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BEFORE THE

SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE AUSTIN, TEXAS

VOL. 1

FFBRUARY 16, 1990

Austin, Texas

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ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTING

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2	HEARING HELD IN AUSTIN, TEXAS, ON FEBRUARY 16, 1990
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4	B-F-F-O-R-F
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6	LUTHER H. (LUKE) SOULES, III CHAIRMAN
7	*******
8	SUPREME COURT: Justice Lloyd Doggett
9	Justice Nathan Hecht
10	COARCE CHAIR: Doak Bishop
11	
1.2	OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Gilbert T. Adams, Jr. Sam D. Sparks (San Angelo)
	Pat Beard
13	Flaine Carlson
14	John E. Collins Tom H. Davis Pat Hazel
	J. Hadley Edgar Tom Leatherbury
15	Charles F. Herring
16	Franklin Jones, Jr. Russell McMains
	Charles (Lefty) Morris
17	Tom L. Ragland
18	Broadus A. Spivey Harry L. Tindall
	Anthony J. Sadberry
19	Kenneth D. Fuller
20	David J. Beck
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<u> P R Q C E E D I N G S</u>

Friday, February 16, 1990

Morning Session

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's come to order, and J thank everyone for being here at ten after 8:00 on Friday morning. We will send a sign-up sheet around a little bit later.

What I thought we would do by way of approaching this thing this morning would be to try to finish our old business, which includes sealed records and the charge, first. Now, Lefty is doing a redraft of the sealed records now. I believe he and Holly are working on that together. And Hadley and Elaine and I finished Wednesday afternoon, I guess it was --

MR. EDGAR: Late.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Pardon?

MR. EDGAR: Late Wednesday.

after having some good conversations through the week together, the draft of the charge rules. And in fairness, I would approach this that we would put those later in the morning so that everybody has a chance, whenever you can catch a moment, to look at those and see how you kind of feel

about them, and understand and absorb them before we talk about them. If that is all right with the Committee, then the only other old business that we have is in the agenda in the front part of the big book.

With that in mind, then what we would -- I would propose is that we would start with probably -- well, Harry

propose is that we would start with probably -- well, Harry has got something that is rewritten, too. We need to come back to that. Maybe we will wait and take a look at that, but he certainly needs to have that done this morning -- start with the 1989 rules that we did not finish last time, and then next, in whatever order we want to take them up, do the sealed records, the charge, and Harry's 167 -- is it A, Harry?

MR. TINDALL: Right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And I am open for anybody's comments on how you think maybe better we could organize this morning.

MR. EDGAR: Mr. Chairman, I move that we proceed as you just outlined.

CHAJRMAN SOULES: Been moved. Is there a second?

MR. TINDALL: Second.

CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay. Those in favor say

"Aye."

(RESPONDED AYE)

CHATRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. 1 MR. DAVIS: Start off with noncontroversial 2 things, right? 3 MR. TINDALL: Court's charge. 4 MR. DAVIS: No, that isn't what I said. You 5 misunderstood. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We have done 169, and we 7 were over to -- let me see. I have "Okay, it says, is on 8 208," and we had -- let me get my check list here to try to 9 get where we were, and you-all can help me. 10 Now, let's see, the last one I checked off was 201, 11 but let me see. Then there is a rule on 324. Did we pass on 12 that one? 13 Subcommittee recommended no change on that one. 14 All in agreement say "Aye." 15 (RESPONDED AYE) 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? That is 17 18 unanimously approved then. MR. TINDALL: What page are you on? 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I am on Page 324, Harry. 20 MR. TINDALL: Okay. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And if you need to have an 22 index, if you kind of go back to the, let's see, I guess it 23 is the third sheet in the book, it says "Written and oral 24 comments to TRCP, TRAP and TRCE." These are the comments to 25

the last -- to the '89 work. We have just now done the last -- finished the last item on the first page, and that goes on for two-and-a-half pages.

MR. EDGAR: What page is Rule 324 on?
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, now, wait a minute.

No, that was -- let me get straight with you, Hadley. That was Rule 206 on Page 324. Now we are going to Rule 208 on Page 327, and we passed on that last time and said that was okay as is. So I must have skipped one.

And so now we are to two -- Rule 216 on Page 332.

And let's see, David, I guess this is your subcommittee,
isn't it?

MR. EDGAR: No, it is mine.

MR. BECK: No.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, Hadley's. Okay,

Hadley.

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MR. EDGAR: I have passed -- every one of you should have before you a letter from me to the Committee dated today concerning Rules 216 and 214.

The matter on Page 332 goes back, and this runs through a number of rules, as to how to spell "jury," is it hyphenated or not. My dictionary hyphenates it. I don't know about anybody else's, but --

MR. TINDALL: Mine just offers one common word, just n-o-n-j-u-r-y, without a space or a hyphen.

1 MR. EDGAR: Well, I will let -- I will leave 2 that to the grammarians, but, anyhow, that is what the 3 purpose of this page is about. CHAJRMAN SOULES: All right. What do you 4 5 recommend? MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Well, we have got to 6 7 do it right or --8 MR. TINDALL: My unabridged dictionary at the 9 office has no hyphen or space, Hadley. Did you use --10 MR. EDGAR: Well, I used Webster's Collegiate. I don't know. 11 MR. TINDALL: That was raised in a number of 12 13 letters we got about the spelling of it. CHAJRMAN SOULES: Where is it? 14 15 MR. TINDALL: It is spelled both -- there are a number of places where it is with a hyphen and there are a 16 17 number of places where it is one word without a space. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Well, I will 19 assign that to every subcommittee jointly, if you will meet in the interim in the next biannual and decide some uniform 20 way to do it, and we will get on Word Search and we will find 21 22 every place it is in the rules and fix it. MR. TINDALL: I concur with that. 23 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anybody want to change this? 25 There being no hands --

MS. CARLSON: Well, also, the TRAP subcommittee suggested the same modification without the hyphen.

MR. TINDALL: Without the hyphen is -CHATRMAN SOULES: All right. Well, let's
go -- that goes to the TRAP rules and everybody else, all the
other rules. We can make it uniform at least because we do
have these rules on disk now.

Okay. No change to 216. In favor say "Aye".

(RESPONDED AYE)

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? There will be no change to 216.

MR. FDGAR: The letter on Page 335 refers to simply the spelling of a -- of the comment -- of the word and the comment on Page 334, and points out that it should be to preclude a default judgment "in" a case, but the bar journal incorrectly used "is" instead of "in."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We have got it fixed.

MR. EDGAR: All right. So we don't need to take any action on that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is right.

MR. EDGAR: On Page 336, Rule 245, one letter on Page 337 says the 45-day notice is too short, and another, on Page 339, says not long enough.

Now, Judge Morris, in a letter on Page 341, says

that at least one appellate court has ruled that forfeiture cases must be set within 30 days after the answer date. This creates a conflict, he points out.

Now, I would like to go out of order just a moment, if I might, because in a letter to me after the Committee met, and as a result of the hearing that the Court held, Franklin Jones pointed out that there was a conflict -- I don't know whether Franklin did it or someone in his office. I am giving him the benefit of the doubt -- that -- I have that in the material to be presented later, but perhaps we ought to take it up now, that --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hadley, is this your February 16 letter that you are referring us to now?

MR. EDGAR: What I did -- yes. What I did, you don't have -- you don't have what I am about to comment on before you because this is in the material which arose as a result of comments subsequent to the public hearing. But Franklin pointed out that why shouldn't the notice period correspond with the 30-day period in Rule 216 for paying a jury fee. Also, that the 45-day notice will interfere with the docket control of many district courts which have monthly docket call.

Then he also points out that Rule 216 provides that a party must request a jury trial and pay a jury fee not less than 30 days in advance of trial. The 45-day trial notice

requirement in Rule 245 will result in the parties obtaining an automatic continuance when the parties request for a jury within the 15 days lead period and the case must be moved from the nonjury to the jury docket. In some districts this will be an exceptionally long delay to jury trial.

I simply point that out to you asking whether or not you want to simply go back and reconsider this 45-day period in the matter which is to be taken up later because of the order of business which we earlier decided to proceed upon.

the agenda where this 245 got changed, the problem that we were addressing — and we had letters from the practitioners — a court could set a case on 10-day notice, but you had to make a jury demand 30 days out. So what was happening was the courts were setting cases on 10 days notice and then saying, "You waived your jury demand, even though you didn't even know when the case was going to be set 30 days ago."

And the reason that a 45-day period was put in place was that this meant that the first time a court set a case, there would still be time to make a jury demand, rather than the first time the court sets a case, there is -- time for jury demand is expired. And we just picked 45 days saying, "Well, in that 15 days, if you want a jury, you ought

to be able to make up your mind and get it done." All I want to do is remind you-all why we made this change because for some other reasons now, there is some reconsideration.

And, Hadley, how would we harmonize all that?

MR. EDGAR: I don't know.

MR. JONES: The problem J saw with it was that it picked up in my office that I think --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Stop that a minute. He's talking and we can't hear.

I am sorry, Franklin, we are not getting you.

MR. JONES: The problem that we picked up in my office that I think was a valid point and I really think we ought not to build this into the rules, and that is a party can get an automatic continuance unless these two rules are harmonized, that is, the rule of setting the case for trial and the rule of jury demand.

Now, there is no -- I don't see any problem it being either 30 or 45 days. The problem is if you set a case either 30 or 45 days out on a nonjury docket, then a party can come in within that 15-day lapse period and demand a jury and he has got an automatic continuance on a motion in rural courts that I know anything about. And that is a problem my office has picked up on and I really don't see any reason for that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I didn't know you ever set

nonjury cases.

MR. JONES: I am usually the one wanting a jury, but occasionally I have a problem that doesn't appeal to a jury for some reason.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Franklin, if -- there is no 15-day period if the case is set 30 days out. When the case is set at that very day, that is the last day you can demand a jury and you may not even know it got set.

MR. SPIVEY: Judges don't always -- don't read it all that way, though, they really don't.

CHATRMAN SOULES: I am sorry.

MR. SPIVEY: Judges look at it as a discretionary thing and that is what the appellate courts pretty well uphold.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: To give a jury.

MR. SPJVEY: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But we don't want it discretionary. We want them to have to give a jury and that is -- I mean the way the Committee voted last time, I say "we," I mean we took this position that a judge who set -- first sets a cases on a nonjury docket without a jury fee having been demanded, at that point in time should be enough in advance of the minimum jury demand period that a party could demand a jury and have a right to it no matter what.

That is the reason that we changed 245 to read the

way it does now and not be discretionary with the court whether or not you get a jury because you don't even know that setting is there until the judge does it, and if your 30 days is already shot, you have got -- you are in a discretionary period.

Some judges -- trial judges in San Antonio believe that the constitutional right to a jury trial means you can't use these rules to manipulate. Others say that is what the rules say. So we can do what we want to do about it. So there it is. And -- but the judges have raised a question about a 30-day forfeiture case.

MR. EDGAR: Well, on Page 341 of your book -- CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right, in a forfeiture case.

MR. EDGAR: -- Judge Morris raises the question, he says at least one appellate court, without giving us a citation, has ruled that forfeiture cases must be set within 30 days after answer date. And I know that there certainly are some provisions for forfeiture under certain circumstances, but I really don't know the case to which he referred.

And if the rule would change to 45 days, it would seem to me that a court would have difficulty in ordering that a forfeiture case would be set for 30 days when the rule says at least 45, but that is all we have and I just wanted to call that to the Committee's attention.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we have -- and on many 1 occasions, this Committee has written standardized rules 2 where some court of appeals maybe started a trend that the 3 Committee felt was inappropriate. I don't know. Of course, 4 I don't know what case Judge Morris was talking about either. 5 It is not cited. 6 What is your recommendation in the circumstances? 7 MR. EDGAR: I recommend that we leave it, just 8 9 leave it as it is. MR. BEARD: I second that. 10 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and seconded. in favor say "Aye." 12 13 (RESPONDED AYE) CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? 14 15 MR. JONES: Opposed. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The "ayes" have it 16 17 house to one. MR. FDGAR: All right. The next rule we have 18

MR. EDGAR: All right. The next rule we have listed here is Rule 296. If you will turn to Page 420 in your book, you will find that Justice Hecht raised a question that the court had concerning the treatment to be given a request under Rule 296, which was filed before the judgment

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was signed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Go ahead.

MR. EDGAR: And I just raised the question

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here that I think that probably is provided for in Rule 306(c). And the question he addresses is how to treat a request which is filed before the judgment is signed. And I 3 think that Rule 306(c) currently takes care of that because it basically says that it will be deemed filed on the date 5 6 of, but subsequent to the date of signing the judgment. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 306(c)? MR. EDGAR: Yes. I wish he were here. Maybe I didn't really understand the nature of his question. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Did we make a change to 1.0

MR. BRCK: No.

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306(c)?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Did not.

Where did we put -- well, this used to be a bigger problem, and I don't know whether this is looking at a case that is pre '84, but in 1984, the Committee recommended to the Court, and the Court adopted, an amendment to 306(c) that put premature file findings of fact and conclusions of law within its ambit. Prior to that, there was a problem. They were not within the ambit of 306(c).

MR. EDGAR: Well, with respect to the query that he raises, though, on Page 420 --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. EDGAR: -- it seems to me that Rule 306(c) solves that problem.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: As a result of an '84 1 2 amendment. MR. EDGAR: Yes. So I don't know whether J 3 have missed something that he is raising, but absent that, I 4 recommend no change because I think it is already cured. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We did make a change to 6 306(c) and I don't know where it is. I know we did. 7 MR. ADAMS: It wasn't published. 8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It is not in the book, but I 10 know we did because you see -- and I can show you where we 11 did it. You will probably remember this. If you have got a rule book, if you look in the fifth line of 306(c), every 12 such motion shall be deemed to have filed on the date of but 13 subsequent to the date of. And we changed that on the "date" 14 1.5 of but subsequent to the "time" of. 16 Now, I don't know why it's not -- I haven't got it 17 before you, but we voted to do that in 1989. 18 MR. BECK: It wasn't published, Luke. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that is probably 19 because it -- I dropped it in my office. But that was 20 very -- it was even -- not even discussed really. It was 21 22 obviously --MR. EDGAR: It should be changed to be the 23 24 time of. CHAIRMAN SOULES: I know. I remember us doing 25

it, and it will be in our minutes, but it is not in the -- it was not published, but that is very noncontroversial.

MR. TINDALL: Two places, Luke.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I know.

MR. TINDALL: It has got to be changed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: J will get that fixed and J apologize that that didn't make it. That is part of your work. J promise.

All right, we are going to change, in Rule 306(c), in the fifth line of the West Version, the word "date" to "time," "date of signing of the judgment" to "time of signing of the judgment." And then, likewise, in the very last line, exactly the same change. Change "date of signing of the judgment" to "time of signing of the judgment."

All in favor say "Aye."

(RESPONDED AYE)

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay.

Are you making a note we have got a 306(c) change?

MR. EDGAR: Then on Page 421, 422, there is a Fifth Court of Appeals memo suggesting that the comment be clarified to Rule 296. And we, as a Committee, have never really worked with the comments, Luke. Did you want -- do you want to take that up here or --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That would be fine. Let me get my paper straight. Did you recommend then no change to

298? 1 MR. RDGAR: Well, I haven't gotten to that. CHAIRMAN SOULES: You haven't gotten there 3 4 yet. MR. EDGAR: J am talking about 296. 5 CHATRMAN SOULES: 296. Okay. Is that -- is 6 that what we are still discussing? 7 MR. EDGAR: The memo on Page 421, 422 suggests 8 clarification of a comment. And I just wanted to call that 9 to the Chair's attention. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Hadley, what would we 11 12 do to clarify it and what pages should we look at for comment? 13 MR. EDGAR: Well, on Page 421. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 421. Is the rule in the 15 16 book anywhere? The rule is on Page 415. 17 MR. FDGAR: CHATRMAN SOULES: 415. 18 MR. FDGAR: Four one five. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the -- they want us to 20 write the comment to say what? 21 22 MR. EDGAR: Well, he doesn't tell you what. He just says he has a problem with it, as was frequently the 23 case in these comments, pointing out that one could construe 24 the comment to mean that findings of fact and conclusions of 25

1	law are well, pardon me.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is not what the comment
3	says.
4	MR. EDGAR: Well, you are right. Just a
5	moment.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: They may have published it
7	wrong in the bar journal, but our comment does not say that.
8	MR. EDGAR: He also refers to Rule 41(a) and J
9	am along with that, and I am wondering maybe if that
10	comment to 41(a) is not the comment to which he referred. I
11	will look right quick.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is that TRAP 49(a)?
13	MR. EDGAR: 41(a).
14	CHAJRMAN SOULES: 41(a). That is it.
15	MR. EDGAR: Yes. He is really referring to
16	that one, so I will leave that up to Dorsaneo's Committee.
17	CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay.
18	MR. EDGAR: But, anyhow, the point he raises,
19	I think, is legally correct, but I don't know which one of
20	those comments.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Could we when we get
22	there, could you remind us to revisit this? Thank you,
23	Hadley.
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1	(At this time there was a
2	brief discussion off the record, after which time the
3	hearing continued as follows:)
4	MR. EDGAR: All right. Luke, on
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Have we finished that
6	item now? Tom Davis.
7	MR. DAVJS: As a matter of information, who
8	does write the comments?
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We sometimes write them
10	here, I sometimes try to write them, and before and they
11	come to the Committee in the report. So sometimes they are
12	written here, and sometimes I write them, sometimes they are
13	in the proposals that come. So there is not any real
14	MR. DAVIS: When we adopt the rule, we should
15	also consider the comments, too, right?
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we always do. We
17	have as a matter of fact, and many times we have decided
18	to write a rule and then the Committee has said, "Put in a
19	comment that we did it for this reason." So that is our
20	practice now.
21	MR. EDGAR: On Page 423, Judge Star raises a
22	question concerning Rule 298, which appears on Page 418. And
23	you will
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hadley, are we
25	MR. EDGAR: We are talking about Rule 298.

MR. EDGAR: It appears on Page 418. 2 CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay. I do not have a 3 consensus on 297 and 296. Is it your motion that there be 4 no change to the '89 work product or do we need to look at 5 this --6 MR. EDGAR: No. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- before we do that? 8 MR. EDGAR: Yes, except as respects the 9 comment to Rule 41(a), but as far as 296 is concerned, 10 11 recommend no change. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And 297? 12 13 MR. EDGAR: Well, there was no concerns voiced to 297. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. All in favor of no 15 change to the recommended version of 296 and 297, say "Aye." 16 (RESPONDED AYE) 17 18 CHATRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. Thank you. 19 MR. EDGAR: All right. Rule 298, appearing on Pages 418 and 419, you notice that what we did in Rule 298 20 was require notice in accordance with Rule 21(a), and this 21 gets us back to certified and registered mail. Apparently, 22 lawyers are sending these to the court, which we are now 23 going to require in addition to sending it to the clerk, 24 25 certified registered mail, return receipt requested, which

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So --

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means that the court then has to interrupt its proceedings to receive what the -- what Judge Starr calls, on Page 423, "a \$10 envelope."

And I think he has got a valid point. To interrupt court proceedings to have to receive mail to comply -- and I am not sure that Rule 21(a) requires that delivery to the court or to the clerk be by certified mail. I think it only is to opposing parties, but yet that is his concern.

This then goes back to Rule 21(a), which I have had some personal frustration with for a long time. But we voted to do what we did and I don't know that we can -- whether we want to undo that or not.

deliberations, put in the certified mail service on judges because of the time periods from -- during which a judge must act after receipt of findings of fact and conclusions of law. And it was our discussion that it was fair -- only fair to the judge for them -- for there to be proof that he got those findings of facts and conclusions of law on a given date and not -- so that there is a time from which it starts running.

And if you remember, we -- this is not just filing with the clerk where you would have a file stamp because the judges say, "Well, that doesn't help us any, it lays over there in the file jacket and we don't get a chance to look at it, we may not even know it is there while our time is

ticking."

So we say, "Well, fine. We will deliver them to the judge." Well, what proof do you have that the judge got them delivered? And this was put in there to give judges some sort of a safety valve that really does -- where you got to prove you got them, you have got to have a green card.

Now, it doesn't matter to me, but that is why we did it this way.

MR. EDGAR: The problem -- the problem, however, is that I don't think that Rule 21(a) requires that the court be served by certified registered mail.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It doesn't.

MR. EDGAR: It talks about serving a party.

And, apparently, lawyers have, by making this reference to

Rule 21(a) and not discerning that difference, simply send

everybody -- serve them by certified or registered mail.

And perhaps this problem that you are presenting could be solved if we made some effort to make it clear in Rule 21(a) that neither the clerk nor the court need to receive notice by certified or registered mail in order to comply with that rule. This goes back to Rule 21(a), I think, and, frankly --

MR. FULLMER: That is the evil right there, is trying to utilize 21(a).

MR. EDGAR: Well, we did that because that is

such a shorthand way of doing it. 1 MR. FULLER: It didn't work. 2 MR. EDGAR: And I can see how this is going to 3 4 create problems with a busy court in a jury trial and having 5 to interrupt the proceedings to receive certified mail. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULFS: Well, that seems to me 7 that -- is that a real problem? I haven't been in a 8 courtroom in a long time where -- during trial where there is 9 not some employee of the court outside of the courtroom doing 10 somethina. MR. EDGAR: Yes, but this has to be delivered 11 12 to the court, the judge. 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: But any -- doesn't any 14 representative --15 MR. EDGAR: If it goes to addressee only, it 16 does. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: If it is addressee only. 18 Tom Ragland. 19 MR. RAGLAND: I was on the subcommittee that 20 worked on this, and my recollection the reason we put that 21 about serving the judge is because if you had a visiting 22 judge, the clerk couldn't deliver that copy of it and, 23 therefore, that visiting judge would be given a certified 24 copy. 25 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That was another part of the

1	discussion, no question.
2	(At this time there was a
3	brief discussion off the record, after which time the
4	heaering continued as follows:)
5	MR. RAGLAND: Okay. Could we address that
6	comment, service on the judge no longer necessary?
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I am not I am reluctant
8	to leave it that way, but that is up to the Committee.
9	MR. EDGAR: Should we get on the record
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
11	MR. EDGAR: the suggestion I made, or just
12	go ahead and reconsider it, or leave like it is, or
13	CHATRMAN SOULES: We are on 290 Rule 298
3.4	MR. EDGAR: 298(a).
15	CHATRMAN SOULES: on Page 418. And Hadley
1.6	has a suggestion for change in 298(a) in response to the
17	public comment coming in from who was it, from Judge
1.8	Starr?
19	MR. EDGAR: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And, Hadley, what is that
21	suggestion?
22	MR. EDGAR: The suggestion to cure his concern
23	would be to, in the last sentence of four of 298(a),
24	change it to read as follows: "The party making the request
25	shall also deliver a copy to the judge who tried the case and

indicate thereon the date and manner of delivery period".

MR. SPIVEY: You are encouraging ex parte communication. Most of my problems don't need any encouragement.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it has been mandated before.

MR. BECK: Hadley, wouldn't you make the same suggestion in 296?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, we have got to go back.

Whatever we do here, we have got to go back and do it on 296.

You are right, David.

MR. EDGAR: But that is the issue that we have before us. And why don't you go ahead and voice your concern again, David, so that we can get it on the record.

MR. BECK: Well, I think I would say that the language proposed by Hadley certainly corrects the problem that Judge Starr raised. However, I think that we have got to go back to the original reason as to why we even amended this rule in the first place, which was to deal with the case law which says that to preserve error you had to call your request for findings of fact and conclusions of law to the trial judge. And so our original concern was, well, let's put in the rule a requirement to that effect and put something express with respect to how you can document that.

And what I am saying is that if we make this

amendment, although we have corrected Judge Starr's concern, we have undone the original purpose, which was to provide a means for documenting that the trial judge received a copy of the request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.

That is my concern.

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And maybe it is enough just to simply require that the party provide a copy to the judge and just, you know, leave the party to his or her own devices if the issue ever arises that the trial judge never got it.

MR. RAGLAND: May I offer -- may I offer this?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom Ragland.

MR. RAGLAND: Refore -- this will be a new last sentence, 298(a), "Service on the judge who tried the case is not required, but the party making the request shall deliver a copy to the judge who tried the case and indicate thereon the date and the manner of delivery."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: In 21(a), we use the concept that a statement of service is prima facie evidence of the delivery. Could we use that here?

In other words, it would say, "The party making the request shall also deliver a copy to the judge who tried the case and state thereon the date and the manner of delivery. Such statement shall be prima facie evidence of the fact of delivery."

MR. FULLER: I will buy that.

MR. RAGLAND: Luke, then that is going to make it sound like delivery to the judge is required just like we had under the old rules. We are not getting anywhere, just getting a new, longer rule that says -- or means the same thing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Further comments? Elaine Carlson.

MS. CARLSON: Yes. I just want to point out that the way we proposed to amend 296 last August was that it now requires or states that such requests shall be entitled requests for findings and conclusions, shall be filed with the clerk, who shall immediately call such request to the attention of the judge who tried the case.

So back on Rule 296, we have the requirement that the clerk notify the judge. And I agree with Tom, that maybe the proper place is for this to come in the comment.

MR. BEARD: What if we just looked at this as an adversary system, and if the lawyers don't protect the judge, they just get reversed, and ignore the court -- notice to the court problem. As a practical matter, the lawyers draw the findings of fact and conclusions of law except on very rare occasions.

So why don't we just take the judge out of this thing and leave it in the adversary system. And if the opposing counsel doesn't get it to the judge, it is just too

bad.

MR. RAGLAND: I think, Pat, what we were trying to address was to eliminate the necessity to prove our delivery or anything else with the judge by filing with the clerk --

MR. BFARD: Well, just take any notice to the judge out. Just file it with the clerk, and notice to the other side, and go on.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The district judges are not going to be happy with that.

MR. BECK: Isn't the issue here who is going to have the burden of seeing that the judge addresses these things? In Rule 296, we say that the clerk has got the burden of calling it to the judge's attention. And then in the next section we say, "Oh, by the way, provide a copy to the judge."

If the Committee's view is that the burden ought to be on the clerk once that document is filed, then you don't even need the last sentence because really what the purpose of the last sentence is is to provide a courtesy copy to the judge, and essentially that is what it is.

MR. BISHOP: But that is not what it says.

MR. RECK: Exactly. I agree with you, that is not what it says.

MR. BISHOP: The problem is that here you are

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creating a situation where you have to file with the clerk 1 2 and with the judge. MR. BECK: Exactly. And I can see the court 3 4 saying that you did not serve the judge and, therefore, somehow you have not satisfied all the requisite steps. 5 So my question is do we need that last sentence in Rule 296 and in 298(a)? MR. FULLER: I don't have a problem --9 MR. BISHOP: To get around that --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Wait a minute. One at a 10 time. Who wants the floor? Ken Fuller and then Doke Bishop. 11 12 13 14

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MR. FULLER: My only problem is, and we have this problem in Dallas a lot, we get so darn many visiting judges, and half the time, the clerks don't even know who the visiting judge was on a given day. And that -- I have got a problem with that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Doak Bishop.

MR. BISHOP: If the purpose of the last sentence is to say that we need to give a courtesy copy to the judge, then I think what you ought to say is that we "should" provide a copy to the judge instead of "shall" and that might get around that problem.

MR. RAGLAND: Well, let me -- let me explain. When this was first rewritten and submitted to the Committee, this sentence that appears on the last line of 296 wasn't in

there, nor was the sentence that we have been talking about here about delivering it to the judge. That was not in there anywhere. But at the Committee meeting, the question about visiting judges came up and that is how that language got in there.

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But it was the subcommittee's view that if you want to get away from proof of delivery of service on a judge, you need to take any reference out to delivery or service on a judge and make it count from the date it is filed with the clerk and put the burden on the clerk to deliver it to the judge.

MR. BISHOP: Okay. Would you put this sentence in there which indicates you still have to deliver it to the judge?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we had judges here at that meeting and, unfortunately, they are not here -- I mean our trial judges that -- we had Judge Rivera and Judge Casseb, and they were pretty vocal that they wanted a requirement that the judge that tried the case get delivery in his hand, her hand, of the proposed findings and conclusions because they then had duties to perform as a result of that receipt.

And the case law and the former rules, at least, seem to react to the -- a perception that the responsibility lodged solely in the district clerk's office for getting

these to the judges is something that did not work, and the judges did not want it left that way, and the rules were not that way, and the cases were not that way.

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I don't know whether it would work if the -- if the clerks had sole responsibility or not, but up to now, no one in the Texas jurisprudence has presumed that that would work. And even in this full Committee in 1989, we were not comfortable, or at least having heard from those judges, in leaving it solely with the clerk to do that.

Whether we want to do that now or not is up to you-all, but I am afraid we are going to get another swell of comment from the district judges if we don't provide some requirement that they get delivery of a copy of the request from the lawyer that makes the request. It is up to you-all. And I --

Okay. Doak, and then David Reck.

MR. BISHOP: Let me make a suggestion that might get around this. If we look at old Rule 298, it says, "After the judge so files written findings of fact and conclusions of law, either party may, within five days, request of him specified further findings."

What we might do is say there, "Deliver to the judge's office, and obtain a receipt therefor, a request for further additional or amended findings." That way you are not having to prove that you served it on the judge himself,

just that you served it to the judge's office, which gets around one problem, and you don't have to go to the more cumbersome problem of filing it with the clerk and doing all of this.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where is the judge's office?

MR. BEARD: The visiting judge is in Hawaii.

MR. FDGAR: The visiting judge is the problem we have. Your concern and your solution, I don't think, solves that problem.

CHAJRMAN SOULES: Remember, we had -- we debated on whether to put "court" or "judge" here. This was the one place where we voted not to put "court" and to put "judge" because we were talking about serving the individual who tried the case and not the court as a body corporate, whatever it is. David Beck.

MR. BECK: The only comment I was going to make is I am in favor of Hadley's language. If we want to address the proof problem, we could add language in the rule to the extent -- and let me just make a suggestion here -- we add the phrase, quote, "with adequate proof of delivery" somewhere in that last sentence.

But the only problem with adding that kind of language is we get right back to Judge Starr's concern because when you start talking about adequate proof, the immediate -- the thought that immediately comes to an

attorney's mind is certified mail. 1 MR. EDGAR: Mr. Chairman --2 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think what we have got is Judge Starr against -- J mean Judge Starr says, "J don't want 4 to be bothered with getting these things and having to 5 6 receipt for them." Other judges say, "We not only want to be 7 bothered, we want to be sure that we get them, and we are 8 willing to give a receipt for them." MR. EDGAR: May I suggest that --9 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hadley Edgar. MR. EDGAR: -- we leave the rule exactly as it 11 12 is, and then if Judge Starr and others have a problem as a result of this rule, then certainly they will let us know and 13 14 we should then respond to that concern. 15 MR. JONES: I can testify that Judge Starr 16 will let you know. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I know he will. 18 MR. BRCK: May I ask one question? 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: David Beck. 20 MR. BECK: If the problem here is the visiting 21 judge, would it make sense to have this sentence only apply 22 in the instance of a visiting judge? I take it by your 23 silence that there is none.

MR. SADBERRY: No second.

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MR. FULLER: Luke, if it is in order, I would

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1	like to put Hadley's last comment in the form of a motion.
2	MR. JONES: I second.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. And Franklin seconds
4	it.
5	And, Hadley, will you restate it? Hadley, will you
6	restate your language? It has been moved that your language
7	be adopted and seconded, but I am not sure I have it down
8	exactly.
9	MR. FULLER: No. No. His last comment was
10	basically leave it as it is, it ain't broke.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, leave it as it is. Is
12	that the is that the motion?
13	MR. FULLER: Yes, that is my motion.
14	CHATRMAN SOULES: The motion is that 296 and
15	298, insofar as they require the last sentence of 298(a)
16	and the last sentence of 296
17	MR. EDGAR: Basically, Luke, we are just
18	recommending that these rules be adopted as presented.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That is the motion.
20	There is a second. 296, 297, 298, stay as they were
21	initially recommended. All in favor say "Aye."
22	(RESPONDED AYE)
23	MR. JONES: One question.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: One question from Franklin
25	Jones.

MR. JONES: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Hadley, is this the rule my office got that provision in that it was subject to the interpretation of the court?

MR. EDGAR: Oh, let me look just a minute.

MR. JONES: I thought we were -- I didn't know we were voting on the whole rule.

MR. EDGAR: Yes, all right. You are right.

If you will look at Rule 298(b), 298(b) on Page 418, 419,

Franklin's office raised a question subsequent to our meeting that the language of 298(b) seems to indicate that the court has a mandatory duty to file findings — additional or amended findings of fact and conclusions of law whether requested or not. I don't really construe it that way when you look at 298(a).

However, if that is a concern, I think that it could be easily corrected by simply inserting, after the words -- after the word, "conclusions comma if required comma", so that Rule 298(b) would read "The court shall make and file any additional or amended findings and conclusions comma if required comma within 10 days after such request is filed", et cetera.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I think I seconded the motion on that rule. If it is in order, I would like to move that that -- I guess it is Ken's motion, be amended to

1	include that provision that Hadley just referred to.
2	MR. FULLER: J am going to accept the
3	amendment. I will accept the amendment, right.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let me I am trying
5	be a grammarian when I probably shouldn't be. I don't know
6	whether that "when required" is going to
7	MR. EDGAR: "If required."
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "If required."
9	How about this: "The Court, when necessary,
10	shall make and file any additional or amended" J am
11	trying to get the modifier in the right spot in the
12	sentence and J don't know where to put it. Maybe J
13	ought to just not even debate it.
14	MR. JONES: I have no problem either way.
15	MR. EDGAR: Well, I guess it would probably be
16	after "file," wouldn't it, "shall make and file, if
17	required".
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that pick up "make"? I
19	don't know, or is that just "filed when necessary"?
20	MR. FULLER: May I suggest a way to do that?
21	After the word "any" after the word "any" after "file,"
22	could we just say "required"? "The court shall make and
23	filed any required additional or amended findings."
24	JUSTICE HECHT: What are required?
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is the problem, is what

1	is required? What may be necessary? I don't know.
2	MR. BISHOP: I would like to
3	CHATRMAN SOULES: Doak Bishop.
4	MR. BISHOP: I would like to suggest a
5	suggestion for that a substitute for that language. After
6	"conclusions," put "that he deems appropriate" instead of "if
7	required" because the word "required" may have other
8	connotations.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about, "The court, when
10	appropriate, shall make" and so forth.
11	MR. JONES: Well, you sure get into a big
12	hassle over what is appropriate.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, isn't that, though
14	MR. BISHOP: Then that leaves it within the
15	discretion of the judge.
16	JUSTICE HECHT: It is up to the trial judge.
17	If he doesn't want to make it, it doesn't make any difference
18	whether it is required or not.
1.9	MR. BISHOP: I mean that is what I think
20	that is what we are trying to say is that he is not required
21	to make them, but he can make them if they are appropriate.
22	JUSTICE HECHT: He doesn't have to do
23	anything.
24	MR. JONES: When you get to the second go
25	round, you have already done everything in the discussion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. I will take it 1 any way somebody -- somebody that feels like they have got it 2 3 gramatically in order, give me a spot and I will put it in and we will vote. MR. BISHOP: Well, I would put after "findings and conclusions" in the second line, "that he deems 6 7 appropriate." MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I think I like the 8 9 mandatory language better and I think we had it in Ken's last 10 suggestion. Ken, would you restate that? 11 MR. FULLER: Yes. "The court shall make and 12 file any required additions." 13 1.4 CHAJRMAN SOULES: Well, but --MR. JONES: I don't know how to get that 15 motion before the house, but I want to do it. 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, but Justice Hecht 18 pointed out that it is not -- there is not any requirements. I mean what is "required"? "Required" doesn't fit. The word 19 20 doesn't fit. 21 MR. FDGAR: The purpose of this suggestion was to make it clear that the court is not required to make 22 23 additional or amended findings without someone requesting it. I mean there has to be something to trigger it. That was the 24

purpose -- that is the purpose of the suggested amendment.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, how about starting it 2 out "Upon such request, then the court" --3 MR. EDGAR: Or "If requested the court shall" 4 or "if properly" or something, but --CHAIRMAN SOULES: The court shall, if the 5 6 court -- "the court, if requested, shall make." 7 MR. DAVIS: You are saying he has got to make 8 it. 9 MR. JONES: It all started out, Mr. Chairman, 10 that we were afraid that this position would compel the court 11 to make additional findings, and that is what we are trying 12 to avoid. 13 JUSTICE HECHT: It looks like the word "any" 14 does that. 15 MR. BISHOP: That is why I suggested my 16 amendment. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we will put it in 18 there. 19 JUSTICE HECHT: Wouldn't that avoid the --20 MR. FULLER: Well, you see, that is what I feel like all the time, "if any," did that conditiona). 21 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The reason the word "any" is 23 in there is that is the way we put that -- that is the way we thought we had it fixed, but we may not have. At least one 24 25 judge has expressed concern that we didn't get it fixed,

1 and --MR. FULLER: That is a good thought. Would 2 changing the word "shall" to "may," would that do it? 3 4 MR. DAVIS: He made it, he has got to file them if he makes them. If he makes them, he shall file them. 5 6 MR. FULLER: Well, I think if you change 7 "shall" to "may," it looks to me like that would -- "The 8 court may make and file any," et cetera. 9 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Well, it is your 1.0 amendment. Amend your own amendment. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's get on with it here. 11 What should we do? 12 13 MR. FULLER: Okay. May I -- may I suggest an amendment to my second amendment, I suppose. "The court may 14 make and file any requested additional or amended findings 1.5 16 and conclusions within 10 days." 1.7 MR. BEARD: Well, but if he has omitted an 18 essential fact you want found, I mean he just doesn't find 19 it, I don't think it is --20 MR. BISHOP: That is the language --MR. BEARD: There are certain things that 21 22 should be discretionary. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hold on. Wait a minute. Pat has got the floor in response. 24 25 What is it, Pat?

MR. BEARD: You know there could be certain 1 2 additional requests that should be manditory after you 3 respond to it and just not in discretion. CHAJRMAN SOULES: Ken, you had remarks to that? 5 MR. FULLER: Yes. What I am saying is this: 6 7 That that is what makes the error if the court does not. 8 are just saying if he is going to make any additional ones 9 that he has got to do it within 10 days. He can't wait 10 30 days, or 40 days, or whatever. 11 MR. JONES: He doesn't have to make any. MR. FULLER: All we are doing is setting a 12 13 time limit for the court's action. 14 MR. BEARD: Well, I was just saying the word "may," it would seem to me that he didn't have to do it in 15 16 certain cases. 17 MR. BISHOP: Mr. Chairman, I think that my 18 language does what we are trying to do without creating this 19 problem. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anybody want to hear it 21 again? 22 MS. CARLSON: Yes. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's hear Doke's 24 language again. MR. BISHOP: "The court shall make and file 25

any additional or amended findings and conclusions" --1 2 insert -- "that he deems appropriate, within 10 days." 3 MR. JONES: I accept that amendment to my -the amendment to the amendment. 4 MR. EDGAR: 5 "Which it deems appropriate." MR. BISHOP: Okay. I will accept that. 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about "that are 8 appropriate"? 9 MR. JONES: Well, that invades his discretion 10 a little bit. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULFS: Yes. I don't think it got a 12 whole lot here. 13 JUSTICE HECHT: Sort of knocks it down. 14 CHATRMAN SOULES: Is that all right with you, 15 "that are appropriate"? 16 MR. BISHOP: That is fine. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We would then insert 18 in the second line -- as T understand Doak's motion, it is 19 that we insert in the second line of 298(b), as it appears on 20 Page 418 of the materials, after the words "findings and 21 conclusions" these words: "that are appropriate", without 22 any punctuation, and then pick up "within 10 days after", and 23 that would be the change. 24 Is that your motion?

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MR. BISHOP: Yes.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Second?
2	MR. FULLER: Second it.
3	CHATRMAN SOULES: In favor say "Aye."
4	(RESPONDED AYE)
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? That is unanimously
6	approved, then, as changed.
7	MR. FULLER: A point of order.
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.
9	MR. FULLER: Mr. Chairman, does the prior vote
10	as to 298(a) still stand, though? That was my motion. I
11	was made the motion and I misstated. I really meant it to
12	apply only to 298(a) when this question came up.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Are we now then
14	ready to vote?
15	All in favor of 296, 297, and 298, as changed,
16	and 298(b), please say "aye."
17	(RESPONDED AYE)
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. That is
19	done.
20	Does that take care of that, Ken, for you?
21	MR. FULLER: Yes, that took care of it.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The next item is on
23	Page 425, Rule 305, I believe, isn't it, Hadley?
24	MR. EDGAR: This, I think, is something we
25	need to address. If you will look at Rule 305 on Page 425,

you will notice that it doesn't -- I mean we have some default judgment problems we need to consider with respect to this rule because the rule would literally require a party on default judgment to notify the party against whom the judgment is being taken of the proposed judgment.

And the -- I recommend that this problem can be remedied, unless we want to change the default judgment

And the -- I recommend that this problem can be remedied, unless we want to change the default judgment practice, to simply state that in the second paragraph, second line, after "parties," to state -- or to insert the words, the -- "on all other parties who have filed an answer."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Who have appeared"?

MR. FULLER: Well, they have appeared, really there has been a return of citation.

MR. BEARD: No, they don't have to answer.

MR. EDGAR: If a party -- if a party has filed a motion to transfer venue, it has not filed an answer and if --

MR. BEARD: Make a special appearance.

MR. EDGAR: -- the court overrules the motion to transfer venue, is the party obtaining the judgment required to notify the opposite party under the current law?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think so.

MR. EDGAR: You think so?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think the only time you

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don't notify a party is where there is absolutely nothing on 1 the record. MR. EDGAR: And then we want to say who have 3 filed -- "who have made an appearance," right? CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that seems fair. 5 That 6 is -- really, the default judgment is no appearance 7 situation. JUSTICE HECHT: Well, or a late answer. 8 9 MR. EDGAR: Well, now, we have got some 10 postanswer defaults now, at least that is what the Supreme Court calls them. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't have any problem with having 305 service of proposed judgment on a -- in a 13 14 postanswer default situation. I think it ought to be. To me, that is the right thing to do, if it is a postanswer 15 16 default. 17 MR. EDGAR: Then we would say who has -- "who 18 have made an appearance." That would be --19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All in favor say "aye." 20 (RESPONDED AYE) 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? 22 MR. EDGAR: All right. Then after the -after the word "parties," in the second line of the second 23 24 paragraph --25 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Who have appeared."

1	MR. EDGAR: "who have appeared." So that
2	it would read, "Each party who submits a proposed judgment
3	for signature shall serve the proposed judgment on all other
4	parties who have appeared and certify thereon," et cetera.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. And that is what we
6	voted on. Everybody understands. That stands unanimously
7	recommended as oh, are there any other changes to
8	Rule 305?
9	MR. RAGLAND: On that phrase that goes down
10	here
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom Ragland.
12	MR. RAGLAND: in another place, Luke. In
13	the last next to the last line of that same paragraph,
14	been served on each party
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Each attorney and the pro se
16	party
17	MR. EDGAR: It would be after "to the suit."
18	MR. RAGLAND: Yes, "who have appeared"
19	"parties to the suit who have appeared."
20	MR. EDGAR: In both places.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about just "has been so
22	served" or "copy has been served" well, okay. Help me
23	with this. We don't want to we don't want to have to

serve every attorney who has appeared because a lot of them

have been substituted out. And I am trying to come up with

1	really not repeating this again.
2	MR. FULLER: How about "opposing counse]"?
3	MR. RAGLAND: "Counsel of record."
4	MR. FULLER: Yes, something a little more
5	generic.
6	MR. DAVIS: If they weren't required to serve
7	them, then why would that even apply, that next sentence
8	there? It is obviously referring to those that you have to
9	serve.
10	MR. FULLER: Luke, there is something else
11	that bothers me about this, also. I don't much like to use
12	this word "serve" because we are really talking about
13	"notice." To "serve"
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We voted to use "serve" in
15	this rule.
16	MR. FULLER: We did?
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, we did.
18	MR. FULLER: Well
19	MR. RAGLAND: I beg the Chair's pardon.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Tom Ragland.
21	MR. RAGLAND: Again, I was on the subcommittee
22	that drafted the rule, and we voted on it in Committee and it
23	came out "notice," and then whenever it came out in printed
24	form, it came out "service." I don't know where the
25	transition was made there.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Shall notice the proposed judgment"?

MR. RAGLAND: Well, the idea -- the whole question came up because of a complaint that a bench trial or jury trial was had and a judgment was entered without the losing party knowing about it. And that is the reason for the rule. And we discussed at length about service on a judgment, and that wasn't indicated.

And the way the rule was originally written, that is we will give them -- deliver them a copy of it. That last phrase in --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes.

MR. RAGLAND: -- Paragraph 2 there read something like, "indicate thereon the date and manner of delivery." And at one time it had the first draft -- the printed draft came out with Rule 21 in it, and I called that to your office's attention, Luke, and then it came back "service." So that is the history of that rule, as I recall it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. A way to fix this is to where we have added the words "who have appeared," to just put a period and let 21(a) take care of what has to be in the statement of service, if we are going to leave it "service."

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): You could go on and say, "And certify thereon each attorney or pro se party to

1	the suit who has appeared and indicate thereon the date and
2	manner of notice."
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that 21(a) requires
4	that.
5	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGFJO): So just stop it
6	right there.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Stop it at "appeared"?
8	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Yes.
9	MR. FDGAR: Well, I would say "who have
10	appeared, and indicate thereon the date and manner of
11	service."
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is required by 21(a).
13	MR. EDGAR: That is right.
14	MR. BISHOP: I would so move, Mr. Chairman.
15	MR. BEARD: Second.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and seconded that
17	we
1.8	MR. FULLER: Hold it. I have a question J
19	would like to ask before we vote.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Please, do.
21	That is Ken Fuller.
22	MR. FULLER: What I understand you are saying
23	is that you are requiring this notice to be given to every
24	attorney who has ever been in the lawsuit?
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. We have just changed

1 that. 2 MR. FULLER: All right. Then tell me the exact language you are talking about using. 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. The second 5 sentence --6 MR. FULLER: Yes. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- which is, of course, the 8 second paragraph of 305, would be this, and it is short: 9 "Each party who submits a proposed judgment for signature shall serve the proposed judgment on all other parties who 10 11 have appeared." MR. FULLER: Okay. And then just leave it to 12 13 21(a) from there on? CHAIRMAN SOULES: On how that is accomplished. 14 MR. FULLER: That is good. That is good. 15 16 MR. EDGAR: Ken just raised the question, 17 though, about what about parties who have appeared and are no longer in the suit at the time the proposed judgment is 18 19 submitted? 20 MR. RAGLAND: That was back there. MR. EDGAR: Well, no, but that is the question 21 22 Ken just raised. As long as we understand that, but that 23 wasn't addressed a moment ago. MR. RAGLAND: That is literally what it 24 25 requires.

1	MR. DAVTS: "All other parties who are"
2	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): "All parties who
3	have appeared and are still a party to the case."
4	MR. BISHOP: "Who have appeared and who are
5	affected by the judgment."
6	MR. FULLER: How about "the current parties,"
7	"the current parties"?
8	MR. BISHOP: You could say, "who have appeared
9	and who are affected by the judgment."
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that put us back to
11	default judgments? That is what I was kind of running
12	that through my mind.
13	MR. EDGAR: Not if you have appeared and
14	because they haven't appeared.
15	MR. BISHOP: That is right.
16	MR. EDGAR: You are requiring that they appear
17	and are affected by the judgment.
18	MR. DAVIS: Who decides whether they are
19	affected or not?
20	JUSTICE HECHT: That is a good question.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about "who have appeared
22	and are parties to the judgment"? No, that doesn't work.
23	MR. DAVIS: Why don't you just leave the thing
24	alone like you proposed it. This is the kind of a thing that
,	
25	doesn't occur every day and we can't solve every evil. And

if they are no longer in the case and they don't get a copy 1 2 of the judgment, then they are not going to complain anyway. MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): But the defaulting 3 party might say, "The default judgment is no good because you 4 5 didn't sign this document." I am just technical. 6 MR. EDGAR: Yeah. You have got -- you know, 7 on default judgments, you have got to literally comply or run 8 the risk of --MR. RAGLAND: There is another rule about 9 10 judgments on default. There is another rule. This wasn't continuing as addressed --11. 12 MR. FULLER: Would "a current party to the 13 lawsuit" do it, you know "who have appeared and are current parties to the lawsuit"? 14 15 MR. BEARD: You can have parties that haven't 16 been served yet while you are taking a default judgment. 17 MR. DAVIS: "Parties to the suit who have appeared." 18 19 JUSTICE HECHT: That is good. 20 JUSTICE DOGGETT: Leave it at that. 21 MR. FULLER: Nobody said it was going to be 22 easy, did they? 23 MR. BEARD: I am like Tom. I just say, say "who have appeared," and I don't believe -- let the -- I 24 25 believe the courts will so construe that that people who are

1	no longer parties are unnecessary.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Somebody might
3	want to continue to think about this a bit and see if there
4	is a simple way to write the words "still before the court."
5	Is "before the court," does that mean
6	anything?
7	MR. DAVIS: Luke
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: What I am thinking of is
9	"who have appeared and are before the court at the time of
10	the judgment."
11	MR. DAVIS: I-uke
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom Davis.
13	MR. DAVIS: how about this: "Shall serve a
14	proposed judgment on all parties to the suit who have
15	appeared"? "Parties to the suit who have appeared," that
16	could be both parties to the suit and they have got to have
17	appeared.
18	MR. FULLER: That would mean that people had
19	been dismissed
20	MR. DAVIS: They are not parties to the suit.
21	MR. FULLER: "Who are," okay. Not "who have."
22	"Who are."
23	MR. DAVIS: "Who are parties to the suit and
24	have appeared."
25	MR. FULLER: That would do it, I believe.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So it would read: 1 2 "Each party who submits a proposed judgment for signature shall serve the proposed judgment on all other parties to the 3 suit who have appears." 4 MR. DAVIS: Yes, "appeared." 5 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. All in favor say 7 "Aye." Opposed? 8 MR. TINDALL: I think "all other parties who 9 10 have" -- I think there was a correction that Ken was saying, 11 "All other parties who have appeared"? MR. FULLER: "All other parties who" -- "all 12 13 others who are parties to the suit that have appeared." We 14 are trying to talk about just current parties and not have to 15 give notice to people that may have been dismissed, severed 16 out, whatever. 17 MR. BEARD: They are not parties anymore. CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think that Tom's language 18 19 pretty much gets it. They are not parties to the suit if 20 they are out. 21 MR. RDGAR: I think "all other parties to the 22 suit who have appeared period", is adequate. CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is Tom's motion. 23 24 MR. FULLER: Okay. All right. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Your second, Hadley.

1	MR. FULLER: Okay. I withdraw my comment.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Those in favor say "Aye."
3	(RESPONDED AYE)
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. That is
5	unanimously approved as changed.
6	MR. RAGLAND: Luke.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Just one second. Let
8	me make a note here unless it is about this rule.
9	MR. EDGAR: And then we strike the balance of
10	that sentence. Is that correct?
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is correct. The
12	second the first and last sentences of the rule would stay
13	the same. The middle sentence would read as follows: "Each
1.4	party who submits a proposed judgment for signature shall
15	serve the proposed judgment on all other parties to the suit
16	who have appeared period". And the balance of the second
17	sentence would be deleted. That is what we voted on.
18	Everybody understand?
19	Okay. That is unanimous.
20	MR. RAGLAND: May I add something
21	CHATRMAN SOULES: Tom Ragland.
22	MR. RAGLAND: for the record, in case
23	anybody ever reads this stuff.
24	There is not any question that this Rule 305 is not
25	intended to address default judgments. The default judgments

are controlled by Rules 239, 239(a), and 240. Is that 1 2 correct? I mean is that --3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is correct. understand it differently? 4 5 No one does. Also, it is not designed to cause any requirement 6 7 for notice to parties that have -- that are already out of 8 the case. 9 MR. FULLER: Would that be an appropriate 10 comment? I think it would be helpful, Luke, in the comment 11 section. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I will work on that. 13 Why don't we move and I will come back and see if I can 14 doctor the comment and bring it to your attention in a 15 moment. 16 What is the next --17 MR. EDGAR: On Rule 308(a) --18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 308(a). I will try to 19 listen and write on the comment here at the same time. 20 Hadley. MR. EDGAR: Rule 308(a) begins on Pages 428, 21 22 429. The first comment on Page 431 points out that the first 23 clause in the third sentence was omitted by the bar journal. 24 However, our copy, on Page 429, is correct. And I don't know

whether West will pick up what is on Page 429 or what is in

the bar journal, but that needs to be called to the Chair's 1 attention. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, West will pick up what 3 is in the court's order --4 5 MR. EDGAR: All right. Well --CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- and we should have it 6 7 fixed here. MR. FDGAR: -- the bar journal -- the bar 8 9 journal dropped a sentence. 10 CHAJRMAN SOULES: Yes, they made -- there were several mistakes in what got printed there. 11 12 MR. EDGAR: All right. So we don't -- no 13 action is required on that now. CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, we have got that fixed 14 and it should stay fixed. 15 16 MR. FDGAR: Now, the suggestion is made on 17 Page 430 that a possible solution to solving the problem that we tried to handle in 308(a), could be obtained by appointing 1.8 19 a special master in family law to avoid unnecessary fees or 20 duplication of effort where a master is already available. 21 And my comment here is that we just simply need Ken 22 and Harry to help us on this, whether or not that any 23 consideration is to be given to that. MR. TINDALL: Well, it wouldn't fit. I don't 24 25 think it is the kind of thing we are getting at in 308(a),

1	and I suggest we reject it.
2	MR. EDGAR: Do you second that, Ken?
3	MR. FULLER: Yes. T am 308(a). Okay. And
4	if you start tinkering with appointing special masters and
5	you get into all kinds of other rules and statutes, it is
6	just over complicated, in my opinion.
7	MR. EDGAR: You have a motion and a second,
8	Mr. Chairman, that 308(a) remain the same.
9	CHATRMAN SOULES: Motion and second 308(a)
10	remain the same. In favor say "Aye."
11	(RESPONDED AYE)
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? That is
13	unanimously the same.
14	MR. EDGAR: That concludes our interim report.
15	CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay. Back, if you will,
16	with me to Page 425. I propose to add the following sentence
17	to the comment: "There is no requirement to give any notice
18	under this rule to parties previously disposed of and no
19	longer parties to the case at the time of the proposed
20	judgment."
21	MR. FULLER: How about the comment that
22	part is okay. How about the default portion?
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Now, there is
24	"There is no requirement to give any notice under this rule
25	to parties who have not appeared."

MR. FULLER: Okay. That is just one, but 1 2 there is another really that has got to be --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Wait a minute. So -- Okay. 3 4 "There is no requirement to give any notice" -- and J will change this in a minute -- "notice under this rule of a 5 6 proposed default judgment against a party who has not 7 appeared." Is that all right with everybody? Okay. All in favor "Aye." 8 9 (RESPONDED AYE) 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. That comment adjustment will be made. 11 (At this time there was a 12 13 brief discussion off the record, after which time the hearing continued as follows:) 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The next item is, let's 15 16 That got us -- let me get myself straight here now on see. 17 that 305, 308(a). That takes us to Rule 534 on Page 432. 18 Okay. Before we do that, I guess, do we have 19 comments, Franklin, to Rule 200? 20 MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, you have got a letter from Buddy Low. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: This will be on Page 312. 22 guess we are going back to 312 and looking at 200. 23 MR. JONES: Actually, he just asked me to 24 report on Rule 200 and Rule 614 and 703 of the evidence 25

rules. And if you will look at your letter, which was written yesterday or just recently, he said his law partner, Franklin Jones, was going to make this report.

MR. COLLINS: I didn't know you-all were partners.

MR. JONES: If I am his partner, I am now fixing to assume the role of his senior partner because a little bit of me feels like an old coon dog, there is not enough of me to not make me do what I want to do. And that is I have got to oppose part of what Ruddy and, apparently, his subcommittee are suggesting here.

MR. FDGAR: What rule are we talking about?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We are talking about

Rule 200 and Rule 614, Rules of Evidence, and this had to do

with taking -- the rule, and whether or not The Rule applies

in depositions. That is generally the subject matter.

MR. JONES: And the proposal is to, if I interpret it correctly -- and not me -- I have asked my lawyer, Rosemary Snider, to look at it, and her interpretation of it is that what we are doing here is abolishing the rule, the witness rule, in deposition. And I am vehemently opposed to that.

I was not here when this rule was considered by the Committee generally and I don't know what right was advanced in favor of it at that point in time, but this, at least in

my practice, is a universal rule which we routinely use. I think in the years I have been practicing law, we have seen the deposition practice develop almost into a trial practice. And the deposition rule is, I think, extremely valuable to all parties when they are deposing, and I don't think we ought to abolish it.

Now, in deference to Buddy and his subcommittee, I am not prepared to move yet, at least, that we scuttle this rule, and I would like perhaps for it to be reassigned for further consideration or at least fully debated before we talk about it, and I know we have got much more important things here to deal with, perhaps, than this problem, but, Mr. Chairman, I cannot move the adoption of the language which they propose to add to begin the rule -- the Evidence Rule 614.

I have no problem with the requiring notice in the deposition notice as to people who will attend the deposition. There may have been -- there, perhaps, is good cause for that. But to say that in deposition proceedings a party can bring everybody to the deposition he plans to use at the time of trial and let them hear everybody's witnesses and get ready on their testimony, I think does violence to the trial practice as we know it.

And I oppose that and would move that the Committee further consider it before adoption.

MR. BEARD: Well, Franklin, T think you are talking about --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: This is Pat Beard.

MR. BEARD: -- talking about a custom that I have been involved in depositions where they attempt to invoke the rule to exclude the witnesses, and they say the rule doesn't apply, and you are left with the debate on that and threaten to walk out. So you are talking about a custom and I don't think any rule.

MR. JONES: Well, you might call it a custom, but anytime that I have a party who doesn't want to admit that the rule applies, I say, "Well, let's go see the judge," and he does. I think the judge right now has discretion --

MR. BEARD: Well, that may --

MR. JONES: -- to impose the rule of witnesses, and I certainly don't think we ought to destroy that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Justice Hecht.

JUSTICE HECHT: Franklin, to summarize what I recall was the debate, and very extensive debate last summer, the question was whether to presume that it applied -- applies or presume that it doesn't apply in a deposition, but to leave open the possibility that you could go and get a protective order if you -- if you, in effect, wanted the rule to apply to a particular deposition.

I think that is where the -- there was no question, as I recall in the debate, that the rule should not apply in some depositions. Everybody seemed to think that it should, and everybody seemed to think that there ought to be cases in which it should not apply in a deposition. So the question was rather than go see the judge every time, which way should the presumption be.

Now, I am kind of like you. As far as I knew, in Dallas, the presumption was that the rule applied in depositions. But this — the proposal changes that. It doesn't abolish it, but it changes the presumption that if you don't want somebody in a deposition who is named in the notice, then it is you who has to go get the protective order from the trial judge rather than the other side who has to go get an order and say, "Let me have so and so sit in at the deposition."

And I am not -- I am not commenting on it.

Just the sum -- I think that is a summary of what was discussed. And the people talked about practices around the state, but I thought the practice, when I was on the trial bench, was that the rule applied in depositions.

MR. JONES: Well, I think, Judge, and I hope I am not disagreeing with you, as a matter of fact, I wouldn't. But my humble opinion is that we ought not to change the custom right now as it exists, and we ought to burden the

party who wants to flipflop how we are going to handle depositions goes to the judge.

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JUSTICE HECHT: Well, I personally, and for what -- as the liaison, I mean that is the way I lean myself, but the comments last summer were that is not the uniform custom in the state, that there are places in the state where that is not true. Now, I don't know.

CHAIRMAN SOULRS: David Beck. Excuse me. I am trying to firm this.

MR. BECK: The concern is -- I mean I share Franklin's views in the sense that at least in my practice, I have always assumed that the rule did apply in depositions. I think the problem is that by adding this last sentence to the proposal, that is clearly giving an indication, in my judgment, that the rule does not apply in discovery proceedings, which may have an affect on your ability to have witnesses present, to get a protective order, and so on.

So my concern is that by adding that sentence in there we are, in effect, making a statement that the rule probably does not apply in discovery proceedings, which I think is a clear change in the status quo.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. That change, for the benefit of everybody that doesn't have it located right now, is on Page 589. There is not anything on Page 312 about that, but it is on Page 589, which is Rule of Evidence 614.

So we have got to really kind of have two pages open here.

Sam Sparks and then Ken Fuller.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I happen to agree with Justice Hecht and with Franklin Jones on the comments on it, not all of it most assuredly, but I always assumed the opposite, and that is that the rule did not apply. But very simply because it is not stated in there, you invoke the rule not dealing with protective orders, but really just practicing law by agreement. You look at the other side and everybody is going to sit in, you say, "Well, then it gives me a question of who noticed who and who gets to go first."

And with this comment in there, you are going to really throw depositions into a scramble for more technical proceedings. And when things can be done by agreement, they should be done by agreement. I just don't think you need the comment in there. It ought to be left like it is now, and people who want protection go get it.

MR. BEARD: Well, all the -- all we have talked about is the rule applies just to the extent that the other witness can't be present. The rule doesn't apply to the extent you can't talk to absolutely anyone but the lawyers. No one has ever considered that, have they? You are just talking about excluding witnesses.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): Just on a straight up car wreck, you got the drivers of two cars. I take them

with the other party out of the room totally by agreement because I don't think they ought to sit and listen to each other and change their facts accordingly. And you do that by agreement because it doesn't say anything in here. The problem is, if it says the rule doesn't apply,

then you have got the race to see who gets out the first notice and who are we going to do first.

MR. BRARD: But if you say the rule applies, then if you -- how far does it go --

> MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I said no comment --MR. BEARD: -- if the court instructed the

witness?

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MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I said no comment either way whether the rule applies or it doesn't apply, just don't put the sentence in there.

MR. JONES: That is a proposal --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Franklin, let me get those with hands up, Franklin, and I will get to you. Excuse me. Harry Tindall.

MR. TINDALL: I have had a series of discovery fights about trying to have an accountant sit in on a party's deposition to help you, to have an expert mental health care professional, and you run into this problem constantly. Maybe this says it too harshly, it doesn't apply, but couldn't we say something here about subject to protective

order being entered, the rule doesn't apply, something like that so that if you do get notice and it says that an accountant will be present or a doctor will be present when the other party's deposition is being taken, if you don't like that, you can get it -- maybe this is too harsh the way it is written.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: If I am understanding what is before the house, it is to delete the material -- the sentence that was added to 614, and otherwise leave the 200 and 208 alone. That is really all we are debating, is do we say or not say anything about 614's applicability to depositions.

MR. TINDALL: Well, you run into another problem, though, of witnesses reading depositions before they are called to trial. How do you stop that?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I am not going to stop that. I am not going to stop doing that.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Your accountant can go read it afterward. He doesn't have to sit and listen.

MR. TINDALL: Hey, you need him there.

MR. SPARKS: Why?

MR. BEARD: Well, I have always -- an expert can sit in the courtroom during the trial of the case. And I have always considered an expert could sit in on a deposition, and I have never had any problem.

MR. FULLER: Luke, I am going to bust if I 1 don't get to say something. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Ken Fuller. J am sorry. Go ahead. 4 MR. FULLER: I tell you, this is a major, 5 major problem for us. I don't know how much it affects you, 6 but if you have done much family law, you get real excited 7 about what we are talking about. I don't know anyone who is 8 victimized by this more than me. I have been to Court to try 9 to get relief and I have been told, "There ain't no rule 10 covers that. You are just on your own." 11 The girlfriend's deposition is going to be 12 taken, they show up with four deacons from the church, 13 we have got to do something. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We have got it -- Ken, we 15 have got it fixed. That is all fixed. 16 MR. FULLER: Okay. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It is all fixed in 200 and 18 208 the way it stands right now. The only thing we are 19 talking about is deleting the last sentence of 614. 20 MR. FULLER: Okay. You are talking about --21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is all that is before 22 the house. All that is before the house is deleting the last 23 sentence of 614. 24 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): Luke, I am sitting 25

1	here looking at Buddy Low's proposal, and the last sentence
2	is underlined there.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: On Page 589?
4	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRIO): And that is what J
5	needed to know.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there a motion to delete
7	the last sentence or to rescind the recommended change to
8	614?
9	MR. ADAMS: So moved.
10	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Second.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The motion has been
12	made that we rescind the earlier vote on 614 and recommend to
13	the Supreme Court no change in 614. Is there a second?
14	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Yes.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is Sam Sparks' second.
16	Any further discussion?
17	All in favor say "Aye."
18	(RESPONDED AYE)
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?
20	Okay. It is unanimous that we not change 614. And
21	then we have already voted on 200 and 208 to leave them the
22	way they were, or have we, Judge?
23	JUSTICE HECHT: Well, I still don't I just
24	need to know, are does the rule apply to depositions or
25	not? I mean I and by changing this, we still left it in

limbo, which is where we were last summer. If you take the sentence out, then you still don't know. And we ought to either say that it does or it doesn't.

MR. JONES: Well, I agree with Justice Hecht, and I think we ought to say that it does, subject to the -- subject to the court having discretion to change it, which, of course, he has under the current law.

Now, if the Chair would like to have a Committee further look at that, a subcommittee look at it, it would be fine with me, but I am prepared to recommend to the Committee as a whole that in substance we keep the rule of -- or perhaps that is not a good phraseology, that we declare that the rule applies in depositions unless otherwise altered by the court. But I don't want us to do something without adequate study if the Chair feels like we need to do that.

MR. BEARD: Well, Franklin, we can't just say the rule applies if you are going — if it is going to go to standard instructions from the court that they are not to talk to any other parties except the attorneys or any of the other witnesses, because that is not our practice at depositions. You may exclude the witness from the deposition, but he may read the deposition, he may talk to the witness. At least, that is the way I would do it.

MR. JONES: Yes, he could do that.

MR. BEARD: But if you said the rule applied,

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the standard instruction is he doesn't talk with anybody but 1 the lawyers, and I don't think we intend that, do we? 2 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now, so now the vote 4 is, as I understand where this stands before the house, 5 200 and 208 remain as recommended, and we take out the last sentence of 614. Is that the case? 6 7 MR. FULLER: Can you direct us to where 200 and 208 are in this book? 8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Yes, I will. 10 MR. FULLER: I have been trying to find it and 11 I can't find it. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, if -- let me 12 13 tell you how to find things and then -- and then, also -- but that is not to keep you from calling on me because, 14 15 obviously, Holly and I are more familiar with these materials 16 than somebody else. 17 In the front of the book on the third page, you 18 will see numbers, and then the rule behind them. Those are 19 the page numbers, is where this -- the index page. 20 MR. FULLER: Yes. Right. CHAIRMAN SOULES: So if you will put your --21 22 take one finger and mark Page 312, and another one and mark 23 Page 327, 312 and 327 -- everybody with me? -- then the last 24 one is 589. Now you have got all three rules. It is like

working a tax code. So you would still give notice if you

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plan to have anybody else at a deposition other than the party's counsel, employee and counsel, and the officer — let's see, other than the witness parties, spouses of parties, counsel, employees of counsel, and the officer to take the deposition, your notice would have to state that.

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JUSTICE HECHT: And if it does, then you can bring them.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Unless somebody opposes them.

MR. RECK: Unless you have a court order saying you can't.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then if the person receiving the notice is going to have somebody there besides that list, that person receiving the notice has to tell the other side, who gave the notice, "I plan to bring some extra people to the deposition that you noticed." And then unless there is opposition to that, the respondent could bring additional people.

Now, we talked about, you know, taking depositions out of state, traveling, that we need to get these things resolved before people are on the road and in circumstances where a dispute arises. And we had a fairly extensive debate about this, if you-all picked up on it at the time.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of the recommendation.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
2	MR. TINDALL: Luke, can we see where 200 is
3	before we move on to
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it is right on Page
5	312.
6	MR. TINDALL: 312. Okay.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay?
8	MR. TINDALL: Okay. yes.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So look with your
10	fingers marking the pages, here is where I understand the
11	matter to be, and I will get your vote on whether or not I
12	understand it correctly, that 200 and 208, as recommended
13	by to the court, remain as they are, as they appear on
14	Page 312 and 327. But that the last sentence, the sentence
15	that we voted earlier to add to 614, that that not be made.
16	So repeating, that we make the changes to 200 that
17	we voted on, that we make the changes to 208 that we voted
18	on, but we not make the change to 614 that we voted on.
19	All in favor say "Aye."
20	(RESPONDED AYE)
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. Does that
22	resolve it?
23	JUSTICE HECHT: Yes, I think so.
24	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Luke, just as a
25	matter of inquiry

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sam Sparks. 1 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): -- is there a place 2 in the rules that gives you the opportunity to contest who 3 can attend? In other words, it says, "If you are going to 4 bring other people, tell us who it is," other than these? 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sure, 166(b)(5), protective 6 7 orders. MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRIA): Then you can go to 8 the court and say, "Well, Judge, this is just like the trial, 9 I want you to exclude them unless they show it is necessary." 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sure. You can -- you know, 11 you can oppose any deposition notice by filing a protective 12 13 order or objections to it. This would just be --MR. TINDALL: Luke, would we do violence to 14 the 200 if we added "experts"? That may cure about 15 16 98 percent of the fights. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, if you are going to 17 take an expert, you have got to tell the person in advance. 18 19 That is the way we voted last time. 20 Franklin Jones. MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, the rest of this 21 22 report is purely --23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Excuse me. Franklin Jones has the floor for the balance of his report, Buddy Low's 24 25 report.

1	And it deals with what rule, Franklin?
2	MR. JONES: This deals with Evidence Rule 703.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, why don't we go ahead
4	and do that so Franklin can get this report wrapped up.
5	703 appears in the materials at Page
6	MR. BISHOP: Excuse me, Luke.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 593.
8	MR. BISHOP: Before we go to that, if 614 is
9	going to apply to discovery proceedings, as I understand our
10	vote
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Our vote is that it doesn't
12	say one way or the other.
13	MR. BISHOP: Well, but I think what we have
14	been discussing is that impliedly, then, it is going to
15	apply.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It implies it is implied
17	like it is right know. It does not in San Antonio, it does
18	in Dallas, it does not in San Angelo, it does some place
19	else. We are making not making any change on that. We
20	voted to rescind the change.
21	MR. EDGAR: What page is that?
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does somebody want to do
23	that differently?
24	MR. JONES: 593.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 703 is on Page 593.

1	MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption
2	of this rule.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I believe it is they
4	recommend we leave it as it is.
5	MR. JONES: I move that then.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Any all in
7	favor say "Aye."
8	(RESPONDED AYR)
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
10	MR. BECK: Wait. Wait. What are we
11	voting on?
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We are voting to reaffirm
13	593 the way it is written.
14	MR. JONES: How is it written? I would
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Look at the
16	MR. EDGAR: You said 593. You mean 703?
17	MR. TINDALL: I think
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I am sorry. I have got
19	confusion. At Page 593, Rule 703. Okay?
20	MR. JONES: My notebook indicates we are
21	making some minor changes, Mr. Chairman.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It says the last sentence
23	says, "I recommend the rule as amended and as it appeared in
24	the bar journal," which is exactly the way it is at Page 593.
25	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Is that reviewed by

the expert?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Okay. All in favor of leaving 593 -- Page 593, Rule 703, evidence rule as it appears on Page 593, say "Aye."

(RESPONDED AYE)

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? Okay. Does that complete Buddy Low's report?

MR. JONES: Yes.

CHATRMAN SOULES: Would you express our appreciation to his law partner?

MR. JONES: I bet he shows the next time.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We are going back now to __ the next rule that we will look at is 534 on -- this is Rule 534, and it is on Page 432. Page 432, issuance and form of citation.

And, Tony Sadberry, isn't this your study?

MR. SADBERRY: That is right, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. SADBERRY: And, Mr. Chairman, this is

Page 432 of the material, and this has to do with the justice
court practice. And I am apologizing for not being here in
the last meeting and presuming that there was no discussion
or action on any of these rules or any of these proposals at
the last meeting. If I am correct in that, then I will
proceed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, these have all been 1 2 recommended to the court for adoption. 3 MR. SADBERRY: That is right. And this is just to discuss the interim --4 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The public comments. MR. SADBERRY: -- public comments --6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. Okay. 7 MR. SADBERRY: -- and our subcommittee's 8 response to that. In the 1988 changes in the district and 9 10 county court practices, certain changes occurred that did not 11 get made in the justice court. So the last time around, in 12 1989, in the work of this full Committee, we made some 13 proposed changes to the justice court rules essentially to 14 conform them to the district and county court practice. 15 Now, we have gotten public comments and our 16 subcommittee has met on those, and we have, what I believe, 17 are just some, I believe, noncontroversial changes in 534. There is a -- in my booklet, there is a -- some 18 19 loose material that is placed in the book that I hope that you all have because there are some changes from what exists 20 21 on Page 432. Let me know if you don't have that. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can you tell us what they 23 are? 24 MR. SADBERRY: Well, briefly, in Subpart (a), 25 we found that the -- what is now the next to the last

sentence in the proposal beginning "It shall state the number of the suit" and going forward, actually, substantially all of that had already been picked up in Subpart (b). The only thing that had not been picked up in Subpart (b) out of that sentence is "the nature of the plaintiff's demand."

1.0

1.2

And the change would be to put that in Part 7, Subpart 7 under (b). 7 under (b) would read "State the nature of the plaintiff's demand." All other provisions in that sentence have been picked up already in the materials that exist on Page 432.

Then we combined 6 and 7 as it exists in your materials before you, and states that -- the existing proposed 6 would now state, "show file number and names of parties," which would be what it would be in 6 and 7 in the current materials. We didn't want to have -- we still wanted to have 12 subparts.

The other change under Subpart (b), Part 2 thereof, as the materials show currently, is be signed by the clerk under seal of court. There was commentary correctly stated that some justices of the peace do not have clerks nor a seal of the court because of the legislature — the legislative provision that we understood in the past and, in fact, did not pass, would be out there, and modified the language proposed to the court is under Subpart 2 of (b), we would state "be signed by the justice of the peace or by the

clerk of the court under seal" -- or "by the clerk under the seal of the court," which would allow the justice of the peace to sign the citation and address the problem of the courts who do not have clerks or a seal of the court.

And those would be, we think, some drafting changes that we would propose to the court, and I have that and I can get copies made if you don't have that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why don't we leave the words "under seal of the court" in there. The justices of the peace all told us they don't have any seals, no authorized seals.

MR. EDGAR: The thought was, Luke, that up on that subcommittee --

MR. SADBERRY: Right.

MR. EDGAR: -- that the Legislature might ultimately authorize a seal of court, and if they did then -- because this was before the Legislature in its last session, and we simply wouldn't have to come back and amend the rule to conform to it. That was our reason for doing it that way.

MR. SADBERRY: That is right. We would hope the disjunctive would clear up that if there is a clerk with the seal of the court, the Legislature adopts that, that we don't have to come back, but in the meantime, the disjunctive allows the justice of the peace to sign, and we don't have a problem, which is a problem we created by a previous change

and in anticipation of this. This is going to have to come 1 back. We have several members of that subcommittee here. 2 3 Tom, you were on there, too. MR. RAGLAND: Yes, I was, and I never was 4 5 certain whether some JPs have clerks or they just have office 6 personnel. 7 MS. CARLSON: They do now, don't they? 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. MR. SADBERRY: Well, some of the comments, it 9 is really a twofold problem: None have seals and some do 10 have clerks, and some don't, apparently. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I am going to -- I am 13 going to ask to relocate the insert to put "by the clerk under seal of court" and then add to that "or by the justice 14 of the peace" so that you cannot -- we won't have somebody 15 16 saying that "seal of court" modifies both. 17 MR. RDGAR: Good point. MR. RAGLAND: Does that mean that if they have 18 got a clerk that they must have the seal of court before the 19 20 clerk can sign it? 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is right, the way this 22 is written. The way this is written --MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Actually, for right 23 24 now --

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Excuse me.

25

1	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): it is written "it
2	shall be signed by the justice of the peace."
3	MR. RAGLAND: Well, T want to get this right.
4	You understand that the JP practice
5	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Right.
6	MR. RAGLAND: is going to become more
7	important.
8	MR. FULLER: Luke, may I ask a question?
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Ken Fuller.
10	MR. FULLER: I have a
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: The court reporter can't get
12	this record with the chatter.
13	MR. FULLER: Okay. I have a question about
14	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): We don't want that
15	on the record.
16	MR. FULLERR: I have a question about some of
17	the stuff in the brackets on (a) on Page 432. It probably
18	makes sense to you all who know what you are doing, but I
19	don't. And it says, "And deliver the citation as directed by
20	the requested party." What is that supposed to mean? What
21	does that mean?
22	MR. RAGLAND: Either the constable or the
23	sheriff or
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Private process server,
25	whomever.

MR. SADBERRY: Ken, let me point out that as the public comments correctly pointed out, none of the members of the subcommittee have extensive practice in the justice court either, but that is correct. The response to your question is we have allowed, in our recommendation to the Supreme Court, and they have temporarily adopted service by private process, which heretofore was not the practice of the justice courts. And that is another rule, okay, which also had some public comment.

Our subcommittee, in looking at it, did not recommend rescinding allowing private process in a justice court proceeding, and that proviso is to pick up that the requesting party, if a private process server is to serve the citation on the requested party --

MR. FULLER: Okay. My problem is with that concept is, are you going to put the burden on the clerk to deliver the citation as directed? What if Joe Schmuck goes up and says, "I have got John Jones, private process server. He is on the other side of town. Ms. Clerk, you take it over there to him." That is the part that is worrying me.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that is exactly what Rule 99 provides for the district clerks.

MR. FULLER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: See, these are the same words.

1 MR. FULLER: Lots of luck, but I mean that is 2 fine. MR. SADBERRY: That was really part of our 3 4 charge in '89, was to get as close as we could to the extent that --5 6 MR. FULLER: Okay. That answers my question. 7 MR. SADBERRY: -- it is focused to the 8 district and county court practices. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. So as I 10 understand those two changes, one would be to put in (b) in the second line after the word "court" the words "or by the 11 12 justice of the peace comma", and then do 3 and finish the 13 sentence. 14 In the same Paragraph 534(b), in the line one, two, 15 three, four -- fifth from the top, we would delete the comma, 16 the parenthesis 7, close parenthesis, and the word "show," 17 simply substitute for those words the conjunctive "and," so 18 that 6 would read "show file number and names of parties." 19 MR. SADBERRY: That is right. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Then after the comma after the word "parties," we would insert the words "state the 21 22 nature of plaintiff's demand comma" --23 MR. SADBERRY: Correct. That was --24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- preceded by parenthesis 25 7, close parenthesis.

1	MR. SADBERRY: That is correct.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then after the comma,
3	start 8 and run it sequentially to the end.
4	MR. SADBERRY: That is correct.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is all of (b).
6	And in 538(a), correspondingly, we would take
7	out three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12
8	and 13 in Lines 11, 12, and 13, where text is still
9	readable between the other hash marks and the other
10	deletions, we would delete all of that as well.
11	And what is left of 534 would be the first and
12	second sentences that appear at the top and the very last
13	sentence at the very bottom.
14	MR. SADBERRY: That is right.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is that your motion, Tony?
16	MR. SADBERRY: That is my motion on 534.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Second?
18	MR. DAVIS: Second.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? I mean all in favor
20	say "Aye."
21	(RESPONDED AYE)
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?
23	Okay. Those changes will be recommended to the
24	court that way and I have got them in my notes.
25	Next, Tony.

MR. SADBERRY: Now, Mr. Chairman, we have changed -- we have made no proposals for any additional changes. To complete the report, we might point out the areas that we did address for the purpose of the minutes and the court.

In 534, you will see in what is on Page 432, which was the next to the last sentence, providing that the citation is not served within 90 days shall be returned unserved. The '89 work was to remove that provision to conform with the district and county courts. However, there was some commentary from the public, and I am mentioning that our subcommittee unanimously recommends that we leave that as this Committee recommended it to the court, that is to remove the 90-day provision. So we are recommending no change in what exists on Page 432.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Discussion?

All in favor say "Aye."

(RESPONDED AYE)

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?

MR. SADBERRY: And, finally, we have already got into this to some extent, and that is the use of private process servers. That would appear in Rule 536 and 536(a). And, similarly, our subcommittee recommends that we do not change the previous recommendation which permits the use of private process servers.

1	MR. DAVIS: What page does that appear on,
2	Tony?
3	MR. SADBERRY: Well, actually, the let me
4	see. The 536
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It is at it is on Page
6	441. 441.
7	MR. SADBERRY: That is how it came out of the
8	'89 work and we just haven't done anything to change any of
9	that. I note that Harry was present at the public
10	MR. TINDALL: The December meeting.
11	MR. SADBERRY: the December meeting. And J
12	didn't get a chance to talk with Harry.
13	Harry, does that comport with what you
14	understood
15	MR. TINDALL: Yes, no changes.
16	MR. SADBERRY: with how there is no change?
17	That is how our subcommittee went on that.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Discussion?
1.9	Okay. All in favor of no change say "Aye."
20	(RESPONDED AYE)
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?
22	There will be no change in our recommendation
23	to the Court on 536.
24	Did that also include 536(a)?
25	MR. SADRERRY: Well, I think it was 536, is

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1	who may serve.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 536(a)
3	MR. SADBERRY: 536(a) only has to do with
4	return of service.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
6	MR. SADBERRY: And I think that may be
7	impacted.
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is on Page 451. Did
9	you have a did you recommend a change in our work as it
10	appears on Page 451, Rule 536(a)?
11	MR. SADBERRY: No change.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Discussion?
13	All in favor of 536(a) as it appears on Page 451
1.4	say "Aye."
15	(RESPONDED AYE)
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?
17	Okay. That is unanimously recommended.
18	MR. SADBERRY: And the final point, I believe,
19	although I wasn't here, that Ken Fuller's subcommittee should
20	have already picked this up. My understanding was that the
21	issue of whether the time counted, under Rule 4, excluding
22	Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, may have affected some of
23	the justice court rules, but that the Rule 4 subcommittee
24	MR. FULLER: We took it out.
25	MR. SADBERRY: would make that

1	recommendation and has already been
2	MR. FULLER: Did that pass? I wasn't here the
3	last
4	MS. CARLSON: Yes, it did.
5	MR. TINDALL: Yes, it passed the last time.
6	MR. FULLER: Okay. Okay. I knew that is what
7	we recommended, but T didn't make the meeting, so
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
9	MR. SADBERRY: Okay. And that is all that we
10	saw, Mr. Chairman, from the public comments that
11	MR. EDGAR: Mr. Chairman, I think if you will
12	look at Pages 440 and 450, you will find that Carol Baker
13	pointed out to us a number of punctuation corrections, and we
14	really ought to have somebody like that on this Committee.
15	But, anyhow, I think all of her points were well taken and I
16	think that I don't really know how we handle that, Tony,
17	but she just pointed out that
18	MR. SADBERRY: I had not seen that, but to the
19	extent she has done that work, I would certainly be amenable
20	to it. Does it change anything substantially or
21	substantively?
22	MR. EDGAR: No. Look on Page 440.
23	MR. SADBERRY: I am looking at it now.
24	MR. EDGAR: And, for example, on Page 432,
25	this is just a typographical error, we didn't put a quotation

mark after Texas. She points that out. 1 MR. SADBERRY: Right. 2 MR. EDGAR: Just to be consistent, I think 3 that the Chair should --4 MR. FULLER: Is there an editorial license for 5 6 that type of thing? 7 MR. EDGAR: I don't know, but she did a lot --8 it took a lot of work for her to go through this and her 9 points were well taken. MR. DAVIS: Can we adopt the recommendations? 10 11 MR. SADBERRY: I would have no problem. haven't had a chance to study them carefully, but I take it, 12 13 from what I am looking at on 440, she has picked up the 14 deletions that we have made and she has also added some 1.5 things. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: May I suggest this to you, 17 and it is up to you-all, but I have looked at a lot of these technical changes and, by far, most of these -- for example, 18 19 the ones we got from the COAJ, I guess we got 20 technical corrections, one of them just flat was wrong, but the other 20 21 19 were absolutely right.

The only way I know how to handle that, I don't want to -- I don't want to get a resolution that we just adopt Carol Baker's work product, there might be something there that is not correct --

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MR. EDGAR: I am just simply referring this to 1 the Chair to Pages 440 and 450. 2 3 CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, I thought we were talking about her whole letter, which was lenghty. 4 5 MR. EDGAR: No. I am just talking about 440 6 and 450. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now, there is no -- J 8 don't see any problem with those. 9 MR. EDGAR: I think she is correct in those. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think she is, too. Could we assign to someone to read Carol Baker's 11 letter and decide which ones should be done and which ones 12 13 should not be done? If they are technical corrections, we will do them. And if there is anything substantive to them, 14 15 I think we would omit them because we never have discussed 16 them unless we do it now. 17 What do you-all suggest we do? 18 MR. SPIVEY: I think your suggestion is right. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 20 MR. SPIVEY: Pick our best grammarian, if 21 there is one, and let them work on it. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Who wants to? Anybody want 22 23 to volunteer? 24 MR. EDGAR: Luke, do you have all of her 25 letters in one place?

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. We have a complete
2	copy of her letter, you see, in the file. We can just get it
3	out.
4	MR. FDGAR: Well, I will try and look over it
5	tonight.
6	MR. DAVIS: Don't you check this anyway for
7	things like that?
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I try to, but
9	MR. DAVIS: Is it an extra burden to check
10	hers at the same time?
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can we leave this to, for
12	example, me and Hadley? Do you want to
13	MR. TINDALL: I so move.
14	MR. EDGAR: I would be happy to leave it to
15	the Chair.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. I was trying to give
17	him that.
18	MR. EDGAR: Well, J will be happy to look over
19	them tonight, if you have them all in one place.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We will see. Do we have
21	Carol Baker's letter intact?
22	MS. HALFACRE: Not here.
23	CHATRMAN SOULES: Can T send it to you
24	MR. EDGAR: Sure.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: and we will just share

that and get after we -- okay. As we go into final copy, we will -- Hadley and Holly and I will do that together, if that is okay.

If anybody else wants to volunteer, I will be happy to get it to you. Anybody else want to look at Carol Baker's letter intact?

Okay. That will be me and Hadley and Holly, and we will do -- we will exercise our best judgment on it.

And I do want to make a record that Carol Baker did a splendid job of going through this and picking out the important things that needed to be changed.

MR. TINDALL: Does anyone know her? I mean that is incredible work she did.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sure is. And I know we all express our appreciation and we might as well do it on the record here together.

The next is 749(c) on Page 454. This will be -- J guess this is the last Rule of Civil Procedure that we address, except for the charge rules and the sealed documents. So we will go from there to the TRAP rules and then to the -- then we have got the evidence rules all done.

749(c). Who reports? Blaine. Thank you.

MS. CARLISON: We recommended to the Supreme Court last August, after our deliberations, that 749(c) be amended so as to delete the requirement that a tenant who is

appealing by a trial de novo out of the justice court, in a forcible entry and detainer case as a pauper, put up one month's rent as a prerequisite to perfect the appeal. The concern was that that requirement perhaps might abridge open court constitutional protection that is afforded to all litigants.

We have received, since that time, some correspondence, which is included in your materials following Page 458 through approximately 464, predominantly from landlords and justices of the peace who question two things: One, the economic implication of that recommendation, and two, whether the rules, as amended, sufficiently protect the landlord when a tenant is appealing in that fashion.

The concern was that the tenant would be proceeding without having to, in effect, put up a supersedaes. The correspondence suggested that perhaps the supersedaes rules in the TRAP provisions would not be applicable to the de novo appeal out of the county court.

And so it really comes down to a question of whether the rules, as amended, one, are constitutional, two, whether they provide sufficient speed in the FR&D proceedings to protect all litigants on both sides, the tenant and the landlord, and, third, the fundamental right of any party who wins at the trial court level to have protection on the appeal as the successful judgment creditor.

The request was made that -- from the JPs -- that our subcommittee interface with the JPs, and we did that. I spoke at great length with Tom Lawrence, who is the chair of the State Bar Committee on JPs and, also, at the JP Legislative Liaison. And we went through the rules very extensively. And, Tom, I am sorry you weren't there to participate since you are enlarging your practice in this area, you would have enjoyed it, but his suggestions were that the rules be streamlined a little bit further to perhaps address the economic implications of our August recommendations to 749(c).

So beginning on Page 455, you see those proposals before you, and I will just — the words that are underlined are the proposed changes. The first one under 749(a) would require that a party filing a pauper's affidavit do so with the court or the clerk because now many JPs do have clerks. In fact, this JP suggested that JPs have clerks, so I am not sure if there are some who don't now by legislative fiat. And that once there is filing of the pauper's affidavit, that out of the JP's clerk's office or from the JP, notice be given to opposing parties of that affidavit of inability within one working day of its filing. That would accomplish speed in the process.

Also, you see in the bottom of Page 455, there is a proposal that when the pauper's affidavit is timely

contested, that the justice is required to hold a hearing and rule within a finite period of days. The suggestion is five days.

On 456, the suggestion is made in the top paragraph on Page 456 that if the JP disapproves the pauper's affidavit, as the practice currently is, the pauper has the right to seek review again out of a county court on the ruling of the inability to proceed as a pauper and that the county judge then have five days, as opposed to currently 10 days, to make a hearing on that.

And the final two changes in 749 address the writ of possession because it -- it now reads writ of restitution, which is no longer a writ, I am told, in this context.

Further down in 751, there is a proposal made that sums that have been tendered to the JP under 749(b), because the tenant is required to keep paying into the registry of the court rent that is accruing during the appeal of the FE&D, that the JP be required to tender the clerk -- tender those sums that come into the JP court to the county court when there is a de novo appeal because the right of the JP to act, including as to those funds, terminates upon perfection of the appeal.

So Judge Warren suggested that if you allow for the filing with the justice of future rent with a JP court under 749(b), that they then don't really have the authority to act

once there is perfection to the county court, and so his 1 suggestion was that all those funds be tendered to the county 2 court. And that is the new and improved scheme we are 3 proposing. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does -- under this scheme, 5 6 new scheme and proposal, does a party have to deposit rent 7 even if he is appealing under a pauper's affidavit? MS. CARLSON: Yes, you still do under 749(b) 8 and that is how the rule currently reads. You no longer, 9 under our suggestion, suggested change of 749(c), have to put 10 1.1 up rent as a predicate to appeal. Okay? CHAIRMAN SOULES: Under this proposal, you 12 13 would not have to put up rent as a predicate to appeal? MS. CARLSON: Right. You can appeal without 14 15 doing that, but 749(b) requires the party, throughout the 16 appeal -- and it is in the nature of a supersedaes, really -to continue to tender into the court not the past due rent 17 that is owed or that is in contest, but the rent that is 18 19 accruing throughout the appeal. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that is in current 20 749(b)? 21 22 MS. CARLSON: Yes. CHAIRMAN SOULES: So we don't need to make any 23 24 changes there?

MS. CARLSON: We would not.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: We would be changing 749(a), 1 not (b). We would change 749(c), what, to read as it does on 2 3 455? MS. CARLSON: Right. And that just simply 5 kind of streamlines the two methods by which the appeal might be perfected. 6 JUSTICE HECHT: What is it on 454? Where is 7 8 it on --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now, this -- I guess it is 9 10 here. JUSTICE HECHT: That is not it. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is not it? 13 JUSTICE HECHT: That is just comment. CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is what I am trying 14 to -- where is the change, Elaine? Let's see. 454 is the 15 way we voted it out in the 1989 sessions. 16 MS. CARLSON: Right. And this is suggesting a 17 further modification on Page 456 to simply say there are two 18 ways to perfect the appeal, when an appeal has been -- appeal 1.9 bond is timely filed among 456 and 749(c), we might insert 20 21 the words "in conformity with Rule 749" or "a pauper's affidavit appproved in conformity with 749(a), the appeal is 22 23 perfected." CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, so what language will 24 be in 749(c)? 25

1	MS. CARLSON: The language on Page 456.
2	MR. FULLER: Is that new language, Flaine?
3	MS. CARI,SON: Yes.
4	MR. FULLER: Oh, but it is not underlined.
5	MS. CARLSON: I am sorry. You are right. It
6	is all it is totally new language.
7	MR. FULLER: It is totally new language.
8	Okay. Now I understand.
9	MS. CARLSON: Because really if you look at
10	749(a), it addresses the mechanics of how you proceed in an
11	FE&D as a pauper. So 749(c) simply sets forth these look
12	at these two rules to see your options and how you go about
13	perfecting the appeal.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
15	JUSTICE HECHT: So you would replace 454 with
16	the language on 456
17	MS. CARLSON: That is correct.
18	JUSTICE HECHT: all together.
19	MS. CARLSON: That is correct.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So the motion is that
21	we change 749(a), as underscored on Page 455 and 456, and
22	that we well, I guess we vote on these one at a time,
23	maybe that will help.
24	Any discussion?
25	All in favor say "Aye."

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(RESPONDED AYE)

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 749(a) then, as shown on 455, will be recommended unanimously.

Then the next proposal is that we delete all of the language in current 749(c) and replace it with the sentence that appears in the center of the page of 456.

Discussion?

MR. FULLER: A comment, if I may.

CHATRMAN SOULES: Yes.

MR. FULLER: She did mention that there be, in the first line here of the proposed -- when an appeal bond has been timely filed -- and you said as required by section what?

MS. CARLSON: "In conformity with Rule 749."

MR. FULLER: "In conformity with Rule 749"?

MS. CARLSON: Yes.

MR. FULLER: And I think that should go in

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. I am making that change unless T hear opposition.

There is none, so it will be made.

Now, does the pauper's affidavit have to be filed?

MS. CARLSON: Oh, yeah.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, why -- it seems -- I am not sure we have got this written right. It says "When it

1	is approved the appeal is perfected."
2	MS. CARLSON: Yes.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Doesn't that mean approved
4	and filed?
5	MS. CARLSON: Recause when you look at
6	749(a)
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
8	MS. CARLSON: that is the way it works out.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: The appeal is perfected
10	whether or not the bond is filed the affidavit is filed?
11	MS. CARLSON: When it is approved.
12	CHATRMAN SOULES: What if it is never filed?
13	MS. CARLSON: Well, then you have to file an
14	appeal bond. Those are your choices, either proceed under
1.5	749 by filing an appeal bond or file a pauper's affidavit and
16	getting it approved in 749(a).
17	MR. SADBERRY: It is already filed. It has to
18	be filed in order to be approved.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I got you.
20	MR. SADBERRY: So it is already filed. It is
21	the approval that may have a time lag.
22	CHATRMAN SOULES: I got you. Okay. Thank you
23	for that help.
24	MS. CARLSON: Because that gives the JP the
25	authority to act in the case until that takes place

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
2	MS. CARLISON: because we have got Rule 751,
3	which cuts off the justice court's jurisdiction upon
4	perfection.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The then those in
6	favor of 749(c) as it appears on Page 456 with the change
7	added in conformity with Rule 749 where we discussed it, say
8	"Aye".
9	(RESPONDED AYE)
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?
11	That is unanimously approved.
12	And then the next is that we, what, take out all of
13	751 as it presently appears and replace it with the language
14	on 456?
15	MS. CARLSON: No. Luke, it would only be an
16	addition of those underlying
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
18	MS. CARLSON: phrases, including some
19	tendered pursuant to Rule 749(b)(1).
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
21	MS. CARLSON: The underlined words
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So just to add those words
23	in current Rule 751?
24	MS. CARLSON: That is correct. That is the
25	proposal.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: The proposal is made.
2	Second?
3	MR. DAVIS: Second.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Made and seconded.
5	Everybody had a chance to look at that?
6	Those in favor say "Aye."
7	(RESPONDED AYE)
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed?
9	Okay. That will be unanimously recommended then
10	for 751.
11	Anything else, Blaine, on your series of rules?
12	MS. CARLSON: Back at 730 730 and 731,
13	there is a minor
14	MR. FDGAR: What page is that on, Flaine?
15	What page are you on?
16	MS. CARLSON: We are now switching forward to
17	Page 730 and Page 731.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Flaine, we are going to have
19	to get to that whenever we get to the new stuff, unless it
20	really does pertain to this.
21	MS. CARLSON: No, it doesn't.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We will get to
23	that
24	MS. CARLSON: Okay.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: when we get to the new

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agenda.

MR. FULLER: I have a query about the part of 751 here where the clerk notifies the appellant about the filing of the transcript separate. Should there not also be a requirement that the clerk notify the prevailing party about the sums that were deposited with them?

If I understand the first part of 751 and the -and the added language, the JP sends the transcript and
everything with any monies that have been paid in. Should
that not also be included in that notice to the -- to the
prevailing party that "Hey, we have got some money up here"?

MS. CARLSON: That would probably be a positive improvement. I think there is --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where would it go?

MR. FULLER: Well, I am not up there having to do this, but it looks like it would be fair to let them know.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where would it go?

MR. FULLER: It would be -- includes -- let's see. The clerk shall -- it is the second paragraph. "The clerk shall immediately notify both appellant and adverse party of date of receipt of the transcript," and somewhere along in there, "and any sums of money received in connection therewith" or something to that effect.

MR. FDGAR: Well, this rule, though, is for filing the transcript. It doesn't have anything -- this is

an appellate process, and it seems to me like notifying them that money has been deposited doesn't belong there. I am not saying that maybe the clerk shouldn't notify them, but it just doesn't seem to me like it belongs in a transcript.

MR. FULLER: Well, that could be said, also, about including the sums tendered. I just think you ought to be consistent. People ought to know where their money is, it seems to me, who the estate holder is.

MR. EDGAR: I am not denying that, Ken. I am just questioning whether or not that information belongs in the appellate record.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Could you-all discuss that and resolve it maybe over a break?

MR. FULLER: Yes, that would be easiest because, Hadley, I am easy on that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now we are ready for for the TRAP report and that -- the TRAP rules begin on Page 465. Bill was unable to return today, but gave us a written report. And I don't know whether someone else is -- is Rusty going to or is some other member of that Committee going to make the report?

Could we take a short break here, five, 10 minutes, and then get back and finish these TRAP rules? We should be able to get this done by noon. They are not that -- as Rill said, there are really not that many significant changes if

we don't take a long break.

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(At this time there was a brief discussion off the record, after which time the hearing continued as follows:)

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We are ready to proceed. Let's get everybody back in.

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We are ready to proceed now, as the vote was this morning to move then to the TRAP rules, and the Chair recognizes Lefty.

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MR. MORRJS: Well, Luke, as you know, we discussed in the interim, I would like to move at this time to go ahead and proceed to the sealing of court records so we can get this over with and not have to deal with it again perhaps tonight or even possibly tomorrow, while everyone is still fresh. I understand in the TRAP rules it is not going to be much controversy and there may be a great deal of discussion on sealing court records. For that reason, I move that we proceed at this time.

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MR. FULLER: Second. MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): First, does your

motion include changes to do with -- necessarily with 166?

MR. MORRIS: No. At this time, Sam, just sealing the court records that I have got in front of me.

MR. BEARD: Mr. Chairman --1 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me -- Okay. Pat Beard. MR. BEARD: -- I think we ought to get rid of 3 everything else. We spent, what, four hours on sealing of 4 records, or longer, the other day? 5 6 MR. HERRING: Fight hours. MR. BEARD: Eight. Whatever. Let's get all 7 8 of this stuff out of the way and then go back to something we 9 have already spent all that time on. CHAIRMAN SOULFS: The motion has been made and 1.0 seconded to change the agenda from the way we voted this 11 morning, was which was to proceed through the old rules and 12 13 then take sealed records, charge, and this 167(a) item. MR. SPIVRY: I thought the motion was to take 14 it up. Wasn't that Lefty's motion? 15 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the motion now is to change that order to take up sealed records presently. 17 MR. DAVIS: Yes, the motion to take up sealed 18 19 records, right. CHAJRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let me see by hands 20 21 how many want to vary from this morning. One, two, three, 22 four, five, six, seven -- I am sorry, I lost count. One, 23 two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. How many want to stay with what we had? All right. 24 25 I would like to have -- does anyone want to make a motion

1	that we put time constraints on the upcoming records debate
2	on sealed records
3	MR. COLLINS: Why do we want
4	CHAJRMAN SOULES: so that we do not run out
5	of time?
6	MR. COLLINS: Why do we want to do that,
7	Mr. Chairman? We haven't put any time constraints on
8	anything else.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, because we haven't
10	gotten to so many other things, that is why. And if you
11	don't want to do it, you don't have to do it.
12	MR. SPIVEY: I have got a problem. Let's
13	don't get into a technical battle and tabling the thing.
14	Let's get it up, vote it up or down, and get it over with.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. As J understand,
16	Lefty, you want to take up now the text of the rule that is
17	before us, 7 Rule 76(a)
18	MR. MORRTS: Yes.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: and to proceed with that
20	and not yet take up the discovery points, I mean the 166(b)
21	and so forth.
22	MR. MORRIS: I think that is part of it.
23	CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay.
24	MR. DAVIS: That is part of it.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's preceed then

with your motion, your motion as it was voted on. 1 MR. EDGAR: May I ask a question of the 2 How does the proposal we now have before us 3 co-Chairs? 4 differ from the proposal which we debated last week? 5 MR. MORRIS: This is what we have passed. MR. EDGAR: In toto? 6 MR. MORRIS: This is in toto. This is exactly 7 what -- we have the record here, these are the minutes, this 8 is what passed. So everything in here is something we have 9 already voted on and voted for. That doesn't mean it is in 10 concrete, but this is what you are looking at. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. For the 12 13 record -- for the record, 76(a), that you have on your desk 14 in front of you, is the composite of our votes last Friday 15 and Saturday relating to sealed records. 16 MR. DAVIS: What are we going to be asked to 17 do? CHAIRMAN SOULES: And I don't know. 18 MR. HERRING: We have a few things we didn't 19 20 get to last time dealing with the draft, the overall draft. We have a few technical corrections based on the way it has 21 22 ended up being printed out. Well, let me run through a couple of things quickly 23 that I don't think there is much controversy about. 24 25 was some language that Dorsaneo had put together that was

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circulated around that deals with continuing jurisdiction, and that is Paragraph C, J believe, in the rule, which is on the next to the last page of the packet that was handed out.

And I think our recommendation is Bill had proposed a change in that continuing jurisdiction. I think it worked with Justice Doggett. If you have that single page that was handed around, it has continuing jurisdiction and appeal. They had worked on that, but I think in our discussion this morning, we decided we ought to just keep C as it appears in the draft that is circulated with one exception, and that is on the third line from the bottom, and this is the next to the last page, we have that introductory clause which I think we determined is not necessary, which says, "Notwithstanding the rights of appeal provided in this Rule," and we would simply strike that clause and capitalize the next word, which is "A."

So it would now read "A court that renders a sealing order maintains continuing jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate that order." Bill had a little bit different language, but in talking about it, we really can't see that we need to make any change in C unless someone else feels differently.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. HERRING: So we would -- we would move that we strike that language I just referred to, Luke, and

adopt C as it is written in the draft otherwise.

MR. MORRIS: I second.

CHATRMAN SOULES: Moved and seconded.

Discussion? Rusty.

MR. McMAINS: What you are asking is C as it is in the printed version?

MR. HERRING: That one clause coming out, Rusty, in the third line from the bottom, the introductory clause.

MR. McMAJNS: The -- whether or not you do, whether or not you have that language or the language of Bill primarily depends on what it is you are talking about being able to appeal from, because the problem I have is that when you say down here that "A court that renders the sealing order maintains continuing jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate," then to the extent you have any rights to appeal based on any decisions, you could have a continuing sequence of appeals by a number of different parties, integrally related issues between dealing with how you characterize continuing jurisdiction and how you -- how you effectuate the appellate process.

So I mean I understand what you are trying to say from the standpoint of the continuing jurisdiction, but when you then try and figure out some way to make it a final judgment or a judgment that is appealable in some fashion,

any order that they render by any -- you could have 18 different appeals by 18 different intervenors if each come in at different times. And that -- I am really not sure anybody wants that much clogging going down the pike.

MR. HERRING: Well, I think we felt that there probably wasn't that much difference between Bill's language and ours that deal with a separate issue and really didn't anticipate that you are likely to have 18 separate appeals. We were going to try to open it up, let everybody intervene. If they want to appeal, have an appeal.

The big problem the press has faced, as you know, is that in every case that has been decided by an appellate court in Texas, they have found that plenary jurisdiction in the trial court has expired and there has been no meaningful review, and the press has not found out until afterwards. And so we are trying to open it up and maybe it goes too far and maybe it poses that danger. I think we were willing to take that risk.

MR. McMAINS: It is kind of temporable. It mean it is like a -- it is like a forever temporary injunction.

MR. HERRING: That is right.

MR. McMAINS: And I just think that is -- I really think that is overstating the access that is intended to be accomplished. Bill was going to try and, I think, do a

proposal in his alternative C, which T think people have.

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MR. HERRING: It should be on this single sheet.

MR. McMAJNS: Yes, on the single sheet, where it just describes the continuing jurisdiction, "has continuing jurisdiction before or after judgment to determine claims of access to court records." I realize that leaves it open, but when you are so specific as to say that "to enforce, alter, or vacate the order," first of all, that doesn't give you any standard.

I mean do you have to have -- if you have got a motion, let's say that he didn't seal it. Then the party is going to start the process over again, you start all of the notices over again, and everything else just by moving to vacate the order refusing to seal. You go through another proceeding. I mean --

MR. HERRING: I think this draft is about as wide open as it can be to allow -- to allow appeals. And if you want to cut it back, if you can -- if you can describe for us how the second sentence -- Bill's first sentence is inconsistent with the intervention right as it had been created earlier in the rules, so that is why we didn't go with that. The second sentence --

MR. McMAINS: Yes, I wasn't worried about the first sentence.

MR. HERRING: Right.

MR. McMAINS: Just the second sentence.

MR. HERRING: Just the second sentence. You might describe how you understand that would limit the appeals and we can talk about that.

MR. McMAINS: Well, all this does is indicate the court has continuing jurisdiction, but it doesn't attempt to define, you know, to enforce, alter, or vacate in language that is so much akin to temporary injunctions. I mean I think the limiting part should be in the appeal remedy.

MR. HERRING: Well, we haven't gotten to the appeal section yet.

MR. McMAJNS: I understand that, but the point is that I -- any appeal remedy that you try and do is going to be related to an order, and if you authorize all of these things expressly by order here under the aegis of continuing jurisdiction, each separate ruling will be appealable. You can't limit it.

And all I am trying to do is to not say what orders you are talking about until we get to the appeal rights so that we can be clear as to what your remedy is when there is something done, because I think that it will be the sense of the Committee, and I am pretty confident of the Court, that they don't want 85 appeals coming down the pike on a single piece of litigation.

1 MR. HERRING: Well, I don't think 2 realistically they are going to get 85 appeals. 3 MR. McMAINS: Why should -- why should one 4 person in the press -- I mean why should all the people in 5 the press do it at the same time? I mean why not one 6 newspaper take a crack at it, then if they fail, another 7 newspaper take a crack at it. And so I mean when you -after about the fifth time that you have to jump through all 8 9 of these hoops, the judge is probably just going to give up 10 and say "Take it." 11 MR. HERRING: Well, you know, the value of 12 that, I suppose --13 MR. McMAINS: You know, you can have the whole 14 shooting match. 15 MR. HERRING: The great value of that is, I 16 suppose, that appeallate experts like yourself, would be 17 hired all the time, but apart from that --MR. SPIVEY: Does that solve your problem, 18 19 Rusty? 20 MR. HERRING: But apart from that, Rusty, if 21 you have got -- if you feel strongly about the language that 22 Bill had drafted and can explain to me, or to Tom, or Lefty, 23 how that limits it further, the appeals, we are not opposed 24 to this language. 25 MR. McMAJNS: I am not saying that it limits

1 it per se. I am saying that any limitation specifically should be in what it is that we are appealing from. 2 MR. HERRING: Which is the next section of the 3 rule. 4 MR. McMAINS: I understand that, but when you 5 put this language in here, this makes it look exactly like a 6 temporary injunction. The cases do hold that you can go 7 back and move to modify, you can move to vacate, and 8 9 each one of those is separately appealable. There is no 10 way to draft an order for definition purposes in the appeal part that is going to be able to be limited if 11 you have got this explicit language as to what the judge 12 13 can do. 14 I am not -- I am not saying that it is a per se 15 limitation. I am just saying that it is inconvenient to use 16 this so explicitly that it is just that wide open. The argument can always be made that it is that way. 17 18 MR. COLLINS: What language would you 19 recommend? 20 MR. McMAINS: Well, I mean the language he has got, it just says that "It has continuing jurisdiction before 21 22 or after judgment to determine claims of access" --23 MR. COLLINS: You mean on the single sheet? MR. McMAINS: Right. 24 25 MR. HERRING: Yes, on the handout, Dorsaneo's

1 wording.

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MR. McMAINS: -- "to determine claims of access to sealed court records and to enforce the court's order." That is all it says.

Now, I realize that you can make the argument that that is the same thing, but this one is done much the way that the temporary injunction stuff is done. It is kind of -- I just think that if you -- once you get into the final judgment, you will see -- I mean into the appeal, if the way we are going it treat it that --

MR. HERRING: Let's go on down to appeals and we can take them both together. How about that?

MR. McMAINS: Well, I just wanted you to understand how related they are.

MR. HERRING: Fine. Well, let's take them together. And the appeal language is on the single sheet. There is no appeal provision in the rule printout that you have. That was printed out from what we did last time because we never put any appeal language in.

And this language, again, is a product, I believe, of Bill, who is not here, and Justice Doggett, and if Judge Doggett is going to talking about it, we may defer to him and let him explain what they were trying to do.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Could we have an understanding of that from Your Honor?

JUSTICE DOGGETT: Basically, the section on appeal, I think, was discussed and then voted down with no substitute last time. And Bill and I just went back and looked at that section and recognized that we do need a way other than mandamus to get this issue up to the appellate courts and try to revise what was in the original draft slightly to accomplish that.

I do think, in terms of the continuing jurisdiction, that there was a concern that you will remember Chuck expressed in the Committee that there could well be circumstances where Rusty has talked as if there might be two appeals at the same time. There might be circumstances where there is a need to go back and deal with this issue a year after the case has been finally resolved. That is why the continuing jurisdiction matter is there, when perhaps a problem with public health and safety is first brought to the attention of the public, and so there may be a need for multiple appeals, for multiple orders.

MR. HERRING: Rusty, why don't you talk about this language? This was not our language, I guess it was Bill's, and you might analyze that in light of your concern.

MR. McMAINS: Basically you may recall we had basic -- there are three notions for possible appellate avenues. One is just don't say anything about it, but allow it, in some manner it is enforced by mandamus jurisdiction or

whatever, bring it within the aegis of mandamus rule. And that you are not talking about appeal at all.

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The other is to try and wrap it into what, in essence, is the interlocutory appeal time table, or the accelerated appeal provision. That is an expedited process. It is quicker and it gets expedited determination, for that matter, in the courts themselves.

The third is just to severe an intervention because the only people that are going to be appealing are people who formally appear as parties, feel strongly enough to pay their filing fees and actually show up, whatever. They are the only people trying to participate anyway in the hearing, I think is our — the way, other than just watch, so was to make that a final judgment, a determination of the intervenor's case, a final judgment, and treat it as an ordinary case to be controlled by that.

I mean that we had talked about amongst ourselves, if you were going to provide an appellate group, that kind of made perhaps a little more sense than the expedited stuff because you are just dealing with a different time table, it is a whole lot shorter fuse, and it is a little -- it also gets extra treatment from the courts of appeals who probably aren't all that excited about that.

Now, this is the first time I have seen this thing

actually typed out. The only problem I have -- this doesn't give, and maybe it was intended and perhaps you can speak to that -- this doesn't give any remedies in terms of the denial of sealing by appeal. It is only if there are sealing. I mean this particular appeal provision. It just says "Any order sealing court records and denying access to an intervenor," finally disposes of the claim of the intervenor to have access to the records, severs the intervenor's claim from any other claim and is appealable as a final judgment.

Now, it doesn't -- so if it ain't sealed, I mean if the judge's determination is not to seal it, then there is no remedy provided, which I assume means then that the remedy there is by mandamus, and it is the only thing you can go on.

MR. FULLER: And then just stay in limbo.

MR. McMAINS: There isn't any provision for the temporary sealing part to apply beyond the date of the hearing. So I mean the point is from that time on -- now, you can theoretically, under mandamus practice, move for temporary emergency relief from the court of appeals, but you -- you know, for the order of temporary sealing, I suppose, in conjunction with this mandamus jurisdiction. That is -- this is a one-way appeal if they seal as opposed to not.

MR. HERRING: Yes. And I don't know if --

MR. McMAINS: I suppose that was the theory --

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one theory behind maybe you limit the appeal to some extent 1 2 because if you have been unsuccessful at sealing the records, since he has continuing jurisdiction, you just go back and do 3 4 it again. 5 MR. EDGAR: Justice Doggett, was it intended to deny the right of this appeal to that type of situation or 6 was this --7 JUSTICE DOGGETT: It was apparently intended 8 in the original draft we were working off of. 9 10 MR. McMAINS: That maybe well be. 11 JUSTICE DOGGETT: The focus of the whole rule 12 was to provide a remedy to obtain openness. There is still 13 the right to mandamus, a trial judge and to seek a stay while that mandamus is determined if records have not been sealed 14 15 which should have been sealed, but I don't have strong feelings about the issue, and I think it is one of those kind 16 17 of issues we need the advice of the Committee as to whether

MR. HERRING: I don't think the original draft was limited to appeals from orders just denying sealing, at least as I understood it. It had "any order granting or overruling the motion to alter, vacate or enforce."

you want to include it both ways.

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JUSTICE DOGGETT: Well, let's go with that language.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I have got Justice Doggett

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suggests maybe that we pick up that language from the 1 original proposal so that there would be appeals in either 2 the granting of sealing or the denial of sealing. 3 MR. EDGAR: Do you want a consensus on that? 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And I guess we need a 6 consensus. How many feel there should be appeals either way, 7 both ways? Four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12, 8 13 -- 14, and that does not count Harry twice, even though he 9 had both hands up. 10 MR. TINDALL: Sorry. CHAIRMAN SOULES: How many feel it should be 11 12 only if sealing is granted should there be an appeal? 13 Well, that is unanimous, then, it should be 14 balanced both ways. 15 MR. FDGAR: I have a second question then. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Hadley Edgar. 17 MR. FDGAR: Rusty --MR. McMAINS: Yes. . 18 1.9 MR. EDGAR: -- did J understand you to make 20 reference here to accelerated appeals? 21 MR. McMAINS: Well, it is not in here. I am 22 saying we had -- there were -- there were three things we 23 talked about as to how avenue. One is if we left it silent, 24 would we just be going by way of mandamus. If we have a 25 specific appeal provision, then we could either try and do it by way of an interlocutory thing or we could try and do it final and go through the regular final appeal system. This was the one that was essentially opted for.

MR. FULLER: Luke -
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Ken Fuller.

MR. FULLER: -- I think that we have

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been -- at least my mind set on this thing has sort of been postjudgment in my thinking since that is where most of the cases seem to come up. But I worry about what I just voted for, and that is how about during the pendency of the suit, one of the parties to the action says, "Okay. Judge, we would like to have the records sealed." And let's assume further that the people who appear on it are only the parties to the lawsuit. I am thinking of divorce cases, you don't have the paper particularly interested one way or the other.

Are we going to create then a right of appeals by one of the parties during the lawsuit that I don't think they had before?

MR. McMAINS: Well, I think that is --

MR. FULLER: Are we creating another remedy for the litigants --

MR. McMAINS: I think an intervenor is anybody, including probably one of the original parties.

MR. FULLER: No. I am talking about what has

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1 gone on. The only people in it are the parties. 2 CHAJRMAN SOULES: Well, if that is true, we are going to create the right of appeal to all parties, not 3 4 just some of them because --5 MR. FDGAR: This says an intervenor. 6 intervenor is not a party. 7 MR. McMAJNS: Yes, J understand. One wonders. 8 though, why an intervenor should be given a superior --9 MR. EDGAR: Well, T am not saying that. 10 just saying that -- I am trying to meet Ken's objection that 11 the rule as currently written would not allow an appeal --12 this type of appeal by a party. That is all I am trying to 13 say. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, may I have that 15 language read back that was in the original because I didn't understand that to be limited to intervenors. Was it? 16 JUSTICE HEHCT: It wasn't. 17 1.8 MR. HERRING: No, the original language 19 completely says --20 MR. McMAINS: No. The original was not. 21 MR. HERRING: -- "Any sealing order, any 22 sealing provision contained in any judgment in any order 23 granting or overruling a motion to alter, vacate, or enforce 24 a sealing order shall be deemed to be a separate and 25 independent final judgment and shall be subject to an

immediate and independent appeal by any party or intervenor 1 2 who has requested, supported, or opposed any sealing order." JUSTICE DOGGETT: And that was the one thing 3 that the co-Chairs continued to agree about. Isn't that 4 right? Isn't that what -- wasn't that in your original 5 6 report, that language? JUSTICE HECHT: I think it was. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. How many feel that 8 the appeal -- right of appeal should be limited to parties 9 10 who are not parties to the controversy at court, as opposed to just parties that are involved in the sealings issue? I 11 mean I don't know whether I am articulating that very well, 12 13 but we say intervenors are parties that become parties interested solely in the question of sealing. That is what J 14 am going to mean by intervenors in this question. And then 15 16 the real parties in interest or the parties to the conflict is going to be decided by final judgment. 17

How many feel that the --

MR. MORRIS: I don't understand what Dorsaneo was doing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- that the appeal right should be limited to intervenors and the parties should be prohibited from an interlocutory appeal?

Just one, two.

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MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): No, Luke, I hear

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this differently.

CHAJRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I think the concern we had last time was that you cannot determine that something is a final judgment just per se. You had the right of appeal by mandamus. And I think what Dorsaneo was doing here, we had already determined that the parties have the right of mandamus over the court's order. And that is why we leave the appeal out.

What you are doing here is saying the intervenor, as opposed to a party, to the intervenor it is final, it is severed, the intervenor's claim, and gives the intervenor a right of appeal as a severed final cause because they are not parties to the case and they don't have to wait till the conclusion. So technically, I think that is the mechanics we are dealing with.

Did J miss something, Judge Hecht? Isn't that what we were talking about last time?

JUSTICE HECHT: That was the -- yes. The issue was can you just make it final by saying so in the rule.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): That is right. And I think what Dorsaneo is doing is saying as far as intervenors are concerned, we can't because they have no other claim.

MR. EDGAR: Well, we haven't addressed the issue yet as far as -
MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): As far as parties, you still have the right of mandamus with any court order.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Who is next?

Hadley, did you have a comment, and then Rusty.

MR. EDGAR: I was going to just follow up on what Justice Hecht said a moment ago. Just because a rule says it is final, I am not sure it is final. I need to think about that a little bit because you haven't disposed of all the issues and all the parties. The Government Code gives you a right of interlocutory appeal, so we can't go up there unless the statute is amended.

And I kind of come back to what I was thinking last time, that perhaps a right of -- or an opportunity for appeallate review by mandamus should be available to the parties and should also be the only method of availability to the intervenors. I don't really know why we have to segregate -- if a party has an interest in wanting these records sealed and is going to complain of a trial court order and must proceed by mandamus, I don't know why we need to segregate the intervenor and give him a right of appeal.

Now, I haven't had anybody explain that to me yet.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the party -- the real party in interest is going to, in most cases, is probably

going to be an appellee. He is going to be a party to the appeal --

MR. RDGAR: Well, but J am talking about -CHATRMAN SOULES: -- while he is a party in
the trial Court.

MR. EDGAR: Yes, but J am talking about let's assume we don't have an intervenor, we just have these two parties, a divorce case. One party wants to complain to the court's order on sealing. Well, as I understand it, the only method available, and even under this proposal that would be available, would be a right of mandamus.

Now, if that is true, then why should we give an intervenor any additional avenue of appellate review? Why not require him to go up on mandamus as well? Now, so J really don't -- I would like somebody to explain the dichotomy there.

JUSTICE HECHT: Well --

CHAJRMAN SOULES: Justice Hecht.

JUSTICE HECHT: -- let me just add a word. It could -- seemed like it could be either way. I mean if you had a sealing order or a refusal to seal, an order refusing a motion to seal, the judge could severe that order and then whether it was party or intervenor, it is going to be a final order, just like you would severe a summary judgment on limitations, or on a DTPA claim, or anything else.

And so it seems to me that if you could structure it in such a way that you could challenge the ruling of the trial judge on appeal either by appeal or by mandamus, then if you wrote the rule in such a way -- for example, Dorsaneo has put in here "impliedly severs," and that is what we were talking about last time because J don't know if you can require the trial judge to severe an order, but if you could, then it seems to me that that order would be finally appealable at the point that it is severed, just like any other order in the case. Of course, you have got a rule that doesn't -- that generally doesn't favor severances.

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But then the next question we got into was which is the most expedient way of achieving full review of the trial court's ruling, is it by appeal or by mandamus? And there is obviously appellate consequences to which remedy that you take. For example, just pick an obvious one, on mandamus, you are not — the jurisdiction doesn't lie to correct disputed issues of fact, and they are going to be disputed issues of fact in these cases.

So if you go up by mandamus and there is a great big dispute in the record, then what is the standard of -- what is going to be the standard of review? And so how it -- how the review is structured seems to me there is a lot of latitude there, but what happens to you after you get to the court of appeals is more consequential.

MR. EDGAR: Well, are you suggesting by that, then, that whether a provision is made for either mandamus, or appeal, or both, that it should apply equally to parties and intervenors, or not?

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, I mean --

MR. EDGAR: I mean I am asking the question because that was the question I had. I don't -- whether we -- whether we can -- if we can carve out some type of appellate process, it seems to me that either party should have that avenue available, rather than saying the intervenor has it but a party doesn't.

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, that obviously has the virtue of simplicity.

MR. EDGAR: And J -- and that is the question that I would like for the proponents and the antagonists to address.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: One thing that, I don't know, I never have heard articulated, maybe it has been. I mean if there is no right to interim appeal, that doesn't mean that the intervenors can't appeal. It just means they have to wait like everybody else until final judgment and then they can appeal and unseal the records. So if the case is ongoing, it is just a matter of delayed appeal, it is not a matter of never having appellate review.

JUSTICE DOGGETT: And that was what we were

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trying to stop. We wanted, because there is a public policy interest or we wouldn't be doing this in the first place, that goes broader than the lawsuit involved, to be able to get that issue up for review, and we were aware of the fact that with one possible exception, Tom, I don't think any appellate court has ever mandamused a trial judge to unseal documents.

MR. LEATHERBURY: I am not aware of.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So we are focusing on -- we are focusing on the pending trial period and how to get the question to the appellate court, whether that would be -- whether there is a vehicle other than mandamus that could be provided.

Rusty.

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MR. McMAINS: First, with regards to whether a party is included, there is nothing in the -- our definition of intervenor, just -- because we don't really define intervenor. What we say is, which is in -- on this page sheet at the hearing. It says, "A hearing shall be held in open court open for the public at which any person desiring to support or oppose the sealing of court records whether or not a party to the suit may intervene for the limited purposes."

Now, that means that if he is party to the suit, then he may also intervene. Okay. That is what it

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says.

MR. FDGAR: That language ought to be changed.

MR. McMAINS: Yes. Well, I am just telling

you --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where is that, Rusty?

MR. HERRING: Second page, (b) (1).

MR. McMAJNS: (b)(1).

That is why -- when I said everybody is an intervenor for purposes of this issue as it was contemplated when we were doing this appeal thing, but that is what it says.

MR. HERRING: What we could do is say "Any person who is not a party" -- "Any person not a party who desires to support or oppose."

CHAJRMAN SOULES: Really what we need is two separate sentences. We can say "nonparties may intervene for the limited purpose of participating at the hearing." Strike "whether or not a party" and just say, "nonparties may intervene."

And it should be "desiring to" should be struck and put "may support it."

"Hearing shall be held in open court open to the public at which any person may support or oppose the sealing of court records." Next would be "Nonparties may intervene for the limited purpose of participating at the hearing."

.1	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Luke, what page are
2	you on?
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, this is (b)(1).
4	MR. HERRING: The second page.
5	MR. FULLER: Would you read that again, Juke?
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. The first
7	sentence would be "A hearing shall be held in open court,
8	open to the public, at which any person may support or oppose
9	the sealing of court records." Take out "desiring to" and
10	substitute "may."
11	MR. FULLER: Got that.
12	CHATRMAN SOULES: Then you would strike the
13	words "whether or not a party to the suit." Now, there would
14	be a period after "court records."
15	MR. FULLER: A period after "court records"?
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is right.
17	MR. McMAINS: You don't want to make the
18	hearing open to everybody unless they intervene.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I will get to that in a
20	minute, Rusty. Then it starts the next sentence would
21	start by putting in the words "Nonparties"
22	MR. FULLER: Got you.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "may intervene for the
24	limited purpose of participating at the hearing."
25	MR. FULLER: Now, by that, I take it they

can't just show up on hearing day and say, "I want to be 1 heard." They have got to file an intervention. 2 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): That is right. 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now we have got to get back to Rusty's point, and that is we are not talking about any 5 6 person. We are talking about -- how about "at which any 7 party or intervenor may support or oppose the sealing of 8 court records"? It is a little bit redundant, but --MR. FULLER: Okay. "At which any party or 9 10 intervenor"? CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is a bit redundant, but 11 12 it is perhaps clarifying. 13 JUSTICE HECHT: An intervenor becomes a party. 14 JUSTICE DOGGETT: Well, an intervenor becomes 15 a party, doesn't it? CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that is why I say it 16 17 is -- that is redundant, but it is -- maybe it helps because 18 what we are talking about if we just say "party," J am concerned that they would say that --19 20 JUSTICE DOGGETT: "Any party including an intervenor." 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Any party including an 22 intervenor." "Any party including an intervenor," "including 23 24 any intervenor"? Should it be that way? 25 Am I messing up?

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Justice Doggett.

JUSTICE DOGGETT: I am not sure it reads very well in either event, but it may be a slight improvement.

MR. FULLER: Luke, as I understand the law of intervention, we don't have to give them the right to intervene here. In Texas, they can intervene. They are intervened until you strike them --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, but --

MR. FULLER: -- so do we have to say that?

JUSTICE DOGGETT: We do need to say that, to make it clear that they have the right to intervene for this limited purpose.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So the first sentence would say, "A hearing shall be held in open court open to the public at which any party, including an intervenor, may support or oppose the sealing of court records period". "And nonparties may intervene for the limited purpose of participating in the hearing."

> Okay. Does that fix the concern of a moment ago? Okay. Well, assume we do that. What is next?

MR. EDGAR: Well, J still have trouble about this -- making this a final judgment in a severance. I would just like to raise the question for discussion about whether or not this should be for both parties and intervenors, the right to appeal, and provide that this is an interlocutory

appeal. And, therefore, it puts it on a faster time track and you get over the problem of trying to argue that this is a final judgment when, in fact, it isn't.

MR. COLLINS: And if it is severed and the only issue relates to the sealing or unsealing, and it is severed into a new cause of action, then isn't that final as to that issue since that is the only issue to be disposed of?

MR. EDGAR: Well, the final judgment goes to all issues and all parties.

MR. COLLINS: Well, it will in that situation after the severance.

JUSTICE HECHT: The problem is making it interlocutory won't cure it because the right to an interlocutory appeal is governed by statute.

MR. EDGAR: Yes, I understand that.

MR. McMAINS: We didn't think we could act as the Legislature. We have been accused of that before, but --

MR. FULLER: Well, you know, something else that bothers me in a family law context. If there is an appeal pending, let's just say of the issue of opening or sealing the records, it is conceivable this case would be over on the merits and two years later they would still be fighting over whether or not to seal or unseal the records and you ain't got no divorce.

JUSTICE DOGGETT: That may well be --

MR. FULLER: This wording disturbs me. You can't have a separate divorce.

JUSTICE DOGGETT: That may well be, as Sam articulated it, why Rill limited this particular appeal section to intervenors, recognizing that the parties could go up by mandamus if they felt it was essential to their case, and otherwise, they would raise it as a part of their appeal on the merits.

MR. McMAINS: Let me -- Jet me say this: I think I have no problem with the concept of a party who has lost on a sealing order in terms of he wanted it -- was opposing the sealing, but it got sealed, that he should have to wait. I have a bigger problem with a party who tries to get it sealed with the enhanced burdens that we have placed on them and doesn't get it sealed, ain't going to have any remedy on mandamus, period, not going to get fact determinations made on a mandamus.

MR. EDGAR: Well, that just --

MR. McMAINS: That just basically means if you take parties out, then a party moving to seal has never an appellate remedy, in my judgment. Now, that is -- the other way, I don't see any particular injury to the party who, if he wants -- if you want to wait because they are being sealed, it is something he may want to complain about later on or whatever, but that is -- he can do that at a later

time. But the party to whom a sealing order is denied has no effective remedy by mandamus, in my judgment.

MR. EDGAR: Well, the converse argument of that was made in discovery a long time ago and the court, by its lucid or more relaxed construction of abuse of discretion, has given both parties, in discovery, whether it is denied or granted, a mandamus.

MR. McMAINS: Yes, but they -- but not in terms of -- not on the issue of where there is a fact question to be determined.

MR. FDGAR: Well, I understand that.

MR. McMAJNS: And that is what J am saying. That is all what this does. All this rule -- what this rule does, from start to finish, is impose very specific burdens with regards to establishing fact questions by preponderance of the evidence. What that means is that once you have requested a sealing order and you don't get it, that is it, because it is going to be open to the public. There is no point. You don't have any other remedy other than by an immediate mandamus, and you can't possibly determine whether you have established your issues by a preponderance of the evidence on a mandamus --

MR. EDGAR: True.

MR. McMAINS: -- even under the relaxed notions of abuse of discretion.

1	MR. COLLINS: But isn't that why the original
2	language, in a sense of fairness, is preferable to this, the
3	language on the single sheet?
4	MR. McMAINS: Well, now, the language on
5	the on this sheet gives the party suffering the sealing.
6	I am actually going at it the other way.
7	MR. COLLINS: Oh, T understand.
8	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): But, Rusty, right
9	now today as we sit here, you request a sealing order and it
10	is denied.
11	MR. McMAJNS: Right.
1.2	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): What right you got?
13	Mandamus.
14	MR. McMAJNS: That is right.
15	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): That is it.
16	MR. McMAINS: I agree.
17	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Now, what all we
18	are saying here is the parties to the case and I think
19	that is why Dorsaneo wrote it this way we can't legislate.
20	We cannot write law. And that is already there.
21	What he is saying is if it won't interfere with the
22	trial of the case, the parties are bound by whatever rules
23	you have got. It can't delay the case sealing or unsealing,
24	either way. But as far as intervenors, public rights to
25	access, that may take longer than the trial. That is what we

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1	were just talking about. That is separate and apart from
2	this. J mean I
3	MR. McMAJNS: I don't have any problem with
4	that. T am just saying
5	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRIO): I just don't think
6	we can
7	MR. McMAINS: that Hadley's question is
8	well put.
9	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRIO): I don't think we can
10	solve your problem no matter what we do because we can't
11	legislate.
12	MR. McMAJNS: No, that is but that is not
13	true.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well
15	MR. McMAINS: In terms of making it making
1.6	the entire issue a severable claim with regards to sealing
17	CHATRMAN SOULES: That is the point right
18	there.
19	MR. McMAINS: that is doable.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes.
21	MR. McMAINS: And it doesn't matter whether you are
22	a party or an intervenor to have that determined. And any
23	appeal determination, frankly, based on the single on a

intervened or was there or had opportunity to intervene at

that -- at that time.

Now, postjudgment is a different thing. It seems to me that we are dealing -- we are basically dealing with two different contexts, one prejudgment, one postjudgment. We are now dealing -- and really what I had formulated kind of a category, our real problem was the prejudgment because, frankly, I think that in a postjudgment context, given a right to intervene once it is disposed of, it is a final judgment. That is just like a turnover order and it is -- there ain't nothing left pending, and that probably is appealable now as a final judgment.

So what we are talking about is prejudgment sealing, who gets to be -- is there going to be an intermediate remedy, who is going to have it? And the question Hadley posed is why should the public have more rights than the parties.

any severance concept of theories that I know of anywhere in the law because when there is a severed item, it is a cause of action. We don't severe issues. You cannot severe issues. You must severe complete causes of action. And when you do, you severe all the parties to that dispute with the cause. And certainly the parties at interest, the real parties at interest, are parties to the sealing dispute.

So if you severe the sealing dispute as a cause of

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action, the real parties of interest are severed in that severance as well. And if that becomes final, then can't everybody appeal? I mean if we are really going to use the concept of severance, I guess we are going to use -- unless we are going to create a new concept of severance, we are going to use the classical one.

MR. McMAINS: The party moving to seal is the party who has the interest anyway, is going to be a party — I mean if he is successful in the sealing, he is going to be a party to the appeal. He is going to be the one saying, "Don't turn this around." He is going to have to be in the appeal anyway if he gets an order sealing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That is what I meant earlier, he is going to be an appellee if he is not an appellant. And in order to try to capture the concept of severance without really trying to do anything beyond that by way of suggestion, but just to try to capture that, I wrote these words that says, "The motion and proceedings constitute a separate cause of action."

Now, the court can say that. They have told us forever what causes of action are. And it is sometimes hard to really tell one from another, but they can certainly say what that is. "The motion and proceedings constitute a separate cause of action, which is automatically severed and appealable by the order disposing of the motion."

1	Now, there is a concept. Do we want it? Do we
2	like it? Does it make sense? J don't know.
3	MR. BEARD: Are we talking about changing our
4	protective order practice?
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we are not there yet.
6	MR. BEARD: Well
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we have changed
8	yes, we are. That is we are.
9	MR. BEARD: In other words, if you get a
10	protective order, that is really a sealing order and you have
11	got to go through all that? I thought the other day that we
12	did not change that.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Not yet, not yet.
14	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): There are many times
15	I get documents that are under protective order that are not
16	sealed. I have got them, but they are not sealed. I just
17	can't give them to anybody.
18	MR. BEARD: Well, the question is are we
19	trying to take this is the effect of temporary sealing
20	whether you get that?
21	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGFLO) There is a difference
22	between sealing and protecting. I haven't got to protect it
23	yet, but I want to.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can we get any help from
25	either Justice Hehct or Justice Doggett on what kind of a

procedural vehicle do we contemplate here, or is it just going to be a rule that says we are going to do this and not worry about whether it is really a severance or what? MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I like the cause of action. JUSTICE HECHT: Well, I don't think it is necessary to spell out our theory of how come this is an appealable order. MR. McMAINS: Right.

JUSTICE HECHT: It seems a little defensive to me to say, "Just in case somebody out there doesn't think this is appealable, here is why we think it is." I mean it seems like we ought to just say it and leave it at that, but I don't have strong feelings about it. And it sounds like that appeal — the review by appeal is the way to go rather than by mandamus. And in all fairness, every party ought to have it.

And so it is not too much different from the language that was in the first proposal. Of course, that doesn't get back to Rusty's original comment that led into all of this, and that is do we want -- is this going to result in a flood of appeals.

MR. McMAINS: Yes. That is a separate problem.

JUSTICE HECHT: That is a separate problem.

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1 MR. McMAINS: But I do think, like I say, I 2 have less problems with the notion of the -- of a party being aggrieved by an order sealing during the pendency of the 3 case. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: John Collins, you had your 6 hand up. 7 MR. COLLINS: I have a motion. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. 9 MR. COLLINS: I move that we adopt the 10 original language found understand Tab C dealing with the 11 appeals, and that is on Pages 3 and 4 of the original 12 proposal, D, appeal, and E. And the only -- the only two 13 words that I would add would be in the third line -- or the 14 bottom line on Page 3, the phrase "a sealing order shall be deemed," right there I would say "a sealing order shall be 15 16 severed and deemed." And that would be the only change that 17 we would make in the original language. It simply severs whatever order the courts make. As I interpret that, any 18 19 party, any person appearing, anybody could appeal. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Give me the language again. 21 We are looking on Tab C, Page 3. 22 MR. COLLINS: Page 3. This is the original 23 language, Page 3 down at the bottom. 24 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): We got it.

MR. COLLINS: All right. Luke, at the bottom

line, beginning there in the center of the bottom line, "or enforce a sealing order shall be deemed," the new language will read "a sealing order shall be severed and deemed." After the word "be," just put "severed and deemed." MR. FULLER: It is just a sealing order that constitutes a severance and not --

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(At this time there was a brief discussion off the record, after which time the hearing continued as follows:)

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Thank you, Judge.

The appeal provision then would be -- would read any sealing order -- "any sealing provision contained in any judgment and any order granting or overruling a motion to alter, vacate, or enforce a sealing order shall be deemed to be" --

Sam, J think one problem we are having is -- and maybe I am not understanding Justice Hecht's comment, well, we don't need to try to pick up something like severances and anchor -- and anchor this into. Just say it is appealable, period, or John.

And it really isn't a severance probably because if you look back up into the list of things that you are

modifying, you are talking about a sealing provision

contained in the judgment. And you are not -- we are not 1 going to severe that. 2 JUSTICE DOGGETT: It might --3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Pardon me. JUSTICE DOGGETT: Luke, it may be necessary to 5 6 use the term "severe." I think what we were --7 MR. COLLINS: I think everybody is familiar with that terminology. 8 9 JUSTICE DOGGETT: -- we were talking about was not going the additional step of saying it is a separate 10 11 cause of action, that that rationale is probably not 12 necessary. But just saying it is deemed and severed, 13 "severance" is a concept that the court would be familiar 14 with. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I got you. 16 What about, Your Honor, this -- it says "Any 17 sealing provision contained in any judgment." Does that need 18 to be dealt with somehow separately? That doesn't seem to me 19 to fit that concept of severance, but maybe it does. Maybe 20 it is. 21 JUSTICE HECHT: Oh, yes. That shouldn't be 22 severed. You don't sever that. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why do we need to say "any 24 sealing provision containing any judgment" in here, because

that is -- that is appeallable as a part of the final

judgment. We could just leave that out.

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, but the time is -- what about timing?

JUSTICE DOGGETT: If it is contained in the final judgment as distinguished from a specific order, that one particular aspect of the judgment can be appealed under this. The parties might choose not to appeal the final judgment.

MR. EDGAR: We can't hear -- we can't hear down here.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Justice Doggett is helping us understand or helping me understand, anyway, something here about this "any sealing provision contained in any judgment," what if the sealing provision is right there in the final judgment. And I didn't understand the meaning of that or the full perforce of it and I had asked a question to get some explanation. Judge Doggett was giving that to us.

JUSTICE DOGGETT: And I was just saying that the concern there was you might -- and I think this is, in fact, what has happened in the two reported cases, you have an agreed judgment and the parties agree to the judgment, but the intervenor wants to appeal that section concerning sealing even though it is not contained in a separate order. That is why the language is there.

MR. EDGAR: And it would seem to me that there 1 2 might be a situation in which one of the parties might want to appeal only that part of the judgment to which the sealing 3 4 order applies --5 JUSTICE DOGGETT: Right. MR. EDGAR: -- and this would provide for that 6 7 as well. 8 JUSTICE DOGGETT: I think that language is 9 okay as it was originally included there. 10

Are you content with it, Ken?

MR. FULLER: Yes.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't have any problem with it except how it fits the concept of severance, and maybe I am just --

MR. McMAINS: The additional problem, though, is the notion of severance we had with regards to severing this claim is that when you have encompassed, which this particular provision does, motions to alter, overrule, vacate, then you are talking about the claim cropping up, and even though it supposedly went over there, it got back in here again and it just keeps flowing. And that is what doesn't make any sense from a severance standpoint.

What I think we were trying to do, by way of the severance, was to basically say we are only going to have one hearing or anticipate basically we are going to have one

hearing on the sealing order before the judgment, and I am talking about this aspect of it, and that is subject to being appealed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The entire litigation process could be taking one newspaper at a time coming in to moving to vacate. The parties could litigate this again, and again, and again.

MR. McMAINS: I understand they can under this proposal.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes.

MR. McMAINS: What I am saying, what I think we -- what I think Bill was trying to do, as a lead-in, was to basically say "Look. We have given the notice, we have jumped through the hoops. People have had a chance to come in and reverse the sealing order."

We have got two different situations, one before judgment, one after judgment. Now, I guess a third, during judgment, or in the judgment, which I really treat as being postjudgment in the sense that it is contained within that. In the prejudgment phase, it just really — this is the thing I am worried about is this continuing sequencing of appeals that you have that is authorized by just continuing to revisit the issue, and either way, I mean whether it is granted or denied.

And this notion of severance doesn't really fit

well unless what you severe is the issue of sealing. Once that is severed there, it is going to determine everybody's rights. And assuming that you have complied with the notice provisions and did everything so that all of that stuff is not void, everybody has got to be diligent enough to intervene at that time --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well -- I am sorry.

MR. McMAINS: -- before judgment.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Excuse me.

MR. McMAJNS: I mean that is -- that was the notion we were talking about in terms of giving an immediate appellate remedy to anybody who is paying attention.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom Leatherbury.

MR. LEATHERBURY: Well, Rusty, I just wanted to point out that the unique thing about sealing is that the need for sealing, if once recognized by the court, can evaporate over time, so you can have a situation where a sealing order is, in fact, appropriate to be entered before judgment, but at some time before judgment, something happens, the cat gets out of the bag some other way, there is other publicity about it, and it is no longer appropriate for the sealing — the court to enforce that sealing order.

So you want a situation where even the same parties and certainly a different party who wasn't at the first hearing, can go back and reapply to the court and say,

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"Circumstances have changed, even though it is still before judgment."

I just wanted to know if you had envisioned that circumstance because it is something that happens quite frequently.

MR. McMAINS: No, J understand that. And I -- I mean I understand that is the concern. And the real concern and the question is how much burden -- and, of course, we have no earthly idea, but how much burden are we willing to put on the system? If we are talking about putting this in the rules for two years, and for two years we are going to say everybody has got an unqualified right to go start this litigation and an endless succession of appeals, we are going to be back here before two years, J guarantee you, if that were to happen.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I wrote this down that as a bit of a stopgap on C, continuing jurisdiction, continuing — "The court that renders a sealing order maintains continuing jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate an order," and I thought it ought to say, "as a result of changed circumstances," which is sort of the test for modifying child support or custody.

Are we going to revisit again and again, just because the Statesman decided not to get involved when the Chronicle did in the first hearing, they want to come in now

doing that.

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and move to vacate and they want to retry the same circumstances they have had notice of. J don't know.

MR. McMaINS: Now, the problem with that is -and I -- and I sympathize totally with that. What I am
trying to do is trying to talk about what Bill and my basic
notions were that we really do have two different
circumstances, one that we have got litigation that is
ongoing, and it seems to me that one of the problems is that
the parties are going to be involved in their own litigation
and should they have to fight everybody and his mother over
some of these other issues to distract them from that piece
of litigation. And all the solo practicioners aren't going
to be too happy about that --

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): Well --

MR. McMAINS: -- when they spend their time

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me let Rusty finish and then I will get you.

MR. McMAINS: Second, now, once you get to the judgment, now, it may be that some years later, I mean this person -- a person involved in this particular proceeding may be running for public office. Many, many years later, you want to go back in and do something else. Postjudgment is a different issue and you shouldn't have a changed circumstance requirement for whatever the sealing is there and here.

So the only window we are really talking about and what I was attempting to kind of strike a balance, is let's not burden the system with one appeal of the sealing issue before judgment. After judgment, every time you want to go in, whoever it is, for whatever reason, they can go try and appeal that. And that doesn't bother me as much.

First of all, I think that is an appeallable order if we give the courts continuing jurisdiction. I think once somebody wants to go in, go to the trouble of filing an intervention, go try and get it done, and he looses, doesn't get it undone, goes up to the court of appeals, I don't think there is a problem with that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sam Sparks, San Angelo.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Just a point of order, and I agree with what Rusty is saying and I hear it. We have a motion on Subsection D made by Mr. Collins to take the original draft on appeal, insert on the third line "enforce a sealing order shall be severed and deemed," and then continue with the original language. That has been seconded. If it hasn't, I will second it, and J think Rusty's discussion is on C, continuing jurisdiction. So I think we should vote on appeals and then do something with continuing jurisdiction, which is a separate question.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Discussion on --

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): What I am saying is

point of order, we are discussing another section other than 1 2 the section --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. My perception was it 3 4 was a part of the same thing, and I don't know whether that 5 is right or wrong. 6 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Well, appeal is a different time. Continuing jurisdiction is the right of 7 appeal when you do it. They are separate questions. 8 9 MR. McMAINS: No, they aren't separate 10 questions. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rusty says --12 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I want to severe D 13 and C. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Rusty says they are not separate and if they -- Rusty, make your remarks. If 15 16 you will, address them to the motion, which is whether to use 17 for the appeal provision the proposal that has now been moved 18 and seconded. And whatever discussion there needs to be 19 about that, let's have it. 20 MR. McMAINS: All right. My point is that this -- that the section on the appeal says "any sealing 21 22 order" -- "any sealing provision contained in any judgment 23 and any order granting or overruling a motion to alter,

deemed," and then it goes on to be a separate and independent

vacate, or enforce a sealing order shall be severed and

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final judgment. The point is every order on a motion to 1 vacate or whatever, it is a -- there is nothing to limit in 2 3 any fashion whatsoever a continuing sequence. MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Yes, there is. You 5 just get one appeal on that. The only way you have a number 6 of appeals --7 MR. McMAINS: No. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Wait a minute. You-all have 8 got to talk --9 10 MR. McMAINS: Wrong --CHAIRMAN SOULES: You-all are off the record. 11 12 Court reporter stop. Now, who wants to speak? It can be Rusty or it can 13 14 be Sam or it can be John. 15 John has got his hand up. He can speak. 16 MR. COLLINS: Okay. I have got one quick 17 comment. 18 Rusty, right now there is no limits on the number 19 of mandamus orders that you can take from discovery right 20 That is not being abused. now. MR. McMAINS: The hell it isn't. 21 22 MR. COLLINS: Well, in my experience -- in my 23 experience it is not, in my practice it is not, Rusty, and so 24 I don't think we are going to be able to cure every 25 conceivable ill here. I mean we have been knocking discovery

1 around now in this state for 20 years and we ain't anywhere close to solving the problem. So I think we have got to get 2 3 something that we can work from, something that we can start 4 with. And I move the question. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Hadley. 6 7 MR. EDGAR: I just wanted to raise -- I have no problem with the question. I just -- the wording of the 8 9 question is the only thing I would like to direct my comments 10 to. I think that when you say, "shall be deemed a 11 12

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separate and final -- independent final judgment," we use the term "final judgment" in this state and we all know what that means. And, also, "shall be subject to immediate and independent appeal," I think to me is superfluous, and I would suggest that we just change the language to say, "shall be severed and deemed a final appealable judgment by any party." That says everything we want to say and doesn't add a bunch of words that nobody ever uses.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. It is John's motion.

Is that an acceptable --

MR. COLLINS: I second that amendment.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Read the words that we are fixing to vote on.

MR. EDGAR: At the bottom of --

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Read the entire read the
2	entire from starting with the word "appeal colon".
3	MR. EDGAR: "Appeal: Any sealing order, any
4	sealing provision contained in any judgment and any order
5	granting or overruling a motion to alter, vacate, or enforce
6	a sealing order shall be severed and deemed a final comma
7	appealable judgment by any party or intervenor who has
8	requested", et cetera, et cetera, on to the end of that
9	paragraph.
10	MR. COLLINS: That is acceptable.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Who has got a
12	clean one of these they can mark up that way for the Chair?
13	MR. DAVIS: Let's vote on it.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Somebody I just want I
15	just want one marked up right now that I can read.
1.6	MR. FULLER: Yes. Will you read it one more
17	time, Luke?
1.8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
19	MR. FULLER: Some of us don't have copies
20	here.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I am going to read
22	it. This will be D, Appeal. All right. This is going to go
23	into Lefty's 76(a) at
24	MR. HERRING: At D.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: at D.

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1	MR. HERRING: Between C and D, we don't have
2	anything in now.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Between the current C and R
4	on the last next to the last pages. D, Appeal. "Any
5	sealing order comma any sealing provision contained in any
6	judgment comma and any order granting or overruling a motion
7	to alter comma vacate comma or enforce a sealing order shall
8	be severed and deemed a final appealable judgment."
9	MR. FULLER: Asking for point of
10	clarification
3.3	MR. EDGAR: "As to any party or intervenor,"
12	and then continue on to the end of that paragraph.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Which may be appealed."
14	MR. EDGAR: No. Just it will be deemed a
15	final appealable judgment, and then if it is a final
16	appealable judgment, people can appeal it or they can just go
17	on about their business.
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It is going to be so deemed
19	by a party?
20	MR. COLLINS: Yes.
21	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): It is not deemed by
22	a party.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that is what this
24	language says.
25	MR. FDGAR: You are right. "Shall be deemed a

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Which may be appealed." 2 "Which may be appealed." Yes. MR. FDGAR: Thank you. 4 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Which may be appealed by any party or intervenor who has requested, supported, or 6 7 opposed any sealing order period". And then the second sentence of that and the third sentence of that, which second 8 and third sentence make up the entire balance of the 9 paragraph, are unchanged. 10 Okay. That is the motion. It has been seconded. 11 MR. FULLER: Okay. Now, clarification before 12 13 we vote on it. I want to ask a question, not a -- not a 14 criticism, but a question. My reading of what you are 15 proposing does not give a person who had been denied a -- who has been denied a sealing order the right of appeal. 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It does. It says -- this 18 gives -- this is mutual. 19 MR. FULLER: Okay. You are assuring me it is 20 a mutual right of appeal. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it says, "granting or 21 22 overruling." MR. McMAINS: That is granting or overruling a 23 24 motion to vacate. He is talking about the sealing order, I think, where it says "sealing order," Luke. The question is 25

final appealable judgment."

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1	does that mean an order sealing it or does that mean an order
2	on the sealing issue?
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me say
4	MR. COLLINS: I think the original intent was
5	to give everybody the right to appeal.
6	MR. MORRIS: Down there in the bottom line,
7	Luke, you could put "motion to seal or alter"
8	CHAJRMAN SOULES: Hold on. Hold on just a
9	moment, please. Let me take them one at a time because we
10	are down to we are down to real particularities now.
11	Who wants to speak? Lefty, did you have something?
12	MR. MORRIS: I was just going to say there in
13	the bottom line, put "motion to seal comma alter," and just
14	continue on. That should take care of that.
15	MR. FULLER: I concede it is mutual with that
16	language.
17	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I don't think you
18	can
19	MR. COLLINS: What did you do, Lefty? Say
20	that again.
21	MR. MORRIS: I just added the word "seal."
22	"Motion to seal comma alter comma vacate."
23	MR. HERRING: Maybe we ought to say "motion to
24	seal or to alter," otherwise it would be
25	MR. MORRIS: All right. Put "motion to seal

or to alter." 1 MR. HERRING: Yes. 2 MR. COLLINS: That is acceptable. 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So the -- I am going to read the first sentence again. The rest of it is all 5 right. So we have it one place in the record from beginning 6 7 to end. "D, Appeal: Any sealing order comma any sealing 8 provision contained in any judgment comma and any order 9 10 granting or overruling a motion to seal comma" --MR. MORRIS: "Or to." 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- "or to alter comma vacate comma or enforce a sealing order shall be severed and deemed 13 14 a final appealable judgment which may be appealed by any 15 party or intervenor who has requested comma supported comma or opposed any sealing order period". 16 Okay. That is the motion. 17 Gilbert Adams. 18 19 MR. ADAMS: I have got a suggestion. What 20 about -- what about saying, "shall be deemed severed," rather than "shall be severed and deemed." It saves the necessity 21 22 for filing a separate motion. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Is that all right, 24 John? 25 MR. COLLINS: Yes, sir.

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MR. EDGAR: How does that read now?

CHAJRMAN SOULES: All right. J am going to do

it again. Is there anybody else got any small changes?

MR. BEARD: I want to say I think that Rusty's

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MR. REARD: I want to say I think that Rusty's point is well taken that there should be only one bite at the apple here during the trial of this case except for good cause shown, to let one newspaper after another, or whoever --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. You can make that motion next.

MR. BEARD: All right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I have got a point of order that I have got to nail down and all I am doing here is getting Collins' words like they are supposed to be before we vote. I guess I am permitted to do that even under the -- guestions haven't been called.

Okay. Now, read it again. We want it right next to our vote the way we pass it, and so we will try to get it there again. If we don't, we will keep working at it.

"Any sealing order comma any sealing provision contained in any judgment comma and any order granting or overruling a motion to seal comma or to alter comma vacate comma or enforce a sealing order shall be deemed severed and a final appealable judgment comma which may be appealed by any party or intervenor who has requested comma supported

comma or opposed any sealing order period".
MR. COLLINS: That is correct.
CHATRMAN SOULES: Anything else on wording?
MR. BISHOP: "Shall be deemed severed in a
final appealable judgment." Does that make sense?
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anything else on wording?
All right. Those in favor show by hand.
Two, three, four let me start over again. One,
two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10 there
is 11 votes for.
Against? One, two votes, three votes, four
votes four votes only against.
Eleven to four to include Paragraph D between C and
E in the draft that Lefty and Chuck have provided us.
Okay. What is is next on sealing court records?
MR. HERRING: Well, we haven't
MR. MORRIS: Let's do C.
MR. HERRING: we haven't done C and that
comes back to now Rusty's question.
In light of this D, Rusty, what do you want what
do you want to do about C?
MR. McMAINS: Well, at that point, it doesn't
make any difference. You have just given them a right to
appeal to every goddamn order you can imagine.
MR. HERRING: Well, in light of that then I

1	move that we adopt C.
2	MR. McMAINS: It won't matter what you put
3	down there.
4	MR. HERRING: In light of that, then I would
5	move that we adopt C.
6	MR. COLLINS: Which C do you want to adopt? C
7	as done by you, Chuck?
8	MR. HERRING: C as we had read it out when we
. 9	started this discussion earlier this morning, which is C as
10	appears in the draft, you know, in the draft circulated with
11	the deletion of the language on the third line, which read
12	"Notwithstanding the rights of appeal provided in this rule."
13	That is the third line from the bottom. We would delete that
14	and put a capital A. And, otherwise, it reads the same as it
15	appears in the multipage draft handed out.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Then is there no
17	limit to the number of motions and appeals for motions
18	regarding sealed records during the course of the pendency of
19	a case? We might as well say it if that is what we are
20	MR. COLLINS: That is correct.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: if we are saying it,
22	let's say it.
23	MR. BEARD: That is what it says.
24	MR. COLLINS: I think that is correct,
25	Mr. Chairman, because the circumstances are going to differ

and change with each case and we can't anticipate right now what may or may not come up during the course of the case.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. COLLINS: We are not talking about traditional litigation here between two parties. We are talking about press, public members, other interested parties, intervenors. And so the answer to the question is, yes, there are unlimited appeals right now.

me ask a slightly different question on that. Are we saying then that even -- all right. The motion to seal is filed and posted under the rule, and the hearing is held, and the ruling is made, and the Statesman, Austin Statesman, didn't come. Then, whatever, there is an appeal or not an appeal. Then the -- in the same litigation, with nothing changed whatsoever, the Statesman shows up days or weeks later and presents for determination the exact same question decided by the trial court the first time that they had public notice of, but they file a motion to alter. No change has occurred that they can show.

MR. MORRIS: We have got a free pleading provision already that I think that would apply to.

MR. EDGAR: Mr. Chairman --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What if it doesn't?

MR. EDGAR: Mr. Chairman --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

MR. FDGAR: -- we -- there is some authority that would give rise to the application of a compulsory intervention and, thus, impose claim preclusion in a case like that. And if they had notice and failed to take advantage of it, then res judicata should apply and bar the relitigation of that issue.

MR. DAVIS: And if there is no --

MR. EDGAR: Well, that doesn't bother me.

MR. COLLINS: I second Chuck's motion, if that

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, suppose it is a good motion, but the parties that tried it the first time shanked it. That frivolous pleading doesn't help there. I don't care. I just want us to know -- very plainly to state what we are doing --

MR. MORRIS: Let me point out --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- so that there is some

MR. MORRIS: -- our motion, this has already passed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Everything before you has already been voted on, and passed, in sealed, and all we have asked to do is to amend C by striking the clause "Notwithstanding

the rights of appeal provided in this rule period", and then 1 2 putting a capital A. That is all. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved. 3 Seconded? Was it seconded, Lefty? 5 MR. MORRIS: Yes. MR. HERRING: 6 Second. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and seconded. 8 All in favor say "Aye." 9 (RESPONDED AYE) 1.0 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Opposed? 11 Okay. That is done. 12 C will be, then, included in the draft of -- just 13 as it is printed on Lefty's February 16 draft, except the 14 words "notwithstanding," all the way down through "rule" will 15 be deleted in the fourth line, and A will be capitalized and 16 that change will be made. 17 MR. FULLER: Luke, question. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Ken Fuller. 19 MR. FULLER: I know we have dealt with this 20 from the standpoint of unsealing records, but we are 21 operating under the general mandate of the Legislature to 22 enact rules governing the sealing of court records. 23 And my question to the Committee or to the Chairman

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is this: Does this rule, as we have presently enacted it or

written it and are going to recommend it to the court, deal

with the standing of third parties who want to come in and seal these records?

We have talked about unsealing them. Now, have we dealt with the grandmother or the grandfather who doesn't want you talking about their mentally retarded 18 year old who sexually assaulted someone and they want to come in and seal?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know. I guess it is, you know --

MR. FULLER: Well, I raise that question because I think it is part and parcel of the same thing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: David Beck.

MR. BECK: I would like to say something for the record, and the first time I saw this proposal is this morning because I could not attend the meeting last week. I am not opposed to what we have done in concept, but I am very troubled about the way we have done it. This represents a very material change in our Rules of Civil Procedure and our general practices.

The bench and the bar have not seen this, to my knowledge. The first time this was ever presented to the general Committee was at the meeting last week with the exception of the subcommittee that was working on this, and I think they have done an excellent job in working on it, but what I am concerned about is the potential problems that we

may not even anticipate, like John Collins was saying.

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We are trying to write a rule that applies in all cases, and I notice there is some references in the rule to public safety and health, but we use some terminology in that rule that we passed that is very, very broad, and I don't know what some of these provisions mean. And I suspect that some of the members of the bar are going to have some real questions about some of the terms.

For example, we include the term "settlement agreement" -- or excuse me, "a settlement agreement in the term court records." It talks about how a settlement agreement is included which restricts public access, quote, "to matters concerning public health and safety." Well, what does a matter concerning public health or safety mean? Does it include the amount of a settlement? I mean I think a good argument can be made that if a defendant pays a million dollars as opposed to a thousand dollars, that arguably is a matter that somehow concerns public health and safety in a products liability suit.

And my concern is that not every case we have got is a personal injury case and not every case we have got is a product liability case. There are patent suits out there, there are domestic relations suits, there are breach of contract suits, that have very critical pieces of information that the parties want to keep private.

this by way of an example, is when we start including settlement agreements in the term court record, when it is not filed of record, historically the parties in Texas have always had the right and the opportunity to contract on almost anything as long as it is legitimate and not illegal. We are taking that right away of the parties to contract, or if we do, it is a matter of public record. I guess my view would be if a party doesn't want to agree to something, they don't have to agree to do it.

And so one of the concerns I have, and I just use

And I am just concerned that we are doing this so quickly, with such limited review opportunities, by such a comparatively few members of even this Committee, that I am concerned we are going to come up with a result that is going to cause us a lot of problems on down the line. I just wanted to say that for the record.

MR. DAVIS: Luke --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom Davis.

MR. DAVIS: -- we are not proposing anything.

We are making recommendations to the Supreme Court and they will decide what to propose depending upon our recommendations. And our recommendations may not be unanimous. We may have one group that recommends this and another group recommends that, and the Supreme Court will sit there and decide which one and they may take the middle

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ground, so -- but we are under a time restraint.

As I understand it, the Supreme Court has to come up with something by a certain time and we are asked to do the best we can and nothing is perfect. We can't cover every situation that could arise and we are just doing the best we can in the time. We recommend to them this is our best and then they take it from there.

MR. BECK: Well, what are our time limits?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well --

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): This is it.

CHATRMAN SOULES: -- this is it.

I would like to have a motion that we accept 76(a) as it has been concluded today just by that last vote, in its entirety, and then --

MR. HERRING: We are not finished yet.

MR. MORRIS: We have got a couple of more.

CHATRMAN SOULES: Oh, you do? I am sorry. thought we were done.

MR. FULLER: We have got a few remaining.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Broadus.

MR. SPIVEY: I agree with you and I think it is time to move on, except I want the record to reflect a response to Davis Beck's oratory there. And I can understand his concern, but one of the basic problems is people have elected to take their private disputes into a public forum.

1 And I face that every time a defendant wants my client to produce income tax returns, and that settles cases sometimes. 2 That is one of the hazards of entering into litigation or 3 being drawn into litigation, and that is just something we have to deal with. 5 MR. BISHOP: That doesn't make it a matter of 7 the public domain. CHAIRMAN SOULES: What else on 76(a)? Next 8 9 paragraph. 10 MR. SPIVEY: Move the question. 11 MR. MORRIS: Well, we have a --12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. I have been told by the subcommittee that we are not ready yet for the general 13 14 motion. 15 MR. MORRIS: We are not quite through our 16 report. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. MR. MORRIS: We have, on page -- we have made 18 the changes on the copies you have, but I want the record to 19 reflect that on the second page, we have stricken the word 20 21 "if" after the word "document period". And we have started that sentence with a "the." And it should read, "The term," 22 quote, "'court records'" -- that is "records," plural, close 23

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Got that. What else?

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quote.

MR. HERRING: At the end of that same page, 1 second page, Paragraph (b)(1), the last sentence, this is 2 3 a -- Lefty Morris is proposing this amendment, which basically would require that if affidavit evidence is going 5 to be considered, that the affiant be present and available 6 for cross-examination. So the new language in the last 7 sentence on that page would read, "At the hearing the court must consider all evidence presented comma which may include 8 affidavit evidence if the affiant is present and available 9 10 for cross-examination." And that is Lefty's proposal. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. And you move with 12 those two additional changes that A through E, including 13 the --14 MR. HERRING: No. We just move right there 15 on -- for that change. I believe that is the motion, Lefty's 16 motion, and I second it. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What other changes are there 18 in the text? 19 MR. HERRING: The next page, which is 20 Paragraph (b)(3), the last line, the word "complaint" should be changed to "petition," "verifying petition" instead of 21 "complaint." 22 23 MR. EDGAR: Where is that? I am sorry.

Paragraph (b)(3), the second to the last word, the word

The last line on the third page,

MR. HERRING:

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1	"complaint" would be changed to "petition."
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It is the last line?
3	MR. HERRING: Yes, second to the last word.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
5	MR. HERRING: On the next page, the last line,
6	the fifth word, which is "he," would be changed to "the
7	party."
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
9	MR. HERRING: All right. Those are the only
10	changes we have to the text before the Committee right now.
11	CHATRMAN SOULES: Okay. The Chair will
12	entertain a motion to adopt 76(a) as now drafted and with the
13	comments just made, all the paragraphs submitted by the
14	subcommittee, as adjusted by today's discussion, and, also,
15	to include the appeal provision that we voted on earlier.
16	Is there a motion? Is there a motion?
17	MR. MORRIS: I move.
18	CHAJRMAN SOULES: Lefty has moved.
19	Is there a second?
20	MR. BISHOP: Second.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any new discussion on this?
22	MR. DAVIS: I would like to be heard on this.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. Tom Davis.
24	MR. DAVIS: It was my impression at the last
25	meeting that this group was almost unanimously in favor of

the proposition that information concerning the 1 2 administration of matters relating to public health or safety or the administration of government should not be hidden or 3 4 concealed. I think our disagreement arose as to whether or not provisions should be put in 76(a) that would make 5 discovery not filed with the court a public record. People 6 7 were concerned about how long they would have to keep it and things of that nature. 8 I have what J think is a solution to that problem 9 which would solve both, which I think would make 76(a) more 10 acceptable to some of us here. I would propose that we amend 11 12 166(b)(5) by adding a little (d) -- do you want to pass these 13 out, John? 14 MR. COLLINS: Yes. 15 CHATRMAN SOULES: All right. Anything else on 76(a)? 16 17 MR. DAVIS: Well, I mean --18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I understand this is 166(b), 19 but --20 MR. DAVIS: This relates to how I vote on 21 76(a) and what other amendments I may make to change it. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well --

But if you will allow me to proceed, I think you will see

that I am trying to clarify some things and move this thing

MR. DAVIS: I am trying to avoid doing that.

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on: That if we adopt 166(b)(5) little (d), to read that "No protective order or agreement relating to protecting disclosure of information concerning matters of public health or safety or information concerning administration of public office or the operation of government shall be valid unless the parties seeking protection files the discovery or results of discovery with the clerk of the court in compliance with Rule 76(a)."

What this says is, to begin with, at the bottom line, there will be no protective orders or agreements on this one particular area unless the one wanting the protection files it of record. When it is then a matter of public record, it falls under the definition of 76(a) and then they have to proceed there. This doesn't say that the documents you have in your file, or anything else we were concerned about, is a matter of public record. It only becomes a public record if someone wants to seal it and they would then have to file it.

And it also recognizes the priority of the thought that matters of public health or safety or the administration of government should either not be sealed, or concealed, or hidden, or whatever you want to call it. And I think this solves both things.

It starts off and says it isn't, but it only falls into 76(a) when someone wants to protect it and move to it,

then it is filed, then it is a public record, but not until 1 then. And we are not concerned with what we have in our 2 3 files as a public record or how long we have to keep it or 4 anything. I think this solves both problems, and with this amendment to 166(a), I, in good conscious, would vote for 5 6 76(a) as presented. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Well, I will 8 take this up next. But at the moment, all those in favor of 76(a) show 9 10 by hands. MR. DAVIS: Wait a minute. What are we on? 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: One, two, three -- we are 13 voting on whether to accept 76(a). I have got a motion 14 and -- one, two -- those of favor of 76(a) as now before the 15 Committee, show by hands. Chuck is not. Lefty is. One --16 hands up if you favor it. One, two, three, four, five, six, 17 seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12. 18 Those opposed hold your hands up. One, two, three. 19 Three. 20 MR. DAVIS: Am J allowed to point out some more things wrong with it before we vote it? 21 22 CHAIRMAN SOULRS: We have voted.

MR. SPIVEY: That is administrative.

it and I would like to get the errors out.

MR. DAVIS: Well, you have got some errors in

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now --

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGRLO): Since we have just brought that up, my understanding was that -- and I was at the last meeting -- was that the vote was pretty strong to exactly what Tom Davis just said, that matters affecting public health and safety or information concerning administration of public office or operation of government, not be hidden from the public. Then we came back and later there was a motion to table the particular discussion about Rule 166(b) or the discovery process.

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I would at this time make a motion to again discuss Rule 166(b) for the purpose of considering Tom Davis' motion.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let me see.

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Holly, have you got my agenda there?

15 16 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Since it was not tabled to a time specific, I think I am entitled to that.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't have any problem

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with taking it up anyway, Sam. I don't think anybody does.

19 20 I mean I think -- we are going to have to -- all right. I am going to take this last item out of order and then we are

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going to go back and do the TRAP rules and we are going to --

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then we are going to get to the new rules and we have got --

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obviously, we have a lot of responsibility here to discharge,

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and I know we have really worked hard to do it and I am very

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pleased with the performance. I don't mean in any way to

criticize that. It is just, I guess, I am cracking the whip a little bit, and if I am out of line, I apologize to you.

1.8

We will move now to 166(b)(5)(d), T think it is, and there are -- there is more than one comment to this and they fit, maybe, together. I don't know. If you -- let's see. In the new agenda on Page 640 and 641 in the materials, 640 and 641, I propose -- Tom has given us 166(b)(5)(d), which speaks to one of our discussions, some of our discussion, and then this is my proposal on 640 to try to deal with the situation where a trial court has lost its plenary power.

And have we fixed that in 76(a)? I don't think so because 76(a) does not reach all discovery. Even under 166(b)(5)(d), it doesn't reach all discovery. And 166(b) -- and that is the reason I am putting them together. What I propose, on Page 640, is that a trial court shall have continuing jurisdiction beyond its plenary power over the merits of a case to rule on motions of any party or nonparty to a case seeking to rescind any order related to discovery.

And we have got cases, you know, the Times-Herald case, they tried to get in, unseal some discovery, I guess it was a Dallas court or maybe -- I don't know whether it was the Supreme Court. I don't remember who --

MR. LEATHERBURY: They actually weren't after discovery in that case. That was pleadings.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It was pleadings.
2	MR. LEATHERBURY: Well, upon appeal it became
3	pleadings. They abandoned the claim for discovery on appeal.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. J don't know
5	whether we want to do this or not, or whether we want to do
6	them together, but that is all the this is the entire
7	information on 166(b)(5)(d), and we are open for discussion.
8	MR. DAVIS: Fine. (d) is fine, just make mine
9	(e) then.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Or either way. It doesn't
11	matter to me. Do we do we want to do this on 640? It is
12	up
13	MR. DAVIS: I think they ought to be separate
14	sections.
1.5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Do we even want
16	to do the my proposal on 166(b)(d)?
17	MR. DAVIS: I have no objection to that.
18	MR. HERRING: You wouldn't call it (d), would
19	you, Luke?
20	MR. ADAMS: I so move, Mr. Chairman, or second
21	it or whatever needs to be done.
22	MR. DAVIS: Second.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: T am getting my I am
24	getting some help here from Chuck on maybe getting it to
25	where it fits. Is that right?

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1	MR. HERRING: Yes. I think you just add his
2	paragraph after (d).
3	MR. DAVIS: (e) is fine because we get no (d)
4	now.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, it is 166(b)(5)(d). I
6	am sorry.
7	MR. DAVIS: (b)(5). There is no (d) now.
8	MR. HERRING: Yes, but look at the structure
9	of the way that sentence is set up.
10	MR. DAVIS: Yes. I understand your proposal.
11	I can make mine (e).
12	MR. HRRRING: See how it is set up with a, b,
13	c? See the introductory clause there? I think what you
14	wanted to do is add it as Paragraph (2)(b)(5)
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I see.
16	MR. HERRING: rather than making it a (d)
17	or an (e).
18	JUSTICE DOGGETT: Luke, may I inquire there,
19	are you is this a vote that is coming up to add the
20	proposed (d) on 640?
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes.
22	JUSTICE DOGGETT: There was a position
23	advocated, which may or may not be correct, I think by Rusty
24	last time, that protective orders die with the final
25	judgment. I gather that is not and then he drew an

amendment, which was on the table, which I have got a copy 1 2 of, that we wanted to codify that in the rule. CHAIRMAN SOULES: I didn't -- I don't have 3 that, Judge. I don't know why I don't have it. 4 5 JUSTICE DOGGETT: This is the only one I have got and I don't know whether he is urging that. 6 7 MR. BECK: Luke, the only comment I would make 8 on that is most of the protective orders I have seen have, as an integral provision, the return of the records so that it 9 10 almost becomes academic unless you have an agreement that doesn't have a provision like that. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I guess run copies of that, 12 13 if you will, and we will spread it around. 14 MR. DAVIS: Luke, do we have before us your 15 suggested change? Isn't that what is up? 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Justice Doggett has brought 17 up an alternative to this, I guess. I don't know. 1.8 JUSTICE DOGGETT: Well, it is not even -- it is not even necessarily my alternative. It is an attempt to 19 20 seek clarification about this provision. Is Rusty coming 21 back? CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know. 22 23 (At this time there was a brief discussion off the record, after which time the hearing continued as 24 25 follows:)

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Okay. Those in favor 1 2 of Tom Davis' suggestion that we add a (b)(5) -- a 166(b)(5)(d) in the text of his handout. There has been a 3 motion. 4 Tom moved. 5 Did somebody else second? 6 MR. SPIVEY: Second. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Broadus seconds. 8

MR. EDGAR: Let me -- let me talk about --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Discussion.

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MR. FDGAR: I would just like to talk about the structure of it. (a), (b) and (c) talk about the court's authority, and then says it is limited to any one of the following, and then it lists three things. And the wording of this really doesn't fit in to one of those provisos. And it just seems to me that perhaps it -- we should say, "provided, however," or something like that, if that is -- in order to carry out the intent of this proposal.

MR. DAVIS: I find nothing wrong with the form.

MR. EDGAR: Well, I understand you don't, but if we adopt your motion, then we automatically adopt the form, Tom, and I was just trying to cure that.

MR. DAVIS: What is the matter with the form? Let's go with it.

Where do you think it ought to be put, Hadley?

1	MR. EDGAR: Well, I don't even know that
2	you it would be a (d). I would just say semicolon after
3	(c) and say, "provided, however, no protective order." And
4	that way then it would apply to both (b) and (c). Now, that,
5	to me, is the logical way to do it.
6	MR. DAVIS: That is fine.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: What are you going to do
8	now?
9	MR. FULLER: Following (c), put a semicolon
10	and then, without a number, "provided, however," and then go
11	with this language because it applies to all the protective
12	orders.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. The form
14	well, it would just be another unnumbered paragraph then of
15	5?
16	MR. FULLER: Yes.
17	MR. EDGAR: Unlettered paragraph.
18	MR. FULLER: Unnumbered paragraph.
19	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): As part of the body
20	of 5.
21	MR. RDGAR: Just part of the body of 5.
22	MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Do you go back over
23	to the original 1?
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
25	MR. FDGAR: Now, as a matter of grammar, you

would have to put semicolons after (a), (b) and (c). 1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, not really. I mean we 2 do this so many ways, we could just block this paragraph up 3 4 with a capital N back to the margin and go with it. 5 MR. EDGAR: All right. Or you could say that, too. That is right. 6 7 MR. DAVIS: However you want to put it in there, J don't care. 8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We will back to the margin 10 and block without any indention. 11 Okay. Do we have lunch out there? 12 JUSTICE DOGGETT: It is sitting out in the 13 hallway. MR. DAVIS: Let's vote. 14 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: David Beck. 16 MR. BRCK: Yes, I want to make this comment. 17 I want to make sure everybody understands what we are doing 18 here, and I know I am in the minority. There are only two 19 people here that I count that do essentially defense work, 20 but what this does, it makes -- it makes certain that no 21 protective order is valid unless you file the discovery with 22 the court. And what we just passed a few moments ago says 23 that if you file it with the court, then you can't seal it. So basically, what this means is, is coupled with 24 what we did a few moments ago, we are making any protective 25

order virtually meaningless, it seems to me, because you have 1 got to file the documents with the court and then the sealed 2 records piece of -- or the rule that we just passed says that 3 4 you can't seal that information. So I want to make sure 5 everybody knows that. 6 And, again, the comment I want to make is that this 7 represents a radical departure from what we have historically 8 done, and I am just real concerned that we are doing this at the last minute with very little opportunity for input from 9 the bench and the bar, as we have done with all these other 10 rules. And I am going to oppose it. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, do you propose or make 12 a motion that we submit this -- publish it and submit it for 13 14 public comment before it is adopted? I don't know whether to 15 do that or not. I am trying to --16 MR. BECK: Well, I asked a question a while

MR. BECK: Well, I asked a question a while ago, Luke, about what are our time constraints, and somebody said we had to do this immediately, and I don't know what --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, with or without --

MR. BRCK: -- I don't know what the

Legislature -- excuse me.

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MR. DAVIS: The motion before the board is to adopt this.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The motion is --

MR. BECK: To adopt it.

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MR. DAVIS: That is right.

MR. BECK: The motion on the floor is to adopt this as written.

MR. DAVIS: Right now, as written, and as we decided where it should fit, the motion is to adopt it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I understand. And we are having discussion.

Doak Bishop.

MR. RISHOP: I don't think that we are under time constraints to make this particular change. We are under a time constraint to make the change to 76(a) because the Legislature acted on it and they asked for guidelines from the Texas Supreme Court.

But I really think that a change like this needs to be studied by the Administration of Justice Committee, which has never seen this. Judge Peeples was here last week. He made a very eloquent plea why we should not be moving so rapidly when people have not had a chance to study these things to determine what the implications are. And I certainly think that we ought to send this to the Administration of Justice Committee first to see what their work is. They have never seen this proposal.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any further discussion?

Those in favor of a new final paragraph to

166(b)(5) as set forth in Tom's proposal, show by hands.

Those opposed show by hands. One, two --1 I am sorry. Hold your hands up, please. I am not 2 getting them all. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. 3 Okay. Did everybody vote? The vote right now is 4 eight to seven in favor, and I don't -- I think there are 5 fewer -- there are more people here. 6 MR. JONES: I was standing behind, Mr. 7 Chairman. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I am sorry. From the 9 movement in the --10 MR. DAVIS: Let's vote again. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: May I -- may I ask for a 12 recount because I am not sure I counted them right. 13 I guess everybody knows what the proposition is 14 that we adopt the language in Tom Davis' handout as a new 15 final paragraph to 166(b)(5). That is the proposition. 16 17 Those in favor show by hands. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. 18 Those opposed. One, two, three, four, five, six, 19 20 seven. Ten to seven, it carries. Okay. Let's have lunch. 21 Let's try to hold it -- let's try to hold it to 30 minutes, 22 if possible. I will see you-all about 1:15. 23 (At this time there was a lunch recess, 24

after which time the hearing continued as follows:)