Taken before D'Lois L. Jones, a Certified Shorthand Reporter in Travis County for the State of Texas, on the 20th day of May, A.D., 2000, between the hours of 8:30 o'clock a.m. and 12:21 o'clock p.m. at the Texas Law Center, 1414 Colorado, Room 101, Austin, Texas 78701.

HEARING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MAY 20, 2000

(SATURDAY SESSION)

COPY

INDEX OF VOTES

Votes taken by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee during this session are reflected on the following pages:

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge McClure is trying to call in, but the phone won't answer, so we're still working on that, but we're onto (d)(2), time to file. Carl, do you want to talk about that?

MR. HAMILTON: Yeah. We worded that the way I think we discussed it at the last meeting, but having looked at it I'm not sure that it's going to work because it says, "A motion to recuse may not be filed later than." Well, the clerk's office is going to file these you know, so to say that it can't be filed to me is unrealistic, and so then I thought, well, maybe we ought to say something like "A motion to recuse filed later than the tenth day of the date the case is set for trial or hearing will be denied without a hearing except under the following circumstances," but then when you put good cause in there then it almost seems like everybody is going to file something with at least a prima facie good cause in it, so I'm not sure that we're going to end up back where we started from that the motion to disqualify or recuse could be filed at any I quess I just think that the clerks are not going to try to make a decision of whether or not good cause is shown.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. HAMILTON: So to say it can't be 1 2 filed I think is not realistic. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if you say, Carl, "A motion to recuse is waived if not filed"? 4 5 MR. HAMILTON: Well, yeah, we could say that, "is waived if not filed." 6 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How does that strike 8 everybody? 9 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Yeah. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "A motion to recuse is waived if not filed." 11 12 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Before? 13 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Isn't that the 14 reason for --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "A motion to recuse is 15 waived if not filed" -- "if filed." Take the "not" out. 16 "A motion to recuse is waived if filed later than the 17 tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial or 18 hearing except in the following instances." That gets 19 you out of the clerk problem anyway. 20 21 MR. HAMILTON: "Motion to recuse is 22 waived if filed later than the tenth day." 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody have an objection to that? 24 25 MR. EDWARDS: Where are we working from?

We've got something on our desk this morning. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Off the record for a 3 moment. (Off the record.) 5 MS. SWEENEY: Are we working from this? 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, you're working 7 from --MR. HAMILTON: Either one. They're both 8 9 the same. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Either one. They're the same as what 11 MS. SWEENEY: 12 we -- okay. Thank you. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What was on your desk 13 is what we decided yesterday. Okay. So, Carl, so we 14 15 fixed that problem. Now what's next? 16 MR. HAMILTON: Well, the four things 17 there that we discussed last time, unless anybody has 18 any changes in the wording. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 19 Technically you don't waive a motion to recuse. You can waive a ground, 20 It seems kind of funny to say the motion is 21 22 waived because what we're really saying is you've waived 23 these grounds if you don't file a motion. HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: 24 25 Yeah.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. That doesn't 1 2 strike me as odd, but --3 MS. SWEENEY: Do we still have Brian 4 Garner cleaning up behind us on things like that or --5 JUSTICE HECHT: (Nods head.) 6 MS. SWEENEY: Yes? Okay. 7 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We don't have to 8 worry about it then. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody have any 10 problems with the four grounds? (a) is pretty 11 straightforward, I think. If the facts didn't exist 12 then that ought to be an exception. "(b), the judge who is sought to be 13 14 recused was not assigned to the case before ten days 15 prior to the date the case is set for trial or other hearing." That's pretty easy it seems to me. 16 17 "(c), the party filing" --18 (Off the record.) CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: (c) is the one that 19 we've had trouble with. "The party filing the motion 20 neither knew nor should have known of the basis for 21 recusal before ten days prior to the date the case is 22 set for trial or the hearing." 23 24 (Off the record.)

MR. HAMILTON: That's the one that Luke

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was against because of the problems of proof.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. HAMILTON: But we revisited that, and I think we voted the last time to put that back in.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that's not my recollection, but I'll vote for this.

Who's got a recollection of whether we voted to put that back in or not?

MR. HAMILTON: I think we need Richard's notes because I think Richard had that in his notes to put back in.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I've got a memo regarding all the votes we took.

MR. HAMILTON: Yeah.

MR. EDWARDS: I don't believe we actually had a vote on it. We had a discussion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I don't believe we did vote on it.

MR. EDWARDS: And if I recall the objection was that somebody is going to have to testify, but it's my notion that if there's a ground for recusal that has been unavailable to a party not through the party's own negligence, in other words, no reason that they should have known it, that the recusal should be denied because, after all, it's still we're talking

about a lot of these things the appearance of impropriety, and the system I think calls out for the ability to make the motion.

trying to get away from this "knew or should have known" language two meetings ago because of the problems of, you know, when does somebody really know something, and I thought our committee was fairly unanimous at that point in time that that was not a good thing to get into, but then if that's true then how do you remedy -- how do you remedy the problem you just identified?

MR. EDWARDS: Well, we deal with knew or should have known all the time. When it comes to conditions that exist and other things, we ask juries to decide it. We ask courts to decide it.

MS. CORTELL: Chip, wasn't it the reverse? At the time that Luke spoke wasn't it that we were saying you had to file within so many days of when you knew or should have known?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right.

MS. CORTELL: In other words, it was a beginning trigger, not an end trigger.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right.

MR. EDWARDS: Not an end trigger.

MS. CORTELL: So maybe the concerns are

lessened when you look at it in that context.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. That's a good point. That's a very good point. Well, I think we've got a clear field for our merry little band. Bobby, how do you feel about it?

MR. MEADOWS: I'm thinking it over.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. What's everybody else think about the "knew or should have known" language? Judge Peeples, do you have -- Scott.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: It's going to be raised in every case if it's -- well, let's think how this works. It's waived if it's not filed within ten days before any trial or setting, so all we're talking about, are we going to bump an immediate setting. So I quess you could avoid it and say, well, if it's a summary judgment setting and you're less than ten days you could -- then your option is I can try to show that I neither knew nor should have known, or I can just wait 'til after the summary judgment and see how it goes and if I lose, file it more than ten days before the motion for rehearing and still have it heard just the same. What's wrong with --

MR. EDWARDS: Well, I was going to bring up that particular issue, whether if you -- you know, the way it is now, if you don't make your motion to

recuse before the first hearing that that judge sits on a case, you've lost your opportunity to make it. You can't lay behind the log, if you will, and say, "Well, I'll wait and see how this one comes out and make it before trial." You can't do that under present day rules. This rule the way it's written I think would allow you to perhaps do that.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: No, I don't think you can. I think if --

MR. EDWARDS: I think the only time it can occur, and it would be -- I think they have done this in the area of former judges, where a former judge hears --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Oh, sure.

MR. EDWARDS: -- a motion and then his appointment runs out and then you get a trial setting over here and he's re-appointed. That's -- there seems to be -- that seems to be handled differently, and it's just a question of how do you want to do it.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Right, but if some -- I think somebody -- I think under our current recusal rules somebody can come in three hearings with me, knowing there is some ground for recusal and not saying anything about it, but when things start looking bad, file it before the fourth one. There is no waiver

there.

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MR. EDWARDS: I don't think so.

MS. JENKINS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The current rule reads very similarly to this rule.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, my understanding of the current -- we are all very careful where I practice in law to be sure if you're going to file a recusal motion it's done before the first time that judge --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Certainly that applies to former judges, but that's by statute. That's a different thing.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, we're talking about recusal, too.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Because currently, I mean, these things are filed all the time after the trial when the jury comes back with a bad verdict. I've never seen one of those that goes off on a "knew or should have known" or waiver. Am I just not remembering?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I can read the language, which says, "At least ten days before the date set for trial or other hearing in any court other than the Supreme Court."

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Yeah, but that

can be any -- if I have 20 hearings on the case -- CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I know. I know.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: -- you just file it more than ten days before any one of them.

There's no waiver if you don't file it ten days before the first one. You file it ten days before the second one or the tenth one.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Unless you're aware of some case law that restricts this language.

MR. EDWARDS: I don't know of any either way, just sitting here.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: All I'm saying is if a -- I would kind of think -- I would rather than getting into a long hearing about who knew what and when, which is going to definitely get into attorney-client and everything else --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: -- I'd rather just relegate them to, well, just file it before the next hearing we have, more than ten days before the next hearing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but what if you're set for trial, and you legitimately -- I mean, you're two days before trial and you find something out big time about the judge.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Then you fall under just found out less than ten days before. Then you fall under No. 1 -- (a).

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no, no.

MR. EDWARDS: No, no. It existed. You just didn't know about it.

existed for a year. Here is the example, and this is from a real case. The judge had obtained a loan from the president of the bank. The loan is outstanding. It hadn't been paid for awhile, and the bank was a party in the case. The plaintiff doesn't find out about that until two days before trial, even though that's been going on for years. (a) doesn't save them.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Well, what's -- (d) could.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: And, again, the alternative is you say, "Look, it's less than ten days. You should have found out beforehand."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Everybody in town knew about this loan.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: But in any event, it's less than ten days, we're two days from trial. I'm not going to stop the trial to have a

motion, multi-day hearing on who should have known what. Let's go ahead with the trial. We'll have the hearing afterwards, and if you're right, we may have to set it all aside, and then the judge balances how serious is this motion to recuse versus the trial schedule, and how -- whether I can bump this trial for ten days.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Brown and then Anne McNamara.

this kind of goes back to Nina's point, though. If the lawyer wants to open himself up to this issue by raising "I didn't know and I couldn't have known," well, then that's a conscious choice by the lawyer. He's decided to open that box up, so I don't think the other side gets to open that box up, and if we want to make it clear, we could say something like "except when a party claims default in the filing exceptions," to make it clear that the party is the one that opens that box up, not the other side.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anne.

MS. McNAMARA: In your example, Chip, if you assume that there was no real way to know about the loan since it's not public, I don't think you can proceed with the trial and then sort it out afterwards. I think for all the reasons we have been talking about

on the subject the appearance of impropriety is so overwhelming and the consequences of an adverse verdict in the trial where you think you've gotten an unfair deal in the first instance is so overwhelming. This kind of goes back to Luke's example. I think you have to have some way to address that situation without proceeding to the trial first.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you're in favor of (c).

MS. McNAMARA: Yeah, I really am.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: And I agree with Anne. I think the alternative of, you know, "Let's not mess up the docket. Let's go to trial. Let's not stop and have a hearing" is to the horrible detriment to the litigants in the case and trying a case for ten days or two weeks or three months and then having to do it all over again is -- to me is the worst of all possible worlds from the litigants' standpoint and from the standpoint of the system if you're going to be challenging the impartiality of the judge after all that.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Would you feel the same way if it's a hearing rather than a trial?

MS. SWEENEY: I would. I mean, yeah, then it gets down to is the hearing on a motion to

compel or is it a dispositive summary judgment, but, yeah, I think that if the judge is --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: But both of those are short. In other words, the obvious distinction is those don't last three months.

MS. SWEENEY: True.

MS. McNAMARA: But still, if you have a dispositive summary judgment hearing you're going to make substantial decisions coming out of that. Can you dare -- do you dare take a case to trial or do you simply have to settle it because you can't live with the consequences?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: All I'm getting at, the thing we're addressing is because the Legislature -- and I agree with them -- people use these to bump a trial setting or a hearing setting.

MS. SWEENEY: That's true.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: And if you throw this in, you're going to bump it.

MS. McNAMARA: Right, but I think that's not as bad as risking a bad outcome that is perceived as grossly unfair.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Don't forget that those four come under the interim proceedings under (4), under

paragraph (4). Any motion that's filed after that tenth 1 2 day, the court can go on with the trial or whatever. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 4 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: So all our 5 arguments are irrelevant. 6 MS. McNAMARA: If that survives. 7 MR. EDWARDS: They're irrelevant only if 8 we agree that --9 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: It's a timely 10 motion, but I'll hear it three months later after the 11 trial. MS. McNAMARA: We haven't talked about 12 13 the interim proceeding. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we're going to get to that referral thing in a minute, but do we leave 15 (c) in or not? Anymore discussion on it? All right. 16 17 Everybody who's in favor of leaving (c) in as worded 18 raise your hand. 19 in favor. 19 Anybody against? One against. So that 20 will carry 19 to 1. 21 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: That was worse than Richard. 22 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Richard's 24 laying low on this. 25 How about (d), for other good cause

shown? Any discussion on (d)?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: What does that cover? Give me an instance where it's not under (a), (b), or (c) but is under (d).

MR. EDWARDS: I don't know of any.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, you could -
HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Substitution of

counsel.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Substitution of counsel. You get a new lawyer in. It's pretty clear that the prior lawyer knew about this, knew about this problem, but he was an idiot and he didn't raise it, and so now the new guy comes in. He says, "Yeah, we knew about it. I know this is going to be terribly disruptive, but this is horrible. This is really terrible facts, and you've got to cut us some slack on this." That would be an instance.

MR. EDWARDS: I guess it -- well, yeah.

Because if something about a contribution or something
that the lawyer -- or some relationship between the new
lawyer and the judge that would have been unknown before
he came in the case.

with -- the current rule is it's easy, was the motion filed ten days before or not. The problem with this,

and if it's less than ten days, you throw it back in the file and forget about it. The problem is the person deciding whether good cause has been shown is the judge you're attacking for being biased. It defeats the purpose of the -- you know, who decides whether good cause is shown? The judge who took the filthy contribution or whatever.

MR. EDWARDS: I would assume it would be the recusal judge.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: No. No. I mean, you don't have to refer it if it's not a timely motion. That's somewhere else in here.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, that's a good point.

The judge who's going to be recused --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Who's the same person deciding whether you should have known or not known.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is Judge McClure coming across the --

MR. ORSINGER: Yes. We're billing it to my long distance service.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Whoa, now we're talking.

MR. ORSINGER: Ann, are you there?

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Good morning.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Morning.

MR. TIPPS: How was the graduation?

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: It was

wonderful. My son got an award for math excellence in his AP algebra, so I was delighted.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good for you.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And him. Ann, we're on (d)(2), time to file.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: All right.

Subparagraph (d) of Rule (d)(2) relating to "for other good cause shown," and there is a discussion as to what subparagraph (d) adds to what is already there in (a), (b), and (c), and there may be some small sliver of circumstances not covered by (a), (b), or (c) which (d) would cover, and Judge Brister has just raised the question of, well, if you come in with (d) you're going to make that good cause argument to the judge you're trying to recuse, and he doesn't have to refer it on under our scheme, and so isn't that kind of a fruitless gesture.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, if the trial judge decides that there isn't good cause shown for the late filing then the way we have it worded I suppose that

it's considered to be waived. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If he says it's not good cause? 3 4 MR. HAMILTON: Yeah. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. That's right. Then it's considered to be 6 MR. HAMILTON: 7 waived. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 8 How so? Under 9 (3), either option, there's still a requirement that the judge that's the subject of the motion to recuse either 10 11 has to grant or refer. 12 MR. EDWARDS: Yeah. Where is the I don't see that in here that there's 13 determination? 14 any discretion on the part of the judge with respect to 15 whom the motion is filed gets to determine whether it's timely filed or not. 16 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Scott, do you see it 18 anywhere? HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 19 It was in the last draft unless it's been dropped. 20 21 MR. EDWARDS: Well, the way this is in 22 here it says that either way that the judge either has 23 to recuse or refer. Or disqualify or refer. 24 MR. HAMILTON: Well, then putting that

phrase in there that the motion is waived if it isn't

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timely filed is confusing because then that looks like the trial judge can decide whether or not it's waived or not. If he thinks it's waived, he may not even refer it.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, the issue is who decides whether it's waived or not, and the way that this is written that he either recuses, disqualifies, or refers, I don't think there's any discretion to make the decisions that you're talking about. Nor do I think there should be.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I don't see in the way you've got the referral options written that if the trial judge, the judge that is being recused, says he doesn't think there's good cause that that absolves him of the responsibility to refer it. I don't see that exception in here.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I think you have to do that, though.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: (c), it's (4)(c) on interim proceedings.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: (4)(c). "When the motion to recuse or disqualify is filed after the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial or other hearing."

MR. HAMILTON: That just gives the trial

1 court the right to proceed.

referred.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. HAMILTON: But it still has to be

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah. He's still got to refer.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, as long as that waiver language doesn't indicate that the trial judge doesn't have to forward it then that's okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So let's get back to the "for good cause shown." Do people want to leave it in there or not? Judge Brown.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Well, I first did, but Scott's point has convinced me maybe otherwise. We do get a lot of these motions to recuse the day of trial by pro se's.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: And if this rule means that now I can go on with my trial but I have to refer it every time, all a pro se is going to do is put "good cause," and it's going to get in the forms these pro se's use all across the state.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: So the exception is going to create havoc in a trial court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But let's say that he doesn't -- let's say the motion is silent. It's filed. It doesn't have good cause in it, doesn't say anything. Does it excuse the late filing? Don't you have to -- HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: If he doesn't say anything, he's dead or she's dead, but they're going to learn.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I mean, the prose's are -- most of them are pretty good at it because they do it a lot, and so they know the right things to say.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if they just put in there, "By the way, I didn't know about this until a couple of days ago, nor did I have reason to know about it"?

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: That's a problem. It seems like to me if we want to allow an out, the out is this judge decides if this judge is wrong there is a remedy. The remedy is on appeal.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I thought that was the reason that we are proposing to amend the rule

to provide that the trial or hearing can go forward for good cause stated in an order on the record so that if you determine that that pro se motion is frivolous and is frivolous on its face, even though it facially complies with the requirements of the rule, you can go forward with the trial or hearing. The presiding judge, the judge to whom it's referred, can have the hearing. There can be due process about hearing the motion, but it doesn't delay the trial, but if you take out -- if you -- I don't think consistent with due process you can let the judge that's the subject of the motion to recuse decide whether there's good cause or the "knew or should have known" or any of those other excepting factors, because you've got a judge that's already subject to a motion to recuse.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. As we're going down the road here we're trying to cure the problem of pro se litigants or just people are trying to gum up the trial filing these late -- these motions at the last minute. Yeah, Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: You know, we have this perennial problem of a few pro se litigants or a lot of pro se litigants but people outside the mainstream creating problems and then we want to write a rule that's going to hamstring the mainstream, the people who

are using the courts properly for the right reasons for serious matters, and I can't see this committee doing that. Surely there is another fix to the frivolous pro se litigant like sanctions or, you know, applications of --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Waste of time on pro se's. They never have any money.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But we're going to let the trial go forward.

MS. SWEENEY: Well, then let the bailiff take them away. I mean, I don't know, but to penalize, you know, Anne's client or my client or, you know, Chip's client or someone who has got a really important, serious matter because of the nutballs on the fringes can't possibly be our solution, and although that doesn't necessarily get us any closer to a solution, I can't embrace one that would have that effect. And I also share Sarah's concern that the judge whose status is being questioned ought not be the one with the power to decide whether or not good cause has been shown.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard, then Carl.

MR. ORSINGER: I haven't followed the entire debate, but would it make a difference if we said under "Time to File," "A motion to recuse cannot be granted if filed later than the tenth day unless"? And

that makes it operative on the judge assigned to hear the recusal. So it's not a question of waiver, but it's a question that the motion will be denied, but that motion would have to be denied by the judge assigned to hear it. Would that help?

MS. SWEENEY: Say it again, Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: "A motion to recuse filed later than the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial or hearing must be denied except in the following instances." Now, wouldn't that lead you into --

MR. HAMILTON: The problem with that is you're asking the very judge who you're trying to recuse to make the decision as to whether there's good cause.

MR. ORSINGER: No.

MR. HAMILTON: You're letting him deny it then.

MR. ORSINGER: What happens if you deny it, though? Don't you refer it out?

MR. HAMILTON: No. Well, yeah, I guess you would still refer it out.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl, you had a point.
What was your point?

MR. HAMILTON: Well, I was just going to say these pro se litigants that are always filing these

motions, probably practically none of those go on for an appeal, do they?

disbarred lawyers are the other -- lawyers in disbarment proceedings are the other frequent because the judge has to come in from out of county, so it's a great opportunity to shut things down by filing that and getting a several day wait so the judge has to go back and then who knows when he reschedules.

MR. HAMILTON: I know, but if you proceed under (4), under the interim proceedings, even though they file this and maybe have said all the right things, you go on and you get a decision made. How many of those go on and appeal it based upon the recusal?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. You're going to get that fixed. Okay. I think we're ready to vote on whether or not we're going to leave (d) in or take it out. All in favor of leaving (d), "for good cause shown," in the rule raise your hand. Do you have a hand to raise?

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Yes. I vote

22 "yes."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 22 in favor. How many

24 against?

MR. ORSINGER: Ann.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No, she's not against. She's in favor.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 22 to 1. Judge
Peeples gets the award for this lopsided --

MR. ORSINGER: He gets a Richard Orsinger award.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Let's go on to referral. We've got two options.

MR. EDWARDS: Before we leave that, could we talk just a minute about the wisdom of allowing the motion to be filed if there's already been hearings before the judge and the motion is something that was known before those hearings started to be filed later on after you start looking at what the judge's, how his rulings have been coming or her rulings have been coming down? That's the thing we talked about before.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No. I think that's a legitimate thing to talk about, Bill.

MR. EDWARDS: It doesn't make good sense to me for a ground for recusal to be out there and known and put the judge, the court, the system in a position where if it's serious enough to warrant recusal that that judge is going to be sitting on motions and then some party didn't like the way that the motions are coming out, maybe the motions in limine or who knows

what, and then you get the partial summary judgments or whatever and then the motion is filed. It seems to me that fairness says if you've got a ground for recusal and you know about it that you ought to make that motion before the first activity that the judge undertakes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is this -- yeah,

7 Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: The problem is how do you know when it's known, when the ground is known?

MR. EDWARDS: Well, we've already been across -- we've covered that already in one of these, "known or should have known."

MS. JENKINS: (c).

MR. EDWARDS: (c). So we have been through that discussion already before a couple of meetings and today also, but this is a question of at what point in time is it too late to file it, and, you know, we do it with an assigned judge or a retired judge or a former judge, and I don't see where there's any difference in it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Have you run into problems like this?

MR. EDWARDS: Me personally?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. EDWARDS: No, because if I think

there's a recusal basis out there, and I've only filed
two in my life I think, or one, I make the thing and
would make it at an early date.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But have you seen it

on the other side?

MR. EDWARDS: No, but Judge Brister is the one that raised the issue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hartley, do you have something?

MR. HAMPTON: I've had recusal motions filed after a couple of years of intense trial activity when everything is done, and it was denied, referred and denied.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. But was it based on things that had been known for a long time?

MR. HAMPTON: Uh-huh.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Was that a basis for the denial?

MR. HAMPTON: Well, they weren't -- I mean, the things that were known for a long time didn't justify the recusal, but if the question is are recusal motions filed after long periods of pretrial activity and lots of motions being ruled on, the answer is "yes."

MR. EDWARDS: And Judge Brister raised that issue.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard's had his hand

up.

MR. EDWARDS: I think that's bad practice.

MR. ORSINGER: This is revisiting the issue that Luke Soules talked about when it first came up, and we've debated this several times, and I know that previous results don't make any difference on this rule.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, they do.

MR. ORSINGER: But we decided that we did not want a waiver ground based on knew or should have known because the other side would attack the motion on knew or should have known and then the lawyer had to come in and defend when they had enough information to know it, and what we ended up saying is, well, if you file within ten days, if you want to raise the knew or should have known issue voluntarily and put your own thinking into play, that's fine, but we're not going to allow the person defending the motion to put knew or should have known in play every time.

Now, if we do Bill's suggestion, which cures the harm that he's talking about, introduces a countervailing harm, which is that every single time you can say, "You should have filed that three weeks before

you did," and then you're in this argument about how much information did you have and at what point would a reasonable person have known and then if you blew it then you've got a malpractice case by your client even though maybe in good faith you didn't feel like you had enough evidence to attack the judge.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We did talk about this.

MR. ORSINGER: And so we ended up putting this here saying if you file within ten days and you want to put knew or should have known at issue, you can, but we're not going to allow the other side to put it in issue whenever they want.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Well, how does Bill's change affect that?

MR. ORSINGER: Because Bill would have a stand-alone provision saying that if you don't file it within so many days of when you knew or should have known, or as Bill said in earlier debate, before a dispositive hearing, whether it's summary judgment, trial, or whatever, then you have a "knew or should have known" standard.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: No, I think he's just saying instead of saying "is set for trial or other hearing," he's saying "set for trial or the first

hearing" or some language like that. That's all he's talking about.

MR. EDWARDS: "The earlier of trial or the first hearing that the judge presides" as opposed to "before trial or hearing."

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I may misunderstand the proposal, but I thought you were saying that if --

MR. EDWARDS: I'm not changing the standards. I'm just saying that if you -- the first cutoff would be the first hearing that the judge presided at or the trial if that was the first and after that you would fall into the exception. You would have to fall into the exception or you wouldn't have a ground for recusal. It doesn't change anything on the exceptions.

MR. ORSINGER: And the burden is still available to you if you want to raise the "knew or should have known." It's just that the start date is earlier.

MR. EDWARDS: Yeah.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Well, then that is different from that other.

MR. EDWARDS: That's all I'm suggesting, is that if it's one of those things that is subject to a "knew or should have known," well, that's fine, but for

those things that are clearly known, I mean, the judge comes in and says, "Hey, I want you guys to know about this, you lawyers, and I'm putting this out there," and everybody says, "Well, okay, we now know it." And then you have a hearing and then that judge rules against one side, and now we're coming down to another hearing and ten days before that hearing the losing side on the first hearing says, "Well, you remember that ground for recusal you raised? I'm raising it." And I just think that you can -- if there's stuff out there that is grounds for recusal you ought to clean it up, and that judge ought to be sitting in that case, and that eliminates those people.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So, Bill, you would say then "It's waived if filed later than the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial or the first hearing before the judge except in the following circumstances."

MR. EDWARDS: Yeah. That's what I would say.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Sarah.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I have one question about that. For instance, with San Antonio's central docket system, it may be that my client, we go in for a hearing on a motion to compel and we get

Judge X, and we've got a ground for recusing Judge X, but frankly, on a motion to compel it's not worth the time and the expense of filing the motion to recuse, but then we get Judge X on trial on the merits. Now, you're saying that we've waived it because we didn't raise that recusal ground for a garden variety motion to compel? I have serious questions about that.

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MS. JENKINS: That's a good point.

Well, if the ground is MR. EDWARDS: serious enough -- you're saying from the standpoint of the litigants. We're -- I'm looking at it from the standpoint of the public and the system. serious enough for the judge not to try the lawsuit, you understand that in this area of the appearance of impropriety if you follow the Federal cases on it, it doesn't matter whether there is actually any lack of impartiality or not. It's the appearance that makes the difference, and those case that have gone to appeal in the Federal system have held that harm is not an issue. It's whether or not the particular statute has been -should have been followed, even if the trial has gone all the way to the end, even if the impartiality question arises in the middle of the trial, even if it's a several week trial, and even if the judge who tried the case was totally impartial.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wall.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: All I'm saying is to me that if you waive it for one hearing, to me it should not mean that you waive that ground for all future hearings or trials.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Wall.

with that is you're going to force motions to recuse when lawyers otherwise wouldn't file them, thinking, you know, that this judge could be impartial or the ground for recusal is really not all that important to the case, but if you know that if you don't raise it at this point, in Bexar County at least, you're never going to be able to raise it again, well, then a careful lawyer to avoid malpractice or what have you or just the possibility of an impartial judge is going to be filing them left and right.

There are many times when you think you have a ground -- you may think you have a ground for recusal, but it's going to take some more investigation, it's going to take some more time to study it, and then you've got to weigh that against you're not looked with high esteem when you file a motion to recuse in general anyway, and so you're sort of reluctant, and if it's a case that you can just waive and say, "I'm not going to

pursue this," then you don't. But I think the problem with requiring the motion for that first hearing is that you're going to err on the side of filing that motion, and that's going to really muck up the system.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bobby.

MR. MEADOWS: The problem I have with the focus the way it is in Bill's view is that it puts recusal up front in virtually every case. I mean, a lot of times you will be in a case and things are going in a way that seem odd. I mean, rulings that you ought to be getting you're not getting, and you get a pattern of conduct that makes you then investigate it, and all of the sudden something might turn up. And if it's something out there and arguably should have been discovered then you've lost your right to act on it, and the way we're talking about it, it would mean that virtually in every case you would need to do some sort of due diligence up front before you had a hearing.

a rule which says if -- this rule has been developed over many years, but I've learned of it by sitting next to him in these meetings, and that is if you've got language that's in the rule that has existed for a long time and there is no demonstrated problem with that language, it's not generally a good idea to tinker with

it. This language has been in our rule for a long, long time, and I wonder if we ought not to invoke the Peeples rule.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, the reason I raised the issue in the first place was that Judge Brister -- CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Who has been silent during this whole debate.

MR. EDWARDS: But he is the one who raised the issue about these last minute motions to recuse after a series of --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. But I don't think he raised this problem. Right, Scott?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Right. I was saying I didn't think it was a waiver, but I'm not saying I necessarily think it should be.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay. Carl, last comment and then we're going to move on.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, yesterday we decided under the waiver provision that if a matter was fully disclosed on the record --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Right.

MR. HAMILTON: -- it may be waived, but by using the word "may" means it doesn't have to be waived at that time, and we discussed that later on a party might come in and decide to go ahead and file the

motion.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: So we would have to go back and change that if we were going to change something else.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's go on to the referral, the two referral options.

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. The two options are -- the differences are on Option 2 the presiding judge of the administrative region has the ability to look at the motion, and if it doesn't comply with paragraph (d)(1) deny it without a hearing. Option 1 doesn't give the presiding judge that right, but Option 2 does. Otherwise the two are the same.

And it also gives the lawyer the right to bring the motion to the attention of the presiding judge if the judge to be recused hasn't promptly forwarded it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Discussion on these two options?

MR. HAMILTON: There was a suggestion, oh, way back a year or two ago by I think Judge Hedges, who's on the Houston court, that the presiding judge ought to have the right to summarily dispose of recusal motions that didn't have anything in them of any substance without having to waste everybody's time going

through a hearing, so that idea was generated way back
there I think at the Court Rules Committee level, and I
don't know exactly how it got in here, but that
suggestion was made at one of the meetings here that
maybe the presiding judge ought to have that right, so
that's -
MR. ORSINGER: I believe we favorably

MR. ORSINGER: I believe we favorably acted on this proposal in a prior meeting.

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HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Don't the last two sentences of Option 2 say the same thing twice, or am I missing that?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: They're the flip side of each other, aren't they?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No, they don't.

MR. HAMILTON: One says if the motion complies he has to hear it or assign it, and if it doesn't comply, he can deny it without a hearing.

MR. ORSINGER: But it doesn't require him to deny it without a hearing. It just permits him to deny it without a hearing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, if we already decided it, why is it an option?

MR. HAMILTON: I don't know that we have decided between Option 1 and 2, have we?

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Well, I thought

that we had said favorably, but that's fine. Let's just vote on it this morning.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Any other discussion about this? Yeah, Steve.

MR. TIPPS: Is this intended to deal with the pro se motion or the frivolous motion?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Right. They don't verify them.

MR. ORSINGER: And also a motion that doesn't -- we're now requiring the motion to detail the factual basis, and so if you get a motion that just says the judge's impartiality may be reasonably questioned, it's gone. No hearing required.

MR. MEADOWS: Do we have a recommendation on this from the subcommittee?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, which option do you guys like? Normally you put the option that you like as No. 1, but maybe not.

MR. ORSINGER: No, I like the second option. I think that probably the subcommittee -- I have the minutes of the meeting.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Judge Peeples.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Can I step back and try to look at the big picture, and I think Option 2 is vastly better. The present rule is very rigid and

doesn't allow good cause and so forth, but once a motion is filed you've got to go through the procedures, but we don't have an out of control problem right now because there are some very strict requirements. I mean, you just can't file a lot of these. Apparently with the recodification draft we've made the decision to make it much easier to file a plausible motion. You know, the judge was assigned late, the grounds didn't exist, you didn't know or should have known the grounds, or good cause.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: And if we're going to allow that many facially valid motions to be filed then we've got to do something on the other end to keep it from getting out of control, and so Option 2, the last two sentences are our way in this draft to keep it from going out of control. I mean, we require a factual detailed motion. You can't just have a shotgun general motion. It's under oath, and if it's not done that way under Option 2 as presiding judge you don't have to -- somebody can't gum up the system. You know, if they won't make it a detailed, factual, sworn to motion, it can be dismissed out of hand; and if Option 2 is not adopted then we've opened the floodgates, so to speak, and not given judges the way to control those

floodgates.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In light of that does anybody in this room want to argue for Option 1?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: That's pretty strong.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Brown.

want to suggest maybe we should add not only "(d)(1)" but "(d)(2)" to the last sentence. If it doesn't apply with (d)(2), in other words, if it's not timely or it's within ten days and it doesn't say "good cause," et cetera, then that should also be able to be denied summarily.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How do people feel about that? Judge Peeples, is that a thumbs up for the record?

MR. ORSINGER: The implication of that is that if you file within ten days of trial or other hearing then it can be denied no matter how detailed it is? Denied without a hearing, no matter how detailed it is?

without a hearing if there is no statement of good cause, for example, or if the person doesn't say they didn't know or shouldn't have known, et cetera.

1 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think that's the question. Are we just going to require that the motion contain a ground in (d)(2), a statement of a ground in (d)(2), or are we going to require that the motion comply in the sense of the evidentiary proof?

The differences between (d)(1) and (d)(2) is (d)(1) is simply you can look at the motion and see if it's verified, contains detailed legal and factual allegations, but the exceptions in (d)(2) are evidentiary concerns, and I don't know that the presiding judge can look at the motion to determine whether one of the (d)(2) grounds exists. They certainly can look at the motion and see whether one of the (d)(2) grounds is alleged.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine, did you have something to say about that?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: No. I agree with Sarah.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: On that point, if we leave it to say only (d)(1) and that means that you have to allege factually your grounds under (d)(2) why it's filed within ten days, if that's what this means and that's very clear then we may not need to add (d)(2).

MR. ORSINGER: It doesn't mean that. We don't -- (d)(1) does not require that your exception to (d)(2) be stated in the motion. We better do that if we're going to do this.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think we

should.

MR. ORSINGER: We better require that they allege specifically why if filing within ten days they need an exception.

MR. EDWARDS: All you have to do is go into (d)(2) and just before where it says -- well, where it says "except in the following instances" put in something like "which shall be detailed in the motion" or something. "In the motion to recuse."

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Just put "If the motion complies with subparagraph (d)(1) and states one of the exceptions for late filing under (d)(2), the presiding judge shall hear or assign."

MR. ORSINGER: Well, but just stating it --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: "Shall not apply

22 or" --

MR. ORSINGER: Do you have to have the factual detail to support your exception or do you just allege the exception exists?

MR. EDWARDS: I think you have to have -if you want to get where we're talking about, and I
agree that we should want to get there, I think you have
to provide for a factual recitation of the basis for
your claim to be under (d)(2).

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I would propose then in (d)(1) we add a sentence that says something like, "If filed later than the tenth day prior to the date the case is set for trial or other hearing then the exception under (d)(2)" -- "any applicable exception under (d)(2) must be stated" -- or "must give the factual and legal basis for any exception under (d)(2)" or something like that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And that way you could just leave -- you could leave Option 2 with (d)(1) in it because (d)(1) would then pick up (d)(2).

MR. ORSINGER: But, see, it should be probably in (1) because that talks about the motion, and (2) just talks about timing, and we don't want to have motion requirements under timing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Would another way to do that be in Option 2 to add a sentence that says, "If it's not timely," in other words, if it's

closer than ten days you have to allege those in detail, and a judge can dismiss it if it's not adequately alleged.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You could do it that way, but wouldn't it be better -- wouldn't it be easier for the practitioner to have their pleading requirements in (d)(1), which is the motion, rather than have to say, "Whoops, I forgot to read" --

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- "(d)(3)," so I kind of like Richard's idea, so will you write that sentence for us, Richard? And while you're doing that, do we have a ground swell of support for Option 2? Is anybody opposed to Option 2 as opposed to Option 1? No hands are up, so Option 2 is adopted unanimously.

And Richard will get us a sentence here in a minute, but in the meantime we will go to subparagraph (4), interim proceedings, and, Carl, what are you trying to accomplish here?

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. We added one change to that yesterday, "except for good cause" portion. I'm not sure that we ought to have a semicolon there, though.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not sure you ought to

25 have what?

MR. HAMILTON: Well, we added yesterday 1 2 on interim proceedings, after "disposed of" we added 3 "except for good cause stated in the order in which the 4 action is taken." I'm not sure we need a semicolon 5 after the "of" there. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You mean you and 7 Richard just added it or we added it in our meeting? HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 8 Yeah. You

MR. MEADOWS: Yeah, I'm glad you -- I couldn't follow it.

you're excepting to the exception.

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MR. TIPPS: I remember that language, but I'm not sure that we added it here. Didn't we add it to something else?

can't write it proposition, except, except, because then

MR. HAMILTON: Well, that's where Luke wanted to add it. I was going to add it as an (e), as a paragraph (e), but Luke thought it ought to go in there, so that's where we put it. "Except for good cause stated in the order in which the action was taken."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. If you'll look on the draft that's on your table, there is some additional language, right?

MR. HAMILTON: Yeah. And then we have -- CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "After referring the

motion to the judge of the administrative region, the judge in whose case the motion is filed must take no further action in the case until the motion is disposed of except for good cause stated in the order in which the action is taken, except that in the following instances the judge may proceed with the case as though no motion had been filed pending a ruling on the motion."

MR. ORSINGER: I would propose we move that to (e).

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Is it a -- is it a separate exception or is it simply a requirement that the exception be stated in the order? Is it (e), other good cause stated in the order?

MR. ORSINGER: That was my conception of it yesterday.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I wasn't here.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, for Sarah, we apparently unknowingly dropped it out of the recodification draft, and Luke was worried about a temporary restraining order scenario, and he suggested that we give the trial court the good cause power back again, but putting it in this paragraph at this point makes it really confusing, and I don't see why we couldn't just stick it in (e).

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And change it to "other good cause stated in the order in which the action was taken."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I think that will work, won't it?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah.

MR. HAMILTON: Do we want to change the wording of it some?

Okay. We'll move that to (e), and there has been some controversy over subparagraph (a). I think Nina has comments on that.

MS. CORTELL: I have been the dissenter in the subcommittee. I don't like the idea of interim proceedings. We got the idea primarily, at least most recently, from I believe the legislation, which incorporated the concept of when you have a tertiary motion to recuse, but we've expanded it to (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and now (9) and (10) motions.

(b)(3), for example, I think if we look back, is where the judge is a material witness or is related to a material witness. I do not understand at all going forward in front of that judge when that's been alleged, and I --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I can explain that one real quick. That's because the pro se's when

they say you're biased will also say they want to call 1 2 the judge, he or she is a material witness because he 3 said this in the last hearing, and he's ruled against 4 all of my --5 MS. CORTELL: Right. Well, I --6 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: If you just 7 leave it on (1) or (2) they will get around it with (3). 8 MS. CORTELL: Right, but then I would 9 incorporate the Paula Sweeney rule, which is it's a 10 terrible principle to adopt just because it gets abused by pro se's, I would think. 11 12 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: When would the 13 judge be a material witness that you didn't know about 14 that a long time before anything? 15 MS. CORTELL: That has nothing to do with 16 whether it's timely or not. If I file it the minute I 17 know then why should he be allowed to continue at the interim proceedings? 18 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 19 Because this is 20 just we're not going to bump an immediately impending 21 trial proceeding --22 MS. CORTELL: No, that's not right. 23 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: -- for a late 24 filed --25 MS. CORTELL: No, that's not right. (4)

right now allows interim proceedings to go forward irrespective of when the motion is filed if the grounds are alleged under (b)(1),(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(9), (b)(10). (b)(9) and (10) are the contributions. (b)(1) is appearance, isn't it, of impartiality?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Right.

MS. CORTELL: (b)(3) is a witness, (b)(2) is personal bias, and it has nothing do with when it was filed. The timing of the filing is picked up under (c), and I would submit with our changes today on that I think that's going to be pretty confusing.

I just think, going back to the integrity of the system, that if your client legitimately believes that you have a biased judge that you ought to -- that the current system of stopping, allowing that to be resolved before you return to proceedings in front of that judge makes the best sense. Now, if you want to narrow it down to where it's an untimely motion or it's a tertiary motion, my concerns would be reduced, but the open-ended (a) here bothers me significantly.

MS. McNAMARA: I agree with Nina. I think this would be a lot better without (a) because things can happen that will change the litigant's situation that can be irreversible, and the inefficiency of the system that the pro se's may inject isn't to me a

worthwhile basis for taking that risk.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Listen to how it sounds. When you take out the numbers and the letters and you put in what they stand for, "When the motion only alleges that the judge can't be impartial, is biased and prejudiced and has received excessive campaign contributions and direct campaign expenditures," it doesn't sound like we're really defending a system of justice.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If that's all you've got on the guy.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's right.

It sounds horrible.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Can't do better than that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Brister.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Well, maybe we've overstated it. It's not just pro se's, and it's not because judges are -- I mean, I had a case, four or five year old case. It's fixing to go to trial. The attorneys switch. Jimmy Williamson refuses to file the motion to recuse, so his client does it himself, instructs him to, and it goes to our administrative judge, regional presiding judge, who appoints a visiting judge who can't come in for six weeks. He comes in for

six weeks.

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After the hearing he says, "Okay. Give me your briefs. I'll rule on it after next Thanksgiving, four months away," and this just -- you know, the other side -- I can't do anything about it. can't rule a thing on it. The other side who wants to get this crazy claim to trial instead gets to spend \$20,000 fighting a motion to recuse. This is -- because it says nothing more than the judge is biased. nothing to say that. It is very expensive to do this, and all we're talking about is if it's a good motion, it's going to go forward anyway. It's going to be granted and somebody is going to have to go back and revisit it all. So we're not doing anything irreversible, I don't think.

MS. McNAMARA: Oh, I would disagree. I mean, it's sort of like -- it's comparable to the <u>New_York Times</u> running a horrible article about you on the front page and then a week later on page 12 doing a retraction. You may get it sorted out, but the consequences of the harm can be irreversible.

You know, if you're talking about, you know, a nine-figure verdict or a motion for summary judgment where you're forced to settle, you can't undo the settlement if it turns out later the judge who

denied your motion was biased, and so I know that there are some really bad consequences of stopping things until you get it sorted out, but I think for sort of the appearance of fairness in the system you've got to deal with the issue before things happen.

not a threat, but let me tell you, the trial judges will come up in arms if you say people have an absolute right to stop our trial docket by filing the motion. They will come unglued because it happens too often. They will -- I don't know if they will have the power to kill this rule, but they will try.

MS. CORTELL: That's the current system.

MR. ORSINGER: No, the current system is it has to be filed more than ten days in advance of trial.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: No, no. It has to be more than ten days before. If it's less than ten days before --

MS. CORTELL: But we're talking you can come back down in the timing, okay, but I'm just talking about (a) right now.

MS. McNAMARA: Just (a).

MS. CORTELL: If you just focus on (a), right now if you file a timely motion under any of the

current grounds, (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), of course, we don't have the campaign contribution rule, you stop the proceeding.

that -- I mean, frankly it's ashame you-all don't have
Judge Peeples because he could have gotten that thing
heard in two days, and you could have moved on, but
that's a function of how each locality deals with
motions to recuse, and I don't think we can write a rule
to require any given district to handle motions to
recuse under (a) expeditiously.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Chip

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, sir.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Right now the only -- the protection, Nina, that you could have would be the lawyer can fax to the presiding judge the motion, and the presiding could look at it and say, "I think this is serious enough to stop the proceedings." Okay.

I'll grant you that might not happen very much. How would it work -- this is just a proposal -- if we put the burden on the judge who thinks it's frivolous to fax it to the presiding judge and get a presiding judge or his designee the right to look at it and say, "I think that the recused judge can go ahead and proceed until we can have a full hearing on this"?

In other words, instead of putting the burden on the lawyer to get things -- you know, to get the judge bumped from interim proceedings, put the burden on the judge who does know the ropes a little better, put the burden on the judge who's being recused to get a ruling that interim proceedings can go ahead.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Well, you kind of have to -- I mean, some judges do that right now.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I mean, it can be done without a hearing.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: But it does kind of get me crosswise with the party who's filed this. "Well, this is frivolous." Call up David. "You need to deny these frivolous guy's motion."

want to say to those of you -- it's been said many times. The lawyers in this room are not the problem, and you-all have lawsuits against each other. We try lawsuits involving everybody, including pro se's, but people who are on the fringe of practicing law, and really, if the rules don't allow us to manage the system with a reasonably firm hand, we're making some real bad decisions here.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you're in favor of keeping (a) the way it is?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, yeah, but I think if that's unpalatable to everybody else what I suggested would be a reasonably okay way to take care of it, to say that it does stop everything, but if a neutral decision maker looks at its and says, "I think that interim proceedings are okay until we can have a fuller hearing a few days from now," or maybe a couple of weeks in Houston. You know, in other words, the people who are offended by the motion, Scott, and who know the ropes can maybe get the interim proceeding to proceed --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wallace.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: -- for just somebody wanting to gum things up.

MR. JEFFERSON: I think it is true that the lawyers in here are not the problem, but also the judges in here are not the problem. There are judges in parts of this state that are a tremendous problem and where you really need to stop the proceedings right away and get something heard and possibly get a mandamus going or something. Otherwise, you lose rights, and there could be a course, settlement, and there are all sorts of things that happen. And so I think I agree. I don't like the subsection (a) in there that sort of gives an out when there's some -- the timing is a real

injustice to go to trial.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bobby and then Richard.

MR. MEADOWS: If I understand what Judge Brister said, it doesn't -- if we took out (a) and left in (c), the judges are in no worse shape than they are now. It doesn't matter if a untimely motion says everything in (a), if it's untimely the proceedings can continue until you get a hearing. So I guess based upon that I would be in favor of taking out (a) and at least until I could hear how the trial judges are disadvantaged by this.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: That's probably right. (a) was in when the recodification draft, which had no ten-day requirement in it.

MR. MEADOWS: So an untimely rule could say those things in (a) and you could still continue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So your point is that

(c) really --

MR. MEADOWS: Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- solves the problem that Judge Brister has been worried about.

MR. MEADOWS: Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And Judge Peeples has expressed concern about. Do you agree with that, David?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think maybe 1 2 Bobby is right about (a) and (c) and how they work with 3 each other. 4 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Right. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Well, then do 6 we have a consensus for deleting (a)? All in favor of 7 deleting (a) raise your hand. 8 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I vote "ves." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All in favor of 9 10 deleting (a). 11 MR. EDWARDS: I don't think she has a copy of what we're talking about. 12 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: 13 Yes, I do. 14 MR. ORSINGER: She votes "yes." 15 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: But I'm sorry 16 if you didn't hear me clearly. I said I vote "yes" on 17 the motion to delete (a). CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 25 in favor of 18 19 deleting (a). Richard, you want to vote against that? 20 MR. ORSINGER: No, I'm not. I want to publicly recognize that Nina has lost this fight every 21 time before until right now, and she got almost -- she 22 23 did get unanimous support, so persistence counts. 24 MR. EDWARDS: Are we working off the 25 draft that's got a date May 19?

MR. ORSINGER: Ann does not have that 1 2 draft. 3 MR. EDWARDS: That's what I was --4 MR. ORSINGER: But there are only a few 5 edits that we made yesterday. 6 MR. EDWARDS: Okay. Well, that's what I 7 I didn't think she had the exact draft we was saying. were working off of. 8 9 MR. ORSINGER: But this language is in 10 her draft. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but she 11 doesn't -- but the draft she has, the stuff we're 12 talking about now, there are hardly any changes. 13 MR. EDWARDS: We'll tell you if there are 14 any changes. 15 16 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Having deleted 17 Okay. 18 (a) overwhelmingly, do we have any other issues? do you have any other issues with (b), (c), (d), or the 19 20 newly written (e)? MR. ORSINGER: I have --21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, no, no. 22 We called 23 on Nina. How is it going to read so 24 MS. CORTELL: 25 that you have a good cause exception to the whole thing?

MR. ORSINGER: The wording on that is not 1 2 that simple. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, for you maybe. Then we'll let 4 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. 5 somebody else write it. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let Hatchell do it. 6 7 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: It's in the 8 current rule. 9 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah, I know, but we now are listing them all as "when" clauses, and it's hard to 10 make this a "when" clause, w-h-e-n. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 12 Right. 13 MR. ORSINGER: You want to visit the --14 MS. CORTELL: I'm okay as long as there is a good cause hook at the end. 15 MR. TIPPS: Why can't we say "when good 16 cause exists, provided that such good cause is stated in 17 18 the record"? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 20 MR. TIPPS: I mean, it's a little clumsy, 21 but... CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "When good cause 22 exists, if it is stated in the order." 23 24 MR. HALL: Where is that? 25 MR. ORSINGER: That is going to go in the (4)(d), new (4)(d).

MS. CORTELL: Do we want to require that it be agreed to by the judge and therefore incorporated in the order, or do you just say "when good cause exists"?

"exists and is stated" since it's the -- again, it's the judge subject to recusal who's going to be writing the order stating good cause.

MS. CORTELL: I would ask that we look back at the language from "time to file" where we added "for other good cause shown" and some concept like that, but to allow a good cause exception.

MR. WATSON: But wouldn't you want that stated in the order?

MS. CORTELL: Well, that leaves it to the judge to so find, and what I'm thinking is what if the advocate believes that there is good cause. The example -- I can't remember whether we talked about it in an entire committee or the subcommittee, but we did have a matter involving the diocese in Dallas where there was a post-verdict motion to recuse, which after hearing was denied, but I thought that the process of having a hearing and stopping the proceeding and not having a judgment entered really served the public good,

in my own opinion, but that was a very late motion.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, no, this language, you understand, is in the existing rule today. This "good cause stated in the order in which the action is taken" is what Luke complained about yesterday we inadvertently dropped out.

MS. CORTELL: But there is no interim proceeding concept in the current rule.

MR. ORSINGER: There is an absolute bar against taking action if the motion is filed within ten days of the hearing except for good cause shown in the order, I believe. There is an exception for events that occur within ten days, but --

MS. CORTELL: Does someone have the rule?

MR. ORSINGER: The introductory clause
says that you have to "stop proceedings except for good
cause shown in the order in which the action is taken
unless" and then if the event occurred within ten days
or if it occurred before but you didn't know or should
have known, we've got a list of exceptions.

MS. CORTELL: Well, we don't have here a concept of if the event occurred -- in other words, we have (c), but we don't have all the exceptions to (c) that we put in the when to file rule. Do you want to incorporate the exceptions that we've put in under "Time

to File"?

MR. ORSINGER: I need to correct what I said. The good cause clause that Luke mentioned yesterday is in the provision about that once the trial judge refuses to recuse and refers it to the presiding judge then they are not to take any further action except for good cause shown in the order in which the action is taken.

MS. CORTELL: So it's the reverse.

MR. ORSINGER: So the good cause exception -- right now if the motion for recusal is filed and denied you cannot take further action after that point as a trial judge except for good cause shown in the order.

MS. CORTELL: Right. So the presumption is that everything stops.

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah.

MR. EDWARDS: In the order in which the further action is taken.

MR. ORSINGER: Yes. That's right. Okay. So I think we have a complete halting right now no matter what, except for the good cause in the order.

MS. CORTELL: Right.

MR. ORSINGER: And then when we drop that out that's what Luke called to our attention yesterday.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. And there are circumstances where even though there's been a motion filed and referred, things like a T.R.O. situation, there may be emergencies where the judge just has to act, like extending a T.R.O., not letting it expire, things like that. So we've got to add a new subsection in it, and you would put it in the body of "Interim Proceedings."

MR. ORSINGER: That was Luke's suggestion and I've --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And it's awkward there, so we are going to take it out of the body, and we're going to put it in new subsection (d), which is going to say, "When good cause exists, if it is stated in the order in which the action is taken." Right?

MR. ORSINGER: I think you ought to say -- I don't know about "it." How about "if such good cause is stated in the order"?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Brian Garner says you're not suppose to say "such."

MR. ORSINGER: You don't like "such"?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: No, Brian

Garner doesn't like "such."

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Well, I don't like Brian Garner. I'm just kidding. I'm just kidding,

1 Brian.

MR. HAMILTON: How about "when good cause exists which is stated in the order in which the action is taken"?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. ORSINGER: You think Brian would like

7 that?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Brian will get a shot at this. "Which is stated in the order in which the action is taken."

Okay. Are we all right on that?

Everybody okay on that?

All right. With that change is there any --

MS. CORTELL: I really think we're inadvertently -- because we have the flip of the concept under the current rule, and we're trying to fit it in here, and I don't think it's -- there is a reason to put it in the body of (4) even though it's awkward because this is where you're saying the judge will take no further action.

I guess, let me ask a different question. We have a lot of exceptions currently to the time to file rule, but we've incorporated here the timing rule without those exceptions. Is there a reason to

incorporate those here? You know, where we're implicitly saying it's timely if you fall under a time to file, those exceptions, but we have a strict ten-day rule now under (4)(c).

MR. HAMPTON: And the other thing that we're doing in (4)(c) is it's inconsistent with the notion that a motion to disqualify can be filed at any time.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is it inconsistent with it?

MR. HAMPTON: Well, in here a motion to disqualify can be filed at any time. A motion to recuse there's a ten-day cutoff, yet a judge can continue to rule on motions if the motion for -- motion to disqualify that would be timely under this rule is filed less than ten days.

of this subparagraph (c) that the motion comes so late in the game that we shouldn't automatically just disrupt everything and stop everything, but that there is that option of going forward? Obviously if it's a serious motion to disqualify that on its face everybody says, "Whoops, we've got a problem here," the judges, I wouldn't think -- nobody would go forward under those circumstances. But if you've got a pro se litigant who

is just going to file a pro forma, "You're disqualified, Judge, because of X, Y, and Z," and everybody knows that's nonsense, why shouldn't you in the spirit of this rule have the ability to keep going forward?

MR. HAMPTON: Well, you're absolutely right except that the purpose of this rule is to deal with those situations where there is grounds for disqualification and the judge continues to act, so when the grounds for disqualification are sufficiently narrow and black and white that -- I just point this out.

right to point it out, but I think that it doesn't matter in light of the spirit of what we're trying to do with subparagraph (c), which the trial judges are all telling us we really need to do and the Legislature, I promise, you is telling us we need to do it, or at least some members of the Legislature.

MR. HAMPTON: The other thing I'd point out is that becomes a more acute problem where you have a central docket.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Nina.

MS. CORTELL: I have one other question.

I'm just trying to understand how (d) will work. If the matter is being heard by the presiding judge and there's a motion to disqualify the presiding judge, who hears

the -- who goes forward hearing the case? 1 2 MR. HAMILTON: That's covered over on --3 MR. TIPPS: The old (d). 4 I'm sorry, your old (d). MS. CORTELL: 5 MR. TIPPS: Old (d), new (c). 6 MR. HAMILTON: That's covered on page 7 seven under paragraph (10). 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, we're not 9 there yet. Any other comments about subparagraph (4), 10 interim proceedings? 11 MS. CORTELL: Well, could I still ask how 12 that's going to work? 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure. 14 MS. CORTELL: I mean, who -- in other words, the presiding judge is hearing the motion to 15 recuse the -- are we just referring to the fact that he 16 can hear the motion to recuse? 17 18 MR. ORSINGER: No, Nina. This occurs when a motion to recuse the trial judge is filed. 19 20 MS. CORTELL: Right. 21 MR. ORSINGER: It's denied and referred out to the presiding judge. The presiding judge takes 22 23 the case, the recusal, themselves and then a motion to recuse is filed against the presiding judge who's 24

getting ready to rule on the recusal.

25

MS. CORTELL: Right.

MR. ORSINGER: So now you have two layers of recusal, and now you've got to go to the Texas Supreme Court, probably, I think is what we ended up doing, to have the presiding judge replaced.

MS. CORTELL: Right.

MR. ORSINGER: And if they're going to play that game and go up to that level for a judge even to just rule on the recusal then we're going ahead with the trial court.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: The idea is there needs to be somebody who is bulletproof and can keep on having hearings if they need to be held and who can't be knocked off and stopped by a motion.

MS. CORTELL: But we're saying that the trial judge can proceed?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: No, the presiding judge. The way I remember this getting in here is a lot of times the presiding judge will assign somebody else who's on the scene and then there will be a motion to recuse that person. If that kind of thing is happening, the trump card that this gives is the presiding judge can say, "All right, I'm going to hear that," and if they want to recuse me, this gives the presiding judge the power to go ahead and issue interim

orders without being stopped dead in his tracks until Tom Phillips can have somebody brought in.

MR. ORSINGER: David, this allows the trial judge to continue. In other words, if they --

MS. CORTELL: So two times you're out?

MR. ORSINGER: No, you're not out anything. All we're doing is saying, "Okay, look." If you filed a motion to recuse --

MS. CORTELL: Right

MR. ORSINGER: -- and then you try to recuse the judge who's assigned to hear the recusal, the trial judge is going to continue to operate until finally the recusal stuff is settled, because it's almost never going to happen that you have a good recusal against the trial judge and then a good recusal against the presiding judge.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Richard, I thought that (d) gave the presiding judge the power to make the interim orders, not the recused trial judge.

MR. HAMILTON: No.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I thought that was Nina's question, wasn't it?

MS. CORTELL: That's the problem I have.

MR. ORSINGER: No, it doesn't. It's one of those instances that the trial judge is permitted to

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, that would mean that by filing the second recusal motion you would forfeit the first one on an interim basis, wouldn't you?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: On an interim basis you do, but you don't forfeit it forever because if they go up to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court says, "Yeah, you're right. The presiding judge should have been recused, so should the trial judge," or one or the other.

MS. CORTELL: Let's go back to the diocese case. The diocese filed a motion to recuse the trial judge. Then the plaintiffs file a motion to recuse the presiding judge, so in that situation the diocese has to go back to the trial judge? I don't think that's fair, but that's how that reads.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I didn't think that's what we meant.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And I don't think that's how it reads either.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah, it does.

MR. TIPPS: It says "a motion" not "a motion by the same" --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: They're going to have

to be by the same party. You're right.

MR. TIPPS: "By the same party" would solve that problem.

MR. ORSINGER: Boy, I tell you, that just doesn't offend me. I mean, how many layers of these recusals are you going to get because --

MS. CORTELL: But you're punishing the party that felt they had a good faith motion in the trial court because the adversary then files at the next level. I think it -- I don't think that's fair. I like Judge Peeples' notion. I think -- and I thought that's what we intended, too, was that the presiding judge -- at some point you have to stop the nonsense, and you need to allow a judge to go forward, but I don't think that means you revert back and you have your trial judge conducting interim proceedings, and I certainly don't think it should mean that the original movant gets penalized because the adversary filed a second motion.

MR. ORSINGER: But you do understand that the consequence of this two layers is that we have now gummed up the recusal process, so we now have to get a hold of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court or whatever our fallback procedure is just to get another presiding judge who could, in fact, do something like extend a temporary restraining order.

1 CHAIRMA

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hang on, Richard.

What if you added to old (d), new (c), at the end of it "by the same party"? Would that solve your problem?

MS. CORTELL: Well, it's less of a problem. I still -- in the best of all worlds I would prefer to go with Judge Peeples' notion, which is you have to settle at some point on a judge to rule on the recusal but that you would still be stopping the trial court proceedings.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Judge Peeples, maybe I'm not clear about what you suggested. How would you change this paragraph?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I think the way it's worded it does mean that if there's a motion to recuse the presiding judge the original trial judge is back on the case for interim proceedings, and I didn't mean for that to happen.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, who is going to be able to answer emergencies during -- while you're chasing Justice Phillips down to find someone to rule on the recusal?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I really don't care who it is. I think the system needs to have somebody who is immune to these motions on interim proceedings. There has got to be somebody.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, the only one -David, right now the only one that's immune is the one
that Chief Justice Phillips assigns to rule on the
recusal of the presiding judge, and if the presiding
judge is cleared then the presiding judge goes forward
to rule on the recusal of the trial judge. If not, then
Justice Phillips' replacement will rule on it and so
we're talking about how many days or maybe even weeks
before we have a judicial officer who's in power to take
any action at all.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How often does this happen?

MR. ORSINGER: What is your remedy?
HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Not often.

MS. CORTELL: I will just tell you that -- and my last reference to the diocese case -- it actually worked very smoothly. Judge Phillips appointed someone and it was resolved within a matter of a couple of weeks.

MR. ORSINGER: But a couple of weeks is not very good if you have something that needs to be acted on in a matter of days and the system is gummed up because the recusal process is now frozen.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Alex.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Well, just sitting

here listening to this, the one instance that it happened it worked smoothly, but what we're worrying about is if that happens again and if there is a situation where there's got to be a ruling in less than two weeks, which is even less likely. It just seems to me that we're -- the more I sit on this committee the more I think we try to solve every potential problem with a rule when that problem may never come up, and then you just make these rules more complicated, and it just seems to me that this may be a situation where we should just let the system work because things work out.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.

though, like this is a relatively simple drafting problem. Subsection (4) can be interim proceedings.

(a) will be when the trial judge can go forward and that's the new (a) and the new (b), and then subsection (d), when can the presiding judge go forward, and that's one provision, and it's if -- it's regardless of motions to recuse either by the same party or any party. But we're talking about two different things. We're talking about when can the trial judge go forward and when can the presiding judge go forward, and we need somebody to go forward at the second level. So don't we all agree on that?

MR. ORSINGER: I would agree with that.

I mean, that's a compromise that hadn't really been
discussed.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But what I'm hearing from Judge Peeples, who is a in position to know at least with respect to one large region, this doesn't come up, right?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Not much. But we've made some decisions here making it easier to file these and expanded the bases on which you can file them, so I don't know if that's going to change, you know, what Alex said or not.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, Sarah, how would you propose changing subparagraph (c)?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Just break it down into -- it's actually subparagraph (4).

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: (4).

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Break interim proceedings down into (a), and subsection (a) would read as it does now, "referring the motion to the judge of the administrative region, the judge in whose case the motion is filed must take no further action in the case until the motion is disposed of, except in the following instances the judge may proceed," blah-blah-blah, and then we've deleted (a), so we have a new (a), and we

have the new (b). Since we've got -- since this is now subsection (a) those are to be (1) and (2), right?

MR. ORSINGER: Okay.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Then (b), "When the motion has been referred to the presiding judge of the administrative region and that judge elects to hear the motion to recuse or disqualify" -- you know, David would have the better language -- "that judge may make interim orders in the case regardless of whether a motion to recuse that judge is filed by any party."

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think that if the system has somebody who is bulletproof, I just think that will chill some of the abuse that otherwise might happen.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I mean, I don't care so much what (b) says substantively or I'm not proposing anything at this point, just that if you break it down into (a) when the trial judge can go forward and (b) when the presiding judge can go forward, I think we resolve it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, I guess I have to disagree with that because if the presiding judge -- if there's a motion filed then to recuse the presiding judge and you're going to let him go forward anyway in a

case that he knows nothing about, why not let the trial court judge go forward in the interim proceeding? What difference does it make really? If they're both subject to a motion for recusal what difference does it make which one goes forward?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What if we just took this paragraph old (d) just completely out of here? Would we -- kind of what Alex just said. I mean, this is not a big issue, big problem, and why completely revamp our rule when we could fix this just by taking this paragraph out of there?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, if you're going to do that then we better take everything out of here about how to process a motion to recuse a presiding judge.

It's not in the rule right now. No mention is made about what to do when somebody tries to recuse the presiding judge. We've now written a lot of procedures on how to handle recusal of the presiding judge, and so we've given a road map to the pro se litigants who want to recuse the presiding judge that they can do it and how it works, and so if we're not going to prevent any interim proceedings then it might be wiser not to cover recusals of presiding judges so as not to suggest the thought to the pro se's that they can do it.

MS. SWEENEY: And that's my question.

Right now, Judge Brister and the people who argue, are the pro se's that are abusively filing motions for recusal, do they know about recusing the presiding judge yet, or are we going to be teaching it to them? Are they doing that now, trying to in addition to recuse trial judges frivolously moving on up? Yes? No?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Well, I see it normally as they move to recuse the trial judge and then appoint a visiting judge, and they strike them under the Government Code and appoint somebody new.

MS. SWEENEY: So they're not going up to the presiding judge level?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I don't think

I've ever had an instance where they tried both.

MS. SWEENEY: Because the only case I know about is the one Nina and I have been alluding to because we saw it unfold in Dallas.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I had one with a guy that's been disbarred since then.

MS. SWEENEY: So recusing the presiding judge is sort of a non-problem in the norm?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Not a common problem.

MS. SWEENEY: Well, then Richard may be right. Why do we need a rule for it?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: We're trying to 1 2 fix everything that could possibly go wrong. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. So --I agree with Richard. 4 MS. SWEENEY: 5 Let's not put it in at all. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. How many 7 people are in favor of deleting this paragraph which is 8 currently (d) but because we already deleted (a) it's 9 moved into (c), but the one that says "when the 10 presiding judge of the administrative region elects to 11 hear the motion to recuse or disqualify, and a motion to recuse or disqualify such presiding judge is filed," how 12 many people vote to delete that language? 13 14 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I do. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 19 people vote to 15 delete. How many people vote to leave it in? 16 Seven vote to leave it in. 17 MS. SWEENEY: You know, I said I would 18 19 never do this again, but, Richard, why did you just do 20 that? You convinced me and then you voted the other 21 way? 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's his style.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's his style.

MR. ORSINGER: No, what I said, Paula, is
that if we take this out then I'm not in favor of -
MS. SWEENEY: Okay.

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MR. ORSINGER: -- detailing how you recuse a presiding judge. I think that's unwise. We don't know how to handle a recusal on a presiding judge right now because there are no procedures. We just make it up. So we thought, well, instead of making it up let's put a procedure in place and let's put a bulletproof individual like David Peeples wants, and that's the end of the hunt, but if we take this out then a pro se knows they can buy lots of confusion and delay by filing the first motion and then the second motion.

And then it's on the hunt for Chief

Justice Phillips, and then if he puts a retired judge in
then, bang, you've got an objection there, and then
you've got another guy coming in and, you know, that's
why you shouldn't -- the chances that we're going to
have another multi-million-dollar case with huge
commercial law firms on both sides with a judge who goes
down and cries with the jurors when the verdict's come
in is zero.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Now, now.

MR. ORSINGER: The chance that some nut case is going to be shooting these like wild bullets in a crowd to try to bring everything to a halt, that is highly likely, and so we're arming these people and then we're saying basically you can bring the wheels of

justice to a halt, and so --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Okay, kids.

Here's the deal. We're going to take a ten-minute

break, but we've got a lot of ground to cover, so let's

try to keep our comments in focus very tight because

we're now on page six --

MR. TIPPS: Can I make a quick comment?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And we've got three
and a half pages to go. Yes, Steve.

MR. TIPPS: Can I make a quick comment on the "except for good cause stated in the order" notion?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. TIPPS: I want to point out simply that that is really a different concept from the concepts that we've now captured in the new (a) and the new (b). (a) and (b) are situations in which the judge can proceed with the entire case, rule on everything as though no motion has been filed.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right.

MR. TIPPS: And the good cause is really a particularized situation in which we're saying you can't proceed with the entire case, but if you've really got to do something and there's good cause, like extend a T.R.O., you can do that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. TIPPS: Which suggests to me that maybe it ought to be dealt with in the body as an exception rather than one of the enumerated exceptions.

proposal.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Over the ten-minute break you and Richard straighten that out.

(Recess taken from 10:17 a.m. to 10:27 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right, guys. Here we are about --

MR. ORSINGER: We have a proposal.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. A

What is it?

MR. ORSINGER: This is in (d)(4), and the recommendation is to return it to the language as written, the except clause, "except for good cause stated in the order in which the action is taken," period. Scratch "except that" and put in the word "however," comma, so it will read, "After referring the motion to the judge of the administrative region the judge in whose case the motion is filed must take no further action in the case until the motion is disposed of except for good cause stated in the order in which the action is taken. However, in the following instances the judge may proceed with the case."

And I have been informed that Brian

Garner does not like the use of the word "however" and 1 2 so --3 JUSTICE HECHT: He likes "but." 4 MR. ORSINGER: "But." Maybe we should 5 say "but in the following." Do you think that would 6 be -- okay. That will make Brian happy. We'll say "but 7 in the following instances the judge may." That's our 8 proposal. 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. And that's been endorsed by whom? 10 11 MR. ORSINGER: It's been endorsed by Brian Garner. The language came -- well, this is --12 13 Stephen Tipps was the one who recommended this elegant 14 solution to the problem. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. 16 objection, nonresponsive. So it's Tipps and you and who 17 else? Duncan? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 18 MR. ORSINGER: No. Actually, we were 19 20 having a different conversation. This is on the table for consideration. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Stephen, 22 23 it's okay with you? MR. TIPPS: 24 Yeah. 25 MR. ORSINGER: It's his idea.

MR. TIPPS: Changing "however" to "but"? 1 2 Yeah, that's fine. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right. 3 4 Everybody okay with that? 5 MR. HAMILTON: So then that deletes (c) 6 then. 7 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Right. Down to 8 an (a) and a (b). 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Down to an (a) 10 and a (b). 11 MR. HAMILTON: I just have one comment to 12 make. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, sir. MR. HAMILTON: I'm not sure how clear 14 15 that language is. Are we just talking about emergency situations? 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's what Luke 17 18 posited yesterday. 19 MR. HAMILTON: Well, if we are, why don't 20 we say that instead of letting "for any good cause 21 shown" go on? 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, because that language has got history to it and rather than changing 23 24 language just for the sake of changing language, I mean, 25 that would be the reason why you wouldn't.

MR. ORSINGER: If I understand this 1 2 correctly, Nina doesn't realize that this just gutted 3 the last victory that she had. 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, she's happy 5 about that. 6 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Everybody okay 8 So, Richard, you will provide me with that with that? 9 language? 10 MR. ORSINGER: Yes. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. We're now 11 12 onto abatement, subparagraph (5) on page six. MR. EDWARDS: Did we work out the 13 language to incorporate the requirements on pleading the 14 less than ten days? I think we were working on that. 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I think we've 17 worked on that, Bill. 18 MR. EDWARDS: We never agreed on it, I 19 don't think, did we? We assigned Richard the job of 20 drafting that. 21 MR. ORSINGER: Oh, I have drafted it. This is (3). No, this is --22 23 MR. EDWARDS: We were talking about what 24 you had to plead. 25 MR. ORSINGER: (d)(1). Okay. This was

Bill's suggestion. In (d)(1), the third line where it says, "State in detail the factual and legal basis for recusal or disqualification," comma, "and if applicable, any exceptions under subdivision (d)(2)," comma. So that means that you'd have to state in detail the factual and legal basis for recusal and disqualification and, if applicable, any exception under (d)(2).

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is that okay with you?

MR. EDWARDS: I think it does what we
were talking about and gives the presiding judge the
ability to see if there -- they failed to state a legal
and factual basis for an exception to (1).

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MR. ORSINGER: I put the comma in the wrong place it should be "for recusal or disqualification and," comma, "if applicable," comma, "any exception under subdivision (d)(2)," comma.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Anybody have any problem with that? No hands are raised, so apparently no problems.

All right. Now, can we go to abatement of interim proceedings?

MR. HAMILTON: Okay. Well, I think most of this we agreed on last time except that Judge Brister didn't like having one judge order another judge to do

hearing the motion to recuse or disqualify may also order the parties to stop interim proceedings pending a ruling on the motion, and then, of course, the parties can agree upon stopping the interim proceedings, and if the recusal judge orders the parties to stop then they request the judge hearing the interim proceedings to stop. It's kind of cumbersome, but --

MR. EDWARDS: What happens if the judge hearing the proceeding says, "No, I ain't going to stop"?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And you've got conflicting orders from two different judges. One says "stop," the other says "go."

MR. ORSINGER: And then it's <u>Haybor vs.</u>

<u>Black</u>, right?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's let Judge
Brister defend his --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Well, I don't know. I'm trying to recall --

MR. HAMILTON: The way we had it worded before was that the recusal judge --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: That's just a general principle. You don't have one trial judge ordering another trial judge to do something.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, you can abate the 1 2 proceedings. You give the judge hearing the recusal the 3 power to abate the proceedings and not order the other 4 judge not to do something. 5 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Or use the 6 passive voice, "or the proceeding is abated." 7 MR. EDWARDS: Or something. 8 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: You know, the 9 person who is going to hear the motion to recuse does, 10 so to speak, outrank the other judge. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 12 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: He has the power to knock him off the case. I'm not offended by 13 14 that. HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: 15 Yeah. Ι mean, that's the rule. 16 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: 17 That's the way 18 it needs to be. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "May also order the 19 20 interim proceedings abated pending"? MS. JENKINS: I think that makes more 21 22 sense. I do, too. I think that's 23 MR. MEADOWS: 24 a lot better. I can't imagine the parties acting in

concert to come back to the trial judge and have him --

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it just doesn't work.

MR. HAMILTON: Say "order the interim proceedings abated"?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "May also order the interim proceedings abated pending a ruling on the motion to recuse or disqualify," period, and strike the rest of the paragraph. Anybody got a problem with that?

All right. Any other comments about this

subparagraph (5)? This was all discussed last time.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Just one thing. We just need to decide on "stop" or "abate" and use it throughout. I mean, the way it was originally drafted it's "abatement of interim proceedings" and then we never used the word "abate" in the paragraph.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We just did now.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And now we've put the word "abate" in the second sentence and we use "stop" in the first sentence. If we're going to say "abate," let's say "abate."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "If all parties to the interim proceedings agree that the interim proceedings should be abated"?

MS. CORTELL: Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MS. CORTELL: And then "the judge shall

1 abate."

8.

MR. ORSINGER: Uh-oh, Brian likes "must" and not "shall." Can we use "must"?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Must abate."

MS. EADS: Well, we must.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Any other comments on this paragraph? Then moving to paragraph sub (6), order entered during interim proceedings.

Carl, any -- we talked about this, of course, at length.

MR. HAMILTON: I think there's been no changes in that one from what we talked about last time.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Anybody got any comments on (6)? Since there are no comments on (6) let's go to (7).

MR. HAMILTON: (7) essentially opted for two, and that will read "Unless the presiding judge of the region has denied the motion without hearing," comma, then a small t, "the presiding judge of the region must immediately hear" and so forth.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Any issues on subparagraph (7), hearing?

MR. TIPPS: I think it would make it easier on the practitioner if we referred back to the provision pursuant to which the presiding judge may deny the motion without hearing. "Unless the presiding judge

of the region has denied the motion without hearing 1 2 pursuant to" whatever that rule is. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Subsection (d)(3) 4 MR. HAMILTON: (d)(3), yeah. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh? 6 MR. TIPPS: Yeah. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't have a problem 8 with that. Does anybody have a problem with that? 9 MS. CORTELL: No. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Schneider, is that a good idea? 11 12 HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: Looks good 13 to me. MR. MARTIN: You want to change "stopped" 14 to "abated" again, last sentence? 15 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Okay. Where is "stopped"? 17 18 MR. MARTIN: Last sentence of the last line. 19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Or the interim proceeding is abated"? 21 22 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: "Pending a 23 ruling." 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Pending a decision on 25 the motion to recuse or disqualify." Is that okay,

Sarah?

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We've been saying "ruling" but we can say "decision."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:

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"Pending a ruling"?

Would you prefer "ruling"?

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I think

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that's what we've been using.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody okay with

making it "ruling"? Okay. Any other comments on this

subsection? 10

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES:

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, David.

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I would like to

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and the 20-day time period for the poor judge to make up

know how everybody feels about the 10-day time period

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his mind as to how to rule on this matter.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You want a historical

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read on that?

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HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I think

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if you put in time periods that are that long, some

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people are going to think they can take them, and I

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think that we ought to do what we can to speed the

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process up.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Carl.

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MR. HAMILTON: I have a question about

how it works because I think the way it works, at least in our area, is Judge Hester assigns a judge to hear the recusal motion and then that judge sets it. This requires the presiding judge to set it. I'm not sure practically how that works, how the presiding judge could set it and then assign some judge. Maybe he has a conflict or something.

MR. ORSINGER: What about "who must set a hearing to commence"?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The "who" is misplaced.

MR. ORSINGER: The "who" is misplaced, huh? Why? "Assign another judge to hear the motion who must."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, let's take Judge Peeples' issue first.

MR. ORSINGER: Oh, okay.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are the 10 and 20-day deadlines too generous? Should it be five and ten?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: They seem too generous to me, but do you-all know of cases where you need that much time?

MR. EDWARDS: I don't understand why it -- a recusal motion is usually pretty short, quick and why somebody needs 20 days to say "granted" or

"denied" is -- you know, if they can't do it within three working days or a couple of working days, you know, and we've spent the first part of yesterday dealing with very short timetables.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And so three days?

Replace "ten days" with "three days"?

MR. ORSINGER: I was involved in a recusal that Judge McDowell did in Tyler, and he took it under advisement and asked for briefs, and it took him almost a month to rule on it, and we had expert witnesses on both sides and all that stuff, and so some of this stuff is real clear, but for him maybe -- and he must have done 500 of these.

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: The 10 days doesn't seem so unreasonable as the 20 days does.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

MS. EADS: I don't understand why you need ten days to do the hearing. I mean, there must be a way to -- well, first of all, we're doing the same thing about making sure that the rules cover every eventuality. Most recusal motions are going to take -- you know, you set the hearing the next day and they will take half an hour in the courtroom and you can rule. I mean, this is not going to be protracted in most situations.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Hecht, throw out some numbers.

with the ten is getting everybody together. Of course, the movant ought to be standing by and ready to go, and it's just the question of the other side. So maybe five days, but I think less than -- I would think less than ten and on the how many days to rule --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Why couldn't you measure that from when the referral as well? You don't want to string out the hearing just so --

JUSTICE HECHT: Measure when to rule

13 from --

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HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: From the referral.

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, Richard says sometimes the hearings last quite awhile and you call a lot of witnesses, so I wouldn't want to put a time in there that people couldn't function with, but I would think that after the case was submitted surely the judge could decide it within a day or two.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So change 20 to 3?

MS. JENKINS: Yes. I think that would

make sense.

MR. EDWARDS: I would say "three working

1755 days." 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Three business days." 3 MS. JENKINS: Yeah. 4 MR. EDWARDS: Yeah, business. 5 the -- we've got that in some other -- what is the word 6 of art we use in --7 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Three days, 8 isn't that business days? 9 MR. EDWARDS: But somewhere in the rules we use is it working days, business days, how do we --10 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Well, I think 11 don't we calculate --12 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, whatever it is. We'll get the --14 MR. EDWARDS: I know there is some other 15 16 stuff in here that has three days in it. Some number of 17 days. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, actually, your calculation of time rule --19 20 HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Yeah. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- excludes weekends 22 and holidays, doesn't it?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So the proposal

MS. EADS: If it's less than a time

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period.

on the tabling is five and three. How many people are in favor of that?

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Except you don't count under the counting rule you don't count --

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: Weekends.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Oh, you don't --

never mind.

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HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: You don't count Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays if it's any time period of five days or less.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So there you have it. So we can just say "three days."

MS. JENKINS: Three days.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples.

think I would favor saying "promptly" or something like that. There are times when nobody is in a hurry, and it's filed way in advance of the hearing, and there's no urgency, and people are busy, and there are going to be times when a time fuse is not important, and what happens if it's not done in ten days?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: It's granted.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: So I think

there is a problem with putting a number in the first

one. I think a short number definitely ought to be in

the second one.

the presiding judging has checked with the judge to make sure he doesn't have any conflicts for five days or ten days? Because if he does then that's going to be another problem.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If it's in the rule I would think he would do that. Steve.

MR. TIPPS: I would simply observe that this short ten-day period could very easily, and in many cases would, disadvantage the nonmovant. In the one recusal motion I've ever handled we had a hearing with three witnesses, and we were the movants, and we spent a lot of time getting ready, and under this rule what you would have to do if you wanted to file that kind of motion is get your case together, ready to go, and file it, and the other guy would have very little time to react. Maybe we want to -- I mean, maybe that's the exception that we don't want to try to write a rule around, but I think it has that effect.

MR. CHAPMAN: That may be another reason to use Judge Peeples' suggestion of "promptly" so that the judge who is going to hear the hearing, hold the hearing, could make a determination as to what's proper and reasonable under the circumstances.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So what if we 1 insert the word "promptly" in front of "set"? "And must 2 3 promptly set a hearing to commence before such judge," 4 period. 5 MR. ORSINGER: So that means the 6 presiding judge will set the hearing and not the judge 7 who's assigned. Is that what we really want? 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, probably not. 9 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: The judge who is going to hear it needs to set the date. 10 11 MR. EDWARDS: Richard has it done. He's drafted it comma, "who." 12 13 MR. TIPPS: "Who must promptly set a 14 hearing." 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does that work? "Who 16 must promptly"? 17 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Bad English. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. How would 19 you do it? 20 MR. ORSINGER: We just can't please 21 everybody, can we? 22 MR. CHAPMAN: What does "who" modify, the presiding judge? 23 24 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's the 25 problem.

1 MR. HAMILTON: "Must promptly set a 2 hearing on the motion." 3 MR. CHAPMAN: You could eliminate that by 4 just saying "and the hearing must be promptly set" or 5 "must commence promptly before such judge"? JUSTICE HECHT: Brian would break it into 6 two sentences and say, "The assigned judge must set a 7 8 hearing promptly." 9 "Immediately CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 10 hear or assign another judge to hear the motion," 11 "The hearing must be promptly set." period. MR. EDWARDS: "The assigned judge must 12 13 set." 14 MR. ORSINGER: What if the presiding judge does it? You can't say "the assigned judge." 15l The presiding judge may hear it himself. 16 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: "The judge who 17 will hear the motion." 18 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "The judge hearing the motion." 20 21 MR. CHAPMAN: The hearing, that's what we're worried about. "The hearing must be promptly 22 23 set." 24 MS. McNAMARA: It must occur. I mean, 25 setting it, you can set it for three months from now.

1 The old language dealt with the commencement of the We've sort of lost that in the last five 2 hearing. minutes. 3 MR. CHAPMAN: 4 Yes. "The hearing must 5 occur." "Must commence promptly." 6 MS. McNAMARA: "Commence." "Commence" is 7 better. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "The hearing must 9 commence promptly." 10 If the presiding judge is MR. MARTIN: going to hear it, we're saying, "The presiding judge 11 12 must immediately hear it" and then the next sentence 13 we're saying he must promptly set it for hearing. 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Must immediately hear or assign." 15 16 MR. ORSINGER: So if he takes it himself, 17 it's immediate. MS. EADS: And I would prefer "immediate" 18 19 to "prompt" because I'm worried about those judges out 20 there who aren't in this room who prompt can mean three months, and "immediate" has a different connotation, 21 which means as quickly as --22 23 MS. SWEENEY: Instanter. 24 MS. EADS: Instanter, right. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, it ought to be

parallel, I would think.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: The existing rule says, "The presiding judge shall immediately set a hearing before himself or some other judge designated." So "immediately" is in the rule right now.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "The hearing must commence immediately." Sarah.

just say "unless the presiding judge of the region has denied the motion without hearing the judge hearing the motion must immediately hear," -- "set a hearing to commence."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but if he's not going to hear it, you don't want him setting it.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's what I'm saying, "the judge hearing the motion."

MR. HAMILTON: We don't have a vehicle for him to assign it. That's where it gets assigned.

MR. ORSINGER: This is the operative clause where he assigns.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Actually, I think that's already been stated, hasn't it?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I think so.

Yeah. That's under subsection (3), referral. "If the

motion complies with subparagraph (d)(1), the presiding judge of the administrative region shall hear the motion or assign a judge to hear it." This is just about the hearing.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. You're right.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Didn't we hear from Judge Brister that although the word "immediately" has been in here that he had one that wasn't assigned for weeks and weeks?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: The hearing was set immediately. It was just set for two months off.

It was immediately set for two months out.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: So it might be good to have an outer parameter such as ten days.

Well, why don't we leave out the whole preparatory language and say,
"The hearing on a motion to recuse must commence prompt" -- "immediately" or "promptly" or "within three days" or whatever we decide the language needs to be?

The presiding judge has already either decided to hear it or refer it under subsection (3), so we don't need to talk about that anymore.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So you say -- so it would say, "Unless the presiding judge of the region has denied the motion without hearing pursuant to paragraph

(d)(3), the hearing must commence immediately." 1 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Just leave all 2 The entire introductory clause has already 3 that out. been stated in subsection (3), and this subsection (7) 4 5 is supposed to just be about the hearing. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. How does 6 7 everybody feel about that? Paula, are you pretty happy 8 about that? 9 MS. SWEENEY: I am so happy. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Can we talk voir dire 10 for a minute? 11 MS. SWEENEY: You bet. 12 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Everybody okay with that? Hartley, is that okay? 14 MR. ORSINGER: Well, Carl has raised the 15 issue that the Option 2 language only talks about the 16 referral from the trial judge to the presiding judge, 17 18 but it doesn't talk about a referral from the presiding judge to another judge, so this is our operative clause 19 20 for the assignment out on the recusal. 21 MR. HAMILTON: Oh, here it is. assign a judge to hear it." 22 23 MR. ORSINGER: I withdraw that statement. 24 MR. HAMILTON: But that only deals with 25 if he doesn't promptly do something then the movant can

ask the judge to assign a judge to hear it, but it's not the operative clause for the presiding judge to assign it.

MR. ORSINGER: Are we going to leave in the sentence that the presiding judge must hear or assign another judge to hear?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah's proposal is to take it out.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Then if we take that out, we don't have a explicit authority for the presiding judge to assign it out.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, then let's leave it in. Well, I mean --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: If all we need is a sentence that says the presiding judge can assign another judge to hear it, just retitle subsection (3) "Referral and Assignment" and leave that sentence, "If the motion complies with subparagraph (d)(1), the presiding judge of the administrative region shall hear the motion or assign another judge to hear it."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Richard, why do you think this language in the referral paragraph, "If the motion complies with subparagraph (d)(1), the presiding judge of the administrative region shall hear the motion or assign a judge to hear it"? Why doesn't

1 that cover it?

MR. ORSINGER: It does. It's the third time I've changed my mind.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Is everybody comfortable with Sarah's proposal that we take this preparatory language out there and just say, "The hearing must commence immediately"? Is everybody comfortable with that? Anybody not comfortable with that?

MR. HAMILTON: How does the sentence read

11 then?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "The hearing must commence immediately."

MR. HAMILTON: What about the first sentence?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, she takes all of that out.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We've already done that. But with reference to what Judge Peeples was saying, I can see situations in which you don't need to have it immediately.

MR. MARTIN: How about "upon request of either party," somebody thinks there needs to be a hearing.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yeah. That's

1 great.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: What about Steve Tipps' point that sometimes the responding party might need more than a day to get ready?

MR. HAMPTON: And Judge Peeples' point that it might not need to be heard yet. So the answer to your question is anybody -- is the question is anybody uncomfortable with that still pending?

HONORABLE JAN PATTERSON: My hand was about to throw up.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. I'm not sure I heard what everybody said. The proposal is on the table, "The hearing must commence immediately upon request of any party," because it could be a --

MR. MARTIN: "Any party."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Any party."

MR. TIPPS: That potentially

disadvantages the nonmovant if the movant is ready to go, all of his ducks in a row, and the other guy is just saying, "You want to what?"

MR. CHAPMAN: What about, "The hearing shall commence promptly consistent with justice"?

MR. ORSINGER: In this Tyler case there were actually depositions taken of non-parties to find out about communications with the judge. How can you do

that in three days if you're the respondent?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Chip, I think we ought to leave it the way it's written.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: You also have a problem with rural judges, and it may be 300 miles, 350 miles, away from another judge to even get them there to hold the hearing. Not everybody has another judge down the hall.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Good point. Judge Peeples.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: On line three just put a period after "motion" and say, "A hearing must be promptly scheduled," period, and move on. You can't make people hold hearings. What are you going to do if it's not held? You've got to trust somebody to hear the arguments and decide if it needs to be heard now and if somebody needs more time. You've just got to trust somebody to make those decisions, and we can't mandate it in this rule. I think that's the best we can do.

MR. TIPPS: I agree.

MR. ORSINGER: I support that, too.

MR. HAMILTON: Agree.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah, do you agree with what Judge Peeples said? Even though he sits on an

inferior court to yours.

his choice to go someplace else. I still don't understand why you need all of the introductory clause or why it's appropriate in the section entitled "Hearing," but I don't think that that makes much difference.

8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not anything to go to 9 war over.

10 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Brian will clean

11 it up.

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MR. ORSINGER: We can delete the first two sentences.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: They are in the existing rule. Do we have them somewhere else in this rule?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. It's in (d)(3), but the word "immediately" is not in (d)(3).

19 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Add it.

20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It should be added.

MR. ORSINGER: In (d)(3) it says, "If the motion complies with subparagraph (d)(1), the presiding judge of the administrative region shall hear the motion or assign it to a judge to hear it."

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That's good.

MR. ORSINGER: The word "immediate" is 1 2 not in there or anything. It does no timetable. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The "immediate" should 3 4 modify "assign." 5 MR. ORSINGER: Well, there was -- we 6 wanted also to encourage the presiding judges to take 7 action promptly, and we have the word "immediate" here 8 on the assignment. If we fall back on Option 2 to 9 (d)(3), there is no encouragement for the presiding judge to act quickly on making the referral. 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: If we add the word 11 "immediately" before assigned that will take care of 12 13 that. 14 MR. ORSINGER: Yes. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: 16 The word "immediately" is in the existing rule. 17 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: And it works in 19 some cases, and it does not work in other cases. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. But, David, we're back to your -- let's see what he's got on the 22 23 table, Carl. Read that language again, David. 24 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I quess

drop the first two and a half lines and say, "A hearing

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must be promptly scheduled" or something. "A prompt hearing must be scheduled," something like that. That doesn't say who does it. I guess you could say one person or the other. I don't know.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, I think we need the first line in there because we have a provision that allows the presiding judge to act without a hearing.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I kind of feel that way, too, because that could potentially conflict with that.

MR. HAMILTON: So I think we need the first line in there, and as Steve suggested or somebody, that we add "pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. So "Unless the presiding judge of the region has denied the motion without hearing pursuant to subparagraph (d)(3), a hearing must be promptly scheduled."

MR. TIPPS: Uh-huh.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Hartley, does that work for you or not?

MR. HAMPTON: Works for me.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody? Nina, does

that work for you?

MS. CORTELL: (Nods head.)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Does that not work for 1 2 anybody? 3 MS. EADS: I would rather have it say 4 "must be scheduled to promptly commence" rather than 5 "promptly scheduled" because the issue isn't how fast 6 it's scheduled but that it be promptly handled. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ann, you think that's 7 8 right? 9 MS. McNAMARA: I do. I mean, there are all these good objections to trying to do some things 10 11 too fast, but the concept of "promptly" incorporates some reasonableness. I would prefer that. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. David, there 13 has been a friendly amendment offered, very friendly, 14 from the right side of the table. "A hearing must be 15 scheduled to commence promptly." 16 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: 17 That sounds sublime. 18 19 MR. HAMILTON: "Promptly commence" or 20 "commence promptly"? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know. 21 What would Garner say? 22 23 MR. ORSINGER: Well, you don't end sentences with adverbs under the old grammar. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So "to promptly 25

1 commence."

2 MR. TIPPS: Don't split the infinitive.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Garner says

4 it's okay to split infinitives.

5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So which way are we

6 doing it? Do we split the infinitive?

MR. ORSINGER: My language advisor won't

8 comment.

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9 MR. TIPPS: I will vote against it if we

10 split the infinitive.

11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "To commence promptly"

12 it is then. Okay. Are we happy with that? Anybody

13 unhappy with that?

MR. ORSINGER: Let me ask you, back on

15 (d)(3) on Option 2, are we going to insert the word

16 about "the presiding judge shall immediately hear the

17 motion or assign"?

18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No.

19 MR. ORSINGER: No "immediate."

20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, wait a minute.

21 We are going to put the word "immediate" in there, but

22 it's going to be in front of "assign."

MR. ORSINGER: A-ha. Okay. Okay.

24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So the language

25 here is "Unless the presiding judge of the region has

denied the motion without hearing pursuant to 1 2 subparagraph (d)(3), a hearing must be scheduled to 3 commence promptly." Okay. Everybody all right with 4 that? Okay. That's what we'll do then. 5 Now, there is a proposal by Justice Hecht 6 to change 20 days to 3 days. 7 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: So moved. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Anybody 9 have a problem with that? There are no hands raised. 10 There are no heads shaking.

MR. TIPPS: Just three business days or three working days?

MR. ORSINGER: Under five days, three means business days. It's under five days.

We don't need it in letters and numerals, do we? Don't we just use letters?

JUSTICE HECHT: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay.

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MR. HAMILTON: Just letters.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else on subparagraph (7)? Carl.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, the next sentence may or may not be correct. "The presiding judge must set the notice of hearing."

MR. TIPPS: It ought to say, "The judge 1 2 hearing the motion must send notice." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, that makes more 3 4 sense, but was this done this way for a reason? 5 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Do you send 6 notice, David? 7 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think it 8 happens both ways. People show up, and you have the 9 hearing, and it's not a problem. This is in the regular 10 rule right now. I don't think it's a problem, and I 11 would say we shouldn't spend our precious time tinkering 12 with it. 13 MR. MARTIN: Chip, I have one comment 14 about that. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, John. 16 MR. MARTIN: It says "send notice." If this is going to happen so fast this could be in the 17 18 presiding judge's chambers or on a phone call or something like that. Maybe "must give notice" or 19 something like that. "Send" implies send something in 20 21 the mail. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm okay with that. David, you all right with that? 23 24 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That or "shall notify everybody." "Give notice" is fine.

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1	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Give."
2	MR. HAMILTON: "The presiding judge must
3	give notice"?
4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
5	HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: The current
6	rule is "presiding judge shall cause notice of such
7	hearing to be given."
8	MR. HAMILTON: That may have been in the
9	recodification, by the way.
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything else
11	about subparagraph (7), hearing?
12	MR. HAMILTON: That's the way it was in
13	the recodification.
14	MS. CORTELL: We probably want to change
15	"stopped" to "abated."
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've done that.
17	MR. ORSINGER: We agreed to do that, and
18	"decision" to "ruling."
19	MR. HAMPTON: Is that sentence necessary
20	in light of paragraph (5)?
21	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Say that again,
22	Hartley.
23	MR. HAMPTON: Is the last sentence
24	necessary in light of paragraph (5)?
25	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think that's a

1776 little different. 1 2 No, it's not, either. 3 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: The footnote 4 says it's meant to correspond with (5). 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 6 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: If so, why say 7 it twice? Everybody getting in a fight over which --8 MR. ORSINGER: We don't need it the 9 second time, I agree. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Let's take that 10 out. Okay. 11 We're onto disposition. Any issues on this 12 paragraph? 13 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yes. The 14 second sentence allows the parties to agree on the 15 judge. 16 MR. MEADOWS: Or permits them to not 17 agree. 18 MS. McNAMARA: It doesn't require the 19 presiding judge to assign. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Is this in the current 21 rule? HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: This is 22 No.

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the constitutional deal, and we talked about this

but the Constitution says, Texas Constitution, if

briefly, whether you want to tell parties that or not,

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somebody is disqualified the parties have a right to select an appropriate person, not required to be a judge, to hear the case. If they cannot agree on that person then the presiding judge appoints somebody.

Now, that's what the Constitution says.

We put this originally in the codification because that's what the Constitution says. Counter-argument is, well, if they know the Constitution, which, of course, nobody in Texas does, then they can do that, but if they don't, why tell them.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That was the reason you came to this meeting at 8:30 on a Saturday morning, to find out that you get to select your judge.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: That was the argument.

that sentence states something obvious, which is people can agree on a judge, and that can be ratified by the presiding judge if he or she wants to. If this is going to cause people to want to read the Constitution and go around agreeing on judges and just say, "We want some nonlawyer to hear a case," I think that's just --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Can't have that.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: We shouldn't do

that.

MS. McNAMARA: We call an ADR, though. I mean, that's --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's exactly right.

MR. ORSINGER: But it doesn't say the presiding judge is required to accept the parties' agreement, right? So this isn't harmful, is it?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: But, Richard,

10 is it helpful?

MR. HAMILTON: I think it's helpful in the sense that it avoids a second recusal and it avoids a second challenge that may be made under the Government Code if the parties can agree on a judge.

HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: There can be some sensitivity on the judges sometimes when they hear that lawyers really want another judge, didn't want me in this one. What about the next case that is in my court? Why do you want that one over me? I mean, I have heard those discussions in the past when the judges talk about letting lawyers pick their judge, so it might have unintended consequences beyond this particular case.

MR. JEFFERSON: I think most lawyers, you know, if they want the trial to go forward and they see

another judge sitting there with nothing to do and can agree will make that agreement, and it will be ratified by the presiding judge if it avoids all these recusal hearings. I don't see any need for that sentence in the rule at all.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What's the third sentence add? What's the third sentence getting at?

MR. HAMILTON: This was brought up by Scott.

MR. ORSINGER: Scott Brister.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: McCown.

MR. ORSINGER: I mean Scott McCown. I'm

sorry. Excuse me.

MR. EDWARDS: The presiding judge doesn't have the power to appoint a master, a statutory power.

MR. ORSINGER: He said the practical decision when an associate judge is recused is that the judge in the court is just going to hear it, or at least they want to pick the other associate judge. They don't want the presiding judge to do that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: And didn't he say also that the presiding judge can appoint?

MR. EDWARDS: I thought he said that the regional presiding judge didn't have authority to make

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1	the appointment.
2	MR. ORSINGER: That was a bold assertion.
3	MR. EDWARDS: I don't know whether it's
4	correct or incorrect.
5	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, I'm
6	sorry. I got ahead of myself. That third sentence
7	doesn't relate to the second, so the proposal is to
8	delete sentence two. All in favor of deleting sentence
9	two raise your hand.
10	HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I vote "yes."
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Everybody in favor of
12	deleting sentence two raise their hand.
13	HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I vote "yes."
14	MR. ORSINGER: Oh, she's against.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
16	HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: No, she's
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 13 in favor. All in
18	favor of keeping sentence two raise your hand.
19	Bill, do you have your hand up?
20	MR. EDWARDS: No. I had it up the first
21	time.
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Ten.
23	MR. ORSINGER: Does that include Ann?
24	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes.
25	MR. JACKSON: Did she say "I vote 'yes'"

or --

MR. ORSINGER: She said -- I think she said "against."

MR. HAMILTON: She said "against."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So I counted her with

you, Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: And so it lost by -- CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 13 to 10.

MR. ORSINGER: 13 to 10.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So that sentence will

be deleted.

MR. ORSINGER: Does it remain in the Constitution, though?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Yes, but don't tell anybody.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We're going to take that up next. All right. Judge McCown's concept of associate judge or master.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: I think it ought to stay the way it is right there. It's very important that the people hearing these abuse and neglect cases and so forth be somebody who understands that, and I think the judge who is close to the scene is more likely to be sensitive to those concerns than somebody farther removed, and there is also a turf issue

here, and I think that Judge McCown is correct and that 2 language ought to stay. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody 4 disagree with that? 5 MS. SWEENEY: So the way it is proposed 6 now it's going to read sentence one, sentence three. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 8 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Well, just as a 9 drafting issue, what if the district court wants to just 10 do it himself or herself now? 11 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: You can do it? 12 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Well, it says 13 "must appoint." "Must direct the district court to 14 appoint a replacement." What if the judge doesn't want a replacement, the judge just wants to do it himself or 15 herself? 16 17 MR. EDWARDS: Just add in there "or hear 18 the matter himself or herself." 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, appoint themselves as a replacement. 20 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: 21 Richard, is this your language or Scott McCown's? 22 23 MR. ORSINGER: This was Scott's language, 24 but actually the way this is written, it means the

recusal is automatically granted no matter whether it's

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1783 meritorious or not, doesn't it? 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No. 3 MR. ORSINGER: "The presiding judge must 4 direct the district court to appoint a replacement." 5 It's like --MS. JENKINS: "If." 6 7 MS. EADS: "If." 8 MR. EDWARDS: "If the judge is recused or 9 disqualified." 10 MR. ORSINGER: Oh, that's after the 11 conclusion. I'm with you. Okay. 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Any other comments to 13 this? 14 MR. ORSINGER: I think we ought to add "or hear it him or herself," however you would do that. 15 Sometimes, HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: 16 17 though, there are locations in which one associate judge 18 serves more than one court, so there is not going to be 19 a particular district judge that appointed that associate judge. It will have been the agreement of the 20 local council of judges who made that appointment. 21 That's true in San MR. ORSINGER: 22 23 Antonio. 24 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: El Paso. Do

you want to clarify that the district judge to whom the

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case is assigned will appoint the replacement?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

if we need this reference to the presiding judge in that sentence. "If an associate judge or master is recused or disqualified, the district court which appointed the associate judge or master shall appoint a replacement."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, and Ann's --

"the district court to whom the case is assigned," she says.

MR. EDWARDS: Yeah. I don't know what you gain from having the presiding judge directing the district court to appoint.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah. Take that out.

MR. EDWARDS: The rule does that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. How about this? "However, if an associate judge or a master is recused or disqualified, the district court to whom the case is assigned must hear the case or appoint a replacement."

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I think that's fine.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Paragraph (9), appeal.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: Chip, can I ask one 1 2 question? 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Elaine. 4 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Is it only the 5 district courts that have the power to appoint masters? 6 I thought the county courts also did. Under Rule 171. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I don't know. 8 MR. ORSINGER: This is a different kind 9 of master. This is statutory associate judge. 10 PROFESSOR CARLSON: So it does not apply 11 to -- there is no power to recuse a master under 171? I don't know. 12 MR. ORSINGER: They're not listed 13 Yeah. as judges in here, I don't think. Where do we list 14 15 judges, Carl? 16 MR. HAMILTON: We don't. 17 MR. ORSINGER: I thought we did. MR. HAMILTON: Oh, at the end we say it 18 19 doesn't apply to some of them. MR. JEFFERSON: Well, but isn't there --20 you can object to having your case heard by an associate 21 22 judge or master. HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: You have an 23 24 I don't think there is an objection. appeal de novo. 2.5 MR. JEFFERSON: Well, that's right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Paragraph (9), appeal.

This is something that I asked the subcommittee to look at. There are instances where the recusal is obtained by fraudulent testimony, and at least some judges take the position that they have no powers to rectify that, even on a motion to reconsider where the evidence has been shown to be fraudulent. So this -- and I'm not sure if that's right or not, but that's the way that some judges view it. So this paragraph is intended to cure that problem so that "the order may not be reviewed except in cases where the movant presented fraudulent evidence in support of the motion." Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: Two components to my question. A, again, are we writing to the exception? How often is fraudulent evidence induced at these, and, B, aren't we creating a reason to appeal with the argument that your evidence was fraudulent in every case? In other words, kind of both sides of the problem.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Who is going to decide if it's fraudulent and how? I mean, appellate courts generally review determinations by trial judges. I don't think they're equipped to decide in the first instance whether evidence is fraudulent.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, I agree. 1 And I 2 think this would permit a trial judge to review that. 3 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, this is 4 appeal. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No. 6 MS. SWEENEY: Yeah. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It says "may not be 8 reviewed." It doesn't say anything about appeal. 9 MR. EDWARDS: Well, the whole thing says 10 "appeal." 11 MR. ORSINGER: But the paragraph title leads you to think that. 12 MS. McNAMARA: And the prior line says 13 14 "reviewed on appeal." HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's what I 15 16 see. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I understand that, and 18 maybe there is another way to do this, but --19 MR. ORSINGER: How about "Reconsideration and Appeal"? 20 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. 22 "Reconsideration and Appeal." MR. EDWARDS: Well, I think we're getting 23 24 down to that letting the tail wag the dog business 25 again.

MS. SWEENEY: Yeah. How often do you have fraudulent testimony, truly fraudulent? I mean, not just stupid, but fraudulent.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I can tell you one instance for sure.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, at what point do you learn that the testimony is fraudulent and what has happened in the meantime?

MS. EADS: And what do you want to do with it? Are you going to suggest that the party that produced fraudulent testimony against a judge then has to have that judge? If the purpose of producing --

MR. ORSINGER: That's fitting punishment.

The guy can't be subpoenaed down to the

MS. EADS: Maybe so.

it works. There's a vague -- there's a vague motion, arguably doesn't comply with the rule that says it has to be specific but alleges a ground that the trial judge, the judge being recused, practiced law with a material witness in the case. Special exception denied. Who's the person? Who's the witness? Interrogatory won't tell you. Go to a hearing. Movant gets up on the stand, reveals for the first time it's this guy, says that he did this, he did that, he did the other thing.

hearing, but within a day or so executes an affidavit saying, "That's absolutely false. I never did this with the trial judge. I never did this. I never did that," et cetera, et cetera. On motion for reconsideration the judge who's been appointed to hear the recusal motion says under this paragraph, "I can't review it. It says -- I've already granted it. It can't be reviewed." So then you try to mandamus. That doesn't work either. You try to go to the presiding judge, "Sorry. I've already appointed another judge to hear it." So you've allowed somebody to get up there and absolutely lie and recuse a judge which has made in this instance --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's your perspective, but so far as the record is concerned there is a fact issue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, yeah. That's right.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: As to who is telling the truth.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And the judge who made the decision says -- no, no, no. Certainly that's true. The judge who made the decision says, "Whoa, this is a serious matter. I would reconsider it except for this paragraph which says that it can't be reviewed, and so I feel like I can't review my decision." The presiding

judge agrees with that.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: You may want a separate paragraph that talks about reconsideration by the trial court.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But that wouldn't be part of an appellate.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, you could rename this "Reconsideration."

MR. EDWARDS: Well, I don't think you want them both in the same paragraph, No. 1. No. 2, we -- the judges who are making the complaint that you're speaking of are thinking that the recusal motion is against them, and the whole reason for these recusal things outside of the area of constitutional disqualification in large part is the appearance of a lack of impartiality. That's what a whole lot of it is.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but the evil of this situation is forum shopping. Didn't like the judge, didn't like the judge that they got, so they moved to recuse him, and they do it arguably --

MR. EDWARDS: Well, if they do it fraudulently there are a whole raft of things in here. First of all, you get down here to the sanction part that puts you back into whatever it is, 215(b)(2), which

allows all kinds of bad things to happen. If they have presented fraudulent testimony --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, but they have won the motion, so nothing bad can happen to them for winning the motion.

MR. EDWARDS: Yes, they can. They're in contempt of court, and if it's sworn to, there may be all kinds of problems.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But that decision means that they have succeeded in their forum shopping.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, so has the bank robber succeeded in getting the money from the bank, you know, but we take care of that in another way. We don't say -- the rule that he couldn't rob the bank doesn't stop him.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Chip, I think that what Paula and Bill have said is correct here. If the motion is granted, you know, and the recusal judge believed what turned out to be fraudulent testimony, it seems to me very important that we still move on and take it from there.

Now, if you had a judge who thought that he didn't have the authority to grant a rehearing, I don't see that in the present rule, which says, "If the

motion is granted, the order shall not be reviewable."

If we were to say here, "If the motion is granted, the order may not be reviewed on appeal," period, then that would clearly limit that to reviewed in an appellate court, and it seems to me you could probably convince that judge, "You've been had. There's nothing in this rule that prevents a reconsideration," but it doesn't open the door to the extent that this last -- this italicized language seems to do.

MS. SWEENEY: The only question I have about reconsideration procedurally, and I may just be too ignorant, but if you persuade the judge with your fake testimony, he recuses himself, it gets assigned someplace else. Now you're in another court. You figure out it's fake testimony. You go back to the original judge who says, "Whoops, I unrecuse myself." What's happened to the other proceeding? Are those orders voidable? What if that other judge doesn't want to get shed of the case? Who has authority to order it? Are we now walking into a situation -- and I don't know, and, I mean, I like what you're saying but --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. This may be just one of those situations where the wrong has no remedy.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Got to live

with it.

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Motion for

3 sanctions.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: You have a

motion for sanctions.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You know, but what's your sanction? I mean, the problem is that the guy has forum shopped and he's been successful. You can't go to the new judge and say, "By the way, Judge, you're better for this guy than the last guy and so I want sanctions."

MS. McNAMARA: You might. If the new judge fits any of the qualifications, you know, of impartiality.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Well, there's a proposal by Judge Peeples to say, "If the motion is granted, the order may not be reviewed on appeal," and stop there or say "but may be considered" --

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Period.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Period.

MR. ORSINGER: Would you be willing to say "by mandamus or appeal"?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh?

MR. ORSINGER: "By mandamus or appeal."

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That needs to 1 2 be in there. MR. EDWARDS: Well, I don't know that you 3 4 have to say that, because the language "reviewed on 5 appeal" has already been -- in this context already been 6 decided that it's not a mandamusable order. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You think there's case 8 law on that? 9 MR. EDWARDS: I know there is. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Really? 10 MR. HALL: There is. 11 MR. ORSINGER: There's no harm in saying 12 it, is there? 13 14 JUSTICE HECHT: You still get someone 15 that wants one. MR. EDWARDS: It might cut them off. 16 David, is there 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. any appetite for saying that the trial court -- the 18 recusing court has authority to entertain a motion to 19 reconsider? 20 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: 21 Chip, I just think it's very important that these decisions be made 22 and you move on. That's a very important consideration 23 24 here. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

And I wouldn't

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Any other Yeah, Skip. comments?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES:

MR. WATSON: Can I ask a question on the first sentence? If memory is correct, the old 18a, whatever it was, said that if it was denied, the order may be reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal. I'm sure there was a reason that was dropped out, and I may be dead wrong on that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, you're right. That's what it says.

MR. WATSON: But I'm wondering why that was dropped out.

MR. ORSINGER: Let's put it back in. don't think it was -- probably Bill Dorsaneo took it out, truthfully, and I don't remember that we ever discussed that we would drop that out, because that is the standard of review.

MR. WATSON: And by dropping it, it appears that it's not, intended not to be the standard, and I'm sitting here wondering what the heck the standard is and how am I ever going to show reversible I mean, and I'm frankly still wondering that of how one shows this is reversible error unless -- I mean, it just is awfully hollow as it is written.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. EDWARDS: That's a question I was going to raise on appeal, what's the burden on appeal, not the -- insofar as whether or not you have to show harm or don't show harm. Is this subject to the harmless error rule, or is it like venue?

MR. ORSINGER: I don't know.

MR. WATSON: I mean, I agree with Bill. To me, based on everything we've been going through in this whole process, it is incredibly hollow. I mean, all these attempts that we've made to try to say that the appearance of impropriety or actual impropriety is just not going to be tolerated, period, when we get down and say, "Hey, look at the evidence. You know, the outcome would have been the same regardless of the judge." You know, or how can you show the outcome would have been different?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't think there is a harm analysis in recusal.

MR. EDWARDS: In order to show that the outcome --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Whoa, whoa, whoa. Are you finished?

25 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I don't think

1797 there is a harm analysis in recusal. 1 2 MR. ORSINGER: But we're not going to write that in this rule anyway, so let's move on. 3 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. We're not going to write it. 5 MR. ORSINGER: We're either going to put 6 abuse of discretion in here or we're not, but we're not 7 8 going to put whether it's subject to harmless error. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Abuse of discretion 9 10 was in the prior rule. MR. ORSINGER: Yes. 11 For --12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, I know it was. I'm reading it. 13 MR. ORSINGER: It says "reviewed for 14 abuse of discretion on appeal." 15 That's fine. 16 MR. WATSON: 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Let me --MR. EDWARDS: Unless there is harmful 18 19 error other than this in the case it is impossible to show harm as a result of a ruling. 20 MR. ORSINGER: That may be true, but 21 that's not a rule of procedural problem, is it? That's 22 23 a rule of appellate substantive law. 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let me read the rule

as it stands right now. "If the motion is denied, the

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order may be reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment. If the motion is granted, the order may not be reviewed by mandamus or" -- "by mandamus or appeal," period. That's the language we currently have. How many -- we have got to move on, guys. How many people are in favor of that?

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I am.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 21 in favor. How many against? One against. 21 against. 21 to 1 it passes.

MR. ORSINGER: Chip, we need to go back,
I think, and clarify on Elaine's point. Carl and I
looked in here, and we don't, in fact, specifically say
that associate judges or masters are or are not covered.

Under subdivision (d)(1) on page three,
"A motion to disqualify or recuse a judge other than a
judge of the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals,
Court of Appeals or Statutory Probate Court," and so
we're only inferentially saying associate judge or
master, and we don't indicate whether the master is
what, Elaine, is Rule 171?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: 171.

MR. ORSINGER: Special master or whether it's a master appointed pursuant to the Government Code. And I think we ought to get a consensus and then write something while we're going on here. Are we going to

include 171 special masters or not? 2 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: No. PROFESSOR CARLSON: 3 No. MR. ORSINGER: No? Okay. We're not. 4 5 Then it's just going to be associate judges because 6 there is a statutory concept for those. 7 MS. SWEENEY: So you can't recuse a 8 special master, you're saying? 9 MR. ORSINGER: That's what the no's just 10 meant. Well, what if it's the 11 MS. SWEENEY: 12 opponent's wife? I mean, of course you have to be able 13 to do something. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I don't 14 15 understand why you wouldn't, if they are going to be 16 making decisions in the case. 17 MS. SWEENEY: How about your appearance 18 of impropriety? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh? PROFESSOR CARLSON: There is some case 20 21 law that says you cannot. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: They're not 22 making decisions. 23 24 MR. ORSINGER: It says you what? It says 25 you what, Elaine?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: They're making 1 2 recommendations to the district judge. 3 MR. ORSINGER: Elaine, the case law says 4 what? 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: There is some case 6 law that says you cannot. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There is a heightened 8 standard of review? PROFESSOR CARLSON: There is case law 9 10 saying that you cannot. MR. ORSINGER: Cannot? 11 PROFESSOR CARLSON: 12 Recuse a 171, but that's why I was asking. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: When they make a recommendation. 15 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I'm not arguing 16 17 against having them recusable. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Yeah, 19 Judge Brown. HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Well, I appoint 20 21 them rarely, but I have on a couple of occasions, and if 22 somebody had a reason to recuse them, I would want to 23 know right then, so I think they should have a right to 24 file a motion. 25 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Yeah, but then

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do you want to load onto it all of our recusal 2 procedures and interim proceedings and ten days? 3 I would expect if I appoint somebody, my brother-in-law, somebody would say something, so I would 4 5 say, "Oh, okay. Let's do somebody else," but remember 6 those are not decision makers, those are recommenders. 7 HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: Yeah, although 8 as a practical matter if you have got a discovery fight with a master looking at a million documents --9 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Don't admit 10 11 that on the record. HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: 12 You know, but isn't the threshold extremely high for even 13 justifying a master? I mean, you've got --14 MR. ORSINGER: Not in Fort Worth it 15 16 isn't. 17 HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: Well, 18 according to the Supreme Court it is. I mean, that can also be one of the -- as a practical matter, if one 19 party strongly opposes a master, it's really difficult 20 for a trial judge to meet all those thresholds. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 22 Yeah. Yeah. How many 23 people think we ought to include master?

HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER:

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masters you mean?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Special masters. 1 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 2 Don't you 3 get -- I mean, No. 1, couldn't you object and bring that up once the special master makes the report? 4 5 wouldn't it be like, I mean, an arbitrator you bring 6 that up when the arbitration awards, somebody moves to 7 affirm it. 8 HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: I think we 9 ought to vote. Didn't we already vote? CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we were in the 10 11 middle of a vote. HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: 12 I'm sorry. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And started kind of talking about it. That's okay. 14 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 15 You know, 16 before we --HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 17 If I can arque my "yes" vote, what if you have got a really 18 document-intensive accounting problem, a tracing 19 problem, and you've got 30 years of documents that 20 21 you're going to have to present to this master. 22 saying that even though I know the master is the husband 23 of my opposing counsel I have to produce my 30 years of 24 documents and wait until he makes a recommendation 25 before I can get rid of them?

No.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER:

HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: No. This could be ruled by mandamus. I mean, this would be an abuse of discretion to basically violate any of these recusal problems.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, the last one of those was granted by the Third Court of Appeals was -- I'll just hire Pam.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I'm not saying you ought to appoint biased special masters. I'm saying we've got a how many page rule now? It's going to be a three-page printed rule. Okay. That's fine for judges, but for special masters, too? I mean, you know, that you have to do it on this time and it's abuse of discretion.

It's not reviewed by abuse of discretion. It's the trial judge that's going to do it, and it's the trial judge -- the fact is that the special master does not make the decision. The trial judge has to make the decision. It's unconstitutional for the special master to do anything but make a recommendation. We get on down that road, how about, you know, special expert panels and stuff like that. I mean, I can imagine you sure want a right to object that person is biased, and that record ought to be made, but these are not judges.

It's different, and it ought to be if you want to write a whole rule for that procedure, that's one thing, but we ought not to just treat them like judges because they're not.

MS. EADS: And so the procedure would be in this situation where you would inform the judge, "This master has a problem," the judge ignores you, you do a mandamus. So you have protections built in.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Elaine.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: I'm sorry I brought this up, but for the record, Rule 171 does not allow the court to appoint a master that is related to any party, so that covers it. It does not speak in terms of bias and impartiality. I think that most times judges will ask the parties if they're comfortable with the special master and even ask them for names, so I don't think this is a problem.

HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: Absolutely.

Absolutely.

MR. CHAPMAN: Well, in Dallas County special masters get appointed without the court asking anybody, and you may have it for a <u>Dauber</u> motion, which is important in your case, and it's going to be decided, and the cases may be set for trial the two weeks hence, and then say you have to take it up on mandamus and

that's your only remedy. If, in fact, you have a basis for -- a real basis for objection because of recusal or disqualification, it seems as though you're putting the party at an unnecessary cost and disadvantage when we've got a rule that takes care of it at the trial level. Otherwise, you're forcing a party with a lesser judicial officer to take it up on appeal in essence. That doesn't make any sense to me, and we ought to include them because as a practical matter they are decision makers.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Judge Lawrence.

HONORABLE TOM LAWRENCE: Well, I think perhaps there does need to be some way to recuse a master, but I'm not sure that it needs to be in this rule to give them the same status or prestige or rights that a regular judge would have. Perhaps we need to look at 171 or a similar rule. I think it would be a mistake to put it in this.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Let's vote on this. How many people would vote in favor of including special master in this procedure?

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: You're talking under the rules and not statutory masters, right?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. How do you vote,

1806 Judge McClure? 1 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Not including 2 3 them. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Not including them. 4 5 Okay. How many vote not to include them? HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Now I vote 6 7 "yes." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 17 not to include 8 9 12 to include, so they will not be included. 10 wrote in "associate judge." We've got them in, right? MR. ORSINGER: On (d)(1) we will say, "A 11 motion to disqualify or recuse a judge or associate 12 13 judge." Is that all right? No. (1). 14 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Richard, under the Family Code aren't the (4)(d) masters still 15 16 referred to as masters? 17 MR. ORSINGER: I think they are. 18 MS. JENKINS: I think they are. MR. ORSINGER: 19 Yes. 20 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: So maybe what you want to say is "statutory masters." 21 22 HONORABLE MICHAEL SCHNEIDER: Statutory 23 masters. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You want to include 24

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statutory masters?

MS. JENKINS: I think you have to for the 1 2 (4)(d) cases. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So it would 4 read "judge, associate judge, or statutory master"? 5 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Right. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right. 6 7 MR. EDWARDS: And then you would change 8 down in (8) from "a master" to "a statutory master." 9 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Right. Thanks, 10 Bill. 11 MS. McNAMARA: Chip, could we get an 12 expression of interest in Tom Lawrence's suggestion that 13 we do something somewhere? 14 MR. ORSINGER: I support putting it into the proper rule and just say "on the same grounds as in 15 18a." 16 17 MS. McNAMARA: Just so they don't get all the complexity of this, but there is some 18 acknowledgement that they can be recused. 19 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think that's a good 21 Richard and Carl, that would be your subcommittee that would --22 23 MR. ORSINGER: We'll bring that to the 24 September meeting. 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: August.

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Oh, August. MR. ORSINGER:

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: August meeting. Okay. Subparagraph (10), assignment of judges by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

MR. HAMILTON: That will be deleted now.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I mean, we didn't exactly vote to do that. We just discussed it, didn't

MR. HAMILTON: It won't make any sense because we removed the recusal to the regional presiding judge, so I would say we have to delete (10). for the last sentence. That's in the current rule.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'm not quite sure why since we deleted the other thing this necessarily has to go, but --

Well, we decided we didn't MR. HAMILTON: want to create a road map for the recusals of the regional presiding judge, so we took out that part over in --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. I hear what you're saying. Justice Hecht, how do you feel about that?

JUSTICE HECHT: I mean, I thought the committee crossed the bridge with the taking out the road map, so if that's what we're going to do, that's fine. As a matter of fact -- but this is what's going to happen I think. Time will tell what's going to happen. If somebody does move to recuse the presiding judge, except for the first phrase, I mean, I think whether he decided to hear the motion to recuse or not, if the party didn't want the regional presiding judge making the appointment of the judge to hear the case, the recusal motion, it would still come to the Chief and he'd appoint somebody.

MS. SWEENEY: I would move to take it out consonant with what we already did.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. So taking it out except for the non-italicized sentence, which is already in the existing rule. All right. So that's history. All right. Sanctions.

MR. EDWARDS: Before we get there in talking about procedure, I don't think there is anything in here that's the equivalent of the old Rule 18a, paragraph (b), and was that left out for some reason?

MR. HAMILTON: 18a what?

MR. EDWARDS: Paragraph (b), little (b), which has to do with what you do when you file a motion. And this says you've got to give everybody notice and get it set in three days and other things. Was there a reason --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: You're taking care of the setting in the other section and then Rule 21 would handle service.

MR. EDWARDS: Where does it take care of it?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: On how fast the hearing has to be set.

MR. EDWARDS: No. That's --

MR. HAMILTON: Paragraph (7) says the presiding judge must give notice of the hearing to all parties.

MR. EDWARDS: Yeah, but this is the filing of the motion itself and the hearing on the motion before the -- bringing it to -- not the hearing on it, but presenting it to the district judge with respect to whom it's filed. In other words, this covered the gap between filing and getting it to the presiding judge, this paragraph (b).

MR. HAMILTON: Well, I think where we've covered that is under the referral, paragraph (3).

MR. EDWARDS: I just didn't know whether we did or didn't.

MR. HAMILTON: It says, "If the judge...in which the motion is filed does not promptly grant the motion or refer it to the presiding judge, the

movant may forward a copy of the motion to the presiding judge and request him to hear it or assign a judge to do it."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, but the paragraph that Bill is talking about says, "On the day the motion is filed copies shall be served on all other parties." That sounds like you've got to serve it the day the motion is filed --

MR. EDWARDS: Right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- as opposed to putting it in the mail and it gets there --

MR. ORSINGER: Putting it in the mail is service. This doesn't add anything to Rule 21.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. All right.
Well, if it doesn't add anything to 21 then there's not that problem.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, this makes presentation to the judge either three days or six days, depending on whether you mail it or hand-deliver it or --

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I mean, notice that you're going to present it to the judge within three days, are we requiring them to present it to the trial judge within three days, because --

MR. EDWARDS: I don't know.

MR. ORSINGER: -- this just gives notice of your intent? It doesn't really make you present it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But the question is, the question Bill raises, is does this -- is there anything substantive in old paragraph (b) that we're leaving out?

MR. EDWARDS: That's what I'm saying.

What paragraph (b) does is make you give notice to the other side and tell the other side that you're going to present this to the judge, not just file it, but present it to the judge, in some given period of time; and that gives the other side a particular period of time to respond to it before the recusal judge is -- or later rules said you either got to recuse or refer, and this gives the opposing -- anybody opposing the motion to recuse an opportunity to get some evidence in front of the district judge where the motion is filed to give that judge something to decide the motion on if there's an opposition to the motion.

If the motion says there's some stock ownership or some relationship and then the other side comes in with affidavits, says, "No, there's not," or something. Or gives them an opportunity to say this is an inadequate motion or at least gives them a chance to say something. Otherwise all that the judge with

whom -- with respect to whom the motion is filed, the only thing that's going to be there before that judge is what the movant has before that judge.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It seems to me self-evident that if you're opposing a motion and you want to file something, you would do that. I wouldn't think that this rule either prohibits or allows it. I mean --

MR. EDWARDS: That's what I'm saying.

I'm just talking about an opportunity to do so.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, the rule doesn't give you that opportunity. It just requires that you make the statement that you expect to present it in three days. Does that prohibit you from presenting it in two days or does it prohibit you from presenting it in four days? I mean, the rule requires someone to make a statement about their intent for a future act, right?

MR. EDWARDS: I just wondered if there was a reason for leaving it out.

MR. ORSINGER: It doesn't make any sense to me. I don't remember that we discussed this. It probably came out on the recodification draft, but now that you have brought it to attention I don't see that (b) accomplishes anything. It doesn't require you to do

it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Here is the answer. Nobody can recall why it was left out. The question is should it be put back in? Anybody think we ought to put it back in, in any form?

Well, since nobody seems to think it's necessary, let's go on to sanctions. The sanctions section in large part, particularly the boldfaced language, is from Senator Harris' bill, and as you may recall, Richard and Bob Pemberton and I met with Senator Harris, and he said he would be delighted if we folded his bill into our rule, in which case his statute would go away.

tried to do here I think on subparagraph (b). And there was an issue that the bill did not address that we thought was a substantial issue, and that is to have some way for the sanctioned person or attorney to suspend the sanction order, sort of like a supersedeas, and we talked to Senator Harris about that, and he didn't have any problem with that concept and said, you know, "If you guys come up with something, fine, let me see it, and we'll go from there." So that's what these next two pages are dealing with, and, Richard and Carl, do you want to make any comments about it?

MR. HAMILTON: Well, under (11)(b) we added the last sentence because the bold part coming right out of the statute, but the statute didn't provide for any sanctions if the order was not superseded or the money was not paid. So we provided for those sanctions under 215.2(b). Then we had a previous rule which said that supersedeas was to be in accordance with Appellate Rule 24, and I think Sarah Duncan wanted some more detail, and I think she was right because some parts of that appellate rule really didn't fit. So what we've designed this to do is give the party the right to supersede either by a written agreement or a bond or deposit in lieu of a bond. Only those three things.

The written agreement is -- could be any way you want to do it, but we just stuck in there that it has to provide for the terms of the suspension, conditions under which the award must be paid, and method of payment has to be approved by the court. That is patterned somewhat from the appellate rules, but the bond is patterned from the appellate rules and the deposit in lieu of bond is the same way. We sort of designed the payment or refund by the clerk.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anybody have any problems, either conceptually or in a picky way?

MR. EDWARDS: We had the discussion, and

I can't remember if we decided or didn't decide whether this means third or subsequent motion against the same judge in the lawsuit or against any judge in the lawsuit.

MR. ORSINGER: The Senator said it was any judge.

MR. EDWARDS: Then we should say that.

If that's what we're doing, it ought to be there,

because you -- the way it's written you can argue either

way.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, the Senator also conceded that he had not thought about the situation where I file two motions to recuse. They're both granted because they are absolutely, positively solid gold, and then I file a third one that's denied, even though it's a close call, and I get sanctioned for it, which does not seem to be in any sense fair. Probably won't come up very often, but --

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. One Senator does determine whether or not he's happy when we override a statute, and the way I recall that it ended up was that he had not recognized that possibility; but he said, "Look, I think if you've had three shots to get your judge, you know, the system, you ought to just live with it, and if you're going to come in the third time, even

if you have been successful twice, you ought to pay."

Now, that was what I recollect. We don't have a tape
recording of that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we didn't go in and bug the guy.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I mean, we may have a difference of opinion about what he said, but I thought he kind of hung in there for the interpretation.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I didn't sense that he hung in there that tough on that.

MR. ORSINGER: Oh, you didn't?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: But we may find out otherwise.

MR. ORSINGER: I don't feel strongly about it myself, but I say let's run it by him. Because if we're going to ask him to agree for us to override his statute, we want to be sure that he's with us.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, I think the practicing Bar deserves to know what their risks are in filing a third motion and not have to find out on appeal whether they're right or wrong in determining that it means three times against one judge or not.

MR. JEFFERSON: This raises the problem again with systems like Bexar County. What happens if you have two or three judges out of the same law firm,

and there is some big case that's been pending for years and they would be disqualified and you filed a motion to recuse on all of them?

MR. EDWARDS: If you win, you're all right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And with the Bexar County/Travis County docket, I mean, you get a whole string of judges. You don't get just one.

MR. EDWARDS: I don't know. I'm just asking which it is, and people ought to be told in advance if we can.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I would propose that we vote what we want, write it that way, and then take it to Senator Harris and say, "This is what we voted and this is why, and are you comfortable if we repeal your statute?" And if he says "no" then we will have to report to the Supreme Court, and they can make a decision about how to handle the politics.

JUSTICE HECHT: Could I understand, in

Bexar County would you ever move -- since you don't know
who's going to try the case or hear a dispositive
motion, would you prophylactically move to recuse the
judges who might be assigned to hear it?

MR. JEFFERSON: No.

JUSTICE HECHT: You would wait until you

got it assigned?

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MR. ORSINGER: Yes.

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MS. CORTELL: If we change the concept, I think we should be mindful it's the same concept that we have currently in the interim proceedings rule, so any change we make here has to be made there, I would think.

> CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's right.

Richard, how did you draft this? Did you try to draft it for three strikes and you're out, even though you hit a home run on the first two pitches?

MR. ORSINGER: No. This picks up the ambiguity in the statute and carries it into the rule.

MR. EDWARDS: You've done a wonderful

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Attaboy, Richard.

MR. CHAPMAN: Applied consistency.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Wall.

MR. JEFFERSON: What if you were to change the letter "a" to the word "the" in the second line.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. That's what I was thinking as a fix.

MR. EDWARDS: Which judge? The judge that's now sitting, the judge that was sitting? (B) and (a) doesn't make a difference.

MR. JEFFERSON: No, no. I'm sorry. 1 "Upon denial of the third or subsequent motion filed in 2 3 the case against the judge." A single judge, the same MS. McNAMARA: 5 judge. Well, but if you say the 6 MR. JEFFERSON: 7 judge --8 MR. ORSINGER: I wouldn't call that 9 crystal clear, Wallace. 10 MR. JEFFERSON: No, but I also wouldn't know if our legislator would think that's an overruling. 11 Richard, would it be possible 12 MR. HALL: to say something along the lines of "upon the denial of 13 14 three motions"? Isn't that what he's really getting at, the three motions, for instance, were denied and you 15 still keep filing motions for recusal? 16 Richard, it sounds like 17 MS. McNAMARA: 18 your description of the conversation, he would be okay with against the same judge. 19 MR. ORSINGER: Yeah, he's definitely okay 20 with three against the same judge, but he's also okay 21 with two successful and then an unsuccessful one against 22 23 your third replacement. MS. EADS: But that's not clear that the 24 25 Legislature is okay with that. I mean, this was -- as I

recall legislative history is that the Legislature wanted to stop the abuse of the system where you keep filing them to delay the process. But there's not -- it's not very clear the Legislature thought that you have two successful and then -- and nowhere was it in front of them two successful and then one is denied on a close call that they still want to impose attorney's fees on that.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Well, this is what I think. I think we ought to do what we think is right, fully explain it in the record, take whatever votes we want, and then we will go sell it to Senator Harris, but I'm clear in my mind that if you lose your third motion, you pay whether you won your first two or didn't. That's just what I recollect his view was.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, that was his view.

MR. ORSINGER: He said, "I don't mind you guys using your rule-making authority to revoke my statute as long as you get my policy enacted." So if we're going to do what we're saying here, I think we ought to just go to Senator Harris, explain the discussion and reasoning and ask him if he would go ahead and accede to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee. If he does, everything is okay. If he doesn't, the Supreme Court knows they have got a

recommendation from us that's hostile to the intent of the Senator and that if they want to use their rule-making authority to revoke his statute and suffer the consequences, they can.

MS. EADS: Well, that's not revoking his statute. That's the point. I think we need to make that clear. We may not be going against the legislative will. It may not be what Senator Harris believes was legislative will, and that's a reasonable debate, but it is an important distinction that I think as a committee we have to acknowledge.

MR. ORSINGER: But we would list this as a statute repealed, so his statute would be replaced by this rule.

MS. McNAMARA: But we would be listing it that way because of your sense of what he really meant behind the words that were adopted.

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. We know what he meant. We may not know what the Legislature meant.

MS. McNAMARA: And that's Linda's point.

MR. ORSINGER: But I'm not talking about

the Legislature. I'm talking about Senator Chris
Harris, who is the vice-chair of the Senate
Jurisprudence Committee, who is going to get -- might
get upset if we override his statute. That's all, and I

think we ought to do what we think is right. Let's try to persuade him. He's a very reasonable man, and then if he just draws his line in the sand, it's a political decision from then on.

MR. HAMPTON: What was it Lloyd Benson said in the debate? "I know Chris Harris. Chris Harris is" --

rewritten so that we're talking about sanctioning conduct of multiple denials of motions to recuse because I think that's what's really sanctionable, not if you've had two good motions to recuse and a third motion, particularly as everybody said in Bexar County and Travis County that won't work. And I assume we could probably sell that to him. What you want to stop is someone who keeps filing these motions to recuse and they're repeatedly denied, and that's the person that you want to sanction, I think.

JUSTICE HECHT: And if you lose three, why do you need a supersedeas? It looks to me like if you're wrong three times in a row, suffer the consequences.

MR. HALL: Yeah. Penalty is sanctions.

MR. HAMPTON: Chip, could you back up a

little bit and tell us sort of the procedure and where

this is? I mean, is he saying, "I will carry a bill to repeal this if you pass a rule"?

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MR. ORSINGER: No. The Supreme Court has the authority to revoke a specific statute if they list it as a revoked statute, but from a political standpoint if we run around and start revoking statutes willy-nilly, we make some people mad, and then in the next session they come back and they say, "Well, we're just going to take rule-making authority and put it over here in the House or Senate committee," and then that's really a lot of fun.

Well, I mean, except when JUSTICE HECHT: it didn't operate the way it should have, the Court would never consider revoking -- repealing a statute without incorporating that policy into the rule. The reason that we got the authorization in the first place, and the only reason we ever used it, except perhaps once, was simply to take -- to avoid the redundancy of having the procedures stated in the statutes and also stated in the rules, and that's the only reason that we were still here is if the -- it was the process revealed that the policy adopted by the Legislature in this statute could be moved over where lawyers are more likely to find it and use it than isn't it a good thing to do that, and I think Senator Harris would agree with

that, and I would hope the whole Legislature would.

But on the other hand, if we don't think this is a good procedure then I don't know that the Court would quarrel with the Legislature on that. I mean, they passed it. They thought it was a good idea, and unless -- well, I just can't foresee circumstances where we would dispute that with them.

MS. SWEENEY: So is there a statute on the books right now that says three strikes you're out?

JUSTICE HECHT: Yeah. Well, it says this.

MS. SWEENEY: It did get passed, and it's on the books?

MR. ORSINGER: It's subject to some ambiguity. It's also subject to another one we haven't discussed this morning, wich is three tiers, the trial judge, the presiding administrative judge, and then the replacement judge, and you could have -- that could be implicated, too, although Senator Harris said it never occurred to him, but I know of at least one case where that happened. So the statute is ambiguous, but we do know the intent of the sponsor.

MR. HAMPTON: Just so that the committee -- everybody in the committee is clear, the sponsor is the one who picked up the bill to strip the

Supreme Court of the rule-making authority, and it passed the House and went to the Senate, just so everybody understands that.

MR. ORSINGER: And I would also point out that he said if we do this by agreement and we revoke his statute, he suggested that we get a letter from him consenting to the repealer so that it can't be used in the next session as evidence of the Court's rule-making authority is out of control.

whether or not he bought off on this issue, he, I think, said that when I posed the question of, well, wait a minute, you can have two good motions and then a close one, the third one is a close one you lose and get sanctioned, he said, "Well, I hadn't really thought of that situation." Now, Richard may be right. Now that he's thought about it he may say, "Well, I don't care," but, I thought, my impression was he was sympathetic to that problem, not necessarily committing to what he was going to do about it. Yeah, Linda.

MS. EADS: I mean, I really think we should go ahead and figure what we think a good rule would look like, like Richard said, and then go to Senator Harris with whatever we come up with. I mean, his influence on this is going to be enormous. There's

no doubt about that, but I can tell, I mean, I just did physicians joint negotiation rules. He was the sponsor on that bill. We did not do everything in adopting those rules that he thought he was going to get. We talked to him. I mean, you know, it happens a lot in the legislative process. That's just how it comes down, but I think we need to do what we think is right and then go from there. But I really -- I mean, I have a hard time with some of these things, imposing sanctions on a lawyer after some of these scenarios. It offends my sense of what a good rule would look like.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Peeples.

if we decide to rewrite (b) to make it three strikes against the same judge? Would it help with Senator Harris if we tightened up paragraph (a), which is straight out of the existing rule and, frankly, which is very toothless because it requires that there be a motion, which frequently there's not? In other words, you can't do it sua sponte, and second, you have to show that the motion was brought solely for delay, which is very hard to do. Now, if we were to change those two provisions of (a), that would make the sanctions more realistic and discretionary. Would that help the Harris version?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It might. How would you change it again, David?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I think that the court ought to be able to do it even if the responding party doesn't move for it, which frankly, a lot of times they just don't want to mess with it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: And second, the requirement that the motion to recuse has to be brought solely for the purpose of delay, that's hard to do a lot of times. There might be some other reason. You know, there wasn't delay. They just wanted to be ornery. Soley for delay is I think awfully hard to show.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We changed the TRAP Rules to incorporate David Lopez' research on the meaning of "frivolous" and Rule 45, for instance --

MS. SWEENEY: Could you speak up, please.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We amended the TRAP Rules definition of "frivolous" for just this reason, because the meaning of "frivolous" had gotten kind of distorted during all the various amendments, and Rule 45, for instance, in the TRAP Rules now just reads, "If the court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may on motion of any party or on it's own initiative after notice of a reasonable opportunity for

response award each prevailing party just damages." And I would propose that we incorporate something that simple into this rule. Just say "if the judge hearing the motion determines that," you know, "it's frivolous."

MS. EADS: I would agree with you if we didn't have this statute, and if we're trying to work the statute into the rules, which would really be good for practicing lawyers to have one place where they look for it, then I don't know Senator Harris is going to go that far down the road to ignoring what he wants in the bill, what he wanted originally or the Legislature, because there is something about a number that just triggers something.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I'm not proposing that we delete (b).

MS. EADS: Oh, okay.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Merely that we modify (a) to say --

MS. EADS: Well, maybe Judge Peeples was suggesting that we go a different route.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I'm sorry. You were suggesting --

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I think that there are going to be sometimes that sanctions are called for but the responding party just wants to go to

trial. They are not interested in sanctions, but it might be good to have them, and if it is totally frivolous, but it might not be completely frivolous.

had said, David, to make (b) a motion against -- three motions against the same judge?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I'm saying if we did that then to sort of strengthen sanctions, which is I think what Senator Harris wants, we could strengthen (a).

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How about if we do
this, David? "If a party files a motion under this
rule, and it is determined on motion of the opposite
party," and add this language, "or on the court's own
motion that the motion was brought" -- strike "solely"
-- "for purposes of delay and without sufficient cause,"
et cetera, et cetera.

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: That goes a long way toward the --

MR. EDWARDS: In Section 10.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code there is a whole series of things that a party or a lawyer does when they sign a pleading or motion, and it provides that the signing represents that "The pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper purpose, including to harass

or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, that each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleadings or motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, that each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or motion has evidentiary support or has specifically identified allegations or factual contention is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, and each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual contention is warranted on evidence or for a specifically identified denial is reasonably based on lack of information or belief."

Now, it seems to me if we tied in this

(a) that when that occurs that the judge may impose the sanctions and, (b), if it's a second time he gets stuck that way, he shall impose the sanctions, you may get there. Or the third -- whether it's against the same judge or a different judge. It's really the evil is not filing a motion that has a reason to be filed and it's denied. The evil is filing a frivolous motion. That's the evil, whether it's against the same judge or against successive judges.

MR. CHAPMAN: You know, I think it makes little sense to try to determine a number or a circumstance from which the rule is keyed. It seems to me that what we ought to do is pay attention to (a) and try to make it -- give it more teeth, as Judge Peeples has suggested, and so that the judge hearing the motion makes a determination at that time under the circumstances. Part of the circumstance being whether this same party has brought three or four motions previously in this same case or not, whether there is any real basis for the motion, or whether it was for the purpose of delay and harassment only.

The judge can make that determination under the circumstances and then we don't have to -- it just seems to me we don't have to get involved with arbitrariness of whether it's three motions or four motions or whether it's the same judge or whether multiple judges. In a central docket like San Antonio where under some circumstances that we can easily think about there could be very good motions that were just lost, and it seems to me that the intention ought to be on making the rule one that the court can consider all of the circumstances and enter the proper ruling.

MS. SWEENEY: Can we get the subcommittee to create that for us?

MR. ORSINGER: We're reporting this rule out today.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sarah, did you have something?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, we had the same discussion when we had the discussion on the no evidence summary judgment rule and also with the basic sanctions rule, and part of the problem is incorporating sanctions provisions into the rule that conflict with Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and I think what we ultimately recommended to the Supreme Court was, I think, a 166a(i) that expressly incorporated Chapter 10 so that people would be mindful of it, and what we've ended up with, what the Supreme Court actually passed was a comment that referenced Chapter 10.

But either way, if we got rid of section (b), that is a direct conflict with what -- with the current statute, as much as any of us may like or dislike it. I mean, I agree with Carl. There are certainly circumstances in a central docket system where you could easily have three good recusal motions one after the other, and to think that you could be sanctioned for that is a little hard for me to believe, but --

Suggest something to you. Can I, for a second? What if you said, "Upon denial of three or more motions, the judge denying the third or subsequent motion shall enter an order," et cetera. So, in other words, you've lost three times, and when you're a three-time loser you're going to get whacked, regardless of who you're trying to recuse.

MR. ORSINGER: Another way to say that would be "Upon denial of a third or subsequent unsuccessful motion," which would be my proposal.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And I will tell you what. I think Senator Harris would go for that because, I mean, you can't argue with the scenario that I present where you win two and then you lose a close one.

MS. CORTELL: That may not be saying the same thing as you're saying.

MR. ORSINGER: It isn't?

MS. CORTELL: I think you could read it either way. "Upon denial of a third or subsequent unsuccessful motion," I don't know that that necessarily means that the other two were unsuccessful.

MR. ORSINGER: Let's go with Chip's language then.

MR. HAMILTON: What's your language,

Chip?

MR. HALL: How about "upon denial of three motions" --

MS. CORTELL: "Three or more."

MR. HALL: -- "to recuse."

MR. HAMILTON: "Three or more"?

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah, because there might be a fourth one.

not get the idea the first time. "Filed in a case against the judge by the same party, the judge denying the third or subsequent motion shall enter an order awarding to the party opposing such motion reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs. The party making such motion and attorney for such party are jointly and severably liable. The costs must be paid," blah-blah-blah-blah-blah and then pick up the language.

MR. ORSINGER: And we take out "filed in a case against the same" -- "filed against a judge." It doesn't matter if you file them against the presiding judge --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Filed in a case under this rule."

MR. HALL: It seems like that would make him happier because that's broader than three against

the same judge.

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CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

MS. EADS: Yes. Yes.

MR. HALL: You just have three motions to recuse, which is broader than three against the same judge. I mean, that's a more likely scenario than three against the same judge.

MR. ORSINGER: I know, but he wasn't limiting it to the same judge.

MR. HALL: I know, but --

MS. EADS: That's what we're saying.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Strike "against the judge" and insert "under this rule by the same party."

MR. ORSINGER: So read the first two

15 lines.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: "Upon denial of three or more motions filed in a case under this rule by the same party, the judge denying the third or subsequent motion shall enter an order."

And, Paula, I know you want to talk about voir dire. We're going to get to it in a second.

MS. SWEENEY: I do. I'm poised, as you can see.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Now that you've run off Judge Brister.

MS. SWEENEY: Yeah. He's not here. 1 2 That's right. Call the question. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, Peeples is lurking 4 over here in the wings. You're not going to run it by 5 him. 6 MS. CORTELL: Can I just ask one other 7 question? Then any concept of supersedeas, shouldn't it 8 apply across the board? Right now we have it only under 9 (b). 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Nina, let's stick on 11 Okay. How many people like this concept of 12 three or more motions? Everybody in favor raise their 13 hand. MR. WATSON: Denied? 14 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, unsuccessful 15 motions. 16 17 HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: I'm in favor. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Anybody against? One 19 against. So that passes 19 to 1. Okay. Now, I'm Supersedeas. Did you just ask --20 sorry, Nina. 21 MS. CORTELL: I was just saying right now it looks like we have supersedeas relating to just 22 23 one -- I'm going to lose my ride. We have a concept of

supersedeas applying to (11)(b), and my only thought was

it should apply across the board to the extent we have

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any concept of supersedeas. It's just kind of weird anyway.

JUSTICE HECHT: Why should you get supersedeas here and not in any other discovery or Rule 13 setting?

MS. CORTELL: Oh, I'm not disagreeing with that, but we put it in I guess because of the statute. I guess that's the reason it's here.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Because Richard thought --

MS. CORTELL: For the tertiary motions.

MS. SWEENEY: But I agree with Judge
Hecht. Why would we have this here, and we don't have
any -- you know, you can file 15 frivolous motions for
summary judgment and there's no --

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It's in the statute.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Richard, make the case for why we should have it here and nowhere else.

MR. ORSINGER: Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 30.016, subdivision (c) "The fees and costs must be paid before the 31st day after the date the order denying the tertiary recusal motion is rendered unless the order is properly superseded," and the problem we had, of course, is that you can't

properly supersede it because it's not appealable anyway. So that's why we created this pseudo-supersedeas process that paralleled the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and if we revoke that then that's just another modification of the statute that we are making.

MR. WATSON: Aren't you also avoiding a potential <u>TransAmerican</u> situation? I mean, where a person can't pay the money and that means they're out of court. I mean, I can see a reason for that. I thought that was the reason it was in the statute.

MR. EDWARDS: My guess is if they can't pay it they are going to have a hard time superseding it.

MR. WATSON: But the Senator doesn't necessarily know about it.

MR. JEFFERSON: What would stop the trial court from superseding it himself without going through the technical rules of the appellate supersedeas? I mean, that would be consistent with Harris' -- or with the legislation, that you wouldn't have to go into all of this detail.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, Richard, this subparagraph (12) is an effort to reconcile the provision in the statute that kind of suggests

supersedeas but doesn't really come to grips with it.

MR. HAMILTON: It's to create a vehicle for the supersedeas.

MR. ORSINGER: That's right.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What?

MR. HAMILTON: It's to create a vehicle to implement the statute that authorizes supersedeas.

MR. ORSINGER: Wallace's issue, I mean, philosophically if you have a right to supersede by posting money instead of paying the judgment, it should not depend on the permission of the trial judge imposing the sanction. If we're not going to give you the absolute right to defer collection and you have to throw yourself on the mercy of the court, that's a different concept of supersedeas. That's not like the rules of appellate procedure concept. You can supersede as a matter of right if you have got the money or the bond.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Paula.

MR. ORSINGER: So Wallace is suggesting a philosophically different approach to it.

MR. JEFFERSON: I just don't know if
Harris was thinking along the lines of the right to
supersede that just exists no matter what, and I'm
trying to find a way -- because I don't like having it
just in that section, not in (a), and then in a very

strange, you know, like Nina was saying and Justice

Hecht, supersedeas provision where you don't get it for

discovery sanctions and for all the band of other --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Are we agreed that if we implement section (11)(b) and strike the italicized language and then don't recommend paragraph (12) and revoke the statute that we've cured the problem?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, cured the problem of a statute that presents us with a --

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: The statute.

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. So we're basically revoking that concept in the statute.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. So what you could say to Senator Harris is, "Look, there are two ways to deal with this. We can provide a mechanism that implements your statute but then gives rights to the wrongdoer that are unlike any rights they get when they are wrongdoing in other circumstances" --

MS. EADS: Right.

or under our rules under Rule 215, and if you want us to do that, that's fine, but it does not strike us that that was your intent, was to give the wrongdoer here more rights than they had in other circumstances.

"So our thought would be let's just do

away with this supersedeas concept, not have this, but if you want it, I mean, if that's important to you, then our committee would recommend that to the Court if the Court chooses to do that in this way." And just kind of draw a dotted line above subsection (12) and say, "This is kind of, you know, whatever you think." How about that?

MR. ORSINGER: We can do that, and what would we do with (b) then? We're just going to drop off the "unless" clause?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Well, wait a minute. What "unless"?

MR. ORSINGER: "Unless the order awarding attorney's fees and costs is superseded."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Right.

MR. ORSINGER: No mention of superseding.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Right.

MR. ORSINGER: But we just -- and then the next sentence would pick up "the judge" -- or "If the money is not timely paid the judge hearing the case may impose any sanctions"?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Correct.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Chip, I have

24 to go. Thank you very much for accommodating me.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, you're not

allowed to go when you're on the phone.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Sorry. You promised it would be over at noon.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, well, I didn't know about Orsinger.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Yeah, well...

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I thought we would get him drunker so he would be more hungover this morning.

Okay. Thanks, Judge.

HON. ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. So I think what we have done here would be appealing to Senator Harris in terms of the harm that he is trying to cure. We have strengthened subsection (a), given the judge more authority, and we have created a more workable and fairer subsection (b), and thirdly, if he wants supersedeas then we have got the mechanism to do that, although our thought and at least we think -- our advice to the Court and we think the Court would be inclined this way as well, why give this wrongdoer more rights than other wrongdoers have. Is that fair to say?

MR. EDWARDS: Yeah.

MR. ORSINGER: So we haven't voted to change (a) yet.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Huh?

MR. HAMILTON: We haven't strengthened 1 2 (a) yet. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: How many in favor of 4 changing (a) along Judge Peeples' proposal? 5 MR. ORSINGER: He's taken "solely" out. 6 Is that the only change, David, is to take "solely" out? 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: No, giving the court 8 the right to do a motion. Anybody opposed to that? 9 MR. ORSINGER: Just say "on the court's 10 initiative." 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: One person opposed to that. 12 13 MR. WATSON: No, I thought you said "in 14 favor." CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, in favor. Okay. 15 16 Nobody opposed. So that rule will read, Richard, "If a 17 party files a motion under this rule and it is determined on motion of the opposite party," and adding 18 this, "or on the court's own motion." 19 20 MR. ORSINGER: We now say "on the court's 21 own initiative." We decided that on the appellate side. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 22 I'll give you 23 that one. "That the motion was brought" -- striking the word "solely" -- "for purposes of delay," and then the 24 25 rule reads on.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So we're going to 1 2 have (12) as an alternative. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. Then we're going to report 4 MR. ORSINGER: 5 back what Senator Harris' response is, or do we just not 6 submit (12) if he goes with this proposal? 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we'll take it 8 and show it to him, but we'll draw a dotted line over 9 the top of (12). 10 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. 11 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. 12 MS. SWEENEY: I move we adjourn. 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We've got voir dire. 14 It's on the agenda for today, Paula. I thought that's 15 why you were staying. 16 MS. SWEENEY: Yeah. That is why I'm 17 staying. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. You can 19 She wants it on the record that we're adjourned. Okay. We're adjourned. 20 21 MS. SWEENEY: Yes, I do. Thank you. 22 (Proceedings adjourned at 12:21 p.m.) 23 24 25

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#005,056DJ

CERTIFICATION OF THE HEARING OF SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

I, D'LOIS L. JONES, Certified Shorthand Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that I reported the above hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on May 20, 2000, and the same were thereafter reduced to computer transcription by me.

I further certify that the costs for my services in this matter are $\frac{166.50}{}$.

CHARGED TO: Charles L. Babcock .

Given under my hand and seal of office on this the 300 day of 2000.

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