HEARING OF THE SUPREME COURT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MARCH 18, 1995

Taken before William F. Wolfe,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public
in Travis County for the State of Texas, on
the 18th day of March, A.D. 1995, between the
hours of 8:00 o'clock a.m. and 12:15 o'clock
p.m., at the Texas Law Center, 1414 Colorado,
Room 104, Austin, Texas 78701.



MARCH 18, 1995

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Luther H. Soules III Prof. Alexandra Albright Pamela Stanton Baron Honorable Scott A. Brister Prof. Elaine A. Carlson Prof. William V. Dorsaneo III Honorable Sarah B. Duncan Michael T. Gallagher Honorable Clarence A. Guittard Joseph Latting John Marks Jr. Honorable F. Scott McCown Russell H. McMains Anne McNamara Harriett Miers Richard R. Orsinger David L. Perry Stephen Yelenosky

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS PRESENT:

Justice Nathan L. Hecht Hon William Cornelius David B. Jackson Hon. Paul Heath Till Hon. Bonnie Wolbrueck

Also present:

Lee Parsley Holly Duderstadt

MEMBERS ABSENT:

Alejandro Acosta, Jr. Charles L. Babcock David J. Beck Honorable Anne T. Cochran Anne L. Gardner Michael A. Hatchell Charles F. Herring, Jr. Donald M. Hunt Tommy Jacks Franklin Jones Jr. David E. Keltner Thomas A. Leatherbury Gilbert I. Low Robert E. Meadows Honorable David Peeples Anthony J. Sadberry Stephen D. Susman Paula Sweeney

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS ABSENT:

Hon. Sam Houston Clinton Doyle Curry Paul N. Gold Honorable Doris Lange Kenneth Law Thomas C. Riney

SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE MARCH 18, 1995

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We're back in session here on March 18th at 8:00 o'clock to take up the appellate rules. We've been having some discussion about the concerns of some appellate lawyers in the change of the presumption of the Englander case that appellate lawyers are going to have to designate the whole record in order for them to do what they need to do on appeal, particularly if they were involved in the trial, just so they will have all the information that they may need for appeal.

Now the incentives to -- or the penalties of designating too much may be a bigger factor than they were before the reversal of the Englander case by these rules, if they pass the Supreme Court.

And we've been discussing that, and I think Bill Dorsaneo has a thought about it. Bill, what are your thoughts on this?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Richard

Orsinger, help me on this a little bit, if you can. The way that the scheme is contemplated to work now is that the appellee who receives a designation of a partial record can

designate the remainder of the record in order to avoid any difficulties of leaving anything out. But that involves some potential amount of risk, because if too much is designated, the appellee would be required to pay the cost of that part that shouldn't have been designated by the appellee.

MR. ORSINGER: That's correct.

Under TRAP 53 it could happen two ways. The trial court can assess the cost of unnecessary portions of the statement of facts, and the court of appeals can assess the portions of the unnecessary -- unnecessary portions of statement of facts against the party requesting it, whether it's the appellant or the appellee. I don't think that's a change from prior law.

What is a change from prior law, as Luke pointed out, is that under prior law you could always cover yourself by attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, which then would justify the entire record. But since we have now limited the sufficiency review to just what record was brought forward by the parties, then there may be no error that

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requires the entire record.

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And maybe what we ought to do, rather than saying "unnecessary," because hindsight is 20/20 as to what's necessary and unnecessary, maybe we ought to use some kind of reasonableness standard; and that reasonableness would include a bona fide concern that there might be an error anywhere in the record and that someone obtains the record to look for it.

However, why should the appellant pay for the appellee to search the record for error if there is no error in there? I mean, why isn't that fair to say that the appellee should stand the risk that after their review of the record there is no error in that part of the record.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I've been against this since the beginning, as the Committee knows, and this brings up part of the reason. You do have appellate lawyers who do sit in at trial, and if there is a partial designation by the appellant, how does that person really even know what parts to

designate, much less whether they're excessive or even reasonable?

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I just -- to me, the Supreme Court got it right. If it's an error that requires as a standard of review the review of the entire record, then that's what the appellant should be charged with bringing up. And he shouldn't be able to change effectively the standard of review by designating a partial record.

MR. JACKSON: Luke, no one said anything about the no-evidence rule, but if you make a no-evidence claim, don't you have to do the entire statement of facts anyway?

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's precisely what one of the complaints is that this would change or affect.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The proposal is that the court presumes that what the -- since both parties have an opportunity to designate whatever they need, that they're going to designate whatever is pertinent with respect to the no-evidence review. And the appellate court can presume that there's nothing that would be pertinent to the no-evidence review that hasn't been

designated. That's the theory here.

Now, there's, of course, two sides of it. But the general overall objective is to reduce costs so that you can have a shorter record.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It seems to me that the appellee's lawyer is saying that "I do not want to pay for a part of the record that really shouldn't have been transcribed and included in the statement of facts because it really wasn't pertinent to anything, but I don't know enough about this case yet to do less than request all of the record."

Now, if that's so, that seems to me to be a matter between the appellee's lawyer and the client, with the problem of economics being their problem. It shouldn't be the case that the appellee should have to pay for an unnecessary part. It shouldn't be the case that the court should have to fund that or wade through it. That's a choice made by the appellee to request the entire record in order to protect the appellee. And I don't see how it's fair to have the appellant have to pay

that without regard to the need for it.

of review.

Now, maybe what Richard is saying, maybe some other word than "unnecessary" would be a better word, although I think "unnecessary" is a pretty good word.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I just think we all need to be very clear that we are changing the rule that historically has put the burden on the appellant to bring forward a record showing reversible error, and by doing that we are effectively changing the standard

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Guittard, and then David Jackson.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: We sort of tried to make it clear. I think if anybody reads it now, they can't escape the effect of it. If there's anything else that we can put in to make it clearer, let's do it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I just hope that the courts of appeals will be more inclined to grant penalties for frivolous appeals if the appellants bring up a short record on factual and legal sufficiency and

the appellant -- and the appellee then shows the court that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence, because that basically means that the appellant has tried to pull the wool over the court's eyes by bringing up a short record, saying, "This is all the evidence that there is."

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And then the appellee comes in and says, "No, there's not. Look at all of this evidence."

I think the courts of appeals ought to hammer the appellants who do that.

MR. ORSINGER: I don't think there's any provision in here for that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, there is a frivolous appeal.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, it's not a frivolous appeal necessarily, because there -it may be arguable that the error that -- that the record they did bring forward does support that a mistake was made. But then when you look at the rest of it, maybe you decide that it's harmless. I'm not sure that the rule that we have for sanctions for frivolous appeal would apply to someone who in bad faith

under-designates the statement of facts. And the worst punishment that they could get under this rule is that they have to pay for the whole statement of facts anyway, so it's almost like, you know, there's no punishment if you do it and you get caught.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: How does the appellee show harmless error without showing -- without bringing up the record?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I mean, a perfect example would be if something is admitted over objection in the version that's brought up, and then it's re-offered later on and comes in without objection. The second admission without objection probably renders the first ruling harmless error. The appellant doesn't bring that up, so the appellee does, and says, "Look here, they might have a good argument under the record they brought up, except it came in later on without objection," so that wipes their point out.

I mean, is there a sanction there? The only sanction I can see is that the cost of that additional record stays with the

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appellant instead of being shifted to the appellee, but I think that's the extent of the punishment.

risk to the appellant to bring up a record that supports their points of error only, when the rest of the record defeats their points of error. There is no penalty for them doing that.

MR. ORSINGER: I don't think there is.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right.

think there is no penalty because they would end up paying for that anyway, and so they have everything to gain by under-designating to show reversible error when an entire record would show no reversible error. That's why I've been against this since day one.

MR. ORSINGER: If I may, I think the use of the word "unnecessary" maybe is too difficult for the appellees, because you only know after the fact whether the part you brought up was necessary or not after the court of appeals rules. And if they rely on

the part of the statement of facts you brought up, it was necessary; if they don't, it was unnecessary.

On the other hand, if you were to use a word like "unreasonable," that would mean someone where they couldn't tell which way the court of appeals might go, or they were the lawyer only for appeal and weren't there on the trial court; that it was reasonable for them to request more of the record, even if it turns out that there was nothing in there that impacts the decision made by the court of appeals.

And that might make it less likely that the appellee will be stuck with a designation that is a reasonable one but it turns out not to be necessary.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, here is the concept I'm thinking of: If the appellee designates a portion of the record that could not reasonably be anticipated to have a bearing on the appeal, could not reasonably be anticipated to have a bearing on the appeal, then you can charge it to them. Of course, that completely pulls the plug, because

there's no part of the record that the 1 2 appellee could not reasonably anticipate could 3 have a bearing. Maybe you could leave out 4 voir dire; maybe --HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 5 Maybe leave out damages, if there's no point 6 7 concerning the damages, and only liability. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Something 9 like that. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 10 11 That's the concepts here, that the appellant designates only liability points and leaves 12 out all the medical testimony. And the 13 14 question is, the defendant comes in and -- the appellee comes in and designates all the 15 16 record, all the medical testimony, which has 17 been excluded from the issues on appeal by the 18 appellant's designation of points. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard 19 2.0 Orsinger. 21 MR. ORSINGER: Of course, if

MR. ORSINGER: Of course, if you make this too easy for the appellee to have the appellant include the entire cost, we're going to defeat the whole purpose, because the appellees will do it every time

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1 and the appellants will have to pay for it 2 every time. 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: They will 4 I don't know if the appellants are 5 going to pay for it, but the appellees are 6 going to designate virtually everything every time. 7 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 8 Who 9 should pay for it? Who is going to pay for it? 10 1.1 MR. ORSINGER: Which abuse is Is the abuse greater that the 12 greater? 13 appellants will under-designate, or is the 14 abuse greater that the appellees will 15 over-designate? I think it's 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 17 the first. 18 MR. ORSINGER: I'm not sure. Ι 19 think most appellees, if they knew that they 20 could ask for the cost of the appeal, would 21 immediately designate the entire record to 22 make it as painful and expensive as possible 23 to appeal the case. 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: David 25 Jackson.

MR. JACKSON: We need to come up with some sort of subjective guidelines for designating the record, because we've already had a situation where a court reporter appeared before the grievance committee because the pro se plaintiff came and said, "I want you to transcribe all the parts where so-and-so said such-and-such." And she found two places, but apparently she never found the third place that this guy contends happened. And she wound up before the grievance committee for not finding all the places that this conversation took place in the record.

And you could wind up with a situation where you would have an appellee telling the court reporter, "Give me all the parts that help my part of the case," and the other side coming back and saying to the court reporter, "Well, give me all the parts that help my side," and you wind up with a court reporter practicing law, or trying to, and then appearing before the grievance committee if he didn't do it right.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, the main reason the entire record is necessary is

1 because of the presumptions right now. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, there 3 are three things: Legal sufficiency, factual 4 sufficiency and harmless error. 5 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 6 charge error. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And charge 8 error. 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But to sav 10 that the entire record is everything that 11 happened in the trial court, that's just a 12 choice. The record is what you have on What happened in the trial court is 13 what happened in the trial court. And those 14 15 are two different things. 16 And in my experience, maybe because of 17 doing mostly business litigation cases, 18 virtually all of the record of what happened 19 in the trial court that is complete in the 20 court of appeals has nothing to do with the 21 It's only a very small part of the appeal. 22 case that has real pertinence to all of these 23 issues that you're talking about, just a 24 couple of pages.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sarah Duncan.

now seen exactly the opposite where a complaint is brought up, the appellee makes the argument that something else is not in the record before the court, and the appellant argues that if he wants it in there, he needs to supplement. And I think that we're going to be getting a lot of those.

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PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So what's wrong with that? Supplement it and get it in there, instead of saying we have to have it all based on the theory that something might be left out.

This complaint could only have occurred on a day that was not included in the statement of facts before the court. And the appellant was, under the current rules, trying to shift the burden of bringing up the record. And all I'm saying is, we will institutionalize that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we've talked about this. Let's see if -- I had promised some appellate lawyers that we would revisit this because they thought that maybe it hadn't gotten enough attention.

1 Is there any -- we've got the rule as 2 it's presently proposed on -- what page is the material on? 3 4 MR. ORSINGER: It's on Page 84, Rule 53. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 6 Page 84, Rule 53, TRAP Rule 53. 7 MR. ORSINGER: It's going to be 8 in subsection (d) and again in (e). 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 10 Okay. 11 and (e). I just want to get a show of hands as to whether or not anybody thinks we should 12 change what's been proposed in Rule 53(d) and 13 14 (e). Okav. Those who feel we should make a change in light of our conversation today show 15 by hands. 16 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 17 Just a second, Luke, let me make sure. 18 question we're asking here is whether we 19 20 should change the presumption from the presumption that there's something out there 21 22 that's not in front of us that's going to 23 dispose of this appeal to a presumption that 24 everything that's on my table is all I'm going

to consider and I'm going to decide the appeal

based on that?

appreciate you raising that, Judge Brister.

I'm not suggesting that we change the reversal of the presumption, only that the -- either we delete the incentive or the penalty that charges that to the appellant for designating too much, one; or that the test be changed to not charge that to the appellee -- and these are just words -- unless the portion that the appellee designates could not reasonably be anticipated to have a bearing on the appeal, a more subjective standard.

Let's just get a show of hands from those who are inclined to make any change at all and those who are inclined to leave it alone.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: So we're talking about changes in the draft that we have before us, not changes in the current law?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right.
Changes in this draft.

MR. LATTING: How do I vote for what you just said? Do I vote for or against what we're getting ready to vote on?

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1	MR. ORSINGER: Vote against it.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me put it
3	this way. How many the vote to okay.
4	Pam.
5	MS. BARON: I think what would
6	really help to do for most people here is to
7	say what the current law is and what the
8	change is.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've been
10	doing that up here for 30 minutes.
11	MS. BARON: I know. But I
12	don't think everybody is following.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, they
14	should have been. We've got other things to
15	do. We've been working on this since
16	8:00 o'clock.
17	MS. BARON: Well, I'll just say
18	that I don't think it's going to be a
19	particularly well-informed vote.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
21	How many feel that Rule 53 as written on
22	Pages 84 and 85 should go to the Court as is?
23	Show by hands. Six.
24	How many feel that it should be changed?
25	Seven. How?

1	MR. YELENOSKY: I want to
2	abstain on that, and I apologize for being
3	late, but I really don't want to vote on
4	something that I
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. By a
6	vote of seven to six with one abstention, it
7	should be changed. Who has a recommendation
8	to change it?
9	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Let's
10	change it the way you suggested it.
11	MR. MARKS: Make that two
12	abstentions. I didn't raise my hand either.
13	John Marks.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. And
15	where is the "necessary" language?
16	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Right
17	there in the first sentence.
18	MR. ORSINGER: No. It's right
19	in the middle of Page 84. It starts on the
20	left-hand side, "portion designated was
21	unnecessary." Do you see that?
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Could not
23	reasonably have been anticipated to have a
24	bearing on the appeal." Okay. If we delete
25	the words "was unnecessary" virtually right

1	there in the middle of the page if you're
2	looking at the underlined portions, it's the
3	fourth underlined line, the words "was
4	unnecessary." Delete those words and insert
5	"could not reasonably have been anticipated
6	to have a bearing on the appeal."
7	Okay. With that change, those in favor
8	show by hands.
9	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Wait,
10	just a second.
11	MR. ORSINGER: You may want to
12	do this now or later, but you have to change
13	(e) also.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And change
15	(e) to correspond as well.
16	MR. ORSINGER: It's going to
17	take a new title, isn't it?
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. But
19	we can do that.
20	MR. ORSINGER: Okay.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Judge
22	Duncan, are you with us now, or do you still
23	need
24	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yes.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Those

1	in favor show by hands. Nine. Those
2	opposed. Five. Nine to five that carries.
3	Okay. I think we ought to go first to
4	Pam's work so that we can try to get that out
5	of way and go on, if the subcommittee agrees.
6	That's probably going to take more time than
7	anything else.
8	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
9	What's that?
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: The
11	administrative appeal.
12	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Did
13	Pam do that?
14	MR. ORSINGER: No, sir. That
15	came to us from the AG's office.
16	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
17	Yes. Well, we'll take that first, if you
18	like.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's
20	take that first. That's Item 11, isn't it?
21	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: It's
22	not a part of the Cumulative Report. It's a
23	new proposal. And the reason that it hasn't
24	been considered before is because the attorney
25	general let's see, we got the request from

the attorney general only late last fall, and so it's taken some time to do the drafting and consider it in the committee, the subcommittee.

The point is to provide a procedure for cases which, according to a relatively new statute, permit direct appeals from state administrative agencies to the court of appeals without any review by the district court, as has been the law previously. In other words, there are two methods of doing that.

The first is that if there's no case filed in the district court, the party objecting to the agency's order can file, as the statute says, a petition for review in the court of appeals.

The statute also provides that if a case for review of an administrative decision has been filed and is pending in a district court, then any party can file a notice of removal of that case to the court of appeals before the trial in the district court. And so this proposed rule is to implement that statute.

Steve, do you have a question?

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1	MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah. Did you
2	say what type of cases are those that
3	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
4	Well, I'm not sure just what kind of cases
5	they are. Pam, will you enlighten us on
6	that?
7	MS. BARON: Well, they're
8	appeals from the Motor Vehicle Commission, and
9	they license a number of different things.
10	But I would guess it would be licensing type
11	decisions.
12	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Do
13	all of those appeals go to the Third Court in
14	Austin?
15	MS. BARON: Right.
16	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
17	According to the statute?
18	MS. BARON: Right.
19	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Which will
20	not make rules to deal with them.
21	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
22	Sarah.
23	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's
24	my question. Why are we putting this in the

Rules of Appellate Procedure when it's an

1 Austin Court of Appeals problem? 2 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 3 Well, this is the reason: I've been dealing 4 with one of the assistants there, Beth 5 Sterling, and it was my thought that if this 6 is purely a matter of the Austin Court, why 7 not just have a little rule here that says, 8 "Such appeals shall be governed by the rules 9 promulgated by the Austin Court and approved 10 by the Supreme Court." 11 Well, the answer to that is the Austin 12 court doesn't make rules. They won't make any 13 rules, so we've got to do it. 14 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 15 we've proposed like an order on transcripts, 16 an order on the form of the statement of 17 facts. Let's propose a Supreme Court order 18 governing these. But to me it makes no sense 19 to put it in the TRAP Rules. 20 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 21 Well, I didn't think so either. I'm just 22 trying to -- Pam. 23 I think there are MS. BARON: 24 some reasons to have it in the TRAP Rules. It 25 is a statute. It's not just Austin lawyers

who are practicing before the Motor Vehicle
Commission. There is a problem with
administrative appeals right now, that it is
kind of a hidden rule. You have to know how
the Austin Court works. You have to know the
local rules of the Travis County District
Courts. This is a statewide practice, but
it's all done here locally really by a very
small group of people who know what's going
on.
I think this gives a fair chance to othe

I think this gives a fair chance to other lawyers to know how to do this, and I think it's good to have it here. The Third Court is reluctant to make rules, and I think it's good that everybody knows what the rules are.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: Pam, can I ask you, I thought from our conversation with this woman from the AG that there were at least a slender number of administrative appeals that could go to another court of appeals besides Austin. Is that wrong?

MS. BARON: No. There are a few. I think there are some agency statutes,

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1 and I can't tell you what they are, that do 2 provide for judicial review locally. 3 MR. ORSINGER: Now, let's assume that that's true. If we just had a 4 5 local rule in Austin, then there would be no 6 requirement that the other courts of appeals 7 abide by that, true? 8 MS. BARON: Right. But that 9 would not affect the Motor Vehicle Commission, all of which do have to come to Austin. 10 11 MR. ORSINGER: But these rules, 12 do they apply to only the Motor Vehicle 13 appeals? 14 MS. BARON: I think they apply 15 only to direct appeals to courts of appeals. 16 And as far as I know, this is the only current 1.7 statute that provides that. That doesn't mean 18 there won't be others. 19 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 20 the attorney general tells us, it's only this 21 one statute that provides for direct review 22 without intervening the trial in the district 23 court, and that all of those go to the Austin 24 Court, so it would seem reasonable to have the

Austin Court do it. But there are reasons to

1 also put it in the TRAP Rules so that 2 everybody knows about it. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 3 Steve Yelenosky. 4 5 MR. YELENOSKY: I was just going to say I had never even heard of this. 6 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 7 hadn't either. 8 9 MR. YELENOSKY: And I've done a fair amount or am aware of a fair amount of 10 11 administrative hearings because of, you know, Legal Services. And either you appeal to the 12 trial court or you don't have any avenue of 13 14 appeal, period, like in food stamps. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Joe Latting. 15 16 MR. LATTING: Why don't we pass a draft here and show it to the Austin Court 17 18 and tell them if they don't like it, give us their comments. And if they don't give us any 19 comments, let's pass it and be done with it. 20 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 2.1 22 Well, we have done that in effect. We have 23 checked it with the court of -- with the 24 attorney general. We have Ken Law from the 25 Austin Court, and it's been submitted to him,

and he made his comments on it. And so I don't know that there's anything more to be gained by presenting it to the court.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, if it's acceptable to those who are going to be using it, why not do it and give notice of it in the TRAP Rules. If it only applies in this case, in the Motor Vehicle appeals to Austin now, who knows what the -- the legislature is meeting across the street, so we don't know what's next.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

That's right. There are several problems in the draft. One is that it doesn't provide a time for filing of a petition, and I think perhaps there ought to be some -- Pam, you have studied this, have you not?

MS. BARON: I'm sorry? I've read it. I'm certainly not near as familiar with it as Beth is.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Well, one problem that I've just noticed in going over it is that it doesn't -- well, first of all, let me say, let me explain that the draft provides that the statutory petition

for review shall be considered the equivalent -- shall be deemed a notice of appeal for purposes of the TRAP Rules. Then it also provides that the notice in a case which has been filed in the district court and removed from the district court before trial, that the notice of removal to the court of appeals shall be considered a notice of appeal for the purpose of the TRAP Rules.

Now, I guess you could construe the rule as meaning that it has to be done within 30 -- that the full petition for review, where it hasn't been filed in district court, has to be done within 30 days from the final agency order. However, perhaps it's necessary to spell that out in this draft, and I think it probably should be. Is there any comment on that?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Duncan.

Well,

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:

I have recently become aware -- maybe I'm not sure how aware I am, but there appears to be in the whole administrative code rules for -- for instance, mailbox rules and filing rules that are completely at odds with the Rules of

Civil Procedure and the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. You can't merge them. You can't
make them harmonized. And if we're going to
have rules in the TRAP Rules governing this
particular type of administrative appeal, then
it would seem to me that we should include the
rest of the administrative appeals, too. I
mean, there should be some continuity between
how you do this kind of an appeal and that
kind of an appeal.

I mean, once we do this, are the TRAP
Rules relating to filing and service
applicable to motions for rehearing and when
they have to be filed and served and how? I
think we're getting in over our heads.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Joe Latting.

MR. LATTING: I was going to suggest that it seems to me that this is an issue for the appellate rules subcommittee, because whatever they want to do with it is okay with me. It sounds as though the Austin Court doesn't care too much about it, and we're not ready to pass a judgment on this, because we've -- I mean, Judge Guittard is just looking over this now. It seems to me

1	the subcommittee ought to tell us what needs
2	to be done, and let's turn our attention
3	elsewhere.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
5	Tell us what should be done.
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: My
7	best recommendation is to add a provision here
8	for a time for filing the petition for
9	review. Make it 30 days after the final
10	order. Otherwise, you could adopt the draft
11	as it stands.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where would
13	that be placed?
14	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: So this is
15	the recommendation of the appellate
16	subcommittee?
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where should
18	that be placed, the 30-day time line?
19	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: It
20	should be under (c).
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Under (c) at
22	what place?
23	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Do we
24	know that this does not conflict with the
25	statute or the administrative code?

1	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
2	Well, I've looked at the statute and
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: One thing at
4	a time. Let's put that 30-day fuse in here,
5	and then we'll talk about that.
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: A
7	suit for judicial review of a state agency
8	decision initiated in the court of appeals
9	pursuant to Article 4413 and so forth, or any
10	similar statute, is perfected when the party
11	challenging the agency files a petition for
12	judicial review with the court of appeals, and
13	then add there, "within 30 days of the final
14	order of the agency."
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Should
16	we change "when" to "if"? If the party
17	challenging files within 30 days?
18	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All
19	right. Say that.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Within 30
21	days of what?
22	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The
23	final order of the agency.
24	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But
25	that's contrary to administrative law, which I

vaguely remember from law school, which is that the timing of the petition in district court, I think, goes from the date of -- never mind. I don't know.

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HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Now, there are two aspects of this, and Sarah raises the point, and I think it's good. There are two aspects of this. One is the appeals from the agency to the district court, which is the usual route. There ought to be in the Rules of Civil Procedure a rule that deals with that kind of situation. And we have discussed that in our subcommittee and have not gotten to the point of preparing a draft of a rule that would cover that sort of situation. And that ought to be taken up in connection with the civil rules, with the trial rules. And this deals only with direct appeals to the court of appeals and cases where the district court cases are removed to the court of appeals without trial.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Joe Latting.

MR. LATTING: I might comment that Travis County has local rules covering what you just mentioned. And if your

subcommittee is going to look at putting those 1 2 in the Rules of Civil Procedure, you might 3 want to take a look at the Travis County local 4 rules on appeals from administrative agencies. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: They're 6 pretty detailed too. 7 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Ι 8 think that's correct. I would agree with 9 The question before us now is, should we not act on this phase of it pending the 10 11 consideration of the other as well? 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. As I 13 understand the subcommittee report, the motion 14 is that with the changes we made in (c), that this -- that we add this Rule 54 to the TRAP 15 16 Rules, correct? 17 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 19 discussion on that? Alex Albright. 2.0 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: 2.1 question: What if we didn't do anything? Wouldn't the Austin Court have to deal with it 22 23 in some manner? 24 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Thev

would, and they do. But nobody would know

what they're doing except those who are on the inside.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We
already have a rule that once an appeal is
perfected, the court of appeals is required to
send a copy of its local rules to the counsel
for the litigants and the party that they
represent.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I guess so.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: I don't think we can expect the Austin Court to act on this.

They have over 50 rules that you're supposed to follow when you file an appeal in the Austin Court of Appeals. But it's my understanding that they were prepared by the clerk's office in order to keep people from calling them all the time; and that for reasons that are not available to the public, the Austin Court refuses to adopt a formal set of rules that's approved by the Supreme Court. So we have a plethora of --

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MR. YELENOSKY: Let's organize a phone bank and force them to.

2.1

MR. ORSINGER: I think it's an internal thing for the court of appeals, and I don't think, based on the current practice, that we should rely on them to do something as complicated as adopt this.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, this also integrates a practice that's unclear into our new method of handling appeals generally. This is an advance in that respect as well.

We have met with the attorney general's office and looked at the local rules that are pertinent and the statutes and worked with the attorney general people to try to come up with something that would solve the problem that admittedly is a problem because neither the legislature nor the Austin Court has done this for public availability and information. And that's why we are proposing it for inclusion now, to satisfy those felt needs in a way that wasn't a Committee invasion but in a way that involves the Committee's working with the informed people in the attorney general's office to develop something that will work.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: We started from a draft by the attorney general's staff, and then we have been working back and forth. They drafted, we drafted, they drafted, and it went back and forth until we finally got to this.

Now, there are several other points here that I think you ought to be aware of.

Number one is, besides the time for filing it, the second point was about the filing of the record.

The statute provides that the agency shall file the record. Now, the agency record is not like a record in any other kind of case. It's a series of boxes of papers which are not easily handled, so that's a problem.

But the question is, unlike other appeals where, under our present scheme on the proposal, the clerk files the record, files the transcript, and the court reporter files the statement of facts, and the appellant's counsel is supposed to know where to look if they don't do their job, in these cases it's the agency that files the record. And that seems to be contrary to our usual procedure or

usual concept, because although the appellant makes his appeal, then the opposing party, the agency, has to file the record. So there is a provision in this rule that the agency shall file the record within 30 days of the time of filing the petition for review or notice of removal.

And since we have abolished the time for filing a record, since we've repealed Rule 54, we have abolished the strict requirement, time requirements for filing the record in other cases, then how does that scheme fit in with this?

Well, one of our drafts left it out with the idea that we treat that the same way as other appeals and let the appellate court clerk be responsible for seeing that the record got up there. But that didn't seem to -- the attorney general wasn't satisfied with that.

And they've got this provision in here for 30 days after. I don't know just what happens if the record isn't filed within 30 days. Surely the appellate court won't say that the appeal isn't good if the agency, the

appellee, hasn't filed the record, so I don't guess that would be a problem. And I don't know what would happen, but I guess that if the record was filed late, it would still be -- the appellant would still have the right to go forward with the appeal. Isn't that right?

MR. LATTING: What about inserting a statement in this rule to instruct the appellate court to direct the agency to file the record; and if it's not filed in a timely fashion, to attend to it. Let's just say that.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I would suppose that our Rule 56 would then apply and that would be the effect of it.

MR. LATTING: Well, if it's an ambiguity, then I would suggest that you clear it up in the rule. And you and Bill and the other people on the committee would need to guide us on that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, Judge
Guittard thinks that Rule 56 would fix it, so
we don't need to say anything here. Okay?

Steve Yelenosky.

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1 MR. YELENOSKY: But perhaps you do need to do a cross-reference. Looking at 2 3 Rule 56, Duties of the Appellate Clerk, I 4 mean, is it clear? Do we need to make some 5 reference that Rule 56 would apply? Because 6 by its own terms, Rule 56 doesn't refer to any 7 agency. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 8 9 Perhaps we ought to check that. I would 10 suggest that we sort of look this over and 11 decide whether we approve it in principle with what suggestions we have and then go back and 12 13 put the finishing touches on it in light of 14 the discussion that we have had here. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 15 Is there a 16 way to get it finished so that we can put it 17 in what goes to the Supreme Court? Would it 18 take long to do that? 19 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Oh, 20 I suppose not. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What do we 22 need to do then? If 56 doesn't take care of

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thing we could do, on Page 97 in Rule 56 in

the problem, what do we need to do to fix it?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO:

Well, one

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24

1	paragraph (c), which talks about no record
2	filed, is to say, "On expiration of 90 days,
3	or 30 days in the case of an accelerated
4	appeal, or" and then whatever this is called.
5	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Or
6	30 days in the case of a
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: of a
8	Rule 54 appeal.
9	MR. YELENOSKY: Right.
10	Although that then throws this esoteric rule
11	into the meat of Rule 56.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
13	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: On
14	expiration of 90 days, or 30 days in the case
15	of an accelerated appeal, or an appeal from a
16	state administrative agency under Rule 54.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Or just a
18	Rule 54 appeal.
19	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
20	Okay.
21	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I
22	would rather have Judge Guittard's words, and
23	I'm thinking more as a teacher now, because
24	I'll have to go back and remind myself what a
25	Rule 54 appeal is every time I teach it.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Say it 2 again. Give me your words again, Judge Guittard. 3 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 4 5 Beginning with subdivision (c), after the 6 words "accelerated appeal," insert "or an 7 appeal from a state administrative agency 8 under Rule 54." So it's "or an appeal from an order of a state agency under Rule 54." 9 10 MR. YELENOSKY: But if people 11 don't carefully read 54, they may think that that applies to any administrative case that's 12 come up through the trial court and is on its 13 14 way to the appellate court. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 15 16 Well, not if it's under Rule 54. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You mean 18 if they don't read it at all? 19 MR. YELENOSKY: Yes. 20 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 21 "After the date the judgment is signed 22 without a proper transcript." Well, 23 "judgment" might not fit quite so well 24 there. That should be "after the judgment or 25 order is signed."

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1	MS. BARON: No, because it's
2	dated from the petition. The filing of the
3	petition triggers your 30 days.
4	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
5	That's right.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: This is going
7	to take another sentence.
8	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
9	Well, I think instead of fiddling with
10	Rule 56(c), we're going to have to write
11	something into 54 to take care of this.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
13	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I
14	think we can do it, but I don't think we can
15	do it here this morning.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
17	Just as a logistical issue, is there any real
18	strong sentiment to just leaving that out and
19	letting it just seeing how it works so that
20	we can get this on to the Supreme Court?
21	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: We
22	can leave that part of it out, sure.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So now
24	the Committee's recommendation is that we make
25	the changes in (c) and otherwise insert new

1	Rule 54 on Page 90 of the materials as the
2	Committee has it drafted. Okay?
3	MR. YELENOSKY: What is the
4	title of this new rule?
5	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The
6	title is Appeals from Administrative Decisions
7	of State Agencies Without Intervening Review
8	by District Courts.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about
10	"Direct Appeals"?
11	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
12	Yeah. Direct Appeals from Administrative
13	Agencies Without Intervening Review by
14	District Courts.
15	MR. LATTING: Well, if it says
16	"direct appeals," do we have to say "without
17	intervening review"? I mean, isn't that what
18	a direct appeal is?
19	MR. YELENOSKY: How about
20	"Direct Appeals from Administrative
21	Decisions"?
22	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
23	Well, it's a little complicated because of
24	this removal thing.
25	MR. LATTING: How about just

1	"Direct Appeals"?
2	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
3	Well, let me see what title I put on it.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about
5	Steve's words, "Direct Appeals from
6	Administrative Decisions."
7	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
8	Certain administrative decisions.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Pardon? The
10	word "decisions" is in the body of the rule.
11	MR. LATTING: Well, it's both,
12	isn't it? Isn't it direct and removed
13	appeals?
14	MR. YELENOSKY: That's true.
15	It is.
16	MR. LATTING: How about direct
17	and removed?
18	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And
19	it's only certain appeals.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: What was
21	that, Judge?
22	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It's
23	my understanding that
24	MR. YELENOSKY: Esoteric,
25	direct and removed.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Direct and
2	removed appeals from administrative decisions?
3	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No, I
4	don't think so. From what I understand
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Judge
6	Duncan.
7	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
8	don't know the substance of all of this, but
9	from what I understand from what Pam said
10	earlier, this is only a very limited number of
11	administrative appeals covered by this
12	statute. All other administrative appeals are
13	not covered by the TRAP Rules and are
14	unaffected by this rule.
15	MR. YELENOSKY: But none of
16	those are direct or removed appeals.
17	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
18	Well, here is the title that the attorney
19	general put on it: Direct and Removed Appeals
20	from Administrative Orders.
21	MR. LATTING: Wonderful.
22	MR. YELENOSKY: Right.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Those
24	in favor show by hands. 16. Those opposed.
25	One. It carries.

1	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: One?
2	MR. ORSINGER: Sarah. Sarah
3	voted against it. She thinks it violates the
4	statute.
5	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No. I
6	just don't think that
7	MR. YELENOSKY: She just
8	doesn't think there should be a rule.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. This
10	is Rule 54. Okay.
11	What's next, Judge Guittard? Let's go
12	back, I guess, and just pick up in sequence.
13	We had finished
14	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: We
15	had finished seven. We're down to eight,
16	right?
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We didn't
18	finish seven, but we've let's forget that
19	for now. Let's get on with it. Five was
20	done. Six was done. Seven was
21	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Seven was
22	done.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Seven was
24	done. And so we're to Item 8.
25	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: And

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1	eight has not been done yet. Now, eight is
2	simple. It merely adds to paragraph (a) of
3	Rule 51 concerning the transcript two
4	additional items which have to be put in the
5	transcript. One is the request for a
6	statement of facts under Rule 53(a). That
7	statement of facts ought to be inserted in the
8	transcript that request. And any statement
9	of points under Rule 53(d) should also be put
10	in the transcript. So I move that that
11	proposal be added to 51(a).
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. On
13	what page of the materials is this?
14	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: It's
15	on Page 74.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So it's just
17	this highlighted portion that is added and
18	then there is no other change?
19	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: No
20	other change.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
22	after "showing any credits for payments made,"
23	then we have an insert.
24	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Insert this

1	from Item 8.
2	Okay. Any objection to that.
3	MR. JACKSON: No. Just a quick
4	clarification.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. David
6	Jackson has a clarification.
7	MR. JACKSON: Does this
8	presuppose that every request for a statement
9	of facts is written?
10	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
11	Well, I think that's
12	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: They're
13	supposed to be written and they're supposed to
14	be filed with the court clerk as well as being
15	sent to you. So yes, there should be one.
16	MR. JACKSON: With the court
17	clerk. Okay. Bonnie and I talked about this
18	a little yesterday. Sometimes the court clerk
19	doesn't get it, so the court reporter has to
20	turn it over to them as part of the statement
21	of facts.
22	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, it's
23	nice of you to do that.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We
25	haven't voted on that. Is there any

1 opposition to this change in Rule 51(a)? 2 There's no opposition, so that will go. No. 9. 3 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 4 Ιn 5 No. 9 apparently we had deleted a little too 6 much. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're at page what of the materials? 8 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 9 On 10 Page 75. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Page 75. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 12 On 13 Page 75 it shows a deletion beginning with "Failure to timely make the designation 14 provided for in this paragraph shall not be 15 grounds for refusing to file a transcript or 16 17 supplemental transcript tendered within the 18 time provided by Rule 54(a); however, if the designation specifying such matter is not 19 20 timely filed, the failure of the clerk to 21 include designated matter will not be grounds 22 for complaint on appeal." 23 We deleted that on the theory that since 24 we've repealed Rule 54 that doesn't make any

However, upon further examination we

concluded that part of it, and only part of it, should be deleted. And that part is the words that now appear deleted there "tendered within the time provided by Rule 54(a)."

So of that sentence which was previously

So of that sentence which was previously deleted, only that phrase -- we propose that only that phrase should be deleted so that the sentence should be restored to this instead:

"Failure to timely make the designation provided in this paragraph shall not be grounds for refusing to file a transcript or supplemental transcript. However, if the designation specified is not timely filed, the failure of the clerk to include the designated matter will not be grounds for complaint on appeal."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any opposition to that? Being no opposition, that's done. So we're going to restore the sentence.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Except for the words "tendered within the time provided by Rule 54(a)."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Except for "tendered within the time provided by

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Rule 54(a)."

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Okay. Item No. 10.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That sentence originated with the Chair, I think.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Years ago.

That's ancient history.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Now we're down to Rule 53(m)(2) on Page 87. This is --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What page is this on now, Judge?

Page 87. The proposal is that the first sentence of subdivision (2) there will read as follows: "The trial court shall upon request by the court reporter or recorder deliver all original exhibits to the reporter or recorder for use in preparing the statement of facts. The court reporter or recorder shall return the original exhibits to the clerk after the reporter or recorder has copied the exhibits for inclusion in the statement of facts." And then the rest of the paragraph would be the same. So that's just a clarification there, which is of mostly administrative

1 significance. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anv 3 opposition to that? So we would take out the 4 first sentence of Paragraph 2 and then --5 let's see, looking on Page 87, tell me what 6 comes out that this replaces. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 7 8 Well, it's indicated by strike-outs in this 9 proposal here, and it goes down through --1.0 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Actually, the 11 entire first sentence is changed --HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: No. 12 13 Down there in about the fifth line, it says, "for inclusion in the statement of facts or 14 15 omitted from the statement of facts." Well, 16 we have stricken out "or omitted from the 17 statement of facts." And the proposal here 1.8 would replace all of that sentence down to the comma after the words "or omitted from the 19 20 statement of facts." 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Except that 22 there's a period here in this case in Rule 87. 23 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 24 Well, I guess it is a period instead of a

25

comma.

Okay.

we're going to substitute 10 --2 3 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: the first sentence. 4 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- for the 6 first two sentences actually. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 7 Yeah. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 9 Okav. So we 1.0 insert this on Page 87. 11 We've got a court of appeals decision of some interest on this. It says, "Our record 12 does not contain a statement of facts from the 13 hearing on Nancy's motion for new trial 14 15 wherein Nancy testified and did not deny that 16 she had been warned about the risk of relying 17 on tapes. Neither Nancy's trial counsel nor 18 the master were called to testify as to what 19 warnings, if any, were given about tapes' 20 quality. In fact, no mention of the inability to obtain a complete record was made until 21 22 after all testimony was concluded and Nancy's 23 attorney tendered the tapes to the court. 24 "In light of the master's warnings, not

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

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to mention common understanding about the

fallibility of tape recording, we cannot say

Nancy diligently sought to protect the record

in this case."

So this court of appeals has held that since a party didn't object to a tape recording at a master hearing and so that she couldn't get a good record of the master hearing, she waived the right -- she could not complain on appeal for not being able to get a record and was denied a new trial, even though she couldn't get a record because the tape was bad. This is Henning, 889
Southwest 2nd.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: That was not Supreme Court approved recording.

That was a tape recorder sitting on the desk just like our court reporter has here. Sure, I mean, if you want to go in and have a hearing and slap a tape recorder on the desk, punch the button and have no one monitoring it, you're likely to get -- but we pay-- let me just point out that's not electronic recording where you've got somebody paid a salary sitting there listening to it making sure you're recording every word that is

| said.

I don't see what application that has to courts of record. That's not a court of record. That's a master slapped a tape recorder on the table and pushed the record button. That's not a court of record.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it becomes a court of record whenever the trial judge reviews it and approves it and you can't show the trial judge was wrong because there was no underlying record.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, wait a minute. Master's appeals, I think, are de novo, aren't they?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's on the record according to this case.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, it must be a kind of appeal that I'm not familiar with, because the ones I'm familiar with are de novo with the trial court.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just as long as we know that there was this denial on the basis of --

MR. ORSINGER: I'm not sure what kind of case that is. If it's a divorce

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case, it's my opinion, and correct me if anybody in here thinks I'm wrong, that all appeals from the master to the district court are de novo. And then if you waive the appeal, which is a trick that a lot of counties use, they won't even send you to the master unless both sides agree to waive appeal to the district court. And then you go ahead and appeal to the court of appeals based on the record you made before the master, but you have to consciously waive your right to a de novo review in the district court.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that may have been done.

MR. ORSINGER: And so I think what this says basically is that if you're going to waive your right to appeal to the district court so that the master's ruling then will be appealed on the master's record, then you better be sure you're getting a statement of facts.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: One
warning: Don't just make sure you've got one;
make sure that it's preserved rather than

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erased.

MR. ORSINGER: Can I ask Judge Brister a question?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sure.

MR. ORSINGER: To my knowledge there are no -- you're the only judge in Harris County that has this procedure. And I don't think anybody in Austin or Fort Worth is doing it where they have family law courts. We have one of them doing it in Bexar County, and they have general jurisdiction including family law.

What is your view of a court that does have family law jurisdiction that does have a master that uses a tape recorder to make a statement of facts? Should that record be under the control of our rule, or is it only the district court's record that should be under the control of our rule?

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I don't know enough about how masters operate, never having had one or been involved with one.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, perhaps we ought to ask ourselves that question. It may

only apply in one court, whoever's court this was. But that's possibly a valid question, because even though there is a right to a de novo review, you'll find customarily that that right is waived in advance, in which event we may be having an electronic statement of facts that doesn't fit our rule.

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may have been a waiver there. I don't remember what the rest of the decision was. I just read it in -- I guess it's in the most recent --

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I can ask around about that and see what the practice in our family courts is, whether that's a problem and whether our rules need to fit together with them.

But I'm sure, you know, that masters certainly don't usually have court reporters sitting in there. Maybe they do. I don't know. Let me call around.

MR. JACKSON: We get hired to take masters hearings. If it's an important enough issue that the lawyers feel they need a court reporter, they'll hire a court

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And the

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1 reporter. 2 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: 3 talk with some of the judges that both have and don't have electronic recording and find 4 5 out what the masters do in those cases. What's the style of that case again? 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's Henning vs. Henning. What is it, Richard? 8 MR. ORSINGER: 889. 9 internal page is 614. I don't know what the 10 11 beginning page is. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. that takes care of Item 11. 13 14 MR. YELENOSKY: Luke, can I just ask a question? 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Steve 16 17 Yelenosky. 18 MR. YELENOSKY: I just wanted 19 to confirm my assumption that this case 2.0 wouldn't have any bearing on tape recorded 21 administrative hearings that are routinely 22 tape recorded and nobody ever brings a court

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this case wouldn't have a bearing on that

reporter in. And suppose there was a problem

with the tape. My understanding would be that

because you really don't have a choice there 1 if the tape is bad. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I have no 3 idea how far it's going to go. 4 This is the 5 first one I've ever seen that way, but it's a 6 new case. 7 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I don't know if that relates to what we're doing now, 8 9 but obviously I would have a concern there. 1.0 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 11 we're over to Item 12. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 12 13 Yes. This is simply an addition to 14 subdivision (a) of Rule 55, which concerns an amendment of the record. Rule 55(a) as now --15 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What page is 17 this on, Judge? 18 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: It's It provides, and this would not 19 on Page 92. 20 be changed, that "If anything material is 21 omitted from the transcript, the trial court, 22 the appellate court, or any party may by 23 letter direct the clerk of the trial court to

prepare, certify, and file in the appellate

court a supplemental transcript containing the

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1 | omitted matters."

And this proposal would add to that the shaded material here: "If the missing material cannot be found in the clerk's office, the parties may, by written stipulation, deliver a copy of the omitted material to the clerk to include in a supplemental transcript. If the parties cannot agree on the accuracy of the copy, upon motion of either party or of the appellate court, the trial court shall, after notice to all parties and hearing, consider what constitutes an accurate copy of the missing material and order it to be included in a supplemental transcript."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Has everybody had a chance to look at that?

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Does anybody object to that?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there any objection to this? No objection. It will be done.

Next is 13. 55(c) is on what page, Judge?

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HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: On

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1	the same page, Page 92. And this has to do
2	with (b).
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: (c).
4	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes,
5	(c).
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. It
7	starts at the bottom of Page 92?
8	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
9	Right.
10	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I hate to
11	have a question on this. But on the one we
12	just did, 12, should that really begin "If the
13	missing material cannot be found in the
14	clerk's office"?
15	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
16	Well, I wondered about that too. Can you
17	suggest a better term?
18	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm
19	troubled by the geography of it. I would
20	doubt that the missing material has found its
21	way into the clerk's office unless we're
22	talking about something the clerk lost,
23	something that was filed and no longer can be
24	found in the clerk's office. I mean, what
25	clerk are we talking about? The trial court

clerk? 1 2 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes. 3 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Why don't you strike "in the clerk's office" and just 4 5 say if it cannot be found? 6 MR. ORSINGER: Well, that means 7 they have a duty to search the courthouse. Should they? 8 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I quess 10 the clerk is supposed to have this stuff. 11 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: It has to be filed. It has to be filed to be considered 12 13 part of the transcript, right? 14 MR. JACKSON: But they could 15 have loaned it to the court reporter. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. What's 17 your comment, Alex? 18 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I think 19 Bill was indicating that this may be stuff that wasn't filed. I think this is stuff that 20 21 had to have been filed to be part of the 22 It's just that the clerk, after 23 having it filed and putting it in the folder for the particular case -- somehow it got 24 25

lost, whether it was when it was sent to the

court reporter or loaned to a lawyer or whatever. It's just not there.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anyone else?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think

I'll take back what I said then.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: No problem?

Leave it like it is? Okay. The vote stands

unless somebody wants it changed. It stands.

Okay. No. 13.

to paragraph (c) at the bottom of Page 92. It seems that this has to do with inaccuracies in the statement of facts. As drawn, the rule would apply only after filing with the appellate court, but the proposal would permit corrections even before filing with the appellate court.

And the rule as corrected would read,

"Any inaccuracies in the statement of facts

may be corrected by agreement of the parties

without recertification by the court

reporter. If any dispute arises as to whether

the statement of facts accurately discloses

what occurred in the trial court, the trial

judge shall, after notice to the parties and

hearing, settle the dispute and make the 1 2 statement of facts conform to what occurred in 3 the trial court. If the disputed" -- and there's a "d" here that ought not -- that's 4 out of place. "If the dispute arises after 5 filing in the appellate court, the appellate 6 court shall submit the matter to the trial 7 court for a decision." 8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: So that would 10 be a complete replacement for the (c) that we 11 have? HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: As modified 13 14 in the handout? HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 15 16 That's right. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 18 Any opposition to this change? comment? 19 There being no opposition, it will be done. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The 20 21 next part has to do with the records in 22 administrative appeals, which have special 23 problems, as indicated.

It would read this way: This paragraph

only applies to cases involving judicial

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1 review of state agency decisions in contested cases pursuant to Government Code 2001.175 as 2 3 At any stage of the proceeding, the amended. parties may, by agreement, make corrections to 4 5 the agency record filed pursuant to Government Code Section 2001 and so forth, as amended, or 6 7 pursuant to Rule 54, to ensure that the agency record accurately reflects the contested case 8 proceedings before the state agency. 9 10 recertification by the court reporter shall be If the parties fail to agree to any required. 11 12 requested correction to the agency record, upon motion of any party or the appellate 13 court, the appellate court shall send the 14 question to the trial court, which shall, 15 after notice and hearing, determine what 16 constitutes an accurate copy of the agency 17 record and order the agency to deliver it to 18 the clerk where the case is pending. 19 In other words, this may be something 20 21

In other words, this may be something that hasn't been at all filed in the trial court. It might be a direct appeal from the agency. And this would provide a mechanism for the appellate court to direct a trial court, in the place where the agency says, to

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1	make that factual decision as to what is a
2	proper record in the agency appeal.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why wouldn't
4	that go to the hearing examiner?
5	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
6	Well, I guess
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How is the
8	trial court going to resolve that?
9	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
10.	Well, the motion is filed and the parties
11	appear and present their evidence and the
12	trial court decides it.
13	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Is this
14	the attorney general's proposal on how to deal
15	with this?
16	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: This
17	is the attorney general's proposal.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That doesn't
19	seem to me to be fair to a trial court to have
20	to resolve a dispute about what occurred
21	before a hearing examiner.
22	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's
23	part of the price of living in Austin.
24	MR. ORSINGER: A small price to
25	pay.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okav. Ιf 2 nobody else is concerned about that, I'm not 3 going to be. MR. PERRY: Doesn't that go 4 5 back to the agency? Isn't the agency responsible for the record? 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's what That's my feeling about it. 8 I'm saying. seems to me it would be an imposition on the 9 trial court system to have them straighten out 10 11 what happened in an agency proceeding. MR. PERRY: Well, it also seems 12 13 like you would have all kinds of questions about how you would open the file in the trial 14 court. I mean, you don't just walk in one day 15 and say, "Hey, judge, we're here." 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's a new 18 lawsuit. Okay. Well, let's just, I quess, 19 vote that up or down. Should it go to the 20 trial court or go to the agency? That's 21 what's on the table for discussion. 22 Richard Orsinger. 23 MR. ORSINGER: Does this rule 24 apply to those appeals that go directly from

the administrative agency to the court of

1 appeals and don't pass through the trial court? 2 3 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: PROFESSOR DORSANEO: As well as 4 5 the ones that go -- I mean, you can't tell under this statue which way it's going to 6 7 happen. Well, that 8 MR. ORSINGER: 9 raises a different issue, which is that if we 10 are remanding it to the trial court to clarify a record that never even went into the trial 11 12 court, then that's even doubly ridiculous. In other words, if we had a direct appeal 13 14 from an administrative agency to the court of 15 appeals, and then we're remanding it to the 16 trial court where the case was never 17 previously pending, I guess, to conduct a 18 factual inquiry now, and then... 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Then what? 2.0 MR. ORSINGER: And then, I 21 quess, render some kind of findings based on a 22 reevaluation of the administrative agency's 23 hearing? 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other 25 discussion? Bill.

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PROFESSOR DORSANEO:

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recollection, and I wish we had the attorney general's people here, is that this was directed primarily at a situation where there is a record made in the trial court but nobody looks in the boxes. I mean, they just kind of admit the boxes. You know, "I offer Boxes 1 through 15, Bankers Boxes 1 through 15," and they're admitted. And when they ultimately get to the court of appeals, somebody notices that something is not in one of the boxes and they have to go back and correct the record. And they want to be able to do that without a lot of hassle. Okay?

And I think this also probably applies to cases that don't get removed from the trial court, but I don't know if that makes a difference, given what the trial court does to begin with, which is just kind of to pass these boxes along.

And this worked from their standpoint, and that's why it's fine with me, because I don't really much care about it, if they don't.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other

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1	comment on this? Okay. Those in favor of
2	inserting paragraph (d) at the end of Rule 55
3	show by hands. 12. Those opposed. One
4	opposed. 12 to one it carries. So that will
5	go in as 55(d).
6	Okay. Item 14 has to do with what page
7	in our materials, Judge?
8	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
9	"Prior of the call of the case" didn't seem
10	to be
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Page 120, is
12	that correct? Yeah.
13	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: That
14	seemed to be an obsolete phrase. And so the
15	rule would be changed to read "before the date
16	set for submission."
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. If
18	you're on Page 120 and you're looking at what
19	was (m) and is now (l), six lines down, the
20	words "prior to the call of the case" have
21	been stricken. And we want to make an insert
22	there now of some new words?
23	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
24	Right.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And those new

words are? 1 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 2 3 "Before the date set for submission." 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection 5 to that? 6 MR. ORSINGER: I'd like to 7 inquire. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Go ahead. 9 MR. ORSINGER: If the appellant 10 does not file a brief, will the appellate 11 court eventually set it for submission, even 12 though there's no brief on file from anybody, 13 or will they prepare a motion to dismiss or 14 issue a show cause order why it shouldn't be dismissed? 15 16 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: That was 17 the point I was going to make. I think in a 18 situation like this, probably the appellate 19 court will not set it for submission or will 20 just dismiss it for want of prosecution. 21 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Ιf 22 the appellant doesn't file a brief, it's 23 dismissed for lack of prosecution. If the 24 appellee doesn't file a brief, then you submit

it on the appellant's brief.

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1 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: But this 2 says where the appellant has failed to file a 3 brief --MR. ORSINGER: 4 But the point 5 I'm making is --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let Judge 7 Cornelius develop his thought and put it on 8 the record, please. JUSTICE CORNELIUS: This 9 10 provision is for when the appellant fails to file a brief. And in that case I don't 11 12 believe the appellate court to going to set it 13 for submission in the traditional sense of the 14 term. MR. ORSINGER: And if I may, 15 16 that means that the appellee will never 17 know -- the deadline for the appellee filing will never occur because there will never be a 18 submission date. There will be just a notice 19 20 of intent to dismiss or a show cause order or whatever. 21 22 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Right. 23 When that happens in our court, we just 24 dismiss it for want of prosecution, and 25 there's no notice to the appellee.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
2	What if we use these words: "Before the date
3	set for submission or dismissal of the cause"?
4	MR. ORSINGER: It's a dumb
5	appellee that files a brief if the case is
6	about to be dismissed.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm
8	just trying to see what the issue is.
9	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
10	Well, if there's a cross-appeal and the
11	appellant has failed to file a brief, then the
12	appellee or cross-appellee may, before the
13	date set for submission, file his brief.
14	MR. ORSINGER: But there may
15	never be a date set for submission if the
16	appellant doesn't file a brief.
17	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
18	Well, if there's a cross-appeal there would
19	be.
20	MR. ORSINGER: You won't even
21	know there's a cross-appeal. You won't know
22	whether there's a cross-appeal until a brief
23	is filed saying so, because the appellee is
24	not required to perfect an appeal.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Judge

1	Duncan.
2	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But if
3	the appellant never files a brief, why would
4	the cross-appellant ever file a brief raising
5	a cross-appeal?
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: If
7	he wants
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge
9	Guittard.
10	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: If
11	he wants affirmative relief from the trial
12	court's judgment, he would.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well,
14	shouldn't that be required to be done before
15	the case is either set for submission or
16	dismissed?
17	MR. ORSINGER: Why don't we
18	just add the two timetables together? Since
19	you've got 30 days plus 25 days, why don't we
20	just say by the 55th day? Same deadline as if
21	there was a brief filed by the appellant.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge
23	Cornelius.
24	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: I was going
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to suggest that we say that he may file his

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1	brief within 25 days after the date that
2	appellant's brief was due, because you're not
3	going to have an official submission of a case
4	in this situation. Just put a time limit on
5	it, which you say would be 55 days.
6	MR. ORSINGER: 30 plus 25.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
8	How do we write that?
9	MR. ORSINGER: Just like he
10	said, within 25 days after the appellant's
11	brief was due.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. After
13	the word "may" and in the place of the
14	stricken words "prior to the call of the
15	case," we will insert "within 25 days"?
16	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Right.
17	From the date that the appellant's brief was
18	due.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 25 days after
20	what?
21	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: After the
22	date the appellant's brief was due.
23	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's
24	good.
25	MR. ORSINGER: Is that "is" or

1 "was"? 2 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Was. Was 3 due. Was due. 4 MR. ORSINGER: 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Any opposition to that? Being no opposition, 6 7 that's done. Okay. That takes care of 14. 8 9 That deals with what pages in the 15. 10 materials? HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 11 12 That's on Page 130 about unpublished opinions. Previously this rule -- this 13 proposal was adopted to avoid the problem of 14 15 what was an unpublished opinion. We simply said, "An opinion designated not for 16 17 publication shall not be cited as authority." But some courts, instead of saying "not for 18 publication, " say, "do not publish," which is 19 20 the same thing, so we put both of those in 21 there, and that's the effect of this proposal. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Sarah 23 Duncan. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 24 25

like to propose an alternative, and that is

1	that we delete subdivision (i).
2	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: And
3	that raises the main question as to whether or
4	not there should be any not published, right?
5	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No. I
6	don't have a problem with opinions that are
7	designated as not to be published within
8	Southwest 2nd.
9	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Could we
10	come back to that?
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Bill wants to
12	know if we can come back to that, and I don't
13	know when, so I mean, we've really done
14	this many times.
15	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes.
16	We've been over that.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: But I don't
18	want to frustrate anybody trying to get this
19	changed, so go ahead.
20	You disagree that we've been over this
21	before. How so, Judge Duncan?
22	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
23	believe it's come up before. But I don't
24	believe that this Committee, or for that
25	matter really the appellate committee at least

in my time here, has really discussed unpublished opinions and what should be done with them.

I personally believe that there is a growing problem and that there are a lot of lawyers legitimately very upset with what's being done with unpublished opinions. And I think we -- I don't think we've actually debated and voted on whether to change or alter this procedure. We just all recognize that it's extremely controversial, and so we say, you know, we've been down this road before; let's not go again.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Any other comment? Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: I have real mixed feelings about this, because Westlaw and other places do have unpublished opinions, so people are aware of them. And you have to insinuate they exist by saying things like "An unpublished opinion on this subject exists in this court," but you can't say what it is, or some people do say what it is and whatever.

On the other hand, you don't want to disadvantage the people that don't have access

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to Westlaw, which costs a lot of money, because they're not even going to get a copy of it.

Let me point out that over time this rule is going to lose its justification, because as we move to CD-ROM cases, which there are now three people that put cases on CD-ROM,

Butterworth, West and Q-Case, the incremental cost of adding all of our opinions is nil.

And you pay like 85 or \$90 a month, and you get your disks every month and you don't have to even have books on the shelf any more or anything else.

Our whole purpose of reducing the volume of papers in our libraries is going to disappear as time goes on. And if we don't kill this rule now, I think we ought to understand that we may want to revisit it, because I believe the original driving force was to keep lawyers from having to pay law book publishers for publishing opinions.

MR. ORSINGER: What was the other unstated reason?

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge

Brister, and then we'll come around the table

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: You

guys may get CD-ROM in the near future, but
I'm not going to get CD-ROMs for decades. And
I don't want people citing unpublished
opinions that I don't have and expecting me to
look this stuff up. I've got a wall of
books. It may be more expensive than CD-ROM,

but do you know how it got there? That's an expenditure we've done for 50 years, and we

can keep doing it forever no matter how much

13 | it costs.

CD-ROM is different, new. It will raise taxes. We're not going to get it. So I'm going to keep getting my books for the next 20 years. If I want to look up what's cited to me, get me my books, because that's all I or anybody else in Harris County is going to have.

And second of all, when I get reversed, or affirmed occasionally, on do-not-publish opinions, they're always less than three pages and they do not explain why they're doing what they're doing, and that's why they don't

publish them.

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And those -- I think it would be a bad idea to throw opinions that are less carefully considered into the law when the judges involved know that. And sometimes they designate them not for publication for just that reason. So I say leave it just like this.

The only suggestion I have is that rather than putting these terms in quotes, if the concern is that, you know, because there may be a hundred ways courts of appeals can decide not to publish something, just make it a generic, not a quotation, not quoted exact language. Just put "opinions that are not designated for publication shall not be cited as authority," rather than trying to guess the specific terms that may be used by courts of appeals.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Alex.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I agree with Judge Brister in the second part of his discussion. I think if we make the courts of appeals publish every opinion, we're going to be inundated with opinions that don't mean

anything, that don't say anything, and they 1 2 weren't intended to mean or say anything 3 except just to tell the parties and the court that they're being reversed. 5 There may be a problem that some opinions are being designated not for publication when 6 they should be published. 7 MR. ORSINGER: That's the 8 9

problem.

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But that PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: is not a problem that is solved by simply deleting Rule 90(i).

Maybe what we should do instead is have a mechanism whereby the decision to not publish is reviewed and then someone makes a decision that this opinion should be published. think there are lots of opinions that should not be published, and I think that we're all inundated with too much information anyway. If there's a way to get things we don't need to deal with out of the system, I think it's good.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sarah Duncan. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Мy proposal, in all seriousness, is not to just

delete subdivision (i). My proposal would be that all opinions be available on Westlaw regardless of whether they're designated available for publication in Southwest 2nd or not, and that is as done in the Fifth Circuit. If it is an opinion that is not published in the bound Reporter, if you wish to cite it, you must give the court to whom you are citing it a copy of it.

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We have the interesting situation right now that while unpublished opinions are not citable as authority in a Texas state court, they are freely citable in the Fifth Circuit and in all of the federal courts.

And yes, there are a lot of cases that should not be published. They don't comply with the standards of Rule 90. But there are a lot of cases that should be published that aren't. And until we remove this obstacle to citation, there's going to be an incentive not to publish certain types of decisions.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Harriet Miers, you had your hand up.

MS. MIERS: I agree with Sarah, Judge Duncan, except with the requirement that

you have to provide it not only to the court but all the parties involved. If there's an access issue, that's resolvable by making available to everyone in the matter what you've been able to locate.

And if it is substantively significant in the lawyer's view what the court said, I don't understand why it's not available for citation.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard, you had your hand up.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ ORSINGER: I was going to say the same thing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anything else? Steve.

MR. YELENOSKY: I guess I do disagree with Alex a little bit and do agree with Harriet on the point that if it really isn't intended to say anything and yet an attorney cites it and copies it to all the parties, opposing counsel should be able to demonstrate that it doesn't say anything, that it was not designated for publication and that that's an indication that it doesn't really mean to say anything, so that there is still a

disincentive to using not-designated-forpublication documents or opinions.

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But in my practice I have noticed that there are times when things aren't published, and all I can figure is that it's sort of an esoteric area of the law for the appellate court. Often this is in the areas that I've dealt with, and they don't want it published, but it's real important for us to have it published.

In TEC cases, for example, there are only several dozen cases. It's not like they're inundated with cases. And you may get a case that the appellate court may not realize the significance of because so few people practice in that area. And there is a mechanism, I guess, already where you can file some kind of motion and ask that it be published, but, you know, it's totally discretionary.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

Anything else on this? Sarah Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I would agree with what Harriet suggested. I mean, I always anticipated that you would have to provide it to opposing parties.

But as an example, Steve used the TEC cases, I was doing -- and I think this is sort of embarrassing to us as a profession, but I was doing research on proving legal malpractice with experts a few years ago. And naturally the Supreme Court cases are published, but it is embarrassing the number of legal malpractice cases in this state that are not reported. It is extremely difficult to research and get reported opinions.

Brister.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: I

don't care if Westlaw prints these things and
you all can them up. My concern is, when
people give me an opinion that they want me to
follow, they never attach the contrary
opinions that suggest I should do something
else. And I think the rules require that, but
nobody ever does it.

When an attorney cites me a case and says this is controlling, if it's a case of any importance, I don't take that on face value because I know they're not telling me the whole story. I go to my Texas Digest or

Shepard's and look it up and see if there may be some other law that says something to the contrary I need to know about. I will be unable to do that on unpublished opinions.

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I can use Westlaw if I personally pay for it, not the county commissioner, but Scott If I take my salary, I can go look up something on Westlaw. Otherwise, I cannot, because it is not in the budget.

And so I don't want people citing to me to follow unpublished opinions when I cannot play with a full deck. I don't know, unless it's published, whether there's a whole area of law and opinions that they're just choosing not to tell me about.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: David Perry.

MR. PERRY: I think the very concept of an unpublished opinion is extremely unfair, because you get into exactly the conflict that is pointed up by this discussion where Judge Brister on the one hand has absolutely good and valid reasons that also apply to a lot of lawyers why an unpublished opinion should not be authoritative.

On the other hand, it's nonsensical that

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an opinion is going to be nonauthoritative.

It would seem to me that if an opinion is going to be sufficiently -- of sufficiently little consequence that it should have no authority, then give the court the ability to publish an order without an opinion. But if they write an opinion, let's have it be published and have it be authoritative.

2.0

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That would be a big change in the court of appeals' standard of review. Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: In response to the comment that David just made, you couldn't effectively present to the Supreme Court the error committed by the court of appeals or even the reasoning of the court of appeals without an opinion.

And having never been an appellate judge, I'm speaking as an advocate now, but one of the virtues of requiring an opinion in every case is that it forces the appellate judges to go through the reasoning process of finding applicable law and then reconciling that law to their outcome of the case. And I think that that's a form of discipline that we force

upon our appellate courts that time has proven is important to the system, so that people can understand that the judges are applying the law to their case and that it's rational and fair the way they're doing it.

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And then I'd like -- to Judge Brister's comment I'd like to say that I sympathize with the condition he's in. I wish that more district judges would do research on their own. Many district judges rely on the opposing party to call to their attention adverse case law. And perhaps Judge Brister may be in the condition to have to do that if someone is citing unpublished opinions or if there might be unpublished opinions that are adverse even to a published opinion that's submitted to the court.

And then the last thing I'd like to say is that we have to reenvision our citation methods if we're going to permit the citation of unpublished opinions. And there are four or five states, either through their courts or through their legislatures, that have adopted a citation format that is not based on the official Reporter, which in Texas would be the

Southwest 2nd. And if we have some that are in Southwest 2nd and some that are not, we have to have a method of citing the ones that are not in Southwest 2nd.

2.0

And I would say, for example, that the cause numbers in the appellate courts would be a possible routine, because they start out by 0493, hyphen, and then the case number, and then hyphen CV or CR, and then we could use that -- pardon me. Sarah says I'm behind the times. Okay.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, I mean, it's in the blue book.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Steve Yelenosky.

MR. YELENOSKY: Another response, I think, to what Judge Brister has said is that there are two alternatives then. And the alternative I think that Judge Brister is arguing is that you cannot then argue the unpublished law. And the problem with that is that I have a case right now in the Fifth Circuit where there is one case on it, and under state law, I guess, I couldn't argue it. And you can be sure, as Richard has said,

if there were any other cases on it, the other parties would find them. But I recite in the brief that this is the only case I'm aware of and I attach it.

Under your regime, I simply would not have any way of arguing that. And it seems to me that the fault ought to be that you can't argue it and the other side can try to ferret out opposing opinions or an opposite opinion, but that it isn't fair to simply exclude what may be the only case on point.

just -- I want to go around again. One of our esteemed members who is not here has spoken on this quite a bit and has said a couple of things.

Number one, the fact that the court of appeals' jurisdiction is mandatory. Parties invoke that jurisdiction and cause the court to have to act upon their case, unlike the Supreme Court, so they've got no choice but to take the case. And a lot of those cases are really not worthy of even having the court give the case its attention, but statutorily they must, so they decide them. And they do

them with these short opinions many times.

And then basically there are cases coming up where the established law has been applied by the trial court or not applied by the trial court, but there's nothing new. It's easy to decide. It's over. He's saying that many of them are cases where the trial court has properly applied the law and people are just still complaining, but they've got really nothing to complain about, so that apparently there are some of those cases.

Then the other piece of it is that sometimes the issues are novel. There really isn't much jurisprudence. And they don't publish their opinions because they're uncertain of their precedential value. They're deciding the case, which they must, as best they can. But they're admittedly uncertain about whether this opinion reflects the jurisprudence and they want the jurisprudence to develop more before they start publishing what they're saying about the jurisprudence.

Now, you all know who I'm talking about. He's just not here today, and I think he would

put those remarks on the record, and I
don't -- a former court of appeals justice.

I don't know whether Judge Cornelius has anything to say about this. Because you've been at this longer than anybody here, if you have anything to add, why, we would be happy to hear from you.

realize that the lawyers think that appellate judges sometimes try to hide their opinions by not publishing them. I can say emphatically that my court does not do that. We try to make a genuine realistic appraisal on the issue of whether the opinion has any precedential value, and it's that basis on which we make our decision whether to publish it or not.

Additionally, I might point out that the Supreme Court has consistently put pressure on the courts of appeals to publish fewer and fewer opinions. They have not done so recently, and they may have done so only before Justice Hecht got on the court. I don't remember. But there was a time that we were criticized by the Supreme Court for

publishing too many opinions and were admonished to publish fewer and fewer.

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I think that as long as you're going to have the power to order an opinion not published, you must have a rule that they cannot be cited as authority, because there are just too many problems that arise when you can't order them not published and yet allow somebody to cite them as authority, as Judge Brister has pointed out, so that's my feeling on it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sarah Duncan.

think what I have been suggesting this morning is that if we take away the incentive for courts not to publish, we will start getting the cases that should be published designated for publication and those that should not be, not. And they will be available in Westlaw, and we won't have anything to worry about.

I think David Perry does have a point.

In a certain number of cases, and I'm not sure exactly how it would be quantified, but I've noticed just in the last couple of months that a large portion of our unpublished opinions

are on motions to dismiss, either for want of jurisdiction or voluntary because of settlement or whatever.

2.1

Well, you could clear -- you could take our 80 percent statistic down real quick if we could dispose of those with an order and not have to write an opinion that's then unpublished.

For those of you that have wills that provide -- that have a provision regarding a support trust, you will find that there is one case in this state that interprets a provision that's used in over 10,000 wills in this state, and that opinion is unpublished. And it affects every single will in this state that has that provision in it.

I don't think this is a small problem. I really don't.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: David and then Bill and Judge Brister.

MR. PERRY: I think one of the practical problems that should be recognized is that the concept that you will in fact have an unpublished opinion is no longer true. It may have been true a number of years ago, but

today, even though it may not come out in a paper hardbound book, it is going to come out in all kinds of other mediums. And as a result, instead of having an opinion that is truly an unpublished opinion, what you have is an opinion that is published some places but not other places and that is designated as being unable to be cited authoritatively, even though it may be important. And I think we would be better off to have either no opinion at all or let it be cited as authority.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. For those of us who read the green books, there's enough to read. I'll say that. And there's many of us who do.

Judge Brister and then Bill, and then let's bring this to a close.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER:

Briefly. An unpublished opinion, the advantage of having an opinion, even though it's unpublished, if it is a substantive area, you have nothing else to go on, the only advantage of having an opinion that you can reference is so that you can short-circuit your argument. "Judge, this is the law. Just

decide it that way."

If it's unpublished, you can take the arguments, you can take the cases that they cite and then put them into your case. If it makes sense, you just carry it over into your case. The only advantage of saying you can cite it is to try to skip over all the reasoning and just say, "It's been decided. Just decide it the same way as some other court of appeals did."

Well, that's not the way I decide. I
don't think that's the way most district
judges decide things: Well, just because some
court of appeals said something 30 years ago,
I'm going to do that.

Just lift the stuff out of the unpublished opinion that makes sense and copy it in. It's not that there's no value to it. However, publishing them all means more books that the county has to buy. If it's in the books, the poor folks can go to the law library and look it up for free. If it's on Westlaw, they may not.

And there's no reason in this day when we're trying to cut costs, equal access to

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litigation, et cetera, that we should have a whole area of law which the rich lawyers and the rich people can use but the poor folks don't know anything about and can't counter.

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And finally, my final point, this doesn't apply to you all's cases. You all know what the law is. When you go into court, you know what the law is and your opposing side knows what the law is. That is not true of at least 50 percent of the litigants in front of me. As I've told you before, I'm informing people to this day that they have to designate experts 30 days before trial. I mean, these are people that have been in bankruptcy, real estate, or something else. They're walking into court and do not know.

And I really believe that most district judges want to follow their oath, do the law, and do not rely -- in many cases, you can look at these people, hear the first five minutes, and you know they have no idea, and you cannot rely on what they're telling you to do. You will actually have to look something up. And that's why we have books in our libraries, to do that.

1 And if I get an unpublished opinion from 2 the guy with money and Westlaw and nothing 3 from the other side, I'm going to be stuck. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Bill, did you 5 have something? 6 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes. 7 think we have all been reading this "shall not 8 be cited as authority" phrase to mean -- I think it's conventional to interpret it to 9 mean that it shall not be mentioned or 1.0 11 included in a brief or quoted. 12 And I think, Judge Brister, you just 13 said, "Well, I don't want you to quote it, but 14 you can paraphrase it." 15 HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Сору 16 it. Copy it if you want. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Or copy 18 it. And I really wonder if we shouldn't let it be cited, but let's make a distinction 19 20 between it from the standpoint of it being 21 authoritative or as authoritative. I wrote a brief the other day out of a 22 case from the Southern District of New York 23 24 published in some sort of a something cite

that I can't tell what the cite is, it may be

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some misspelling from Westlaw, and it's a perfectly useful case for the court that's to decide this question to read. Now, it's not authority on Texas law, Texas partnership law, being from the Southern District of New York interpreting whatever in the world it's interpreting anyway, I mean. But I ought to in writing this brief be able to mention it, and let the court make whatever use of it the court wants.

Maybe we read too much into this "cited as authority." If we think of all cases as authority, we would think of, I guess, occasionally secondary authority as authority. We call it authority and it's hardly authority. It's just argument and reasoning.

So I don't like not being able to cite something that is free, generally free, you know, or no less available than other things that are cited routinely, when it might provide some assistance to someone who has to decide a question; even though I would recognize that perhaps they might not have the complete picture and they might not agree with

it.

So I don't like interpreting this to mean shall not be cited at all or included in the briefing at the trial or appellate level. And I don't know exactly what kind of wording to use on that. Maybe the Fifth Circuit wording would take care of it. But that's my attitude about it, and I'm only an appellate lawyer.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. No repetition. Anything new on this? New. Sarah Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Can I make a motion? Is that new enough?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, sure.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Well, Richard has something first.

MR. ORSINGER: I was going to follow Bill's suggestion by saying "should not be considered an authoritative statement of the law," and then that it has its informational value but it doesn't have precedential weight.

But as a practical matter, if it's your court of appeals that has handed that opinion

1 down, that means more than if it's somebody else's court of appeals. You should know that 2 3 if you're a trial judge. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 4 Okay. 5 Motion. Judge Duncan. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 6 I move 7 that Rule 90(i) be amended to read: 8 "Unpublished Opinions. Opinions designated 9 not for publication may be cited as authority by counsel or by a court, and due weight may 10 11 be accorded them." 12 MR. LATTING: Don't you want to 1.3 include a requirement that they be provided 14 to --HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: So 15 16 long as -- let me see, it's going to have to be rewritten. "So long as a copy of the 17 opinion is provided to the court and all 18 counsel." 19 20 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 21 Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just a 22 23 moment, please. Okay. Let's see, the motion 24 is that Rule 90(i) be amended to read, 25 "Unpublished Opinions. Opinions designated

. 1	'Do not publish' or 'Not for publication' may
2	be cited"
3	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No. I
4	agree with Judge Brister. Take out all the
5	quotations. "Opinions designated not for
6	publication that are"
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about
8	"Opinions not designated for publication"
9	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No. It's
10	got to be the other way. It's got to be the
11	ones that are designated not for publication,
12	because the ones some are not designated at
13	all, and people are not playing this game.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
15	Opinions designated not for publication,
16	without the quotes, may be cited.
17	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: May be
18	cited as authority.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: By counsel or
20	by a court, and due weight may be accorded, so
21	long as a copy of the opinion is provided to
22	the court and to all counsel.
23	Okay. Anything new on this now?
24	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
25	Mr. Chairman.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge
2	Guittard.
3	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I
4	think the issue here is whether or not these
5	unpublished opinions, whether citable or not,
6	should be considered as authoritative. I
7	would really prefer the rule as written, but
8	as a substitute for this proposal that says
9	they are authoritative, I would propose and
10	move as a substitute that the rule read,
11	"Opinions designated not for publication are
12	not authoritative and shall not be cited
13	without providing a copy to the court and
14	opposing counsel."
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there a
16	second to the substitute motion?
17	MR. ORSINGER: Can I ask a
18	question?
19	MR. LATTING: Yes, I'll second
20	that.
21	HONORABLE PAUL HEATH TILL:
22	Would you accept a friendly amendment saying
23	complete, a complete copy, because I'll tell
24	you, I have received some that are incomplete,
25	and they don't tell me that.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
2	There's no problem with that.
3	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Can I
4	ask a question?
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Sarah
6	Duncan.
7	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: When
8	you're saying they're not authoritative, then
9	they have no precedential value. They cannot
10	be important to the jurisprudence of the state
11	if they have no precedential value. Is that
12	the intent of your substitution?
13	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
14	Right.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
16	Restate the substitute motion and we'll vote
17	on that, and then we'll vote on the main
18	motion.
19	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
20	"Opinions designated not for publication are
21	not authoritative and shall not be cited
22	without providing a complete copy to the court
23	and opposing counsel."
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's

been moved and seconded. You've got something

new on this, David? 1 2 MR. PERRY: Yes, sir. I would 3 propose that we say that unpublished opinions 4 may be cited as persuasive. 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes. Add 6 that into this thing and it will work. 7 MR. PERRY: And take out the word "authority" entirely, and just say that 8 9 they may be cited as persuasive. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 10 Alex 11 Albright. PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I don't 12 13 understand what you mean by "as persuasive." But I think what Judge Guittard's amendment 14 does is make these opinions like Bill 15 16 Dorsaneo's New York supplement opinion or like a law review article that is interesting and 17 18 maybe --19 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Or like a 20 writ denied opinion from another court of 2.1 appeals. PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: 22 23 maybe interesting and the court should know 24 about it because it gives a way of thinking

about the arguments, but the court does not

1	have to follow it, which I think is exactly
2	what is meant by an unpublished opinion. And
3	I would support Judge Guittard's amendment.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Those
5	in favor of Judge Guittard's substitute motion
6	show by hands.
7	MR. YELENOSKY: I'm not sure
8	what we're voting on.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we may
10	have to rewrite it. But let me count the
11	hands again. Nine. Nine. Those opposed.
12	Six.
13	HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: How
14	did Sarah and I end up on the same side?
15	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
16	don't know.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now,
18	those in favor of the main motion. That
19	carried by nine to six, but I still want to
20	get a show of hands on the main motion.
21	MR. ORSINGER: Is that assuming
22	that this one fails?
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I don't
24	know Roberts' Rules of Order well enough to
25	tell you. I'm sometimes criticized because we

1	never get to something somebody else proposed.
2	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But
3	that was fairly deliberate.
4	MR. ORSINGER: I support
5	Justice Guittard's motion, but if that fails,
6	then I support Sarah's. So can I vote on both
7	of them?
8	MR. YELENOSKY: And there's
9	also David's.
10	MR. ORSINGER: And I support
11	that one too.
12	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: I thought
13	Judge Guittard's motion was a substitute
14	motion. And if so, if it's adopted, then it
15	kicks the other one out. That's all there is
16	to it.
17	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Can I
18	make one comment on the record?
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
20	Yes. And Judge Guittard, will you write out
21	your 90(i).
22	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: My
23	discussion with Judge Guittard before we took
24	a vote on this amendment, part of my question

was, is it the intent of this amendment that

1 these opinions subject to subdivision (i) will 2 not be authoritative, will have no 3 precedential value, and cannot, therefore, be 4 important to the jurisprudence of the state. 5 I'm not saying this on behalf of my court, 6 which is, I think, getting ready to put our opinions on Westlaw. I'm saying this as a 7 8 former appellate lawyer. The reason this game 9 is played is to keep the opinion from being 10 reviewed by the Supreme Court in part. 11 JUSTICE HECHT: It doesn't 12 work. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 13 The 14 amendment -- but that's not what's going on. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're 15 16 continuing to argue, and we've got a motion 17 that's passed. And I want to read it again

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're continuing to argue, and we've got a motion that's passed. And I want to read it again just to be sure that the Committee agrees that this is what we did. And then I want to get Judge Guittard's response to David's tendered amendment after we get that language.

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Why don't we take about a 10-minute recess and give the court reporter a break.

Be back at 20 after, according to my watch.

(At this time there was a

1	recess.)
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's
3	come back to order. Everyone write this
4	down: 90(i). Unpublished opinions.
5	Unpublished opinions designated not for
6	publication
7	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: No.
8	Opinions designated not for publication.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: are not
10	authoritative and shall not be cited without
11	providing a complete copy to the court and
12	opposing counsel.
13	MR. YELENOSKY: Parties.
14	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Parties.
15	Because parties equals counsel.
16	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
17	Opposing parties. Okay. Opposing parties
18	rather than opposing counsel.
19	MR. YELENOSKY: All parties.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. And
21	all parties.
22	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All
23	other parties?
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All other
25	parties. Okay. This is the way it reads:

"90(i). Unpublished opinions. Opinions 1 2 designated not for publication are not 3 authoritative and shall not be cited without providing a complete copy to the court and all 4 other parties." 5 Now, I'll take amendments with no debate, 6 7 and we'll vote through the amendments. State the amendment and we'll vote without debate. 8 Okay. Going around the table. 9 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I move to 10 add the word "precedent" after the word 11 12 "authoritative" and the words "as persuasive authority" after "cited," such that the text 1.3 reads, "Unpublished opinions," or however you 14 want to begin it, "designated not for 15 publication are not authoritative precedent 16 17 and shall not be cited as persuasive authority 18 without providing a complete copy to the court and opposing counsel" -- or "parties." 19 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 20 Т 21 would accept the amendment. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The 23 amendment has been accepted. 24 Okay. Are not authoritative what?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Precedent.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And shall not
2	be cited without providing what?
3	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Shall not
4	be cited as persuasive authority.
5	MR. MARKS: Why put "authority"
6	in there?
7	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Why
8	do you say "authority"?
9	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I
10	say "authority" because we call everything
11	authority whether it's authoritative or not.
12	That's already been mentioned.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Does
14	anyone else have a specific amendment?
15	Richard.
16	MR. ORSINGER: I would break
17	that up into two sentences and put a period
18	after "are not authoritative," period. "They
19	shall not be cited." In other words, the
20	"and" suggests to me that if you provide a
21	copy, all of a sudden they may become
22	authoritative.
23	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't
24	think so.
25	MR. ORSINGER: Well, maybe

1	not. But I'm in favor of putting a period
2	after the first sentence and then starting a
3	second sentence.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: You're in
5	favor of putting a period after "authoritative
6	precedent," period?
7	MR. ORSINGER: Period. "They
8	shall not be" and then carry on with the same
9	language.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "They shall
11	not be cited." Any opposition to that?
12	"Precedent," period. "They" strike
13	"and" "shall not be cited as persuasive
14	authority," and so forth.
15	Okay. Any other amendments? Sarah, do
16	you want to make an amendment?
17	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Oh,
18	no.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
20	Harriet, offer an amendment.
21	MS. MIERS: I would just delete
22	the word "authoritative." I don't understand
23	the difference between "authoritative" and
24	"precedent."
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection

1 to that amendment? HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 2 Yes, 3 I would object to that. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 4 Okay. 5 there a second to that amendment? No second. It fails. 6 7 Okay. Are we ready to vote? Okay. Here 8 is what we're voting on to replace 90(i) on "90(i), 9 Page 130 of the materials: Unpublished Opinions. Opinions designated not 10 11 for publication are not authoritative precedent. They shall not be cited as 1.2 persuasive authority without providing a 13 complete copy to the court and all other 14 parties." 15 MR. LATTING: No, that's not 16 what Dorsaneo -- he said "and" --17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Then we took 18 the "and" out. 19 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 20 I don't 21 mind the "and" not being in there. But if the "and" is not in there, I would rather have 22 the sentence read affirmatively rather than - 23 24 negatively; that they may be cited as 25 persuasive authority if --

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is that
2	amendment accepted, that they may be cited?
3	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: No, no,
4	no. That changes it, Bill.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: They
7	shall be cited as they may be cited as
8	persuasive.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: You don't
10	accept the "authority" part of the amendment?
11	Okay. Any second to leaving "authority" in?
12	That fails. Okay. Here it goes again, and
13	I'll read it slow so you can fix your notes so
14	that you can look at it.
15	"90(i), Unpublished Opinions. Opinions
16	designated not for publication are not
17	authoritative precedent. They may be cited as
18	persuasive if a complete copy is provided to
19	the court and all other parties."
20	Now, that's the proposed amendment.
21	MR. LATTING: Second.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sarah, do you
23	have an amendment to offer?
24	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yes.
25	I would suggest that we place the burden for

1 providing the copy -- "They may be cited as 2 persuasive if the citing party provides a 3 complete copy to the court and all other 4 parties." 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection 6 to that addition? All right. 7 MR. GALLAGHER: Why don't you just take out the whole thing? 8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The motion 10 has been made to take out the whole thing. 11 Any second? No second. It fails. 12 There's a second. Those in favor show by hands. 13 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Wait, take 14 15 out what whole thing? 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just take out 17 90(i) altogether, I quess. 18 Those in favor? There are three. Opposed. That motion fails. 19 20 "90(i), Unpublished Opinions. Opinions designated not for publication are not 21 authoritative precedent. They may be cited as 22 23 persuasive if the citing party provides a 24 complete copy to the court and all other 25 parties."

1 Those in favor show by hands. And 2 those opposed. Three. 13 to three the motion carries, so this will be the new 90(i). 3 4 HONORABLE PAUL HEATH TILL: Read it one more time, please, Luke. 5 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "90(i), 7 Unpublished Opinions. Opinions designated not 8 for publication are not authoritative 9 precedent. They may be cited as persuasive if the citing party provides a complete copy to 10 the court and all other parties." 11 12 Okay. Next is Item 16. 13 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: This is an amendment to Rule 130, paragraph (a). 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And this is 15 16 on Page 149 in your materials. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 17 18 However, subdivision (a) doesn't appear there because it hasn't previously been amended. 19 20 The rule as now in force reads, "Method 21 of Review. The Supreme Court may review final 22 judgments of the courts of appeals upon writ 23 of error." And the amendment would simply say 24 that "The Supreme Court may review the final 25 judgments of a court of appeals by writ of

error if a timely motion for rehearing has been overruled."

Now, that doesn't change the goal, it just enlightens some misguided or ignorant lawyers that might think they can file an application for writ of error without presenting a motion for rehearing and having it overruled.

Ken Law says it's surprising how many lawyers don't understand that they can't file an application for writ of error without having a motion for rehearing filed and overruled.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection to inserting this into Page 149? Being no objection, it will be done.

Next is No. 16 and then No. 17.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Next is No. 17 on Page 155. The rule reads that the Supreme Court -- let me get the page. The rule says "Expenses" in the middle of Page 155. "The party applying for the writ of error shall deposit with the clerk of the court of appeals a sum sufficient to pay the expressage or carriage of the record to and

1	from the Clerk of the Supreme Court."
2	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: I love that
3	language. Let's keep it in there.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's kind
5	of neat, isn't it?
6	JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Archaic.
7	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The
8	issue is, shall we go with the archaic
9	language?
10	MR. LATTING: Yeah. What the
11	heck.
12	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Or
13	shall we substitute "expense of mailing and
14	shipping"?
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection
16	to No. 17? Being no objection, it will be
17	done. It's amended.
18	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: In
19	Rule 182, which is on Page 162
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just a
21	minute, let me get my notes caught up here.
22	"Expense of mailing or shipping."
23	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: It's
24	as stated in Item No. 17.
25	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think

the Court does do that, right? It has current Rule 182 as amended in 1990 rather than the one that was in our prior drafts, so that has already been done.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I've got 132(b). So now we're at Rule 182, and it's on what page?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 162. As a result of this project spanning at least, what, Judge, three years or four years, maybe, the appellate rules combined committee meetings over a period of four years?

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

That's right.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Okay. The draft of Rule 182 that was in our report was actually a draft that had been amended in 1990, and we caught that in red-lining. So the change that you have on Page 162 of the March 13, 1995, Appellate Rules Report is faithful to the current rules. And the only change, which has already been voted on, is to provide damages for delay in original proceedings as well as when there's an application for writ of error.

1	MR. ORSINGER: So the reference
2	in the supplementary report to 182 is not
3	that's not the page
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's on
5	Page 162.
6	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It's been
7	previously included in previous versions.
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: This is on
9	Page 162. We're saying that in Rule 182,
10	language previously included in the report
11	limiting the Supreme Court to ten times cost
12	as a sanction was deleted. It's not deleted
13	on Page 162.
14	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
15	That's right.
16	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So this is
17	informational.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So it is the
19	intent for the Supreme Court to continue to be
20	limited to 10
21	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No. For
22	the Supreme Court it is the intent of the
23	Supreme Court to have the rule that it wants
24	to have.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

1 MR. ORSINGER: We need to draw 2 a line through our report then. 3 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: In other words, the proposal 4 That's right. 5 is -- the existing rule has the language "not 6 to exceed 10 percent of the amount of damages 7 awarded." That has not changed in --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, it 8 9 has. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 10 11 the report on Page 162. But the proposal is 12 to strike out that language, "not to exceed 10 percent of the amount of the damages 13 14 awarded," so that the Supreme Court will have 15 the discretion to impose a different penalty. 16 Of course, if no damages are awarded, 17 then there's no basis upon which to assess a 18 penalty, so that if you delete that language, 19 this will give the Supreme Court more 20 discretion with regards to penalty. 21 MR. ORSINGER: Luke. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just a moment There's some confusion. 23 here. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No. Tt. 25 didn't happen. It was supposed to be fixed,

and it's not fixed back on Page 162. I'll 1 have to take back what I said. 2 3 MR. ORSINGER: The current rule says "an appropriate amount." What's wrong 4 5 with the current rule language? What's wrong with (b) in our paperback books? 6 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Nothing. 8 We're trying to get it here on this page. 9 MR. ORSINGER: Well, why can't 10 we just say that we're going to eliminate this 11 entirely from our book, because we have no changes to the rule as --12 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But "or in 13 14 an original proceeding" and "or relator" needs to be added. 15 MR. ORSINGER: Let's just --16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hold on just 18 a second. Holly and I are going to have to do 19 this next week. 20 "Whenever the Supreme Court shall 21 determine that an application for writ of error or an original proceeding has been taken 22 23 for delay and without sufficient cause, then 24 the court may award each prevailing respondent 25 an appropriate amount." Strike "not to exceed

1	10 percent of the amount of." Insert "as
2	damages." Strike "awarded to."
3	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And just
4	keep going.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Strike
6	"awarded to." Okay. "As damages against
7	each petitioner or relator."
8	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Can I
9	make a suggestion?
10	PROFESSOR DORSANEO:
11	Appropriate amount as damages.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Appropriate
13	amount as damages against each petitioner or
14	relator."
15	Okay. I've got it, and it now tracks the
16	present rule. And the only changes are
17	underscored. Okay. We've got this, and the
18	papers that go to the Supreme Court will be
19	correct. Judge Duncan.
20	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
21	thought it initially paralleled the rule
22	that
23	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It was
24	changed in 1990.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now,

1 we've fixed Rule 182, which was incorrect in 2 the materials on Page 162, and now we're down 3 to 19. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 4 5 Well, this has to do with Rule 190. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: On page what? 7 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 8 9 Well, let's see, it's on Page 166. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Page 166 in 11 the materials? HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 12 13 But it has to do with subparagraphs, and Yes. 14 it has not been -- they're not in our report. 15 Subdivision (b) of Rule 190 says the 16 points relied on for the rehearing shall be distinctly specified in the motion. That's 17 18 okay. We keep that in. But we strike the rest of that paragraph, which says, The motion 19 20 shall state the name and address of the 21 attorneys of record for the parties to the 22 trial court's final judgment; and, if there's 23 no attorney of record, the name and address of 24 the parties to the trial court's final

25

judgment.

1	The reason for striking that is that
2	that's already required in the briefs, so
3	there's no use to require that to be put in
4	again in the motion for rehearing.
5	The party filing such motion shall serve
6	on each party to the trial court's final
7	judgment or the attorney of record a true copy
8	of the motion. Well, of course, that's also
9	superfluous because service is elsewhere
10	provided.
11	Now, the next subdivision, "Notice of
12	Motion. Upon filing a motion"
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hold on.
14	Now, what you're saying is that in Rule 190(b)
15	we're going to retain the first sentence only
16	of the present rule?
17	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: And
18	strike the rest.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And delete
20	the remainder?
21	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
22	Okay. And in subdivision (c), let's see, all
23	of paragraph (c) would be deleted.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: (c) is
25	deleted?

1	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes,
2	because it's required that the court that
3	the motion be served, so that's sufficient
4	notice.
5	Subdivision (d), then, would be amended
6	by providing that the parties shall have five
7	days after instead of "after notice in
8	which to file an answer," say "after service
9	of the motion in which to file an answer."
10	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: None of
11	that's a big deal.
12	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
13	That's right.
-	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I need
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES. Okay. I need
14	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can
15	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can
15 16	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All
15 16 17	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All right. "The parties shall have five days
15 16 17 18	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All right. "The parties shall have five days after service of the motion" strike
15 16 17 18	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All right. "The parties shall have five days after service of the motion" strike "notice" "in which to file an answer to
15 16 17 18 19 20	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All right. "The parties shall have five days after service of the motion" strike "notice" "in which to file an answer to the motion."
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All right. "The parties shall have five days after service of the motion" strike "notice" "in which to file an answer to the motion." CHAIRMAN SOULES: The party
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	to have somebody read (d) to me so I can HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: All right. "The parties shall have five days after service of the motion" strike "notice" "in which to file an answer to the motion." CHAIRMAN SOULES: The party shall have five days after.

1	motion.
2	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: In
3	which to file an answer. I don't guess we
4	need "to the motion." We'll strike that.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. "The
6	parties shall have five days after" and we
7	strike "notice"
8	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
9	"after service of the motion."
10	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Make it
11	10 days.
12	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
13	Well, that's another question.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Five days
15	after service of the motion in which to file
16	an answer."
17	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
18	"Answer," period.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And strike
20	"to the motion."
21	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
22	Right.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And retain
24	the rest of the rule?
25	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

1	Right.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that's
3	(d), right?
4	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
5	Yeah.
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Now,
7	Professor Dorsaneo raises a question which has
8	not previously been proposed as to whether we
9	should increase the number of days from five
10	to 10, which is
11	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The reason
12	I do that is, because by taking out the things
13	we're taking out, we're taking out some of the
14	engineering and we actually make the five days
15	shorter.
16	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I
17	guess.
18	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 10 days is
19	the more normal time to do anything in
20	response to a motion in a court of appeals
21	anyway.
22	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I
23	would agree.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any
25	opposition to 10 days? No opposition. That

It's 190.

carries.

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Is there any opposition, All right. then, to 19 and the expansion thereon related to (d)?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, it's CHAIRMAN SOULES: Item 19 on this -- well, to this amendment to Any opposition to that? Rule 190. none, that will be done then.

> Item 20. Okay.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: would provide an order of the Supreme Court for an administrative basis as to what's to be done with old records. This would provide -this would implement the statute which provides that after the 10 years after the final disposition that the court may destroy those records or shall destroy those records which have no -- unless they have unique permanent value.

And this would provide the mechanism for implementing that statute, which would adopt the procedure that I think is followed in the Austin Court, perhaps others, that provides that the panel that decides an opinion shall,

when the record is disposed of initially after the case is over, file with the record a paper to say this document -- this record shall or shall not be permanently preserved. Then after 10 years, if it hasn't been so designated, the records may be destroyed.

The proposed rule would also provide that the court of appeals may revise that designation or change it at any time before the record is destroyed.

So the first subdivisions, (a) and (b), would simply have definitions there.

Subdivision (b) would require in (1) that before any court records are destroyed, the court of appeals shall, in accordance with Government Code section 51.204 and the guideline provides by the State Archives, determine whether they should be permanently preserved.

No. 2 requires that determination to be made immediately after disposition of an appeal or other proceeding. The panel that -- I prefer "which" to "that" -- Judge Cornelius.

JUSTICE CORNELIUS: I have a concern about subdivision (2).

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And

I don't

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Okay. JUSTICE CORNELIUS: want the courts of appeals to be required to file in every case after they decide it a statement one way or another. I think that's just extra work that we don't need to do. I would propose that subdivision (2) be changed to provide that if -- that the panel which decided the case -- take out that "immediately after final disposition." Just say the panel which decided the case shall determine whether the records shall be permanently preserved. If they are to be preserved, the panel shall file with the case record a statement to that effect.

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HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: That's all right with me.

JUSTICE CORNELIUS: That way you don't have to clutter up the "case filed with the statement" part, unless they are worthy of preservation.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: would suppose you would have a form. And as it is here, you would just check off -- check

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1 "preserved" or "not preserved." Now, I don't have any objection to --2 3 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: But I would rather not have the panel be required to do 4 5 anything unless they determine that the 6 records ought to be preserved. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 7 The problem about that is to make sure that the 8 panel's attention is focused on that problem, 9 and not put the burden on the panel to take 10 any -- to figure out what they ought to do at 11 12 that point, but call their attention to the fact that they need to make a determination 13 14 and not just let it go without determining it. JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Well, No. 1 15 16 says that they will make the determination 17 before the records are destroyed. 18 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes. JUSTICE CORNELIUS: And as a 19 practical matter, that's how my court does 20 We wait, and then we'll get an entire 21 22 batch of records and then decide if they 23 should be preserved.

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of review is done?

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PROFESSOR DORSANEO:

What kind

1 JUSTICE CORNELIUS: What kind 2 of review? Just a personal one between myself 3 and the clerk and the other judges, you know, 4 if it's --5 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The 6 current judges, right? Not the ones that 7 decided it? JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Right. The 8 9 current ones. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that's a 10 11 problem, because this just says the panel has to decide it. 12 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 13 14 Yeah. The thought there is that that panel, 15 after being familiar with the record, knows 16 better than anyone whether it has permanent 17 So the purpose of the rule is to require that panel to make the initial 18 19 determination subject to redetermination by 20 the court at any time. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's three. 22 I don't know. You've got to have the 23 panel determination. Under three, you've got 24 to have a panel determination before the court

can make a determination. The government

code, does it limit the power to make this determination to the panel that decided the case?

the panel.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't think they ought to be, because it may or may not happen at the time. The panel may not even be -- you may not even be able to reconstitute

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

that's why he put in there "immediately after the case is decided." But I hesitate to put another burden on the panel that in every case they not only have to have an opinion and they've got to have a judgment, they have to have a decision whether to publish or not, but they've also got to have an immediate decision as to whether or not the record ought to be preserved.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And all I'm doing in responding to that is saying if it's not done immediately, which I understand your position, then it shouldn't be limited to the panel that made the decision, because you may not be able to reconstitute it.

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Judge Duncan.

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HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Two points. One, I think if it's not done immediately by the panel, it effectively can't meaningfully be done by someone later on down the road.

And two, this is beside the point but I don't want us to lose it in the discussion, I don't think that (a)(2)'s definition of "Record on Appeal" is going to work, because it includes everything that's been filed in the trial court regardless of whether it's in the appellate court or not. And that's sort of an aside.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Alex

Albright.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Well, I have two points too. One quick point is you use the words "court records," which is also the words used in 76(a) and the appellate equivalent of 76(a). And I'm just wondering if it's confusing to use "court records" in two different ways. Maybe we should think up another word. I think you do have in (1), "records of a case." Maybe that should be

1 the word that's used.

Secondly, I think what Judge Cornelius is saying is just that there is a presumption that the panel has decided that the records should not be preserved unless there is a piece of paper that says it shall be preserved. So I think you do have a decision of the panel immediately, it's just that in most cases there will not be a piece of paper filed to reflect that decision unless they have decided to go counter to the presumption. I don't see that that's --

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: You have a presumed finding that it's not to be preserved.

JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Right.

the question is, is that realistic. Has the panel really taken any thought -- given any thought to that problem if they don't have to record a decision one way or another?

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Well, is it significant?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: I agree with

Justice Guittard. I'm afraid that it will be
routine that nothing is put in the files just
because it's a neglected issue that's not
mentioned or brought up; and that we may be
assuming someone is making a conscious
decision, and then after a while we find out
that no one is making a decision, conscious or
unconscious.

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PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: But just by checking off a piece of paper, I doubt that there will be a conscious decision made on that. They will just check "not preserved" until somebody happens to brings up the point that this may be something that should be preserved, which I wouldn't think would happen very often.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's hear from the court of appeals people on this too. Judge Duncan.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: It seems on me -- I mean, I don't know exactly how other courts' procedures are, but when we circulate opinions, there's a publish/do not publish slot, and you look at it, and you

think, oh, should it be or shouldn't it be, and you look at what the writing author has done.

And if you have another little box on there that says "preserve records/not preserve records," in nine out of 10 cases I'm sure that you would just go, "No, don't preserve this." But it causes you to advert to it, which I don't know about the other courts, but I don't think anybody has caused me to think about should the records in a particular case be preserved.

And I don't think it's terribly onerous a burden to put on the panel to make that determination one way or the other when the final opinion is issued. Maybe I'm off base.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

You're right.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Am I right? Judge Guittard says I'm right, so I must be this one time.

JUSTICE CORNELIUS: Well, I don't feel that strongly about the matter, so I'll just withdraw my suggestion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: As a result

1	of this discussion, though, do there need to
2	be any changes made in the way the order is
3	constructed?
4	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I do
5	think we need to change (a)(1).
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Change
7	(a)(1). Change it to say what?
8	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Alex
9	has brought up that "court records" is
10	confusing because of 76(a). I think "record
11	on appeal" is confusing because of TRAP 50(a),
12	so what if we just said, "Records of a case
13	are all documents filed, or presented for
14	filing and received" no, that won't do
15	it "in an appellate court."
16	But you still also want to include the
17	motions folder, the folder containing the
18	court's orders, the
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is it the
20	file of the clerk of the court of appeals that
21	we're going to get rid of, the whole thing?
22	MR. ORSINGER: Judgment and all
23	opinions?
24	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No.
25	Those are kept.

1	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: No.
2	Opinions are always kept. They are not to be
3	destroyed. But it's the other papers in the
4	case that would be destroyed.
5	MR. ORSINGER: Can I also
6	inquire, are preliminary opinions always
7	destroyed automatically and never become part
8	of the file? In other words, they don't no
9	one will ever see a preliminary draft of an
10	opinion. Is that right?
11	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
12	That's right.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: As far as I
14	know.
15	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The
16	briefing attorneys get copies of the briefs
17	that are marked up, but do not
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
19	what are we going to call these papers?
20	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Records of
21	the case.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we have
23	"Order of the Supreme Court Regarding the
24	Disposition of Papers in Civil Cases."
25	Why don't we call them "papers"? "Papers

defined." 1 2 MR. ORSINGER: How about "For 3 purposes of this order, papers are:" PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 4 5 definition is consistent with the one in 6 TRAP 22 as proposed. It's completely consistent and identical to it. 7 To what? CHAIRMAN SOULES: 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 9 10 (Indicating). 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: But that doesn't necessarily mean that we want to 12 13 destroy the same things, and this is for two 14 different purposes. 15 Okay. Are we going to define this 16 somehow so that we can get on with it, or leave it like it is? 17 Help us. HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 18 Lee, 19 do you have a suggestion? 20 MR. PARSLEY: I don't have a 21 I just drafted this, and there is suggestion. a reason for a distinction between "court 22 23 records" and the "record on appeal," because the Supreme Court sends back to the courts of 2.4

appeals the record in some instances and does

not send back the record in other instances, and that is the record as defined by the appellate rules; that is, the statement of facts and transcript. But it doesn't send back everything. It doesn't send back its entire file. It just sends back the record, so there has to be a distinction between those two.

Sarah has got a point that there may be a problem with the way the "record" is defined as everything in the trial court, and that may need fixing. But there's got to be those -- because the Supreme Court doesn't send back the entire file. It just sends back the record sometimes, and so we've got to be able to recognize that distinction in the rule, which is why we had the definition section to begin with.

Now, what we call them doesn't really matter. We just have to distinguish between the record and everything that's in the file, which are two different things.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: So why can't we just substitute every place "court records" is used or "records of a case" is

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1	used and substitute the word "papers"?
2	MR. PARSLEY: Well, is a poster
3	board "papers"?
4	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Because
5	that would be a
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Or
7	correspondence with the court or something
8	like that, is that that's a paper. Is that
9	going to be considered the record?
10	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: What if it
11	says, "Papers are defined as all documents
12	included in the transcript, or in the
13	statement of facts, and any other papers or
14	items made part of the record on appeal or
15	otherwise filed, or presented for filing and
16	received, in an appellate court."
17	So papers are defined to include items,
18	which would be a poster board or a gun or
19	whatever else, I suppose.
20	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But
21	then we still have the "record on appeal"
22	problem.
23	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: But then
24	it would still say "'Papers' include the
25	'record on appeal.'"

And then Part (2). "Record on appeal" defined. The "record on appeal" is defined by TRAP Rule 50(a).

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But that's the problem. 50(a) we changed intentionally to mean everything filed in the trial court including the transcript on appeal.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Well, then we just need to figure out a definition of "record on appeal" then. And if that is used inconsistently in 50(a), then maybe we need a different term.

MR. ORSINGER: Why do we need "record on appeal" anyway? Doesn't "papers" cover the whole waterfront?

MR. PARSLEY: Well, again, if you go to (c) in the order, Part (c)(1), (2), and (3), the Supreme Court does things with the record, what we always think of as the record, that it does not do with all the papers in the file. So you have to distinguish between the record, which sometimes they send back to the court of appeals and sometimes they don't, and all

Okay.

papers on file, which they sometimes store all of and sometimes they don't.

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

"the record" defined anywhere in this order?

MR. PARSLEY: Well, I only
refer to "record on appeal." I don't ever
refer to "the record." I refer to "the record
on appeal," which is defined in (a)(2) as

being the record on appeal from 50(a).

MR. ORSINGER: Why do we even need to discuss that? If we define "papers" to be things that are in the custody of the court of appeals, we don't care where they look or whether they came back. What we're destroying is papers in the court of appeals. And if they're in the Supreme Court or the trial court, they don't get destroyed.

MR. PARSLEY: Well, the answer to your question is, and maybe that points up your problem, is that part (c) talks about destruction of papers in the Supreme Court as well. This order does not just apply to the courts of appeals. The proposed order applies to the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: 1 The words "the record" are used several times in (c). 2 3 MR. ORSINGER: We don't need to use it, though, is my point, Luke. 4 Why don't 5 we just say "papers," and then we'll just say 6 papers in the court of appeals can be destroyed under the following circumstances; 7 8 papers in the Supreme Court can be destroyed 9 under the following circumstances. And let's not worry about where they went or where they 10 11 came from. If they're there, they get 12 destroyed; and if they're not there, then we don't worry about them. Wouldn't that be a 13 way to avoid the definitional problem? 14 15 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Lee, what 16 is the "record on appeal" that you're talking 17 about? The transcript and the statement of 18 facts? Then why don't we just say "the transcript and the statement of facts"? 19 20 MR. PARSLEY: I would say 21 transcript and statement of facts as 22 supplemented, because you can supplement 23 those, and so maybe that clears it up some. 24 MR. ORSINGER: Can I inquire,

are the transcript and statement of facts

1	included in "papers" as we've defined it?
2	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes.
3	MR. ORSINGER: Then why do we
4	even need to discuss it?
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's
6	start with Part (1) and see how inclusive it
7	is, and we're going to use the words "Papers
8	defined."
9	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
10	Statement of facts, briefs, motions?
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Papers
12	defined. 'Papers' are all documents" and
13	I'm just trying to get this moving. I'm not
14	trying to necessarily do this, if anybody has
15	got an objection. "'Papers' are all documents
16	included in the transcript or in the statement
17	of facts and any other papers or items made
18	part of the record on appeal."
19	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No.
20	You can't use "record on appeal."
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Part of the
22	what then?
23	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
24	Appellate file. Case file.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Of the

ţ	
1	appellate case file?
2	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Just
3	say "any other papers or items filed."
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other
5	papers or items filed.
6	MR. ORSINGER: Filed or
7	presented for filing.
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Filed or
9	presented for filings in a court of appeals.
10	Filed or presented for filing and received in
11	an appellate court.
12	So we strike "'court records' include
13	the 'record on appeal.'" Strike all of
14	(2)?
15	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I think
16	that's up to Lee. Lee, do we need to
17	distinguish the record on appeal?
18	MR. PARSLEY: We've got to,
19	because in part (c) they do some things with
20	the record on appeal that they don't do with
21	the other items that we defined as "papers."
22	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: So we
23	could say "'Papers' include the 'record on
24	appeal,'" and then "The 'record on appeal' is
25	defined as the transcript and statement of

1 facts as supplemented." 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Papers" 3 include the "record on appeal"? 4 MR. ORSINGER: Well, you don't 5 need to say that, because that follows from our definition of papers, because the record 6 7 on appeal is filed in the court of appeals. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, he's 9 wanting to define -- okay. So we don't need 10 that sentence, but we do need (2), which says "record on appeal" means transcript and 11 12 statement of facts, because he uses that as 13 defined -- the record on appeal is the transcript and statement of facts as 14 15 supplemented. And all supplements. 16 Okay. So "papers" are defined in the 17 first sentence under (1) to the period. 18 Delete "'Court records' include the 'record 19 on appeal.'" Then say "'Record on Appeal' 20 defined. The 'record on appeal' is the 21 transcript and statement of facts and all 22 supplements." Does that do it? 23 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: It may 24 actually sound better to use the term -- make

it "court papers" instead of just "papers."

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Court
2	papers. Okay. We'll change the title to
3	"Court Papers."
4	Okay. Now, what do we need to do from
5	there?
6	MR. ORSINGER: Change "court
7	records" to "court papers."
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we've
9	got to go through all of this then.
10	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: So
11	where it says "records of the case" in
12	item (2), it should be "court papers"?
13	MR. ORSINGER: Yes.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. That's
15	the record on appeal, because that's used
16	later as a term of art.
17	MR. ORSINGER: Not in
18	subdivision (2). It's records of the case. I
19	think they mean "court papers" there.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
21	MR. ORSINGER: In (b)(1),
22	change "court records" to "court papers."
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Court papers.
24	Anything else on (1) other than "records" to
25	"papers" in the second line? Nothing else?

1	Good. No. (2).
2	MR. ORSINGER: Okay. On the
3	third line.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: The third
5	line, "whether the court papers of the case."
6	MR. ORSINGER: Court papers.
7	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I
8	suggest that in the second line strike "which"
9	and insert "that."
10	"Immediately after the final disposition
11	of an appeal or other proceeding, the panel
12	that decided the case shall determine."
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "That."
14	Okay. (3). Anything on (3)?
15	MR. ORSINGER: The second line.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Court papers.
17	MR. ORSINGER: And then on the
18	third line.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. (4).
20	MR. ORSINGER: Second line.
21	MR. YELENOSKY: And then on the
22	fourth line, it says "papers or exhibits," and
23	we've already defined "papers" to essentially
24	include exhibits.
25	MR. ORSINGER: This is

different. Aren't we saying that exhibits
will be sent out to the parties on request?
It's handled a little bit differently, isn't
it?

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: These are
papers and exhibits outside of the defined
term "court papers."

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
Shouldn't it just be original exhibits? It
shouldn't be original papers, because that
would mean original motions and things likes
original briefs.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: It seems like it would only be exhibits.

MR. ORSINGER: And not just original exhibits, because we send copies up most of the time.

MR. PARSLEY: The point here is that Rules 51 and 53, if I'm correct, Judge Guittard, which we have already approved in this Committee, require the trial court to make an order for the preservation, safekeeping, and return of any original papers or original exhibits that are sent on to the court of appeals. The idea here is that since

1	the trial court has ordered that these things
2	should be returned, or under our rules should
3	have ordered that, that we have to provide
4	that the appellate court will do that, will
5	return to the trial court the original papers
6	or exhibits.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's what
8	this is designed to do under (4).
9	MR. PARSLEY: That's the
10	point. It may not have done it right, but
11	that's the point.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So we just
13	need to change it to "court papers" in the
14	second line, and then that works. (4) works.
15	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Should we
16	refer to those rules in (4)?
17	MR. PARSLEY: It wouldn't hurt.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
19	MR. YELENOSKY: You have a
20	second reference to "record on appeal."
21	MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. Lee, I
22	think we need to change that, because we talk
23	about "included in the record on appeal," and
24	remember, "the record" now includes what's in
25	the trial court, so maybe we ought to say

1	"filed in the appellate court" or something
2	like that.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Without
4	regard to the determination of whether the
5	records of a case should be permanently
6	preserved, within thirty days after final
7	disposition of an appeal, pursuant to" what
8	rules, Lee?
9	MR. PARSLY: 51. The original
10	papers are under 51.
11	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: We've
12	taken "papers" out on Page 86,
13	subdivision (m).
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Excuse me,
15	just a minute. Let me try to get this one
16	point down.
17	MR. PARSLEY: Original papers
18	are in 51(d).
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 51(d)?
20	MR. PARSLEY: Correct.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So "Without
22	regard to the determination of whether the
23	records of a case should be permanently
24	preserved, within thirty days after final
25	disposition of an appeal, any original papers

1 or exhibits included in the record on 2 appeal" -- I don't know if we're keeping 3 that -- "shall be returned to the trial court 4 pursuant to Rule 51(d)." Original 5 MR. PARSLEY: exhibits, I'm sorry, are under 53(m). 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 53(m). So pursuant to Rule 51(d) and 53(m). 8 9 Now, what else on (4)? Judge Duncan. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That 10 was it. We've changed "record on appeal" to 11 12 "court papers." CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Any original 13 14 papers or exhibits." And we should probably strike "including the record on appeal" 15 16 completely. "Any original papers or exhibits 17 shall be returned pursuant to those rules." Doesn't that take care of it? 18 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: 19 What if 2.0 you said "exhibits sent to the appellate court 21 under Rules 51(d) or 53(m)"? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 22 Well, 23 actually why wouldn't we leave it "record on 24 appeal," because that is only the transcript 25 and the statement of facts, which includes the

1	exhibits. Well, we've redefined that. Never
2	mind.
3	MR. ORSINGER: What's wrong
4	with just leaving "included in the record on
5	appeal" out altogether?
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just strike
7	it. Just strike it and put the rules in,
8	because the rules it takes us back to the
9	rule.
10	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: But it
11	seems to me like it should refer to 51(d) and
12	53(m), because that makes it clear that it's a
13	special circumstance where the trial court has
14	sent these to
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yeah. And I
16	wrote that in.
17	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Okay.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right after
19	"trial court" in the next to the last line,
20	"trial court, pursuant to 51(d) and 53(m).
21	The appellate court may, but is not required
22	to, copy those papers" and so forth.
23	Okay. Now (5). (5) is okay.
24	MR. ORSINGER: No. It's got
25	"records" in there. "All other court

papers." 1 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "All other 3 court papers." 4 (6). HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 5 Now. 6 there's a problem with (6). Let me just -this term, "permanent value" -- instead of 7 8 "permanent value," that term came from an 9 earlier draft where "permanent value" was 10 used, but now the draft reads "records that 11 should be permanently preserved." So it will be necessary to change this to 12 13 read, (1) destroy the papers which the court 14 decides, finally decides should not be preserved; and (2), return the records of a 15 16 case -- the papers in a case that the court 17 finds should be permanently preserved over to 18 the State Archives. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. (1)20 says, "Destroy the papers the court determines." 21 22 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 23 Should not be permanently preserved, and turn 24 over to the State Archives.

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

Just a

1	minute, sorry. "Should not be permanently
2	preserved." And then (2) is okay?
3	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
4	Well, no. And (2), turn over to the State
5	Archives the papers that the court finds
6	should be permanently preserved.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Turn over to
8	the State Archives the what?
9	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: The
10	papers, the court papers that the court finds
11	should be permanently preserved or has found
12	should be permanently preserved.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. (c).
14	MR. ORSINGER: Before we go on,
15	can I ask you one question?
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.
17	MR. ORSINGER: On
18	subdivision (5), it is unclear to me what
19	papers, if any, fit in subdivision (5) or why
20	we even have a subdivision (5). We've talked
21	about all other papers, so do we need "other
22	than original papers and exhibits"? And if
23	so, then
24	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
25	Other than as stated in (4)?

1	MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. If that's
2	other than as stated in (4), we've got to fold
3	that sentence into the end of (4), because
4	"other" could mean other than (1), (2), (3),
5	and (4). And I think (1) through (4) include
6	everything.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It doesn't
8	include the decision.
9	MR. ORSINGER: Well, we've
10	defined "court papers," and then we tell them
11	to make an initial determination and then a
12	subsequent determination, and then we say all
13	other papers are to be held until they're to
14	be destroyed.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Until an
16	ultimate disposition, and then that's defined.
17	MR. ORSINGER: See, the problem
18	I have is "other than." Other than what? It
19	seems to me that if "other than" means other
20	than in (4), then why don't we put this
21	sentence at the end of (4) and not make it a
22	separate subdivision.
23	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
24	What's the point there, Lee?
25	MR. PARSLEY: He's correct.

1	The "other" was referring back to (4), and
2	perhaps we should change the caption of (4) to
3	include (5) as a sentence in paragraph (4).
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So what do we
5	change the caption in (4) to say?
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
. 7	Well, "original papers and exhibits" is all
8	right, isn't it, even though we've already had
9	that?
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Do we need to
11	change the caption, Lee?
12	MR. PARSLEY: Well, I think we
13	do.
14	MR. PERRY: Maybe "Original
15	papers and exhibits" ought to be No. (1),
16	because everything else does not apply to
17	that.
18	MR. YELENOSKY: That's right.
19	MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. That's an
20	excellent point.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
22	(4) becomes (1), and then (1) becomes (2),
23	right, (2) becomes (3), (3) becomes (4)?
24	MR. ORSINGER: We don't need
25	section (5) then. That sentence is completely

1 unnecessary if we put that first. 2 MR. PERRY: Well, (5) really 3 defines everything that the remainder of it talks about. 4 5 MR. ORSINGER: We don't need 6 to, though, because if it's not handled by 7 (1), it's handled by (2). 8 MR. PARSLEY: (1) and (2)No. 9 are intended only to tell the court to make the determination. What the determination is 10 11 and when to make it is what (1), (2) and (3) 12 are intended to do. (5) was intended to say -- now that 13 14 you've made the determination, (5) and (6) were intended to say now what disposition you 15 make depending on that determination. 16 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 17 Can I 18 suggest that (5) might should be (2)? HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 19 It seems to me that (1), (2), and 3 should 20 21 stay as they are. And (4) and (5) should be 22 put together. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think that's what Lee is saying. (1), (2), and (3) 24 25 have to do with getting a decision made, and

1 then --2 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 3 That's right. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So the numbering will be as in original. 5 Okay. So this is (4). And then if we 6 7 just move the sentence that's in (5) to the 8 end of (4), do we need to change any caption? 9 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yes. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 10 What 11 should it say? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 12 Well. 13 I think if you merge those two, I think you 14 are losing the emphasis that is now being placed on treating original exhibits and 15 16 papers differently from all other papers. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What's the 18 purpose of this, Lee? How do we fix this so 19 that it says what you envision it as saying? 20 MR. PARSLEY: Well, I think the 21 easiest fix is to leave it as is, not combine 22 (4) and (5), and say in (5) that "The 23 appellate court shall keep and preserve all 24 other papers, other than original papers and

exhibits, until their ultimate disposition as

prescribed herein."

MR. YELENOSKY: So then why did we abandon moving that up to the front? Since you're saying we're not going to talk about this, you're sending it back, now let's talk about the stuff you have to make a determination about.

Well, the general rules, rules (1), (2) and (3), are general with respect to all papers, the briefs, the transcript, statement of facts, everything. (4) just concerns a special situation where there are original papers or original exhibits in the court of appeals. And that's a different disposition than the general disposition of the papers, so that should follow the others.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Then we're saying the court shall keep and preserve all papers except duplicates and original papers or exhibits?

MR. ORSINGER: Why can't you just say, "Except as provided in subdivision (b)(4), the appellate court shall keep and preserve all other court papers,

1	except duplicates, until their ultimate
2	disposition"?
3	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Yes,
4	that's fine. Except I don't think then you
5	would need the word "other."
6	MR. ORSINGER: Take "other"
7	out. Yeah. "Except as in provided in
8	subdivision (b)(4), the appellate court shall
9	keep and preserve all court papers."
10	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:
11	Yeah, except duplicates, until their ultimate
12	disposition as prescribed herein.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Subject to
14	paragraph (4)?
15	MR. ORSINGER: No. Except
16	as what have we got
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: But we've got
18	except, except.
19	MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Whatever.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Pursuant to
21	paragraph (b)(4) above, the appellate court
22	shall keep and preserve all other"
23	MR. ORSINGER: No. Kill
24	"other."
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "preserve

all court papers, except duplicates, until 1 2 their ultimate disposition prescribed herein." 3 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Right. 4 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then we've got ultimate disposition, and we talked 6 7 about that. Now we've got the Supreme Court. "In the 8 9 Supreme Court, the following disposition is 10 made of court papers." Reverse and remand. The Supreme Court 11 12 returns the -- what? Returns what? Returns 1.3 the record on appeal. We've defined that. 14 (Continuing) -- to the court of appeals. court of appeals shall then dispose of the, 15 16 what, record on appeal? Of the court papers? MR. YELENOSKY: Court papers. 17 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: In accordance with paragraph (b). The Supreme Court keeps 19 20 and preserves all other items which constitute How about "The Supreme Court keeps and 21 what? preserves all other items except duplicates." 22 23 Would that work, Lee? 24 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Wait a 25 minute. The Supreme Court keeps and preserves

1	court papers in its in that court.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All other
3	items. It's just everything that's left.
4	MR. PARSLEY: I think that's
5	fine, Luke.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "All other
7	items except duplicates."
8	MR. PARSLEY: Until they are.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Until they
10	are turned over to the State Archive."
11	MR. ORSINGER: That means
12	everything that the Supreme Court keeps is
13	permanently saved forever, no discretion?
14	MR. PARSLEY: That's how it
15	works today.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Keeps and
17	preserves all court papers of that case"?
18	MR. PARSLEY: All court papers
19	of that case.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Until those
21	court papers are turned over to the State
22	Archive."
23	Okay. "In all other cases, the Supreme
24	Court returns the record on appeal to the
25	court of appeals, keeps and preserves all

1 other court papers of that case, except 2 duplicates, until they are turned over to the State Archive." 3 Okay. Does that get there, Lee? 4 5 MR. PARSLEY: Yes. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 7 other comments on the Order of the Supreme 8 Court Regarding Disposition of Court Papers in Civil Cases? 9 10 Okay. Any opposition to this being 11 recommended to the Supreme Court? There's no 12 opposition, so it will be recommended. Where do we put it in our papers? 13 14 back? It goes after -- it should be following 15 Following 181. 181. MR. ORSINGER: Ouestion. 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Ouestion. 18 Okay. 19 MR. ORSINGER: This is just 2.0 going to be a miscellaneous docket order, and 21 it will not be in anybody's version of the 22 rules of procedure. Is that what this means? 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't I'll have to ask Lee. Is this a 24 know. miscellaneous docket order? Is that the idea 25

1 here, or will it be in the rules? 2 MR. PARSLEY: Judge Guittard 3 and I talked about this. We decided to make 4 it an order to begin with, because we felt it 5 was purely administrative and it really didn't 6 make any difference to practitioners. 7 unless somebody says it ought to be published, 8 I can't see much of a reason to -- I'd make it 9 miscellaneous. 10 MR. ORSINGER: So the Supreme Court will just mail it out to all the courts 11 12 of appeals? 13 MR. PARSLEY: That's what I 14 would assume. Judge Guittard, do you have any 15 comment on that? 16 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Well, the other orders of the Supreme Court, 17 18 the ones directing the record particularly, 19 are included in the rule book. And I suppose 20 that this might be included as well. I don't 21 see any point in leaving it out. It's not 22 very long. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What do you In the rule 24 recommend? What do we recommend? book or not in the rule book? 25

1 HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: 2 recommend putting it in. 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okav. Does everbody agree with that? Bill. 4 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think all of the Supreme Court's orders ought to be 6 7 put in an appendix in the rule book, period. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 8 9 every one? 10 MR. ORSINGER: My goodness, 11 they might hand down 100 orders a year or Everything related to the state bar is 12 more. a miscellaneous docket order. Isn't that 13 14 right? Referendums, approving appointments to this Committee, you name it. 15 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. 17 Well, the Supreme Court can probably do what 18 it wants to. We say we want this one in the 19 rule book, right? 20 Okay. Now, turn to Page 69. We have changes on Page 69 because Bonnie read this 2.1 and felt that she was not given enough 22 23 direction or it wasn't clear enough for her to follow, and we have some changes. The changes 24 25 are as follows. You can note them on your

copy, and then we'll talk about them.

In the second line, between "bond" and "deposit," put a (1). The same line, after the words "cash or," a (2). The next line, after "leave of court," insert the word "tender."

In the seventh line that begins "of America," delete the comma after "thereof."

Delete "that is." Insert before the word "insured," insert the word "and."

In the next line that begins "of the United States of America or any agency thereof," a period after "thereof," and insert "the cash or negotiable instrument shall be." In the next line, after "surety bond," insert "and." In the next line, after "would be," delete "a" and insert "the."

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Where is that?

MR. ORSINGER: The second to the last line.

"bond" put a period. Strike "for the protection of other parties." And the rest of it stays as is. Take a look at that.

1	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: On the
2	second line
3	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You don't
4	want the cash conditioned in the same manner
5	as would be a surety bond.
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: I
7	don't understand what we're doing here.
8	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
9	believe the (1) in the second line where
10	did you put that?
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let me
12	do it again. In the second line, after the
13	word "bond," (1). After the word "or"
14	MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Let's
15	stop here. That's in the wrong place. It
16	ought to be "shall deposit (1) cash or, (2)
17	with leave of the court, a negotiable
18	obligation." You can deposit both cash or
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Did you get
20	the word "tender"?
21	MR. ORSINGER: No.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I gave
23	it to you. Okay. Let's go through here
24	again. Okay? On line 2
25	MR. PERRY: What page are you

1 quys on again? 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: On Page 69. 3 Okay. Anybody that doesn't have Page 69 raise your hand. Okay. Everybody has got it. 4 Line 2, after the words "filing the 5 6 bond, "insert (1). After the words "cash or," 7 insert (2). In the next line after "leave of court," insert the word "tender." 8 In the seventh line that begins with the 9 10 words "of America or any state thereof," 11 delete the comma after "thereof," and delete "that is," which are the words there 12 following. Then insert before "insured" the 13 word "and." 14 In the next line, it reads "of the United 15 16 States of America or any agency thereof," 17 change the comma to a period. In the next 18 line, this is a change from what I gave you, because cash doesn't need to be conditioned on 19 20 anything, I don't think --21 MR. PARSLEY: The condition is, 22 if you lose, they get it. They ought to get

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HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

the cash as well if you lose.

Yeah. It's conditioned.

23

24

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. You're
2	right. The cash deposit actually, right? The
3	cash deposit or negotiable instrument
4	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: No.
5	No.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: shall
7	be
8	MR. ORSINGER: It's a
9	negotiable obligation.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
11	(Continuing) negotiable obligation shall be
12	in the amount fixed for the surety bond.
13	After the comma, insert the word "and."
14	In the next line after the words "would
15	be," strike "a" and insert "the." After
16	"surety bond" put a period, and delete "for
17	the protection of other parties."
18	Any opposition to that? Judge Duncan.
19	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
20	Regarding the new subparagraph 2, if you have
21	leave of court, you're entitled to file it,
22	not just tender it. And that makes a big
23	difference if you're trying to stop the
24	execution process.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Any

1	opposition to that? Bonnie, is that okay?
2	Does anyone see any problem with that?
3	MS. WOLBRUECK: That's fine.
4	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let's use
5	the word "file."
6	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: No.
7	You want to deposit the obligation, the
8	negotiable obligation, do you not, rather than
9	file it? So instead of putting the "tender"
10	there, say "deposit." "With leave of court
11	deposit."
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is that okay,
13	Judge Duncan?
14	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Yes.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
16	we're now going to change the word "tender" in
17	the third line, instead of inserting "tender,"
18	we're going to insert "deposit."
19	All right. Any other comments? Alex
20	Albright.
21	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Does
22	"cash" only mean \$100 bills, or can it be a
23	cashier's or certified check.
24	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: That's

1	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Okay.
2	That's a negotiable obligation.
3	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Wait,
4	I'm getting confused here. Well, it has to be
5	accepted by the court.
6	MR. LATTING: Luke, let's talk
7	about that, because there's a confusion here
8	in Austin.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Bill
10	suggested we take out the word "deposit" in
11	the fifth line because it's redundant of the
12	one we put in in the third line. Judge
13	Duncan.
14	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Why
15	don't we we've got one class of things here
16	that has to have leave of court, and it's a
17	negotiable obligation of certain things. And
18	so I would take out in the fifth line
19	"deposit" up to "any."
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So it
21	says "or of any bank or savings and loan."
22	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: If
23	you've only got two, then make it an "and,"
24	but one or the other.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Or with

leave of court deposit a negotiable obligation
with the government of the United States of
America or any agency thereof, or of any bank
or savings and loan association chartered by
the government of the United States of America
or any state thereof, and" what's wrong
with "that is"?
HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
Because the "that" doesn't refer back to the
association.
CHAIRMAN SOULES: "And insured
by the government of the United States of
America or any agency thereof."
PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's
fine.
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Joe
Latting.
MR. LATTING: I would like to
see us write this rule where a cashier's check
is specifically stated to be the equivalent of
cash. The reason
cash. The reason
CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's just an
CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's just an

1 leave of court in order to deposit a cashier's 2 check, because it's just a needless step. 3 And the clerks don't know how to handle this. Some clerks treat it one way and some 4 treat it another. 5 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 6 Actually, 7 the Uniform Commercial Code says that a check is cash. 8 9 Well, I know. MR. LATTING: 10 But tell that to -- when you go to Burnet and 11 tell them that "This is cash," they say, "No, 12 it's not." 13 And it seems to me that it would 14 streamline -- and no offense to Burnet, but it depends on what clerk's office you're in, 15 16 whether it's cash or not. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 17 Okav. 18 what Joe wants to do is say after the word 19 "cash" in the second line to say "or a cashier's check." 2.0 21 MR. LATTING: But I think we 22 ought to make it from a national or a state 23 I guess there aren't any other kinds.

But we ought to restrict it to that so it's

not some private company's cashier's check.

24

1

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Well.

I'm just

3 4 5

Well, how do you deposit cash? Do you go down to the bank and get a little sack and put the money in the sack and bring it to the clerk?

Or can't you just write the clerk a check, and if he cashes it, it's cash.

7

6

saying that different clerks -- I can tell you

9

8

from having to deal with these cases. They

MR. LATTING:

10

don't quite know what to do with it when you

11

walk in. They say -- some clerks say you need leave of court and some say you don't in order

12 13

to give them a cashier's check.

14

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

15 16 Well, we ought to write the rule so that you can tender to the clerk either cash or a

17

personal check or any kind of a check which is

But it's different from a deposit, like

18

effective only if it's cashed.

19

20

you would put up a deposit of a negotiable

21

instrument which the clerk keeps and doesn't

22

cash.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That doesn't

24

23

take care of Sarah's problem. She wants an

25

immediate supersedeas whenever that clerk

takes a cashier's check, not after the check has been negotiated, and we need that.

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MR. LATTING: And a cashier's check from a state or national bank would do that. I mean, that's my suggestion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Again, what

Joe wants to do, as I understand it, is after

the word "cash" in the second line put "or

cashier's check."

MR. LATTING: From a state or national bank.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, then
you've got to worry about "insured." What if
we added a sentence at the end saying that a
cashier's check shall be the equivalent of
cash, because then you've got to repeat all
that verbage in there about insurance and
everything, because a cashier's check from an
uninsured institution will not be honored.
I've seen it happen, if they go under. And
maybe they're through going under, but they
did.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe we could look in the Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 3 or 4, and see what they do. We

could borrow from that.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I had a criminal case in December that concerned the Uniform Commercial Code, and you don't want to get into that.

MR. LATTING: I don't care how we phrase it, Richard, but the point being that if it's a cashier's check from a state or national bank, that's going to take care of 99 percent of the problem. And it's going to keep from having to going to a judge and getting leave of court if we can take a cashier's check to the clerk's office.

GHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's get on with it here. After "deposit cash" insert this: "or cashier's check or, (2) with leave of court, a negotiable obligation of the government of the United States of America or any agency thereof, or any bank or savings and loan chartered by the government of the United States of America or any state thereof, and insured by the government of the United States of America or any agency thereof."

Well, we're just going to have to repeat it. "Or cashier's check drawn on any bank or

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savings and loan association chartered by the 1 government of the United States of America or 2 any state thereof, and insured by the 3 government of the United States of America or 4 any agency thereof." You have to say it 5 6 twice. That's okay. 7 HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And if you say it twice, go ahead and indent (1) and 8 (2), instead of having them imbedded in the 9 10 text. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So 11 12 after "the bond," we'll put a colon and a paragraph. And at the end of "thereof" the 13

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first time, we'll put a paragraph and do (2).

And then we'll have a paragraph that says the cash must be conditioned and so forth.

MR. ORSINGER: Can I ask a question?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then "any interest thereon."

Okay. Here is what we're going to have to do. We're going to have this "Wherever these rules provide for" part, and then we're going to have an indented (1) and an indented (2), and then back to the margin with the last

That takes care of it. 1 sentence. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 2 The 3 last two sentences. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The last 5 sentence. HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: The 7 last two sentences, Luke. If you don't take the cash deposit or negotiable obligation back 8 9 to the margin, then it's going to be a part of subparagraph (2), and that's just not right. 10 It applies to both of them. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okav. Well let's just take that last -- we'll just make a 13 14 paragraph and have -- the last paragraph will not go back to the margin either way. It will 15 16 start with The cash deposit or negotiable instrument -- negotiable obligation shall be 17 18 in the amount fixed and conditioned, and any 19 interest thereon shall constitute part of the 20 deposit. So there will be another paragraph 21 after (1) and (2), right? HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: 22 Ι 23 think it needs to go back to the margin so 24 that it applies to -- it's one rule.

no paragraph. There are two prongs on what

1	you can deposit, but the last two sentences
2	apply to everything in the paragraph.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
4	it's just one paragraph all the way through,
5	but it has two indented paragraphs in the
6	middle?
7	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN:
8	Right.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Does
10	that do it?
11	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: But
12	there's just one other thing.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
14	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
15	don't think you can condition a negotiable
16	obligation. I think you can condition the
17	deposit of a negotiable obligation. So what I
18	would suggest is just take out "cash or
19	negotiable obligation" and just say "the
20	deposit shall be in the amount fixed for the
21	surety bond and conditioned in the same
22	manner."
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection
24	to that?
25	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No.

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1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 2 deposit shall be in the amount fixed" and so 3 forth. Okay. Richard. MR. ORSINGER: I'm concerned 5 that if we're going to treat cashier's checks 6 the same as cash, then we should prescribe that the clerk cash the cashier's check right 7 8 away. Because I can foresee that people will 9 make the cashier's check payable to the 10 appellee, and two years later, when it's 11 presented for negotiation, it may not clear. 12 So if it's going to be nondiscretionary, 13 meaning no approval of the court, then I think 14 we should ask the clerk to negotiate it, 15 convert it into cash, and then handle it like 16 cash. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But that 18 cashier's check at the top is meant to be 19 cash. 20 MR. ORSINGER: But I can tell 21 you right now it's going to be written payable to the appellee. 22 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, why

payable to the clerk"?

don't we say "deposit cash or cashier's check

24

1	MS. WOLBRUECK: And because I
2	couldn't deposit it if it was made payable to
3	the appellee.
4	MR. ORSINGER: That's right.
5	Payable to the clerk.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Payable to
7	the clerk, drawn on any, and so forth.
8	MR. LATTING: How about let's
9	say payable to the clerk or endorsed to the
10	clerk by the payee, because sometimes you get
11	a cashier's check payable to Joe Latting, pay
12	to the order of Travis County District Clerk.
13	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well,
14	that's Joe Latting's check then.
15	MR. LATTING: Well, okay. I'll
16	give up on it. I don't think it's right yet,
17	though.
18	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: If they
19	won't take your check already, they shouldn't
20	take that one.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The
22	clerk shall negotiate the check promptly.
23	MR. LATTING: I don't know if I
24	agree with that. I mean, unless my

endorsement is a forgery, my credit doesn't

1 have anything to do with the validity of the check. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 3 How do you want us to say this so that it directs you? 4 5 Shall negotiate the check promptly into the clerk's account? 6 7 MS. WOLBRUECK: I don't have a 8 problem with that. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where do you 9 In the registry of the clerk? 10 keep this? MS. WOLBRUECK: Yes. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. clerk shall negotiate the cashier's check 13 promptly into the registry of the clerk? 14 MS. WOLBRUECK: 15 Just say deposit it. 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: You actually 18 deposit it, don't you? MR. ORSINGER: Well, every 19 20 county does it differently. But in amounts that are over the FDIC insurance limit, I 21 believe, the government code, correct me, 22 anybody who has fought through this, requires 23 24 that they be in a special trust arrangement 25 with the depository bank that's backed up by

1	U.S. deposits.
2	MS. WOLBRUECK: That's taken
3	care of in the Local Government Code,
4	Chapter 117, the depository contract per a
5	court order.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Don't you
7	negotiate the check into the clerk's account?
8	MS. WOLBRUECK: Yes, I do. And
9	the amount should be covered under the
10	depository contract.
11	MR. ORSINGER: But we don't
12	have to say that here.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, we do.
14	MR. ORSINGER: We don't need to
15	talk about all the local government codes.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's
17	right. But we need to tell her what to do
18	with it.
19	MR. LATTING: The clerk shall
20	deposit the check promptly. That's all you
21	need to say. We don't have to tell her what
22	account to put it in and all that stuff.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Deposited
24	promptly into what?
25	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: As

- 1	
1	provided by law.
2	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: That's
3	right. Wherever they deposit it.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's
5	all I'm trying to get at, is just so that we
6	say that in a way the okay.
7	We can't hear anyone up here. I can't
8	hear and the court reporter can't hear.
9	Okay. The clerk how do you want me to
10	say this? What I've got written down here is
11	that "The clerk shall deposit any cashier's
12	check promptly."
13	MS. WOLBRUECK: That's
14	sufficient.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now, Judge
16	Till, you had your hand up.
17	HONORABLE PAUL HEATH TILL: You
18	do have in there that the check is to be made
19	out to the clerk of the court, don't you?
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right.
21	HONORABLE PAUL HEATH TILL:
22	Okay. That's fine.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So it
24	says "or cashier's check made payable to the
25	clerk drawn on any banks," and so forth.

1	And then after we get down through what
2	all the banks are and how they're insured, we
3	have a new sentence. It says, "The clerk
4	shall deposit any cashier's check promptly."
5	And then we go to (2), which talks about
6	negotiable obligation.
7	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I've got
8	one question that I hesitate to ask.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Go ahead.
10	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't do
11	this any more, and I haven't done this for a
12	while, but when I've done it, I used to do it
13	with my own check. That doesn't happen now?
14	MR. LATTING: You can do it in
15	Travis County.
16	MR. ORSINGER: It's not a
17	negotiable obligation of the government or a
18	bank.
19	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I know
20	what we just did. But I used to be able to
21	say that this is cash. And people used to not
22	say, "That's not cash, that's a check."
23	MR. LATTING: That's right.
24	But it's never been a negotiable obligation of

a bank; it's been your negotiable obligation.

And it's been in my -- I don't think it's 1 clear that the clerk should not have accepted 2 3 that as cash. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I 4 5 think you can find definitions of "cash" that 6 include personal checks in the Uniform 7 Commercial Code. And every time somebody 8 said, "That's not cash, that's a check," I 9 would show them that. And they would say, 10 "Fine," because they didn't expect my check 11 to bounce anyway and they took it. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okav. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And I 13 14 don't want to have to make people do cashier's 15 checks unnecessarily. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. We're off the record. 17 18 (At this time there was a discussion off the record.) 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Back on the 2.0 21 record. 22 MR. ORSINGER: This is probably 23 not a problem, but is the FDIC an agency of 24 the federal government not withstanding the 25 fact that it's a corporation?

1	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Sure.
2	MR. ORSINGER: It is? Okay.
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3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know.
4	MR. ORSINGER: All right. Then
5	I won't worry about that.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
7	Anything else on this? Okay. Those in favor
8	show by hands. Opposed. Okay. That's
9	unanimous.
10	Except for Rule 7, which I don't want to
11	revisit today, probably nobody does today
12	well, maybe some. We've got seven minutes.
13	Can we use them?
14	Again, I want to thank Clarence Guittard
15	and Bill Dorsaneo and all the members, Alex
16	Albright, all the members of this committee
17	that worked so hard on these appellate rules.
18	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And
19	special thanks to Lee Parsley as well.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And to Lee
21	and to Holly for getting this report
22	together. It's come to closure before any of
23	our other work, probably substantially before
24	any of our other work. The charge rules are

very close. And I do want to thank all of you

for what you have done and thank you on behalf of the Court and the Committee and the bar and the bench for doing all this work.

We will make the corrections as a result of this meeting and forward them to Justice Hecht for presentment to the Court. And I will provide everybody a copy of the final report so that at your leisure you can look back through here and see if you can pick up any errors that we have made in doing the report.

If you find an error, just copy it on your copy machine and interline it or write what you think is wrong and get it to me, and I will get it to the Court promptly.

Judge Brister.

HONORABLE SCOTT BRISTER: Where do we stand? And do we need to meet sometime for more than a day and a half on a weekend to finish? How many more years are we going to be doing this?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we've got meetings set all the way through November, so we've got May, July, September and November.

I think a lot depends on how far we get with discovery at the next meeting, if we get discovery pretty much to closure at the next meeting. And we should have a sanctions report at the next meeting based on what we think the discovery rules are going to look like, and we've got a pretty good picture of that.

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Then -- and I expect to have the charge rules in a red-lined version ready to go to the Court after our next meeting. I think that will be very short, because they've already been approved, there's just some grammatical errors in the final report and some things like that that we just need to take a brief look at, I think.

So by the end of the next meeting, we should have the charge rules done, sanctions with major progress, discovery with major progress. That would mean that by the July meeting we would want those closed. All three. Well, the charge rules probably next time. Discovery and sanctions closed in July. That gives us September and November to to get the miscellaneous rules done that we've

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got.

And any time we have a gap in our schedule, we'll get to work on those miscellaneous -- I'm calling them miscellaneous rules. They're very important because they're coming from everywhere. And they may in fact slide back and change some of the things we've done, because there are a lot of good ideas that have come from all over the state in those materials.

And then -- but I don't know if this is quickly enough for the Court, soon enough for the Court, but we can do it, I think, on our regular schedule as long as we make progress.

What do you think, Justice Hecht?

JUSTICE HECHT: I think we ought to stay on it for now. I expect the Court will be through with the TRAP Rules by the May meeting or at least by our summer break, so we'll be ready to look at something else by then.

MR. ORSINGER: Can I ask a question?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me make this comment, and then to you, Richard.

The Court is going to look at these, and they may feel that some of the things we've done are not the way they want them, and that obviously is going to influence scheduling. Particularly if the discovery rules are conceptually different from the way the Court wants to go, then we're going to have a good deal more work to do, which is fine, of course. As I suggested, that wouldn't be any imposition, because it has to satisfy the Court.

But my understanding from Justice Hecht is that he anticipates that the Court is going to look at the rules and change them the way the Courts wants them and then get those back to us just to advise the Court if we see any serious problems with what the Court has done that they may not have seen. And obviously those things come up here just because there are more sets of eyes.

So we'll have brief sessions on the rules after the Court gets done, at least brief sessions, perhaps more extensive sessions on the rules after the Court gets done with them. Richard.

1 MR. ORSINGER: After the 2 Supreme Court has done what it's going to do 3 on the TRAPs, do they then go out for public 4 comment in the Bar Journal before they're 5 adopted? 6 JUSTICE HECHT: Oh, yeah. 7 mean, we'll put them out for comment and have 8 a public hearing, if we do what we've done in 9 the past, before they're adopted. 10 MR. ORSINGER: So it's unlikely 11 that they would go into effect before maybe 12 January 1 of '96? 13 JUSTICE HECHT: Right. That's 14 likely. And, of 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 16 course, the Court -- after that there's a very 17 formal process that's required by statute that 18 we publish them in the Texas Bar Journal so long before the effective date, but that's 19 after they've been promulgated. 20 21 If you have this report from Alejandro Acosta that Alex passed out, either leave it 22 23 here so Holly can pick it up or bring it back 24 with you next time because we won't 25 redistribute it. We'll pick up all the ones

that are left and we'll bring them back, but if you take them, you have a chance to look at them in the meantime. Justice Guittard.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Mr. Chairman, there are a couple of matters with respect to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial rules, that may need some attention. One is that a number of the Rules of Civil Procedure have been proposed by the appellate subcommittee, some of which have been approved by this Committee, and so the question is, what's the status of that? Is that finally adopted?

There are other rules that we have proposed for the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the rules with respect to judgments and so forth, that have been published in our previous reports but that have not been finally adopted, such as Rule 300. That probably should be considered by the subcommittee that has responsibility for those rules.

The third question is the problem of coordinating the TRAP Rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure. Now, I've noticed here --

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I've read this (indicating).

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Alejandro's report.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Alejandro's report. I've noticed that they've gone a long way towards doing that. They've adopted some of the TRAP Rule provisions for the trial rules, and I think that's a big start in that direction.

As I wrote to you in that letter, it seems logical to have a section of rules, of general rules, that apply to both trial and appellate courts. And some of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, Rule 1 and 2 about construction of the rules and so forth, are really intended to apply both to appellate and trial procedure and should be included in general rules.

Likewise, rules that are common, such as perhaps rules as to service, time and so forth, that are common to appellate and trial rules, should be included in the general rules rather than in the separate -- repeated in the separate TRAP and trial rules.

So it would seem to me feasible to have a

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1	joint committee for the trial rules and the
2	appellate rules to work on rules that apply to
3	both trial and appellate courts. And I would
4	just inquire how we're to organize that and go
5	forward with that?
6	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: Can I
7	ask a question real quick?
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Duncan.
9	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: I
10	assumed that what I received in the mail was
11	what the appellate rules report has always
12	looked like before. But now I realize, and I
13	guess this is what you're saying, that the
14	Rules of Civil Procedure that the Appellate
15	Rules Committee proposed amendments to and
16	have been approved by this Committee are no
17	longer included in the appellate rules
18	report.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right.
20	HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: And so
21	I guess what you're saying whose decision
22	was that?
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Mine.
24	HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: But
25	we are to but what are we to do with

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those?

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. You asked me several questions, and I'll try to remember them as we proceed.

First, any subcommittee that believes that because of its work in its area there needs to be a change made in an area of responsibility of a different subcommittee, they need to write me and tell me what you recommend done. Now, for those that have already been passed, I need you to say, "These have been passed by the Committee."

And I will then direct that information to the chair of the subcommittee that has authority over those rules, because as we go through these sections of the rules, we're going to have to see -- we're going to be addressing other concerns that have come from the public. And they may relate to the same rules that we've already passed, but we passed them without regard to the fact that we have a public inquiry that needs to be addressed. So we've got to overlay those.

I hope that all of the appellate input that we've got from the public from every

source has been addressed in these appellate rules that are going to the Supreme Court. I don't know that, but your committee has had them, so I guess they've been addressed. Eventually we'll probably go through those individually just to check them off and be sure that we have.

But anyway, the subcommittees that have authority over certain portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure are going to have that authority, with your suggestions, as to what they need to be doing.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: Does that include the rules that -- the trial rules that have already been adopted by this Committee?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It does.

HONORABLE SARAH DUNCAN: So we are going to revote on matters that the Committee as a whole has already voted on after the subcommittee is given an opportunity to redraft them. Is that right?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I don't assume that the subcommittee will redraft anything that we have already passed. But

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it's going to come up in their report. It may be -- I would assume that those pieces of their report will be very quick. But they need to see how it fits in their scheme and in their area as well as the appellate rules.

We have to make the Rules of Civil
Procedure work, too, sequentially, and since
we haven't even looked at those rules yet, we
can't send to the Supreme Court changes in the
Rules of Civil Procedure until we look at them
comprehensively.

MR. LATTING: Luke.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Joe Latting.

MR. LATTING: The sanctions committee is planning to meet twice before the next meeting of this Committee. And we're going to come forth with two different versions of the suggested sanctions rules based on this division of the house we had before. So if anybody has any comments or ideas about how sanctions ought to be structured in view of where we're headed with discovery, let us know. And if you want to come to the meetings, let me know so that we can have your input. We'll be getting

together at the end of this month and again in April.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now, did I respond to the issues that you raised, Judge Guittard, or are there some that I didn't get to? I know I tried to talk about how we're going to -- the logistics of the rest of the process.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Perhaps a little more definition with respect
to this coordination of the appellate and the
trial rules and the general rules that apply
to both.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. What I would like to do is have the appellate rules subcommittee select among themselves representatives from each of the other Rules of Civil Procedure subcommittees where you think you need to have input.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD:

Okay.

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Yourselves, and have the findings of fact and conclusions of law area, or whatever that scope of the rules is, have a delegate, and

tell me who you want, and I'll put that person on that subcommittee. So there's a blending there now of the Appellate Rules Committee into the Rules of Civil Procedure Committee so that your work product is not lost, and that committee's representative is there to convey it fully to that committee.

It was never any intent to have the Appellate Rules Committee usurp any piece of anybody else's authority. It was only to have input into the other subcommittees where you feel it's necessary in support of the appellate rules or for any other rules.

HONORABLE C. A. GUITTARD: What I would like to do is to have a draft of these general rules, these common rules, and direct Lee to make such a draft, and for us then to present it to the subcommittee that has the responsibility for those rules. Do you understand what I mean?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right.

Okay. That's about as good as can do now.

We're just going to have to have a liasion at some point to handle it.

(HEARING ADJOURNED.)

1 2 CERTIFICATION OF THE HEARING OF SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 3 4 5 I, WILLIAM F. WOLFE, Certified Shorthand Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that 6 7 I reported the above hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on March 18, 1995, 8 9 and the same were thereafter reduced to computer transcription by me. 10 11 I further certify that the costs for my services in this matter are $\mathcal{F}/$, $/D_{7}$ 12 CHARGED TO: Soules + Wallace 1.3 14 15 Given under my hand and seal of office on 16 this the 31st day of March, 1995. 17 18 19 ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES 925-B Capital of Texas Highway Suite 110 20 Austin, Texas 78746 21 (512) 306-100322 23 WILLIAM F. WOLFE, CSR 24 Certification No. 4696 Certificate Expires 12/31/96 25

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