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6	MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
7	September 28, 2001
8	(MORNING SESSION)
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18	Taken before D'Lois L. Jones, Certified
19	Shorthand Reporter in Travis County for the State of
20	Texas, reported by machine shorthand method, on the 28th
21	day of September, 2001, between the hours of 9:10 a.m. and
22	1:05 p.m., at the Texas Law Center, 1414 Colorado, Room
23	101, Austin, Texas 78701.
24	<b>COPY</b>
25	<u>.</u>

## **INDEX OF VOTES** Votes taken by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee during this session are reflected on the following pages: Vote on <u>Page</u> FE&D FE&D FE&D FE&D FE&D

1

2

3

5

6

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're on the record, and, good morning, everybody. Thanks for coming. We'll start out with a status report from Justice Hecht as to what the Court is doing with our handiwork.

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, everything remains We would like to do the appellate rules pending. forthwith, if we can get one last change made. We had an issue come up several times in the last couple of months -- things run in clumps, it seems like -- that I have mentioned to Professor Dorsaneo, regarding the sealing of records in the appellate court; and we don't have any rule on that; and we have had a number of briefs filed just --I don't think there's any plot or anything, it just so happened, referring to settlements and things that have been sealed in the trial court sometimes under 76a, sometimes not, and can those things be sealed in the appellate court. We just don't have a rule on it, and I don't remember the issue having come up before, so I asked him to look at that. Otherwise, I think we're ready to go forward.

I was at the judicial conference this week, and my sense is that the judges are pretty much ready for the change in Rule 47, which has to do with the publication of court of appeals opinions and the citations

to them. I don't know that the Court of Criminal Appeals is as comfortable with the committee's proposed changes as other judges seem to be and as I hope my Court is, but we'll just have to see about that. But in any event, if we can either get closure on the TRAP rules or decide that what's left is going to take some more time then I think we're ready to go ahead with that and the summary judgment rule and two or three other things that we're just kind of sitting there waiting on enough of a package to justify making a change.

The Judicial Council, which is another group, statutory group, that meets and that the Chief Justice is a part of, has adopted some guidelines on cameras in the courtroom. We will send those over. They would like this committee to vent those rules. They also have some -- they're trying to adopt some standards for evaluating the conduct of visiting judges, and they would like this group to look at those rules, too. So as soon as we have those, which I think is eminent, we'll send those over to the committee and get somebody -- get you-all to look at those.

Then finally, you may have seen in <u>Texas</u>

<u>Lawyer</u>, we formed a committee the other day which goes by the informal name of the committee to fix everything, which is a committee that is going to be chaired by Joe

Jamail. Chip is on it. Steve Susman is on it. Ricardo Cedillo from San Antonio, Tommy Jacks, Jimmy Coleman, Lee Kelly, Professor Thornburg at the SMU Law School. I'm probably leaving somebody out, who are going to look at a number of systemic-type problems that the Bar has looked at and this group from time to time has kind of worked around some and see if there are solutions to some of these problems.

One of them is referral fees, an issue that the Bar has looked into some years ago and decided not to take any action on. Another one is a settlement rule, something like the Federal courts have, but perhaps more effective, that generally would provide that if you make an offer of settlement and the other side doesn't accept it within a reasonable period of time, some time window, then bad things can happen. That works both ways. The Legislature has worked on this for about six sessions and come up with nothing, so the lieutenant governor wants us to look at that.

Maybe whether we -- whether anything can be done about any -- or whether problems exist in the conduct of class actions and whether anything can be done to alleviate those. The Federal system, as you may know, is looking at some -- some fairly insignificant changes and some fairly significant ones, and so is that a good idea

or not, and other issues that this group may want to take up; and when they finish and come up with recommendations, then those will come back through here, so you'll get a chance to see those, the finished product, before they go to the Court.

2.0

But the Court has done this from time to time, to appoint committees that are sort of hooked into this committee but not necessarily part of it, to try to work on issues that those people are interested in and this is such a -- this is such a thing. So it's not a -- it's not a deviation from the way that work flows through this committee to the Court, and it will come back through here, but they'll get a chance to work on it ahead of time and give us their thoughts on it.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Can I ask a question about that?

JUSTICE HECHT: Yeah.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Are there any -- not that I want to do it, but are there any judges that are on that committee? Because to have a work product be formed and then start floating it up without having any judicial input can lead to paths and problems that you don't want.

JUSTICE HECHT: I can't remember. Chris, do you remember? I don't think there is a judge on it.

MR. GRIESEL: Just you.

JUSTICE HECHT: Me. Yeah. I'm on it.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you're a judge.

JUSTICE HECHT: Some say. But I think that's a good point, and we'll think about that. The constraints were that the people who were -- who brought up this topic and wanted to do the work on it wanted it to be a small group so that they could get something done and then let people argue about it, as opposed to like the discovery rules subcommittee which worked and worked and worked on many details over a long period of time. I'll see if they are amenable to that, but they may just want to just come up with something and float it past people around them individually and have that -- I don't know, Scott. I think it's important to have judges on there, at least with respect to the class action issues and the trial issues.

They would like to look for ways to facilitate and expedite the trial of mass litigation, and they say that even if class actions are not -- even if the -- they seem to cycle in and out, that you can expect that there will be mass litigation, and how can we help the trial courts and the courts of appeals get through this stuff.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Yeah. My only concern would be that without a judge there at the outset

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their solution might be "Judge will put aside everything
    else on his docket and concentrate fully on what we want,"
    and then if they form it and put it out there and you're
 3
    opposed to it then you're obstreperous and noncooperative
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    and don't want to do any work.
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                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Would it be okay if we
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 7
    limited it to Travis County?
                  HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER:
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                                             Is it a
    legislative committee or a Court committee or a Bar
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    committee or
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    what --
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                  JUSTICE HECHT:
                                   It's a Court committee.
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                                          I mean, if you're
                  HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN:
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    going to be there and you're going to be active, I don't
    have any concern, but I just -- if you're more in a
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    liaison role and there wasn't going to be an active judge
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    there, just one would maybe leaven the bread.
. 17
                  JUSTICE HECHT:
                                   Yeah.
                                          No, I'm going to be
 18
    there, and I will be active, but there are -- some of
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 20
    their issues are of more concern to them as practitioners
    than they are to the judges.
 21
                  HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: That's what I'm
 22
    worried about.
 23
 24
                  JUSTICE HECHT: Referral fees, I really
 25
    don't have a dog in, and I don't know that the Court does,
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but they want to talk about ad litem fees, and I have a little more concern about that, but to the extent that the parties can get together and work out some of those things then that's okay. The systemic court handling of its docket, that's a little bit bigger problem for the judges, I think.

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Oh, yeah, Harry Reasoner is on it, right. Thank you. And the impetus came from several different directions. First Joe wanted to do it, and so anybody that wants to volunteer these days, we are not usually turning people away. Governor Ratliff wanted us to look at the settlement issue and specifically requested our help on that, and some of the members of this group were opposed to a settlement rule some years ago, so it seemed to be ideal for them to be inside the tent working on it rather than not, so it's possible that they will decide that the solutions need to be legislative, Scott, and will recommend that rather than a change in any kind of rule, or not. They don't have a -- I don't think they have a good idea what the solutions are. And that's all I have.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: To the extent the Court wants input, Frank Gilstrap, would it be fair to say that there is some level of interest in the Legislature and in the Bar on the recusal rule, since we went over there three or four times?

MR. GILSTRAP: I think that's right.

JUSTICE HECHT: Okay. And the presiding judges met on the recusal rule at the judicial conference, and they have some recommendations that when I get them I'll send them to you, because they're not congruent to this committee's recommendations.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I have those right now for you and for Chip.

JUSTICE HECHT: Okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Well, we'll keep working on the never-ending recusal rule. I should have started out by introducing the young lady to my right, which is Debra Lee, who is my secretary now and is taking over Carrie Gagnon's role as the person who takes all the grief from everybody on this committee. So Debra is right to my right, and she's been working very hard to transition from Carrie, who left to move out of Houston and has done a great job, and I know is going to do a great job.

There is a sign-in sheet in the back, as is customary, and in terms of scheduling, I don't think we're going to get through all of this today, so I think there will be a Saturday session, and I'd like to end at a quarter of 5:00 today, if that's all right with everybody, just for people's planning purposes. So with that, Elaine

and Judge Lawrence, we were in the middle of your FED rule when we last met, and let's continue.

1.3

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Everyone should have, and if you don't have there's extra copies over there, a packet of information that is Bates stamped, so if you don't have a copy that has a number one on the bottom, you don't have a working copy. In addition there is -- we have a second short handout that says "Handout for Forcible Entry & Detainer."

All right. If everybody has their handouts, I'd like to start by giving a little background information. The last time we met we spent some time looking at some -- the really pure procedural aspects of changing the rules, primarily looking at service of FE&D cases and a few other issues. Today I'd like to start by presenting the problem that was presented to us through the State Bar Rules Committee and the background for that problem and some possible big picture solutions, and then we have actually proposed rules, many proposed changes, to almost all of the FED rules to try and tweak them and put together a cohesive scheme.

As you know, FE&D cases are within the jurisdiction of the justice courts, regardless of the value of the property; and historically it's been an action in which the only issue that can be litigated is

possession, the idea being that a landlord or a party seeking forcible entry and detainer writ of possession ought to be able to go in very quickly, expeditiously, prove up their case, be able to get their writ or not; and other issues that might throw out a landlord-tenant relationship are the subject of separate litigation, so the usual rules of trying everything together transactionallly-related simply don't apply in this area for that reason.

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The FE&D rules were modified, however, to allow an action for back rent to be added to an FE&D claim, so to that extent that issue can be joined and the JP can adjudicate that up to a 5,000-dollar limit because of the subject matter jurisdiction. FE&D cases are supposed to be quick and simple. Most tenants, I believe, represent themselves; is that correct, Judge?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Substantial percentage.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Substantial percentage represent themselves, but as you see on page three of the handout, Footnote 1, we have a pretty complex scheme for figuring out the applicable procedural rules and statutes that apply. Potentially there are three sets of procedural rules that are implicated in a forcible entry and detainer case. One are -- one, of course, is our

regular Rules of Civil Procedure apply in JP court to the extent that that's feasible. Secondly, we have specialized rules that apply in JP court, 529 to 591, and then we have an even finer hone on this. We have forcible entry and detainer rules, 738 to 755. It's that latter group of rules that fall within the authority of the subcommittee and what we were charged with looking at.

In addition, the Legislature at Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code has many statutory provisions that affect forcible entry and detainer actions, to which we need to be mindful when we're trying to put together a cohesive scheme.

The problem that we were presented with through the State Bar Rules Committee was the problem of what should be required of a tenant when they seek to appeal from the JP court level to county court level. Currently -- and let me just back up there. Of course, you know that that's a de novo trial from JP court to county court, and then there is a second potential appeal from the county court judgment in an FE&D case, if it's a residential property, onto the court of appeals and potentially the Texas Supreme Court.

The manner in which the -- the security,

I'll leave it that general, that must be put up by the

tenant at the JP level to the county court under our

current scheme is different than what is provided, really, by the Legislature in Chapter 24 for superseding a 2 judgment and posting an appeal bond going from county 3 court to the court of appeals. Currently at the JP level there is a requirement that an appeal bond be posted, and 5 the JP sets the amount of that appeal bond, but it 6 includes -- through what I understand from practice and reading the rule broadly, that typically that's going to include a requirement that the tenant, if they are the 9 unsuccessful party at the trial court, include in that 10 appeal bond the amount of any judgment, money judgment, 11 that's been interposed as well as attorneys fees, and then 12 there's a requirement to post rent as it becomes due. Is 13 that a fair statement? 14 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Only if there's a pauper's affidavit. 16 17 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Only if there's a pauper's affidavit. 18 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Otherwise the bond would moot the potential rent. 20 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay. I'm sorry. 21 So if you are a non-indigent coming out of JP misspoke. 22 currently you must put up the amount of the judgment, 23 attorneys fees, and rent. 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Rent for the 25

pendency of the appeal.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: For the pendency of the appeal. If you're an indigent currently under the JP rules, you can go in and prove up your indigency, in which case you're required to post rent as it becomes due, but you're excused from putting up the appeal bond.

The problem with that scheme is several things. Our Supreme Court in construing the open courts provision has held in Dillingham vs. Putnam and several other related decisions that the open courts guarantee in the Texas Constitution prohibits a requirement that a party secure a judgment through a bond as a precondition to appeal. The open courts provision, as you may know, is a state constitutional guarantee. It is not part of our Federal Constitution, and we have to look to our state body of law to try and see how -- what the interpretation should be on construing the rights. The jurisprudence in this area is nowhere near developed, as you might guess, as it would for a Federal constitutional guarantee. Not all states use the open courts provision. We're one of 39 that do.

It emanates from the Magna Charta, and I tried to track some of the history just to get an idea of what are the restrictions potentialities of going forward with a required supersedeas. It was part of the Magna

Charta at a time when the king's court required judges to buy their judgeships, and the judges apparently would turn around and require that you pay large filing fees and you pay large sums of money to get any writ issued, including something like a writ of possession for a tenant and in other areas, and it's against that background that there was to be a guaranteed access to the courts for all people, and that guarantee has been construed by our Supreme Court and other states that have it to allow guaranteed access not only to a trial court, but you have a guaranteed right to access an appellate court as well.

That is not to say that you get a free ride. You do, however, under <u>Dillingham vs. Putnam</u> have the right to proceed on appeal without having to post a supersedeas bond to secure a money judgment with the downside risk that if you don't put that up, if you don't post a bond, you still get to proceed with the appeal. Your right to appeal is protected by putting up a very diminumous appeal bond to cover costs. But you still get the right to appeal, but the downside risk is your judgment, of course, might be superseded. It might be enforced, and you may find that if that happens, and, for example, in an FE&D case, the issues on possession, according to intermediate courts, are mooted.

So as a tenant going now, currently, from

county court to court of appeals, you've got to put up an appeal bond -- well, actually we don't even do that anymore. You have to put up a supersedeas bond required under the Property Code if you want to suspend enforcement of an FE&D judgment against a tenant. If the tenant does not do that, they proceed on appeal, but the landlord can go get a writ of possession, moots the possession issue, and only leaves the issue of money and any other claims that are nonpossession claims.

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At the JP court right now we are requiring under our rules, which are suspect, or certainly implicated, by the holdings in the open courts guarantee, we are requiring a tenant who is not an indigent to post in effect a supersedeas bond, but we call it an appeal bond, and it's required. You know, the big difference between an appeal bond and a supersedeas bond is the appeal bond must be filed before you get access to the court. That is in my view and our view of the committee, our subcommittee, that is not proper. We are concerned about the structure of the way a tenant proceeds from JP court to county court on that issue.

Having said that, there is nothing that allows an indigent to get a pass on a supersedeas bond.

An indigent or a nonindigent's right to appeal is protected under our current scheme from county court to

courts of appeals because once you perfect the appeal you go forward, regardless of whether the supersedeas has been You get your right to go forward on the court. What you lose, however, is the right to suspend enforcement of the judgment; and you risk, as I said 5 earlier, that the landlord will moot that issue. that does not moot the tenant's claims, independent claims 7 that the tenant might have for wrongful eviction or other matters. 9

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You know, like I was telling you before, res judicata does not operate the same in this area of the law because these proceedings are designed only to adjudicate possession and now writs, if the landlord chooses to add So all other issues are still on the table, so to speak, and the tenant may bring those claims independently.

What our subcommittee was faced with from the State Bar Court Rules Committee, their particular concern that was expressed to us is that currently a pauper can proceed from JP court to county court by filing a pauper's affidavit and then they're required within five days to put up one rental period's rent guaranteeing in some cases because of those two time periods, ten potential days of free rent; and the State Bar committee was of the mind that we should condition perfection of an

appeal in an FE&D case upon the indigent paying rent up front, rent -- one rental period's rent into the registry of the justice court; and that failing to do so, a writ of possession would issue.

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That has some concerns for the subcommittee for the issues we just discussed under the open courts rule. Can you require someone -- or how much can you require someone up front to bond a potential judgment or obligation and if they don't do that, deny them access to the court. That's not to say, however, that a tenant is free and clear from the requirement of paying the rent as the appeal or the FE&D case goes forward. There is no constitutional right to live free while you proceed in an FE&D case, but the subcommittee was mindful of the concerns that were expressed by the State Bar committee and the concerns a landlord would have in general of their right to be paid rent while an appeal is being taken.

We looked at the State Bar Rules Committee recommendation, and we looked as well at all of the FE&D rules. Our committee is very fortunate this year to have Judge Lawrence on it, who has been a JP, I believe, for 20 years? 19 years?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 19 years.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: 19 years. So he brings a wealth of practical experience to our committee, which

many of our committee members, we don't spend our time doing forcible entry and detainer, yet this is such an important area of the law for the people who are affected, and Judge Lawrence expressed last time and I think -- what percentage of the docket?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's substantial.

About 118,000 forcibles a year filed in Texas, so it's -
I mean, the percentage varies from court to court, but

it's pretty substantial timewise.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: And there's a bigger issue that the State Bar Rules Committee and other committees have struggled with and, quite frankly, we struggled with as a subcommittee; and that is this is supposed to be a simple, expeditious remedy that a tenant could figure out how to do on their own per se; and, quite frankly, before we even started, these rules were very, very -- and they remain -- fairly complex. It's difficult when you've got three potential areas of rules applying and then you have legislative statutes to make it simplistic.

So our -- we have many recommendations, but our main recommendation on the problems with what the tenant should be required to secure insofar as appealing from JP court to county court is our subcommittee was of the mind that we should have parallel provisions, that the

same type of requirements that exist for superseding a judgment from the county court to the court of appeals should exist at the JP court to the trial de novo through the county court; and that provision, the county court provisions for supersedeas, as I said before, are driven by the Texas Property Code. The Legislature has provided that, so we would be providing a parallel scheme for superseding the judgment.

The tenant would not be under an obligation to post a supersedeas in order to take the de novo appeal; but they would risk, if they failed to do that to secure any money judgment, mooting the issues of possession, as we discussed earlier. The tenant would be required under our subcommittee proposal to post an appeal bond that covers the costs of court, which are fairly minimal.

Judge Lawrence I believe said that's normally under a hundred dollars.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. \$67.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: \$67. So Constitution, that is permissible to require a party to secure the cost as a precondition at the lower level to go on, but we would leave supersedeas as an option for the tenant. We also would require that the tenant pay rent into the registry of the county court as it becomes due and that the tenant risks -- if they fail to pay the rent or they

fail to post supersedeas to secure a judgment, they risk the landlord being able to come in and obtain the writ of possession while that de novo appeal is proceeding and mooting that issue potentially.

As I discussed on -- after Bates stamped page 7, it's an unnumbered page, says "7a" at the top, implicit in this recommendation requiring the tenant to supersede a judgment out of the trial court or the JP court to the county court would be the abandonment of the notion that perfection of a de novo appeal to the county court operates to vacate the lower court's judgment. This is a very strange area of law.

Footnote 1 talks about this line of cases that say that once you take a de novo appeal from JP court to county court, that JP court judgment is vacated or annulled, so much to the extent, if you look at some of the footnoted cases, if one party perfects the appeal, perfects an appeal to the county court in a multiple party case, that then vests jurisdiction in the county court and the other parties to the underlying judgment cannot have it enforced against them even though they did not appeal to the county court, which seems very odd to me; and that whole line of cases is strange.

I understand intellectually why you might want to say, well, on a de novo appeal you vacate and the

other judgments are no fact, but for purposes of enforcement that leaves things really wide open. Court wants to continue with that approach then our 3 subcommittee original proposal would not be a logical 4 If we are going to adhere to that concept that solution. 5 a de novo appeal from JP court to county court annuls the 6 lower court judgment, there is nothing to supersede, nor 7 can we require an appeal bond to secure that judgment. So if we went under the existing law as it now stands, the 9 solution might be to just say, well, it's a simple 10 expeditious proceeding. You go from JP court to county 11 That JP court judgment is vacated and annulled; 12 the tenant has got to put up rent as it becomes due. 13 That's a very easy solution. It just leaves the landlord 14 without any security for the first judgment, and maybe 15 that's okay. Maybe that's the way that we want to go. 16 you did have a money judgment for back rent, but it's gone 17 now because we have a de novo appeal, so you need to go 18 get another one, and we will require the tenant to put up 19 rent as it becomes due. 20 A third option we didn't really explore but does come to 21 mind is to what extent can you require a person to 22 up-front money, and what I was thinking about in that 23 regard was our interim writs of garnishment, attachment, 24 and sequestration, that kind of idea that we do have 25

constitutionally permissible bases in which to require a party to bond things when we think that there is a potentiality for the defendant making themselves judgment-proof, removing the property or the like. You know, it could be that something like that could develop, but to me that seems to be a legislative function and not necessarily a function of this committee.

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So I guess I would say at this point,
Mr. Chairman, we would kind of just like to hear the
conceptual feedback from the committee, the full
committee, on these issues, if there's a leaning one way
or the other; or the alternative would be to march through
our concrete proposals and deal with those first one at a
time.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody have any global thoughts about this? Yeah, Steve.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I used to represent tenants in Legal Services for some years, but it's been many years since then, and the rules may have changed since then, and my memory certainly has faded, but my recollection was -- and this may still be true and Judge Lawrence can certainly say. The time period for a landlord to get into court to try an eviction case is what now? I mean, if a landlord files a forcible, they get a hearing in how long?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's supposed to be six to ten days after it's served, so, you know, add some service time to that, so you're looking at two weeks at least.

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MR. YELENOSKY: Right. Right. And if the tenant loses at that hearing and doesn't do anything, the writ of possession issues in, what, five days?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: After five days.

MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. So you have a total of potentially eleven days, and the way I would look at this is, I understand -- first of all, on the end of the supersedeas being perhaps unconstitutional when required of a person to appeal, that's one issue; and I think that does need to be addressed; but on the indigent side of things, you have somebody who -- now, granted, a landlord is supposed to send notice of termination and there are rules about that; but if a landlord files a forcible and somebody with five days notice of trial doesn't know, doesn't get their act together to demand or to assert a defense based on prior notice, they may not have had any In a matter of six days they could be in court notice. with an order from the court saying, "You're out of your house and if you want to stay, you owe three months prior rent."

Now, to put that in perspective for those of

us of higher income, let's say you got a notice to be in court next week in six days and you can't get a lawyer for whatever reason and you're not a lawyer and you get a 3 judgment against you saying, "You're out of your house 4 unless you put \$12,000 up in the next five days. You can 5 appeal, and that's going to cost you \$700, but it's 12,000 6 to stay in." If you win your appeal later, you may get possession back. I think that's a value judgment as to whether we want to put people in that position or not. The current rules don't put people in that position, and I 10 think it would be a major change to do that, and my 11 understanding of what is proposed would do that. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I don't know 13 about the \$12,000. I think that would be very unusual. 14 The typical appeal bond is probably between two and three 15 thousand dollars. 16 17 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Well, no, he was trying to show proportionality. 18 19 MR. YELENOSKY: Proportion for an individual whose income by definition --20 21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Oh, okay. Ι'm sorry. I misunderstood. 22 MR. YELENOSKY: -- would have to be indigent 23 in order for this to apply. I'm just trying to pick some 24 figure that we can grasp, because the real figures I don't 25

think any of us fathom what the amount of money -- \$2,000 to somebody whose income in a year is \$12,000 might as well be a million.

bond, though, could be minimal. It could be that the plaintiff is not asking for back rent, just asking for possession. It may be a non-rent breach of the lease, in which case the appeal bond may be \$200. You're going to have -- this should not be a total surprise to a tenant because, presumably if it's a rent breach then the tenant will have known that he didn't pay rent. There's got to be a notice to vacate and a three-day wait after that to filing a suit. There's a service time and then there's the time to actually get it to court, which is supposed to be six to ten days, so you're looking at a little more time maybe than you think in order for the tenant to try to hire a lawyer if he wants to.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, that assumes -- well, first of all, you're talking about the appeal bond being low and I am not as concerned about the appeal bond as the proposed supersedeas, because the proposed supersedeas would be a function of the alleged back rent owed, and there may be defenses to the alleged back rent owed that aren't asserted because you've got six days to get to trial, you aren't aware of your rights and educated well

enough to determine them in that amount of days and get a lawyer. You may even have -- you may even have an argument based on the Fair Housing Act. You're not going to be able to get that together in six days.

Now, again, then you get to the question of whether the amount of money to remain in possession should be that alleged back amount of rent or if instead a person should just be required to pay current rent pending appeal, which is the current state of the law.

the supersedeas is set it's not going to be based on what's alleged in the petition. It will be based on a trial, the judgment rendered by the court after a trial, after an evidentiary hearing and a full opportunity to present defenses, but you're correct that the trial court says that the judgment is for the plaintiff for possession, \$3,000 back rent, then you base the supersedeas on the amount of the judgment, and that's correct, but it's not based on allegations. It would be after trial and a full hearing.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, and I guess my argument is it's a trial and it's a full hearing six days from when the tenant may first know. Now, you're right, they're supposed to send notices and all that; but assuming poor or no defense by the tenant, it could be six

days from the time that the tenant knows the landlord is alleging this 'til they get in court; and proof in a court, of course, depends on how well the allegations of the landlord are defended.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Could I ask another question on this back rent? Because what is the present substantive property law about withholding rent? For example, if I am a tenant and the plumbing completely backs up and I'm living in sewage and I call my landlord and the landlord does nothing and so I take my meager resources to do what the landlord's legally obligated to do, which is take care of the sewage problem, I now can't pay my rent; but, of course, the landlord breached first; and the landlord files an FED alleging a rent breach to get me out.

If I lose the FED, for whatever reason, then I'm going to lose possession unless I can pay the back rent, but I can't pay the back rent because all the money went to fix the sewage problem. Does the substantive law allow the withholding of rent if there's been a --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's governed by Chapter 92 of the Property Code, which is the "Landlord's Duty to Repair"; and if it is a violation that is covered by the Property Code, which is something that affects the material health and safety of an ordinary tenant, and

specifically the situation you address is actually specifically addressed and it would, the tenant has to give the landlord notice of the problem and request to repair; and if he doesn't, the landlord actually can repair it himself and deduct that from the rent. So there is some --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: You mean tenant.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The tenant can.

I'm sorry.

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this is kind of a different take on the problem Steve's raised, which is, is I lose and I'm ordered then to vacate. If I want to take an appeal, I've got to come up with the back rent, but my money went to repair the problem, and I can't come up with the back rent, and so I lose possession.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank Gilstrap.

MR. GILSTRAP: Before we go much further down that road, I'd kind of like to maybe get a fix on where we're going with this discussion. Certainly the whole law of eviction is something that could be examined in depth. It involves the rights of little people, including some little landlords, and you could easily go in and blow the whole thing up and rewrite a better law, but as Elaine says, this is an ancient area of the law.

Some of this stuff has developed over years. Many people know how to do it already, and any change you make is going to make a real change in a huge number of lawsuits in JP court.

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I think the approach the committee took was not to try to rewrite the law, but basically to take the existing law, including the existing language, and go through and make some needed changes, such as the requirement involving an appeal bond which apparently is mandated by the Constitution. What are we going to do with this? Are we going to first of all look at the old review? Are we going to talk about the ins and outs? If so, which ins and outs? My concern is we could be here on this as long as we were on recusal. It's that complex.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ouch. We don't want to do that. Well, that's a great point, and, frankly, Stephen, I was going to ask you this question. Do you agree with the subcommittee that the existing law with respect to appeals from JP court to the county court de novo needs to be fixed?

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, only with respect to nonindigent appellants because that's the only thing that's constitutionally compelled. Isn't that right, Elaine?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: No -- No litigant can be

required to bond a judgment by supersedeas to appeal.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right, but I mean the only change that is constitutionally compelled from the current rules is one that would release -- because nonindigents right now are required essentially to post a supersedeas, would be required to separate out the requirement of an appellate bond from the requirement of a supersedeas bond. That's constitutionally compelled because the current rules define the appellant's bond essentially to be a supersedeas bond.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Right.

MR. YELENOSKY: So the only constitutionally compelled change is one that fixes what an appellant's bond should be in amount and uncouples that from the back rent and then says, "Well, if you're not indigent and you want to retain possession, you have a choice of supersedeas," as opposed to being compelled to have that in your appellant's bond.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But you agree that no matter what the scope is, something needs to be fixed?

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, but I think it's very important to say that part, because I understood -- I agreed with Frank up to the point where maybe I misunderstood you. At the end I thought you were saying that everything proposed here is not substantive, because

to the extent that we're talking about a supersedeas that
would have to be posted by indigents, that's very
substantive and that does exactly what you were suggesting
earlier, which is overturns a whole body of law and
perhaps the basis, one of the bases, for supporting a very
rapid entry into the JP court.

So I would say if people agree with Frank then we focus on the one constitutionally compelled change here, which can be done without affecting the current right of indigents to appeal merely by paying current

rent.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Steve, you're correct.

Those are two distinct issues and then there's a myriad of other problematic issues that exist as well, such as there's case law right now saying Rule 245 applies when you go to the county court, goes both ways.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: And the setting of trial
-- these are supposed to be expedited proceedings and
there are intermediate court decisions saying "We need to
give 45 days notice of a trial." That's not very
expedited. And there's other cases saying, "Well, that's
modified to the extent it's feasible, and it's very
unclear." 7216. But there are other problems, and you're
right, those are the two central issues.

MR. YELENOSKY: And those are other problems that yet you may very well be right need to be fixed constitutionally, and we can focus on those. I think if we do get to the issue for supersedeas for indigents we are not only getting into the debate here, but as I told Judge Lawrence before, quite frankly, if that were to be changed by rule I think you would see tenant groups going to the Legislature saying "Change one of two things. Either make it so that when we're indigent we don't have to pay a supersedeas that we can't pay to continue possession, or rewrite the JP rules so that landlords can't get in in six days and have a hearing before we're prepared to have it heard," because the legislative support for the JP system may be in part based on the assumption that you get in quickly but the person is not -- is held harmless if they decide they want to appeal and take it to county court.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: Steve, currently to appeal from county court to the court of appeals an indigent has to post supersedeas.

MR. YELENOSKY: And I think that is a different situation precisely for the reason I just said. You can get into JP court so quickly. Rarely the tenant, given the population of legal aid lawyers, have one. If they are going to raise it to the level of county court,

go through a trial there, then I think it is different when you go from the court of appeals -- or from the county court to the court of appeals.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl, do you want to yield to Sarah?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No, go ahead. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Carl first.

MR. HAMILTON: I missed the last meeting, and this may have been stated, but the way this all came up was the Justice of the Peace Association came to our committee and through a subcommittee we learned that there was a lot of abuse of the rules by the tenants in that they all had figured out how to manipulate the system so that they cannot pay rent for at least ten days and sometimes up to three months before they actually get evicted, so this was the problem that we set about to fix.

I guess I agree with Elaine that certainly the de novo trial would eliminate the necessity for anything. So I think that really does need to be fixed, but once we fix that, it seems to me that the fairest way to do it is to have the parallel systems of an appeal, which doesn't require anything except an appeal bond, and then a supersedeas procedure whereby they at least have to pay the rent in order to maintain possession of the property. Now, the supersedeas bond to protect against a

money judgment I think as a practical matter -- you may know more about this -- is that there are not many landlords that really care about getting the money 3 judgment for the back rent because if they can't pay the current rent they are not going to pay the back rent 5 6 either. So it's mostly a matter of possession, and 7 most of the cases are forcible detainers without 8 necessarily suing for back rent, so that a procedure that in unusual circumstances where you had a back rent 10 situation, the tenant is just going to have to come up 11 with either a pauper's affidavit or a bond to supersede 12 I don't see anything wrong with that. It may require 13 a little work to rewrite some of this, but I think that's 14 the way we ought to go. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan, then 16 Steve. 17 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 18 I may be too theoretical about this and not practical. It's my nature. 19 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Judicially noted. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's not true. 21 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But it does seem to 22 me -- and I think it's true historically -- that the 23 reason the law vacates a JP judgment upon appeal to the 24 county court is because the JP court is not a court of 25

record, and we're not willing to give a presumption of correctness to a judgment emanating from a court that is not of record.

I have long been concerned with the Dillingham vs. Putnam problem in these rules, but I also
have a great concern with giving a presumption of correctness to only one type of JP court judgment.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: And if I could just follow up on that, Sarah, the case law is to the extent, for example, that if a tenant appeals to the county court and the JP court judgment is vacated and the tenant does not proceed expeditiously and the FED is dismissed for want of prosecution by the county court, you have no judgment. There is no judgment to rebut. So it does -- the case law, you're right, currently is very clear that there's a vacation, an annulment of the JP judgment, and for the reasons you stated; but that may be the reason, but it does have problems in putting forth the correct procedures.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen and then Judge McCown.

MR. YELENOSKY: Carl Hamilton and I also spoke before this, and I can give anecdotal information from the tenant's perspective and Carl and others can give them from a landlord's perspective and the JP can give

probably both, but the point there is that when we start talking about there's a problem because the landlord's can't do this or that, we're really talking legislatively. Now, whether or not this rule was written with in mind some legislative end that we want to make it this way or that way for landlords or tenants, to change it now because we see a problem for landlords clearly is making a kind of legislative decision.

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Now, I don't know, but I think we try to stay away from that. We talk all the time about how this doesn't work because the plaintiff, the defendant, who might be on one side or another in a particular situation, is unconstitutionally disadvantaged or the rules aren't fair between the two, but to say that we need to change a rule because landlords are having to wait too long to get possession -- which may or may not be true. I know there are small landlords, but to have that debate here, really, to me is a legislative debate, and it would require us to ask whether clearly changing that would be more advantageous to landlords, and clearly some people think moving to be more advantageous to landlords would be fair, but then we have to have a debate about whether the current system is fair when you compare it to other forcible entry and detainer systems around the country.

Judge McCown.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Well, I mean, I agree with Frank in what he -- in his approach, which is we need to fix any procedural problems but not change the law, but my understanding is that requiring the back rent to supersede is a change, that that's not what we're doing now, and that's what's being proposed.

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MR. YELENOSKY: For indigents.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: For indigents, and I have a real problem with that. You know, Carl just said these suits aren't about -- usually about back rent because the landlord doesn't care; but if you change the procedural rule, they would quickly become about back rent because the landlord would want to set a supersedeas amount so high that the tenant couldn't meet it and the landlord would get possession; and I don't want to sign off onto the philosophy that Steve just said, which is that we shouldn't make legislative decisions through these rules because sometimes I think we should and in the future may want to; but if we're going to look at policy, we ought to look at it in a systematic, sophisticated way. We should go out and study the relationship between tenants and landlords and who's getting ripped off economically or who needs what.

We shouldn't make it based on anecdotal evidence, and my guess is that we're better off in a

system overall where landlords get possession a little more slowly than in a system where tenants are booted a little more quickly. That would be my guess about what we would find if we studied it. So, I mean, I don't know where that leads us, but I agree with Frank we ought to just fix the procedural parts and shouldn't make substantive changes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the subcommittee probably spent more time on this issue than any other issue. We had a lot of discussion. I spent a lot of time talking to plaintiff's lawyers and defense -- indigent defense Bar trying to come up with something. We looked at the existing case law, the statutes that govern appeals from other ways, and this is what we felt at the time was the best way to do it.

Now, is there another way? Yes, obviously, but the issue of whether or not you give an indigent -- allow an affidavit of indigence to suffice for the supersedeas as well as the appeal bond itself is just one issue of a lot of things here, most of which does not have anything to do with that. We've got a lot of procedural issues that don't involve that particular thing that I think we can talk about and maybe get some agreement on. And this one we certainly need to talk about, but it's

only one part of a lot of changes.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Can we fix the trial de novo problem by just saying that it's a trial de novo in the sense that we're going to hear everything again because, as Sarah says, it's not a court of record, but that the judgment below is not void? Can we do that by rule?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We have in the proposed changes a fix to that and a lot of other problems we haven't even gotten into. I think the proposed rules dovetail together. The rules can be written in a way either to solve the problem raised by the indigent appeal on supersedeas, one way or the other, and not change a lot of the other things, but that issue is addressed in actually Rule 748a in the proposal.

This was not the only issue. We looked at all of the problems. We have got a lot of problems with the rules, and we looked at all of them to try to figure out how best to handle them at the JP court level through the appeal to county court and then the trial at the county court. I mean, this is a pretty substantive change in the procedural rules that we think is going to make everything run a lot smoother.

I guess I'd rather just start with Rule 748, which is where we left off last time, and work through it;

and when we get to Rule 750, which is the supersedeas, we can talk about that or just skip over it and save that 'til later; but I think you'll see as we get into it how everything kind of fits together.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Yeah, I think the line between substance and procedure is often a very murky and fuzzy one, but my sense is that our charge is to not cross that line into substance as a general proposition but rather to stick with the administration of justice and procedure; and certainly if we spot in a rule that there is a problem with the constitutionality of the rule that we should fix it without regard to much of anything else; but having said all that, the rules are what they are. They are Rules of Procedure, and we are charged by the Court with studying and recommending to the Court what changes to the Rules of Procedure there should be.

I agree with Steve, however, and Frank that we don't need to and are ill-equipped to start getting into legislative-type activity where we're choosing one interest group, the tenants, over another interest group, the landlords. So if that is a fair summary of where we are in terms of the substance versus procedure, I think it would be appropriate now to go to Rule 748a.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 748.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 748, and start talking

about it. Anyone disagree with that? 1 MR. CHAPMAN: I just have a question. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You don't disagree, 3 though? 4 Don't disagree, though. 5 MR. CHAPMAN: CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Then you may speak. 6 7 MR. CHAPMAN: Thank you. I quess it's a point of order. Elaine, is the bottom line that the subcommittee has recommended the parallel procedure? Is that what is --10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes. 11 MR. CHAPMAN: -- implicit in these proposed 12 13 changes? PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes, and we really did 14 not feel like we were in the legislative encroachment. In 15 fact, the procedure that we're paralleling are the 16 legislative procedures from county court to court of 17 appeals. But Steve makes a valid argument that there may 18 19 or may not be reason to do that. That's something that I think is a procedural issue. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. With that noted, let's qo forward. 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. If you look 23 on the Bates stamped version, page 8 through page 14 is an 24 index of the rule changes that talks about what was 25

changed, what was deleted. It sort of helps you follow the discussion, and some cases we took portions in one rule and put into a different rule. Some cases we amended, changed the substance of the rule, but for the purposes of this we're going to start on page 22. Everything that is underlined represents an addition. Everything that is struck through represents a deletion. There are notes and comments. If the notes and comments have been underlined then the proposal is that that actually be put into the rule as a comment. Some cases I've got a comment for the committee or comment to the committee. That's not to go into the rule. just to try to help understand what we have done and why. Rule 748 as it currently exists is fairly It talks about what the judgment is, and there's small. not much to it in the current rule, but in order to make the process work to figure out how much rent is to be paid to the registry of the court during an appeal, figure out how to set the supersedeas, to figure out what to set the appeal bond at, we feel like we need to expand somewhat Rule 748; and what we're going to do or what we propose to do is we're specifying what the judgment may include as far as the judgment for the plaintiff, what can be awarded 23 to the plaintiff or what can be awarded to the defendant. 24 An overview is that that would have to be reduced to a 25

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finding of fact and put in a written judgment; and that written judgment would specify how much rent is awarded, the date through which the rent is awarded; and that becomes important to try to figure out how much rent and when rent should be paid into the registry of the court.

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Currently there is a requirement that if there is an affidavit of indigence and appeal from that that says rent be paid into the registry. Well, the difficulty is that the judgment may include rent through a certain date, and that's not currently reflected in a judgment, so we feel it's important to put the date on which the rent is rendered or on which the rent is granted so it's obvious that you're not going to charge the defendant twice, in other words. You're not going to assess a judgment for rent through the end of the month of September and then require rent be paid to the registry of the court within five days after the appeal and, therefore, he has to pay it twice. So that's why we feel like we need to specify on the judgment what rent is awarded and when the rent is through and also the date the rent is due because that becomes important in county court when you try to figure out, well, when is the rent supposed to be paid into the registry of the court? it should be paid when due, and that needs to all be based on the judgment that's originally rendered by the trial

court, the JP court.

Now, I don't know if you want to go through this line by line. In the first paragraph we're making it clear that a justice may give judgment for -- obviously for the possession -- we're not changing that -- but also for back rent, contractual late charges, and attorneys fees, if sought and established by proof, provided that it's within the jurisdiction of court. Our 5,000-dollar jurisdictional limit includes attorneys fees, so it's everything other than court costs.

Now, if a defendant prevails then the defendant may be awarded possession obviously, attorneys fees as authorized and established by proof and provided it's within the jurisdiction of the court. If the judgment is for possession, the judgment shall issue a writ of possession for the plaintiff, and we're not changing the five days.

When we get into subparagraph (a), we're talking about the -- that the judgment itself must be in writing in a separate document, contain the full names of the parties as per the pleadings, state for and against whom the judgment is rendered. The judgment forms now, actually, you don't actually have to have a judgment form now. You can write it in the docket book, and that's permissible; and then, of course, if it's appealed, you

make a copy of that docket book and send it up. We're trying to refine this so it's clear exactly what the judgment is, because that's going to be more important.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Can I stop you for two seconds? Is the jurisdictional limits of the JP courts statewide, uniform statewide? In other words there are no counties where the JP court has a larger jurisdictional limit?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There used to be a distinction, but not anymore. It's 5,000 for forcibles. There is no jurisdictional limit for deed restrictions, but for forcibles it's 5,000 statewide.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And everything else is 5,000.

"(b), a forcible entry and detainer judgment shall contain findings of fact." And then we specify -- and this becomes important for the purposes of determining the supersedeas and for determining -- and we're going to have a supersedeas, presumably, if the defendant is not indigent. That's not probably something that's going to be that controversial I would assume, so whether or not the indigent defendant is going to be relieved of the supersedeas, then if there's going to be a supersedeas to be posted to secure the judgment then you would need the

information in (b) to determine that as well as for the county court to rely on. We're trying to determine how much rent is to be paid into the registry and when that is due.

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Now, (c), not all cases of forcible detainer are going to be under rental agreement, either written lease agreement or oral rental agreement. You have a lot of cases that are because there was an original -- maybe there's been a mortgage foreclosure and there's been a holdover after that. There's been a termination of executory contract. So there may not be an independent obligation to pay rent. Well, you still have an interest by the landlord that he's having to pay the mortgage or having to expend funds that his interests need to be protected just as if there was an agreement to pay rent, so there's a determination in these cases that you determine the fair rental market value and assess that, and that will be the amount to be paid into the registry of the court during the pendency of the appeal.

The notes and -- I'm sorry, yeah, the notes and comments at the bottom were clarifying there -- in essence, we're clarifying exactly what the judgment can be for, as far as a judgment for the plaintiff or a judgment for the defendant. We're explaining that recovery under any other grounds than specified is not to be allowed,

because sometimes people want to come in and they file a petition and they want damages for holes in the sheetrock or they want some other ground of recovery, and we're making that clear that's not to be included in here.

There actually are -- and also that there is no -- I'm sure we put in here not that there was a counterclaim.

MR. CHAPMAN: Yeah, it's there.

there's no counterclaim. There's actually some case law about that in a county court case that the court ruled that really it's not appropriate to have a counterclaim and we're specifying that because sometimes defendants want to file a counterclaim; and if you get into counterclaims or other matters of recovery then you lengthen the process, and it's designed to be a rapid process.

They're actually in -- if you look at the standard Texas Apartment Association lease agreement, which is probably used in a substantial percentage of nonpayment rent cases -- most of the large landlords use it -- there actually are 18 different paragraphs in the Property Code where a tenant can independently sue a landlord. There are 13 different provisions in the Property Code where a landlord can sue a tenant. Just because we limit the grounds of recovering a forcible does

not preclude them from filing it. They can always file a separate lawsuit for these other independent grounds, but 2 I think the focus has always been to limit the grounds of 3 recovery to just those things set forth. 4 MR. YELENOSKY: Can I ask a question? 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Steve. 6 MR. YELENOSKY: Some of those grounds --7 just to point out because this later will become relevant to the other issue if we talk about it, some of the grounds the tenant can bring actually relate to the issue 10 of possession, that a tenant could bring in another 11 lawsuit. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Doesn't mean that 13 they can't use that as a defense in the forcible. 14 means that an independent ground to try to get monetary 15 damages would not be appropriate in this particular 16 They can certainly sue for monetary damages in a 17 action. separate lawsuit. Whatever defense comes up, obviously, 18 they could use. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ralph. 2.0 MR. DUGGINS: How does that deal with 21 Scott's situation? I mean --22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Where the sewage 23 24 was in the apartment? MR. DUGGINS: Where the tenant has been 25

forced to expend the money that he or she would otherwise have spent for rent.

Would give testimony in court that they gave the notice and the landlord refused to do it; therefore, they repaired it themselves, deducted it from the rent; and that would be a defense to the nonpayment of rent, at least for those repairs during that period of time; and if the landlord sued for the full amount of the rent and didn't give them credit, then that should be a judgment for tenant for possession. That would be a valid defense.

MR. CHAPMAN: Well, as a practical matter, you've got in many instances a tenant who is pro se, has scribbled out on a piece of paper that "I didn't pay rent because the plumbing didn't work and I had to pay for it myself. I spent \$67." Under these changes and this comment, will the JP court judge throw out that, what could be considered a counterclaim, and say, "I am not going to hear it. It's not appropriate"?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it would not be heard as a counterclaim now, nor would it be heard under the proposed revisions. There is not a counterclaim per se in a forcible detainer action.

Now, the Legislature in Chapter 22 of the Property Code has set forth very specific guidelines on

when the defendant can repair stuff, when the defendant cannot pay the rent for some reason, and that's not going to change. Nothing in the rules that we're proposing today is going to affect what the Legislature has done as far as defenses to an eviction in the Property Code.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Could I make a proposal? Since you're proposing to have an official comment, where it says "The rule also" -- "The rules also allow a defendant who prevails to recover any costs and attorney fees to which they are entitled, but a defendant may not file a counterclaim," could I propose that after "counterclaim" you put a comma and say something like -- these may not be the words you want to use, but say something like "though the facts supporting a counterclaim may support an affirmative defense if they relate to possession"?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. I don't -- that would be fine with me.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: I just think if we're going to have an official comment saying to people there can't be counterclaims, we can clarify in that same official comment that there might be an affirmative defense if it relates to possession, that those facts might support that affirmative defense.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's fine.

1	HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Let's break it down
2	to two sentences, though.
3	HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: All right.
4	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. Well, I
5	understand what he wants to do. I can work on that.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody opposed to that,
7	to that friendly amendment? Any comment? Okay.
8	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: In the handout, the
9	small handout you have, 748a is the second page of that,
10	and probably we really need to have that as 748(d) and not
11	have an a.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What you're proposing is
13	taking Rule 748 and adding a new subsection, (d)
14	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: and moving the
16	language that you have in your proposed Rule 748 small a.
17	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right, without
19	parentheses?
20	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think it makes
21	more sense to put everything relating to the judgment in
22	one rule instead of having an a.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody disagree with
24	that? It makes sense to me.
25	HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Here's where we get

into a particular troublesome problem, which is --1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just so we identify for 2 the record, this is a handout for forcible entry and 3 detainer agenda items which was handed out today, and on 4 the second page of this handout there is a proposed rule 5 748 small a, "Judgment of the justice court upon appeal," 6 and we now have proposed taking that language and moving 7 it to create a new subsection, small (d), to Rule 748, 8 which is on Bates page 22 and 23 of the June handout, 9 10 correct? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 11 12 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Before we do that, can I ask a quick question? 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Judge Brown. 14 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: On the attorneys 15 fees issue for the tenant, do they have to file something 16 17 requesting that? In other words, do they have to have a prayer or can they just -- can their answer that says, you 18 know, "I don't think I owe the money" be enough that they 19 can get attorneys fees? 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There are two ways 21 that a tenant can get attorneys fees. One way is if there 22 is a written lease agreement that says the prevailing 23 party is entitled to attorneys fees. So they wouldn't 24 have to do anything. 25

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: They don't have to put it in their pleading, in other words.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, and the other way that they can get attorneys fees is Property Code, Section 24.006, and that says that if the landlord has a specific pleading for attorneys fees separate and apart from the lease agreement and the tenant wins, the tenant can get attorneys fees. So the tenant does not have to do anything to get attorneys fees if they prevail so long as one of these two scenarios is in effect.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Thank you. Sorry.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Now, 748(d) is designed as much as possible to try to solve a problem that has existed for a number of years, and it affects the appeal and the status of a judgment of the JP court if it's appealed to county court, as Elaine got into.

If you -- under our current rule it talks about a judgment being perfected when you post the appeal bond and then some case law says that if the judgment is perfected then the judgment in justice court is annulled or vacated or --

MR. EDWARDS: You're talking about the appeal being perfected, not the judgment.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The appeal being perfected, and from JP to county court. There is another

hurdle, though, and that's Rule 143a, which is that the county clerk -- it says that a filing fee be paid, and that's in the rules. So if the filing fee is not paid then the county court never has jurisdiction, so the judgment that is perfected from the JP court is sort of in limbo until the judgment -- until the court costs are paid in county court, and then when the county court judge invokes jurisdiction and takes jurisdiction, at that point the judgment in JP court is a nullity or is vacated.

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Now, if the judgment at county court, if the case at county court, if they decide to dismiss that case for want of prosecution or some other reason then it's all over and the plaintiff no longer has to have a judgment. The plaintiff has to go back to JP court and start over again and file a new lawsuit because the judgment was originally vacated in the JP court, and there are a lot of things that affect that. There is quite a bit of case law that talks about it. The case law is confusing, sometimes contradictory; but we're trying to fix that problem here; and what we propose, "If the judgment of the justice court is not appealed then it remains in force and the prevailing party may enforce their rights under the judgment of the justice court." That's the easiest scenario, no appeal. Judgment is final, and it goes into effect.

If the appeal of the judgment of the justice 1 court is perfected, but the county court's jurisdiction is 2 not invoked then the judgment of the justice court remains 3 in force, and the prevailing party may enforce their 4 rights under the judgment of the justice court. So if the 5 appeal bond is posted and everything looks right from the 6 JP level and they send it up to the county court, the county court doesn't take jurisdiction, then that means 8 that the justice court -- it's clear, even though there's 9 case law that sort of says that, it's now clear that that 10 original judgment is in effect and may be enforced. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How would that happen 12 that the county court doesn't take jurisdiction? 13 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: They don't pay the 14 court costs. They don't pay the court costs at the county 15 court, right, Andy? 16 17 MR. HARWELL: That's right. MR. YELENOSKY: Or file an affidavit. 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Or file --19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah's amused by this. 20 Sarah's amused by this. 21 Well, I'm a little 22 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We have -- it's now getting close to a decade 23 frustrated. 24 of Supreme Court case law on not paying filing fees 25 exactly when they're due, and we're going to create a

whole different set of rules for these kinds of cases, and I'm frustrated.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know that we're creating a new set of rules. I think we're trying to refine what is really existing case law for the most part.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's not my understanding of what the Supreme Court says, and if Dorsaneo were here he could tell us exactly the cases, or maybe Pam can or Elaine, but the Supreme Court has been quite liberal on not paying the filing fee precisely when it's due and there being conditional jurisdiction until that fee is paid.

that I've read -- and I have got a number of them here that deal with appeals from the justice court to county court, both forcibles and nonforcibles -- if the jurisdiction is not invoked, and nonpayment of the filing fee is one of those, we are not talking about paying it late. We're talking about it not being paid, period. They have always kicked them back and not invoked jurisdiction and said that the judgment of the JP court should be enforced. I mean, I don't think I'm changing anything.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Andy, how does that

work?

MR. HARWELL: Well, whenever the case is appealed they have to pay the filing fee before the county court will come in. Now, the pauper affidavit, if the pauper affidavit is filed then our county court judge --we have two county court-at-law judges. They say that the pauper's affidavit has to be approved at the county court level. In other words, it doesn't -- it's not approved automatically, but the court costs still have to be paid up front.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's say that on the day that they're due they're not paid. What happens then? I mean, does the county court say, "Okay, fini, it's over. See you."

MR. HARWELL: That's correct.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: They send it back to the JP court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Send it back to the JP court. Well, what if there's a motion, petition, or something to say, "Okay, I missed the date, sorry, but now it's five or ten days later. Here's the filing fee. Now will you take my case"? What happens then?

MR. HARWELL: It's up to the judge. I mean, the judge will have to order --

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: But can I ask a more

fundamental question, because --1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 2 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: In our county I don't 3 think the clerk would let you get your paperwork across 4 the threshold. They would not take it without a check or 5 6 an affidavit of indigency. MR. HARWELL: 7 That's correct. 8 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Would you-all do that, Bonnie? 9 MS. WOLBRUECK: As far as the filing of the 10 case, we would accept the filing. 11 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: You would? 12 MS. WOLBRUECK: No issuance or anything on 13 14 the document. HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: I don't think our 15 clerk would. 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But the way it 17 works, if you send the JP -- if they post the appeal bond, 18 the JP sends it up to county court, and under Rule 143a --19 correct me if I'm wrong -- they have got 20 days to pay. 20 MR. EDWARDS: Well, what 143a says is, "If 21 the appellant fails to pay the costs on appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace or small claims court 23 within 20 days after being notified to do so by the county 24 clerk, the appeal shall be deemed not perfected and the 25

county clerk shall return all papers in said cause to the 1 justice of the peace having original jurisdiction, and the 2 justice of the peace shall proceed as though no appeal had 3 4 been attempted." Isn't that -- if 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I'm hearing you correctly, Bill, that's the justice court 6 7 fees and costs. 8 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: No, that's the county court. 9 10 MR. EDWARDS: That's county court. 11 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's the filing 12 fee for your appeal. It says "costs on appeal to 13 MR. EDWARDS: the county court, " Rule 143a, "costs on appeal." 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We're going to fix 15 this problem with the costs on appeal a little bit later. 16 We're going to get to that. I'm just trying to --17 But that's what it says now. 18 MR. EDWARDS: 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. We're going to fix this problem in a second, but I'm trying to go 20 through the status of the judgment, which is at this point 21 not different than existing case law, but I'm trying to 22 clarify it because the case law is sort of all over the 23 place a little bit. I think it is going to make it easier 24 to understand. 25

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, let's satisfy 1 Sarah's problem, though, with this. Is there case law, 2 Sarah, that you think under this Rule 143a says, "Okay, it 3 says 20 days, but we're kind of liberal guys, and we'll 4 let you do it in 30"? 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I am not talking 6 7 about 143a, and I am not talking about FED case law. I'm just talking about --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just generally. 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I'm talking about 10 appeals from district courts to courts of appeals, and it 11 is the notice of appeal that invokes the jurisdiction of 12 the court of appeals, not the paying of the fee, and I am 13 not in favor of creating a different rule. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Do you think a different 15 16 rule exists now, from --HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 143a --17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: From JP to county court. 18 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And I don't know if 19 it's interpreted as it's written, but there appears to be 20 a 20-day --21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There's a different 22 rule for JP. There is. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. But what Judge 24 25 Lawrence is saying is there is a different rule, and so

jurisdiction is not invoked if within 20 days of getting notified you don't pay your fee. 2 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Well, is it accurate 3 to say jurisdiction is not invoked, or is it more accurate 4 to say jurisdiction is not retained? You get -- the case 5 goes up. It gets filed. You get notice of what's owed. 6 You've got 20 days to pay it. If you don't pay it in 20 7 days then it goes back to the JP and they act as if no 8 appeal were perfected. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So if you said 10 11 "jurisdiction is not invoked or retained," not invoked would be in those counties that where like you say --12 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Well, but I'm not 13 sure that's -- I was thinking of a case in the district 14 It seems like this is its own procedure that 15 you're going up from the JP to the county. They have a 16 specific rule about it. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: As Bonnie says, that they 18 will take it --19 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Yeah. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- but they will hold it 2.1 until the fees get paid, and, Andy, what do you do? 22 MR. HARWELL: We have a notice of appeal, 23 24 and I quess that's the 20-day period where the parties are notified, and if the fees are not paid then it goes back 25

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to JP court.
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Would this be fixed if it
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   said "is not retained," Judge McCown?
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                 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN:
                                        Well, I'm --
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                 MR. YELENOSKY: I have a different
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   suggestion.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Steve.
                 MR. YELENOSKY: 143a is a different rule,
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   but it's just a different rule. There's nothing that
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   would prevent us from proposing a change to Rule 143a.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We have a change to
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   143a in this.
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                 MR. YELENOSKY:
                                 Okay. And I haven't seen
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   that or looked ahead to it; but if what we're talking
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   about now is governed by the existing 143a, maybe this
   would affect people in a way I don't want them to be
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   affected; but with respect to indigents, it always had
   seemed to me silly that you had to file an affidavit of
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   inability in the JP court and then turn around and file
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   one in the county court in the very same action. So I
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   don't know why we need the two-step process.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You might have come into
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   some money in the interim.
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                 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, that's right, but
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   perhaps -- that's true, but 20 days?
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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If the affidavit of 1 indigence or pauper's affidavit is granted in the JP court 2 for an appeal to county court, you don't have to file a 3 new one in county court. 4 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, it used to be, I 5 think, that you did. 6 7 MR. HARWELL: Our two county courts-at-law require that it be refiled. 8 MR. YELENOSKY: See. 9 MR. HARWELL: They said because the judge's 10 ruling at the JP level doesn't necessarily mean that that 11 ruling will be upheld at the county court level. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I think our changes 13 to Rule 749 is going to correct that problem. 14 PROFESSOR CARLSON: But I guess the big 15 picture, though, is it the sense of the committee that you 16 don't want to have perfection of an appeal by filing fees? 17 Sarah's saying like --18 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: No. 19 PROFESSOR CARLSON: -- by notice of appeal. 20 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: I don't see any 21 reason to change it. We're talking about if they don't 22 pay the fee, they get 20 days. 20 days after notice if 23 they don't pay the fee then it's dismissed. 24 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Not under this 25

rule. I think that the proposed rule is that you perfect by paying the fee.

MR. CHAPMAN: Yeah. That needs to be changed, so it dovetails with the existing rule.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That is the existing rule. You have to pay the filing fee for the county court to accept jurisdiction on the case. That's the existing. That's not only the existing rule, there's a lot of case law that says that.

"If the appeal of the judgment in the justice court is perfected, but the county court's jurisdiction is not invoked" then et cetera, et cetera. So if you envision the situation in the second sentence where the appeal is perfected, but it's really not perfected because they haven't paid the costs in 20 days --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I would never -CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah's got a problem
with that.

what the Supreme Court would do, but my hunch is that the Supreme Court hasn't had to deal with an appeal from the justice to county court and get this issue resolved, because the Court's been pretty consistent in other areas where people are trying to pay -- to tie paying the filing

fee to perfection of an appeal. JUSTICE HECHT: This is a weird thing, 2 though. Because the appeal is really a de novo 3 proceeding, about to be a de novo proceeding, and 4 ordinarily -- I, frankly, don't know what the law is, but 5 I suppose you could go down to district court and file a 6 petition. You've not invoked the trial court's 7 jurisdiction unless you pay the fee. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or file an affidavit of 9 indigence. 10 JUSTICE HECHT: I don't know if that's the 11 law or not. 12 MR. EDWARDS: They won't take the fee in 13 14 district court. HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Yeah. The clerk 15 wouldn't -- that's what I was saying. The clerk wouldn't 16 17 take it. JUSTICE HECHT: Now, it's different -- I 18 know it's different in our shop. If they tender papers 19 without paying the fee, we just take them and write them a 20 letter and say, "Pay the fee," and then send them back if 21 they won't. I don't know how the court of appeals works. 22 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 23 MS. WOLBRUECK: Well, there is many 24 different bases for that throughout the state as far as 25

how clerks deal with the issue of not accepting filing fees for pleadings, but I think that there is in the rules and the like and through some case law that if whenever a document is tendered to the clerk, it is deemed filed. So that tendering actually files that document. So there is a rule that says that the clerk needs to file but does not have to issue, so most clerks will file the document, although the check is not included in with it, but then rule --

JUSTICE HECHT: Bonnie, does that apply to the original petition?

MS. WOLBRUECK: Yes, the original petition.

And so then, you know, the recourse for the clerk is really Rule 143, which allows rule for costs, and the clerk then goes and says, "Okay, you haven't paid the filing fees. I'm filing a motion to rule for costs," and that's done a great deal in the state.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Brown.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Do we have to use legal terms like "perfected" and "invoked"? Can't we just say, "If a notice of appeal is filed but the filing fee is not paid and an affidavit is not filed"? For one thing, it will make it easier to read for the tenant, but, secondly, it seems like we don't have to decide this legal issue. We can draft it in more practical terms.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: 1 I agree. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The procedure that 2 Bonnie is talking about, there is notice to the person 3 4 filing the original petition that you haven't paid the fee, and there is an opportunity to cure that deficiency. 5 MR. EDWARDS: There is one under 143a, too, 6 because they don't kick it back until 20 days after notice. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The second sentence is 10 trying to get at the situation where, however it's done in 11 whatever county it's done in, the proceedings do not go 12 forward in county court, and in that event then the JP 13 judgment remains in force --14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Maybe it will make 15 it easier --16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- unless I'm missing 17 18 something. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I hate to get 19 ahead, but the new Rule 749(d) -- I'm sorry. The proposed 20 Rule 749(d) is going to require the filing fee to be paid to the JP court at the time of the motion of appeal bond 22 or notice of appeal from a plaintiff, so I don't think 23 we're going to have this problem anymore. So 748 makes 24 25 more sense, I think, if you understand that if 749(d) is

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adopted then you're not going to have 143a where there's
   going to be the separate notice and the 20 days.
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                 The appeal is truly going to be perfected at
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   the time you post your appeal bond and pay the court costs
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   or you do your affidavit of indiqence, which means you
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   don't have to do either one. It's going to be clear at
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   the end of it that there's no filing fee and no appeal
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   bond to be posted or the plaintiff gives his notice of
   appeal and pays the filing fee, so we're not going to have
   this conundrum anymore under the new proposed 749(d).
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                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
                                           I think that's
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   exactly what some people are objecting to, is that you --
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   under 749(d) there is no perfection until the filing fee
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   is paid.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                           That's correct,
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   and --
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                 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: And what's the
   problem with that?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                           That's the existing
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   law.
                 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Yeah.
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   problem with that?
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                                           Under 143a, that's
                 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
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   not --
                 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: No, what's the
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problem with the proposed rule? 1 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's not --2 that's not -- doesn't appear to be the --3 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Well, what's the 4 problem with the proposed rule? Why should a person be 5 able to walk in in a de novo proceeding and file without 6 paying the fee? You either pay the fee or you have the 7 affidavit of indigency. You're at the clerk's counter, 8 and you're there with your papers, and the clerk says, 9 "Either you write me a check for this much or here's an 10 affidavit of indigency." Why should you be able to force 11 the clerk to take it without doing that? 12 MR. YELENOSKY: That's on the amount of 13 14 days. I think exactly the 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: same reason that clerks now take original petitions and 16 17 notices of appeals from district courts to courts of 18 appeals. HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: And what's that 19 20 reason? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That we want to 21 give people a fair opportunity to comply with their 22 responsibilities; and if I mail in a notice of appeal and 23 not a check, I think it's fair to say, "Sarah, you've only 24 done part of what you need to do. Now you need to pay the 25

fee, and if you don't pay the fee within X number of days, your appeal is going to be dismissed," just like we do on original petition, apparently from what Bonnie says, and as we do on appeal from district court to the court of appeals.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Steve.

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MR. YELENOSKY: Well, there's nothing wrong with that, I think, Judge McCown, if you lengthen the number of days to do it, because right now you've got five days, I guess, to file your notice of appeal, whatever, and then you get time from the county court to notify you you have to pay, and there's a period of time in there. If you lengthen the period of time to do this just one thing, that might allow people the opportunity to get the money together. That's really the only issue from my perspective, but landlords aren't going to want to do that because they want a short period of time for appeal of five days, so that if a tenant does nothing, on the sixth day they can get possession. So it's mediating between landlords getting possession quickly when tenants do nothing on appeal and giving tenants enough time to get money together if they're going to have to pay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carlyle.

MR. CHAPMAN: My problem with all of this, moving away from the notion that is embodied in 143a that

after 20 days -- or 20 days after notice is that this implies a bunch of "got you's." We are talking about a process where most people, the majority of the cases, people are pro se. Many times they're struggling just to try to understand what the process is, and what 143a presumes is that if someone files but doesn't pay or understand that a check needs to be paid, they've already paid something, or if they were a plaintiff in the JP court, they may assume that that's all that's necessary and it's just papers that need to be filed.

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We shouldn't, I don't think, then take out those notice provisions that provide people reasonable access and an opportunity to be heard. I mean, I just think that this kind of eliminates -- it makes it more arbitrary and less fair, and I think that we ought to leave those provisions unchanged with regard to provisions that give notice.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The proposed 749(b), which defines what it is to perfect an appeal that we haven't got to yet, that's going to require that this filing fee be paid at the time you perfect the appeal.

MR. CHAPMAN: I have a problem with that, too, and I think that you're just increasing the amount of money that the person has to come up with at a specific

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I mean, they're just -- I think that that's -- that
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   time.
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   permits --
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the decision
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   as to whether or not a filing fee is charged was made, and
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   currently there is a filing fee required. So if that's a
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   recommendation to change that, to have no filing fee by
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   anybody if there's an appeal, then I quess that can be a
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   recommendation.
                 MR. CHAPMAN: Well, I haven't implied that,
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   and that's not what I'm suggesting.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. But if there
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   is going to be a requirement that a filing fee be paid
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   then there are two ways to do it. One is that it be paid
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   up front when the appeal bond is posted or the notice of
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   appeal given to the JP within five days. Now, the five
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   days, we keep it at five days. It's always been five
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          I quess that could be changed if the committee and
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   the Court wanted to.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that jurisdictional,
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   the five days?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                           Well --
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if you file it on
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   Day 7?
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If you file it on
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   Day 7 you've lost your right to appeal.
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MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah, it is jurisdictional.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that's what I thought. So the filing fee issue is kind of tricky. If you don't pay your money on Day 5 and you have to pay it on Day 5, you could lose your substantive rights.

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The problem with the existing rule -- I think you've already pointed out -one of the problems is that we send the papers up, we send the appeal bond up, and the transcript, and that goes to the county clerk. The county clerk then sends out a notice -- and if I get something wrong, tell me, Andy. The county clerk sends out a notice to the appellant, who may be the plaintiff or the defendant at the original level, saying, "You've got 20 days to file it," and a lot of them don't come in. Now, maybe a lot of them don't come in because they don't understand it, they don't think they have to do anything, and that's probably true, but I can tell you that a lot of them don't come in because the tenant may appeal, and he knows that he's got a period of time in which he doesn't really have to do anything because you've got to give the notice, then you've got to wait 20 days, then you've got to send it out. So it could be almost a month in which he's not paying any rent or doing anything, and he knows that if he posts the appeal bond then nothing is going to happen for close to 30 days

after that.

So part of why we want to change 749(b) is to speed up the appeal -- the time in which it goes from the JP court to when it's heard at the county court so there isn't this 30-day delay.

MR. CHAPMAN: And I vote --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If you want to do away with having to pay a filing fee at all, that's fine, but the filing fee -- what's the filing fee at county courts? Hundred and --

MR. HARWELL: 148, I believe.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Wow.

either going to have to be paid under the current rule 20 days after the notice is given, or under the proposed rule that's going to have to be paid up front to perfect the appeal. It makes the system work smoother to do it up front to perfect the appeal. If you want to lengthen the process by having to appeal within ten days or one of these other things, you can do that, but understand that from the landlord's standpoint, they don't want the process lengthened to get the appeal done.

MR. CHAPMAN: Well, but from a due process standpoint and access to the courts, I think we ought to give notice as opposed to promote deficiency.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: You mean keep the rule like it is and allow 20 days?

MR. CHAPMAN: Right.

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MR. YELENOSKY: Well, if you tighten up the procedures that you think are preventing landlords from getting current rents so that the landlord is getting what he or she would get from that tenant or another tenant, maybe they're going to raise the rent, but at least what they have been getting all along, if that concept is held, then I don't see a problem with the changes; but some of these changes are going far beyond that; and for a landlord to say that they want to get somebody out right away when they are getting current rent doesn't really -- isn't sympathetic to me.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: If you took an appeal, would they be getting current rent during that appeal time?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If the appeal is perfected and the county court accepts jurisdiction and there is an obligation to pay rent that would be reflected in the trial court judgment, then rent would have to be paid into the registry of the court during the pendency of the appeal.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Right, but that doesn't affect this 20-day period because what the

landlord is concerned about is not the tenant that's going to stay and prosecute the appeal and pay the current rent. It's the tenant that's going to walk but takes the appeal so they get the 20 to 30 extra days.

MR. YELENOSKY: But you could tighten up -I mean, whatever -- if there's a time period in there
where they're ending up leaving without having paid
current rent during the pendency of the appeal, I
understood that prior rule to be tightening that up by
setting the date when they pay and all that, and that
could be tightened up without holding people hostage to
paying within 5 days or 20 days, something above what the
landlord would normally get during that period, in order
for them to contest it.

to pay rent into the registry will not occur until after the county court has jurisdiction, and that's not going to happen until the court costs are paid. I mean, the issue is when do we want the court costs to be paid, after notice and 20 days after that, or at the time that you perfect the appeal, which makes everything work a lot better? I mean, it makes the rules work better.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, it makes it work better unless you're the person who can't pay it and you're not in your apartment.

MR. CHAPMAN: Or unless you're the person 1 who doesn't understand that you have to pay --2 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 3 Yeah. -- within five days. MR. CHAPMAN: 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, you file an 5 affidavit of indigence. 6 7 MR. CHAPMAN: You may not be indigent. You 8 may just not understand. 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: You could easily not be indigent and not be --10 11 MR. YELENOSKY: Not be able to pay. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: There's \$148, which 12 sounds awfully high to me, but there's a 148-dollar filing 13 fee. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Brown has been 15 16 patient. HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: It just seems to me 17 it's a little inequitable to say, "We'll let lawyers make 18 mistakes. We won't kick theirs out because they didn't 19 file a fee, but we will not let the pro se litigants go." 20 I mean, the lawyers are the ones who know the rules. 21 give them grace. How can we not give a pro se the same 22 thing? 23 MR. CHAPMAN: I just --24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, there's not a 25

1 lot of grace built into the rules as they exist now. It's
2 pretty firm. I mean, it's --

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Well, but there are for lawyers. We've just heard that, for the Supreme Court, for filing a petition.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'm sorry. There's not a lot of grace period built into the forcible rules now. I mean, it's designed to be fast and --

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: And can I point out something, because this kind of goes back to Frank's comment earlier, and there really isn't a way to separate procedure completely from substance here because in the real world lots of problems between landlords and tenants could be worked out without anybody going to court if the landlord or the tenant were a little more reasonable with each other; and to the extent that you make it easier and faster for the landlord to kick out a tenant and get possession, to the extent you cut the hassle factor by making the rules more efficient, the landlord loses incentive to work out those minor problems with the tenant and instead just goes to court.

And so this free 20- to 30-day ride that the tenant gets that's a disadvantage to the landlord is also the system's way of building in an incentive for the landlord to work out those problems instead of going to

court. So there's just no way to separate these procedural rules completely from making policy choices.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Well, but speaking economically, landlords are not going to just -- landlords have to make a profit. They're not just going to bear these costs and say, "Well, we just will make less." If landlords -- there's a certain percentage of rents are not paid and they're going to have people in there for 30 days, what are they going to do? They are going to charge higher rents to all the other poor people who pay on time.

The cost of all deadbeats is not born, economists tell us, by the capitalists that we want to punish.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: But taking that -HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: They are born by
the consumers who are responsible who have to bear the
cost of deadbeats.

HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Taking that economic analysis one step further, the market for rents forces landlords to at a certain point they can't exceed what the market will pay because you'll go to some other landlord, and what you get here is taking some of the profit out of the landlord and leaving him with a little of the profit, but without doing -- without actually going out and doing an empirical analysis you can't know how that rule works.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I can tell you 1 they won't volunteer to bear 100 percent of the costs. 2 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Right, but they do 3 volunteer to bear maybe 20 percent or 30 percent of the 4 costs and take a little less profit. 5 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: The question is 6 should we shift the cost -- and to some degree you do, 7 maybe say "yes" -- but should we shift the cost from the people who aren't paying to people who do? That's -- if 9 you boil --10 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: 11 12 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: -- it down, that's what you're going to do. 13 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: 14 No. Or should you shift some of the costs to the landlord out of profit; and 15 this, what's being proposed, is a change. Already we 16 are -- the system puts a hassle factor in there that 17 forces a landlord to work out some amount of those 18 If it's economically cheaper to work out the 19 problems. problem than it is to evict the tenant, he'll work out the 20 problem, so you are shifting that economic analysis, too. 21 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: To interrupt this debate 23 between Justice Keenes and Justice Friedman, to hear from 24 Judge Brown. 25 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Maybe we could

think out of the box for just a minute. It seems like 1 maybe part of the problem is that we don't think the 2 tenant knows their rights. Maybe we could put in the 3 judgment a notice that's required that advises the tenant they have five days to file their notice of appeal, and 5 maybe we give them another five days to file the filing 6 fee or something like that. Maybe that's a compromise 7 that in putting something in the judgment where they're at least advised of the rights might help some of the issues 9 about they don't know, they walk in there, it's 5:00 10 o'clock p.m. the fifth day, and they didn't bring a check. 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. Well, let me 12 -- I'm not opposed to that, but let's don't do it in a 13 judgment, because the judgment is not going to be signed 14 probably when the tenant is still there. If you want that 15 then you need to have the court hand the losing party 16 something about their -- or actually both parties, really, 17 because one party may decide they didn't get enough rent 18 and they want to appeal, I guess in theory, but that both 19 sides are given something at the time outlining their 20 rights. I think if you want it to be effective you need 21 to do it right after the trial. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Steve, Carl, and then 23 24 Pam. 25 MR. YELENOSKY: Oh, on the economics, I

think you're right, Judge Brister, that it comes out of both of them. You have a little graph, and you meet at some point and some of the profit comes out of the 3 capitalist, some comes out of the consumer, in a perfect market; but that -- it's not a hundred percent, but if 5 we're just talking about --6 7 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Well, he was taking it all out of the consumer, and I'm saying some of it 8 comes out of capitalist. 9 Well, in any event, what 10 MR. YELENOSKY: 11 we're talking about right now is the 20-day period, not the landlord who is saying, "I haven't been paid rent for 12 six months, " because the question there is, "Well, why did 13 you wait six months before you sought forcible entry and detainer or whatever recourse you want?" That back amount 15 he's probably never going to get if the person is not --16 is judgment-proof. The only question is, is 5 days, 20 17 days, whatever; and that I don't think is worth worrying 18 about the economics of. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carlyle, you still want 20 to say something? 21 MR. CHAPMAN: No. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Pam. 23 24 MS. BARON: I think the problem is the concept of jurisdiction and premising jurisdiction on 25

payment of the fees, because what I'm hearing is, is that the jurisdiction doesn't transfer until the fee is paid; and so the 20 days can slow up the process. So I'm thinking maybe that shouldn't be the jurisdictional basis, but if the fee isn't paid within the 20 days then the appeal is dismissed and it's sent back.

MR. CHAPMAN: And that's exactly what 143a seems to say, and I vote to keep it just as it is because of, one, the appearance of fairness; two, the concepts of notice; and, three, the open courts concept that is implicit in this. I just don't think that we ought to be making changes that affect people who are most vulnerable to the change without having the ability to respond to it. I think this is the wrong way to go.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge Lawrence, and then we'll take a break, which we're desperately in need of.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If you say that the -- if you want to argue that the county court would accept jurisdiction when the appeal bond and the transcript is sent up and that if they later do not -- if I understand what you're saying, and later the filing fee is not paid so they dismiss the appeal and send it back to JP court, the problem with that is that under a lot of existing case law if they accept jurisdiction then the JP court judgment

is vacated. It doesn't exist any longer. 1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: It's not revived. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's not revived. 3 I mean, it's over with, and the parties have to start over 4 again and file a new lawsuit. That's the existing law. 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Then that's the 6 7 problem, and let's fix the problem. MR. CHAPMAN: I thought that there was a 8 later provision that you were proposing that dealt with 9 that. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's one of their 11 alternatives, but that's not the primary recommendation 12 they're making. 13 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Isn't it true --14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It deals -- I'm 15 16 sorry. 17 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No, go ahead. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It deals with it --18 it deals with it if the filing fee is paid at the time the 19 appeal bond is posted. Then everything dovetails 20 together. It makes it work, and the definition of when 21 the appeal is perfected as defined in a later rule, it all 22 fits together if we do it that way. If we keep it the 23 existing way, then we'll have to make some later changes, 24 25 which can be done.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: And the rules could be 1 written to incorporate Pam's suggestion, but we have to be mindful that that goes contrary to our existing case law 3 and just assume that case law would be corrected or 4 changed by the rule. 5 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: About 160 years of 6 7 existing case law. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 8 That's no problem. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We'll be in recess for 9 ten minutes. 10 11 (Recess from 10:59 a.m. to 11:20 a.m.) MR. GRIESEL: I think we have Justice 12 McClure on the phone, just in general. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have her on the phone 14 in general? 15 MR. GRIESEL: Well --16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or does she want to break 17 into this and do her deal? 18 MR. GRIESEL: Let me make sure she's still 19 on there. 20 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I think we must have a 21 solution now because I've established that Justice Duncan 22 is taking a position even to the left of mine, so Judge 23 24 Lawrence will have to accept my position on this. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. We're joined

by Justice McClure from El Paso, from what I understand. 1 HON. ANN McCLURE: Good morning. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good morning. Justice 3 McClure, is your time limited so that you want us to jump 4 to your issue now or are you just dying to hear about FED? 5 HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: Well, my position is 6 7 just this, Chip. First of all, I apologize that my physical disability at the moment prevents me from traveling, but my mental faculties are not impaired, so I 9 at least wanted to be able to listen in on the 10 11 discussions, and you can take up my proposals at any time during the day that's convenient to you. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, if you're 13 with us for the duration, you may regret that, but --14 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: Your mental faculties 15 may be impaired by the end of the day. 16 HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: That may well be. 17 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But since we're right in the middle of Rule 748, which deals with the judgment and 19 writ on forcible entry and detainers, if it's all right 20 with you we will continue with that discussion. HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: That's fine with me. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And we'll fit you in this 23 afternoon for sure on your issue. There was a suggestion 24 made, Judge Lawrence and Elaine Carlson, by Judge 25

Patterson that it might be fairer to you that if we allowed you to kind of get through the whole scheme before 2 attacking you violently as we have been for the last hour 3 and a half, but that's up to you guys. 4 MR. EDWARDS: Can I ask one question to kind 5 of put this thing in perspective? 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure. 7 MR. EDWARDS: How many of these cases out of 8 justice court on an annual basis end up in the county court? 10 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It would be a relatively small percentage. I couldn't tell you. Oh, 12 let's see... 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How many did we say were 14 filed in justice court? A hundred --15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 118,000. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 118,000 a year. 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Let's see if I have 18 -- actually, I do have that number. It's one percent. 19 Out of -- roughly, out of 118,577 in the last fiscal year 20 1,295 were appealed. 21 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: In the whole state? 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. 23 PROFESSOR CARLSON: To the county court. 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: To the county 25

court. PROFESSOR CARLSON: I've seen fewer to the 2 court of appeals. 3 JUSTICE HECHT: So we're not talking about a 4 lot of money. 5 MR. EDWARDS: I just wanted to get a feel 6 for it, and the reason I brought it up was I have been in 7 the apartment business for over 30 years and never had one 8 of these things go to county court. 9 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, how is it that the 10 landlords are so up in arms about this? 11 I have no idea. MR. EDWARDS: 12 HON. F. SCOTT McCOWN: They're probably not 13 as good a landlord as Bill. They probably have a lot more 14 appeals. 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: These proposed 16 rules are not landlord-driven. I mean, the committee did 17 not look at this because the landlords have been writing 18 The committee looked at it because, one, the 19 Court Rules Committee asked us to look at some things, so 20 we looked at that; and then Elaine brought up the 21 Dillingham case, which forced us to have to look at the 22 whole appeal process; and you can't just fix one rule 23 because these things all go together. So you've got to 24

fix everything at the same time, and that's why it's kind

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of a massive undertaking, because you can't just go and fix Rule 749(a) and be done with it because everything else is affected by that.

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So it's not landlord-driven. It's more driven by the fact to make the rules make sense and to fit, which now the rules are confusing, as in existence now. They just don't work particularly well. We're trying to make it work and make more sense and comply with Dillingham.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Would you like to take up the suggestion that Judge Patterson --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I'd love to. Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. 748, as we've been discussing, talks about the judgment itself. It talks about what's going to have to be in the judgment, what the judgment can be rendered for, and then what we have been discussing for the last 30 minutes or so is the status of the judgment, which is very confusing now.

We're trying to make it make more sense, conform to existing case law. We were not trying to change existing case law with these rules, but make it fit existing case law and also to make it fit what's going to come next, which is Rule 749; and Rule 749 talks about the appeal and it talks about motions for new trial. It talks

about setting aside judgments. We talk about what a defendant must do to appeal a case and what a plaintiff must do to appeal a case.

Then in part (d) of that we talk about paying the filing fee, that it's to appeal the case and perfect the appeal you must pay the fee to the JP at the time that you file the appeal bond or your notice to appeal, and we do that because of the problem of the time delay under existing Rule 143a and to make it easier for the county clerks. The county clerks are going to get everything at one time. They're going to get the appeal bond or the notice of appeal and they are going to get the filing fee all at one time so they know that they can docket it and issue a case number and they are ready to go, as opposed to now having to set it aside for 20 or 30 days until they get the filing fee in or then not do something with the filing fee.

So we're trying to solve problems that the county clerks have. We're trying to solve a lot of problems that the county court judges have and then problems with the JP court. So that's in (d).

In (e) it talks about the form of the appeal bond, and let me say that another thing that we've done that's been paramount is to try to follow the TRAP rules wherever possible, particularly for the form of the appeal

bond, the required notice of appeal, the affidavit of indigence, and the supersedeas. We're trying to follow the TRAP rules as much as possible. We were trying to avoid creating an esoteric body of law that nobody understands except those that practice in there. We're trying to make it so that people who do appeals under the TRAP rules would at least be somewhat comfortable and familiar with what we've done here and have it make sense. It's not going to be exactly the same because it can't be, but it's going to be as much as possible to have some consistency.

(F) and (g), or (g), talks about challenging the sufficiency of the appeal bond. This happens all the time, and there is a huge body of case law that says if you post an appeal bond in JP court that even if it's not perfect you're supposed to send it up, and that's on forcibles and regular appeals. So if all the T's aren't crossed and the I's dotted and such minor things such as the appeal bond not signed, for example, are not a problem. You just send it up and you fix it at county court.

So we're trying to make it clear that if you want to challenge the sufficiency of the bond you do it at county court, not at the JP court level, because once they perfect the appeal, that's it for the JP court, and the

county court handles everything on it after that.

749b -- or 749a is the affidavit of indigence. This follows the TRAP rules as much as possible, sets forth the time limits to file it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What do you mean "as much as possible"?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, not everything works on the time rules. We tried to adopt all of the language that we could, but, for example, under the current pauper's affidavit you've got to file it within five days. The judge has to handle it within five days, and then you appeal it to county court, and the county court judge has to look at it very quickly. We tried to follow -- we tried to keep the time limits the same as the existing pauper's affidavit, but we're changing up the contents of the affidavit.

Currently the pauper's affidavit is pretty loose. 749a, which is the current pauper's affidavit, it really doesn't have any particular requirements that the person asking for the affidavit of indigence or pauper's affidavit has to set forth. It's really kind of loosey-goosey, and the problem with having it so undefined is that you have a different result depending on which court you're in. If a judge doesn't have a list of contents for that to be in there then what may be a

pauper's affidavit in one court, may not be a pauper's affidavit sufficient in another court. So we're trying to 2 make the rules consistent so that you have the same result 3 whether you're in Harris County or in South Texas or wherever. 5 And the contents of the affidavit of 6 indigence is in subparagraph (b), when and where filed, 7 the duty of the clerk or justice of the peace, no contest filed, contest. These are all -- although the language 9 may be slightly different in a different format, this is 10 all substantially in accordance with the existing pauper's 11 affidavit rules. We're not really changing that at all. The appeal from the disapproval of the 13 pauper's affidavit at justice court level to the county 14 15 court --MR. YELENOSKY: Judge Lawrence, can I ask 16 just a question on what you just described? 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. 18 MR. YELENOSKY: How does that, what you're 19 proposing here, differ from 145, which is the county 20 court's description of the affidavit of inability? 21 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know the 22 answer to that because I used the TRAP. TRAP Rule -- is 23 24 it 20 --20. Yeah. 20.1. 25 MR. CHAPMAN:

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I used TRAP Rule 1 20.1, which incidentally, I've talked to Fred Fuchs about 2 this, because he's the lawyer that represents Legal Aid. 3 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: He was comfortable 5 with this part. 6 7 MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: He didn't have any 8 problem witH paralleling the --9 MR. YELENOSKY: The TRAP rules? 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- TRAP rules. 11 MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah, and I would defer to 12 Fred on that then. My only question is if it's TRAP rules 13 as opposed to the county court rules then we've got that 14 situation we were describing earlier about at least some 15 county courts requiring a new affidavit of inability in 16 the county court on your appeal. Are they different 17 enough that we're going to be judging the same appeal 18 essentially by two different standards? 19 Well, I think that the proposed rules are 20 very clear that if you -- if the affidavit of indigence is 21 granted, not only do you get a free appeal but you do not 22 have to pay the filing fee in county court. You don't 23 have to go through the process again. 24 25 MR. YELENOSKY: Your proposed rules.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah.

MR. YELENOSKY: Okay.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Now, 145, isn't that a rule -- affidavit of indigence to file the lawsuit?

MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. But under the current rules that's perhaps what a trial court would do if it got an appeal from JP court.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: They may. I don't know. But we're -- that's not going to be an issue because once the affidavit is granted in accordance with this rule, then that's it. They don't have to worry about the filing fee. Under the proposal.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. Thank you.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Okay. And otherwise the procedure for handling the affidavit of indigence is the same as handling the pauper's affidavit. There is one exception. I like some of the language in the TRAP rule that says that you've got to hold within five days but the judge can extend the time period for the hearing for five days. In the JP courts every time the Legislature meets we have another couple of statutes that require us to do something within five days. So sometimes you just can't get it to the hearing within that time period, so this allows us to extend it for one five-day period, or presumably it's not prohibitive that someone

could ask for that to be extended.

Now, 749b talks -- defines perfecting the appeal, and 748 and 749b have to match. They have to -- the language has to be similar in that so it all makes sense. In 749b we talk about when the defendant timely files the appeal bond, deposit, or security and the filing fee required, or the affidavit of indigence is appealed or is approved, then the appeal should be deemed perfected. When the plaintiff files a notice of appeal and the filing fee then the appeal will be perfected.

When an appeal is perfected, the JP makes out a transcript of the entries, which is what's required now, and sends that to the county court and then the county court would docket that in accordance with how they do it now. But you don't have at issue any longer about, well, what's the status of the judgment, has the jurisdiction been invoked, has the filing fee been paid. You know right away that the jurisdiction of the county court will probably be invoked because the filing fee and the transcript are going up. You don't have this limbo period of 20 to 30 days where you're waiting for the filing fee to be paid, and what if it's not paid, and I can tell you that the county courts, we get -- it's confusing.

The current system is just, frankly,

confusing, because the county courts sometimes send us back a procedendo and say, "Go ahead and issue the writ of possession," when they've taken jurisdiction of it, and we can't do it, or they tell us to go ahead and handle the appeal bond or go ahead and handle the sureties on the We've taken care of our stuff and do the appeal bond, and when we can't do it they have to do it. So there's a lot of confusion in the county courts because of this issue of when the appeal is perfected and when the justice court judgment is vacated and when it's not. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah. 12 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Was it a conscious decision to perfect an appeal with an appeal bond rather 14 than a notice of appeal, or was that --15 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, the existing law for -- I don't know, forever has been that you post an 17 appeal bond to appeal. 18 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That needs to be 19 the law then, appeals from district court, district court 20 appeals. 21 That's been the law 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: in JP court both for forcibles and for regular appeals 23 24 forever.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: We didn't have any

significant debate on changing that.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. We tried not to -- we tried not to change things that have been in existence for several years like the appeal bond and all these other things. What we're trying to do more is to make the rules fit together better and to comply with <a href="Dillingham">Dillingham</a>, but we really had no discussion about doing away with appeal bonds or doing away with filling fees.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Or perfecting through a notice of appeal only, is what Judge Duncan is saying, which the rule could be written that way.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Does that

13 answer --

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Uh-huh.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The latter part of 749b is really for the county clerk. "The county clerk shall docket the case. The trial should be de novo. The county clerk shall immediately notify both appellant and appellee of the date of receipt of the transcript, docket number of the cause, and advise the defendant that if they have not filed a written answer in county court they need to file it" -- or "in justice court, they need to file it in county court," because currently the defendant does not have to file a written answer. He can just show up for trial.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: At JP court.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: At JP court. I'm sorry. Excuse me. Now, here's the part that Steve will not like. "The perfection of an appeal in a forcible entry and detainer case does not suspend enforcement of the judgment." So this is the dual track appeal. You appeal the case itself, and if you want to suspend the enforcement of the judgment you have the supersedeas. We put this in "The Appeal Perfected" so that we're giving ample notice early on before you even get to Rule 750 that deals with supersedeas as to how we propose the law work.

"Enforcement of the judgment may proceed unless the enforcement of the judgment is suspended in accordance with Rule 750. If the appeal is based on a judgment for possession and court costs only then the tenant's failure to post a supersedeas will allow the appellee to seek a writ of possession. Issuance of a writ of possession will cause the appeal to be moot and allow the county court in which the case is pending to dismiss the appeal."

Now, this language that talks -- part of the reason that the language in 748 exists, which talks about vacating the judgment, the suspension of the judgment, what the county court can rely on in the JP court judgment, is to make 749 work and to make 750 work. We

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have a note in a comment where we're making it very clear
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   what the intent is, is that you can appeal the judgment,
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   but if you want to forestall the execution of the judgment
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   then you have to post a supersedeas.
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                 MR. YELENOSKY: I have a question. I'm not
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   going to argue with you right now.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're going to hold
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   that?
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                 MR. YELENOSKY:
                                 Yeah.
                                         Can I ask just a
9
   question on it? This sentence that begins right after
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   "Rule 750," period, "If the appeal is based on a judgment
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   for possession and costs only then the tenant's failure,"
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   et cetera, I don't understand that sentence even within
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   the context of --
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                           Okay.
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                 MR. YELENOSKY: Why is that sentence in
   there?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                           Are you talking
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   about "if the appeal is based on a judgment for possession
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   and court costs only"?
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                 MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah.
                                         Right.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it's the
22
              It's a question of mootness.
                                             If you're
23
   mootness.
   appealing only possession, some tenants want to appeal
24
   possession and maybe there wasn't a judgment for back
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Some tenants don't care about the issue of rent. 1 possession, but they don't like the judgment for rents, 2 and they want to appeal the question of rent; but if 3 you're appealing the issue of possession only and you 4 don't post a supersedeas, then it was the feeling of the 5 committee -- and Elaine can speak to this -- that perhaps 6 7 that's really a moot question now. If you've been evicted then what's the point of further appealing the issue of possession if you've been evicted because you've not 9 posted a supersedeas? Is that --10 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I guess maybe I'm 11 misreading it, but "if the appeal is based on a judgment 12 for possession and court costs only" I read to mean that 13 doesn't include any appeals where the court has issued a 14 judgment for possession and back rent; and so then --15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, that's right. 1.6 I mean, that sentence to me 17 MR. YELENOSKY: reads that you wouldn't be able to get a supersedeas or 18 failure to post a supersedeas wouldn't allow writ of 19 possession in any case where there's a judgment for rent. 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, what we're 21 trying to say is that if a judgment is for back rent, 22 court costs, attorneys fees, and possession and you don't 23 post a supersedeas, you may be evicted and lose 24 possession; and that issue may be mooted, but the appeal 25

would still go forward on the question of attorneys fees, back rent, and whatever else was in the judgment.

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MR. YELENOSKY: Well, it may be the way I'm reading it or it may be the way it's worded, but it to me seems to contradict 750 because that sentence by itself seems contrary to what I understand you want to do, to limit what you want to do to situations where there's not judgment for back rent.

this a lot of thought, and here's what we -- here's the problem that we identified, is that, okay, you don't post the supersedeas and you get evicted because you've not posted supersedeas, and a writ of possession issues, and that's the only thing you were appealing on. So do you still go forward with the appeal on the question of possession when possession is no longer a viable issue? And what we're trying to say here is that the answer would be, "No, it would be moot and it would be dismissed."

Now, maybe we need to word it differently, but that was the concept that we were trying to put forward.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, perhaps it's after "if the appeal is based on a judgment for possession and court costs only," comma, and then just skip down to "issuance of a writ of possession will cause the appeal to be moot,"

et cetera. 1 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 2 MR. YELENOSKY: Now, again, I'm just 3 speaking if we're going to go with this concept, because 4 like I said --5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's hold these specific 6 thoughts. 7 MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah. Okay. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're slipping into 9 the --10 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- specific as opposed to 12 the overview. Just as Judge Patterson has got to give a 13 speech. 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Rule 749c is the 15 form of the appeal bond, and that's been changed up 16 It was a little archaic the way it was done, somewhat. 17 and we've just changed some of the wording on that so it 18 makes a little more sense. 19 Now, Rule 750 is the suspending enforcement 20 of forcible entry and detainer judgment pending appeal to 21 the county court and supersedeas. Now, as much as possible we have tried to follow the TRAP rule for the 23 supersedeas. (a) talks about "The appellant who has 24 perfected an appeal shall be entitled to suspend the 25

enforcement by complying with the following procedures:

(1), filing with the justice court a written agreement with the appellee for suspending enforcement of the judgment."

In other words, if the tenant gets the landlord to agree to it then they can file something in writing saying that it would be suspended, which is in, of course, the TRAP rules, and there's no need to post a supersedeas. (2), filing a supersedeas; (3), a deposit; or, (4), alternate security, which is all per the TRAP rules.

Now, (b) and (c) and (d) are all pretty much in accordance with the TRAP rules. (e), the effect of a supersedeas is that the judgment is suspended. (f) talks about the amount; and, of course, now, it becomes obvious why we wanted in Rule 748 specific dollar amounts and judgments, because you calculate the supersedeas. One of the existing problems with the appeal bond is that although there is a loose guideline in the current rule for appeals, it says that you post the appeal bond and you should consider the amount of the judgment and pending rent. There's really nothing that tells me what I have to set, and I can set the appeal bond very low or very high, and there is inequity, I think, that may occur because someone may decide that they would set a high appeal bond

for some reason or a low appeal bond.

So in a forcible there's really nothing that prevents the judge from setting it at a hundred thousand or one dollar if he chooses to. So part of the supersedeas is to make that streamlined, because the only purpose is to take care of the existing judgment. You want to secure the judgment that's been granted. We no longer have to worry about rent during the pendency of the appeal because that's covered a little bit later. We're going to get to that in just a second.

We're separating, uncoupling -- as the term is used here -- uncoupling the concept of, one, appealing the case itself by securing the costs; two, the appeal and the supersedeas to satisfy the judgment, which really should not be any more than the judgment to secure that; and then the third issue, which is the payment of rent to the registry of the court during the pendency of the appeal.

So we've really separated that out into three separate mechanisms instead of one that exists now, which is not particularly equitable, and it can be abused. I am not suggesting it ever has been abused, but it certainly has the potential to be abused by having basically an unfettered ability to set whatever appeal bond you decide you want to set on a particular case with

very, very little in the way of guidelines.

now, this is -- we put (g) into the supersedeas because this all deals with getting evicted during the course of the appeal if you don't do something. Now, we could have made this a separate rule, and we can certainly do that easy enough, but it fits in 750 better than anywhere else. And (g) talks about the effect of appellant's not paying rent or the amount of fair market value into the registry of the county court.

Currently the only time that a tenant is required to pay rent into the registry of the court is if it is an indigent that is appealing and it's a nonpayment of rent case. If an indigent is appealing a non -- some other nonrent breach of the lease, there's no requirement currently that they pay rent into the registry of the court. If a tenant who is not indigent appeals, although you may as a judge, if you wish, set two or three times the monthly rent to cover the cost of appeal, you don't really have do that. So there's really no protection for that landlord, and the tenant would not under the existing rules have to pay rent into the registry of the court any time other than an indigent with a nonrent case.

So what we're doing is saying that regardless of why you appeal it, regardless of the basis

of judgment, if there is, in fact, an obligation to pay rent, that during the pendency of the appeal you have to continue paying rent into the registry of the county court; and if you don't, you can be evicted. Now, nobody that I've talked to in the industry, so to speak, has had a problem with continuing to pay rent that they're obligated to pay under an oral or written lease agreement, so we are not requiring them to do anything more than they are already obligated to do, which is pay the monthly rent.

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Now we're saying, though, that during the pendency of an appeal instead of paying rent to the landlord and the landlord may say, "No, I didn't get the rent" and not provide a receipt when the tenant pays it or the tenant just may not pay it, we're going to have it paid into the registry of the court, and there are mechanisms and provisions for the landlord to be able to draw that rent out and a requirement on the landlord that he file a motion with the court if the rent's not paid. So this was something that nobody had a particular problem with.

(h) talks about when the judgment has been suspended that you suspend -- supersedeas has been posted that you suspend enforcement of the judgment, and if you are already in the midst of enforcing the judgment, that

it be stopped.

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(i) says that once the appeal has been perfected and five days have expired since the day the judgment was signed, actions to suspend the enforcement of judgment have to be made to county court. Now, this was actually far more complicated than it sounds right here because when you get into the idea of, well now, which judgment is in effect? Is the JP court judgment still good or does the county court judgment have jurisdiction Who would issue the writ of possession if something isn't done? And this is also why the language in 748 becomes very important in trying to understand what happens under (i) and when you can go back under the supersedeas -- when you can go back in and seek eviction if the supersedeas has not been posted and the status of the judgment in trying to figure out where you file the supersedeas and when you would file it, who you would file it to.

(j), "If the appeal is perfected and the tenant does not take any actions to suspend enforcement of the judgment within five days after the judgment is signed or if the tenant does not pay rent into the registry of the county court as it becomes due, the county court where the appeal is pending may issue a writ of possession at any time." We've already actually told them this a couple

of times in the rules already, but we're just summing up one more time what's going to happen to them if they don't post a supersedeas or pay rent into the registry.

Now, also, there is a subpart (k). This is in the small handout, 750(k). "If the appeal is perfected by the approval of an affidavit of indigence, the defendant must post a supersedeas bond, deposit, or security with the justice court. If the affidavit of indigence was approved in the justice court, the supersedeas, deposit, or security must be posted within one day after the affidavit of indigence is approved. If the affidavit of indigence is approved in county court, supersedeas bond, deposit, or security must be posted in the county court within five days after the affidavit of indigence." So what we're doing is we're extending the time limits to post the supersedeas if the appeal is granted based on an affidavit of indigence, either at the JP court or the county court.

And then we have a note and comment reinforcing one more time what's going to happen if the tenant who perfects an appeal does not post a supersedeas or pay rent, that a writ of possession can issue. So it's four or five times in there we talk about that, what's going to happen.

Now, Rule 751 is the form of supersedeas

bond. Rule 752, we start to get into the county court, and I had some discussions with county court judges about some of the problems they had, and the rest of the rules really deal with the county clerk and the county court law judge trying to solve some of the difficulties they have.

752, all we really did was make a couple of

style changes. We struck out one thing in the last sentence that's going to be added a little bit later. 753 is a duty of the clerk to notify parties. The clerk should notify him, and I think the product said something about this, about the notice provisions. "The clerk shall notify both appellant and the adverse party of the date of receipt of the transcript, the docket number of the cause. Such notice shall advise the defendant of the necessity for filing a written answer in the county court when the defendant has pleaded orally in the justice court." I think that's the second time we've mentioned that.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Can I just interject there that the reason that is necessary is there's not a separate summons that goes out in county court when there's the de novo FED appeal? Correct?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Uh-huh.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: So we've got to give the defendant the notice or we thought it was desirable to give the defendant notice that otherwise would be in a

citation.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 753a is the default provisions. This is the existing provisions. What we -- we changed "his" to "the defendants," and we changed "the default may" -- that the defendant made no answer in writing in the justice court and fails to file a written answer within 10 days -- we extend that from 8 to 10 -- after transcript is filed in the county court, allegations of the complaint may be taken as admitted and judgment by default may be entered accordingly. We just changed 8 to 10 days there.

754, which is currently blank, we now call "The Trial of the Case in County Court." (a), "The trial of forcible entry and detainer as well as hearings and motions shall be entitled to precedence in the county court."

(b), "No jury trial shall be had in any appeal unless a written request is filed with the clerk of the court a reasonable time before the date set for trial of the cause on the nonjury docket, not less than five days in advance." The county court judges were concerned about the question of Rule 216 and then also 245, and we're trying to -- there is some case law that talks about that I think should relieve a lot of the concern that they have now, but I think that was a February 2001 case

that talks about that, but we're really kind of paralleling the case that's on point here, and we're also making the time limits clear so that there's not any confusion in the county court about the time limits for the jury trial and when they can set it.

Now, generally discovery is not appropriate in forcible entry and detainer appeals; however, the county court has the discretion to allow reasonable discovery. This -- the problem is with extended discovery on the type of a case that is supposed to be done quickly, even in county court. So we're trying to -- there's really not anything that talks about discovery in a de novo appeal of a county court case now. There's nothing in the rules about it now, other than referring to the general discovery rules. If you assume that they apply, then I guess it would, but we tried to make some balance between these cases supposed to be tried pretty quick at the county court and discovery.

Now, this existing language is very similar to the language the Legislature has already used in the Small Claims Court Act which gives the judge in the small claims court the ability to allow reasonable discovery. So we're just using similar language to what is in the Legislature -- or which the Legislature has put in the Government Code now. There may be some discussion on

that, but we thought that -- we tried to adopt a balance. Understand, this has probably been tried once. You know, there may have been a default at the JP court level, but in all likelihood if it's gotten here it's probably been tried one time already. But, again, we want to make provisions for discovery if it's appropriate.

(d) talks about when you can set it for trial, and we're going to talk about changing Rule 245 in a second. Now, (e) talks about what the county court can do if there's a deficiency with the bond, either supersedeas or appeal bond. (f) talks about what happens if the appellant doesn't prosecute the appeal, and 755 is writ of possession, and a writ of possession is -- we change that -- that's 10 days to get the writ, and we also changed a provision that is in conflict with the Property Code. The Property Code talks about appealing a judgment from the county court, and they use the term "unless the premises was used as a primary residence."

I'm sorry. 755 currently says "unless it's used as a primary residence," but the Property Code is less restrictive. The Property Code is "unless the premises was used as a residence." So we simply changed that to reflect what the Legislature did in the Property Code.

Rule 4 needs to be changed because we've

renumbered some of these rules, and Rule 4 deals with computation of time. the five days rule. Rule 143a, we are exempting forcible entry and detainer cases from that because the proposal is that the filing fee be paid at the time the appeal is perfected, not after a 20-day notice. Now, 143a, I will point out, would still apply on appeals from JP court that are not forcible entry and detainer.

Rule 190 we are exempting forcibles both in JP court and county court from the discovery control plans, and there's language in both the trial court and the county court to allow discovery at the discretion of the court.

And 216 says that the rule talking about the request time for the jury trial would not apply. That's because we have a separate rule in 754 to talk about requesting the jury trial with different time limits, and then 245 is the same thing. Some judges were worried about, well, how -- it says we're supposed to give it precedence but then this rule says you have to wait 45 days, so which is it? So we're trying -- since we talked about the time limits for setting it for trial on 754, we're exempting the trial in justice court and the appeal from Rule 245. And that's the overview.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: For the record, I wonder, anybody but Elaine or Judge Lawrence, can you tell us how

this substantial revision of the JP forcible entry and detainer rules got to our committee? There was an 2 interplay with the rules committee. Carl may want to 3 speak to this. 4 PROFESSOR CARLSON: We received when this 5 committee convened at the beginning of the term from the 6 State Bar Rules Committee a request that there be a look 7 at the manner in which the appeal bond is set, and there was concern expressed by the State Bar Rules Committee 9 about tenants using the process that currently exists to 10 basically ride out a supposed appeal and to effectively 11 live rent free during the gap of that time. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So that was the impetus 13 Carl, did your group propose any language or just 14 note the problem? 15 MR. HAMILTON: No. We sent a couple of 16 minor changes to the rule on the paupers affidavits and 17 some other things, and I guess that's one of the things 18 that prompted you-all to start --19 20 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Those are -- excuse me, Carl. 21 MR. HAMILTON: -- taking a look at that. 22 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Those are set forth 23 24 beginning on page 52 to 58, I think. Yeah, the State Bar Rules Committee proposal or recommendation is included

there.

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as we started looking at what Carl had sent and trying to change that, that was -- would have been relatively simple but for Dillingham, and then when we thought about -- when Elaine brought up Dillingham and we started looking at, well, this is not going to work, we need to make more substantive changes and in addition to what Carl has proposed, had proposed, there were some other things that we identified that needed to be fixed. Now, primarily that was in Rule 738 through 747, and those are not -- we went over that last time.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That was not a big deal. The real substantive changes is 748 on. But when Dillingham came into effect that required a pretty substantive revision to make everything work, so that's why it got a little bigger than we had first anticipated.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Chris, do you have any sense of what the Court's view is about <u>Dillingham</u>'s effect on the JP rules regarding FEDs and what the Court's thought process is or if it is even really focused on it?

MR. GRIESEL: No, I don't have have a sense as to what the Court's view is on <u>Dillingham</u>. In terms of the Court's thought process, it was a charge to the

committee, but in terms of are they actively looking tomorrow to change FED rules, I'm uncertain of that. I do know that this is an area where there is an incredibly large number of cases in the state of Texas and an active area where there's a lot of people who don't have lawyers on their side.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MR. GRIESEL: It's also, as Judge Lawrence said, an increasingly complicated area, too, because of the number of commercial FEDs.

Other question. Are we aware of any legislative initiatives in this area or any interest on the part of any particular legislators that need to be accounted for?

MR. GRIESEL: No. There were scattered legislative initiatives, and there always have been on FED actions, but nothing approaching, I think, this this term. There was a legislative initiative in the past session dealing with uniform -- setting up discovery and discovery mechanisms in justice of the peace court, but that initiative didn't go anywhere.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. I can speak to that a little bit. In talking, as we started getting into the rules and I started talking to the landlords' attorneys and the tenants' attorneys, some of the rules in

here are specific requests from them, just what they perceive to be problems. So not all of this is 2 necessarily generated through the subcommittee, and some 3 of the -- there are a few things in here that are 4 dovetailed with some bills that were introduced but for 5 whatever reason didn't pass that had some significant 6 support that would improve things. So we've actually made 7 some changes and some suggestions. When we had to fix something, we said, "Well, let's look at what they 9 proposed," and that language was pretty good, and in some 10 cases the landlords' and tenants' attorneys had both 11 signed off. So even though it didn't pass we reflected 12 some of those changes. 13 So we looked at everything that went in this 14 this last session. Everything that passed I think is in 15 Even some of the stuff that didn't pass we looked 16 there. at and maybe adopted parts of it. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And by "passed" what do 18 you mean, that there's now a statute that's been signed by 19 the governor? 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. But I don't 21 think there's anything that happened that would change --22 I don't think anything passed. There's some stuff that 23 24 passed in the Property Code, but nothing that would affect 25 the rules or the trial.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Steve, can I ask just one more, or maybe two more, questions?

MR. YELENOSKY: Sure. You're the chair.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Can you describe for us the scope of your effort? I know both you and Elaine, Judge, have talked about talking to people; and I'd like to get a sense of what input the subcommittee has received outside the subcommittee, if you know what I mean.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, surprisingly it's not been universally approved. There are -- the landlords -- the groups involved would be, you know, the landlords. Of course, you've got everybody from somebody having one rent house to a mall or people with huge blocks of apartment complexs.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Then you've got the tenants, not only the people that represent the indigent tenants, but also represent tenants. You've got the JP's, the county clerks, the county court-at-law judges. There are things in the changes that each group likes and things that they don't like for the most part, so -- but they're never ever going to agree on all of this because there's just too much diametrically opposed thinking, but there are parts of it -- the most controversial would be the issue about the supersedeas for indigent tenants, which we

have -- the subcommittee has discussed longer and harder and worked on more than anything else. 2 Everything else I don't think is going to 3 be -- I don't think is going to be that controversial, 4 but, you know, everybody likes some parts and doesn't like 5 other parts. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In terms of people 7 outside your subcommittee or outside this committee, have 8 you talked to 5 people, 10 people, 100 people? HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And they range -- they 11 cover the spectrum of these various interest groups that 12 you mentioned? 13 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I feel like I'm 15 taking a deposition. You nodding your head, "You must 16 answer outloud." Yeah, Stephen. 17 MR. YELENOSKY: I have a proposal, not of 18 language, but that we ask the subcommittee to do the 19 20 following, and I don't know if you want me to phrase it as a motion or not. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's hear it first. 22 MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. It would be that the 23 subcommittee take what they've done, which, as Justice 24 Lawrence has said, I think there's a lot that's really 25

good here; and I am not going to object to changes that fix things; and some things I know you vetted with Fred Fuchs, who knows a lot more about this and I think would take the same position I would philosophically on it; but I would ask the committee to redraft for this committee's consideration a change that would not alter the current situation with respect to appeal by indigents, such that a supersedeas would not be required for indigents; and I would also invite the committee, should it wish, to propose something that would tighten up the requirements of payment of current rent during pendency of appeal, because I don't -- I don't object to that.

I've talked to Fred during the break. He doesn't object to that, and what I understood to be the concern earlier defined as people living rent free speaks only to current rent, because at that point if there's a back payment due, you know, they may eventually get judgment for it, they may be able to collect on it, but living rent free means they are not paying rent during the pendency of appeal. That's what it means to me, and if that's a concern during this 20 days and the committee wants to propose some way in which the JP court or county court can issue a writ of possession when a tenant doesn't pay what would otherwise have to be paid then, you know, that could also be considered, but my motion would be to

draft something that doesn't change the current situation with respect to supersedeas for indigents while correcting the current situation with respect to a lack of separation of supersedeas and appellant bonds for nonindigents because that's constitutionally required.

Suggestion that there be an alternative universe, basically, that -- of rules that the subcommittee would draft which would do as you say, not alter the current situation with respect to supersedeas for indigents, and would make that all fit within the framework of the rules so that at a subsequent meeting we could look at that framework and say, "Okay, we like that," and then look at this, what we have before us now, and say, "Okay, we don't like that" or "We do like it," whatever? Is that what you're suggesting?

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I mean, if the consensus were to keep things as they are with respect to nonindigents then I would love that consensus now where we don't have to look at it later and consider both, because obviously I would prefer that result. So if people are ready to say, "That's what we want, bring that back to us without, you know, an alternative, just bring that back to us so we can look at the wording," then I'd be happier with that, but barring that, give us both.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You would be happiest 1 with --2 MR. YELENOSKY: With us all deciding right 3 now that we don't want to erect a supersedeas barrier to 4 continue possession by indigents which does not currently 5 exist. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So that's what you -- that would be your number one choice. 8 MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And then your second 10 11 choice would be, okay, draft around it so it doesn't 12 change the rule with respect to --MR. YELENOSKY: Well, my second choice would 13 be I guess that we defer that question to another day when 14 they have it in front of us, but maybe we're ready to 15 decide that now. I know I'm not the only one who feels 16 this way. I know a couple of other people have spoken up. 17 A number -- most people have not spoken up, and so I don't 18 know what the sentiment of the committee is, but if the 19 majority of the committee agrees with what I just said, 20 maybe we ought to find that out now. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Elaine. 22 PROFESSOR CARLSON: A couple of things I'd 23 24 like to say. One is that the problem that exists with the appeal bond in forcible entry and detainer cases exists in 25

the 500 series of rules for regular JP proceedings. The <a href="Dillingham">Dillingham</a> problem is present in both. So just bear that in mind on the big picture vote.

Secondly, I think I speak for the subcommittee when I say we welcome as much definitive input as we can get on issues so that we're not spinning our wheels, and we realize -- we had hoped to get that input at our last meeting and we simply didn't have the time. So we have gone forward with specific suggestions, thinking that might be more helpful to see what it looks like.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  YELENOSKY: Right, and I wasn't able to be at that meeting, so I --

PROFESSOR CARLSON: But we certainly are willing to redraft and draft with the will of this committee, but we really need some input on key issues. Does the committee as a whole favor supersedeas at all of a JP judgment in light of the fact that the case law says that judgment is annulled and vacated? And Justice Duncan pointed out they are not courts of record. Do we favor that at all?

Do we want to change the law or suggest to the Court a change in a rule that would change the law that a dismissal out of the county court would revive a justice court judgment when currently that doesn't exist?

That's a very strange anomaly to me in the law.

Do you concur that discovery should be discretionary with the court? Do you concur that Rule 216 and Rule 245 should have -- continue the carving out or expressly have carving out to continue an expedited proceeding from the JP court to the county court, or do you believe at the county court level if you appeal, this should be wide open like any other county court proceeding, or are we still trying to keep this -- because it makes a big difference in how you structure the rules and timing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.

theoretical me again. I need first before we can -before I can address those discrete issues, I need a
theoretical framework with which to think about this
problem; and to me that theoretical framework has to hinge
initially on whether the JP judgment is going to have
presumptive validity, and until -- if we continue the
current law, which is that an appeal to the county court
vacates or suspends the judgment, as I e-mailed Elaine, I
don't understand what there is to supersede.

So for me, at least -- and I'm hoping a majority of the committee agrees -- the first thing that we have to decide is whether this JP judgment, unlike

other JP judgments, is going to be given presumptive 1 validity and not vacated or suspended pending an appeal. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Doesn't it have validity 3 4 if it's not appealed? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yes, and it is -- I 6 agree with you, Justice Duncan, but there is giving 7 validity to the justice court judgment in that the appeal bond requires that the JP set the amount that considers the amount of that judgment as well as future rent. 10 there is some -- which is maybe not sensical, but it is 11 our current system. So the subcommittee struggled with 12 those two potentials, is it valid or isn't it? Do we 13 supersede it or don't we? Do we give any validity to the 14 JP judgment or is it a complete do-over? 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the specific problems 16 that we were presented with or that we uncovered were, 17 one, with the so-called free ride during appeal problem 18 and, two, the Dillingham problem. Those are the basic two 19 problems. 20 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Those are the two 21 central problems, and then procedurally many minor things, 22 but, yes, those were the two major problems. 23 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But I would have a 24 If you want to allow an affidavit of indigence 25 question.

to allow an indigent defendant not to post a supersedeas, would that be only for the writ of possession or would 2 that also be for a writ of execution, abstract of 3 judgment, or other attacks? 4

MR. YELENOSKY: Are you asking me? My opinion?

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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, my opinion would -- I mean, I think Justice Duncan's point is obviously a very good one, which is if you answer the question as she does, I think, which I've described as to the left of me at this point, you know, you wouldn't even have to worry about that; but assuming you do have to worry about that, my concern is the possession issue; and as a policy matter, I'm less concerned about a landlord executing a judgment for \$600 on an indigent who's, frankly, probably going to be judgment-proof anyway if they cannot dispossess them of the property.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The subcommittee, you know, understood the problem of a supersedeas and an The difficulty we had was trying to figure out some legal justification for treating them differently, and we just were not able to do that.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: And do you know of any? 25 Because the case law from going county court to court of

appeals, as you know, an indigent must post a supersedeas like any other litigant. 2 MR. YELENOSKY: I mean, historically -- I'm 3 sorry. Go ahead. 4 PROFESSOR CARLSON: But there is no such 5 thing as an affidavit of indigence for supersedeas. 6 MR. YELENOSKY: But as you know and you've 7 pointed out, historically, is this right that you couldn't 8 even get a judgment for rent. The only issue was 9 possession. 10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's right. 11 MR. YELENOSKY: That's right. 12 historically there never was an issue of posting a 13 supersedeas that would cover back rent in order to remain 14 in possession. 15 PROFESSOR CARLSON: You're right. 16 MR. YELENOSKY: So I would arque 17 historically we have never had the situation where people 18 were in danger of being put out on the street because of 19 back rent. People -- it didn't allow for that, so when we 20 moved to a system where it allowed for a judgment for rent we then coupled that payment, put the whole judgment 22 together, and then thereby in my opinion undermined the 23 protections that were there for possession. 24 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But there was still 25

a requirement that you post an appeal bond. Even if back rent was not a part of the lawsuit you still had to post an appeal bond, so it was the same problem.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. But if you were indigent you would post an affidavit of inability, and that would cover the appeal bond, and you would owe zero as far as the supersedeas. So to me, I mean, we could --you're putting it into, understandably, a theoretical framework; but, frankly, I think it is not cognizant of the history and policy that's been behind this; and if, given what we have now, you feel that we're boxed into a particular situation, I would say let's figure out how to get out of that box before we say we've got to do this.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: To add to the historical context -- and I completely agree with Steve -- I just want to make the very simple point to remind people we are talking about people's homes, and the law has always been, I think, somewhat more protective of people when you're talking about their home. As Steve says, we're talking about putting people on the streets.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I agree, and there are a lot of hoops that a landlord has to jump through to evict somebody, but, you know, there also are rights that a landlord would have. I mean, we're not

multimillion-dollar apartment complexes. We're talking about people sometimes that have one rent house. They can't pay their mortgage on it until they get their rent in. So, you know, it's a pretty substantive right that a landlord has.

MR. YELENOSKY: But we're writing rules that aren't going to distinguish between those two and so -HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And can't.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. And so if we change the rules, you may be helping people that those of us would agree are landlords who are themselvess of low income and preyed upon maybe by somebody who isn't, but you're definitely going to hurt people on the other side who maybe have been falsely facing eviction.

I mean, I'll give you an example. Earlier

-- I'm on the board of the Austin Tenants Council, so I

read their stuff and I'm getting filled in at board

meetings. You know, as much as we don't like to admit it,

there is still race discrimination going on out there.

You could have an individual who, yeah, they haven't paid
their rent in two months, but neither has their neighbor,

and they're getting evicted because they're African

American.

Now, when they go in before you the evidence

quickly before you in six days may be nonpayment of rent for two months. It may take a bit to figure out and establish that, yeah, that's true, but there's a systematic practice here of evicting people of a particular race who are in arrears while letting others slide, and that's clearly illegal.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: The subcommittee -- CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I think it just gets back to we need a theoretical framework for viewing these types of cases. We don't need a pro any given interest group framework for discussing these cases, and to me the theoretical framework has to be is there a basis for giving presumptive validity to a JP FED judgment when we don't give presumptive validity to any other type of JP judgment because it's not a court of record.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples, you haven't said a word all day. Got anything to add to that?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: When I have something to say I'll say it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I know you're storing up your energies for a later topic. Well, I think that's well put; and the issue is, Elaine, how can we frame a motion or a question or whatever that the whole committee can vote on to give you and Judge Lawrence a sense of what

the committee is and what you can do to fulfill that 2 sense? PROFESSOR CARLSON: I'll speak first, and 3 Tom can chime in since he has been the principal scrivener, and we're willing to keep going, but I think it 5 would be very helpful to know whether it's the sense of 6 the full committee that a JP judgment should be superseded 7 or not. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's -- why don't we 9 state what the issues are and then we will take them one 10 at a time. Whether a JP judgment should be superseded or 11 not. 12 MR. YELENOSKY: Whether it exists after an 13 appeal such that it needs to be superseded. PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah. Appeal trial de 15 novo to county court. 16 MR. YELENOSKY: Justice Duncan can phrase it 17 better than I, but, I mean, there's -- the question is, is 18 there anything to supersede at the point that an appeal is 19 filed or is it gone? 20 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And currently we --21 maybe I am not making myself clear. There's an anomaly. Right now we have case law saying that the judgment is 23 vacated by the de novo appeal, but there's a rule that 24

says, "but, by the way, go ahead and secure that judgment

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by an appeal bond." So to me it's not as clear as it is to Justice Duncan that we don't give some presumptive 2 validity if we're requiring someone to put up an appeal 3 bond that can cover it, except for indigents. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And maybe I missed this, 5 but in addition to that, if something happens up at the 6 county court, either because the fees aren't paid or because somebody loses interest, there can then have 8 something subsequently occur to the JP court in terms of 9 issuing a writ of possession. 10 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Not necessarily. 11 PROFESSOR CARLSON: In some instances. 12 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If the fees aren't 13 paid and jurisdiction is not invoked at the county court, 14 then, yes, the JP court judgment can be enforced. 15 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Because there's a rule 16 that says that. 17 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But if jurisdiction 18 is invoked in the county court then the JP court judgment 19 is gone forever. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There's nothing you can 21 do. 22 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, the county court can 23 issue a writ of possession. 24 25 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, the county

court can, but the JP court judgment, no matter what the 1 county court does, once the jurisdiction is invoked then 2 the JP court judgment is nullified in that sense. 3 PROFESSOR CARLSON: It's not revived. 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It can never be 5 revived. 6 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Under our current scheme, but yet we've got a rule that says, "but go ahead 8 and secure that judgment." That's why I said what do you 9 want to do with this? These are intellectual conflicts in 10 11 our rules. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right. So 12 question one in some variation is whether it's the sense 13 of this committee that the rules should be written to 14 promote the concept that a JP judgment should be 15 16 superseded. 17 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Or we can take up Sarah's question first. Do you want to give any 18 19 presumptive validity? MS. BARON: I think we need to decide the 20 ultimate question of whether that judgment is still intact 21 22 before we decide whether or not it can be superseded. 23 MR. LOW: Right. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Say that again, Pam. 25 MR. YELENOSKY: That's it.

MS. BARON: I think we need to determine whether there's any continuing effect of the judgment while the case is being transferred from one to the other. Because it affects a lot of these issues that we're talking about. It affects supersedeas. It affects failure to pay the fee.

MR. LOW: Right.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Under the proposed 748 we tried to solve that. We didn't finish that rule, but in the next couple of sentences we tried to address that problem.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All these things are sort of subspecies of the same question. Judge Brister. Chief Judge Brister.

not too familiar with JP practice or anything, but I'm just assuming two circumstances in our sewage case. One, one is the tenant pays money and fixes it and, therefore, has no money to pay the rent. In that circumstance it seems to me you ought to be able to appeal without posting something. You have already paid something.

On the other hand is the case where something needs to be fixed and you don't fix it and you just don't pay. You have spent nothing. You just want to stay rent free because you think the place is worth less

because this hasn't been fixed. In that case it seems to me you ought to have to pay.

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So, in other words, I'm thinking as far as equities there's some circumstances where it may look like this is somebody just wanting to stay free, some circumstances not; and if you do it in terms of, well, to appeal you have to file an appeal bond or you have to make a deposit of one month's rent, it's either one way or the other for all those cases, which is going to create some unfairness.

Supersedeas, on the other hand, is something that judges have discretion on. We can adjust supersedeas to what the equities require in that situation, if I'm reading it right; and if that's so, it seems to me supersedeas is the better way to go because it allows the judge to say, "Well, look, I'm going to make you post this much if you want to stay in there and appeal"; and they say, "Hey, I can't post that because I already paid to fix the sewage" then that is something a JP can take into consideration. I'm just afraid any other circumstance you're going to be unfair to one side or the other; whereas a supersedeas might allow some play of the equities. Am I right or wrong about that?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, Rule 7 --

proposed Rule 750(f)(i) will allow the judge to do exactly

that, to set a lower amount or even no amount if they want to.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip Watson.

MR. WATSON: I'm wondering -- to address
Pam's question, let me ask a question about de novo
appeals in general, whether at the county court or at the
district court, and it goes to what happens to the subject
matter. Let me use by way of an analogy a condemnation
case in which the commissioners have made an award and
said, "Okay, State you can take Farmer Brown's farm for
the interstate and you're going to dispossess him of his
home and his right to make a living, but you've got to pay
him X" and the state appeals that condemnation award I
think usually to district court for a trial de novo.

What happens in this type of trial de novo to the award below? Does Farmer Brown have to vacate his house? Does he have to post a supersedeas? I'm trying to find an analogy of a trial de novo that also has the weighty consequences we're dealing with here. On one hand we're holding up the interstate highway, which those of us who drive know that's no small thing, from the other side where they kick someone. How does it work? Anybody know? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't know, Skip,

but you also need to remember we're not talking about an appeal from one court of record to another court of

record. We're talking about --

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MR. WATSON: That's why I used the analogy of the commissioners court because that's not a court of record either.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right.

MR. WATSON: It's the same thing.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, let me read -- I can't answer the question about condemnation, but let me read this 1886 case. I mean, that's how far back this goes, and there are cases this year that say the same thing. "The Constitution provides that in all appeals from justice court there should be a trial de novo. An appeal from a judgment rendered in a justice court does not merely suspend its execution until the determination of the cause in the appellate court, as does an appeal from the district court to this court, but it does serve to annul the judgment. On such appeals the appellate court does not affirm or reverse the judgment of the justice court but tries the case de novo on its merits and renders such judgment as ought to be rendered, and there is not a procedendum, " and I've got four or five other cases if you want to read that say essentially the That's the status of an appeal from JP court same thing. to county court.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And that's for

every JP court case.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Every JP court case, not just forcible.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carlyle.

MR. CHAPMAN: Well, we have some history about this before the combat was amended in Texas law. We had an administrative decision that was not a record decision but was binding if not appealed, but once appealed the administrative decision was of no further value or effect. It was vacated. The parties went forward with regard to their claims and had to make proof de novo, and there was no concept that there was any weight to be given to the administrative award below.

So that's the way it worked, and either side could appeal. There was a re-alignment of parties, however; and the burden remained on one party as opposed to the other; that is, on the claimant; and that's a little different in terms of this circumstance; but the concept that the determination of a tribunal that had no record below was vacated and no further effective was very well accepted and worked without a lot of difficulty.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Frank.

MR. GILSTRAP: It seems to me we may be approaching this problem backwards, and we're approaching it theoretically. If you take Carlyle's reasoning to its

ultimate extent then any time there's an appeal from the justice court by the tenant, the tenant stays in the house because there's no judgment kicking him out.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right.

MR. GILSTRAP: And that obviously is unacceptable. It seems to me the real bottom line here is can you stay in the rented premises without paying your rent, and once we decide that we can fix the rules pretty much the way we want to, and I think that's -- and my concern is that in latching onto these concepts of jurisdiction and vacated judgment we're really going to be masking the real issue underneath.

MR. CHAPMAN: Well, I don't accept that premise. It seems to me that you could have a situation where the JP court determination is vacated, of no further import, and yet with regard to a certain category of cases -- in this case the forcible entry and detainer case -- would be expedited in the court, in the county court. You could get a determination made in short order. As a matter of fact, the rules already provide for that.

It would be an expedited proceeding, and the county court could have -- as a matter of fact, the rules provide for that, too -- ways in which to deal with the various inequities of the parties upon being presented with those circumstances. That is not a new or novel

concept, and certainly that's something that we could easily accomplish. The question, though, is whether or not there's any reason to make a court that is not of record to have precedential value, and I don't think I have heard any reason why we should.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy Low.

MR. LOW: Chip, let me ask the question.

Assume that somebody owes me rent. I'm the landlord, and

I file suit to kick them out. A judge says, "Yeah, you've

got no reason not to pay the rent, you're kicked out."

They give notice of appeal and go through all that. Then

I don't have that judgment. Then they dismiss their

appeal. What do I do? Do I file again --

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right.

MR. LOW: -- and then he appeals again?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right.

MR. LOW: I mean, and I guess they could live there forever. I guess I just give the property to the government and let them live there forever.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: If the landlord doesn't make sure he goes forward and gets a judgment in county court and that gets dismissed without there being a judgment then the landlord has to start all over again in JP court and refile it.

MR. LOW: And then what about the next time?

I get a judgment again. Can he just repeat it, or how many times can it repeat? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, next time 3 you'll probably go forward and try to get the judgment --4 MR. CHAPMAN: Why would you sit back and do 5 nothing --6 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- but it sure 7 could happen more than once. 8 9 PROFESSOR CARLSON: But if you're the landlord you've got the judgment on the tenant. 10 11 MR. LOW: Well, the tenant appeals. PROFESSOR CARLSON: Gotcha. 12 I'm not going to appeal. He gave 13 MR. LOW: me what I wanted. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. 15 If the MR. HAMILTON: I have a question. 16 tenant appeals and then the landlord dismisses, you 17 indicated that -- is there a way for the landlord to 18 protect the judgment in the county court if the tenant is 19 the appellant and then he dismisses it? 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, understand 21 the burden of proof doesn't shift at the appellate court. 22 The burden of proof is the same as at the JP court. 23 original plaintiff, the landlord, has a burden to go 24 forward and to get that judgment. 25

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MR. HAMILTON: Then how can a tenant dismiss
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   it?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, he gets
   dismissed for want of prosecution or for some other
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   reason..
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                 MR. CHAPMAN: No, wait. Isn't there a
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   notice?
                 MR. HAMILTON: If the landlord is the
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   prosecutor, how can that happen?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It happens.
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                                                        Ιt
   happens all the time.
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                 MR. YELENOSKY: Can a landlord file an
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   original proceeding?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          No. Justice courts
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   have original jurisdiction, exclusive; and, yes, there are
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   notices.
                 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Can I ask
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   something?
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I mean, the notices
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   that I read --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I knew you'd get drawn
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   into this.
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                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: -- are existing
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   notices that they have to give now.
                 MR. CHAPMAN: So both parties are getting
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notice from the county court that there is an intent to dismiss for want of prosecution. 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Because the 3 landlord doesn't go forward, doesn't file any motions, 4 doesn't ask for a judgment to be entered, doesn't ask for 5 a default judgment, doesn't ask for a trial setting. Everybody just kind of sits back and waits for somebody to 7 do something, and the court just DWOPs it. 8 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't have a lot 9 of sympathy in those circumstances. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples. 11 quiet, quiet. 12 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Do we have any 13 information on how long it takes to get these cases heard 14 in county courts? 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It varies from 16 county to county. In Harris County a rule of thumb is 17 three months, but sometimes it's faster. I'm sure it's 18 slower in some counties. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy Low. 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: There's not a time 21 period built into the rules now that says you have to hear 22 it in a certain time. It just says -- in county court it 23 just says you give these precedence. 24 25 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I'm just wondering

how long in the real world it takes these county judges to get the cases disposed of.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think it could be three months sometimes.

MR. YELENOSKY: But the time frame -- and Frank I think said something about living rent free. Do we all agree that what we're talking about here is maybe a 20-day period where the JP court doesn't have jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession and the county court doesn't have it yet, where no writ of possession can be issued, but after that 20 days, however long it takes to get to county court, the county court can issue a writ of possession if the tenant doesn't pay rent? Do we all agree that that's the law?

And if that's the law, when we talk about living rent free, I think that we shouldn't use that term because that's not what's happening. During the pendency of the appeal it's true that any back rent will not be ordered paid if they don't have to post a supersedeas, but they're not accruing new debt to the landlord without risk of a writ of possession.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I don't know that I agree that there is an obligation. Where in the rules does it say that once a appeal is perfected the tenant has

to pay rent into the registry of the county court? The only place it says that, if the tenant has an -- has a pauper's affidavit and it's a nonrent case. That's the only time the tenant has an obligation. Otherwise, the landlord can go in and file motions and ask the county court judge to do something, but there's nothing in the rules now that require rent to be paid into the registry of the court.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, then that's a problem that we may want to address.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we did. We have.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, that may be something you can address without doing the other thing that I don't like.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Here's some -Here's some questions I've heard. One question is, is
there any presumption of validity to a JP decision, what
do we believe, and we can express that in affirmative or
negative terms. We could vote on if the full committee
believes that there should be presumptive validity to a JP
decision.

Another question is should there be continuing effect of the judgment from JP court to the county court; and then Frank's issue, shall we make it so

that you can't stay on the rent premises without paying 1 the rent, which is more kind of basic. So those are the 2 three things I've heard. 3 Elaine, I would like you to frame a question 4 that we could vote on that would give you some assistance 5 in -- you and Judge Lawrence -- in the process. 6 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Can I ask more than one? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. You can ask as 8 9 many as you want. PROFESSOR CARLSON: That would be a long 10 11 question. Okay. Should we give any presumption of validity to a JP judgment once the appellate court's 12 jurisdiction has been invoked through a de novo appeal? 13 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Those people who believe we should give presumptive validity to a JP decision once 15 the de novo process is -- I knew you were going to say 16 something -- has commenced? Raise your hands, but Sarah 17 wants to say something. 18 19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I just want to -- I would like for the Chair to clarify whether you're asking 20 this question solely in the context of FED cases or are 2.1 22 you asking whether all JP court judgments should be given presumptive validity? 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Our discussion is limited 24 25 to FED.

MR. LOW: Let me ask a question. What do you mean by presumption of validity? What is the effect of that? I mean, I know what a presumption of validity means, but I don't know what it means in the context of your question.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Like when a

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district court judgment in your personl injury case, that judgment is in effect until a mandate issues and it's supplanted by a --

MR. LOW: Until another court -- all right.

And then if I dismiss then it's gone back into effect.

Okay. That's what I thought you meant, but I have voted before when I didn't know what I was voting on.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Me, too.

MR. LOW: I didn't want to do it again.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence.

ask a question. What about the situation where you have rent that continues to accrue during the course of the appeal and you're three or four months down the line, there's been no more rent paid into the registry of the court, the county court dismisses, and the original JP court judgment is now in effect, and you can execute on that, but that doesn't have anything to do with the other three or four months rent that have accrued. So aren't

you cutting out that landlord from being able to collect 7 more rent? You're going back to the original judgment 2 that ignores any more attorneys fees, any more rent. 3 Do you file another suit? MR. LOW: 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine, would this be a 5 way to say it? All those who think a JP decision should 7 have presumptive validity while the case is in the process of being appealed de novo to the county court raise your hand. 9 MR. HAMILTON: I have a question first. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl. Yeah. 11 MR. HAMILTON: Is there any judgment that a 12 JP court can enter other than a money judgment? I'm 13 talking about in all cases. 14 MR. YELENOSKY: They have no injunctive 15 16 power, right? 17 MR. HAMILTON: A money judgment and this judgment for possession in a forcible detainer? 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, we -- in a 19 small claims court action it's money only; and in a 20 justice court suit you have some additional powers subject 21 to the jurisdictional limit of the court; and you can ask 22 for other things; and while, no, we don't have injunctive 23 24 powers, we do have the ability to issue a writ of possession; and a writ of re-entry, we have the right to

put somebody back into the property, which is like an injunction, but it's not an injunction. 2 MR. HAMILTON: That's all in a FED 3 proceeding, though. 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But in a regular 5 justice court suit we can do other things than money 6 judgments. 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Detachment and 8 garnishment. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina. 10 11 MS. CORTELL: Let me ask a question. Are we trying to pass upon a question that's been part of our 12 jurisprudence for over a hundred years, or did I 13 misunderstand the law that's been cited to us? 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Lawrence nods his 15 head in the affirmative. 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: We are. The law 17 has been like this for a long time. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those who think a JP 19 decision should have presumptive validity while the case 20 is in the process of being appealed de novo to the county 21 court raise your hand. 22 MR. YELENOSKY: In FEDs. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In FEDs. Thank you. 24 25 All those who think it should not raise your

hand. 1 HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: I vote "no," Chip. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. 3 Well, that is clarifying indeed. It's eight in favor and seven against, 4 unless I missed somebody over there. Did you guys vote? 5 MR. HARWELL: I didn't. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does that clear things up 7 for you, Elaine? 8 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Really clear. Thanks. 9 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: I quess I don't 10 11 know what we just voted on exactly, but are you saying that the judgment can be revived if it's dismissed by the 12 county court, or does the judgment just remain in effect 13 14 until such time that you get final judgment? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ask your Chair there. 15 16 She's the one that put this thing together. PROFESSOR CARLSON: I hope it's the latter. 17 MR. GILSTRAP: Chip? 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Frank. 19 20 MR. GILSTRAP: I think maybe we should try it from the functional approach. 21 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. All right. Here's 23 the question: Should we make it so you can't stay in the 24 rent premises without paying rent? All those who agree with that --25

MR. YELENOSKY: Point of order. I'm not 1 sure what that means, based on my prior comments. 2 MR. GILSTRAP: It's a lot clearer than 3 "presumptive validity," I promise you that. 4 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, it is clearer than 5 that, but are we talking about an arrearage that's been 6 awarded in a judgment, or are we talking about rent that 7 comes due at that time that would otherwise be paid under ρ the lease contract? 9 MR. GILSTRAP: I think he's right. Maybe we 10 should break those down. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. State it so we can 12 talk about it. 13 Well, you know, first of all, MR. GILSTRAP: 14 should the tenant be allowed to stay in the premises rent 15 16 free without paying the current rent as it comes due, to distinguish that from the accrued rent? 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And I think to state it 18 in a way that the vote would be clear we would say all 19 those who think the tenant should be prohibited from 20 staying in the rent premises during the appeal de novo 21 proceedings without paying rent as it comes due raise your 22 hand. 23 MR. EDWARDS: I think that I'd like to 24 suggest kind of an alternative to that, and that is 25

whether or not the county court should be allowed to prohibit the defendant from staying in the premises rent free, because maybe the county court when it hears it, 3 maybe there's a dad-qum good reason for them staying in 4 there rent free. 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right. Should the 6 7 county court be permitted to issue a writ of possession if the tenant does not --8 MR. EDWARDS: Yeah. 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Or if the tenant 10 11 does not pay rents as they accrue. MR. CHAPMAN: Current. 12 Suppose that your lease says MR. EDWARDS: 13 that all utilities are going to be paid, and the landlord 14 is not paying the utilities, and in order to keep your 15 utilities from getting turned off you're going to pay an 16 amount of -- to the electric company, the city, the gas 17 company, the water bill, an amount almost equal to your 18 rent or maybe more than your rent because the fuel 19 adjustment clause in the electric bill? Why should you 20 get kicked out while you're fighting with the landlord? 21 MR. LOW: But, Bill, we've got the provision 22

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MR. YELENOSKY: Well, that's a separate

if the county court doesn't acquire jurisdiction then how

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can he do that?

question. 1 MR. EDWARDS: That's a separate question. 2 MR. GILSTRAP: But, see, you know, what Bill 3 says may be true and there may be some exceptions you want 4 to make, but I think voting on it that way kind of 5 obfuscates the underlying issue, and that is as a matter of policy are we going to allow the people to stay in the 7 place without paying the current rent? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, here's one way, 9 10 with Bill's suggestion in mind, that we could say it. me see if it works for you, Frank. All those who think 11 the county court should be able to prohibit the tenant 12 13 from staying in the rent premises without paying rent as it becomes due during the appeal process. 14 MR. HAMILTON: Rent determined by the court 15 16 to be due. HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: Chip, would you say 17 18 that again? All those who think CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. 19 the county court should be able to prohibit the tenant 20 from staying in the rent premises without paying -- and 21 there was a friendly amendment here -- without paying rent 22 23 as determined by the court. MR. HAMILTON: As determined by the court to 24 be due. 25

MR. EDWARDS: It's not past rent.

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HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: It seems to me this is getting too complicated. You ought to do an 80/20 rule. I mean, what is it going to be most of the time -- CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: -- and then whoever is the exception ought to have the burden to come into the court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Because otherwise you're going to have the county courts on every case has to have a hearing on this, and there's just not enough county court judges or time in the day.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those who think the county court should be able to prohibit the tenant from staying in the rent premises without paying rent as it becomes due during the appeal process raise your hands. That's the question. You don't have to raise your hands yet. Did you get that, Justice McClure?

HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: I did. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's vote on that. Let me state the question one more time and then raise your hand. All those who think the county court should be able to prohibit the tenant from staying in the rent premises without paying the payment of rent as it

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becomes due during the appeal process raise your hand.
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                 HONORABLE ANN McCLURE:
                                         I vote "yes" on
   that.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And all those who vote
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5
   against raise your hands.
                 So that, by a vote of 21 to nothing, is a
6
7
   principle that this committee unanimously believes, and is
   that helpful to you or --
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                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: No, that's helpful.
9
                 MR. YELENOSKY: Do you have a next question
10
   on the back rent?
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12
                 MR. GILSTRAP: Past due rent, yes.
13
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Steve, can you
   frame the question on the back rent?
14
                 MR. YELENOSKY: I don't know that I can.
15
   Frank, you want to phrase it?
16
                 MR. GILSTRAP: All those who think that the
17
   county court judge should be able to prohibit the tenant
18
   from staying in the premises while paying the past due
19
   rent raise your hand.
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                 MR. HAMILTON: How could the county court do
21
   that 'til the appeal is decided?
22
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Let's phrase it
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   this way and get to the real issue, which is -- well, I
24
   quess we need to take two votes on this. One is do you
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want to have a provision for supersedeas bond on an appeal from JP court to county court enforceable to secure the judgment?

I think we need to take a second vote on whether or not an affidavit of indigence should apply to that, but just in general do we want to have this dual track so you appeal the case and then post a supersedeas to suspend the enforcement of the judgment? I mean, that's really the issue, isn't it?

MR. GILSTRAP: Well, Chip, as I see it, I mean, once you make the decision that the tenant can be kicked out if he doesn't pay the rent then I think

Dillingham mandates a supersedeas bond procedure; but, you know, the real issue, again, is functionally, you know, are we going to allow the tenant to stay in the apartment rent free -- without paying the past due rent while the FED appeal is being decided? And once we decide that then I think the committee can come up with a plan.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let me see if I've written it faithfully to what you just said, Frank. All those who think the county court should be able to prohibit --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Could you just phrase it positively? Should the county court do X, Y, or

Z?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, the problem is when 1 you do it that way --2 MR. GILSTRAP: We've already submitted one 3 that way. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. All those who 5 think the county court should be able to prohibit the 6 tenant from staying in the rent premises without payment 7 of past due rent during the appeal process raise your hands. 9 MR. CHAPMAN: Well, isn't that what the 10 11 appeal process is about? Yeah. That's not --12 MR. HARWELL: CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you'll vote against 13 14 it. 15 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: You mean post a 16 supersedeas. You don't mean they come up with the rent on the spot. 17 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh? I'm trying to get their language down. 19 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah, you don't 20 mean they come up with the back rent on the spot. You 21 mean they post a supersedeas. 22 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: For the back rent. 23 24 MR. CHAPMAN: I mean, that's part of what's being decided by the appeal.

MR. GILSTRAP: Without paying the back rent or superseding the judgment for back rent. I think that would solve the problem.

MS. BARON: Can I just make the point that superseding it is financially the same to these people as coming up with the money?

MR. GILSTRAP: Sure.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. And historically it was a nonissue because there wasn't a judgment for damages, so historically somehow we have made a decision that it didn't.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's just try to get the language. All those who think the county court should be able to prohibit the tenant from staying in the rent premises without superseding the judgment for back rent during the appeal process raise your hand.

Does that get it? Don't raise your hands yet. Does that language frame it in a way that would be helpful to the subcommittee?

Okay. So now we're going to vote on it.

All those who think the county court should be able to prohibit the tenant from staying in the rent premises without superseding the judgment for back rent during the appeal process raise your hands.

All right. All those who disagree raise

1	your hands.
2	HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: I vote with that
3	group.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In favor or against?
5	HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: Against.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The votes in favor are
7	eleven. The votes against are nine. So that doesn't
8	PROFESSOR CARLSON: That doesn't help.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It doesn't help except
10	that it seems to me that if we're going to be changing 150
11	years of law that maybe there ought to be a greater
12	consensus than 8 to 7 and 11 to 9.
13	MR. YELENOSKY: The next question is going
14	to be
15	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I kind of think
16	there ought to be a better reason for changing it than an
17	1890 case that we've co-existed with.
18	MR. EDWARDS: It's the Constitution of the
19	state that's the reason, as I understand it.
20	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I have not
21	had a chance to read this case. I'm not persuaded that it
22	mandates no supersedeas.
23	MR. GILSTRAP: Judge Peeples, do you mean
24	Dillingham? Are you talking about that case?
25	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah.

MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. I just want to make 1 that for the record. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any other votes we 3 could take that would help --4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. We need to 5 take a vote on whether or not if there is a supersedeas 6 that an affidavit of indigence could suffice and allow an indigent tenant to not post a supersedeas. 8 9 MR. YELENOSKY: And that's the -- Chip, that's the current state of the law and has been then --10 well, in the sense that the effect has been that if you're 11 indigent you don't post a supersedeas. I think it would 12 do the same presumption that you just stated. 13 MR. HARWELL: And, Chip, I have a quick 14 The supersedeas bond, does that only cover --15 because we had discussed in our committee meeting that it 16 wouldn't only cover the rent but also possibly attorney 17 fees or is it only rent we're talking about? 18 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No, no. 19 talking about everything. Anything monetary in the 20 judgment the supersedeas would cover. PROFESSOR CARLSON: In the JP judgment. 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: In the JP court 23 judgment. 24 25 MR. GILSTRAP: Well, but there is a

difference between requiring the tenant to supersede the 1 2 judgment for rent and order to stay in the premises as opposed to superseding the judgment for rent and attorneys It seems to me it makes sense that's a logical 4 fees. distinction there. 5 MR. HARWELL: That's why --6 7 MR. EDWARDS: Well, when you get to the county court level isn't there a right, if you think you 8 can't recover the stuff that's going on, that you can seek a writ of attachment on the property to pay the costs? 10 MR. GILSTRAP: You mean to collect the 11 judgment? 12 13 MR. EDWARDS: To collect the judgment. There's a procedure already in place at that level that 14 allows the person that thinks they're going to come up 15 short to go out and post a bond and grab the property. 16 MR. GILSTRAP: Assuming there's property to 17 18 grab. Well, it may be possession of MR. EDWARDS: 19 the premises. 20 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: You're talking 2.1 about a post-judgment collection. 22 MR. EDWARDS: No. I'm talking about --23 MR. HAMILTON: When we talk about 24 superseding the money judgment, are we assuming that the 25

money judgment says if you don't pay you give up 1 possession? Or do we have to have a supersedeas for the 2 money judgment and a separate supersedeas for the 3 possession? 4 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: No. You have one 5 supersedeas for everything, but if you don't post a -- the 6 7 supersedeas is to suspend the enforcement of the judgment and the judgment for possession and the judgment for back 8 rent, for costs and attorneys fees. So if you don't post 9 a supersedeas then a landlord could go in and try to 10 enforce judgment by getting a writ of possession for 11 possession or writ of execution on abstract of judgment, 12 garnishment, turnover, whatever they want to do. 13 14 MR. LOW: What would happen, though, in a 15 situation where you pay in your current rent but you don't pay your back rent. Then ordinarily you would be able to 16 17 enforce the judgment that you owe for the back rent, but 18 they couldn't kick you out of the house --HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well --19 20 MR. LOW: -- because you're paying the current rent. 21 22 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: But the back rent 23 is now going to -- you would post an appeal bond 24 currently, which the judge presumably sets to encompass

the amount of the judgment for back rent and attorneys

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fees plus back -- rent during the pendency of the appeal,
   presumably. So if you don't post the appeal bond now,
2
   then you don't appeal and you get evicted.
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                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Here's --
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   Steve, let's try this out. All those in favor of the
5
   proposition that the filing of a proper certificate of
6
   indigency should allow the tenant to stay in the rent
   premises without paying the back rent or current rent
   during the pendency of the appeal raise your hand.
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE:
                                          Not current.
10
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Not the current.
11
                 MR. YELENOSKY: Not current.
12
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not current. Back rent?
13
                 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, without paying a
14
   judgment for money damages.
15
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: It's not just rent.
16
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Without paying a
17
   judgment for money damages?
18
                 MR. YELENOSKY: You could -- Justice
19
   Lawrence, whatever. Would it be a judgment?
20
                 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, it's the
21
   posting of a supersedeas. I mean, that's what this is
22
   about.
23
                 MR. YELENOSKY: Without posting a
24
   supersedeas.
25
                 Yeah.
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HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. What we're 1 voting on is do we want to let an affidavit of indigence 2 to allow an indigent tenant not to post a supersedeas and 3 continue to appeal. 4 MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah, I think that question 5 will get to it. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those in favor of the proposition that the filing of a proper certificate of 8 indiqence should allow the tenant to stay in the rent 9 premises without posting a supersedeas bond during the 10 pendency of the appeal. How does that work? 11 MR. GILSTRAP: We're just talking -- we're 12 not talking about ongoing rent. We're just talking about 13 the judgment that the JP court rendered. 14 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Yeah. 15 16 MR. GILSTRAP: Okay. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those -- let me read 17 18 it one more time. All those in favor of the proposition 19

that the filing of a proper certificate of insurance -- of indigency. Wait.

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All those in favor of the proposition that the filing of a proper certificate of indigency should allow the tenant to stay in the rent premises without posting a supersedeas bond during the pendency of appeal raise your hands.

HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: Yes. 1 MR. EDWARDS: Well, that -- I'm going to 2 stay out of that one. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those against raise 4 your hands. 5 The yea's had it by a vote of 13 to 3, so 6 7 that proposition passed by a vote of 13 to 3 votes. that give you a sense of how this committee feels, Elaine, even though you voted against it? 9 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah. And one other 10 thing would be helpful. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. What other 12 thing would be helpful? 13 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Is it a sense of the 14 full committee that you -- that we want to shift from 15 perfection of a de novo appeal to the county court from 16 filing fee to notice of appeal with the 143a catch-up 17 provision? 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Say that again. 19 PROFESSOR CARLSON: I know you're 20 21 frustrated, Tom, but I want to know. Say that again. HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: 22 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Is it a sense of the 23 full committee that we want to shift from perfection of 24 appeal by filing fees to the county court to a notice of 25

appeal will perfect county court jurisdiction with a 20-day catch-up provision like that in 143a? 2 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: My only comment 3 would be that the Texas Association of Counties is 4 probably not going to like that because we're talking 5 about filing fees for all appeals from all JP courts, and 6 that's a substantial amount of money. You're talking about a free appeal with no filing fee whatsoever. 8 9 PROFESSOR CARLSON: No. A filing fee, but it's not jurisdictional. 10 11 MR. CHAPMAN: But it's not jurisdictional. PROFESSOR CARLSON: You perfect by the 12 notice of appeal and then if you haven't -- you're suppose to pay a filing fee, but if you don't, we keep the 20-day 14 hiatus. 15 MR. CHAPMAN: 143b. 143a. I'm sorry. 16 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: All right. 17 you're saying -- so the vote you want is to have the 18 filing fee paid as it is now, not at the time that the 19 appeal is perfected. 21 MR. CHAPMAN: Right. 22 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And the appeal will be perfected when the notice of appeal is filed. 23 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Here's how I can frame it. All those in favor of shifting from perfection 25

of an appeal with the payment of filing fees to a system 1 of a notice of appeal which perfects jurisdiction. 2 MS. BARON: I have a question. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Pam. 4 5 Elaine, in that system then if MS. BARON: you don't make the payment within 20 days and we have 6 no -- the appeal is perfected, and there's no underlying judgment, right? 8 That's the real problem. 9 MR. EDWARDS: PROFESSOR CARLSON: That is the problem. 10 So it can't work. MS. BARON: 11 MR. GILSTRAP: No. We can fix that. 12 13 MS. BARON: No, because we voted -- we didn't have a good vote on whether the judgment has any 14 15 validity. HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Not if -- if we're 16 going to let deadbeats off on the other two votes, this 17 lets them completely off. 18 19 MR. LOW: Just by filing a piece of paper. As I understand Elaine, the MR. HAMILTON: 20 question is whether we want to go with the way they 21 proposed it, which is the filing of the fee in the JP court which perfects the appeal, or to rely upon Rule 143a 23 for the notice; but as I understand Rule 143a, if that fee 24 is not paid then it's just a nullity and nothing happens 25

to the JP court. 1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's true. Can I ask 2 Andy to address what your practice is one more time? 3 MR. HARWELL: Well, when the notice of 4 appeal is brought to us, it in essence just sits there for 5 20 days; and we don't issue a cause number or anything to 6 the docket; and if the fees are not paid then everything is sent back to the JP court. 8 MR. HAMILTON: So there's never an appeal 9 under 143 if the fee's not paid; isn't that right? 10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's the effect of it. 11 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: And that's the 12 current case law. There are cases that say that if the 13 filing fee is not paid then the appeal is not perfected. 14 It goes back and JP court has to issue a judgment. 15 16 MR. EDWARDS: Exactly. HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: So is the motion 17 whether we should retain that current law? 18 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Exactly. Because the 19 proposal that we made was to perfect the appeal by the 20 filing of the notice and the filing fee, which is 21 22 distinctive from the current practice. 23 MR. EDWARDS: No. Not really. 24 MR. HARWELL: You're just asking for the filing fee -- well, you're just asking for it up front.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: 20-day grace period. 1 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Right, the 20-day 2 3 grace period. Well, you've got to pay the MR. EDWARDS: 4 fee or it isn't perfected. 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: We didn't have the 6 We're requiring -- forcible was not in 143a, 7 20-day 143a. right? 8 HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: That's right. 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Under your 10 11 proposal. 12 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Under the proposal. But that's different from what MR. HARWELL: 13 14 you said a little earlier about it not being perfected when the notice was filed and no fee was paid. 15 16 saying pay the fee along with the notice at the JP level and then it goes to the county courts at that time rather 17 than the 20 days, waiting the 20 days. 18 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Right. So do we want 19 20 the 20-day grace period that 143a gives, kind of a floating time to perfect, realizing that that then is 21 22 enlarging the time for the forcible entry trial in a 23 county court because they've got to wait the 20 days, but 24 Steve Yelenosky I think would say that's a good thing. you think that's a good thing?

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: My argument would be under the current system there's confusion and you don't know when the appeal has been perfected because the county court's jurisdiction is not invoked until that happens. There are notice requirements that it extends it. It's confusing to the county court-at-law judges sometimes because they -- sometimes they send back notices thinking that they have -- do not have jurisdiction over the case or they have jurisdiction, which it's just the opposite result. It's confusing.

If you pay the filing fee up front then, yeah, I realize it's another 120 or 40 dollars that they have got to pay now as opposed to in 25 days. You don't

have got to pay now as opposed to in 25 days. You don't have these issues about when the jurisdiction is invoked. I mean, you know that the appeal is perfected then. It goes up. It's docketed, and everything moves along, and from the standpoint of actual practice it would be better to have it paid at the time you file the appeal bond.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let me see if I can frame the question. All those in favor of a system where you're perfecting an appeal in FED cases only upon filing a notice of appeal and payment of a contemporaneous filing fee. Is that what you're looking for?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Right. Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's what we're going

to vote on. So all those who are in favor of a system where you perfect an appeal in FED cases only upon filing a notice of appeal and payment of a contemporaneous filing 3 fee raise your hand. 4 HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: 5 Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wait a minute. 6 keep your hands -- if you have your hands up, put them up. 7 MR. YELENOSKY: Wait a minute. Am I voting 8 for this or against this? I got lost. I have found my 9 way again, with Justice Duncan's --10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Put them up one more time and keep them up. I see people popping them 12 up and down. 13 And you voted "yes," Justice McClure? Did I 14 hear that? 15 HONORABLE ANN McCLURE: Yes, I did. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All those opposed? Ιt 17 passed 12 to 8. So, again, I don't think you have a 18 strong consensus to change 150 years of Texas law. 19 MR. EDWARDS: I don't think that changes 150 20 years of --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't think you have 22 23 consensus to change five years of law. 24 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: So let me make sure I've got it. The consensus of the committee is if 25

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I'm in my apartment --
                 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, I love the way you're
2
  going to wind up with that.
3
                 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER:
4
                                           If I'm in my
   apartment and decide I'd like to stay there for awhile but
5
   I have some other things I'd like to spend my money on,
   stop paying rent. Eventually I get an FED notice.
   Eventually that goes to trial, and I have no defense.
8
   just wanting to stay free, and so I lose. All I do is
9
   file a notice of appeal with the county court, don't spend
10
11
   a dime.
                 MR. GILSTRAP: You start -- no, you start
12
13
   paying rent.
                 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER:
                                           Let me finish.
14
   Let me finish. I file a notice of appeal with the county
15
   court, and then I get another 20 days to stay there.
16
17
                 MR. YELENOSKY:
                                 Paying rent.
                 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER:
                                          Without -- well,
18
   if I don't pay rent, what happens? How is it any
19
   different? I just don't pay, and I get another 20 days,
20
   and if that's right, why in the world are we for that?
                 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, we voted earlier that
22
   we didn't think people should get away with --
23
24
                 PROFESSOR CARLSON: But who has jurisdiction
25
   then?
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HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: And so you file 1 another FED for the rent that I'm --2 MR. YELENOSKY: I don't know. 3 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: And I'm --4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Brister, if there 5 are -- the answer to your hypothetical, I think, and I would think the whole committee would share this, is if there are deadbeats out there as clever as you, we're probably going to let them do it. Let's break for lunch. 9 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: My experience 10 after twelve years on the bench is there are. 11 (A recess was taken at 1:05 p.m., after 12 which the meeting continued as reflected in 13 the next volume.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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2	CERTIFICATION OF THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
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4	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
5	
6	
7	I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand
8	Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported
9	the above meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
10	on the 28th day of September, 2001, Morning Session, and
11	the same was thereafter reduced to computer transcription
12	by me.
13	I further certify that the costs for my
14	services in the matter are $\frac{1}{290.50}$ .
15	Charged to: <u>Jackson Walker, L.L.P.</u>
16	Given under my hand and seal of office on
17	this the 9th day of October, 2001.
18	
19	ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES 1702 West 30th Street
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21	(512)323-0626
22	D'Lois L. Jones, CSR
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