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9	HEARING OF THE SUPREME COURT
10	ADVISORY COMMITTEE
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19	Taken before Anna L. Renken, a
20	Certified Shorthand Reporter in Travis County
21	for the State of Texas, on the 12th day of
22	January, 2001, between the hours of 1:19 p.m.
23	and 5:03 o'clock p.m. at the Texas Law Center,
24	1414 Colorado, Suite 101, Austin, Texas

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78701.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's go 2 back on the record everybody. Okay. 3 got the proposed solutions to our problems. 4 Okay. Let's take up the work product of the ad hoc subcommittee on (e)(4); and you should 5 6 have in front of you the language which has 7 been proposed. And Luke is the author of this. Why don't you tell us what you've done 8 9 MR. SOULES: Okay. Thank you. 10 (4), interim proceedings, there are three 11 inserts there starting with the sentence 12 "However, in the following instances, the 13 judge, " and I inserted "against whom the 14 motion is directed may proceed" -- strike out 15 "with the case" -- "may proceed as though the 16 motion had not be filed." So that would be 17 the judge against whom the motion is 18 directed. That could be the trial judge, the 19 recusal judge, regional judge, Justice of the 20 Supreme Court, whomever would proceed as 21 though the motion had not be filed. And of 22 course, if that's the recusal judge, the only 23 proceedings before that judge are recusal 24 proceedings as opposed to trial. 25 So this takes care of the issue of

whether it's what we've called vertical 1 motions or horizontal motions. It could be 2 3 subsequent trial judges, or it could be going up the ladder in the recusal process; but it 4 does not empower the initially challenged 5 6 trial judge to try the case until just because 7 the recusal judge has been challenged and 8 maybe the regional judge has been challenged. 9 The process has to work its way back to the trial court. 10 11 And then the -- so the purpose of that 12 was to get the vertical and horizontal and to 13 say that the judge who would proceed would be 14 the judge who is confronted with the third 15 motion, and that judge would proceed with whatever is before that particular judge. 16 17 The ground then that was added was "when 18 the motion is a third or subsequent motion 19 filed in the same case by the same party." 20 MR. HAMILTON: What is the 21 difference in (c) and (a)? 22 MR. SOULES: (c) and (a). (a) is 23 where the party has been sanctioned. 24 MR. HAMILTON: I think Judge McCoy 25 suggested that "sanction" wasn't the right

1	word anyway, that it ought to be "denied,"
2	where the motion had been denied. I mean,
3	what difference does it make whether they've
4	been sanctioned or not sanctioned as long as
5 .	there has been a third motion filed?
6	MR. SOULES: The big difference
7	between (a) and (c) is that (a) could apply to
8	a second motion. If the party has been
9	sanctioned on the first motion, then it would
10	apply to a second motion, I think.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't think
12	so.
13	MR. SOULES: No. That's not right.
14	Because your sanctions don't occur until the
15	third motion.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, under (a)
17	it could be anytime. It could be sanctioned
18	any time; but under (b) it doesn't apply to a
19	third or subsequent motion.
20	MR. HAMILTON: Also (a) refers to
21	e(11)(b), which I thought we were going to
22	eliminate.
23	MR. SOULES: (e)(11)(b) only applies
24	to the third and subsequent motion for
25	sanctions.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
2	MR. YELENOSKY: So (c) eats up (a)?
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, let's focus
4	on (c) first. Let's focus on
5	MR. SOULES: I move that we, just so
6	we have got something on the table, I move
7	that the inserts and the strike-throughs that
8	I've submitted to the Committee be passed.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Do we have a
10	second?
11	MR. HAMILTON: Second.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any further
13	discussion about this?
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip.
15	MR. WATSON: No.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen.
17	MR. TIPPS: I think that (a) and (c)
18	overlap unduly.
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. The motion
20	is just to discuss the inserts and strike-outs
21	in the introductory paragraph and the addition
22	of (c). I agree with you. We need to pay
23	attention to (a) in a second.
24	MR. TIPPS: Okay.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But let's move on

Luke's motion. Any further discussion about this, or do you want to take a second look at it? Okay. Nobody has said anything, Luke. So everybody in favor of the additional language in the introductory paragraph of (e)(4), Interim Proceedings, and the addition of the language on (c) which says "when the motion is the third or subsequent motion filed in the same case by the same party" raise your hand. Anybody opposed? By a vote of 22 to nothing it passes.

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Okay. Now let's take up the issue of whether or not (11)(b) and (11)(a) do what we want them to do. Now the reason for having a sanctions feature for third or subsequent motions is because that's in the statute, and Senator Harris thought that that was an important feature of his statute.

I think in fairness to Judges McCoy and Harris, they're more concerned about the process moving along and less about sanctions; but nevertheless, we ought to do what we can. Luke.

MR. SOULES: Can I speak to that? (11), the sanctions section (11)(b), is a

mandatory sanctions provision where three or four motions have already been denied. I don't see what the problem is. I think we ought to leave that in there, (11)(b). Now and I don't know whether or not you want to take this a piece at a time. I do want to say something about (4)(a). (4)(a) is swallowed up by (c) the way it's written now because you're to the fourth motion under he e(11)(b) before the sanctions are mandatory, so you're already past the time where the trial court can proceed under (c).

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However, it seems to me that we could discuss -- back up just one second. A trial judge can sanction a party, has discretion to sanction a party for the first motion to recuse. (e)(11)(b) is mandatory sanction after three denials.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. SOULES: So we could discuss whether under (a) we wanted to have a provision that the trial judge could proceed with the case if the party had ever been sanctioned for filing any motion to recuse. I don't favor that because I think (c) is

1	enough.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. (c) is
3	broader than (a), but encompasses everything
4	that is in (a).
5	MR. SOULES: Well, but if you took
6	out "pursuant to subparagraph (e)(11)(b)" out
7	of (a),
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
9	MR. SOULES: then you would have
10	a situation where the trial could proceed or
11	the hearing could proceed on any motion to
12	recuse, not the third or fourth or second.
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
14	MR. SOULES: If the party had been
15	sanctioned for the first one.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That was not the
17	intent when we drafted this; but maybe we
18	MR. SOULES: I don't favor it.
19	Somebody asked what is the difference. I
20	think we ought to eliminate (a).
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. I do too.
22	MR. SOULES: But I want to get what
23	I see before the Committee, what I see in this
24	heard by the Committee before we vote on
25	that. There may be something else here that

1	I'm not seeing; but I think we ought to
2	eliminate (a).
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What does
4	everybody else think? Eliminate (a)?
5	COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Yes.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there a
7	consensus on that? Anybody opposed to that?
8	(No opposition.) Okay. Bye-bye (a).
9	MR. SOULES: And keep mandatory
10	sanctions under (e)(11)(b)
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: (e)(11)(b) yes.
12	There's another issue under (11)(b) we'll talk
13	about in a second. Now do we want to we're
14	going to need to renumber. And do we want to
15	just make (4)(b) now (4)(a)?
16	MR. SOULES: I think so.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And (4)(c)
18	will now become (4)(b). Okay.
19	MR. SOULES: Right.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Now
21	onto (11)(b), Senator Harris had a concern
22	about our insertion of the word "against a
23	judge," because it sounded like, it sounds
24	like perhaps that we're talking about denial
25	of three motions against the same person.

1	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: You
2	are.
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Excuse me?
4	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I
5	believe that was our intent.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. I think it
7	was too.
8	MR. HAMILTON: What paragraph?
9	. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're at (11)(b)
10	now.
11	MR. SOULES: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And so the
13	question is what is our thinking about this?
14	Do we want to
15	MR. SOULES: It was heavily debated
16	because of the central docket issues; and this
17	got voted in this way because of the central
18	docket issues. See, this doesn't this is
19	mandatory sanctions.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
21	MR. SOULES: So now you've had a
22	series. You've had your first judge in Bexar
23	County that you had to recuse. Well, of
24	course, this is a denial.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. The thing

1 we were concerned about, Luke, was when you 2 win two and then you lose the third that's the 3 way the statute reads. MR. SOULES: Right. But things are 4 5 getting worse. I got the first judge. I 6 thought that judge should be recused; but I 7 lost. Then I got a worse judge for the next 8 hearing in Bexar County; and I filed my 9 motion, and I lost. Now I have got the worst of all worlds assigned to me for trial. 10 11 MR. CHAPMAN: Which Judge McCown 12 said would not happen to anyone normally. 13 Wasn't that his point, that who here would ever believe? 14 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. You're 16 running into a string of bad luck if that 17 happens; but follow Luke's --MR. SOULES: Well, you can run into 18 19 random bad luck, you know. And --20 MR. CHAPMAN: I just want us to make 21 sure that that's --22 MR. SOULES: And now I need to file 23 a motion. And if I lose that one, I am going 24 to get mandatory sanctions. I think it's 25 great for the trial to go forward with the fix

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1 MR. ORSINGER: I'm not sure that 2 this language addresses the concern that I 3 thought we had; and so I would like to pose this question to Sarah that assume that I have 4 5 my first hearing in the case coming up, and I don't file my motion to recuse until maybe 6 7 four days before the hearing. It's clear to 8 me that at that hearing nothing in my motion can be considered unless it meets these listed 9 10 criteria. So then the factors that can be 11 considered are considered and denied; but I have others that were never considered. 12 1.3 then after the hearing I file a new motion to recuse. My trial is six months away. 14 15 can't be any delay here; but I want to get rid 16 of the judge on grounds that didn't get 17 considered in my first motion because it was 18 filed too close to special exceptions hearing 19 or something. Am I entitled to re-present 20 those grounds that were not considered, or 21 have they been waived because I didn't get them heard before the first hearing, filed at 22 23 least 10 days before the first hearing? 24 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 25 understand the intent of the Committee, that

1 motion, that second motion would not be 2 subject to (e)(2). 3 MR. ORSINGER: So the grounds that did not get considered in the first hearing 4 5 then I go ahead and have my hearing; but now 6 by gosh, I'm entitled to my unconsidered 7 grounds. I want a hearing on that; and I 8 haven't waived it because I filed it too close 9 to an earlier hearing. 10 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Right. 11 MR. CHAPMAN: But you can only file 12 one more motion before you would be 13 sanctioned. MR. ORSINGER: Right. 14 15 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 16 the problem I think with using the word "waiver" at all. 17 18 MR. WATSON: That's right. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Because 19 20 waiver isn't something that comes and goes. 21 It's something that comes, it's done, and it's 22 never going to be seen again. And what 23 should, as I understood the intent of the 24 Committee, if you've got a good ground, but it 25 doesn't meet one of these criteria, and you

file it in a motion that is not within 10 days of a setting, you ought to be able to get that ground heard.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hardberger.

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HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I think that this proposed language is not saying what we want it to say. Specifically the phrase "the only grounds that will be considered" I assume the grounds that would be considered is the substance of the recusal motion. What these are, the (a), (b), (c), (d) merely give you the right to be heard on the substantive grounds. This says the only thing, the only grounds that will be considered is what allows you to talk about what you should be talking about, so it leaves you nowhere, it would seem to me, as stated.

MS. CORTELL: Didn't we have alternative language I think from Richard earlier to address this, which is that it's waived only for purposes of that hearing or that trial? And doesn't it really fix the problem or not? Are we looking at both sets of proposals?

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does that fix 2 Phil's problems? MR. ORSINGER: Well, I think that it 3 answers my question more clearly in Sarah's 4 language; buť Sarah says "Can you waive 5 something for purposes of a hearing and not 6 waive it for the lawsuit?" I don't have an 7 8 answer to that. But it would seem to me that 9 if, say, it's waived for purposes of the hearing, but only that hearing, --10 MR. YELENOSKY: Right. For purposes 11 12 of that motion. 13 MR. ORSINGER: -- then that means 14 that it's not waived for purposes of a later 15 hearing, so to me my language would cure that 16 problem. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I mean, that happens all the time, doesn't it? I mean, you 18 have a pretrial and you file something late. 19 20 The judge says "I'm not going to consider that 21 now. We're too close to the hearing date. 22 They didn't have an opportunity to respond. 23 I'm going to set that over for some other time 24 when everybody has" --25 MR. CHAPMAN: But you have not been

told that it was waived, though. 1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that's the 2 3 very thing. That's the very problem. Like Sarah says, if you waive it, it's waived for 4 all time. You don't waive it for a little 5 bit. 6 MR. EDWARDS: Well, you can waive 7 elements of proof, a particular hearing, maybe 8 9 a venue hearing. You agree to waive certain 10 elements for purposes of that hearing. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: File a summary 11 12 judgment and you assume certain facts are true 13 that you waive at the hearing. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I don't 14 15 think you waive them. I think you stipulate 16 for purposes of the hearing only that those grounds have been met. 17 MR. EDWARDS: What is the difference 18 between that and waiving it for that hearing 19 only? 20 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Tipps. 22 MR. TIPPS: I think the question is 23 whether or not the motion is considered; and I 24 think what this needs to say is "if a motion 25 to recuse is filed within 10 days, the motion

is considered prior to that trial or hearing only if these criteria are met." It's the circumstances under which -- what this Rule deals with is the circumstances that would justify a late file motion, and this Rule says only under these special circumstances will the Court entertain a late-filed motion.

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HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I think that's the point.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I agree with Judge
Duncan about the motion being waived; but I
think that what we were trying to do on this
is we were trying to have a 10-day rule to say
that any motion that you file for recusal
outside of 10 days is okay. It doesn't affect
anything. You get that heard if and when.
But if it's filed five days before the
hearing, it doesn't stop the hearing or the
trial unless it meets one of the four
criteria. Now -- and, well, let me back up.

If it meets one of the four criterion, it may not even necessarily stop the trial then.

It still may be an interim parallel proceeding; but at least it's going to be

1 heard. It's not going to be those grounds 2 aren't going to be waived. Any ground that 3 you don't put in there that's in existence and you could have put in there within the 10 days 4 is waived forever. You can't ever hear that 5 again. So that the only thing that is going 6 7 to be heard by the recusal judge is what was -- what meets one of these four criteria 8 if it's filed within the 10 days. 9 10 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: And is 11 what you're saying is a motion to disqualify 12 may be filed at any time? A motion to recuse 13 must be filed before of the 10th day prior to 14 trial --15 MR. HAMILTON: Right. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 16 17 unless it alleges one of the following, --18 MR. HAMILTON: Correct. 19 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: -- or 2.0 unless the recusal judge or somebody finds one 21 of the following. 22 And as I say, I don't really have a dog 23 in the hunt as to whether it's waived or not waived; but I think we need to have a Rule 24 25 that is clear about what it is we're trying to

accomplish; and I don't think the discussion
indicates that we have such a Rule.
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina.
MS. CORTELL: This is just a
proposal. What if instead of "waive" we say
"will not be heard", the motion will not be
heard?
HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: Will not
be what?
MS. CORTELL: Heard.
HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I had
one very similar to that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: Which is
striking out the words from Sarah "The only
grounds that will be considered and
substituting "it will not be considered unless
one of the following criteria is met:"
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What does
everybody think about that?
MS. CORTELL: I think you can keep
the present wording and just take out "is
waived" and say "will not be considered" right
there. I think it's more consistent with the
rest of the drafting.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Just so I
2	understand Justice Hardberger's suggestion,
3	"However, if a motion to recuse is filed
4	within 10 days of trial or other hearing, it
5	will not be considered unless the following
6	criteria are met."
7	HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: "One of
8	the following criteria."
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Unless one of
10	the"
11	MR. YELENOSKY: But that implies
12	that if you meet any one of those criteria,
13	the whole motion gets considered; and that's
14	not what we mean to say. We just want those
15	portions of the motion that meet the
16	criteria.
17	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Which is
18	why I think we need to talk about grounds.
19	MR. YELENOSKY: We need to do
20	something other than just say what Chip read,
21	because what that means is you touch one and
22	you get the whole trash can motion in.
23	Right?
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I think
25	that's right, though, isn't it? Oh, no. No.

1	I see what you're saying. No. No. I
2	see what you're saying.
3	MR. YELENOSKY: You can have a
4	litany of reasons for recusal. You don't want
5	them all considered just because one of them
6	is right.
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Because you could
8	say because if there are four grounds for
9	recusal, one of which only arose within the
10	last three days, can you bootstrap in the
11	other three that have been around for a long
12	time?
13	MR. YELENOSKY: So we have to make
14	the language more precise.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
16	MR. GILSTRAP: We can solve that
17	problem if you want to take Nina's approach.
18	Go to (e)(2), and in the second sentence say
19	"a motion to recuse will not be considered if
20	filed later than the 10th day prior," blah,
21	blah, blah, "except on the following grounds."
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does that cure
23	the multiple grounds problem?
24	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Frank, did
25	you intend to change the word "instances" to

"grounds"?

MR. GILSTRAP: Yes. I mean, that's the point. It's only on these grounds.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: If we're going to have a 10-day filing deadline, we need to say you've got a 10-day filing deadline. If there is an exception to the 10-day filing deadline, let's say what the exception is; but we're getting it so convoluted that I think people aren't going to realize "Hey, guys, there's a 10-day filing deadline unless you meet this test."

MR. YELENOSKY: But typically when we talk about a filing deadline we talk about a filing deadline for a pleading, motion, whatever; and in this instance that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about a filing deadline for a particular point, ground, whatever you want to call them that might be made, not the whole motion. Right? So we can't use our standard language about a filing deadline.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I don't understand why. Why can't we say "A motion to recuse must be filed before" --

1 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 2 least 10 days before. 3 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: -- "at 4 least 10 days before trial except the following grounds may be raised in a motion to 5 recuse filed within 10 days of trial." 6 7 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, you can say that. Yes. You can say that. It's different 8 9 than what I thought you were suggesting that 10 we have a cutoff, and then if you meet the 11 exception, the motion comes in. And I was 12 concerned about all the issues raised in a 13 motion coming in when we only intended some 14 ground or using a word that perhaps is 15 preferable. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 16 17 completely agree with your comment and still 1.8 do. We've got to distinguish between a motion 19 and grounds. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What is wrong 21 with bootstrapping other grounds for recusal 22 if one of them meets the (a) through (d)? Ι 23 mean, I am just raising the question. would you not want to permit? I mean, you're 24 25 going to get in under your first ground

1 because the facts just arose a couple of days 2 ago; but you have got to wait for grounds (2) 3 through (4). Why? 4 MR. GILSTRAP: Because you should 5 have raised them earlier. 6 MR. EDWARDS: What do you do if the 7 new ground is frivolous? 8 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: The judge 9 got older. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I guess it 10 matters if it's a trial or a hearing, because 11 12 if it's a trial, then you're out of luck; but 13 if it's just a hearing, based on what everybody has said, then you could raise 14 15 grounds (2) through (4) later. 16 The problem we're having is because we've 17 got this odd situation where you could -- the 18 10-day rule applies to a trial and a hearing; but we all think that you can revive your 19 20 grounds after the hearing date, but more than 21 10 days before the next hearing or trial. 22 Right? That's the problem, I think. 23 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I mean, the 24 10-day I thought was because we wanted to We had two different evils to 25 prevent.

remediate between; and one was the people filing them at the last minute in order to delay a hearing. And allowing somebody to later file the same motion when it's not going to delay anything doesn't seem to be an evil that we've identified, so I mean if we want to be punitive, I guess we could say, you know, "You didn't file it within 10 days of this motion to continue; therefore, you can never raise it again in the case." But that doesn't seem to me to be an evil.

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HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: And part of the whole point of the discussion from last time was I might be very willing to waive this ground for recusal, as Bill says, for purposes of a motion for continuance hearing; but I don't want this guy hearing my case.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bill.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I'm reluctant to even begin thinking very much about changing a lot of the language given all of the many, many, many hours that have been put into this; but I do think Sarah's draft which talks about "will be considered or will

not be considered" is better than saying
"waived." So I would recommend Nina

Cortell's ever so slight modification, "A

motion to recuse will not be considered," you
know, rather than something more elaborate
than that.

I'm tempted to stop and probably should stop with that statement. If you wanted to do a little bit more, you would say "A ground in a motion to recuse will not be considered if the ground is included in a motion filed later than the 10 -- is included for the first time in a motion filed later than the tenth day prior to the date," et cetera. But that's just an elaboration on my first point. Let's change "waived" to something that we mean.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: I'm confused.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: At least you're

willing to admit it.

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PROFESSOR CARLSON: In (e)(2) we're talking about not being entitled to a hearing when you're within the 10-day window. Right? And then it refers at the bottom of (e)(2), last sentence, to "any motion filed after the

tenth day is governed by (e)(4)." And go to

(e)(4) Interim Proceeding, and talks about the

fact the judge gets to go ahead pending a

ruling on the motion. That's the last end of

that first subsection (4).

So is this overall scheme that if you file something within 10 days, this motion to recuse, it will only be heard on these four grounds? The judge can proceed on an interim basis; but then it says pending a ruling on the motion on any of those grounds in (4).

They just don't read consistently to me. I don't get it. And that's why I think we're back to Sarah's point. Are we really talking about waiver, or are we talking about you don't get a hearing at all, or the judge rules on it without you getting a hearing? I don't understand how (e)(2) and (e)(4) fit together.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, if you satisfy one of the four, then even if it's within 10 days of trial or hearing, then it gets considered.

PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: Okay.
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the

25 CHAIRMAN BAB

1 proceedings are stopped. You don't have an 2 interim proceeding. 3 PROFESSOR CARLSON: You don't? 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You do not. 5 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 6 motion filed after the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial or other 7 hearing is governed by subparagraph (e)(4). 8 9 Any within 10-day motion is going to go 10 through the interim proceeding. 11 MR. HAMILTON: It doesn't stop the 12 proceedings; but you still get heard if you meet the four criteria. If you don't meet the 13 four criteria, --14 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're out. 16 MR. HAMILTON: -- you don't get 17 heard on anything. 18 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: that's what -- if all we're talking about is 19 20 whether you're going to get a hearing on a 21 ground that is included within a 10-day 22 motion, maybe that is what we need to say is 23 "However, only those grounds meeting the following criteria will be heard or 24 25 considered" or whatever; but if our concern is

1 what are we going to have a hearing on if it's 2 filed within 10 days, then maybe we just need 3 . to be more express and tell people that unless you -- only those grounds that meet one of 4 these criteria will be heard. 5 MR. HAMILTON: But you have the 6 7 "good cause" in there, so there's always 8 going to be a hearing. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 9. Ιf 10 there's always going to be a hearing, then 11 we're not really limiting any hearings, so why 12 don't we just --13 MR. HAMILTON: We're not limiting 14 the hearings. We're limiting the grounds on 15 which recusal can be granted; and that's the problem with the "good cause" catchall; but --16 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 17 It's a 18 significant problem. You're going to have to have a hearing to determine if there is good 19 cause to have a hearing. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BACOCK: Richard. Richard, 22 are you still here? HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 23 No. Не 24 stepped out. 25 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Carl.

1	isn't it as I'm reading this, perhaps I should
2	have read it a bit more carefully before.
3	Doesn't the connection pointed out by
4	Professor Carlson between (e)(1) and (e)(4)
5	operate on the assumption or (d)(4) operate on
6	the assumption that the waiver is a waiver of
7	the ground for the case as a whole? Isn't
8	that what it assumes?
9	MR. HAMILTON: Yes. I think so.
10	The waiver is a waiver of the ground.
11	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: For this
12	case forever after.
13	MR. HAMILTON: Right.
14	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: So when
15	Richard talked about making the modification
16	to make it clear that's only for the
17	continuance hearing
18	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I don't
19	see where you get that out of (4).
20	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Why would
21	you have all this (4) in there if it only
22	makes a difference for the continuance
23	hearing?
24	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: Wasn't it
25	the sense of the Committee that we felt that a

1 10-day absolute Rule was not desirable and 2 that we wanted to allow people to seek a 3 recusal within 10 days if one of these four 4 grounds was present; but that you don't get 5 the reward of stopping a hearing or trial? 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 7 PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: that's what these are supposed to read? 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. PROFESSOR CARLSON: Okay. 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if we said 12 this, Elaine? "A motion to disqualify can be 13 filed at any time. A motion to recuse must be 14 filed at least 10 days prior to any trial or 15 any hearing except in the following 16 instances:" HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: 17 Yes. 18 Yes. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anything wrong 20 with that? Do you want me to read it again? 21 Okay. "Time To File: A motion to disqualify 22 may be filed at any time. A motion to recuse 23 must be filed at least 10 days prior to any 24 trial or other hearing except in the following 25 instances: " and then pick up the language.

1	MR. HAMILTON: Good.
2	HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SCHNEIDER:
3	(Nods affirmatively.)
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that okay?
5	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Uh-huh
6	(yes).
7	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: And then
8	when we get to the end of (e)(2) as it now
9	reads do we want to say "Any motion filed
10	after the tenth day is subject to (e)(4)," or
11	do we want to say "Any motion subject to the
12	exception is then subject to (e)(4)"?
13	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Any
14	motion.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any motion.
16	Because of what you just said.
17	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: You
18	don't want to give them the incentive to delay
19	the trial or hearing.
20	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: Let's say
21	I don't have one of these four grounds, and I
22	file a motion to recuse within 10 days.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
24	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: That
25	doesn't stop the interim proceeding. It

1	doesn't stop. You go forward under (e)(4)
2	pending a ruling on the motion.
3	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: If it
4	doesn't cite any of those four, it does just
5	like the current Rule, which is it is
6	ignored. A motion filed less than 10 days is
7	considered not filed. It doesn't exist. I
8	ignore it, and I go on with the trial.
9	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: So then
10	when you go to (e)(4) it talks about Interim
11	Proceeding. The judge can go forward pending
12	a ruling on the motion.
13	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: If it
14	raises one of these four grounds, then you go
15	to (4), the Interim Proceeding.
16	MR. YELENOSKY: So if I file a
17	motion to recuse which happens to be six days
18	before a discovery hearing, you ignore it?
19	MR. CHAPMAN: Unless it completes
20	one of those four.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: For the purposes
22	of the discovery hearing.
23	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: That
24	hearing, absolutely.
25	MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. But did we

make it clear for purposes of that hearing in our language?

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HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: The language in this is about the same as the current 18(a). Current 18(a) is "At least 10 days before the date set for trial or other hearing filed," et cetera.

MS. CORTELL: But don't we still have the inconsistency, Elaine, that you pointed out earlier in the last line?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: I'm sorry, Nina?

MS. CORTELL: That any motion filed still is broader than a motion meeting these four criteria, and so it's still overly broad. There's still the inconsistency that Elaine mentioned if we don't narrow what we're talking about in the last sentence.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Right.

MR. YELENOSKY: And Scott was referring to Chip's language. I just tried to jot it down. But Chip's language doesn't solve the problem identified. Maybe it's elsewhere. I mean, it says a motion must be filed within up to 10 days before a hearing unless it's on one of these grounds, so I file

1	a motion that's not on one of these grounds.
2	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: We
3	ignore it.
4	MR. HAMILTON: I don't think you
5	ignore it. I think it has to be passed on to
6	the presiding judge, and you just proceed with
7	the interim proceeding, and they still get a
8	hearing on it.
9	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Well,
10	then you want something other than a filing
11	deadline. The filing deadline says that you
12	have to file it by then. If it's not filed by
13	then, what do we do with it? Do we still look
14	at it? No. It wasn't filed by then.
15	MR. YELENOSKY: Right. And that's
16	my concern, because if I file the motion, and
17	it's a perfectly good motion to recuse, and I
18	don't expect you to rule on it before the
19	hearing on discovery, but I happen to file it
20	within 10 days of the hearing on discovery, it
21	goes in the trash can.
22	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: No.
23	No. I'm sorry. We ignore it for purposes of
24	the hearing that it was within 10 days of.
25	MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. Well, I'm

just saying Chip's language, maybe when we get the projection system and stuff we'll be able to see the language, and I'll put in my two cents then; but I didn't see Chip's language as I jotted it down making that clear. And maybe it does.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm not sure it does; but I'm not sure any of the language we've been talking about does either.

what we're saying, and this does sort of ring a bell -- it may be the wrong bell -- is that if a motion is filed within 10 days of trial or other hearing, it must allege one of these things or it won't be considered before that trial or hearing?

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Right.

Because where we started on this draft was we removed a filing deadline completely. The deal was you can file it at any time you want. If it's filed within 10 days, then we're going to go on with about our proceedings; but then people raised the lying-behind-the-log problem. I know that the judge is going to have to recuse him or

herself; but I also want to delay this thing and put off the day of reckoning, so I'm going to hold that ace in the hole, file it, you know, the moment before trial. It's going to be good, so it won't do any good that you-all are going to proceed onto this trial. We're going to have to cancel the trial anyway because it's a good recusal. So that is why the 10-day thing came back in again.

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I wasn't convinced personally that was that big a problem; but maybe it was. But as a result the two -- an argument can be made you don't really need both. If you're doing one, you don't need the other.

MR. YELENOSKY: And what we're really saying is an exception to the interim proceedings. We're not talking about a filing deadline. You can file it any time you want; and the only thing is if it's on -- it goes to an interim proceeding except for those following grounds. Right?

MR. HAMILTON: It goes to an interim proceeding any time it's filed within 10

1	days.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Unless it's
3	unverified.
4	MR. HAMILTON: Unless what?
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Unless it's
6	unverified.
7	MR. HAMILTON: Well, yes.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Because remember,
9	we had that debate, and in (e)(1) it says "A
10	motion to recuse must be verified. An
11	unverified motion does not invoke the
12	proceedings under this Rule except for
13	sanctions." Right? So you can ignore an
14	unverified motion. So you could, if you
15	wanted to, say you can ignore a late-filed
16	motion that doesn't comply with (2).
17	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: It's not
18	a filing deadline. It's a limitation on the
19	grounds that will be heard at that
20	MR. YELENOSKY: But it's interim
21	anyway. Right? Once you have the interim
22	proceeding, why do we need it?
23	MR. CHAPMAN: I thought it was to
24	consider the exceptions.
25	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: That's

where the waiver idea came from. Hide behind
the log with this in your pocket, and wait
until you go to trial because you know you can
get the trial canceled.

MR. YELENOSKY: That's a
conventional trial. But it says "or other

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conventional trial. But it says "or other hearing," which we've all said so I lie behind the log until five days before the hearing on my discovery motion or my continuance, and the punishment is I waive it. So you could say "conventional trial."

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: You could just drop "or other hearing."

MR. YELENOSKY: Or drop "or other hearing." But if you say "trial" --

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: And I think we had a discussion about that, dropping "or other hearing"; and the argument was that some hearings were so expensive to prepare for and bring everybody in for you wanted it to apply to that too.

My feeling was "or other hearing" you can always reschedule a hearing. From the trial judge's perspective the trial is what I care about. I'll always be here on Monday; but the

1 argument from a lot of the lawyers was "Well, 2 not me. I have to bring everybody in for a 3 special appearance" or whatever the particular hearing they had in mind was, and that is 4 5 expensive if I have to bump that for some 6 reason that you knew about and just decided to make life difficult." 7 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, the motion 9 is on the table, but it hasn't been seconded 10 for the language to read "A motion to 11 disqualify may be filed at any time. A motion 12 to recuse must be filed at least 10 days prior 13 to any trial or other hearing except in the 14 following instances: " And do we want to talk 15 about -- do we want to vote on that? Is there 16 a second? 17 HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I'11 18 second it. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Second. 20 Any more discussion on that language? want to vote on it? All in favor of that 21 22 language raise your hand. 23 MR. HAMILTON: Are you saying "or 24 other hearing"? 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

1 MR. HAMILTON: I can't remember what 2 the prior discussion was. Maybe you remember, This talks about "other hearing" at 3 Scott. that point; and it talks as though there is 4 5 going to be an interim proceeding on that; but 6 when you get over to the interim proceeding 7 Rule the Court only proceeds on an interim proceeding if when the motion to disqualify or recuse is filed 10 days before set for 9 10 conventional trial. We left out "other hearing" there. 11 12 MR. SOULES: We deliberately did 1.3 that. MR. HAMILTON: We did that 14 deliberately. But it seems like that's sort 15 16 of inconsistent if we're going to have 17 "hearing" in the time to file. What happens 18 if you file within 10 days of a hearing? 19 MR. GILSTRAP: There is no need for 20 an interim proceeding. You just have the 21 hearing later. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right. 23 Yes. 24 MR. GILSTRAP: See, the hearing on 25 discovery is passed. You couldn't raise it at

1	MR. ORSINGER: The problem with
2	random assignment counties is that in the
3	rural counties you don't have random
4	assignment; but as a practical matter like if
5	you have a trial in the third week of April
6	and you think you're going to get judge so and
7	so, but he had a criminal he had a capital
8	murder case that carried over in an adjoining
9	county, and now they've flipped judges on you;
10	and so it's not a Bexar County, but it's
11	probably two thirds of the counties in Texas.
12	MR. SOULES: You have three times.
13	MR. ORSINGER: What?
14	MR. SOULES: You still have three
15	strikes.
16	MR. ORSINGER: I know the
17	percentages are low.
18	MR. GILSTRAP: I understand that
19	they may change judges on you; but the problem
20	in the random assignment counties is you're
21	going to have a different motion every a
22	different judge every time you go to court.
23	And it seems to me that if you could carve
24	them out, that might diffuse that problem,
25	because we're trying to do one size fits all,

1	and one size doesn't fit all.
2	MR. SOULES: It does, because
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Cayce.
4	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I wanted to
5	try to address Sarah's concern and this
6	rebuttable presumption idea. What if we
7	provided in (b), left it mandatory as it is
8	provided in there, the opportunity for the
9	party who brought the motion to show that it
10	was not brought for purpose of delay and
11	without sufficient case? In other words, put
12	the burden on them to show there is some merit
13	to bringing this third or fourth or fifth
14	motion; but otherwise if they don't meet that
15	burden, they're sanctioned?
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's an idea.
17	What do people think about that?
18	MR. WATSON: Isn't that the
19	rebuttable presumption?
20	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: That's the
21	request on rebuttable presumption.
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, it is.
23	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: That's
24	what rebuttable presumption does though. It
25	shifts the burden to the moving party to

1	demonstrate that it was not abuse of power.
2	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: It's just a
3	little stronger to keep it mandatory unless
4	they show this, I think.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I kind of like
6	that. Mike, what do you think? You like that
7	too, don't you?
8	MR. HATCHELL: I don't think
9	anything of this. I don't have any dogs in
10	this fight.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Did you get that
12	down? Hatchell has no dog in this fight.
13	Okay. I like the idea even if Hatchell
14	doesn't.
15	Anybody else have any thoughts about
16	this?
17	HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: Do we
18	need a motion?
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'd love to hear
20	a motion.
21	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I make that
22	in the form of a motion.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
24	HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I second
25	it.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right.
2	Discussion on that? Everybody clear on what
3	we're talking about?
4	MR. GILSTRAP: State it again,
5	please.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The motion, I
7	believe, is that in (11)(b) we would strike
8	the words "against the judge," and at the end
9	of the sentence, the first sentence we would
10	say "unless the party bringing the motion can
11	demonstrate that it wasn't brought for the
12	purposes of delay and without sufficient
13	cause." Okay. That's what we're talking
14	about.
15	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: But and
16	only on the third time? Why wouldn't that
17	apply to the first time?
18	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: It would.
19	But the first time we're talking mandatory
20	here unless you demonstrate that you've got
21	some merit. Otherwise
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Otherwise the
23	judge
24.	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: you'd be
25	sanctioned automatically.

1	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: My
2	question is you filed it and you lost, imposed
3	costs on the other side. Why should
4	shouldn't there be a presumption that you pay
5	for that cost unless you show just the same as
6	we do with discovery motions?
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The way Judge
8	Cayce has suggested it there is.
9	MR. ORSINGER: I'm saying do it with
10	the first motion.
11	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: I'm
12	saying why are you waiting until the third
13	time to do that? That ought to be the rule
14	the first time.
15	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I was just
16	going to say the first time give the opposing
17	party the right to seek sanctions as I read
18	it. This subpart (b) is directed to the trial
19	court to issue automatic mandatory sanctions
20	unless the party against whom the sanction is
21	going to be issued demonstrates that the third
22	motion is not frivolous.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Sarah.
24	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: As
25	worded the proposal doesn't address Richard's

1	point, which I thought was a good one,
2	MR. YELENOSKY: Right.
3	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: which
4	is the third and subsequent motion won't be
5	brought for purposes of delay because it won't
6	delay.
7	MR. YELENOSKY: It has to be
8	abusive. It has to be some other evil we're
9	attacking other than delay. We have to define
10	what that evil is.
11	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Good way
12	to put it.
13	MR. GILSTRAP: But in your motion in
14	your proposed wording change "and/or," and I
15	think that would solve that problem.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Jan.
17	HONORABLE JAN P. PATTERSON: It also
18	puts the trial judge back in the position of
19	having to make findings, which I think was
20	Judge Brister's comment about why we have this
21	problem in the first place.
22	I would like to suggest that we get a
23	sense of the Committee on the language of
24	either "shall enter," "should enter" or "may
25	enter" and just leave the language as it is

otherwise.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We have a motion that's been seconded, so that's what we're discussing right now.

still, of all the things, I mean, to take the discretion out of the hands of the trial judge on something this particular and specific and given to such a variety of situations, as Frank says, it just -- this is not the area we could do that. It's just like the three strikes you're out statute. It's trying to fit all instances.

And so I will favor -- and the other comment, with all due regard to Senator Harris, it's possible that when he hears the full discussion he will agree with us. This is the whole question of what is legislative intent and what did he have in mind at that point. Until we have a discussion with him or a proposal we may not have the complete answer to that and we may satisfy him in some way. So until we know that we have not satisfied him I don't think we ought to put anything onerous in place just because of some

1 unspecified concern that someone had now a 2 year ago. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, based on our discussion with him, Frank Gilstrap's and 4 my discussion with him, I don't think his 5 concern has lessened any. Do you agree, 6 7 Frank? 8 MR. GILSTRAP: I think he's still 9 concerned; and I think you've correctly identified the source of his concern, and I 10 think we took a great step today by bringing 11 12 these two judges in, and I think they were 13 very pleased with the way it went. And so I'm 14 optimistic that we're going to be able to get 15 there with Senator Harris; but I've only known 16 him for 40 years, so I can't read him. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Cayce, 18 could you reread the language again that you think we should add to this sentence in 19 20 (11) (b)? 21 HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Well, mine is 22 a little different than the way you worded 23 it. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that's why 25 I wanted to get your language.

1	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I would just
2	add at the end of that sentence after taking
3	out "against a judge" at the end of that
4	sentence put a comma, "unless the party making
5	such motion demonstrates the motion was not
6	brought for the purposes of delay and/or
7	without sufficient cause."
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: John.
9	MR. MARTIN: Do you have to show
10	that all three meet that test, or the last
11	one, or?
12	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: "And/or."
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "And/or."
14	MR. ORSINGER: No. He's talking
15	about the third motion. You're talking about
16	the third motion.
17	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I'm talking
18	about the third motion.
19	MR. MARTIN: Just the third motion?
20	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Just the
21	third motion, yes.
22	MR. CHAPMAN: Doesn't the "and/or"
23	raise the specter that you'll in some courts
24	have to prove both delay and without
25	sufficient cause and in other courts you can

1 prove one prong or the other? Isn't that --2. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: That's the problem with "and/or." It's inherently 3 ambiquous. 4 5 MR. CHAPMAN: -- vague? HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Just leave 6 7 "or." PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: "Or" means "and/or." 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen Tipps. MR. TIPPS: I don't think it should 11 12 be "or" in (4) because if you're in a 13 situation in which the filing of a motion 14 necessarily would not delay the trial, then 15 you could always avoid sanctions by proving I 16 didn't -- I'm demonstrating that I did not 17 file this for purposes of delay. MR. YELENOSKY: Don't we want to 18 take "delay" out of this provision. We may 19 want it in the other sanctions provision where 20 21 it's possible that you're going to delay 22 things; but we've just said when we couple 23 this with the other provision there's no way 24 there is going to be delay. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 25 Right.

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1	MR. TIPPS: Without sufficient
2	cause.
3	MR. CHAPMAN: Without sufficient
4	cause.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Cayce, do
6	you agree with that?
7.	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I'll take
8	that. That sounds good.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right.
10	Richard.
11	MR. ORSINGER: Well, we have Rule 13
12	that has a set of how you figure out when you
13	sanction somebody; and we've got Chapter 10.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
15	MR. ORSINGER: And we're now going
16	to have yet a different standard. But Rule 13
17	for better or worse kind of rotates around the
18	idea of whether it's groundless or not. And I
19	don't know that we want to buy into all the
20	case law that's background here; but this has
21	been relatively serviceable insofar as other
22	motions and pleadings are concerned. Perhaps
23	we should consider using similar language, or
24	maybe Rule 13 is not well written and maybe we
25	shouldn't; but we do have a lot of

1 interpretive history on this. And the 2 standard is groundless means no basis in law 3 or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modification or 4 5 reversal of existing law. MR. SOULES: 6 That's going to get 7 repealed in the recodification which goes to the statute book. 8 That was the recommendation 9 this Committee made several years ago to the 1.0 Supreme Court. HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Rule 13 is 11 12 addressing pleadings that are groundless. 13 We're not just talking about what is alleged 14 in the motion being necessarily completely 15 groundless. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This is 17 different, I think, Richard. MR. ORSINGER: Different in what 18 Because Rule 13 applies to motions as 19 sense? well as pleadings. In fact, Rule 13 applies 2.0 21 to this motion unless we say it doesn't. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, this 22 23 (11)(a) is already in the statute. I mean, it's already in the Rule 18. 24 That's right. 25 MR. ORSINGER:

1 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 2 was one of the problems is there's 20 places 3 where sanctions are in the Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've got to deal with the hand we're dealt, though. 6 7 MR. ORSINGER: Well, see, what's 8 happening is we're carrying forward the old 9 sanction Rule under 18(a) that it has to be for a delay. And what is the other? 10 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We changed that. 12 You know, we took "solely" out. The current 13 rule says "solely for purposes of delay." 14 Judge Brister persuaded everybody that that 15 should come out last time around. 16 But the point is we have a motion that is seconded on the floor. So anymore discussion 17 18 about the language that Judge Cayce has 19 proposed? 2.0 MR. CHAPMAN: And that would presume that we would not tinker with (a)? 21 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right. 23 This motion, unless I misunderstood it, does 24 not address (a), (11)(a). Anybody else? Well, then let's vote on this. Everybody that 25

1 thinks that we should strike the words 2 "against a judge" and add the words after the 3 last, the first sentence of (11)(b), the last 4 word including comma, "unless the party making such motion demonstrates that the motion was 5 6 brought with sufficient cause." 7 MR. HAMILTON: Can we vote on those separately? 8 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, you mean 10 "against the judge"? No. Unless you want to 11 accept the amendment to --12 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. That's all 13 right. 14 HONORABLE DAVID CAYCE: No. Let's 15 just go for it. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All 17 right. Everybody in favor of that raise your 18 hand. Everybody against raise your hand. motion carries by a vote of 20 to 11. 19 So 20 that's the way we'll fix it. Bill. PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: If there 21 22 is concern about the use of the standard 23 "without" or "with sufficient cause," which 24 actually is the standard which was in the 25 former Appellate Rule, we could be more

consistent with Chapter 10 and with the current Appellate Rule by using the word "frivolous" or "nonfrivolous."

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I don't know if that's a large issue.

You could use the sufficient cause standard.

Presumably that would send somebody back to
the case law with respect to what are now
regarded as frivolous appeals, and you could
come up with something fairly understandable
as a standard; but there is concern about
consistency.

I think the right thing to look to would be Chapter 10 rather than Civil Procedure Rule 13. And there, you know, the title uses the term "frivolous," and that's the term we picked up in the Revised Appellate Rule.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there not however some case law or a body of cases that have developed around Rule 18 that has used the words "without sufficient cause"?

HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I don't know.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's been around a long time, has it not?

JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: It's been

1	around a while.
2	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: What was the
3	purpose of including that terminology in
4	subpart (a)?
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's carried
6	forward from the current Rule.
7	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Okay.
8	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: That's the
9	way we used to talk about these kinds of
10	things for "delay" and "without sufficient
11	cause"; and we don't talk about it that way
12	elsewhere anymore.
13	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: Could I
14	ask a point of clarification? Did we just
15	vote the entirety of (b) including the joint
16	and several liability on the attorney and the
17	client?
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We haven't
19	discussed that; and I don't think that was the
20	vote.
21	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: All
22	right. Thank you.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If somebody has
24	got a concern about that, we should talk about
25	it; but I think the motion was only to strike

1	that language and add the other language.
2	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I'm going
3	to move that we use the word "frivolous,"
4	because the more I think about it once you
5	take the "not for purposes of delay" away from
6	"without sufficient case" you may water the
7	standard down to amount to no standard at
8	all.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So what
10	you would do, Bill, then is change the
11	language we just voted on to say "Unless the
12	party making such motion demonstrates that the
13	motion was not frivolous"?
14	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes. Or
15	words to that effect. But I would also change
16	(a).
17	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Subpart (a).
18	That's where I got the term.
19	MR. EDWARDS: Where does "frivolous"
20	come from?
21	MR. ORSINGER: The Appellate Rules.
22	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Well, it
23	actually comes from the way we started talking
24	about these types of issues for a while. And
25	Chapter 10 is titled. Chapter 10 of the Civil

1	Practices & Remedies Code is at least entitled
2	Sanctions For Frivolous Pleadings & Motions.
3	Granted,
4	MR. ORSINGER: Yes. But what
5	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Granted,
6	when you read the text of Chapter 10 it's more
7	complicated than that.
8	MR. EDWARDS: Yes. It says "not for
9	any improper purpose including to harass or
10	cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
11	in the cost of litigation."
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That sounds like
13	"without sufficient cause" to me. Okay.
14	Carl.
15	MR. HAMILTON: What does the word
16	"demonstrate" mean? How do you what is
17	the standard to see whether or not one has
18	demonstrated something? Is that like
19	"preponderance of the evidence"?
20	MR. EDWARDS: I would assume.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know.
22	MR. HAMILTON: A prima facie case or
23	what?
24	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: It is shown.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They would have

to overcome what otherwise would be a mandatory order, I would guess; but what quantum of proof you need for that I suppose would depend on how the subject would be judged.

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MR. ORSINGER: We really have one articulation of this concept in Rule 13. We have another articulation in Chapter 10. We have another articulation in the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and yet a different articulation now we're not contemplating.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How are they different, Richard?

MR. ORSINGER: There's no one way of describing the concept that we're after. Like if you actually look at Chapter 10, they've got four different aspects that you're vouching for whenever you sign and file a motion. And if they find that you violated any of those, you're subject to sanctions under Chapter 10.

The frivolous appeals just says if the appeal is frivolous, no explanation or definition of any kind, no standards set out in the Appellate Rules at all.

And in Rule 13 they have a bunch of recitals; but apparently you're not punished for them if they're wrong unless they're groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for purposes of harassment; and then "groundless" is defined. They're I think trying to get at the same thing; but they used different words; and some of them have longer lists. Some of them have short lists. The Appellate Rules doesn't have a list at all. It just uses the word "frivolous" which is not the word "groundless."

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And so I guess it's consistent for us to make up a new word and use it; but it might also be appropriate for us to find out is there a core concept hear, and can we describe it in such a way that it would be useful at the trial level and at the appellate level and for purposes of recusals.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I would say we're not making up a new word. This has been in the Rules for a long time. They're making up new words.

MR. JEFFERSON: I'd like to second

Professor Dorsaneo's motion. I'd second the motion to use the word "frivolous." I think we all know what it means; and the Courts do too.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We haven't had a motion yet; but when there is one I will take that as a second.

MR. GILSTRAP: I think I know what "groundless" and "frivolous" mean. I think they come out of the DTPA; and it's just hard as can be to get your attorney's fees under the DTPA if you're the Defendant. And we're going to stick that in (b) and make, you know, require that that hill can be climbed; and the result, and so we're saying on the third motion you could be sanctioned if it's frivolous. And that's seems to me to completely take the teeth out of (b). I mean, I could see it in (a); but I don't see on (b), say, where you're given three strikes and the third strike the test is frivolousness.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Bill, I notice that Rule 251 the motion for continuance uses sufficient cause. Do you think that

"frivolous" is a less onerous test to meet, as Frank has suggested?

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I think that it's possible and in fact you're almost compelled to do so to read the words "without sufficient cause" to mean that you didn't win, which makes it a type of strict liability standard which is not what we intend.

I think when the Appellate Rules had the twin standard of "for delay and without sufficient cause" what was really driving the imposition of the sanction was the "without delay" part, and the protection was additional protection, talking about "sufficient cause."

The appellate cases, as you know, set up, you know, a list of factors that you would look at to see whether this is, you know, for purpose of delay, without sufficient cause. I don't think any of this -- any appellate lawyer would have too much trouble thinking that those factors and that type of thinking are embodied in the word "frivolous" as currently set forth in Appellate Rule 45. I think that's what everybody would think.

People use the word "frivolous" in just

1	general parlance now. We know what it means.
2	It probably does mean "groundless" and "for
3	some improper purpose"; and I don't know
4	whether we can come up with a really good
5	definition of it; but in the absence of coming
6	up with a really good definition, which I
7	can't, I like the use of the word "frivolous"
8	because it better conveys what I think ought
9	to be the way this is looked at than "without
10	sufficient cause" which is way too strict.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So you
12	would propose in (a), or your motion, Bill, in
13	(a) is "brought for purposes of delay and
14	frivolous" striking "without sufficient
15	cause"?
16	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: No. We
17	took out the "delay" part, didn't we?
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not in (a) we
19	didn't.
20	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: We didn't?
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We did it in
22	(b).
23	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes. I
24	would say take out the "delay" part.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That the motion

1	was brought for purposes of delay and
2	frivolous.
3	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: We'll just
4	say it was frivolous.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That the motion
6	was frivolous.
7	MR. CHAPMAN: Are you talking about
8	(a) or (b) now?
9	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: (a) and
10	(b). I'm talking about both.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But we're
12	starting with (a). Let's start with (a). Your
13	motion is that (a) should read "If a party
14	files a motion under this Rule and if it's
15	determined on motion of the opposite party or
16	on the Court's own initiative that the motion
17	was frivolous, the judge hearing the motion
18	may impose any sanction authorized by Rule
19	215.2(b)." That's the first part of your
20	motion. Right?
21	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: (Nods
22	affirmatively.)
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that a "yes,"
24	Bill?
25	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes.

MR. CHAPMAN: I don't understand why we're tinkering with (a) when this implied the first motion, and what we're concerned about is that it is for the purpose of delay and it does not have a proper basis. And that seems to be substantially different than the concept that we are grappling with in (b) where it seems to me that the "delay" and "without sufficient cause" is proper in (a); but what we're trying to do is heighten the standard in (b) so that it's "frivolous." And I thought that's where you were going, that "frivolous" was a standard to be imposed in (b) as opposed to delay.

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PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I must admit, Carlyle, that the only reason that I began to talk about (a) was for consistency; and I'm not sure consistency is important.

MR. CHAPMAN: Yes. It seems to me that what we're after in (b) is to, as someone else pointed out, to avoid the trap of the argument about delay and there's been no delay because I'm doing this within the 10-day period, et cetera, et cetera. And I was convinced. I been convinced that "without

1 sufficient cause" in the context of (b), if it 2 can be interpreted to mean you didn't win, is not enough. And so it seems to me that (b) 3 ought to be "frivolous," and we ought to leave 4 (a) as it is. 5 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Do you 7 accept that? 8 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I accept that (a) is a different matter. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So we're going to 11 leave (a) alone; and (b) we're going to change 12 the language, Judge Cayce's language we just 13 voted on to say "unless the party making such 14 motion demonstrates that the motion was not frivolous." 15 16 HONORABLE DAVID CAYCE: Second. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All 18 right. All in favor of that raise your 19 hands. All opposed? It carries by a vote of 20 20 to 5, so we'll make that change. 21 All right. Now moving right along, Sarah 22 has proposed language for (e)(2) which you-all should have. It's in her beautiful 23 24 handwriting. Do you want to tell us what you 25 have done, Sarah?

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: said to someone earlier, "I don't care" if the decision of the Committee is to say that grounds not brought more than 10 days before trial are waived just for purposes of that setting or are waived forever. Actually I do care. But assuming, as I think was said, it was the intent of the provision that a ground not contained in a motion to recuse filed more than 10 days before trial be waived only for purposes of that setting, I think we need to be more clear about that intent and be more clear. I still don't even understand the concept of waiving a motion. To me you can only waive grounds. You can't waive a motion. But what we're trying to say I think is that we will only consider grounds that meet the criteria in (e)(2) if they're contained in a motion filed within 10 days of trial. that's what I've tried to say. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Did you intentionally exclude "or other hearing"? HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN:

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"10 days of trial

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:

1	or other hearing," correct?
2	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Right.
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So the
4	first sentence from (e)(2) is not changed; but
5	the second sentence
6	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Actually
7	the first sentence is changed.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is?
9	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: It's
10	changed to include motions to recuse.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, sorry. I
12	see. Okay. So "A motion to disqualify or
13	recuse may be filed at any time. However, if
14	a motion to recuse is filed within 10 days of
15	trial or other hearing, the only grounds that
16	will be considered are grounds that meet at
17	least one of the following criteria: (a),
18	(b), (c), (d)." And then would you delete the
19	final sentence in (e)(2), Sarah? I would
20	think not; but I'm not sure.
21	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: No, I
22	would not.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So now
24	we're clear on the changes that are proposed.
25	Everybody clear on that? Judge Cayce.

theory with what Sarah has said. I just wonder though if by providing that a motion to recuse may be filed at any time are we inviting the kind of abuse that we've been talking about most of the morning which is the successive filing of motions to interfere with the progress of a trial? And I realize it's addressed in these other provisions; but if we say you can file a motion at any time to recuse, then we're asking parties to do just what --

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. You're giving with one hand, and you're sort of taking away with one.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Well, we're saying you can file the motion at any time. To that extent, yes, we're inviting motions to recuse; but then we're saying it's not going to delay the proceeding, one; and two, the only grounds we will consider are grounds that meet one of these criteria, which I think is what we were trying to say in the language that we've now got.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard.

1	that we put over in (4)(b), now (4)(b); but I
2	think I don't think it should be mandatory
3	sanctions unless it's filed against the same
4	judge.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What does
6	everybody think about that? John, what do you
7	think?
8	MR. MARTIN: If we're going to say
9	the same judge, I think it ought to have the
10	word "same" in there, because I think it's
11	going to be interpreted two different ways.
12	Personally I think it just ought to be three
13	motions that are denied.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You don't think
15	it should be the same judge?
16	MR. MARTIN: No.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You think it
18	should be
19	MR. MARTIN: Right.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you're with
21	Senator Harris on this.
22	MR. MARTIN: Well, I wouldn't put it
23	that way. Our opinions on this topic just
24	happen to coincide.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. There

1	we go. Okay. What else? Buddy.
2	MR. LOW: That would be accomplished
3	by just striking out "against the judge" the
4	motion filed in the case under this rule.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: By the same
6	parties?
7	MR. LOW: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's great.
9	Bill, how do you feel about that?
10	MR. EDWARDS: I think if I were
11	caught with three, I wouldn't like it very
12	much; but I think the chances of getting
13	caught with three denials in the same case is
14	pretty slim.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip.
16	MR. WATSON: I just move we take out
17	"against a judge."
18	MR. LOW: I second that.
19	MR. WATSON: And see how we feel
20	about it.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.
22	PROFESSOR CARLSON: I agree with
23	Luke. I think if you've got mandatory
24	sanctions, you really should you should be
25	able to show the abuse.

1	COURT REPORTER: You should be able
2	to show?
3	PROFESSOR CARLSON: You abused the
4	system.
5	
6	MR. YELENOSKY: This includes those
7	vertical motions too now. Right? Because we
8	started talking about them without
9	distinguishing. So if, Luke, as you said to
10	me at lunch, you want to get to Chief Justice
11	Phillips, aren't you mandatorily setting
12	yourself up for sanctions because you've got
13	three motions in the same case?
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, and but
15	maybe you should, I mean.
16	MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I know. Do we
17	mean that? That's all I'm saying.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Well, I
19	think if we take out "against a judge," yes,
20	that would catch the vertical sanctions
21	motions as well. Anybody else? Yes, Buddy.
22	MR. LOW: But this means you have to
23	have lost three times.
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
25	MR. LOW: Denial. Not what Luke is

1 talking about where you win one and you win 2 It doesn't say you just filed three. Ιt 3 says upon denial. And even in baseball you're out after that. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Especially in 5 baseball you're out after that. 6 7 MR. EDWARDS: I did have one case where the motion to recuse was against the 8 entire Court of Appeals, which would be six 9 judges. What happens there? 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that's just 11 12 one motion. 13 MR. EDWARDS: It's one motion. But if you have "judge" in there, it's six 14 judges. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Okay. 17 Justice Hecht, here you go. Now that you've waded into the thicket of this, we're talking 18 about (11)(b) and whether or not we should 19 20 strike the phrase "against a judge." So the debate, and there seems to be some 21 22 split on it, is some people think that we 23 should take out "against a judge" and just have mandatory sanctions if you have taken 24 25 three motions, they've all been denied, and

upon the denial of the third one you get sanctioned just automatically.

Others say "Well, but what if they're real close cases, and you're in good faith, and you're not a bad person? Should you really get sanctioned upon that third denial?" And so that would militate in favor of leaving it "against a judge," which would mean we would say denial of three or more motions filed against the same judge.

Senator Harris I think thought that it was not the intent of this statute to make it against the same judge. He meant to have it just three or more motions. Now Senator Harris' statute or the legislature's statute does not make a distinction about between whether it's granted or denied; and I think we unanimously think that is a problem, because you wouldn't want somebody winning two and then losing a third and getting sanctioned; but now subparagraph (b) says "upon the denial of three other motions filed in a case." Do we leave "against a judge" in or take it out?

JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: Well, are you

going to do what I say?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Whatever you say

I'm sure this group is going to raise their

hands.

JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: I'm for taking it out; but that's just me. I think that's closer to what Senator Harris had in mind.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. That's for sure.

JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: But I don't speak for the Court on that. That is just my view.

MR. SOULES: One last try. In most of the venues it's going to be against the same judge. That takes care of itself. But where we've got random assignment dockets there is a risk to litigants if you don't say "the same judge." And it may be just a few places in the state; but for the most part throughout the state if you put "the same judge" in there, it doesn't change the practice at all. And I think for those of us who practice in randomly assigned venues it's protective of the parties and protective of the system of justice to have it this way.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Luke is there a circumstance that you can think of in Bexar County where there would be three judges who ought to be disqualified or recused in a case that either don't do it themselves or are not recused by a higher authority?

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MR. SOULES: Probably in Bexar

County you would get voluntarily recusal. You probably wouldn't have to fight.

JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: I guess part of my reaction is when are you ever going to lose three motions to recuse? I'm kind of like Scott McCown. I just can't imagine it happening; but it may be so far removed from the practice it's not realistic.

MR. SOULES: You could have a case, and I don't -- this is not a reflection on our Bexar County judges, because I think we have great judges; but you can have a case that is so inflammatory that you keep fighting your local judges until you can get somebody from out of the county to come in and try the case. You just don't believe any judge in that county can be fair in those circumstances.

MR. CHAPMAN: Or you could have a party that in a particular county or jurisdiction is just disfavored, and you don't have -- your intent is not to delay the trial, because remember, we started this whole discussion with the problem being that the trial is being delayed. It was a dilatory practice. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. CHAPMAN: But rather there is a legitimate concern with regard to the issue of fairness. And I think that it's sufficient to say that you can't delay the trial; and we've dealt with that. And I think it goes beyond what is really required to make it mandatorily sanctioned simply because you have lost three motions. Your motions may be very close, or you may have, as I've said, a party who is just disfavored in the county.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or favored.

MR. CHAPMAN: Or favored. And you're attempting to oppose that.

MR. SOULES: This only deals with mandatory sanctions. It's not dealing with any other issue.

MR. CHAPMAN: Yes. And I think the problem I'm having is that the sanctions are mandatory regardless of the merits of the motions.

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right.

MR. CHAPMAN: And that strikes me as inequitable.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I completely agree. I think to say that mandatory sanctions based merely upon the number of motions filed there's no hint of due process in an equity sense in that.

I would also point out that in the counties that have central dockets we're not just talking about the judge assigned to try the case. We're talking about all of the judges who were assigned to hear all of the matters in that case. We're talking about all the pretrial motions. And I can conceive of a situation in Bexar County where you would have three recusal motions that you lost each of which was just almost good and each was directed to a judge assigned to hear a particular pretrial matter. And I have great

concerns with mandatory sanctions without regard to the merit of the motion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: I think the problem is we disagree with the statute because it imposes harsh penalties on some instances where it ought not to be imposed. I think that one solution is to delete (b) entirely and not try to have a sanction. Let the statute stand on its own, and let the Supreme Court interpret it as to whether it's good, bad or indifferent, because we've taken care of it by the interim proceeding in effect.

The statute says we're going to punish you if you do it three times. We're saying we're not going to punish you. We're just going to let the interim proceeding go forward, so you can't stop the proceedings by doing it and then let the sanctions take care of themselves with the statute.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl, the only thing though is that the statute is worse than this, because the statute punishes you whether you win or lose the first two. So do you really want to kind of punt the issue and

1	allow that situation to be out there to you
2	know, and maybe an appellate court will turn
3	that around and say the legislature can't do
4	that, or maybe not. But to let that situation
5	exist when we have the opportunity to fix it.
6	MR. HAMILTON: To fix it, though, we
7	have to go contrary to the statute.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, yes. We've
9	got to do something. Maybe not contrary to
10	the statute; but we've got to do something.
11	MR. CHAPMAN: But if we come up with
12	a fix, then the statute may be withdrawn.
13	MR. SOULES: That's right.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's the
15	point.
16	MR. CHAPMAN: And so that's why,
17	Carl, you ought to do something that is
18	equitable and so that it replaces the statute
19	which is clearly in my view inequitable.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's the point.
21	MR. SOULES: Sarah's due process
22	point just on the sheer number of filings,
23	that if we are to the third motion against the
24	same judge, we've had some opportunity
25	already; and that doesn't bother me as much as

I've got a new face, and I have got a big problem, and I the lawyer or somebody is going to getting sanctioned if I lose this; but I can't represent my client if I don't file this motion, so I just have to take the risk.

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MR. CHAPMAN: And, you know, we all tend to think about this in our home county; but think about the lawyer who is out of his or her home county, and you're trying it somewhere else where you don't know, you don't have those relationships, and you really do need to protect your client. And I worry about that.

of this is an effort to discuss with Senator
Harris whether his purposes and the
legislature's as he understands them wouldn't
be better served by a change from the statute
that he proposed and got enacted. So in that
regard perhaps the Committee wants to just
suggest to him several options, one of which
would be to take that out, or another might be
to change it from "must" to "should" or some
lesser term, or another might be "should"
taking into consideration the grounds for the

motions that have been made or something

to -- I don't think it's productive unless he

just happens to agree with us to tell him we

don't think that's a good idea. We can

explain it to him; but maybe we have some

middle ground we can agree on.

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MR. GILSTRAP: I think the closer we come to the statute, the more chance we have of getting it withdrawn. That's certainly the sense I have.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I agree.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I would also just post for your consideration if you're substitute counsel, and there have been previously filed in the case two really bad motions, and you come in with one that you in good faith believe should be granted, but it's denied and you get sanctioned.

MR. SOULES: You put at risk your board certification and your federal credentialing where you have to report sanctions even if it's a dollar and a slap on the hand. The problem is the mandatory sanctioning feature of this.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stephen.

(512) 323-0626

MR. YELENOSKY: Just a couple of things. I understood from Judge McCoy and Judge Harris that there was an opportunity to talk to Senator Harris, as Justice Hecht also suggested. And if there is, then perhaps we can clarify what they said, or we can confirm what they suggested, that he was more interested in preventing the delay of cases than imposing sanctions, in which case perhaps he isn't opposed to dealing with it as we proposed here without having a mandatory sanctioning provision.

But if he is insistent on a mandatory sanction provision of the type that is the proposed legislation where three motions and the third one denied and even if you won the other two imposes mandatory sanctions, I would not agree with Frank that we should try to approximate that, and because what we're doing then, if the Supreme Court takes our advice, is putting in place something that maybe would not be passed legislatively. At least it would have to go through a legislative process and be subject to people saying "This isn't a good idea. Perhaps it violates due process."

And we on the fear that that's going to pass would be suggesting to the Supreme Court through its power it put it in place; and I just I don't think we should operate that way.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think we ought to try to get a sense of the Committee as to what we want to do and on these various options. I think Justice Hecht has got a great idea that maybe (11)(b) should be in play to a certain degree with Senator Harris just to see what his views are; but I think it would helpful to see what our Committee's views are. Bill.

MR. EDWARDS: I have not been able to put my finger on what Senator Harris' objective really is. I've heard a lot of suggestions. But does anybody really know what he's trying to do? Because if you know what he's really trying to do, it makes our job easier.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think, and Frank, supplement what I say; but I think he was reacting as it turns out to the situation that he had experienced somewhat himself, but

more importantly that Judge McCoy and Judge

Harris from Tarrant County had suffered with

this case where a lawyer facing disbarment was

engaging in multiple recusal motions and

thereby stringing the proceeding out

ad infinitum; and he wanted that stopped, and

he wanted that person sanctioned for doing

that.

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MR. EDWARDS: Isn't the elimination of the delay, doesn't that really do what he's wanting done, and then the sanctions can be, you know, permissive, but not mandatory?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Mandatory, yes. Buddy.

MR. LOW: You've got to assume that Senator Harris can read what he has written; and he did put in there sanctions. He didn't stop with just saying, you know, I'm trying to keep delay. He wanted more teeth in it; and that is more teeth. Now whether he really would be satisfied with fewer is a question we don't know; but we have to assume that he knows what he drew meant sanctions, and he wanted to do that. So what Justice Hecht said is right, that most of us here probably don't

favor mandatory sanctions; but if he's really serious about not just delay, but sanctions, then we need to come up with something that will satisfy him and not just tell him we're not going to do it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This is just an

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This is just an idea. But what if we took out the phrase "against the judge" and in the third line where it says "shall enter an order" we insert the word "should" instead of "shall"? Stephen.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, also just what about suggesting that, and as Luke pointed out earlier, you can impose sanctions permissively even prior to any number of motions being filed. So why aren't we presenting our suggestion as one in which sanctions are available even at an earlier date, and certainly are available at three, but we just don't want to make them mandatory?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've got that in (a) under certain conditions.

MR. YELENOSKY: Right. All I'm saying is that if in fact, and I don't think any of us know, but the suggestion is that,

well, maybe he really is interested in sanctions. If he's not, apparently there's not a problem. If he is, it isn't clear that he's necessarily interested in having them mandatory. And we have a provision for sanctions, or we could go with one I think by consensus if it's not mandatory.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina.

MS. CORTELL: Is there a way to put a concept in here that if you could file multiple motions, that there is a presumption that arises, something like that, and then it could interplay with (a) in that way? I think what we're all struggling with is this notion of three times and you're out even if there was something reasonable. But if you create a presumption at three, would that get you there?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Maybe so. Sarah.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I guess
I would have an alternative suggestion to
yours, Chip. I would simply change (a) to
"must." I don't care if it's the third
motion or the sixth motion or the first
motion. If someone files a motion to recuse

1 for purposes of delay without sufficient 2 cause, I think it ought to be a mandatory 3 sanction; but there you're tying the sanction to the abuse of the recusal process. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if you put 6 "must" in (a) and had a comment, or even put 7 it in (a) and say "denial of three or more motions raises a presumption" of bad manners 8 9 or something like that? HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 10 11 Rebuttable presumption, that would be fine. Judge Brister. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 13 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Are we 14 talking about the sanctions rule or the 15 interim proceedings right now? 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sanctions. 17 MR. SOULES: (e)(11). HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: And the 18 19 question is whether we should drop this? 2.0 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What we've 21 started moving toward now, Scott, is that if 22 in (a) we would change "may" to "must," and we 23 would add a sentence that says "denial of three or more motions filed in a case under 24 25 this rule by the same party raises as

rebuttable presumption, that the motion is in 1 2 violation of this subsection" and drop (b). 3 HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Rebuttable 4 presumption, what type of proof would be 5 necessary? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that "Hey, 6 7 it's a close call each time, " you know, and/or "Look, I'm new to this case. You know, the 8 9 lawyer that filed a couple of bad ones before, 10 I don't know; but this one is really, even 11 though I lost, is solid." 12 MR. CHAPMAN: But we should go on to 13 say that the rebuttable presumption is that of That's what the judge is asking. 14 abuse. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. What is the standard? 16 MR. CHAPMAN: 17 And what we're looking for is whether or not there is abuse. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. And the 20 rebuttable presumption would be tied back into 21 subsection (a) which is for purposes of delay 22 and without sufficient cause. Yes. Judge 23 Brister. 24 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: I don't 25 necessarily oppose that; but I mean, my

understanding was the reason the legislature did what they did several years ago on frivolous pleadings and stuff like that is because they did not want to leave judges with discretion about sanctions because they thought judges who are elected tended not to want to sanction lawyers because it makes them mad. And the legislature's message "We don't care whether it makes them mad. We want to sanction them because it's expensive when people do this." And I don't really have a problem with that.

Remember, what you could do after the second time if you want to avoid this is go ahead and try the case and appeal. Let's remember. I don't see any due process question in this at all. All you have to do is look at the federal court. And what stops when you file a motion of recusal in the federal court? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. The judge who is involved says "denied" and you keep right on going, and nobody says that's a violation of the way the world is created or the Constitution or anything else. But if that judge is wrong and should have

recused, you go through the trial and you appeal, and the appeals court says "We're not doing it. You should have recused. You should have gotten out of the case."

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So it seems to me the first person who files it the third time an argument can be made is asking for trouble. If they really have good grounds, we file this twice, we knocked them down twice. And we're telling you we'd like to try this case, and you may change and win on appeal; but that's not too much to ask to say "If you want to do it a third time, you better be right this time or you are paying because."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. I think
Sarah's point on due process though was that
you're sanctioning somebody in a mandatory
fashion tied not to abuse of conduct, but just
the fact that they filed three motions.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Right And you could write the rule another way to say no more than two motions may be filed period, and your ground after that is you appeal saying they shouldn't have denied my motion to recuse.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that may be okay in Harris County. But in Bexar County 2 that's a disaster, I mean, if you only have 3 two shots. 4 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 5 6 yes, if you don't tie it to the same judge. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Buddy. 8 MR. LOW: One of problems, it was suggested in (a) that we make it mandatory if 9 10 the motion was brought for purposes of delay. 11 And generally when you get into delay they say the main purpose. I mean, you know, "Put me 12 13 on the stand; and I think I've got a good motion." They say "Well, didn't you really 14 15 want some delay?" "Well, yes, I did want some 16 delay." A purpose. I mean is it just any 17 purpose? Is it a main? I think if you just 18 put "for purpose of delay" and leave it there, 19 I think you're opening up a can of worms. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, it goes on 21 to say "and without sufficient cause." 22 MR. LOW: Well, but any motion that -- okay. 23 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard. 25 MR. ORSINGER: I think we need to

consider that if a motion is filed within 10 days and it doesn't slow anything down, than an argument could be made that it couldn't have been filed for purposes of delay; and I don't want to eliminate the possibility we could sanction someone for filing a malicious or frivolous motion just because they filed it nine days before trial.

MR. YELENOSKY: Or if it's the fourth or fifth motion, it's interim proceeding, so it couldn't be for purposes of delay either.

MR. ORSINGER: I think we have to be careful if the only sanction is upon a finding of purpose of delay, because we have now made it to where many of them will not delay, and they're still going to be frivolous, some of them.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Frank.

MR. GILSTRAP: We were, everybody seemed okay with (b) until we raised the problem of random assignments. Would it be possible to carve random assignment counties out of (b)?

MR. SOULES: It's okay with me.

that time. You don't put that motion on an
interim proceeding. You then go ahead and
hear it later. The only time you have a need
for an interim proceeding is when you're in
trial.
MR. HAMILTON: Well, but if you go
ahead with that motion, that is an interim
proceeding.
MR. GILSTRAP: I don't understand.
MR. HAMILTON: If you have a
discovery pending, a motion to recuse is filed
five days before, if the judge goes ahead with
that discovery motion, that is an interim
proceeding.
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No. I don't
think that's right.
PROFESSOR CARLSON: What about
summary judgment?
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's why we put
"conventional trial" in there.
PROFESSOR CARLSON: I know.
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But this
subparagraph (2) only says "Any motion filed
after the tenth day prior to the date the case
is set for trial or other hearing is governed

1 by subparagraph (e)(4)." But (e)(4)(b) says when the motion to recuse or disqualify is 2 filed after the tenth day prior to the date 3 that the case is set for conventional trial on 4 the merits you can go forward, so it's not 5 6 picking up a normal, old discovery hearing. 7 Right? MR. HAMILTON: Right. That's what 8 I'm saying. But we're not providing for that 9 in here. We don't say what happens. If you 10 11 file it five days before a discovery hearing, 12 I suppose the way this is worded that hearing 13 cannot go forward. That's canceled. And 14 maybe that's the way it is supposed to be, because that can be re-set. So that 15 automatically knocked it off. The only thing 16 that it doesn't knock off is the conventional 17 trial. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think we did 20 that deliberately, didn't we? 21 MR. HAMILTON: We did. Yes. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Are you 23 saying do you want to revisit that? 24 what you're saying? 25 MR. HAMILTON: No. No. No. I'm

1	just saying, questioning whether these are
2	consistent or whether we need more explanation
3	as to whether or not the hearing on the
4	discovery motion goes forward or doesn't.
5	Maybe it's clear. I don't know.
6	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Mr.
7	Chairman.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, Bill.
9	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Maybe Carl
10	is talking about the same thing here. I'm
11	trying to concentrate and focus. But I think
12	the last sentence in (e), the last
13	unenumerated sentence in (e)(2) is something
14	that needs to be changed.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. The last
16	sentence in the paragraph?
17	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
19	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I think a
20	number of changes are necessary.
21	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: But it's
22	at least too cryptic when it doesn't refer to
23	more than subparagraph (e)(4), because it's
24	pretty clear this would also at least be
25	governed by (e)(3), but that if it's late,

that it's still going to be processed. And then the question is when it's or while it's being processed what else can happen? And to say it's governed by (e)(4) is not all that helpful to me either because it's very hard for me to see the relationship between (e)(4) and (e)(2), not to mention the absence of any reference to (e)(3).

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Maybe somebody could write just a sentence to replace the sentence I've identified as the one that gives me trouble and kind of spell that out without trying to do it by some sort of a cross-reference which normally creates more puzzlement than enlightenment; but that needs more work.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

MR. HAMILTON: I think the fix is on that sentence, "Any motion filed after the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for conventional trial" and strike "or other hearing" --

MR. GILSTRAP: Yes.

MR. HAMILTON: -- "is governed by

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1 (e)(4)." 2. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Uh-huh (yes). 3 MR. HAMILTON: Because that eliminates the other hearing, which is where 4 the confusion arises. 5 6 MR. GILSTRAP: I think that works. 7 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: But 8 doesn't that assume that you can't re-file the 9 motion within, you know, a period of time greater than 10 days before the subsequent 10 11 It assumes that I need to get this 12 motion ruled on rather than, you know, filing 13 one that is not subject to some sort of 14 tardiness complaint, which may have been what 15 was in the mind of the person doing all of 16 this subsequent engineering. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So how do you fix that? 18 19 MR. HAMILTON: I don't think that 20 assumes you can't file a motion unless those grounds have been waived because you didn't do 21 22 it when you knew about it. 23 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Let me try 24 to say this another way. Maybe we're just 25 talking over each other. I don't need to

1 worry about this late motion if the only 2. adverse effect is that I'm getting a ruling on some preliminary matter that I would prefer 3 some other judge to make if I can go ahead and 4 move to recuse on all of my grounds and get 5 that, you know, back on track. 6 7 This engineering, you know, has this 8 motion that is tardy penned. I don't need to worry about this motion anymore if I can file 9 another one. 10 MR. HAMILTON: No. 11 That's not 12 right, Bill. 13 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Okay. 14 MR. HAMILTON: The motion that is 15 tardy is filed. If it's filed five days before a hearing, it stops the hearing and it 16 17 goes through the normal channels. MR. SOULES: What's the consequence 18 of just taking out the sentence? 19 MR. HAMILTON: If filed five days 20 21 before a conventional trial, it doesn't stop 22 the trial, and it goes into the interim 23 proceeding. 24 MR. SOULES: Right now we say it 25 does stop something.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. And, Bill, 2 if you limit this last sentence to 3 "conventional trial" even though you pick up 4 (4)(b), that may suggest that you're not 5 giving effect to the introductory photograph (4) which say everything stopped except for 6 7 good cause stated in the order in which the action was taken. 8 9 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: The 10 whole problem we're addressing here is just 11 with "hearing." Right? 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 13 Does 14 everybody still feel strongly that we can't 15 bump this hearing until this recusal is done? 16 If you just remove "or other hearing" from 17 both of these, then you don't have this, you 18 know, what happens to one that was too late, 19 but can it be resurrected? Does everybody 2.0 still feel? I never did feel strongly that it 21 was any big deal to bump any other hearing, 22 get the recusal done, and come back and do 23 that hearing. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. That's what 25 I think. But what about in following up on

1	that, Judge Brister, what about Luke's point?
2	Why don't you even need that sentence?
3	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: You
4	don't.
5	MR. SOULES: Take it out.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Take it out. And
7	then you've got a pretty clean subparagraph
8	(2) if you take out the last sentence. So
9	I'll amend my motion to include deletion of
10	the last sentence.
11	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: The
12	question will still be if we drop that
13	sentence, then what happens to the motion
14	filed six days before a special exceptions
15	hearing?
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It stops the
17	hearing. It stops the hearing.
18	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: I think
19	we need to make that clear, because it says we
20	either it can't be considered or it can't
21	be filed.
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, it says
23	(4) says "After referring the motion to the
24	presiding judge or the administrative region
25	the judge in whose case the motion is filed

1 must take no further action in the case until the motion is disposed of except for good 2 3 cause stated in the order in which the action is taken. However, " and then we have two 4 5 interim proceeding sections. HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 6 there are at least one or two cases that say 7 8 right now under the current Rule which is just 9 you can't file it within 10 days. If you do 10 file it, everybody can ignore it. It does not 11 get referred. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 12 Isn't 13 that -- maybe that's the point that was the 14 intent behind (e)(2) is that you have to file 15 by the tenth day. If you don't file by the tenth day, it will be and can be and will be 16 17 ignored unless you allege one of these things 18 in which case it will go through the referral 19 process and stop the proceedings. But only stop trial 20 MR. CHAPMAN: 21 and not stop hearings? 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 23 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: No. 24 Stop --25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Stop hearings,

1 but not trials. 2 MR. CHAPMAN: Yes. Stop hearings. 3 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Because under the interim proceedings you can go 4 forward with the trial. 5 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Maybe you say 7 then "A motion to recuse must be filed at 8 least 10 days prior to any trial or other 9 hearing except in the following instances which must be asserted in the motion or 10 alleged in the motion: " You don't like that, 11 Sarah? 12 13 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Huh-uh 14 (no). 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I'll 16 withdraw it then. 17 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Because you're getting back into the problem of if a 18 motion alleged one of these, it's going to 19 2.0 have to go through the referral process and we're going to have to hear all of it. What 21 22 we're really talking about is the only grounds 23 we're going to here that are going to stop a 24 hearing are these grounds if they're filed in

a motion that's file within 10 days.

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1	MR. SOULES: Actually in these
2	circumstances the grounds. In the
3	circumstances.
4	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: In the
5	circumstances.
6	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN:
7	Circumstances.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or instances.
9	MR. SOULES: These circumstances
10	open up all grounds.
11.	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Right.
12	MR. SOULES: If you change Time to
13	File, you essentially do what you were saying,
14	Chip, "Must be filed at least 10 days" I'm
15	not using artful language "at least 10 days
16	before the case is set for trial or other
17	hearing unless the basis for the judge who the
18	party filing or good cause is shown," then you
19	take care of the filing problem. And then
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Cayce.
21	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: We're trying
22	to do too much. You had a motion that would
23	have set a 10-day time period for filing
24	motions to recuse, and unless alleged or
25	asserted, these types of grounds or

1 circumstances. And we've gotten into this other part. Could we just go ahead and maybe 2 3 get your motion voted up or down? 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okav. HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Because I 5 think it would be easier to fix these other 6 7 parts of the Rule once we get past that. Do 8 you follow? 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I do. That was 10 sort of what I was thinking. 11 MR. SOULES: Would you say your 12 words again? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. The first 13 sentence is unchanged. "A motion to 14 disqualify may be filed at any time." 15 second sentence now reads "A motion to recuse 16 17 must be filed at least 10 days prior to any 18 trial or other hearing except in the following 19 instances: A motion to recuse must be filed 20 at least 10 days prior to any trial or other 21 hearing except in the following instances:" 22 Yes, Carl. 23 MR. HAMILTON: Keeping with the drafting rule, I think we're still supposed to 24 25 say "not later than 10 days prior to the date

1	the case is set"
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
3	MR. HAMILTON: rather than
4	"within 10 days."
5	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Has that been
6	seconded?
7	HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I second
8	it.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Phil seconded
10	it.
11	MR. SOULES: Question.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
13	MR. SOULES: I just called for the
14	question.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right.
16	Everybody in favor of that raise your hand.
17	Everybody against? Anybody against? It
18	passes 25 to nothing.
19	MR. SOULES: I move we delete the
20	last sentence in (e)(2).
21	HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: I second
22	that.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any discussion?
24	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO:
25	Discussion. We need to know, or at least I

1 need to know what you have in mind, because I think we need to know what happens if this 2 3 motion doesn't satisfy the 10-day Is it referred, or is it 4 requirement. annulled? If it's referred, then we need to 5 know what effect the referral has. 6 7 referred or otherwise acted upon, what effect 8 does the referral or other action have on the 9 trial judge's ability to proceed? 10 MR. SOULES: Okay. Then I move that 11 we add to what we just voted "otherwise the 12 motion will not be considered." 13 MR. HAMILTON: I don't think that 14 does very much, because any good lawyer is 1.5 going to always put something in there for 16 good cause; and so practically all of these 17 motions are going to have a good cause paragraph that means it's going to have to be 18 deferred. 19 20 MR. SOULES: The door is open. Ιt 21 gets referred. 22 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: I'd 2.3 drop "or other hearing" from the second 24 sentence, and then you can drop that last 25 So then -sentence.

MR. SOULES: The second sentence of what, Justice Brister?

the last sentence where the same motion was dropped and then drop "or other hearing" from the 10-day time limit. Therefore, if you file a motion within 10 days of just some discovery hearing or something like that, there is no time limit. You can file it the day before the discovery hearing. No problem. You could bounce this discovery hearing. It's referred, and you get the recusal done in the normal channels.

If it's before trial, within 10 days of trial, though, then there's whether or not it does this, there is no question what you do. You refer it; but you go ahead with the trial. Okay. You don't have this problem of what if you do -- what about the one that is filed less than 10 days before a hearing? Do you refer it, or do you not refer it? What is the point of referring it? Does it come back up, or can you refile it?

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: That makes sense to me; but I think that's really a

slightly independent idea. We have to figure out, you know, if whether or not we take out the "or other hearing" business in there, we need to figure out whether the motion that is still covered is going to be referred or not.

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And I think what Carl said is that the only practical solution is to say that it needs to be referred even if it's tardy, even if it's tardy.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's Carl's point.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: That's Carl's point. So that needs to be in this last sentence which is not in there now explicitly anyway. And I would without trying to put motions on top of motions on top of motions suggest that the last sentence, if it's retained, say that "any tardy motion," whatever that language is, "must be referred or otherwise acted upon as provided in subparagraph, " if that's what it is, (e)(3). And then after that we would have to say After that we need to say more; but more. that's as far as I'm able to get in working through this.

1 I like Justice Brister's idea that all of this engineering probably makes very little 2 3 sense if what we are talking about is some little hearing that can be rescheduled without 4 any big deal. 5 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What about if we 7 kind of borrow the concept we had before which 8 would be to say that if you file a motion, if you file a tardy motion, and you don't assert 9 10 the one or more of the four grounds? HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 11 12 decides that is the problem. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The pleader. HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 14 15 kind of my problem with the deadline in any 16 event is the problem with the judge to be 17 recused deciding whether you got this in on 18 time or not. It's the problem with the judge who is the subject of the motion deciding 19 whether you've said that in your motion or 20 21 That's why it seems to me the Rule ought 22 to be they're all referred. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 24 Then 25 the second part is but if it's within 10 days

1 of trial, it doesn't matter to me whether it's 2 good or not or timely or not. Let the administrative judge decide that. Meanwhile 3 get ready for trial. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So you 6 would say, you know, even if it's on its face 7 inadequate. 8 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: I kind of disagree with the cases that say I make a 9 10 call about whether I think it's timely or 11 not. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good point. 13 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: But you 14 could also have an interim, intermediate provision. If the motion does not comply with 15 16 subparagraph (e)(1), the said presiding judge 17 may deny the motion without a hearing. What 18 we could also have is if you have got a within-10-day motion and don't allege one of 19 20 the criteria in (2), --HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 21 22 Exactly. 23 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 24 denied without a hearing. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that different

1	than referral?
2	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: No.
3	It's referred.
4	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: It's
5	still referred.
6	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: The
7	presiding judge can't touch it until it is
8	referred.
9 ·	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: If we went
10	back to Luke's suggestion just to take that
11	out all together, wouldn't we be where we're
12	trying to get?
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Actually we
14	would, because subparagraph (3) is referral;
15	and it doesn't distinguish between late filed
16	motions or not. It just says "The judge in
17	the case in which the motion is filed must
18	promptly sign an order ruling prior to taking
19	any action."
20	MR. HAMILTON: I'll second Bill's
21	motion that we change that to read "Any motion
22	filed after the tenth day prior to the date
23	the case is set for trial shall be referred,
24	shall be either granted or referred in
25	accordance with paragraph (e)(3)."

1	MR. SOULES: Can I try something
2	else here? If we start with Time to File and
3	say "A motion to disqualify or recuse may be
4	filed at any time." And I think Sarah
5	disagrees with this. But "If a motion is
6	filed within 10 days, it must allege, show,"
7	whatever, and then these four things. If it
8	doesn't, then of course, the presiding judge
9	could decide the motion is defective; but it
10	would still be referred.
11	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I do
12	agree with that.
13	MR. SOULES: That's okay?
14	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I really
15	think it would work if you just do the
16	referral in that last sentence, and then you
17	end up going through the interim proceeding.
18	MR. SOULES: But you refer every
19	motion, not just that particular kind.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any motion
21	whenever filed.
22	MR. SOULES: I'm trying to make it
23	general. You can file either motion any time;
24	but a recusal motion has to allege this extra
25	information.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But Judge 2 Brister's point --3 MR. SOULES: And then they all get 4 referred under (3). 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why don't you 6 have a final sentence, Luke, that says "Any 7 motion whenever filed is referred pursuant to subsection (3)"? 8 9 MR. SOULES: That's fine. That's 10 fine. But you probably should still say that the recusal motion within 10 days has to have 11 12 these additional allegations. PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: 13 That's 14 what Chip's motion did already saying it must 15 be filed. To me it must be filed not later 16 than except under the following circumstances, 17 well, I'm going to tell somebody they need to put in their motion; but those circumstances, 18 19 one or more of them. 20 MR. SOULES: Yes. But we're 21 changing the practice now in our debate. 22 We're saying the recusal motion can be filed 23 any time. Not -- we're not -- we no longer 24 have a 10-day rule on recusal motions. 25 just saying, and that's where we're headed, I

think, or what several people are talking about. So to say the recusal motion has to be filed within 10 days unless is no longer correct. It can be filed at any time; but it has to have these extra allegations in it, and then every motion has been to be referred. If you want to put it in there, that's fine with me.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I understand that now. I like that.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I had previously suggested that we ought to say "except in the following instances which must be asserted or pled" or whatever you say "in the motion." Sarah didn't like that when I suggested it before.

MR. SOULES: If you're going to say it can be filed at any time, and it's got to be referred and all that, you get into the question of a defective motion at the presiding judge's level, because if it doesn't have these allegations in there and it's within 10 days, the presiding judge and regional judge can take care of it.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Well, we

1 would need to add that to the referral provision, because now it just says if it's 2 3 defective under (e)(1), the judge can deny it without a hearing. What we're saying is, and 4 I think this actually was our intent back when 5 6 we did this six months ago, if it's defective under (e)(2), you can deny it without a 7 8 hearing. HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: But it still 9 10 would have to be referred to deny it. 11 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 12 Everything has to be referred. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. So 14 here's -- we will say "Any motion whenever 15 filed must be referred pursuant to (e)(3)." 16 And then in (e)(3) we're going to say "If the 17 motion does not comply with subparagraph (e)(1) or (e)(2), the said presiding judge may 18 deny the motion without a hearing." Right? 19 20 MR. SOULES: That gets most of it; 21 but we're still going to have to put in there 22 that a motion filed within -- a recusal motion 23 filed within 10 days must allege these 24 additional items. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I suggested

1	that, and it was not accepted.
2	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: No.
3	That's fine.
4	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: My initial
5	had it in there.
6	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: You said
7	it differently than Chip said it. The way
8	Chip said it it was he said it a different
9	way.
10	MR. SOULES: It's a different way of
11	saying the same thing. "Time to File: A
12	motion to disqualify or recuse may be filed at
13	any time. A motion to recuse filed later than
14	the tenth day prior to the date the case is
15	set for trial must allege one or more of the
16	following:"
17	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: "Must
18	show the following:"
19	MR. SOULES: However you want to say
20	it. I don't know whether the motion shows.
21	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Actually
22	the motion states.
23	MR. SOULES: "Must state," that's a
24	good word, "must state."
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. We're

going to take a break, Luke. Why don't you write it out.

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(Recess 3:25 to 3:45 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Guys, let's get back to work. Okay. Let's go on the record. Luke, has been hard at work at the break and has language that is going to probably supplant change or modify what we've already voted on that, so that's fine.

MR. SOULES: Let me try to step through this with you, and then we can go back and take it point by point. Start with (e)(2) which is page three of seven to say "A motion to disqualify or recuse may be filed at any time. A motion to recuse that is filed later than the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial must state one or more of the following: " And then I just deleted "when," so that it's stating something and ends with "other good cause." Then delete that last sentence of (e)(2). And then proceed to (e)(3) which is Referral, and we change two sentences here. The first is starting in the where I've drawn a rectangle around it. the judge refuses" -- no. That's not right.

1	Skip over those words and start "the judge
2	must promptly refer every motion to disqualify
3	or recuse to the presiding judge of the
4	administrative region if the judge refuses to
5	recuse or disqualify." And then as Sarah has
6	pointed out, "If the motion does not comply
7	with subparagraph (e)(1) or (e)(2), the
8	presiding judge may deny the motion without a
9	hearing."
10	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Luke, we
11	may have already voted on that first
12	suggestion when Scott moved to change the
13	language at the beginning part, okay, in the
14	voting what you've just suggested.
15	MR. SOULES: Well, may be. I guess
16	we can vote again.
17	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Question.
18	MR. SOULES: But the idea here is
19	that either kind of motion can be filed at any
20	time. A late-filed motion to recuse has to
21	state one of these four additional things.
22	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: It's not
23	late- filed if it's filed within 10 days.
24	MR. SOULES: Within 10 days. Within
25	10 days, that's right. And we've made it

1	clear, I hope, that every motion has to be
2	referred if the judge refuses to recuse; and
3	then so it's clear that the presiding judge is
4	the person who decides whether the motion is
5	adequate if it had these additional
6	allegations that were filed within 10 days.
7	That's (e)(2), and that's something for the
8	presiding judge to decide.
9	And I guess just so we can get discussion
10	going, Mr. Chairman, I move those changes.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.
12	MR. HAMILTON: A couple of
13	comments. One, did you take "or other
14	hearing" out of that?
15	MR. SOULES: We took "or other
16	hearing" out, yes. I'm sorry.
17	MR. HAMILTON: I think that needs to
18	be in there.
19	MR. SOULES: I'm sorry. I missed
20	that.
21	MR. HAMILTON: Doesn't "or other
22	hearing" need to stay in there?
23	MR. EDWARDS: Different places.
24	MR. SOULES: All right. Let's go to
25	Interim Proceedings. And that's why I think

1	that can come out. The way the interim
2	proceedings Rule work against the way
3	(e)(4) works against (e)(2) and (e)(3) is that
4	in three instances the trial judge can proceed
5	even without good cause stated in the
6	motion in the order. The trial judge can
7	proceed for good cause stated in the order no
8	matter what; but without that the trial judge
9	can proceed to hearings if it's a subsequent
10	motion for one where sanctions have been
11	opposed.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No. We changed
13	that.
14	MR. SOULES: You took that out?
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We took that
16	out.
17	MR. SOULES: All right. Oh, that's
18	right. We've got (a) and (b) when it's a
19	conventional trial on the merits or it's a
20	third or subsequent motion.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
22	MR. SOULES: Any hearing can be
23	conducted.
24	MR. HAMILTON: What you're now
25	saying is that

1 MR. SOULES: Regardless. 2 MR. HAMILTON: -- you can put 3 anything you want in a motion filed five days before a hearing. It doesn't have to comply 4 with these four. I thought that even if it 5 6 was before a hearing, it had to comply with 7 these four requirements if it was within 10 8 days. PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I think 9 10 you're going to put that "or other hearing" 11 back in (2) such that the way this works is 12 that the other, that hearing --13 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Ιt doesn't work. 14 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: No. 15 Ιt 16 doesn't work. 17 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: If you 18 have "or other hearing" in (e)(2), but it's 19 less than five days, and you don't state, 2.0 because remember, if you don't state it, what 21 happens? It goes to the administrative 22 judge. The administrative judge, "This didn't 23 say the right things." Bounce it, not because 24 it's not good, but because it didn't say the

right things; and we're back to the problem we

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were trying to address which was what do you do with a hearing that is -- can it be resurrected or not resurrected, when, and all that kind of thing.

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MR. SOULES: And you stop every hearing except the conventional trial. I mean, that's right.

MR. CHAPMAN: Luke, I thought that we spent a lot of time talking about circumstances where some hearings can be case determinative even though they're not case final, for example, a motion to transfer or a motion for summary judgment or, for example, a venue hearing in a very important case or a significant case for your client. And I thought that what we said is that there are some hearings, and the run of the mill discovery hearings are not those hearings; but there are some hearings where the issues presented for the litigants are so important that you don't want to lose your opportunity to complain about an inappropriate judge in the case.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: And you won't because you're not bouncing. Those

1 hearings are delayed. They will not be 2 disposed on a case dispositive hearing because 3 the hearing is put off until after we decide recusal. 4 5 MR. CHAPMAN: And here's the problem with that: There are some issues. For 6 7 example, I can think of motion to transfer, that if it's not determined and determined on 8 9 a prompt basis, as a substantive matter as 10 well as a practical matter you've lost the 11 opportunity to get the advantage that your client seeks. And the delay that then is it 12 13 imposed because you can't proceed with the 14 hearing is a problem; and it's a problem for 15 the litigant on a substantive basis. 16 MR. SOULES: My experience on the 17 recusal process is that it moves fast. 18 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Ιt 19 can. MR. SOULES: I've had six; and they 20 21 all moved fast. So they moved as fast as you 22 ordinarily get a venue hearing decided. All of them I've been in have been over within 30 23 24 days. 25 MR. CHAPMAN: I just want to make

sure that we are affirmatively deciding to eliminate hearings from this process.

MR. SOULES: A motion filed before a hearing doesn't have to say these things in order to stop the hearing. The hearing can go forward unless it fits --

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: No. By dropping --

MR. SOULES: -- (b), the third or substantive motion.

MR. HAMILTON: What we're doing is we're departing from what we decided last time, which was that there are many hearings that parties spend lots and lots of money for getting ready, bringing witnesses and so forth that ought not to be bumped.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Right.

And the reason, the only reason I suggested we should do that is because I don't think we discussed last time if you do that you have this resurrection problem. If you put the 10-day deadline before "or other hearing," we didn't discuss, "Oh, and what happens with that motion which is denied because it wasn't 10 days, but there is some good grounds in

1 there?" How do you write a -- I think it gets 2 cumbersome to try to write the Rule of when 3 grounds or motions or which part of it comes 4 back up and how later. My suggestion was 5 you're going to have to do it one way or the 6 other; and I think it's easier just to drop 7 "or other hearing." 8 MR. HAMILTON: Well, then we might try to visit the "conventional trial" and 9 10 change that to define it to include hearings 11 that are going to take X number of days or 12 something. HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 13 But then what do you do? You file a late motion 14 15 five days. It does or does not state the 16 ground. Okay. So then you go ahead with the 17 hearing. MR. HAMILTON: Go ahead with the 18 19 hearing. 20 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: what about those grounds? What about that 21 22 motion? 23 MR. HAMILTON: They get referred to 24 the presiding judge. 25 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Who

denies them because it was late.

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MR. HAMILTON: No. No. No. The only thing that the "late" has to do with is that it doesn't stop the hearing. He still has to consider the grounds; and if they're good, parties just run the risk going ahead with the hearing.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: If it's in (e)(2), you don't consider it because it's filed late. That's what I would like to drop out of (e)(2). If it's in (e)(2), you don't consider it. There's a deadline of 10 days.

MR. HAMILTON: The trial court doesn't consider it.

MR. SOULES: And the presiding judge doesn't either because he rules it's defective. I mean the regional judge doesn't consider it either because he rules it's defective for not having one of these four allegations.

MS. EADS: What I'm hearing then is that if it's filed, then the hearing will be canceled and reset. That's going to have a very big effect on the State who is often engaged in hearings all over the state every

day often on significant issues; and we dispose of a lot of our cases through summary judgment and the like.

So I'm just worried about the financial and fiscal impact of that because there are hearings that have great consequences. We're engaged in a lot of that. So there is something to be argued for. Understandably I understand in some hearings it doesn't matter; but some of them will have a substantial effect on the business of the State and its litigation.

MR. CHAPMAN: Judge Brister, what about my opponent who has not filed a response timely to a motion for summary judgment who then files a motion to recuse? If the hearing is canceled and then reset, then suddenly his seven-day period to respond has been extended.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Right.

MR. CHAPMAN: What happens to the substantive rights of my client, because he simply files a motion that in essence is a motion to delay?

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Of course, there's a thousand things that people

can do to delay. This is just one of them.

People who get sick, people have conflicting

court settings. There's a lot.

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MR. CHAPMAN: But that's not the hypothetical I asked about.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: great. And I would be happy to say that's fine. The problem is where we started with this discussion. Okay. What do you do with, all right, if there's other hearings in there, you filed it late, it's referred; but it's denied, because it was filed late? what about the grounds that are in there? When did the -- what do we do with those? Are they waived as the Rule originally started this morning? Not waived, but you could raise? You have got to -- if it's a deadline, there's a procedural grounds to get rid of it that does nothing to the underlying grounds; and so we need to then if that's fine, the way you want to go, that's fine; but we've got to put another paragraph in about what happens to those motions.

MR. CHAPMAN: I didn't raise that to get back into the argument about that

1 procedure, because I think those are -- that is a thicket. But I do raise it because we 2 may want to look at whether or not we include 3 summary judgment in the kinds of hearings. Or 4 what have we said? We've called them 5 6 conventional trials. We may want to include 7 summary judgments because of that problem. I 8 raise that. 9 MR. SOULES: Well, I quess that 10 focuses, Mr. Chairman, on the question of 11 whether we have "or other hearing" in there --12 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, summary .13 judgments --14 MR. SOULES: -- in about four 15 places, which would be in the lead-in of (2) 16 and then in the first three points of that. Perhaps if we get past that, we can get the 17 18 rest of this done. 19 MR. YELENOSKY: Carlyle, you're 20 talking about having the summary judgment 21 hearing go ahead, right, just like the 22 conventional trial would with the interim 23 proceeding. 24 MR. CHAPMAN: (Nods affirmatively.) MR. YELENOSKY: 25 And that only, what

I heard you say was your particular concern is with respect to summary. So that concern could be fixed by changing "conventional trial" to "trial including summary judgment on the interim proceedings provision without changing the other ones. Right?

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MR. CHAPMAN: I think so.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ SOULES: We have beat that to death.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Then you're right in the teeth of that. I mean, most of the time people, you know, don't ask you about whether they ought to file a summary judgment. They just do it, and it's set within 21 days. And maybe this is a brand-new case, and maybe you're just finding out about this judge and his or her relationship with the opposing counsel. And if you put that in there, then that's fine; and the summary judgment goes ahead anyway and is granted by the time you get to your recusal hearing. Is that -- I think that looks a lot worse.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're replowing a lot of ground we have already plowed. I'm hearing the same people make the same comments

they did the last two meetings. Let's see if
we can fix the problem that we identified and
try to avoid rearguing stuff we have already
argued about and decide it. Don't you think?

HONORABLE PHIL HARDBERGER: Here,
here.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Where does that leave you, Luke, if we apply that standard?

MR. SOULES: Well, I think we still have to decide whether "or other hearing" belongs in (2), lead-in and then the first three pieces. There is some ambiguity and I think in some of the cases too if you accept the trial judge for the first hearing, are you ready to roll? Are you stuck with the trial judge?

There are instances that have occurred where a lawyer who files a case gets the judge to set a hearing very quickly after answering it, a pretrial hearing, and then contends that that judge can't be recused. And the judge doesn't want to be recused because he's a friend of the lawyer that filed the case; and there are some abuses. So that's (11).

The other is that you would cause due to some pretrial hearings. That's the other side of it without making these, stating these additional items. I think that's the intention. That's where the line is drawn.

MR. HAMILTON: Luke, where we are is if we're not going to protect any other device except the conventional hearing from being bumped off, if that's the only thing we're going to protect, we don't need "other hearing" there.

MR. SOULES: Well, you can go forward with other hearings if the motion is a third or subsequent motion to recuse, because that gives the judge the right to go forward in interim proceedings no matter what they are under (e)(4), so it won't stop it there.

You've got two bites at the apple. I guess if you want to do it for delay, you are subject to getting sanctioned if you do that on motion number one; but --

MR. HAMILTON: All I'm saying is unless you're going to project other hearings, we don't need the 10-day requirements in these four things.

MR. SOULES: That's right. 1 That's all I'm 2 MR. HAMILTON: saying. 3 MR. SOULES: That's right. 4 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bill, did you 6 want to say something? One thing that we're 7 doing I think just kind of in a late Friday 8 afternoon fashion is we are about to take the focus off this 10-day thing which is exactly 9 10 opposite of what we are being told by outsiders we shouldn't be doing. Now if we 11 take it out of the hearing, if we take that 12 13 out of the hearing thing and just eliminate 14 that, you know, isn't that a signal to the Bar 15 that they can lay behind the log just the way 16 we've worded that? 17 It seems to me that what we have to do is 18 follow the language we already voted on and approved, I might add, is that it must be 19 filed within 10 days, and you can get out of 20 that for four reasons, but the focus is still 21 22 on the fact that it's got to be filed 10 days 23 before any hearing or trial. 24 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: But the only -- we're not -- I didn't raise that just 25

because I wanted -- I lost last time. only reason we're doing that is because we started with the problem what do you do with the one that was filed late procedurally and you still want to raise those grounds after? That's the only reason we got back into that is because we have this problem that if we stick to that, we're going to have to add another paragraph that says what to do with that. Do the grounds come back? Does the whole motion come back now that it's not untimely anymore? It still hasn't been ruled It was just ruled on once untimely; and on. that's a problem we didn't address last time.

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If we want to stick with that, that's fine; but we've got to start writing that paragraph. And I'm just suggesting don't write that paragraph. It's just easier to just revote this other one.

MR. SOULES: We still have the 10-day prior to conventional trial.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: One other really important thing that has occurred to me and Justice Cayce too, I think, is once we start working this up; and let me do it this

way: If we leave the "or other hearing" in (e)(2), and somebody manages to pass the pleading hurdle by having that alleged, then presumably in order to obtain a favorable ruling on the recusal motion, not only the grounds for recusal, but the special circumstance needs to be established. And that as I understand Justice Brister is one of the reasons why you want to take "or other hearing" out.

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HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: (Nods affirmatively.)

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Okay. But the same problem exists for "conventional trial" such here is what happens if we leave it the way it is: You have a special requirement for an eave of trial, an eave of conventional trial motion. That motion passes the pleading burden. The trial is conducted. You lose the motion not because the grounds were bad, but because you should have been quicker; and we end up with the worst of all possible situations.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: No. We decided that because it wasn't fair knowing

that was a financial interest in the judge's family to wait until five days before trial and then -- or in the middle of the trial and scuttle the whole trial and waste not just counsel's time, but juror's time and everything else.

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PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: We can move those special requirements down into the interim proceedings provision and not have them impair the determination of the ground, however long that takes.

I don't know mechanically how to do that. I think it's a bad place for these additional things that you need to prove in order to get the motion granted to be, okay, when it means that you lose the motion when it's ultimately determined.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Right.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: It's the same point that you just made changed into a different context. I don't want to stop the trial; but I want if it turns out that this judge needs to be, you know, recused or disqualified, to have the trial not tapped. don't know exactly how to word that.

HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: I think what would, if I follow you, what could be done to this is take, okay, looking at (e)(2), Time to File, let's say we leave it "A motion to disqualify or recuse may be filed at any time." We take these four criteria that allow you, or these grounds that you can assert at any time and still be valid and bring them down to (e)(4) and somehow connect them to the provision that when the motion to recuse is filed after the 10th day prior to the case being set for trial or hearing unless, and then you have these four provisions.

In other words, there could not be a -the proceeding could not go forward if you had
a ground for recusal that you did not know
about, for instance, until the fifth day
before trial; but in any case all motions to
disqualify or recuse would be referred and
would be heard pursuant to (e)(3). It's just
that in those motions that have these four
grounds, one of these four grounds stated in
there the proceeding could go forward in that
case. Is that?

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I'm having

1	a hard time. What I want to do is have the
. 2	trial go forward, but the result not count if
3	you were not misbehaving. No. I don't even
4	think I mean that. I can't say what I mean.
5	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Well, you
6	would not be misbehaving. The trial should go
7	forward if you did not know of the ground for
8	recusal until getting to trial within the
9	10-day period. In that case that would be an
10	exception to the (e)(4)
11	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Oh, that's
12	right.
13	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: provision
14	of allowing the trial to proceed even though a
15	motion has been filed. I know that's
16	radical. That's a radical change.
17	MR. SOULES: That's not going to
18	satisfy Senator Harris.
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip.
20	JUSTICE JOHN CARLYLE: Why isn't it
21	going to satisfy Senator Harris?
22	MR. WATSON: I'm just trying to
23	MR. SOULES: He wants the trial to
24	go forward.
25	MR. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hang on.

1 Skip. MR. WATSON: -- figure out why we 2 3 have had "or other hearings" in there in the first place. And is it -- can you look at --4 I don't have 30.06 with me. Is that part of 5 the statute that we are trying to --6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's been in in the Rule for 17 years. That was a point I was 8 9 going to make. MR. WATSON: 10 Yes. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Trial or other 12 hearing" has been in this Rule since 1984 when 13 it was first passed. Now has this -- Judge 14 Brister, has this caused a big problem? HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 15 16 The only problem is that -- I've never seen 17 the recusals being used as a weapon to stop 18 pretrials hearings. When it's used is to stop 19 trials. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 21 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: And so 2.2 that's why I think we ought to drop the "and 23 other hearings, " because that's really -- I 24 think that's really when it's used, and don't

get into. You know, if you did it before a

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hearing, we're going to go ahead and get rid of it and not face this "what happens when," because you get into with hearings you're in the middle of a case, and you're going to have a chance to raise that ground with that same judge again, and you have to answer the question "can you." And if you drop "other hearings," that problem goes away.

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PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Here's what I want to -- here's what I mean. What I mean is that you get to litigate your recusal grounds late if you discover late -- no. I still don't have a grasp on it.

MR. SOULES: Mr. Chairman, I want to get past this. Let me make my motion with "or other hearing" in there. Then we can move to get that out. Is there anything otherwise if we leave "or other hearing" in there, is the rest of this true to the debate that we had before I tried to write it?

MR. HAMILTON: Well, one other point: And that is to say you must say these things, but we don't say what happens if it doesn't say that.

MR. SOULES: Well, we do. We say

"If the motion does not comply with 1 subparagraph (e)(2), the said presiding judge 2 3 may deny the motion without a hearing." 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. So that 5 takes care of that. But let's back up, Luke. 6 What are we trying to accomplish on (e)(2)? 7 Let's stick with (e)(2) for a minute. are we trying to accomplish? 8 9 MR. SOULES: We're saying that we 1.0 can file it at any time. There was consensus 11 on that in the motion. 12 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 13 that's changing the law and changing the Rule. 14 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wait a minute. 16 Do we have consensus on that, that we can file 17 it any, that that's what we should say, you 18 can file it at any time you want? 19 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Ιt 2.0 depends on what the exceptions are. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, yes. 22 think that's a bad signal if you put it that 23 way. I mean, obviously with disqualification 24 you can file it at any time, because that's 25 something if it exists, it's a problem.

that the way we want to say recusal, you can file at any time?

MR. SOULES: You can file it at any time; but if you file it within 10 days, you have to state one of these grounds. I was seeing all heads shaking "yes" and was told to go write it. I don't know. It looked like there was a consensus to me; but I don't know.

MR. ORSINGER: If you don't have a deadline precluding filing, you're tacitly telling them they can file it at any time. I don't know that it really matters. What matters is what is the consequence of not filing it early enough. To me that's what the real matter is.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, just it's this whole thing of giving with one hand and taking away with the other. You know, the lawyer that readings this says "Oh, I can file this any time. But wait a minute. Hold on. If I file it within 10 days, then maybe I can't file it." It seems to me you ought to affirmatively say you've got to file it at least 10 days before unless you can wiggle out

of it for these four reasons.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: I don't think that's -- it's the same thing one way or the other.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is the same.

You get to same finish line; but you get there
a different way.

HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: Isn't the evil we're trying to address at least in part is to keep proceedings from proceeding in the face of a what may be a frivolous motion? Is that not what we're trying to address?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that's part of it. But I misunderstood what Judge Brister said before. And I think his most recent explanation is that "Look, the hearing is going to get stopped whether it's 10 days before or five days before the way we've structured it here; and that's okay with us by in large, because you know, a hearing you can reset."

But the real evil is the trial. When they do it to delay the trial that's a big problem; and we've covered that in our Rule because now we have an interim proceeding when

it's within 10 days of the conventional trial no matter what. The judge can with his discretion go forward unless the recusal judge stops him.

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So Judge Brister says "Look, let's take this hearing thing out, and we have got other protections in there. We have got something on waiver. Like when something has been stated on the record it may be waived. We've got protections on multiple motions, so that's okay." So Judge Brister's point is that let's just take this hearing think out because it unnecessarily complicates things and means that somebody might file one within five days of a hearing, but then turn right around and file the same motion, and there would be another hearing, you know, more than 10 days. So why complicate things that way? Let's clear out that underbrush and just key it off a conventional trial.

HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: By doing that we would be permitting successive motions to recuse to be filed prior to the hearings without any impugnity.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER:

1	Sanctions. You bet.
2	HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: You can have
3	three.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Three. And then
5	you're in trouble.
6	MR. SOULES: Two.
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Or two, and then
8	the third one you're in trouble.
9	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: If when
10	you get referred and you have the hearing and
11	the motion and "By the way, Judge, they did
12	this five minutes before we had our special
13	appearance, and I had five witnesses coming
14	from Tennessee and I'd like their airfares
15	paid," that ought to be paid. It ought to be
16	granted.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And we have that
18	ability in (11).
19	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So we have it.
21	We can do that by (11). Okay. So maybe I was
22	the only one that was an impediment to
23	dropping this "or other hearing." But I do
24	think we ought to be very careful about
25	dropping language that has been there for 17

1	years and there's not been any problems; but I
2	think maybe I'm persuaded that Judge Brister
3	is right about this.
4	MS. EADS: I am too.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are you okay with
6	that, Linda?
7	MS. EADS: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip.
9	MR. WATSON: I don't know where we
10	are; but maybe if we just move through it a
11	sentence at a time and voted on the
12	sentences.
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. We're
14	spending way too much time on this.
15	MR. WATSON: I'm worried about the
16	Rule against perpetuity.
17	MR. SOULES: You're more worried
18	about the Rule
19	MR. WATSON: This life and being is
20	finite; and I don't know who plus 20 years
21	is.
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I
23	completely agree with what you just said. So
24	the first sentence, "A motion to disqualify
25	may be filed at any time."

1	MR. HAMILTON: "Or recuse."
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, okay.
3	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Luke has
4	a motion on the floor.
5	MR. SOULES: That never got seconded
6	because he went to debate.
7	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I second
8	your motion so long as it included "or other
9	hearing."
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Cayce had a
11	motion that had been seconded that preceded
12	Lukes. We have several things on the floor
13	here.
14	MR. SOULES: Okay.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Let's
16	stick with this. "A motion to disqualify," do
17	we want to put "or recuse" in there "may be
18	filed at any time, " because that is telling
19	the Bar that, you know, basically any old
20	time?
21	MR. SOULES: So moved.
22	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Second.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's vote
24	on that. How many people want to include the
25	word "or recused" after "disqualify"? And how

1 many are opposed to that? It passes 13 to 11. 2. Okay. All right. 3 Now the next sentence, we voted on 4 language earlier that says "A motion to recuse 5 must be filed at least 10 days prior to any 6 trial or other hearing except in the following 7 instances: " Now is the sentiment that we 8 should scrap that in favor of something else? 9 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Yes. 10 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Sure. 11 If we do "A motion to disqualify or recuse may 12 be filed at any time, but the motion to recuse 13 filed within 10 days of trial" and that separate "or other hearing" question --14 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 16 HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: 17 "must state the following:" 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think our vote 19 a minute ago necessarily means that we have 2.0 got to change that language. So Luke's --21 HONORABLE JOHN CAYCE: In light of 22 the vote, I'd move we adopt Luke's language. "A motion to recuse if filed later than the 23 24 10th day prior -- not later the 10th day prior 25 to date, " whatever Luke's language.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Luke's
2	language, Luke, read along with me. "A motion
3	to recuse if filed later than the tenth day
4	prior to the date the case is set for trial
5	must state one or more of the following:"
6	MR. SOULES: So moved.
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Second?
8	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Second.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. All
10	in favor of that raise your hand. Opposed?
11	That would be passing by 22 to 2.
12	All right. You want to strike the word
13	"when" in subparagraph (2)(a), correct,
14	Luke?
15	MR. SOULES: Right.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody opposed
17	to that in light of the prior votes?
18	(No opposition.) Okay. Now so that will pass
19	unanimously. Going down to the last sentence,
20	Luke
21	MR. SOULES: There is an editorial
22	correction where it says "other good cause,
23	must state other good cause," just take out
24	two words to make it fit grammatically.
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wait a minute.

1	MR. SOULES: "Other good cause" at
2	the top of page four of seven must state
3	something. You can't state "for other good
4	cause."
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And you want us
6	to strike the word "for" and "shown"?
7	MR. SOULES: Right.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And now what do
9	you want to do about the last sentence in
10	this?
11	MR. SOULES: Delete it.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Delete it.
13	MR. SOULES: I move to delete it.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Does
15	anybody second that?
16	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Second.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. All
18	in favor of deleting the last sentence? All
19	opposed. That passes 25 to zero.
20	Now within this paragraph the phrase
21	"trial or other hearing" is used a number of
22	times. I assume well, what do you want to
23	do about "or other hearing"?
24	MR. SOULES: I move we delete "or
25	other hearing" in four places in paragraph two

1	are the places it appears.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. So
3	that would be in subparagraph (a), right?
4	MR. SOULES: The lead-in, and in
5	subparagraph (a), (b), (c) and (d) bullets.
6	(a), (b) and (c).
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody
8	second that?
9	MR. HAMILTON: What paragraph?
10	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Second.
11	MR. SOULES: It's (e)(2), and the
12	lead-in, and in the three bullets on page
13	three of seven.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And do we want to
15 ·	say "conventional trial"?
16	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: One
17	thing at a time.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You're right.
19	Good point. Let's do strike "or other
20	hearing." A second on that?
21	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER:
22	Second.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All in
24	favor of striking "or other hearing" in
25	subparagraph (2)(a), (b) and (c) raise your

1	hand. All opposed? That passes by a vote of	
2	14 to 8.	
3	Now inserting the word "conventional	
4	trial" in (a), (b) and (c), is that what we	
5	want to do, Luke, or not?	
6	MR. SOULES: I assume. That's the	
7	only thing that really gets stopped, because	
8	we could spend forever talking about	
9	conventional trial in (4).	
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Is there a	
11	second?	
12	MR. EDWARDS: Second.	
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All in favor of	
14	adding the word "conventional" prior to the	
15	word "trial" in subparagraph (2)(a), (b) and	
16	(c) raise your hands.	
17	MR. SOULES: And the lead-in.	
18	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: And the	
19	lead, yes.	
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the lead.	
21	All opposed? That passes by a vote of 11 to	
22	4.	
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. What	
24	other violence can we do to subparagraph	
25	(e)(2)?	

1	MR. SOULES: (e)(2) is done. (e)(3)
2	we could get to now. We can just rearrange
3	and add something to the sentence that starts
4	one, two, three, four, five lines from the top
5	of (3). It begins now "If the judge refuses"
6	just to get your eyes to the right place.
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
8	MR. SOULES: Re-do that sentence to
9	start "The judge must promptly refer every
10	motion to disqualify or recuse to the
11	presiding judge of the administrative region
12	if the judge refuses to recuse or disqualify."
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All the language
14	is there except for "every," right?
15	MR. SOULES: Yes, "every motion to
16	disqualify or recuse."
17	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Why are
18	you moving the "if" clause?
19	MR. SOULES: Just to put the
20	emphasis I've got to refer every motion.
21	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Really
22	you're just replacing the first phrase of that
23	sentence.
24	MR. ORSINGER: No. He's moving it.
25	MR. CHAPMAN: Moving it to the end

1	of the sentence.
2	MR. ORSINGER: He's changing "if" to
3	an "unless."
4	MR. SOULES: No.
5	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: No.
6	He's moving the "if" clause to the end of the
7	sentence. And to me
8	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: It's
9	already in the first phrase of the next
10	sentence.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. The
12	proposal is this: That we're going to move
13	the introductory clause to the end of this
14	sentence, and we're going to add the word
15	"every" before "motion" and "to disqualify or
16	recuse" after "motion," so that the sentence
17	would read "The judge must promptly refer
18	the" "must refer " strike "the"
19	every motion to disqualify or recuse to the
20	presiding judge of the administrative region
21	if the judge refuses to recuse or disqualify."
22	That's the proposal. Is there a second?
23	MR. HAMILTON: Second.
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any further
25	discussion?

1	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Mr.
2	Chairman.
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
4	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I think we
5	need to get from the court reporter the
6	language that we voted on earlier changing the
7	first sentence.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The language we
9	voted on early, which the court reporter can't
LO	possibly find since she wasn't here this
11	morning,
L 2	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Oh, well,
13	that's a good point.
L 4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: but which I
15	wrote down says "The judge in the case in
16	which the motion is filed must without further
L 7	proceedings promptly recuse or disqualify or
18	refer the matter to the presiding judge of the
19	administrative region before taking any other
2 0	action in the case."
21	Any further discussion on this proposed
22	amendment to (e)(3)? All right. All in favor
2 3	of the proposed amendment raise your hand.
2 4	All opposed? That passes by a vote of 17 to
) E	2

1	MR. SOULES: And the last item is
2	one, two, three, four, five, six, seven,
3	eight, nine lines from the top of that
4	referral paragraph. The center of the ninth
5	line down starts "If the motion does not
6	comply with," to get your eyes to the right
7	place, subparagraph (e)(1). We add "or
8	(e)(2)."
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is there second
10	to that?
11	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Second.
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody opposed
13	to that? That will pass unanimously.
14	Are we done with this?
15	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: Don't we
16	have to also do another (e)(2) on the next
17	line? "If the motion complies with (e)(1) or
18	(e)(2), add there?
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's a good
20	point.
21	MR. HAMILTON: (e)(1) and (e)(2)?
22	It might not be an (e)(2) motion.
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Why don't we just
24	say "If the motion complies with subparagraph
25	(e)"?

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1	MR. SOULES: I think we definitely,
2	(e)(1) and (e)(2) are the provisions that talk
3	about what the motion has to contain.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.
5	MR. SOULES: And that's what I was
6	trying to get to expressly state, that the
7	jurisdiction to determine compliance with
8	(e)(1) and (e)(2), if necessary, is in the
9	jurisdiction of the presiding judge.
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's got to be
11	(e)(1) and (e)(2).
12	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: And
13	comma, "if applicable."
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "And (e)(2), if
15	applicable."
16	MR. HAMILTON: They're not all
17	(e)(2) motions.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right.
19	MR. SOULES: Sarah just read it to
20	you.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "And (e)(2), if
22	applicable."
23	MR. SOULES: Why don't we just say
24	"presiding judge of the region, presiding of
25	the administration region"?

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Here is
2	the proposal on this: "If the motion does not
3	comply with subparagraph (e)(1) or (e)(2),
4	the," striking the word "said," "the presiding
5	judge may deny the motion without a hearing.
6	MR. SOULES: I accept Sarah's
7	amendment.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Now wait a
9	minute. The amendment is coming up in a
10	minute. "If the motion complies with '
11	subparagraph (e)(1) and (e)(2), if
12	applicable," that's her amendment, "the
13	presiding judge of the administrative region
14	shall hear the motion or immediately assign a
15	judge to hear it." Have I correctly stated
16	that, Sarah?
17	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Uh-huh
18	(yes).
19	MR. ORSINGER: If that first
20	connector was an "or,"
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It is.
22	MR. ORSINGER: It is?
23	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
24	MR. ORSINGER: that means that
25	you can comply with (1) and not (2) even if

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1	(2) is applicable. That will not work.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So it should be
3	parallel, "and (e)(2), if applicable."
4	MR. ORSINGER: That's right.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "And (e)(2) if
6	applicable." "Where applicable" is more
7	appropriate. Okay. Any discussion on that?
8	Anybody opposed to that? That will pass
9	unanimously. Bill.
10	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Maybe it
11	doesn't even bother me; but what happens now
12	is we get down to a hearing. At some point
13	we're going to get down to a hearing on this
14	motion to recuse that's either conducted
15	parallel to simultaneously with the interim
16	proceeding which is now could be the trial.
17	Okay? So I guess it really is the trial.
18	That's what we're talking about.
19	And my question is, is anybody, and I'm
20	not even sure I'm still uncomfortable with
,21	it. Is anybody uncomfortable with the fact
22	that under the Hearing paragraph if the motion
23	is filed within 10 days, there will be more to
24	prove than the grounds for recusal? And this
25	is what I'm thinking.

1	MR. SOULES: Within 10 days of the
2	conventional trial?
3	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes. The
4	trial has gone through, and we have the
5	hearing. Somebody says "Well, I can see that
6	this judge should have recused himself because
7	this is in violation of the Code of Judicial
8	Conduct, this proceeding with this case, but
9	everything is fine because you should have
10	been a little quicker in figuring that out."
11	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Is the
12	question if anybody is bothered by that?
13	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes.
14	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Yes. I
15	remain bothered by that to this day. I think
16	it's disgraceful that in our judicial system
17	we would let a judge who should be recused
18	decide a case; but that is the vote
19	HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: We
20	fought.
21	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: We
22	fought that battle and lost.
23	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: The
24	question is whether we should let the decision
25	stand, I think. Not so much whether we should

1 let the case go forward. 2 MR. SOULES: Well, and the case law 3 on that is that if a judge is under a recusal challenge and makes rulings and then is 4 recused, the replacement judge decides whether 5 or not to vacate the orders that the judge 6 7 made while he was under a recusal hearing. It's not like disqualification where the 8 9 orders are void. So a judge could proceed to 10 trial, verdict and judgment, and then the replacement just say "I'm not going to vacate 11 it." 12 13 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Which is 14 generally what happens. MR. SOULES: I've never had the 15 16 experience. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 17 I would imagine the burden to show that the rulings 18 19 should be vacated is exceptionally high. MR. SOULES: I move that we add to 20 21 the interim proceedings a provision that says 2.2 "If the motion is granted, orders made in 23 interim proceedings must be vacated. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wait a minute. We all agree that we have debated this 25

before. 1 2 MR. ORSINGER: We gave the discretion to the judge who grants the recusal 3 4 or the replacement judge to go back and set it aside. I don't think we made it mandatory. 5 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right. And, Luke, I don't in fairness --7 MR. SOULES: If it's done, it's 8 done. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In fairness, you know how it is. We had the full Committee 11 12 before debating this for a lengthy period of 13 time. I don't think with half our Committee here and because of the lateness of the hour 14 15 we ought to revisit something that substantive. 16 17 MR. SOULES: I agree. And I'm on 18 the Disciplinary Rules Committee of 19 Professional Conduct too; and I have missed a 20 couple of meetings because of having 21 conflicts, so I missed that. I apologize for 22 taking your time. 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If you had been 24 here, it probably would have come out 25 differently.

MR. SOULES: Well, no. I don't say that.

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PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: We'll be out of order if you must, Mr. Chairman. But we didn't vote before on the -- on this separate issue. If the motion can be made late, if you satisfy special pleadings requirements, the trial proceeds; and then at the end of the process the judge should have been recused, but you didn't prove everything in your motion that you were required to put in there, the verdict and judgment stands.

PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: You mean one of those four essentials?

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes. You have to prove an exception in order to win the recusal argument because you were late; and that ends up just being waiver again.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: Because otherwise you're back into the hiding behind the log. If it doesn't, then the alternative is you can hide behind the log. You can wait until the day before trial. You can go through the whole trial and then cancel it off and get the things delayed for six months

simply by hiding behind the log.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I think that's the appropriate answer. And if that's fine, I think that may well be a good answer; but I hadn't thought this all the way through until today.

HONORABLE SCOTT A. BRISTER: You definitely will have to prove who knew what when in that less-than-10-day circumstance; but the argument was but your easy way out is file it 11 days before if you don't want to do that. That's all we're asking.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: These words all come rushing back to me as familiar comments.

MR. SOULES: I'll withdraw my motion. We don't need to talk about it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Now Chris, I

think if -- I've tried to keep track of

everything we've done; but you're going to

need to study the transcript. And the sooner

you can get a redraft to this Committee, the

better, so that Frank and I can go to Senator

Harris and Judges McCoy and Harris and make

sure that everybody is on the same page. And

having done that, we may finally be at the end

of the recusal Rule, which call to drinks on Justice Hecht later.

(Laughter.)

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: I'd like to tie up the loose end about the juvenile referee. Chris was kind enough to share with me his copy of the Family Code and pointed me to the salient language. And the procedure is self-contained, but ill defined. If there is going to be a hearing before a referee, you must inform the parties. Actually the referee or master must inform the parties they are entitled to have the hearing before the juvenile court judge, and each party is given an opportunity to object; and if nobody objects to holding the hearing before the referee or master, then it can go forward. They don't tell you what the grounds for objection are; and they don't tell you that if the objection is to referee number one, whether your only recourse is to go to the full judge or whether your ultimate recourse is to get a second referee or even a third referee.

1 And it seems to me like what we ought to 2 do is leave this here and not try to bring it 3 into the Rules of Procedure or to put the Rules of Procedure into this Family Code 4 5 provision, because they appear to have no defined standard of when you object and what 6 7 the consequence of the objection is other than you don't get this referee. 8 9 MR. SOULES: Second. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 10 Second. 11 MR. ORSINGER: But who is your 12 second or third referee or what the objection, 1.3 we ought to just let the juvenile people figure that out. 14 MR. SOULES: Second. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So your 17 recommendation is not to add any language? MR. ORSINGER: Yes. I don't think 18 19 we ought to even mention it other than leave 20 it in our transcript and hope nobody reads 21 it. 2.2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. And, 23 Bill, you're going to owe a comment in 24 Footnote 24 of the draft. Okay, Elaine, at 25 the risk of getting your heart ripped out.

1 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Just one real 2 quick. I had asked you earlier, Chip, under 3 (e) (11), Sanctions, paragraph (b) if the last 4 sentence was part of the vote; and you said "no." 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right. 6 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: And just maybe a 8 point of clarification. But it says that for 9 sanctions the party making the motion or the attorney for the party are jointly and 10 severally liable for fees and costs, which 11 seems to be a little bit contrary to 12 13 jurisprudence on sanctions; but it may be what 14 the statute requires. I really don't know. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It's what the 16 statute requires; and I'm almost certain. 17 I'll double-check. 18 MR. ORSINGER: Should we -- I mean, 19 at the very least we ought to say the attorney 2.0 who files the motion, shouldn't we, because 21 some law firms sign a law firm on the 22 pleadings. 2.3 MR. SOULES: That's a defining 24 term. 25 MR. ORSINGER: What is?

1 MR. SOULES: "Attorney" and "charge." 2 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: This is right out of the statute. This language is right out of 4 the statute. The comment on the Rio Grande 5 case, Chris, can we delegate to you? 6 7 MR. GRIESEL: Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All 8 9 right. Anything else about this Rule? Okay. Good. We're done for the moment. Who knows 10 11 whether it will rear its ugly head again. 12 Maybe the next meeting. 13 Bill, we've got about 20 minutes left. 14 Do you elect to proceed on the TRAP Rules, or would you defer to tomorrow? 15 16 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Well, 17 let's do at least this much so people know 18 what it is we'll be looking at. I suppose everbody downloaded on your machines or 19 otherwise had somebody prepare the package of 20 21 materials. You have basically in terms of 22 what I'm going to talk about three documents. The first one is the one identified in the 23 24 agenda as the memorandum. It's 3.2(a), 25 memorandum date November 2, 2000, from Bill

1 Dorsaneo to Chip Babcock Re: Revised Rules of 2 Appellate Procedure. That memorandum which we also talked about last time represents the 3 final draft of recommendations from this 4 Committee to the Court concerning the Rules 5 6 that we talked about at the October meeting. 7 I believe that no further action is 8 needed on this November 2, 2000, document, because we dealt with that. The Rules staff 9 10 attorney had prepared a similar document which 11 now presumably corresponds with this document 12 from beginning to end. 13 MR. GRIESEL: (Nods affirmatively.) 14 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: So that is 15 finished. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 16 Does 17 anybody disagree with that? (No opposition.) Okay. Now is this in the possession of 18 the Court in any way other than just copying 19 20 Chris on your memo to me? 21 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Well, --22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that's one 23 way to get it there. But typically what 24 happens is when our Committee approves something, then I'll transmit it to the 25

Court.

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PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: This is ready for you to transmit to the Court; but you may want to wait until we do, add other things together.

The next document which you probably downloaded is another memorandum which is not expressly identified in the agenda, although I believe it was on the website; and that is a memorandum to Chip Babcock from Bill Dorsaneo dated January 4, 2001. And this memorandum covers what we talked about in November on November 17th. And on November 17th we didn't conclude a large number of additional recommendations: but we did finish work on four of them. And I'm confident that this requires no further action either; but it means that we have so far as reflected in two memos dealt with a number of the proposed suggestions for revision at our last two meetings. And this January 4 memo has not been formally transmitted to Chris as a representative of the Court or to you at a meeting; but I'm doing it now if it wasn't already done when I sent it to you.

1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't believe
2	that this Bill, I don't believe that this
3	made it onto the website.
4	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: It
5	didn't?
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Unless I note
7	that on the cc: you copied it to all SCAC
8	members.
9	MR. HAMILTON: I got it off the
10	website.
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You got it off
12	the website?
13	MR. WATSON: It was on there late;
14	but it was on there.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right.
16	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: But I
17	copied, I sent it to everybody too anyway.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. That's
19	what it shows here. All right. Does anybody
20	have any comments or suggestions or problems
21	with the January 4 memo? (No comments.)
22	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: If you do,
23	you can raise them tomorrow.
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All
25	right. What is next, Bill?

professor bill Dorsaneo: The next one is the one which I guess we should take up tomorrow unless we can do some of it today; and that's the memorandum like the preceding two dated January 10, 2001, entitled Proposed TRAP Revisions Discussed, But Not Finished At November Meeting. And these were the ones that the Committee was sent back to work on more. These are the ones among those ones we were directed to work on more that we've finished working on. And that's what I propose to talk about when we get into the merits of considering these matters.

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In addition to this January 10 memo there is another document which was prepared by Pam Baron in connection with subcommittee discussions concerning TRAP Rule 42; and I believe that is ready for full Committee consideration, and Pam will be here tomorrow to present it. If she's not, I can do that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I think that's really all we're ready to move forward with. There are additional matters on the SCAC TRAP subcommittee agenda; and I'm

1	beginning to think, Mr. Chairman, that that
2	subcommittee needs to meet every month that
3	the full Committee is not meeting because
4	there are a lot of proposals coming from the
5	courts and from appellate specialists.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. The
7	December 10th memo to me appears to have
8	Rules, TRAP Rules 9, 34.6(e), 34.6(f) and
9	46.5. Is that right?
10	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Right.
11	That's the January 10th memo.
12	MR. HAMILTON: January 5th.
13	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: January
14	10th memo.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: January 5th
16	superceded by January 10th.
17	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes.
18	MR. HAMILTON: The 5th is superceded
19	by the 10th?
20	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Correct.
22	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: What
23	happened is the January 5th memo was sent to
24	the Chairman by me and to the members of the
25	TRAP subcommittee; and then it got sent to

1 everybody before the TRAP subcommittee had acted on it. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Are you 3 4 prepared, or do you want to in the 10 minutes 5 we have remaining --6 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- to try to 8 knock some of this out? 9 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's do it. 11 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Let's look 12 at the January 10th memo. The proposed change 13 is to Appellate Rule 9 which is the Rule 14 entitled "Papers," maybe "Papers" generally. 15 At the last at our November meeting on 16 November 17th the issue was raised about 17 whether the Appellate Rules should authorize 18 incorporation by reference when one party 19 files something and the other party wants to 20 embrace it and incorporate it by reference. 21 The proposal was to adopt, at that meeting to 22 adopt wholesale the language of Federal 23 Appellate Rule 28(i) which says this: "In a 24 case involving more than one appellant or 25 appellee, including consolidated cases, any

number of appellants or appellees may join in a brief, and any party may adopt by reference a part of another brief. Parties may also join in reply briefs."

At the November 17th meeting after a brief discussion we were instructed to incorporate that or something like that in Rule 9 rather than to amend the Briefing Rule, our Briefing Rule, Appellate Rule 38. In doing so I changed in the draft the language to make it broader than appellants and appellees making this incorporation concept apply to original proceedings, adding the words "relator or respondent, relators or respondents," and beyond that I broadened it to cover not merely briefs, petitions and responses, but motions and other documents filed in an appellate court.

The language is substantially like

Federal Appellate Rule 28(i); but it's broader

and extends the idea to everything.

HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: And everybody.

PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: And this was presented to the TRAP subcommittee at our

1 telephone conference meeting; and I -- and 2. there was a fairly well attended meeting. 3 About 10 members of the Committee, you know, 4 were there; and it was approved at that point after I admonished them that I wanted them to 5 6 not to rubber stamp it, but to look at it very 7 carefully and critically. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Was there any criticism? 9 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: No. 10 Ιn fact, it was --11 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: I did have 12 13 one question that wasn't addressed in the 14 conference call. Can one adopt another 15 party's verified petition or response or 16 motion? And I don't -- it's not a criticism, 17 because I don't know the answer to it, and I 18 don't know that it's a problem at all. But I 19 just do have -- you know, it's one of those 2.0 niggling little questions. 21 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: I don't --22 MR. EDWARDS: Wouldn't the party 23 adopting it have to verify? 24 PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: You'd 25 adopt; but you'd have to verify.

1	MR. EDWARDS: You'd adopt by
2	reference; but you would have to verify your
3	own pleading.
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You would think
5	that's what the Rule should be. Is this what
6	this says?
7	MR. EDWARDS: I don't know.
8	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: No. I
9	don't think it says.
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think it's
11	silent. Don't you?
12	PROFESSOR ELAINE CARLSON: Yes.
13	MR. GILSTRAP: Tell me, what do we
14	have to verify in the Appellate Rules?
15	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Motions
16	that are based on facts outside the record and
17	not within, something akin to judicial notice,
18	mandamus petitions.
19	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: It would
20	be very easy to restrict this to briefs.
21	MR. EDWARDS: Mandamus is one.
22	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Yes.
23	MR. HAMILTON: This doesn't include
24	amicus. Should it?
25	HONORABLE MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER:

No.

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2 PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: Well,
3 amicus would not be any of these people.

JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: But they
frequently do do that. Could we simplify this
by just saying "A person may join in a brief,
petition response, motion or other document"?
I guess you wouldn't want amicus joining in a
petition.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Skip.

MR. WATSON: One thing that was kind of hanging over the discussion that at least I didn't think was resolved in the subcommittee, but that is just obvious, that is the potential for there to be, for example, a single appellant and 12 appellees and the ability to split up multiple arguments, and everybody make part of an argument, and then by adopting by reference other arguments have, you know, 150 or 200 pages of appellees' briefing versus the 50 pages of the appellant; and I think we sort of resolved that by the Supreme Court is very sensitive to that by virtue of some of the rulings on argument in the jurisdiction section. I'm not convinced

the Courts of Appeals are that sensitive to 1 it; but I don't know how you fix it. I just, 2 we just sort of said "Yes. That's a problem, 3 and it's going to be there." 4 HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: You are 5 6 still going to have the same number of pages 7 of briefing. It's just that one brief is going to be devoted to issue one instead of 8 9 being divided between issues one and two; and 1.0 brief number two is going to be devoted to issue two instead of being divided half and 11 12 half. 1.3 MR. WATSON: Right. HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: 14 Which 15 actually might improve the quality of briefing 16 a lot. 17 MR. WATSON: Oh, I think it might 18 well do that; but... 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's get back to 20 issue of verification. 21 JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: 52.3 says

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that "All factual statements in the petition

competent to testify in the matters stated."

for mandamus must be verified by affidavit

made from personal knowledge by a client

1	So why should someone who has joined in the
2	petition that someone else has already had a
3	witness verify have to make an additional
4	verification?
5	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: They
6	probably couldn't.
7	JUSTICE NATHAN HECHT: Not be able
8	to. Once it's verified it's verified; and
9	they're just saying "me too."
10	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: That same
11	logic would apply to everything that's
12	verified and already verified.
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's okay. So
14	your question is answered to your
15	satisfaction?
16	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: (Nods
17	affirmatively.)
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that a "yes"?
19	HONORABLE SARAH B. DUNCAN: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right.
21	Anything else about this Rule? Any other
22	questions or comments, special effects?
23	MR. SOULES: I move we adopt Rule
24	9.
25	MR. MEADOWS: What was the reason

1	for having the two words "any number of," just
2	"number of," the second line?
3	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: The reason
4	why is the monkey-see, monkey-do reason that
5	the language appears in 28(i)
6	MR. MEADOWS: Okay.
7	PROFESSOR BILL DORSANEO: of the
8	Federal Appellate Rule.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good enough for
10	me. Any other comments? All right. It's
11	been moved and seconded. All in favor raise
12	your hand. Anybody opposed? It carries 19 to
13	nothing, and nobody opposed.
14	And that will do it for today. We'll see
15	you tomorrow morning at 8:30. And everybody
16	who had stayed, thank you.
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1	***********
2	CERTIFICATE OF THE HEARING OF
3	SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
4	************
5	I, ANNA RENKEN, Certified Shorthand
6	Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that
7	I reported the above hearing of the Supreme
8	Court Advisory Committee on the 12th day of
9	January, 2001, and the same were thereafter
10	reduced to computer transcription by me. I
11	further certify that the costs for my services
12	in the matter are \$_\frac{\psi_50}{\ldots} charged to
13	Charles L. Babcock. Given under my hand and
14	seal of office on this the 22^{n} day of
15	<u>TANVAN</u> , 2001.
16	
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