here is for there to be two classes. Instead of published and unpublished on the civil side there will be opinions and memorandum opinions; and it seems

to me that retaining publication in criminal 1 2 cases could just go hand in hand with that. 3 Surely 99.9 percent of the memorandum opinions, criminal opinions would be qualified 4 5 as unpublished. So but of course we're very 6 interested to know if this is going to be a 7 problem and to hear from the courts of 8 appeals. The other --MR. YELENOSKY: Let me ask a quick 9 10 question. 11 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Please. 12 MR. YELENOSKY: Or would you rather me 13 wait? 14 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: No. No. I'm just 1.5 sorry to take up your time. 16 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I was just going to 17 ask if the rationale or the concern is that 18 there are frivolous appeals, what that might that indicate that you want to signal we do on 19 20 some cases that don't state any new law make 21 any memorandum opinions. What would the 22 reasoning be in your mind of refusing to allow 23 somebody to cite what probably no one is going 24 to want to cite anyway? 25 Well, of course, if JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK:

nobody is going to want to cite it, then why do we need to let them cite it?

This brings me to the other rationale.

I'm not sure how these memorandum opinions are going to develop in the practice. And it may be that after a while we can just do the work exactly as you say.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right.

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JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: And it will be of virtually no precedential value anyway. But at our court, and this is why I'm interested in hearing whether the courts of appeals have the same experience. In our court we're -- we deliver unpublished opinions because we handle a lot of cases, many more than the Supreme Court does as the court of first resort.

The death penalty cases, and the post conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases we get over 6,000 of those a year. And it's one thing to be sure that we're resolving them correctly under the correct law; and it's another thing to parse every one of those opinions thinking about every word, whether you're going to have to live with it 20 years from now. And there may be a similar feel in

1 the courts of appeal. I don't know; but 2 that's one of the feelings on our court. not the rule. It's not the result. It's the 3 dictum that has to be looked at so carefully 4 and negotiated over if everything is going to 5 be publishable and everything is going to be 6 7 citable. MR. EDWARDS: Do you have any kind of 8 rule that with death penalty appeals that 9 10 they're all published or not? JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: No. They're not 11 all published. 12 13 MR. EDWARDS: If I'm sitting there and somebody is going to put me on a table, I 14 think my appeal is important enough to be 15 16 published. JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Well, they're not 17 published in the sense that they're not in 18 19 bound volumes in West; but they are on-line with Lexux and WESTLAW. 20 21 MR. EDWARDS: Are they considered 22 precedential? 23 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: No. That's why we 24 thought that they shouldn't be published. Our 25 criterion on publication is is there any new

law in this? And a death penalty case is mostly application of well settled law to the particular facts of this case. It's not something we have chosen to do. We're the first court of direct appeal.

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MR. EDWARDS: I understand what you're saying. It seems to me that perhaps most cases that it is important jurisprudence of the state to see how you are applying facts to determine that it's settled law.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. That argument is made, I understand what you're saying.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Womack, I've done a little bit of -- I hesitate to call it scholarship, so I'll call it writing about this rule. And something that I've come upon lately and in fact I mentioned it this morning has to do with Rule 47.7. That's the rule that has bothered me, and it was bothering me, and I couldn't quite put my finger on it. And I think I now know why. And that is because I think this rule written is a prior restraint. And because an organ of government is telling a citizen that they cannot say something back to the government. In other words, you're

saying to lawyers or to pro se litigants "You may not tell us, you may not speak to us about certain cases." And if this is a prior restraint, then it meets a very heavy burden under the First Amendment.

I mention this only because our prior discussions which you attended did not flesh this out at all much less completely, and you might if the court, if your court is still talking about this, discuss that issue. I've looked at rules in the state systems of other states and in the federal system, and virtually every court has an unpublished opinion rule; but very few of them have rules that are as mandatory as this which say you must not cite somebody as authority to the court.

The 9th Circuit in the federal system has a comparable, similar rule and upheld that rule against an attack, a constitutional attack under a different provision of the federal constitution and not as a prior restraint; but it seems to me that when a body of government, particularly a court says to a litigant that they may not speak about

something that that does raise prior restraint issues.

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Now lawyers can be gagged, as we all know; but there have to be very stringent circumstances for a lawyer to be gagged even in a criminal case, an ongoing criminal case, and it's always on a case-by-case basis; and I can't imagine that if there was a rule of court that said lawyers in criminal cases can never speak to the media under any circumstances, that that would be constitutional. So I would say for the sake of saying it that when the court is looking at 47.7 you might consider whether it might be more appropriate to say "Opinions not designated for publication by the court of appeals under these or prior rules do not have precedential value" and just stop right there. And then if Bill Edwards sees a case that you might not have thought raised anything unique, but nevertheless his client is in exactly the same factual circumstance and wants to cite that case, he can, and the court can do whatever it wants with it, obviously not being bound by it, but could

look at it for whatever persuasive value that it might have.

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So that is the only thing I would add of a new variety although I think that it was the sense of this committee and I think the hope of our committee that both courts would reach the same conclusion on Rule 47, but understanding where you're approaching it from. Frank.

MR. GILSTRAP: Chip, just since we're on the record, I don't think I need, want to let your argument there go unchallenged. I mean, there are plenty of things you can't say in court, and no one has ever said they're prior restraints. You can't put salacious material in your brief. You can't ask an irrelevant question. You can't present irrelevant testimony, you know. And maybe someone in the Arkansas Law Review has come up with the idea that this is a prior restraint; but I'd like to look at it real close before I just roll over and let that go unchallenged.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, for the sake of argument, you can say salacious things, you can say irrelevant things; but you can be

sanctioned for them, or what you say can be struck or kept out of evidence. It's the whole fundamental precept of the First Amendment where you are certainly liable for abuse of speaking; but only in rare circumstances can the government keep you from speaking in the first instance. And this rule as a per se matter keeps somebody from speaking in the first instance. And the lawyer in the 9th Circuit who cited an unpublished opinion was called before the court on an ethics violation because they had violated a court order, and the issue was whether or not they were going to be sanctioned. And that --

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MR. GILSTRAP: Since he could say it and was going to be sanctioned that's not a prior restraint.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, no. They said that there has been some confusion because of the constitutionality of the rule because of the 8th Circuit opinion which we discussed at length in committee, and so we're going to let you off the hook. But Judge Kazinsky said in no uncertain terms that if anybody does it

again, they're going to get sanctioned. The prior restraint argument was not raised in that case; and maybe the result would be different if it was in front of a different judge.

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MR. GILSTRAP: I mean, "Counsel, if you ask that question again, I'm going to put you in jail," that's a prior restraight.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nevertheless it's subsequent punishment.

I may. This 47.7 was modeled after one of three possible rules that were forwarded to me by Justice Hecht; and I just picked one because this was not a matter of final or even preliminary decision. And it may -- I appreciate the thought, the constitutionality issue which I think is very interesting. And it may be more accurate to say instead of saying "must not be cited as authority" it might be more accurate that they will not be regarded as authority by the court or by a court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: So you know, this

is not by any means a final draft.

On the other foot. And if the litigant wants to waste time in their brief that has page limitations on citing something that you have already indicated you're not going to consider because he feels or she feels it is most compelling, then maybe that's okay.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: And that seems to be the present practice.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Because although on the civil side -- I don't do any criminal law; but on the civil side I know that I frequently come across cases for which there is no authority on the civil side or which decides a case under particularly unique facts which I feel would be helpful to tell the court about and yet am prohibited by this rule from telling the court about it.

And there's all sorts of tricky ways to do it. If Orsinger were still here, I mean Orsinger gets up in court and says "Now I can't tell you about this; but there are two cases from Dallas right on point and but they're unpublished and wouldn't presume to

violate the rule by citing them to you; but you ought to know they're out there." And so of course, their law clerk goes and gets on Lexus and finds them.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Sure. And in the brotherly and sisterly spirit of the law you're trying to save the court from having to reinvent this decision.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But I wonder is there a paradigm?

what we ought to be able having to play those kind of games when it seems to me this mechanism is self regulating because if the litigant is so foolish as to spend his whole brief on stuff that the court has indicated A, is not precedential, and B, we're probably not paying attention to, well, that's they get to do that. Lawyers get to do that if they think that's in the client's best interest. Yes, Linda.

MS. EADS: You know, your discussion about prior restraint reminded me of something I had completely forgotten. It must have occurred in '82 or '83. There was a

controversial grand jury investigation in

Denver about offshore banking; and one of the

DOJ lawyers was brought up for sanctions for

how he behaved toward witnesses in the grand

jury, and there was an appellate -- there was

a district court opinion really sanctioning

this DOJ lawyer, and the 10th Circuit agreed

with it. And the 10th Circuit ordered WESTLAW

not to publish its opinion, and WESTLAW

brought a lawsuit about that saying that's

prior restraint and won.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

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MS. EADS: So along those lines I think there is some argument to be made about we can say it in the rule; but how enforceable it is if anybody wanted to contest it is another matter.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Should you put lawyers to the test who violate the rule and actually be sanctioned for doing so? If there is a compelling reason for it, sure you do. If not, maybe you don't. And the only reason I brought it up is that wasn't -- that was probably the only thing that wasn't fully fleshed out in the prior discussion about

Rule 47. Yes, Nina.

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MS. CORTELL: I guess, Judge Womack, the maybe only other thought I would have, and maybe it's a little bit building on what Steve said earlier is if you have a true memorandum opinion at least as we think about it from let's say the 5th Circuit, it's so nondescript as to be meaningless anyway. So the fact that it's out there -- "meaningless" is a little strong. But certainly not a great case for precedential value, not one probably --

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Difficult for a nonparticipant to evaluate.

MS. CORTELL: Exactly. Exactly. So it sort of takes away it seems to me the harshness of the dilemma about, you know, should we be able to cite it or not cite it. It becomes a little bit moot if in fact that's how those memorandum opinions are going to look.

Now I think you said at the outset that that remains to be seen, and I think that's fair. But if it's in fact a little bit after the Fifth Circuit model, then it will answer itself, I think.

1 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. This would 2 just wither away, I think. That would be another way to handle it would be, and I 3 considered that, and certainly it's still 4 possible to say that memorandum opinions will 5 6 not be regarded as authoritative. 7 MS. CORTELL: Right. JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: I'm not sure we're 8 9 ready to say that now. MS. CORTELL: Right. Right. I 10 11 understand. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And I think the 13 way -- I don't know if it's in the transcript or within a note or somewhere; but I think 14 15 that our view and recommendation to the 16 Supreme Court was that memorandum opinions are 17 a signal from the court that they have slight, 1.8 if any, precedential value, somewhat different at opposed to no precedential value. 19 20 MR. YELENOSKY: And my understanding was 21 in part what we were trying to do was signal 22 to the lawyers you probably don't need to 23 waste your time with this. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 25 MR. YELENOSKY: But you might very well

waste your time with it and find a memorandum opinion we said that not only the lawyer thinks is quite helpful, but the judge does as well. So I mean, I don't think there is a constitutional problem with the court saying generally these won't be considered as precedent; but I also think that issue takes care of itself. Either it's helpful or it isn't; and I don't know that saying in a rule that we decree that these are not helpful is a good thing to say.

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JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: And the actual concern is we want to be able to do something different in this case without having to overrule dictum in another opinion.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I guess the counterargument would be that the next litigant should be able to say you did something different here, and I'm exactly that same situation.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Okay.

MR. YELENOSKY: And I think that's sort of, if I remember right, what the 8th Circuit was talking about in the body of common law. How can you say that you're following common

law when you take some things and say these are exceptions that we will not consider in the body of law? I mean, I think that's the Circuit's rationale for it that you shouldn't get to do that.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. Yes. Well, you're right. And if like cases are turning out with unlike results, there is a problem.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right.

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JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Our concern is that language will be taken from a case and imported into an unlike case and then we have to deal with it.

MR. YELENOSKY: Uh-huh (yes). And that may be an issue of judges and how judges read one another's opinions.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, with that digression, thank you for indulging us. What else should we talk about, Justice Womack?

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: The only other rule of significance is the first one in the little packet, Rule 25.2 which has to do with, that presently has to do with the form of notice of appeal. The court since -- well, let me back

up. A person who has plea bargained and gotten the sentence that he plea bargained for has given up a lot of the right to appeal in a criminal case. The statute enacted in 1977 said that those people can appeal only with permission of the trial court or if they're appealing a pretrial ruling essentially. And the goal of this was to keep people from staying out on appeal bond by taking a meritless appeal that will nonetheless take months or years to resolve and also to cut down on the workload in the appellate system.

The way the court of criminal appeals tried to do it was by requiring appellants to say in their notice of appeal "I'm a plea bargainer and I have permission of the trial court," or "I'm a plea bargainer and I'm appealing a pretrial motion."

This hasn't worked well. One problem is that a sizable fraction of appellants seem not to know this requirement. Their notice of appeal just says "Me want appeal." And then after the lawyer is appointed, the record is prepared, the brief is filed, the court of appeals discovers "Oh, you're not entitled to

appeal because your notice was in the wrong form." The defendant has fallen into the trap, and the public purpose of keeping such people from, you know, appealing has been frustrated at least to some extent. There has been expense to the counties and to the appellate system.

What I'm trying to do here is to have this matter settled much earlier in the game by instead of putting the responsibility on appellants to put this in a notice of appeal I'm putting it on the trial judges. A plea bargainer has got to have the trial judge sign off. Well, no. Every appellant has got to have the judge sign off and say either this guy is not a plea bargainer or he is a plea bargainer and he has my permission or he is a plea bargainer and he's appealing a pretrial ruling.

Now there will still be a sizeable fraction of appellants who will not do this; but now it will be apparent as soon as the notice of appeal gets to the court of appeals that something is wrong. So if the notice of appeal comes in that the trial judge has not

signed off on, I'm relying on the appellate clerks under Rule 37.1, the appellate clerks to say this is a defective notice of appeal and then, you know, something starts happening. The appellant has got to take care of this immediately. So this should be happening before a lot of record preparation has taken place.

Maybe there will not have been any record preparation before substantial amounts of time have been put in by an appointed attorney.

And before the appellate court has got to get that record, look in it, and verify that this guy is entitled to appeal. It will keep people who are not supposed to be appealing from appealing at an earlier stage of the game, so it will also serve that public purpose of having these people, plea bargainers either begin being punished or begin being rehabilitated or both right after the trial instead of after the appeal has run its course.

Now I understand that there is a burden here. Trial judges are going to have the additional burden of having to sign notices of

1 appeal. According to the caseload in the 2 courts of appeals last year depending on how 3 many working days you say a trial judge has, I hesitate to venture into that estimation on 4 5 how many working days there are a year for an trial judge; but this would be in the 6 7 neighborhood of 25 notices of appeal every working day in the entire state of Texas. 8 So 9 I don't think it's going to be that big a burden on the trial judges. 10 11 MS. BARON: I have a question. 12 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. 13 MR. BARON: On timing the person 14 appealing has a due date that they have to get 15 this accomplished by. JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. 16 17 MS. BARON: I'm a little concerned that 18 if it's not signed by the trial judge, that it 19 could be considered to be late, or if the 20 trial judge doesn't get to it in time, then 21 they may lose their right to appeal. 22 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Maybe. Yes. 23 guess if the trial judge stalls it, that could 24 happen. I may be able to write around that. 25 MS. BARON: Is there a way to have them

1 file their notice of appeal --2 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Appeal and then 3 have the trial judge sign off. 4 MS. BARON: -- and then have maybe the 5 appellate clerk send something to the trial 6 judge to certify? JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: I don't know. 7 That might be more work for the appellate courts --8 9 MS. BARON: Yes. I'm just --JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: -- than we want to 10 11 have. 12 MS. BARON: I think --13 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: That's why I'm 14 trying to float this out here is to get reactions. 15 16 MS. BARON: Right. I guess I'm just 17 concerned that the burden now is on a party 18 who is trying to meet a deadline who may not have liberty and, you know, have easy access 19 20 to the trial court to get this signed in a 21 timely fashion to get it back; and we don't 22 want that to be the reason that they lose 23 their appeal if they actually have a right to 2.4 appeal. 25 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: No, we certainly

don't. I need to look again at Rule 37.1, because it seems to me there is some play in that rule for people to get out of the late filing trap when their notice gets to --

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MS. BARON: I mean, it could be they could file the notice and then this could be a second step that doesn't affect perfection or time, but this needs to be done as it's docketed.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. And another advantage might be that you cut the defendant and the defense lawyer out of it all together. The communication would take place between the court of appeals clerk and the trial judge --

MS. BARON: Right.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: -- saying, you know, asking the trial judge "Hey, was this a plea bargainer? And if he was, does he have your permission to appeal?"

MS. BARON: Right. Because they are already dealing a lot with something similar at least in civil cases where when the court of appeals gets the notice of appeal they send out docketing statements --

1	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes.
2	MS. BARON: for the parties. This
3	would just be like almost like a criminal
4	docketing statement that will go to the
5	judge.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Justice Hecht.
7	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: You have,
8	this draft that you sent us leaves out current
9	(d) or (d) 25.2 which deals with amending
10	notices of appeal. I wonder if you meant to
11	do that.
12	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: No, I didn't.
13	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: I think that
14	might
15	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: That's a computer
16	deal.
17	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Yes.
18	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: I've got a version
19	of the rule in my computer that doesn't have
20	(d) in it.
21	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: "An amended
22	notice of appeal correcting a defect or
23	omission in an earlier filed notice may be
24	filed in the appellate court at any time
25	before the appellant's brief is filed. The

amended notice is subject to being struck for 1 2 cause on the motion of any party. After the 3 appellant's brief is filed, the notice may be 4 amended only on leave of the court of appeals 5 or appellate court." 6 MS. BARON: I quess the question is does this count as the filing of the notice if the 7 judge has to sign it? Have you even started? 8 9 Do you have something to amend? 10 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Right. 11 MS. BARON: And that could be a problem 12 if you don't. 13 MR. GILSTRAP: You could maybe have just 14 a proviso on there to say provided that the 15 certification can be added later or in the 16 amended notice of appeal or something like 17 that. 18 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. Thanks. 19 These are really good points. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen. 21 MR. YELENOSKY: This is just 22 wordsmithing. But 25(2)(a) let's see (2)(a) 23 (1) and (2) it says "The defendant in a plea bargaining case may appeal only" and it gives 24 25 the two subsequent. And when I first read

that before I read down further the way it's written it read to me as if (a)(1) wouldn't ever need to get the judge's permission or certification, and that and it also seems to mix two notions. One is (a)(1) is the matters that can be raised, and then (2) is only after getting the court's permission to appeal.

Does that mean may appeal any matters that the court gives permission to appeal?

I'm having trouble articulating the

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I'm having trouble articulating the problem I had; but when I first read this I didn't see that you were going to have to get permission under the subpart (1) because of how it's written.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Well, if you're under subpart (1), you don't have to get permission.

MR. YELENOSKY: You have to get a certification.

JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Right. Which every appeal, every appellant has to get a certification even if they're not a plea bargainer.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, they have to get a certification that the appeal -- that they

1	have the right of appeal under Rule 25.28(2).
2	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: That's either
3	one. That's either one
4	MR. YELENOSKY: Okay.
5	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: It's not only
6	either one; but it's also a third class
7	there.
8	MS. EADS: Right.
9	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: It's the people who
10	are not plea bargainers.
11	MR. YELENOSKY: Okay.
12	MS. EADS: I was going to say the same
13	thing. I think the way it's structured you're
14	not sure what it means. I mean, (2)(a)(2) is
15	all the defendants in all criminal cases have
16	a right to appeal if they're not plea
17	bargainers. Right?
18	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Right.
19	MS. EADS: And they also have to get a
20	certification. Right?
21	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Uh-huh (yes).
22	MS. EADS: But then I would make the next
23	one I would make it under (2). I'd probably
2,4	make it a different paragraph, maybe (3).
25	JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes.

1 MS. EADS: And say "a defendant" so that 2 it's a whole different provision so you know that that kind of defendant is different. 3 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. That's a good 4 5 suggestion. MR. EDWARDS: Either that or if it's put 6 7 in there under (2) that all have a right to appeal provided that if you're a plea bargain 8 defendant, you have to meet. 9 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Yes. That's what 10 11 I'm thinking. Yes. I'm thinking that also. 12 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: If you look 13 down two pages at the form, you can see what the trial judge has to check off. He has got 14 to check off something for everybody. 15 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: We tried to do a 16 17 little form thinking that may help. Well, thank you for the suggestions. I'm sorry to 18 19 have taken up your time. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not at all. 20 That's what we're here for. 2.1 22 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: As I say, I solicit reactions. And absent members may be 2.3 24 interested as well in coming up with some 25

suggestions.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is it all right to put 2 this on our website so people can access it? JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: I'd like it. 3 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Did you say 4 5 that you had contact with the court of appeals 6 or they should be involved? 7 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: I have not. wanted to get through this forum to begin with and then try to contact some of the individual 9 10 justices. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Okay. 11 12 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: May I be excused? 13 (Laughter.) 14 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Thank you again. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: We'd covet 15 your advice on the eviction rules. 16 17 JUSTICE PAUL WOMACK: Let these people, 18 let them stay in their apartments. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Back to the FED rules. And here is another e-mail. 20 2.1 This one is from William Donovan, Justice of 22 the Peace, Bexar County and Marcia Weiner, W-e-i-n-e-r, Justice of the Peace, Bexar 23 24 County. I'll just read it into the record 25 since it's relatively short.

1 "We would appreciate your consideration of our concerns regarding the proposed 2 3 eviction rules that the Supreme Court Advisory Committee will be voting on Friday, June 14th, 4 5 2002. We are concerned that the proposed 6 rules would create a hardship for pro se 7 parties on both sides. We want our courts to continue to be pro se friendly, inexpensive 8 and provide a timely remedy to both defendants 9 10 and plaintiffs. Thank you for your 11 consideration of our concerns. Very Truly 12 Yours." So with that in mind --13 14 MR. YELENOSKY: Are you getting real-time e-mails? I'm going to start sending you 15 16 e-mails. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's what Bobby is 1.8 trying to do to me. MR. HAMILTON: Did you send that to him, 19 20 Bobby? 21 MR. MEADOWS: Yes. It's hard to get the floor in here. 22 23 (Laughter.) 24 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Before we 25 leave the appellate rules I should have said

this before Paul left. I guess what we will do, I guess what my court will do is talk about everything that is pending in the TRAP rules I hope on Monday or Tuesday of this next week, or if not, then the Monday or Tuesday a week following which will be our next two and only administrative conferences before the summer break. And we've been waiting to talk about all this to present the court of criminal appeals' views on this. So then we will know what those are.

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Remember the process was we took the recommendations, we had questions about some, some we weren't sure about, we brought them back, you commented on all those, we have those comments. The court has not reviewed those yet because we've been waiting on this so we could do the whole thing at once. So we will be ready to do that; but then we won't have a chance to show you except informally what the final work is before we send it to the Bar Journal in the middle of July. So I'm wondering if we have any suggestions. Bill.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I remember you asked us at the last meeting whether there were any

1 cases cited lately where somebody requested 2. findings of fact when findings of fact were 3 not appropriate and then got bounced; and I'm 4 a few advance sheets behind right now, but 5 there was one that just kind of popped up. 6 You were asking for it to appear. So I will 7 e-mail it to you. 8 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: All right. 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You probably already 10 have seen it. HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Send his name 11 12 to the grievance committee too. 13 (Laughter.) 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, --15 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Well, I mean 16 I guess I'm just thinking out loud here. We 17 will have to go ahead. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 18 HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: And Paul 19 20 sounds like he wants to make some more changes 21 and maybe even change the last part of 47, or 22 maybe they'll decide not to; but I think we 23 probably ought to try to still finish them up 24 and get them out. We can always change them 25 if there is public comment.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

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MS. BARON: Can they come back to the subcommittee on the TRAP rules just to comment on them?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That would be good. We're going to need to -- I'd thought I'd try to recraft his combination of 47 because it doesn't look right to me.

HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Right. It didn't. We have to do some more. All right. So that's what we will do. We will stay in communication with them, see if he wants to make any changes in reaction to the comments. We will decide the issues that are back from us. We will finish it up and send it to the subcommittee; and we'll still shoot for publishing the whole mess of them in the September Bar Journal to take effect January 1st.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sounds good. Anybody else besides the subcommittee and myself and probably Buddy who wants to see these rules when they come out?

HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: We'll send them to Debra and she can send it to everybody.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That will work. All right. Back to FED. Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. were talking about -- we are actually as I understand talking about Rule 750; but Larry got off on Rule 749(a) which is the procedure for affidavit of indigence or as it's called now pauper's affidavit. And I'll go ahead and comment on it even though we're not really on that rule; but the proposed Rule 749(a) and the mechanism and the procedure by which someone applies for a pauper's affidavit is a combination of the existing pauper's affidavit rule and the new TRAP rule, the TRAP rule that deals with affidavit of indigence. And we followed the existing mechanism and existing procedure in that almost to the letter with one exception; and that one exception is that there is a provision in the TRAP rules that you're supposed to do it within five days; but the judge can extend the time for the hearing on the pauper's affidavit another five days.

So we -- that's in the TRAP rules, but not in the existing rule in the pauper's affidavit, so we went ahead and incorporated that because it gives the JPs a little more flexibility because the legislature is always passing stuff that has to be done within X number of days that we have to do. So this gives us a little more flexibility if for some reason we need to put off the hearing more than five days.

Now we could take that out. That's not a big deal; and that would potentially speed about 10 days assuming that both the JP and the county court at law judge extended it for another four days the time of the hearing; but you know, the subcommittee didn't perceive that as being too big a problem.

Now the Houston Apartment Association when we first started talking about the rule their position was that they really didn't care about the affidavit of indigence too much. They tell their landlords don't even contest it. Let it go up uncontested because it gets it up to the county court quicker. So they said they don't care about that. They

just want to make sure rent is paid into the registry of the court, and that was their big deal about it.

Now also on this rule we voted on September 28th on Rule 749(a). We voted that rent be paid into the registry of the county court during the pendency of the appeal, and the vote was 21 to nothing; and then we voted May 18th. I'm sorry. That's, yes, that's all we voted. We didn't vote on anything else on that; but of course, that's the heart of the rule. That is what we have already voted on, none of which has anything to do with Rule 750 which is what we're actually on.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think I'm

beginning to understand this maybe a little

better. But you have already the concept in

place of the obligation to pay rent during the

pendency of the appeal; but it seems to me

that there is a problem if the rent is not due

because the next rental date is --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Exactly

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- 25 days from now. Why can't we solve everybody's problem by saying that you have to pay rent during the

pendency of the appeal; but you know, accelerate or move forward, move backward the date that you pay the rent so that you pay 30 days rent like from go at the appeal process? You pay the future rent, instead of you know, pay during the pendency of the appeal when you file the appeal.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: You want to change the contract by rule?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm not trying to cut this off; but this is really a 751 Rule issue.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, it may be. It may be. 749 I think it's a 749(b) issue too, because to me what would be fair is for somebody who is appealing to not have the obligation to rent suspended either by the appeal or by virtue of the time gaps, et cetera. So that if you just pay the rent, I don't see that as a Dillingham problem because that's not paying back rent. That is paying rent to stay in possession during the pendency of the appeal, because you're paying the rent, but it solves Larry's problem too

because you won't be able to do this five days, 10 days, four more days, filing, docketing issue deal. Just move up the --move back the payment date.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: There's no problem with that, is there?

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I think one of the concerns that tenants have had in the discussion of this is that they've not wanted to pay a month's rent, that they file an affidavit of indigency, and then perhaps that the trial was held or the deadline for the filing of the affidavit falls on the 29th of the month. They post a month's rent, and then suddenly two days later they've got another month due. Professor Dorsaneo has an extremely good point here. We can simply -- I don't see where it's necessary to differentiate between that is past due and rent that's due in a back rent case. Okay? And if we had an amount of rent that has to be submitted to the justice court, then that rent payment is good for 30 days. If adjustments have to be made in the future, they would be made to the county court at law to go back

commensurate with the contract date 30 days hence, and that way the tenant does not have to pay anything but one month's rent for the first 30 days during the pendency of the appeal.

And also Larry isn't here. Mr. Niemann is not here. I also have been making discussions and things. His point about the pauper's affidavit contest and all does have a valid point in urban counties because in urban counties you have more than one county court. So it goes to the county clerk, and then four or five days elapses before through the rotary system that case is sent to a particular court. So we have about 15 days that just where things just absolutely fall through the cracks.

And I don't pretend to be an expert on the <u>Dillingham</u> issues; but from what I understand from Professor Dorsaneo if the justice court can issue a writ through default in a pauper's affidavit if there is a default, if I understand Professor Dorsaneo, that's not a problem and they can still go forward with an appeal as far as removing that judgment

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later on if they win on appeal. Thank you. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine, did you want 3 to say something? 4 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Is everybody 5 following this discussion? I mean, seriously. 6 7 MS. CORTELL: (Nods negatively.) PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay. Because we're 8 9 all talking about an issue that maybe we can sort of look at fundamentally. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you know, Pam of 12 course is smarter than the average bear, so she can follow all of this stuff. But it 13 occurred to me the way we got off on this was 14 15 we were talking about 749(b), and somebody 16 said "Wait a minute. We can't decide 749(b) 17 unless we talk about 750." And then we got to 18 talking about 750 and someone said "Well, it's not really 750. It's 751." 19 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 751 has the 20 21 problem. It says pay the rent when -- it says 22 pay the rent during the pendency of the 23 appeal; but the next rental payment is not due until 25 days from now. 24 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Can we vote on

1 750 and get that since we've spent some time on that before we got off on the other 2 Then we can move on to 750(a) and 3 issues? then 751 which is the rent problem. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. It strikes me 5 6 that that is the way to move expeditiously, 7 but cautiously. MR. YELENOSKY: I move passage of 750. 8 MR. EDWARDS: Second. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any further 10 11 discussion? Everybody in favor of 750 raise 12 your hand. Anybody opposed? It carries 14 to nothing, the Chair not voting. 13 750(a), the form of the supersedeas 14 bond. 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's the form 16 17 of the supersedeas bond; and we have once 18 again added the phone numbers for the sureties, work and home numbers. 19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anything else? 21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. We have not 22 added anything else. The subcommittee moves 23 passage. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does anybody second 2.4 25 that?

MS. EADS: Second.

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MR. EDWARDS: Which one are we looking at now?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 750(a) Form of Supersedeas Bond.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's been moved and seconded. Anybody have discussion about 750(a), Form of Supersedeas Bond? Everybody in favor of 750(a) raise your hand. Is that your hand raised?

MS. MACNAMARA: Sure.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That passes 15 to nothing, the Chair not voting. So now we're on to 751.

me explain 751. This was carved out of 750.

This is the obligation to pay rent during the pendency of the appeal. There are several obligations on the part of the tenant who loses a judgment. Now he can appeal the judgment itself, the decision of the trial Court by posting an appeal bond in accordance with Rule 749 which is basically to secure the cost only. He must also to prevent being evicted post a supersedeas bond to secure the

judgment. Otherwise the landlord, the plaintiff can execute on the judgment by getting a writ of possession or a writ of execution or however; but really the critical thing is the writ of possession. So he must post a supersedeas bonds unless he's an indigent; and we voted that indigents would not have to post a supersedeas to appeal.

Now the second obligation on the part of the tenant is that they pay rent to the registry of the court during the pendency of the appeal, and that is rent as it becomes due. And we voted already, as I indicated, that rent be paid into the registry of the county court.

Now the reason the rent needs to be paid into the registry of the county court and not the JP court the current rule is that if it is an indigent who is appealing on a pauper's affidavit, that's the current affidavit of indigent language and it's a nonpayment of rent case, then they've got to pay rent to the registry of the court. Otherwise they can be evicted.

So in talking to the landlords about that

it was the position of the landlords that it doesn't make sense for it just to be paid, for a writ to be paid for an indigent tenant on nonpayment of rent. Any tenant should have to pay rent to the registry of the court during the pendency of the appeal, which made a lot of sense to everybody.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: To stay in possession.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: To stay in possession. I'm sorry. To stay in possession. That made sense to everybody. It was consistent. So regardless of whether they're indigent or not, regardless of the cause of action everybody pays rent to the registry of the court. And this is what the landlords initially wanted, and so that was put in there.

At the last meeting it became apparent that some of the landlords had a different idea about that; and the proposal came up that they wanted rent. And Larry Niemann is here, so he can correct me if I misstate it. But the landlord's proposal at the May meeting was that one month's rent be paid into the

registry of the JP court, not the county court
I think within five days after the -- either
five days after the judgment was signed or
five days after the appeal. I don't
remember. But one of the two. And then if it
wasn't paid, that you could have a writ of
possession, and that they only wanted that
rent paid for a nonpayment of rent case. They
didn't want it paid for anything else, for a
case based on a nonrent breach such as too
many dogs in a premises or hazardous
activities or whatever.

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Now subsequently to that I talked to
Howard Bookstaff from the Houston Apartment
Association. He has changed his position on
that; and the Houston Apartment Association
now wants rent paid to the registry of the
court for everything, which is the existing
proposal that regardless of the cause of
action rent be paid into the registry of the
court. They still want it in the JP court.

Now the subcommittee when we were first formulating this considered different ways for this rent to be paid. And a couple of things struck us was that, one, we didn't think it

could be for advanced payment of rent. And if
the justice court judgment is for rent, say,
to end of the month or for whatever period
that JP says to do it, then if you're asking
then to put another month's rent to the
registry of the court when a portion of that
rent has already been secured or already been
taken into consideration of the judgment, then
that's an advance payment of rent to stay in
possession; and we thought that would be a
problem.

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So we considered all of that. There really wasn't -- and the subcommittee's proposal is that basically it stay like it is, that rent be paid into the registry of the county court as it becomes due, not into the JP court, and that rent be paid on any kind of lawsuit regardless of the cause of action, that any tenant would have to pay it, indigent or not, on nonpayment of rent or whatever, that it's consistent.

And I guess it didn't make much sense to the subcommittee from, you know, the administration of the rules to have you try to figure out well, when is rent paid to the

registry of the JP court, when is not paid to the registry of any court. What if the cause of action is for both nonpayment of rent and for some nonrent breach which happens very frequently? How do you handle that?

And I guess there is some way the rule could be crafted for that. But you know, the proposal of the subcommittee is that it be done exactly like we've already voted to do which is pay into the registry of the county court as it becomes due. Now I know that Larry Niemann has a comment about that probably and probably Judge Prindle. Okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: If the eviction is for something other than nonpayment of rent, then presumably the rent is paid up in that case. And if we're dealing with a nonpayment of rent and we say the rent is payable when it becomes due, it's already due because it hasn't been paid. That's why the suit. So let's say that the suit is filed on the 15th and rent was due on the 1st. You've got 15 days that are past due and 15 days that should have paid. So why wouldn't they be required to pay the second 15

days as a condition of staying on the premises? And then when the 1st comes around if we're still in the appeal, they've got to pay another?

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, in Rule 748 the JP is going to make a determination on the judgment how much rent he is awarding and when that, what date that rent is through.

MR. HAMILTON: You're talking about past rent now.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm talking about past rent or maybe rent for another couple of weeks into the future depending on what the lease agreement says. I mean, you know, the example I gave earlier, if I render a decision today, we'll say the 14th, I may look at the lease agreement and decide the lease agreement entitles the plaintiff for a judgment for possession and back rent through the end of the month in accordance with the lease agreement. So that judgment may be for the entire month of June, you know, the next two weeks. It just depends on what the judge, you know, how the judge finds and what he puts But whatever he finds and whatever he down.

puts down at the point that the rent is due again that's going to be on the judgment of 748. Then that's going to have to be paid into the county court. And if not, then the county court can issue a writ of possession.

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MR. HAMILTON: But then you're giving him 16 days free.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. It's secured by the judgment. That 16 days from now until the end of the month is going to be in the existing judgment that he's going to have to post a supersedeas for.

MR. EDWARDS: The problem is with that you've got the indigent problem with those 16 days. It's fine if you've got somebody posting a supersedeas; but it seems to me that regardless of whether the person who has to pay rent is going to get to stay or not stay you're going to have to pay rent to the end of that period. And it seems to me you ought to be able to define when it's due for purposes of being able to stay in possession to include that portion of any judgment for rent that is from here to the next contractual pay period which is what you're saying.

MR. HAMILTON: Yes. That's what I'm saying.

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MR. EDWARDS: In other words, it treats everybody the same. If you've got one day left, you have to put up, pay your one day rent; and then tomorrow you have got a 31 to pay. If you have 29 days left, you put up 29 days, and then your next one comes up in 29 days.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, but that's all going to be recorded on the judgment under Rule 748 that the JP renders as to how much is due, when it's to be -- you know, when that, what date that reflects the rent being paid, when the rent is due on the next day.

MS. CORTELL: Future rent days.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. So that's all going to be on 748. But we thought it was important that you not have to make a tenant pay advance rent when there is already a judgment for rent for that existing period of time, that you can't make him pay rent in the future that's not yet due.

MR. EDWARDS: But you're talking about possession. You're talking about the right of

possession as opposed to the obligation for rent.

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MR. HAMILTON: Two different things.

Past rent is one thing and right to stay in possession is another thing.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, that's right. But I mean, what the rules are saying and what the existing rules reflect to a degree is that if you don't pay rent as it becomes due in accordance with your existing contract or oral rent agreement or whatever it is, then you can be evicted; but you have to pay your rent as it becomes due. I think even the tenants agree with that.

MR. HAMILTON: The problem is it's the date when it comes due. It may be 29 days down the road from the date that the eviction judgment is signed.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, and it's going to be different all the time. That's why the judge is going to have to -- I mean, that's why the judgment is going to have to have that information on it. That's the point of having the wording in the judgment in 748 like it is so that that's clear.

MR. EDWARDS: And I think what --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Maybe I'm missing your point.

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MR. EDWARDS: -- Carl and I are suggesting is that it seems appropriate that that amount of the judgment which deals with rent in the future needs to be posted in order to secure the right of possession in the future.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Isn't that a Dillingham problem?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't think it is if you're doing it for the future, because I don't think that's -- that's not affecting your ability to appeal whether you were in violation of the lease and should be dispossessed for what you did in the past. It's paying for what you're getting in the future. You could say "Well, you need to pay it contemporaneously like every morning."

Okay. But I don't think that that -- I think that's too technical. You pay it for -- it makes sense to me to pay it for the next or for the remainder of the rental period that you're talking about.

MR. EDWARDS: You still have the right --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And if you get thrown out, then you get it back.

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MR. EDWARDS: You have the right of appeal anyway. The question we're talking about now is the right of possession.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The right of possession during the pendency of the appeal. Now to me that goes back to the 749(b) is that if you did that, that ought to be enough, not supersedeas for the whole obligation. If you did that, that ought to be enough because then if you won and it turned out that you weren't in arrears on the rent, that you had paid the rent, and then you paid the rest of the rent, then you're in possession, and that makes sense to me. It doesn't make sense to me while you're disputing, the tenant is disputing I am not in breach of the terms of this lease. And I understand to stay in possession during the pendency of this appeal I have make a rental payment.

And Mr. Niemann's point that there is a problem there because that obligation needs to be -- that separate obligation needs to be secured, that it needs to be taken care of, I

would have it done, you know, right then. Not 15 days later. Granted there is a little bit of, you know, a little bit of engineering in that.

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MR. YELENOSKY: If you're disputing, if you are saying if the judgment is on today on the 14th and your judgment is back rent for the month of June and you didn't pay in June and your appeal is "Yes, I did pay."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I did pay.

MR. YELENOSKY: "I did pay." You're saying though to remain in possession that I have got to pay the rest of this month which I believe is paying again what I already did pay.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Right.

MR. YELENOSKY: And if I'm right, I probably don't have 15 days worth of rent to pay you. And is that a <u>Dillingham</u> problem?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: See, it's not as bad a problem was what -- it may be arguably a Dillingham problem; but in my mind as long as I'm paying rent to stay in possession it's kind of like a whole new plan because we have a controversy about what happened in the

1 past. Okay? And if I'm right and I paid 2 through the other period, well, my rights get vindicated. 3 4 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. But it is a 5 <u>Dillingham</u> problem to me if your ability 6 because, you know, if I don't pay that 15 days that you're telling me I have to pay, I'm 7 going to lose possession and I'm going to lose 8 9 the ability to continue my appeal because my appeal is only about possession, and the 10 11 reason I can't pay is because I did pay. 12 MS. BARON: And the reason, that's 13 already part of the judgment that has been 14 either superseded by a bond or by the pauper's 15 appeal. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I want to let you 16 stay in possession if you pay that rent. I 17 18 don't want to have to have you do a 19 supersedeas bond and pay the rent too. 20 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, all I'm saying 21 is --22 MR. DOGGETT: That's the current rule. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 23 Huh? 2.4 MR. DOGGETT: That's the current Rule 25 749(b) that's been scrapped.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Sorry. I'll be 1 2 quiet. MR. YELENOSKY: It just seems to me I 3 have no problem saying I paid June and I'm 4 5 going to appeal that; but when July 1 rolls around I agree I haven't paid that because it 6 7 hasn't come. I am obligated to pay that; but we are arguing about whether or not I paid 8 June. And in order for me to continue arguing 9 about that I have got to pay either all of 10 11 June again under Larry Niemann's proposal or 12 I've got to pay at least 15 days of it under your proposal when individuals who are in this 13 situation who pay rent based on, you know, 14 they live paycheck to paycheck. They are not 15 going to have it. 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen, let me ask 18 you a question. Do you like the language in 751 as proposed by the subcommittee? 19 MR. YELENOSKY: 20 Yes. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not to focus us on 22 what we're doing here. 23 (Laughter.) 2.4 MR. YELENOSKY: Yes, I do. And my 25 cohorts back here do too.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

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MR. FUCHS: Mr. Chairman, with one exception, and it's more not with respect to this discussion, but some of the language in subparagraph (b)(1) I would have some concern about the court language in (b)(1), that "the court must issue a writ of position if there is a default." I think the word "may," we should go back to "may" because I can think of situations where the appellant has been one day late and the Court didn't want to issue a writ of possession and they had paid the rent by the time he had the hearing in county court. And I think the county court judge should have the discretion to say "Well, you were one day late; but you got it paid" and it shouldn't be "must issue a writ of possession." It should be "may issue a writ of possession."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I may be wrong about this. But didn't we discuss "must" and "may"?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We did. We had "may" in there, and we were told to change it to "must."

1 MR. FUCHS: I "must" have missed that. "may" have missed that. 2 3 (Laughter.) CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank. 4 5 MR. GILSTRAP: Can't the landlords neatly 6 avoid this problem by just not suing for the 7 current month's rent? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know. 8 MR. NIEMANN: No. The affidavit of 9 10 pauper gets you an appeal regardless. 11 MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. I know that. 12 what I'm saying is if the landlord comes in 13 and say this is June 14th and says "I want to 14 evict this guy and I'm not seeking recovery for the month of June." Then --15 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, what was 17 he there for to begin with? What was the 18 original cause of action to get you into court then? 19 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, he didn't pay his 20 21 rent for, you know, May. Do you see what I'm 22 saying? 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. There is a, not 24 without opposition; but there is -- see, I can 25 feel these things happening.

1 MR. YELENOSKY: That's why you're the 2 Chair. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There is a developing consensus around 751. I think we've talked 4 5 about this on two or three occasions at some 6 length. So I'm going to suggest that the 7 subcommittee has made a motion and seconded 8 it. 9 MR. EDWARDS: Can I ask a question? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 10 11 MR. EDWARDS: Frequency within which 12 there are appeals on the ground "I have paid 13 rent." 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: What do you mean 15 frequency? 16 MR. FUCHS: Frequency of appeals where 17 there has been a tender of rent has been 18 refused by the landlord. It's been a tender late. 19 20 MR. EDWARDS: Okay. Now if there is a 21 tender, of course the person has the money. 22 MR. FUCHS: That's right. That's right. 23 MR. EDWARDS: That's not a problem in 24 those cases. I'm talking about the problem 25 where the tenant says "I have paid and I don't have the money now to pay because you already got it." What percentage of the cases?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Prindle.

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HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I hope I can answer that question after 20 years of experience. The latest statistics that I have say that the number of cases appealed from justice court on an eviction case is 1.2 percent, 1.2 percent. As far as the issues as far as the ones challenging you have two different types of defenses brought up by a tenant. One is that they dropped the money order in the mail chute and the landlord claims he didn't get it. That's the most common of those. In my court, and I can only speak for my court, sir; but that happens less than three percent of the time. The rest of the time you either have a suggestion that they tendered the rent and it was refused or they don't challenge the fact that the rent was not paid at all.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MR. NIEMANN: Mr. Chairman, for the record --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

1 MR. NIEMANN: -- can I say I would be 2 happy to withdraw my proposal and go with the 3 Dorsaneo proposal. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm not even sure I 4 5 even like what I'm saying at this point. MS. BARON: I don't like what you're 6 7 saying. It doesn't seem fair. MR. NIEMANN: I personally think that the 8 9 frequency of a tenant having actually paid rent and the landlord said it wasn't paid I 10 think that occurs only a fraction of the time, 11 12 that we are being abused by the affidavit of 13 pauper to get another month free rent. I 14 think the imbalance is way against us on that. It's very unfair; and nothing has 15 16 been -- nobody had suggested how to solve that 17 abuse. MR. YELENOSKY: Well, you're saying only 18 1.2 percent of the cases are appealed. What 19 percent of those are you saying are abusive? 20 21 MR. NIEMANN: In my experience a great number of them. I can tell you it's so bad 22 23 that Judge Cercone up here in Dallas is

telling the landlords don't even think about

contesting this frivolous pauper's affidavit

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because it will cost you another month. And the tenants are learning that, and they're just --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Of those people who are about to vote if you're persuaded that this rule is defective because of what Mr. Niemann is saying, you'll surely vote against this rule. So I think we're ready to take a vote. And this is not the last stop on the railroad. Anybody who has had experience with our committee the Court will frequently reject completely what we say.

MR. YELENOSKY: Say it isn't so. Has that ever happened?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That has happened. So the fact the whole point of this is to try to create a record where all points of view are expressed and within the time limits we have as freely and as openly as we possibly can.

That's why we have these great court reporters here to create this record. So there are no winners or no losers; but we are going to vote on this. So everybody in favor of 751 raise your hand. All those opposed? By a vote of 11 to 3 the rule passes, and the Chair not

1 voting. Okay. Where do we go next, Tom? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 753(a). 3 I'm sorry. 753. Excuse me. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 753. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: What we did 6 there was some language that we had, we were 7 told to put in the last sentence. It says "The notice shall admonish the defendant that 8 a default judgment may be taken unless a 9 10 written answer is filed with the clerk within 11 eight days after the transcript is filed in 12 the county court." I mean, that's the law; 13 but all this rule now says is that that is 14 also going to have to be on the citation. So 15 that was, and that was the only change from 1.6 last time. So we would move that be adopted. 17 MS. BARON: Can we use a different word other than "admonish"? Maybe "notify" or 18 "state." 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That was the 20 21 language we came up with last time; but we can 22 put whatever. There is nothing magic about 23 that. 24 MS. BARON: Well, I think if a layperson 25 reads this, they won't know what "admonish"

1	means.
2	MR. YELENOSKY: How about "warn"?
3	MS. BARON: Or "warn."
4	MR. GILSTRAP: "Threaten."
5	(Laughter.)
6	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: What do you-all
7	like?
8	MS. CORTELL: "Warn."
9	MS. BARON: "Warn."
10	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: "Warn. "
11	All right. I will cause it to happen.
12	MR. YELENOSKY: Make it so.
13	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Make it so. Is
14	the Chair going to take any action now?
15	MR. ORSINGER: Yes, we are. Is there a
16	second for that motion?
17	MS. BARON: Oh, my God, this is scary.
18	MS. CORTELL: Let the record reflect this
19	is scary.
20	MR. YELENOSKY: We all knew one day this
21	was going to happen.
22	MS. BARON: He keeps moving closer and
23	closer to that.
24	MR. ORSINGER: It's just temporary.
25	Don't get upset. Is there a second to the

1	motion?
2	MS. BARON: Second.
3	MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Any further
4	discussion? All in favor raise your hand.
5	Twelve. Okay. And all opposed raise your
6	hand. None. So the Chair not voting. The
7	Chair does not vote. 12 to zero. 753 is
8	recommended.
9	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We're going to
10	skip 754(c) because we voted on 754 except for
11	(c); and that's discovery, so we're holding
12	off of that. So we'll go to 755.
13	MR. ORSINGER: And we're not going to
14	discuss 753(a)?
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We already voted
16	on that.
17	MR. ORSINGER: And that's already been
18	adopted.
19	MS. EADS: I'm not sure we voted on
20	749(b).
21	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We didn't.
22	MS. EADS: We're going to skip over
23	that.
24	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We didn't. 755,
25	the only change there from the proposal is

1 this is Niemann's suggestion that we add the 2 manufactured housing language so that it's in And we were told to do that last time. 3 4 So I move that be adopted. 5 MR. EDWARDS: Second. 6 MR. YELENOSKY: Which one are we talking about now? 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: 755. 8 MR. ORSINGER: 755, the last sentence, 9 10 the last two sentences. 11 MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. There is some lack 12 of clarity. Frankly I don't -- on the 10-day 13 period. 14 MR. FUCHS: Mr. Chairman. 15 MR. ORSINGER: Yes. The concern from the tenant's 16 MR. FUCHS: 17 perspective here is that when the county court 18 at law issues the writ of possession or signs 19 the judgment the Property Code provides that 20 you have that the judgment may not be stayed 2.1 if the supersedeas is filed within 10 days. So we wanted to make clear here that the writ 22 23 of possession should not issue or cannot issue 2.4 until the 11th day after the judgment is 25 signed. And there's an attempt to do that

with this added language; but I still don't think it's sufficiently clear to the county court judges that they cannot issue that writ of possession until the 11th day after the judgment because you've got 10 days to try to supersede it and stay in possession if you're going to appeal.

We just want to make it clearer to the county court judges, that they understand, because this is a current problem that they can't issue that writ of possession until the 11th day after the judgment because the tenant has 10 days in which to post a supersedeas.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That language was added. That sentence was added to combat that exact problem.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. But he's saying it's --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: So how do you want to change it then?

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, we could make it clearer I guess now that I've heard it I guess if we say "However if the defendant is leasing a manufactured home lot" --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. Not that

1 sentence. 2. MR. FUCHS: I think the first sentence needs to address it. 3 4 MR. YELENOSKY: But you could add it in 5 that sentence and say "The writ of possession 6 shall be issued 11 days" or whatever. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think we're 8 talking about two different problems. Now the second to the last sentence is the one we 9 10 added last time. I don't think that is related to the last which is a different 11 12 problem. 13 MR. FUCHS: I think we need to say --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: So I think 14 15 you're talking about the last sentence. 16 MR. FUCHS: Yes. And I think you need to 17 state it in the first sentence "The writ of possession or execution or both shall be 18 19 issued by the clerk, the county clerk 20 according to the judgment rendered, but not 21 prior to the expiration of 10 days, " something to that effect somewhere in the first 22 2.3 sentence. 24 MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: What if we just

1 added a sentence at the end similar to what 2 the language is in 748 to keep it consistent 3 which says "No writ will issue"? Let's see if I can find that. 4 5 MR. ORSINGER: Couldn't you just in the first sentence say "shall be issued by the 6 7 clerk of the county court according to the judgment rendered not less than 10 days after 8 judgment" or something? 9 10 MR. FUCHS: Yes. Uh-huh (yes). PROFESSOR CARLSON: "Less than." 11 MR. DOGGETT: It's the "however" that 12 gets confusing if you add it to the bottom. 13 14 MS. CORTELL: I agree with that. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm not 15 16 understanding this either; but the last two lines "unless within 10 days of the signing of 17 the judgment the appellant files a supersedeas 1.8 19 bond, " add that to the beginning part of the first sentence. 2.0 MS. BARON: I think the concern is the 21 2.2 way it's stated because it says --MR. YELENOSKY: "Shall be issued." 23 24 MS. BARON: -- go ahead and issue it. 25 MR. YELENOSKY: Right.

1 MS. BARON: And then later it says --2 MR. YELENOSKY: Wait 10 days. 3 MS. BARON: -- wait 10 days. 4 MR. ORSINGER: It doesn't really say wait 5 10 days. You have to infer that you have to 6 wait 10 days. MS. BARON: Yes, exactly. It doesn't say 7 8 it directly. 9 MR. YELENOSKY: Why can't you just start 1.0 it out by saying "After the expiration of 10 11 days a writ of possession or execution or both 12 shall be issued"? 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Isn't this 14 language in the Property Code? 15 MR. NIEMANN: No. It's implied from the 16 right of the -- Fred is right. The defendant 17 can under the Property Code supersede the 18 judgment of the county court within 10 days. 19 So you certainly don't want the county court 20 to issue it after five days, and then the 21 tenant -- and then effectively destroy the 22 tenant's right to supersede it. So all you 23 have to do is to say "the writ of possession 24 shall be issued by the clerk of the county 25 court of judgment no sooner than 10 days

1	after."
2	MS. BARON: How about starting with an
3	"if" clause that says "If the tenant has not
4	posted the bond within 10 days, the writ of
5	possession shall be issued"?
6	MR. NIEMANN: That works.
7	MR. ORSINGER: Is that the last sentence?
8	MS. BARON: Well, we're adding it to the
9	first sentence. We're put an "if" clause on
10	the first sentence.
11	MR. NIEMANN: Either way works.
12	MR. YELENOSKY: So you could say "If
13	after the expiration of 10 days from the date
14	of the judgment the tenant has not filed a
15	supersedeas, the writ of possession shall be
16	issued."
17	MS. BARON: Yes.
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Say that again
19	slower.
20	MR. YELENOSKY: "If after the expiration
21	of 10 days from the date of the judgment," I
22	guess comma, "the tenant"
23	MS. BARON: "The appellant" actually.
24	MR. YELENOSKY: "the appellant"
25	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, no. It

would be "defendant." 1 MR. YELENOSKY: -- "defendant has not 2 3 filed a supersedeas bond" or I don't know 4 whether you want to say "supersedeas bond complying with the county court, " if you need 5 that language; but if they haven't, then the 6 7 rest of the sentence is as is. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- "then the 8 writ of possession are execution or both shall 9 be issued." 10 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. 11 12 MR. NIEMANN: Are you going to let the pauper also appeal without putting up a 13 supersedeas bond? 14 15 MR. YELENOSKY: We already decided I 16 think actually on the county court, no, we 17 wouldn't. 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Thank God, he's back. 19 2.0 (Laughter.) 21 MR. NIEMANN: You made him pay rent in 22 the county court, but not in JP court. 23 MR. YELENOSKY: No. I mean, oh, I 24 thought your question was do they have to post 25 a supersedeas to appeal from county court to

1	court of appeals?
2	MR. NIEMANN: Yes. You have said
3	MR. YELENOSKY: I think we have said
4	MR. NIEMANN: even the pauper has to
5	post a supersedeas in order to make that
6	appeal.
7	MR. YELENOSKY: I believe so.
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's the TRAP
9	rule.
10	MR. NIEMANN: But he doesn't have to do
11	it in the JP court.
12	MR. YELENOSKY: I think what we
13	decided
14	MR. NIEMANN: What is the rationale?
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm sorry. Say
16	that again.
17	MR. NIEMANN: What is the rationale for
18	allowing the pauper to appeal the JP court
19	decision to county court by affidavit, but not
20	allowing him to appeal the county court
21	judgment to the appellate court by affidavit?
22	MR. YELENOSKY: Oh, he can appeal by
23	affidavit.
24	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: He can. That's
25	the

1	MR. YELENOSKY: The question was
2	whether
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: TRAP rules.
4	MR. YELENOSKY: he has to post a
5	supersedeas.
6	MR. NIEMANN: That's what I'm talking
7	about.
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: When you go from
9	county
10	MR. NIEMANN: The supersedeas.
11.	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: to district
12	court.
13	COURT REPORTER: Wait. You-all can't all
14	talk at the same time, please.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, hold on.
16	MR. NIEMANN: I'm just saying in all due
17	respect you've got a double standard here.
18	You're saying that the pauper in order to stop
19	a writ has to post a supersedeas bond in order
20	to appeal to the appellate court, but doesn't
21	have to post a supersedeas bond or pay any
22	rent in order to appeal to the county court.
23	MS. BARON: Well, we actually have a
24	double standard on the court system because
25	the appeal from a JP to the county court the

1 appeal actually is de novo and the lower 2 court's judgment has no effect. Is that 3 correct? 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right. 5 MR. GILSTRAP: It does now. 6 MS. BARON: Is does now. But it doesn't. I mean it's de novo. It starts over 7 8 as opposed to when you appeal from the county court to the appellate court the county court 9 10 has decided the facts and the appellate court 11 is just performing the appellate review. 12 not starting over. So we have got two different kinds of review going on. Actually 13 we have only one kind of review, and then 14 we've got to start over. So there is a reason 15 for having different standards. 16 17 MR. YELENOSKY: But if Mr. Niemann if 18 you're proposing getting rid of the 19 supersedeas for appellate courts as well, I'll 20 support you. 21 MR. NIEMANN: No, I'm not. I saw the 22 opportunity to point out the discrepancy 23 between the two. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 25 MR. HAMILTON: And the language that you

1 just stated, Stephen, wouldn't it be more 2 appropriate to say "unless the judgment has been superseded, " because the pauper doesn't 3 have to post a bond. Right? 4 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: A supersedeas? 6 MR. YELENOSKY: No. They do. 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: From district court to the court of appeals, yes. 8 9 MR. YELENOSKY: They do. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. See if 10 you're talking about -- I mean, that's the 11 12 difference. We're letting at the JP to county 13 court we voted to let the pauper get out of posting a supersedeas; but that's not the law 14 when you appeal from county to district court 15 to the court of appeals. A pauper has to post 16 17 a supersedeas. 18 PROFESSOR CARLSON: To suspend enforcement. 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: To suspend 20 enforcement. 21 22 MR. GILSTRAP: To appeal. 2.3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, not to 24 appeal; but to suspend enforcement. So we 25 have got a more liberal appeal JP to county

1	than county to district.
2	PROFESSOR CARLSON: That was the vote.
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But that was the
4	vote of the committee.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So is there amended
6	language on the table here?
7	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: "If after the
8	expiration of 10 days from the date of
9	judgment the defendant has not filed a
10	supersedeas bond, then the writ or possession
11	or execution or both," et cetera. Right?
12	MR. YELENOSKY: Yes.
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that's replacing
14	what language?
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's just it's
16	going before the first sentence.
17	MS. CORTELL: The clause is added to the
18	first sentence, but delete the "however."
19	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. That's
20	going before the last first sentence.
21	MR. HAMILTON: You don't need the last
22	sentence.
23	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: So we're
24	deleting the last sentence?
25	MS. CORTELL: Yes.

1 MS. BARON: Right. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any more discussion on that? Any more discussion on 4 5 Rule 755 in general? Are we ready to vote? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 6 Moved. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody second? MS. BARON: Seconded. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Seconded. 9 All in 10 favor of Rule 755 as amended raise your hand. 14 to nothing in favor, picking up steam, 11 Chair not voting. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Go back to 13 749(b) which we deferred until we do 750 and 14 751. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And where we are in 17 this is we're focusing on the sentence that is 18 of the last sentence of the second paragraph, 19 and we propose to change it to say "If the 20 defendant does contest a judgment for 21 possession and fails to post a supersedeas 22 bond when required, the plaintiff may seek a 23 writ of possession, and the issue of 24 possession may not be further litigated in the 25 eviction action in the county court."

1 that is the sentence we are focusing on, is it not? And since we decided 751 in favor of the 2 subcommittee does that have any collateral 3 estoppel effect on this discussion? 4 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it would 6 be inconsistent to change 748 now. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It would what? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think it would 8 be inconsistent to change the language of 748 9 now. 10 1.1. MR. NIEMANN: I agree. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 749(b). I'm 13 sorry. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 749(b). I was 14 15 wondering what you were talking about. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: To understand it all 16 17 though the person who proceeds with the 18 pauper's affidavit is excused from the 19 obligation to post a supersedeas bond, so that 20 sentence we're talking about doesn't have any 2.1 consequence. 22 MR. NIEMANN: Because of the way you 23 voted on 750 the Fuchs/Niemann language is 24 irrelevant now. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Having --

1	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This sentence only
2	affects people who are not indigent
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right.
4	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: because they have
5	to pay the next rent and then post a
6	supersedeas bond. Or let's say if it was for
7	the full judgment for rent arrearage plus.
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, now wait a
9	minute. That sentence would apply to anybody
10	that gets evicted because they either A,
11	didn't post a supersedeas or didn't pay rent.
12	MR. YELENOSKY: Or didn't pay rent. But
13	it doesn't say that. It just says
14	"supersedeas."
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well,
16	MR. YELENOSKY: I mean, it would apply
17	to indigents; but it would be
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's in a
19	different area of the rule. It's the same
20	language.
21	MR. YELENOSKY: But that same language is
22	in there that the issue of possession may not
23	be further litigated if you fail to pay rent
24	when it comes due?
25	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh (yes).

There is some dual language because of the, you know, the dual issue of supersedeas and appeal, so we used dual language in different places.

1.

MR. FUCHS: I can tell you who would be affected by this. It's the person who tries to do an appeal, loses. The justice court says "You're not indigent," appeals to the county court. The county court says "You're not indigent." And both decisions are wrong. The person is in fact indigent and cannot afford to post the bond.

I just saw a case like that recently, and the law firm representing him pro bono didn't want to seek extraordinary relief in the court of appeals, clearly couldn't pay the supersedeas; but said there is nothing we can do. He's given up possession. He would like to still try the issue of possession and proceed on appeal to remove the stigma of the judgment and had a good defense on the merits; but because he had not participated in the justice court trial because he arrived 10 minutes late because he was slowed down by a traffic accident, and when he gets there the

JP says "Sorry, too late" even though the attorney is still there for the landlord. And so he tries to do the appeal, and they find him not indigent, not indigent on appeal to the county court and he's out and can't appeal the judgment.

If you had language here allowing in that case for someone then to appeal for the purpose of removing the stigma of the judgment, which will be very few cases, I think that would be good, and I think just as a matter of constitutionality it's required because there is an issue there. You may have given up possession; but I don't think it's moot in that case.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any further discussion on that subject? Yes, Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I still think there are two situations. There is that, and then there is the tenant who still wants possession; and I think that tenant needs to have a right to go on with the appeal.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, he can still appeal the judgment, just not the issue of possession.

1	MR. HAMILTON: That doesn't do him any
2	good. He wants to appeal the right of
3	possession and if he wins, go back into
4	possession.
5	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I know
6	he'd like to; but if he doesn't post a
7	supersedeas or pay rent to the registry, why
8	should he be able to stay in possession?
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have discussed that
10	at some length.
11	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We've actually
12	already voted on this.
13	MR. HAMILTON: He can pay rent into the
14	registry and go on with his appeal and just
15	not supersede any of the back
16	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That would be my
17	preference; but
18	MR. HAMILTON: Yes.
19	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: that's not the
20	way they have it engineered.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any further
22	discussion?
23	MR. EDWARDS: What happens on somebody
24	that is in there on a with a pauper's oath
25	and is paying rent fails to pay rent?

	,
1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Fails to pay rent.
2	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, he gets
3	evicted.
4	MR. HAMILTON: And he loses possession.
5	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, he loses
6	possession.
7	MR. EDWARDS: Where does he lose
8	possession?
9	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: County court.
10	MR. EDWARDS: No. Where does it say?
11	MR. YELENOSKY: 751.
12	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 751.
13	MR. EDWARDS: Does it say "writ of
14	possession"?
15	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: He loses possession
16	if the next time rent comes due and he doesn't
17	pay.
18	MR. EDWARDS: Where does it say?
19	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 751.
20	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 751.
21	MR. EDWARDS: Does it say "writ of
22	possession"?
23	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And 750 an 749(b)
24	say that if you're not an indigent, you have
25	to pay rent, you have to post a supersedeas,

1	and if you don't, you're out and you are dead
2	forever.
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there any
4	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And you're not
5	back.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there any
7	opposition
8	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You're not coming
9	back.
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: to the I think
11	cosmetic changes we made in 749(b) changing
12	the
13	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That was
14	Stephen's language.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The language, anybody
16	opposed to that? Okay. Does anybody want
17	to
18	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Anti middle class.
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just to coin a
20	phrase.
21	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Screw the college
22	students.
23	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Does anybody want to
24	revote on 749(b)? We already voted on it
25	once and approved it. Does anybody want to

1	revote on 749(b)?
2	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, all we
3	voted on was that sentence about the
4	mootness. We haven't voted on anything else
5	yet.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But maybe the entire
7	rule. Do you want to move that?
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I move to vote.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does anybody want to
10	second that?
11	PROFESSOR CARLSON: Second.
12	MS. BARON: All right. Any further
13	discussion on 749(b)? All right. All of
14	those in favor of 749(b) as amended by the
15	language I read a minute ago raise your hand.
16	MR. YELENOSKY: Do we have that language
17	and the defendant language? That's in there?
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh (yes).
19	MR. YELENOSKY: That's in there.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All opposed? It
21	passes by a vote of 10 to two, the Chair not
22	voting. And tell me that we're done with
23	these.
24	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. We're done
25	with the easy ones.

1	PROFESSOR CARLSON: These are issues
2	coming up.
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Now that's the
4	easy stuff. Now we'll get to the hard stuff.
5	MR. EDWARDS: Did we look at the comments
6	on this stuff?
7	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I hope you did.
8	MR. EDWARDS: Were we voting on the
9	comments too?
10	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.
11	MR. EDWARDS: Okay. You didn't talk
12	about them. I just wondered.
13	MR. YELENOSKY: Because you knocked the
14	fight out of us with the easy stuff.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. You knocked the
16	fight out of me. What else do we have?
17	(Laughter.)
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we have
19	got several things. First is possession
20	bond. We've got to talk about possession
21	bond, discovery, motion for new trial. Those
22	are the ones that are controversial. And
23	we'll talk about possession bond first. We
24	have actually already voted on this, on a
25	concept of this.

The possession bond issue is where you have got a tenant who is a danger, who is a safety or health risk and they need to get him out quick. The current rule, you know, is not a very good rule. It needs to be changed; and we came up with a variety of different ways to change that. We had a meeting on that. There were some good ideas that came out of the meeting. Some of the ideas have been adopted. We once again have two versions, version one which is a jury trial if the defendant wants it, version two which is no jury trial.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What rule are we talking about?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 740, page two.

MR. YELENOSKY: We could vote on jury trial or no jury trial?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. Well, we have actually already voted that we have a jury trial for this; but there was still concern that that would mean that the sense of this being an immediate possession, you know, it is not going to be immediate by any means. It will be some point in the future. But, you

know, there is an issue. Can you deny somebody a right to a jury trial?

So we did vote. The vote was taken on November 2nd. It was 10 to 7 that we have jury trials and not prohibit jury trial.

Some of the ideas that we came up with through the ad hoc committee that met May 30th, one that the plaintiff could only use this possession bond process if there is an allegation that the tenant has committed some serious criminal activity that is a health problem or safety problem, so he's going to have to allege that. That's one.

Two, it's going to speed up everything.

The trial date is going to be set four to seven days. Instead of the normal six to 10 days which we have now it will be four to seven. Now the four to seven is somewhat arbitrary. That can be changed. We could go three to six. The four to seven was in order to give the JP the chance to manage his docket to the extent you'd let the constable serve it, estimate when it's going to be served and set the trial time, so it's not something that you have got to stop everything for. But

again, we can, you know, that language can be tinkered with a little bit. It could be less than that. It could be three to six. I don't know if we can make it much less than that; but it certainly could be three to six.

1.0

The trial would be held. If we go with version one, the trial is going to be held three to six days unless they ask for a jury trial in which case you get the jury in insofar as quickly as practicable. And after the trial there is going to be three days to appeal; and again, that is something that is somewhat arbitrary. That could be two days. I don't know that we would want to make it any less than two days; but certainly we want to speed it up more than three days.

The notice has to be returned within one day of service, the citation, so the Court knows what is going on with that case, when the possession bond trial it going to be held because you have to notice the other parties in.

And then in (c) "If the defendant fails to appeal for trial," the -- oh, the other thing is that there is the JP's position, and

the subcommittee came to adopt this, is that this only be for possession, that you not join the question of rent, that it be for possession, attorney's fees and court costs, that there be no rent, no late charges or anything else. So if it's truly a hazard and you want to get him out quick, then it would be limited to possession. The landlord has not lost his right to sue in a separate action for rent and other damages, which there probably would be some in a situation like that.

The appeal would be held in the same way. The language in version one and version two is identical. The only difference is that version two says there is no jury trial. It has to be a bench trial. So that's the proposal. It speeds it up somewhat.

There were other alternative proposals
that were put forth. One was to let them get
out immediately and then have a possession
bond; and I mean literally evict them
immediately and have a trial on it seven days,
10 days later, you know, the danger being that
you may have to readmit them and lose the

1	possession bond. The landlords didn't like
2	that. They didn't want to go with that. So
3	this was the best that we could come up with.
4	There really was not a consensus of all the
5	groups as to exactly how to do it; but this is
6	I think I'll hazard to say this is fairly
7	close, about as close as we could get.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And as I understand it
9	version one is jury trial and version two is
10	no jury trial?
11	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Version one is
12	you have a right to a jury if you make that
13	request.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
15	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Version two
16	there would be no jury trial.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And didn't we
18	previously vote
19	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We did.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: that were going to
21	do jury trial?
22	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 10 to 7, that's
23	correct.
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are you suggesting we
25	revote on that?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I've always suggested we revote on that. But I mean, I've always felt that if you really want to have it immediate, that you need to not have the jury trial, that it needs to be a bench trial only. There was a minority opinion within the subcommittee that felt that you shouldn't do that, that we need to reserve jury trial. So anyway but that's really the --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Despite the closeness of the vote I recall the vociferousness of the gang of 10 that thought that a jury trial was very important.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, you know, once again, whatever the will of the committee is. If we say we're going with version one, that's fine. We still need to talk about the mechanism by which we do this.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I just want to see where we focus our attention. Is there any appetite by anybody, although Justice Hecht has a weighted vote on this, for revisiting the jury versus nonjury issue?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's pretty

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I've always suggested we revote on that. But I mean, I've always felt that if you really want to have it immediate, that you need to not have the jury trial, that it needs to be a bench trial only. There was a minority opinion within the subcommittee that felt that you shouldn't do that, that we need to reserve jury trial. So anyway but that's really the --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Despite the closeness of the vote I recall the vociferousness of the gang of 10 that thought that a jury trial was very important.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, you know, once again, whatever the will of the committee is. If we say we're going with version one, that's fine. We still need to talk about the mechanism by which we do this.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I just want to see where we focus our attention. Is there any appetite by anybody, although Justice Hecht has a weighted vote on this, for revisiting the jury versus nonjury issue?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's pretty

1 clear. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't hear any shouting or clamoring for this. So let's why 3 don't we focus on version one. 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 5 That's version one. (a) of one is the --6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Linda has got a 8 question. MS. EADS: The language where you say 9 10 that "If the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has engaged in criminal activity 11 within the previous 10 days," why do you limit 12 13 it to the previous 10 days? 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the 15 thought being, and actually I've lifted this 16 language from Robert Doggett. He came up with 17 this language. MS. EADS: It sounds like Robert. 18 1.9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Except I changed. I think he had the word something 20 21 other than "serious," "violent" or something. MS. EADS: I was worried about the 10 22 23 days. 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the 25 thought was that if this person truly is a

hazard and truly is causing disruption, why would the landlord want to wait a long period of time? It would seem like they'd want to get in immediately and file this.

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MS. EADS: What if the landlord didn't know that? Let's assume it's a member of al-Qaida. Okay.

MR. YELENOSKY: Call the police.

MS. EADS: Well, and the landlord, you know, well, you're right. They may be able to do it and they may not; but let's say the landlord may not have known the activities that had preceded it and it is not 10 days. It's longer than that that the information is. I mean, if I'm the landlord, I would like to get that person out of my house and not wait for the police to arrest necessarily before I can do it.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I mean, yes. There wasn't any attempt to try to -- there was an attempt to make it as broad as possible for the landlord to file this and not put too many hoops for them to jump through to make sure that there really was that problem there and they weren't just

trying to evict somebody for nonpayment of rent on an expedited basis.

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MR. YELENOSKY: And if it's a status, I'm sure there were other examples; but I mean, he didn't, whatever. If the incident happened 10 days ago, but he doesn't continue to present a threat, then you don't need this. If the incident happened 10 days, but you still allege that there's a threat that continues to exist, I guess you would have an argument.

And I guess you're saying the language doesn't allow you in those instances because --

MS. EADS: No.

MR. YELENOSKY: -- it talks about engaged in serious criminal activity within the previous 10 days.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Then I'd rather, if that's a problem, I'd rather take out "within the previous 10 days" and just let the JP ask the landlord the question "Well, why are you coming in 30 days later" and have them take that into consideration in setting the possession bond.

MS. EADS: You're not immediately evicted. You're going to have a trial to the

jury.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Then I'd be in favor of just taking out "within the previous 10 days."

PROFESSOR CARLSON: "10 days."

MR. DOGGETT: But the converse is true.

We're going to say, you know, 10 days. We wouldn't want to limit the poor landlord not knowing what to do after somebody shot somebody yesterday. At the same time they're going to give them notice to appear in four days by alternative service. I mean, this is a person not even being served personally.

MR. NIEMANN: Let me tell you where we anticipate, or I would like to maybe have a rebuttal to what Robert says.

One of the most common problems we are having nowadays is somebody who lies about the status as being a convicted rapist or a convicted molester. Now that is an incident that happens at the time of rental application, and it's not going to happen within the previous 10 days. And God help us if you're going to say if you killed somebody 11 days ago, you can't get them out quick; but

1 if you killed them 10 days ago, you can. 2 MR. DOGGETT: You've got five days to appeal. If you appeal on the sixth day, 3 4 you're out. There are cutoffs for everything. 5 6 MR. NIEMANN: I rest my case. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just like the death 8 tax. MR. NIEMANN: I would ask the committee 9 10 to please take it out. 11 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, if you don't 12 like -- I mean, I would like to leave 13 something in there. If you want to say, if you don't want to use 10 days, if you want to 14 use something that indicates some kind of 15 16 proximity. However if you just take the 10 17 days out, it's completely unbounded. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I suppose you can 19 always remove them at some point in time if 20 they have lied in a material way on the rental 21 application and you find out about it. 2.2 this is just a matter of doing this on an emergency type basis, reason for some period 23 24 of time whether it's 10 days or 14 if

something has happened which is indicative of

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a dangerous situation that you want to move quickly.

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MS. EADS: I'm sorry. But if there is a pedophile who moves nextdoor to my apartment and that pedophile was convicted a year ago and my landlord finds out about it, I want that person removed from my vicinity of my daughter as fast as possible. And this is not a summary procedure. This is not evicting them before they get their day in court. If the information is wrong and if that person wasn't convicted of this, then they can say it to the judge. We're not evicting them and then having a hearing. They're still in possession. But leaving it to 10 days, I mean.

And Robert, your issue about how much time they get to have notice is fine and I agree with you. I think it's too short right now. That's a different issue. This is an issue of whether or not you can take emergency procedures, you can use emergency procedures when you come to learn that someone is arguably dangerous and not have some they have to have that dangerous action 10 days before

you can do anything. That's very limiting to 1 a landlord and to the people who may be 2 3 affected by the landlord's action. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 4 5 MR. HAMILTON: I have a question about a 6 couple of things. One is the word "serious," 7 I'm not sure we need that. But does the sentence mean to say that if someone has 8 9 engaged in the past, that they must now constitute a threat, or is it that they 10 11 engaged in something in the past that 12 constituted a threat then, or is it both? 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think the 14 intent was that it be a present threat. MR. HAMILTON: So it has to constitute a 15 threat on the premises then? 16 17 MR. YELENOSKY: "Constitute a current or 18 continuing threat" maybe should modify 19 "threat," whatever you do with "days." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's go back to 20 21 Linda's point for a second. Is it a breach of 22 the lease if the pedophile has accurately 23 disclosed that two or three years ago he was convicted of pedophilia? 24 25 MS. SPECTOR: If he accurately disclosed

1 it? 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No. 3 MR. LAWRENCE: Larry, you're the expert. MR. NIEMANN: No. If he says "Yes, I am 4 a convicted murderer, pedophile and rapist," 5 6 and the landlord leases to him with that 7 knowledge, it's not a breach of the lease. MR. YELENOSKY: And literally if this 8 were invalid, I guess you could come back 9 10 three years later and say criminal activity 11 which we now decide is a threat even though 12 nothing has happened in the last three years. 13 MR. NIEMANN: The landlord would have a 14 credibility problem --15 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. MR. NIEMANN: -- if he knowingly let's 16 17 somebody in and now says that the person is despite my knowledge of being a threat. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I'm just trying 20 to get to the goal line. Maybe one could say 21 that if there has been criminal conduct within a period of time or if there has been 22 23 misrepresentation about prior criminal 24 conduct; but having an open-ended situation

where, you know, if the guy was convicted of a

25

crime a couple years ago.

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That really wasn't the intent of this rule.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

the rule is that it be some current condition that's in existence that justifies getting him out with a little bit of an expedited proceeding. And I would not think. I mean, we are not giving much of a remedy to the landlords. We're just speeding the process up. So I don't think we need to put too many hoops for them to jump through; but we don't want it to be abused, but I don't think we want to make it too difficult for them to file this if there really exists a problem.

MR. NIEMANN: I think if Judge Lawrence doesn't think misrepresentation about past sexual offenses or murder or whatever is a continuing threat to my tenants, then I would ask the committee to expand it to include misrepresentations about criminal history in the past. We view lying about criminal history as a continuing threat. And if Bill Edwards ever got ahold of one of my landlords

for failure to immediately take action to
evict them, he'd nail us to the cross.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But he'd take no
pleasure in doing it.

(Laughter.)

MR. NIEMANN: Because he would argue very eloquently that that pedophile is a continuing threat to every child on the premises.

MR. FUCHS: Folks with criminal records are in every apartment complex around.

Misrepresentation is something that occurs regularly be is right or wrong in order to get there. The conduct they ought to be -- this process I really urge limit it to conduct that is serious occurring on the premises and affecting those tenants and let's not punish him for something that supposedly I hope they've already spent time in jail for.

MR. GILSTRAP: Chip.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

MR. GILSTRAP: I would like to add to that. I mean, there is for example I think the statistics are that one out of every eight persons in Wise County is on supervised release. That was in the paper recently right

up here near Fort Worth.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I've been to your neighborhood.

(Laughter.)

MR. GILSTRAP: The point is we're trying to strike a balance here. One the one hand we want to give an expedited procedure in certain The problem is that that can be abused cases. in simple rent cases. I mean, if you just say they can post a bond and get them out, that's the problem. We have got to strike some kind of balance. And where we strike it it has just got to be a practical call. We made this, I think we made it earlier is this was where we were going to strike the balance. Maybe we need to change it; but there's always going to be examples on each side that you can come up and say "Oh, the rule is going to be abused." We have just got to have some standard and get it and move on.

MR. HAMILTON: They don't just get them out by posting a bond out. They have a hearing.

MR. YELENOSKY: Trial.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's expedited.

That's expedite. MR. GILSTRAP: 1 MR. YELENOSKY: What about a serious 2 criminal activity that has come to the 3 attention of the plaintiff for 10 days, so if 4 you find out about a misrepresentation? 5 6 MR. EDWARDS: Well, the thing it seems to 7 me important about this entire process is the part that says "constitutes a threat to the 8 health, safety or security." That's a present 9 threat, a present threat. It doesn't matter 10 when it was. You know, it doesn't matter 11 12 whether it was done yesterday if it's not a 13 present threat. It doesn't matter whether it's a serious crime. Maybe just a minor 14 15 crime like throwing garbage or sewage out in the street or something. It's not a serious 16 17 It's a minor crime; but it's crime. nevertheless an immediate threat to the place 18 19 where it's being done. It seems to me I would 20 advocate taking out the word "serious" and 21 perhaps you put in there "constitutes an 22 immediate threat" and let it go at that. MR. YELENOSKY: Or move "serious" in 23 24 front of "threat." MR. EDWARD: "Serious," yes. 25 I think

it's more the present serious threat than it what the conduct was before. I mean you could have the pedophile that we talked about that gets released on parole from the penitentiary after 15 years and moves into that apartment. Now it's 15 years since he's done it; but he's been locked up in jail for 15 years. I'd consider that person an immediate threat.

MR. GILSTRAP: We've got a provisional compromise substitution here; and that's this: In line two delete "serious criminal" and in lines two and three delete "within the previous 10 days," and then in line three before "threat constitutes" put in "present." So it reads "If the plaintiff also alleges in a sworn petition the defendant or defendant's authorized occupants or guests had engaged in activity that constitutes a present threat to the health, safety or security of the plaintiff" blah, blah, blah.

MR. NIEMANN: I'll go for that.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I like that.

MR. HAMILTON: Yes. That sounds good.

MR. GILSTRAP: I move "present threat."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: "Imminent" would be

1	slightly broader.
2	MR. EDWARDS: But nobody would know what
3	it means.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anything for more
5	business. The only lawyer who knows what it
6	means.
7	(Laughter.)
8	MR. NIEMANN: Wouldn't that leave us with
9	the ability to at least argue to the judge
10	that "Judge, this person lied about being a
11	pedophile six months ago, and we consider him
12	a present threat for having lied"?
13	MR. EDWARDS: Yes.
14	HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I respectfully
15	submit that that would be a fact issue to be
16	tried and litigated.
17	MR. NIEMANN: Yes. But we could argue
18	it.
19	HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Sure.
20	MR. NIEMANN: Okay. We could argue it.
21	I just want the ability to argue it and let
22	the judge decide.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How does the left side
24	of the table feel?
25	MR. FUCHS: We can live with it though.

1 MR. EDWARDS: I don't know if Carl would appreciate that remark. 2. (Laughter.) 3 MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. I mean we chatted 4 5 over here; and, yes, we can accept that. I 6 mean, we're not trying to protect somebody who 7 really is a threat. We're just trying to 8 protect the, --MR. GILSTRAP: Someone who is not. 9 MR. YELENOSKY: -- yes, the landlord 10 11 acting in bad faith and make sure that the language at least minimizes that. 12 1.3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I hear a growing, 14 overwhelming consensus. So the sentence is 15 going to read "If the plaintiff alleges in the 16 sworn petition that the defendant or 17 defendant's authorized occupants or guests 18 have engaged in activity that constitute a present threat to the health, safety or 19 security of plaintiff, plaintiff's agent or 20 other tenants, the plaintiff may file a 21 22 complaint seeking immediate possession." Ιs 23 that okay with everybody? 24 MS. CORTELL: Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody opposed to 25

1	that? All right. This
2	MR. EDWARDS: "Constitutes."
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh? "Constitutes"?
4	MR. EDWARDS: You've got an "or," so you
5	need an "s." "Constitutes," not
6	"constitute."
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Mine says
8	"constitutes."
9	MR. EDWARDS: I didn't hear you say it.
L 0	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, "constitutes."
L1	Okay. So that
L 2	MR. EDWARDS: The court reporter is
L 3	nodding her head. She didn't hear it either.
L 4	(Laughter.)
L 5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So that sentence is
16	approved by acclamation. This is a good
L 7	stopping point unless everybody wants to
18	continue to slog through this rule.
19	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, let me
2 0	make one point. We have some people from out
21	of town. I don't know what their schedule is,
2 2	if it's going to allow them to come back
2 3	tomorrow. And some of the stuff that is on
2 4	that we still haven't done is discovery and
2.5	motion for new trial That's really all that

1	is left. I mean, whatever the committee wants
2	to do; but I guess
3	MR. YELENOSKY: We'd rather slog
4	through.
5	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know
6	if these people can come back or not.
7	MR. DOGGETT: Have we voted on 740?
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No.
9	MR. DOGGETT: Just this issue?
10	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. We voted
11	on
12	MR. GILSTRAP: It's 5:00 o'clock. We're
13	trapped here anyway.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm fine. I just want
15	to do whatever everybody wants to do.
16	MR. GILSTRAP: You live about three
17	blocks away.
18	MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I suggest we keep
19	going, and maybe we'll be able to get
20	through.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's fine with me.
22	Okay. What else about 740, version one?
23	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. The last
24	sentence that is underlined on 740 is
25	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: Justice Hecht

1 notes his dissent. 2 (Laughter.) HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, he does 3 have more votes. All right. It says "The 4 plaintiff may seek a judgment for possession, 5 6 costs, and attorney's fees, but no other 7 grounds of recovery listed in Rule 738 may be joined with an action for immediate 8 possession." So we're saying it's going to be 9 limited just to possession, attorney's fees 10 11 and cost, no rent or late charges. 12 PROFESSOR CARLSON: That would have to be 13 a separate lawsuit. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It would be a 14 15 separate lawsuit. Plaintiff can still sue, 16 but not in this action. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any discussion on 18 that? Does anybody have a problem with that? 19 MR. DOGGETT: I have one slight, very insignificant think. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 21 Yes. 22 MR. DOGGETT: We used the word "emergency 2.3 possession." Are we sticking to "emergency 24 possession"? Is that right, or is it 25 "immediate possession"? To be honest I think

1 "immediate possession" implies the person is 2 going to get it right then and there; and of course, that's not the case. I think 3 "emergency possession" is what this is all 4 5 about. MR. YELENOSKY: So it's the title? 6 7 MR. DOGGETT: And so in other words, we 8 say those, we use those words; and I'd just like to stick with one and so say so "with an 9 10 action for emergency possession" and since that's the title of this. Just clerical; but 11 12 in case that's an issue I wanted to bring it 13 up. In other words, I would say where you say the word "immediate" say "emergency" where it 14 says it in that sentence and it actually says 15 it in the prior sentence. 16 17 MR. YELENOSKY: And shouldn't the tile also just be "Emergency Possession" then --18 19 MR. DOGGETT: Right. MR. YELENOSKY: -- and drop the rest of 20 21 that "Complainant May Have Immediate Possession"? 22 23 MR. DOGGETT: Since that is the intent of 24 the body. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 25 Whatever.

1	Whatever you-all want to do is fine. So
2	you're proposing just to say "Emergency
3	Possession"?
4	MR. DOGGETT: Everywhere it says that.
5	That way it's the same.
6	MR. NIEMANN: Is it clear that the writ
7	can issue immediately after a default?
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we haven't
9	gotten to that yet.
10	MR. DOGGETT: We haven't gotten there
11	yet.
12	MR. NIEMANN: Okay.
13	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: So the title is
14	going to be "Emergency Possession" and we're
15	dropping the rest. And then everywhere it
16	says "immediate"
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Immediate possession"
18	it's going to say "emergency possession."
19	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Or how about and
20	where it just says "possession" it's going to
21	say "emergency possession" also?
22	MR. YELENOSKY: Well, except "The
23	plaintiff may seek a judgment for possession,"
24	I don't know that it's important to have it
25	there.

1	MR. GILSTRAP: What does "emergency
2	possession" mean if not immediate?
3	MR. DOGGETT: What is immediate? For
4	filing?
5	MR. GILSTRAP: It means right now.
6	MR. DOGGETT: Right now when you file you
7	get it?
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There is an emergency
9	situation that needs to be addressed
10	immediately. It doesn't matter what you call
11	it.
12	MR. GILSTRAP: Well, I understand that.
13	I guess the question let me
14	PROFESSOR CARLSON: Instanter.
15	HONORABLE NATHAN L. HECHT: I was just
16	thinking that.
17	MR. GILSTRAP: But he just asked the
18	right question. When do they get possession?
19	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Forthwith.
20	MR. YELENOSKY: Soon.
21	PROFESSOR CARLSON: Instanter.
22	MR. FUCHS: That's coming.
23	MR. DOGGETT: That's coming. Right.
24	MR. GILSTRAP: All right.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: With those changes any

1	problem with that? All right. Let's go to the
2	next sentence.
3	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: "The trial held
4	under this rule will be the only trial held in
5	this cause." In other words, there is going
6	to be one eviction trial, not two on this
7	action.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any comments on that?
9	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't like that
10	section.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You don't like that
12	sentence?
13	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't like it.
14	MR. YELENOSKY: It does make it sound
15	like
16	PROFESSOR CARLSON: We don't really need
17	it.
18	MR. YELENOSKY: at least something
19	else we need to do if we can.
20	PROFESSOR CARLSON: I don't think we need
21	it. I think we can ax it.
22	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay.
23	PROFESSOR CARLSON: They'll be
24	surprised.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. What else?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (b)(1) "The answer date on the citation shall be the trial date which must be set no less than four days and no more than seven days from the date of service, and such trial date shall be clearly noted on the citation."

Now, you know, again four to seven is arguable. We can change that. We certainly don't want to go any longer; but we can go three to six. It's just a question of docket management by the JP courts.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I have two questions. One is the (b) starts out "The justice court shall notify the defendant of possession bond in the same manner as service of citation." That sort of implies that there isn't going to be a citation; but yet elsewhere it talks about the citation. I think that's a little confusing. But then it says that the trial is going to be four to seven days from the date of service. Well, how do we know when the date of service is?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, just like we know now. That's how we, that's what we

1 live with now. You estimate how long it's going to take the constable to serve it and 2 you set your trial date somewhere within that 3 window. That's how we do forcibles now. 4 5 MR. HAMILTON: You just guess at the day? 6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, yes. 7 MR. GILSTRAP: If they don't get served, 8 you pass. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If they don't 9 10 get served; then you send it back and it's redated. 11 12 MR. HAMILTON: But a citation is 13 required? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 14 15 MR. HAMILTON: And then if you go over to 16 the comment, I don't know whether the comment 17 goes with the jury rule or not; but the comment says the defendant must be served with 18 a possession bond and the rule says he shall 19 20 be notified that they filed a possession 21 bond. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This comment --2.3 MR. HAMILTON: Is that going to go with 24 this rule or not? 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't think so.

1 It's the version two. 2 MR. HAMILTON: The rules are supposed to be the same except for the jury. 3 MR. HAMILTON: Yes. But this is talking 4 about how the trial has to be before the 5 6 judge. 7 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. You're right. Okay. We can fix that. I 8 think part of this is that we some of this 9 10 language is original language with the 11 existing possession bond rule; and at one time 12 we were going to in the previous version this made a little bit more sense; but changing it 13 this way the language is a little awkward. 14 You're right. It needs to be changed. 15 really should be "such citation must be 16 17 served" I think would be more accurate. MR. HATCHELL: Instead of "noticed"? 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 19 MR. HAMILTON: But there still has to be 20 a notice about the bond. Or do they get 21 served with the bond? 22 PROFESSOR CARLSON: It should be "a 23 24 defendant must be served with notice of the 25 filing" --

1	MR. HAMILTON: "Notice of the filing"?
2	PROFESSOR CARLSON: "of the possession
3	bond."
4	MR. HAMILTON: That would be together
5	with the citation, wouldn't it? Notice would
6	go with the citation?
7	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.
8	MR. HAMILTON: Maybe you could just say
9	that, notice of the citation together with the
10	notice of the filing of the possession bond
11	together with the citation.
12	HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: You could say
13	"attached to the citation."
14	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I guess
15	what I'd like to do is rather than try to fix
16	this right here is give me a little time to
17	fix that. I don't think that will be a big
18	deal. We can change that.
19	MR. GILSTRAP: We could probably do that
20	tomorrow.
21	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes.
22	MR. GILSTRAP: It's not going to require
23	a vote I don't think to fix it or certainly
24	contested.
25	MR. YELENOSKY: What do we need votes

1	on?
2	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, everything
3	that is underlined certainly.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What do people think
5	about the four to seven? Is that the right
6	window?
7	MR. GILSTRAP: Is that the current
8	window?
9	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. There is no
10	current window.
11	MR. DOGGETT: Six is the current.
12	MS. EADS: Four sounds short to me. What
13	do you-all think?
14	MR. FUCHS: I think it's short.
15	MR. YELENOSKY: You could have
16	alternative service. Right?
17	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If it's
18	alternative service, it's going to be a little
19	longer.
20	MR. HAMILTON: What do you do if you put
21	the trial date in there, say, six days and
22	then the defendant doesn't get served until
23	the sixth day or something?
24	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, if the
25	constables can serve it within that window,

then they bring it back and it's redated and then you go again.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If four sounds short, you could say "unless it's a pedophile."

MS. EADS: This hobgoblin rule of mine is consistency, and I have never been consistency.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, my point is that, I mean, this rule is directed at emergency situations and normally four in a vacuum is too short; but I mean, if you've got a guy that's wielding knifes.

MS. EADS: Guns and knifes. Well, I don't know. I mean, four days sounds a short time having to accomplish everything that needs to be accomplished; but I'm not against it. I'm just saying --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think what is going to happen, and I've got no experience in this area, so you guys; but I think that the degree of threat is going to measure how quickly people move on this thing. And if there is a big, huge threat, then the judge and the constable and everybody are going to be moving

quicker and the landlord is going to be moving 1 quicker. 2 MR. ORSINGER: If it's really huge, they 3 might be able to get him arrested in less than 4 5 four days. MR. YELENOSKY: That's what I'm saying. 6 MR. PRINDLE: Yes, sir. But they're out 7 on bond. That creates the problem. 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So there, Richard. MR. ORSINGER: The problem here is the 10 11 criminal justice system. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Judge Prindle says he thinks the JPs can live with three to 13 14 six, which if the committee wants to do that, 15 we're not going to get a lot of these. There's not going to be a huge number of these 16 17 filed. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: I'd like three 1.8 to seven. May I speak just for --19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Sure. 20 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: A lot of the 21 22 JPs in smaller counties only have evictions 23 one day a week and it's on a certain day. And 24 if we make it seven days instead of six, they 25 could lower the four to three and still have

1 maximum flexibility. 2 MR. FUCHS: But if you do the three to six, Mr. Chairman, somebody they serve 3 4 alternate service say on a Friday, they've 5 gone out of town for the weekend, don't get 6 back until Sunday night. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That was the reason 7 for four. 8 9 MR. FUCHS: That was the reason. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If it was in a 10 weekend, wasn't it? 11 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It would have 13 been had I thought of that, certainly. 14 (Laughter.) 15 MR. FUCHS: That's right. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's go with four to 17 seven. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 18 19 (b)(2) "In order to obtain a jury trial the defendant must demand the same on or before 20 21 two days from the date the defendant is served 22 with citation and pay the jury fee. 23 justice must hold the jury trial as soon as 24 practicable." It's just going to take a while 25 sometimes in an urban county and maybe even

some of the rural counties to get a jury in right away. So putting a specific time limit on when you have the jury in is just not going to be practical, I don't think.

So what we're saying is that we want to speed it up. They've got to make the request two days from the date they're served which is not, I mean, not unreasonable. They've got two days to come in; and then you try to get the panel and get them in as quick as possible and get them served. So again it's faster than it is now; but this is an emergency.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any comment? Okay. What is next?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (3), "The officer or other authorized person serving the notice complaint for immediate possession shall return such notice to the justice who issued same within one day after service." It puts a little burden on the constable. The problem is if you've got this hearing, this trial that's expedited, you need to be able to notice everybody; and you've got the plaintiff, the landlord may have to get police officers in. I mean, typically if I get one

of these, there is a police officer or two that's going to testify because they came out and made a scene or there's some other witnesses, so you need to give as much time as possible to get the parties in to know when the date when it's going to be held, when the trial is going to be held. So that's the purpose of that. It's quicker notice for the Court.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any comments about that? You're on a roll, Tom. Keep going.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. (c), now (c), "If the defendant fails to appear for trial, or if the verdict or judgment after trial is for the plaintiff for possession, costs and attorney's fees, then the plaintiff may request a writ of possession from the justice court after the expiration of three days from the date the judgment is signed by the justice."

So you have three days to appeal; and on the fourth day you can issue a writ of possession. And whenever a justice court judgment under this rule, whenever a justice court signs a judgment under this rule either

party may appeal in the same manner provided for a nonemergency eviction trial. So the mechanism of the appeal is the same. It would be intended that the supersedeas and payment of rent to -- well, not payment of rent; but the supersedeas would apply in this, supersedeas provisions and the appeal and 749, the appeal bond provisions. So there wouldn't be a requirement to pay rent to the registry of the court, I quess. Well, I quess there would be because we're saying you don't sue for current rent; but unless we exempt it there would be a requirement that they post a supersedeas or a requirement that they pay rent into the registry of the court when it becomes due.

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MR. GILSTRAP: Tom, what do costs and attorney's fees have -- I think we talked about that. But what do they have to do with this? I mean, why should they have to prevail for possession costs and attorney's fees?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, because the plaintiff may have to hire an attorney; and I think they're entitled to get their attorney's fees. They may in some cases be

1	required to have an attorney. I think they
2	need to get their attorney's fees. Also if
3	the tenant prevails and they hire an attorney,
4	they may be able to get attorney's fees.
5	MR. GILSTRAP: What I'm saying is suppose
6	they get possession, but they don't get their
7	attorney's fees. Then can a plaintiff request
8	a writ of possession?
9	MR. DOGGETT: You bet.
10	MS. CORTELL: You just don't want an
11	"and" in there.
12	MR. GILSTRAP: I think maybe it's "or."
13	MR. DOGGETT: You don't want an "or"
14	because if they get attorney's fees.
15	(Committee members speaking to each other
16	at the same time.)
17	MR. DOGGETT: Strike costs and attorney's
18	fees.
19	MR. GILSTRAP: I think you just want
20	possession.
21	MS. CORTELL: Why don't you just say
22	"possession."
23	MR. GILSTRAP: In other words, to get
24	possession they have to get an order for
25	possession; and whether they get an order for

1	costs or attorney's fees shouldn't have
2	anything to do with whether or not they get
3	immediate possession.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So are you going to
5	strike costs and attorney's fees?
6	MR. GILSTRAP: What's that?
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are you going to
8	strike costs and attorney's fees?
9	MS. CORTELL: That's the suggestion.
10	MR. YELENOSKY: And I think Judge
11	Lawrence was saying you would get those as a
12	matter of course if you got possession; but
13	you don't want to make getting the possession
14	bond contingent on getting costs.
15	MR. GILSTRAP: Contingent on whether they
16	get costs or attorney's fees. Do you see what
17	I'm saying?
18	MS. CORTELL: Yes. Right.
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So do you want to
20	strike those words out of this here?
21	MR. GILSTRAP: I think so, yes.
22	MR. DOGGETT: Along the same lines, the
23	word "verdict" I don't think you need there.
24	I think just "judgment," because that could
25	on an off chance a verdict is different than

1	the judgment if you just won a judgment. On
2	the off chance if the tenant were to win the
3	jury trial and JP JNOVs.
4	MR. GILSTRAP: "Verdict or."
5	MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. "Verdict or."
6	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. "If the
7	defendant fails to appear for trial or if a
8	verdict or judgment."
9	MR. DOGGETT: But you have to have a
10	judgment. You can't issue anything unless you
11	have a judgment.
12	MR. YELENOSKY: You can have a judgment
13	based on a verdict in a bench trial; but
14	you've still got to have a judgment.
15	MR. NIEMANN: Judge Lawrence mentioned
16	that the shortening of the appeal date to
17	three days. Where is that, Judge Lawrence?
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That is in (c),
19	the first sentence.
20	MR. NIEMANN: It says if they request a
21	writ of possession. Where does it say the
22	appeal deadline is three days? Does it say
23	the appeal deadline?
24	MR. YELENOSKY: It doesn't say it
25	implicitly anywhere.

1	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I guess
2	it's sort of inferred though. I guess we
3	could put it in.
4	MR. NIEMANN: On a nonemergency eviction
5	file it's five days.
6	PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's right.
7	MR. NIEMANN: It needs to say three
8	days. You're going to have the writ issued on
9	the third day, for example. But he can still
10	appeal it on the fifth day?
11	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No.
12	MR. NIEMANN: What is there going to be
13	appealed?
14	MR. YELENOSKY: He's just saying he's
15	going to add the language in to make it
16	clear.
17	MR. NIEMANN: I think it needs to be
18	clear that the appeal date is three days if
19	you're going to allow appeal.
20	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: So are we saying
21	that we don't want the landlord to be able to
22	get costs and attorney's fees, or are you just
23	saying we need to put in another sentence?
24	PROFESSOR CARLSON: You don't need to put
25	that in there.

1 MR. GILSTRAP: The writ of possession 2 doesn't need to be conditioned. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I know. 3 you saying do we want to put that in another 4 5 sentence somewhere else? 6 MR. HAMILTON: It's already in the 7 sentence over on the next page. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 8 Carl. 9 MR. HAMILTON: Sue for those. It says 10 you can sue for those. 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It says it on 12 the next page. 13 MR. HAMILTON: Well, the first sentence, the first phrase of (c) I think needs to be 14 changed to say "in the event of a default 15 judgment," because if the tenant fails to 16 17 appear, you still have to have a judgment I 18 would think before you can get the writ of 19 possession. 20 MR. YELENOSKY: Why don't we just have 2.1 then why didn't it just say "if the judgment 22 is for the plaintiff for possession, then 23 after the expiration of three days the 24 plaintiff may request the writ"? However you

get it you have got to have a judgment like

25

you're saying.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. Say that again.

MR. YELENOSKY: "If the judgment," so you strike "defendant fails to appear for trial or if the verdict." So we've got "If the judgment" and you don't need "after trial," because you've got a judgment or you don't.

"If the judgment is for that plaintiff for possession," strike costs and attorney's fees, "then," and then here you just insert the "after the expiration of three days from the judgment from the date of the judgment the plaintiff may request a writ of possession."

I don't know that you need "from the justice court" either. Do you want me to read it again?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes, read it again.

MR. YELENOSKY: "If the judgment is for the plaintiff for possession, then after the expiration of three days from the date of the judgment the plaintiff may request a writ of possession" period.

MR. NIEMANN: Could you also clarify?

1	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Eliminate "then."
2	Yes, you don't need "then."
3	MR. NIEMANN: Could you also clarify that
4	is a revised appeal deadline? Because the
5	last sentence implies that the appeal will be
6	as in other cases, other cases.
7	MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. That was just
8	taking care of that sentence. Your suggestion
9	was to clarify; and Judge Lawrence, I think
10	you were saying that you would at least agree
11	to a clarification.
12	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, yes. Yes.
13	MR. YELENOSKY: So then you would have a
14	sentence saying either there or somewhere else
15	that the defendant has whatever it is, three
16	days to appeal.
17	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: How about "may
18	appeal within three days"?
19	MR. NIEMANN: "No later than three
20	days." "May appeal no later than three days"
21	would be good.
22	MR. HAMILTON: You could say that the
23	appeal is the same as in other cases except
24	that the time is three days.
25	MR. NIEMANN: That would work too.

1	MR. YELENOSKY: Actually to make this
2	parallel to that other one we were working on
3	where we put "after the expiration of 10 days
4	if there is no supersedeas," don't we have to
5	say something "if there is no" well, I
6	guess is there a supersedeas in this
7	situation?
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, there
9	would be.
10	MR. DOGGETT: Yes. It's the same thing.
11	MR. YELENOSKY: It's the same thing.
12	MS. CORTELL: If there were attorney's
13	fees.
14	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If there are
15	attorney's fees, it could be.
16	MR. YELENOSKY: So we have to be
17	parallel.
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. Are
19	you thinking that we're striking out "costs
20	and attorney's fees"? Are you thinking that
21	that's going to be automatic somehow without
22	us saying it?
23	PROFESSOR CARLSON: It doesn't go there.
24	MR. YELENOSKY: Well, this paragraph is
25	not talking about what you get. It's talking

1 about one of the things you get which is 2 possession; and that was my understanding. And the very first 740(a) says you can get 3 4 costs and attorney's fees. 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Why does the appeal 6 have to be fast? 7 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: It's an 8 emergency. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 9 No. Not now. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Why not now? 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: He can appeal. 11 12 can appeal, you know, the first amended 13 anyway. 14 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: We're fixing to discuss that. 15 16 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: If the person is 17 out, it's not an emergency anymore. MR. NIEMANN: Well, if he's not getting 18 19 him out sooner than three days as I think was 20 contemplated by Judge Lawrence and the 21 subcommittee, then if there is an appeal by 22 supersedeas bond or affidavit, you can't get him out. And that is another issue that needs 2.3 24 to be addressed. Let the pedophile stay there 25 by appealing it as a pauper.

1	HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Or appealing it
2	in any way.
3	MR. YELENOSKY: Well, or a rich pedophile
4	who pays the supersedeas, I mean, either way.
5	MR. NIEMANN: Either way. In the
6	meantime Bill Edwards is just salivating to
7	sue us.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Have you got this
9	language down in this paragraph?
10	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think so.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Do you want to read
12	it?
13	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: He's getting a little
15	feisty here late in the afternoon. He wanted
16	to stay, and now he won't perform. Like a
17	show dog.
18	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right.
19	"If the judgment is for the plaintiff for
20	possession, then"
21	MR. EDWARDS: Strike "then."
22	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right.
23	"the plaintiff may request a writ of
24	possession after the expiration of three days
25	from the date of the judgment." Is that

1 correct? 2 MR. YELENOSKY: I'd just put that clause I'd put "the expiration of three 3 before. days" prior to "the plaintiff." 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Then "Whenever a 5 justice court signs a judgment under this rule 6 7 either party may appeal within or no later than three days in the same manner as provided 8 9 for a nonemergency eviction trial." Is that 10 correct? 11 MR. HAMILTON: What was the answer to 12 Bill's question which provided an appeal time that's different? 13 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, just to speed things up is the only answer I have. 15 16 COURT REPORTER: I couldn't hear you, 17 Carl. State your question again, please. 18 MR. HAMILTON: What was the answer to 19 Bill's question as to why the appeal time has to be any different? 20 21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think they said 22 the guy might still be in there one way or 23 another, whatever might still be in there one way or the other. 2.4 25

MR. GILSTRAP:

He could supersede.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And that we have to 1 2 hurry. 3 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's just to 4 generally speed the process up wherever we can 5 speed the process up. I guess that's the only 6 answer I have. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Got you. Okay. 8 Anything else? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's it. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've gone --10 11 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Mr. Chairman, --12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 13 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: -- there is one 14 other issue that I addressed in my letter to 15 the group --16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: -- about 17 18 automatically negating a writ out of a justice court. We have two additional options in 19 20 addition to the language proposed, and these 21 are emergency situations. One, and the 22 current rule right now is if you have a default case and a defendant does not appear 23 24 after they've been notified of the immediate 25 possession bond and all that, a writ can be

issued immediately upon a default whether they appeal or not. And you know, we have potential explosive situations here, and maybe perhaps we ought to discuss whether or not the justice can issue a writ for emergency possession after the matter is litigated.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: After a default.

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: After a default. That's current rules as we have right now. And under the proposal they simply can be -- the defendant can not come to trial, can simply come in and file an appeal within three days, and the whole emergency process is rendered moot.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So what you're saying is the defendant doesn't show up, and three days later or within three days following he appeals and supersedes it, and that you can't get him out?

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Yes.

MR. NIEMANN: We would hope that you would if it's a default judgment situation, then an immediate writ can be issued and he can appeal within three days to get it off his record only.

MR. DOGGETT: And the problem is we've reduced it down from six days down to four days; and alternative service we are now absolutely increasing the number of default judgments absolutely when you're now reducing the time. So now we're shortening it from six to four and still allowing for alternative service and two days now to request a jury trial. And so the result is they can issue now the writ immediately.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And as we said before, once they're out they're out.

MR. DOGGETT: Exactly. And so I think that's unreasonable. It's three days they have if they no-show or not. And you know, as everybody knows on these immediate possessions, if they truly are the rapists and murderers, they don't show. So consequently --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They usually don't appeal.

MR. DOGGETT: Exactly. They don't appeal, the ones that are truly the rapists or murderers. And by the way, right now the current system is they can appeal and whatnot;

and I haven't heard that as the big clamoring that we haven't been able to get out the rapists and murderers. That has not been the biggest.

MR. NIEMANN: I assure you the people who lie on their applications when they have a judgment against them will utilize the appeal process to stay there while they're relocating. And that's not the answer to the pedophile problem.

MR. DOGGETT: Or the bad check case or the --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I mean, I think -- yes. I'm sorry. Go ahead

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: We really never talked about pedophiles previously. We have talked about threatening situations with firearms, serious confrontations, threats to kill, these type of scenarios, and we have proceeded under this premise. And if someone does come in and asks for a jury trial,

Mr. Doggett, there is not a default. And you know, I don't think that that can be coupled under the time frames that you're performing, because if they come in and ask for a jury

trial, there is no default.

MR. DOGGETT: I understand.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. But the point is with it being so short like being four days there is it seems to me a great deal of possibility that somebody is going to default, but not in an intentional way, not in a way that they're ignoring the proceeding. And now if you immediately dispossess them the day they default, that there may be a large group of people who have some defense, maybe not meritorious, but have some defense that you have just dispossessed them and they have no way to cure that when they didn't get notice. And it just seems so draconian to add that wrinkle to it, I would think.

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: May I address that, Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, yes. Sure. You quys are in the trenches. I'm not.

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Okay. But we see this and we deal with this and we're very concerned about the explosive situations. We submit respectfully to this committee that those tenants know what is coming because of

the notice to vacate. They are required to BE given a reason under Chapter 24 of the Property Code on the reason and they know this is coming. I can think of no case in 20 years in my court to where we have had a Code of Conduct eviction and the tenant left town and had no inkling that this was coming.

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I'm more concerned about the vast
majority of the cases with explosive
situations and our ability to deal with them
because lives can be at stake here, not only
to the landlord and his agents, but to the
surrounding tenants as well who may very well
come to testify against this alleged miscreant
if they can be given some semblance of
protection of immediate removal of this person
from their midst.

And, you know, and I agree with everyone else. This needs to be litigated. Once it's litigated I still think that we ought to consider an emergency approach from the justice court level in a default.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other comments? Carl, on the left.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, it's really kind of

no different from a peace bond. You can order 1 2 somebody to put up a peace pond; and if they 3 don't, you put them in jail. Right? HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Yes, sir. That 4 5 is a remedy. 6 MR. HAMILTON: It's kind of like that. Maybe you ought to have the power to keep them 7 out of this property like you're suggesting. 8 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: All right. 9 Well, peace bonds of course are not an 10 injunction. It requires a respondent to put 11 12 up a certain amount of money with the registry 13 of the court in order to perform with the bond. If they don't, then they can go to jail 14 for up to one year; but a peace bond and 15 removing a person from a property to where 16 they are creating a danger to others in the 17 18 rental community probably is two different 19 things. 20 MR. HAMILTON: I'm saying you can 21 piggyback one on the other. 22 HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Yes, sir. And 23 I'm not saying that we can't. But, you know,

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ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES

when we're dealing with these emergency

situations we're not only dealing with the

tenants here. We're dealing with their guests. That's also things that come up. And I deal with these a lot.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina.

MR. CORTELL: The trouble I'm having is distinguishing between those situations where you have a true emergency and true potential of immediate physical harm, and that's one situation. And contrast that with what Mr. Niemann has been saying which is that someone six months ago lied on an application and, you know, they violated some law, and now he's going to go in and argue they're an immediate threat, and some judge may agree with that. Okay. Let's just assume that.

That's just a very different scenario
where I mean are all of us willing to abrogate
rights and risk improper defaults and so
forth? And so that's the trouble I'm having.
So if I hear "Yes, someone has got a gun,"
it's easy to say immediate writ, send them
out. But if we're also going to, if this net
is also going to encompass someone who fibbed
on an application and now we're going to argue
they're an immediate threat, then I can't go

with abrogation. And I don't know the answer to that; but that's the problem I've having with the debate.

MR. GILSTRAP: Yes. That's it, you know.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: She's so eloquent.

MR. GILSTRAP: I've been having problems
too. I just couldn't say it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody else?

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Mr. Chairman, I
think this is an excellent point she brought

up. This is something that we discussed, the
three of us, Fred and Larry and I when we had

our meeting. And we intended for this to be
an immediate threat, not something that was in
the future. If anyone needs further

clarification in this rule to tie down the
true emergency to where it is exigent and it's
immediate, we have no problem with that; but
we want the tools to save lives out there if
it comes to that.

MR. DOGGETT: And everybody agreed to take the 10 days out. I mean, something really happened 10 days ago where someone really was harmed, not someone fibbed three

years ago and now we think he might do something again.

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HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Well, that's again --

MR. DOGGETT: So we tried to strengthen the rule and now we're sort of piecemealing it, taking it apart.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But wait a minute.

We're starting to replow old ground. What we're talking about now is whether or not we are going to add a weapon in the arsenal of the judge which is that on the day of default no waiting around for appeals. We're just going to dispossess him. That's what we're talking about.

HONORABLE SANDY PRINDLE: Or one day after.

CHAIRMAN BABOCK: Or one day or whatever; but not three days. And so the way we have done this, the way we have done the "that constitutes a present threat to the health, safety or security of the plaintiff, plaintiff's agents," et cetera, that is leaving the argument open for the landlord, for the plaintiff to say, you know, "He was

convicted of. You know, this is Charles
Manson, Judge, and he didn't tell us about it.
And the multiple murders may have been only,
you know, two years ago; but he didn't tell us
about it. And so now we need to get him out
of there." That argument is preserved under
the rule as we've talked about it. It may not
win ever; but it's still preserved. So now
what we're talking about is giving another
weapon to the judge which is basically taking
away their appeal.

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MR. GILSTRAP: So we have to have a higher standard to do that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're effectively taking away their appeal it seems to me.

MR. GILSTRAP: A higher standard to do that.

MS. SPECTOR: I'd like to raise the possibility that the person who is the tenant who may be evicted because of the immediate threat may actually be the victim of some violence. And in a domestic violence situation it's often the case where the ex husband or the boyfriend comes onto the property, shoots the gun, threatens the

neighbors, and the landlord is trying to evict the mother and the children. In that case where the tenant defaults, she couldn't get to the court on time, she arrived a few minutes late, the threat of the immediate dispossession with no opportunity for appeal is especially egregious. So I would urge the committee to retain the appeal process in this provision.

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MS. EADS: I think that's a really good example. I know a number of women who face that, and maybe not eviction, but have faced where they're threat to their neighbors is not their fault; and they need to have an appeals process for the situation.

MR. FUCHS: I just had a case with an ex boyfriend who fired into the front door of the woman living at the apartment complex, and she was served with a notice to vacate. She got a protective order against the guy, gave it to the landlord, and he insisted he was going to still proceed with the eviction. He didn't care. And we ended up filing a Fair Housing complaint and it went away; but he was going to file an eviction against her. He

didn't care that she had gotten a protective 1 order. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It was fair to him 3 that he had a tenant that had people 4 5 shooting. MS. SPECTOR: Those aren't isolated. 6 7 They happen all over. MR. FUCHS: It was the ex boyfriend not 8 living on the premises. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I think, and 10 11 this is interesting debate here. Every side 12 has got good points. So the vote we'll take is Rule 740 with the various amendments that 13 14 we have made to the language, but otherwise as And so everybody in favor of that raise 15 is. 16 your hand. 17 MR. YELENOSKY: So that keeps the three 18 days for appeal? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 20 MR. GILSTRAP: As is with the changes we 2.1 voted on. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those opposed? By 23 a vote of 11 to nothing the rule as modified 24 by the language we've discussed on the record 25 is passed.

1 MR. NIEMANN: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a clarification? 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 3 4 MR. NIEMANN: Can the appeal be on a 5 pauper's affidavit, and does the pauper have to put up a supersedeas bond in these 6 7 dangerous conduct cases? MR. YELENOSKY: Well, what we just voted 8 on is no. The appeal can be, yes. And it's 9 true they don't put up a supersedeas, no, 10 because we said "in the same manner" except 11 12 for shortening the time frame. 13 MR. NIEMANN: I was just calling it to your attention and actually wondering whether 14 that is wise for somebody to stay in what the 15 16 judge has considered a dangerous situation, danger to other people simply by saying "I'm 17 broke." Are we protecting? Is it more 18 19 important to protect him or the other people 20 he may be a danger to? Would you consider blowing off the affidavit when he constitutes 21 22 a threat to neighbors, other tenants and 23 management?

shouldn't -- I mean, do you feel any more

MR. YELENOSKY: You're saying that they

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comfortable if they get to stay because they can afford the supersedeas? I mean, all you end up doing then is assuring that the truly indigent threat is out. You don't get the person out. Unless you're going to eliminate the right of appeal you're not getting out the person who has the means to pay the supersedeas. Right?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I see the point that is being made; but it seems to me it's the same point in a slightly different variation as what we have just discussed, whether or not immediately upon default immediately to kick somebody out.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. I mean, I think there is a fair question, a policy question for society about how quickly and who and what and the rights; but the line you're cutting is not -- is one that's based on ability to pay or at least alleged ability to pay.

MR. NIEMANN: I asked the question; and that's all I wanted to know.

MR. YELENOSKY: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's good. We're good at answering questions.

MR. NIEMANN: So that there is a record 1 2 of how everybody feels. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 3 MS. EADS: Well, you're saying that for 4 the record. If you have a situation like 5 6 that, you've got other things. First of all, the landlord has taken reasonable steps. 7 The landlord's liability is somewhat protected by 8 this. Secondly, you've got restraining 9 10 orders. You've got peace bonds. You've 11 got -- you do have law enforcement. I mean, 12 it's not -- it's not the society is now 13 unprotected or that the tenants are unprotected. In fact, if you'll take my sorry 14 15 example about pedophilia, we now have public 16 records of it, so tenants are somewhat 17 protected from that also. So we're not 18 without protection. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. And after we're 20 done I'll tell you a funny story about that. 21 MR. EDWARDS: In Nueces County you might 22 have a sign. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Does 24 everybody want to keep slogging away? 25 subcommittee, and Pam looks like she is

1 praying. So we will take up again at 9:00 in the morning. Let me just -- I don't know 2 where we got 8:30 started; but it was a bad 3 tradition. 4 5 What we have for tomorrow is to finish 6 this up which hopefully won't take the whole 7 time. And what else do we have that we can discuss? I don't want to take up cameras in 8 the courtroom, Richard, with seven people 9 10 here. MR. ORSINGER: We have an issue on the 11 12 right to vote, right to introduction, 76(a) 13 issue. 14 MR. GILSTRAP: What's that? 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 76(a). Judge Lawrence 16 has got as execution issue. 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: (Nods 18 negatively.) 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, he doesn't. 20 not ready on it; but he will be by September. 2.1 We've got -- Bobby, are you going to be here 22 tomorrow? 23 MR. MEADOWS: I'll be here. 2.4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You've got Rule 202 25 just to report on?

1 MR. MEADOWS: Well, there's been no action on it. I've received some letters, and 2 Chris forwarded me some cases that deal with 3 it, and I've read all of that; but --4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, just tell the 5 6 committee what it is we're going to be talking 7 about. 8 MR. MEADOWS: All right. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Orsigner, have you got 10 Rule 21? Is that something you can talk about? 11 12 MR. ORSINGER: No. You know, Luke Soules 13 has supposedly got something about that; but I have never found out. No one knows. I think 14 it may be a typographical error. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Will you check before 17 the next meeting and see if it is? 18 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. I can't find a 19 living person who knows what that is. MR. GILSTRAP: And Chip, don't we have 20 21 some unfinished business on offer of 22 judgment? Was there something that was going 23 to be transferred or did we conclude that? 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I thought we concluded. 25 it. Well, no. We completed it for this

1	time. There is some stuff we need to go back
2	on; and then there is going to be a Jamail
3	committee meeting on Wednesday, and then we're
4	going to talk about it again in September
5	unless the Court has already ruled by
6	September. So that, you know, maybe we'll
7	take it up to 12:00. It doesn't look to me
8	like we will.
9	PROFESSOR CARLSON: All we have is Tom
10	and Richard.
11	MR. GILSTRAP: And let me say we've got
12	some stuff on FED that is still going to be
1.3	tough. Discovery is still there.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Yes. Oh, I
15	know. I know. I wasn't trying to minimize
16	that.
17	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Discovery and
18	motion for new trial.
19	MS. CORTELL: So what is on for
20	tomorrow?
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: FED, Rule 76(a), and
22	Rule 202 just for Bobby to tell us what the
23	issue is; and that's all.
24	MS. BARON: Not 18(c)?
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I just don't

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think we ought to do that again with like
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           seven, 10 people here on a Saturday morning.
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                 MS. BARON: Yes, I agree. I agree.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've done that
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           before.
                 (Adjourned 5:50 p.m.)
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2	CERTIFICATE OF THE HEARING OF
3	SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
4	***********
5	I, ANNA RENKEN, Certified Shorthand
6	Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that
7	I reported the above hearing of the Supreme
8	Court Advisory Committee on the 14th day of
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11	further certify that the costs for my services
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