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SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

May 15, 1986

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Okay. There's no

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's open up on the record. Are there any changes in the minutes?

MR. TINDALL: I move they be approved.

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

further discussion and we'll approve the minutes of our last meeting. And I'll submit those to the court reporter to attach to the transcript. welcome all of you. We've been here a few The weather has delayed starting the meeting, but we are now convened. In earlier discussions, the committee voted unanimously to approve the suggested changes to Canon 3-C1 by making the recommended changes and putting a 1 beside "disqualification" and a 2 beside "recusal," and then renumbering the other portions of Canon 3-C which were 2 and 3, to renumber them to be 3 and 4. The word "he" in the second line of the A part of 3-Cl is to be deleted. It should have had a strike through. And the S, I believe that does have a strike through on some copies, and the B part is to be deleted. That was an unanimous recommendation. We have been discussing here for some time informally the Administrative Rules. And, Judge Casseb, you were going to make a general statement about those rules to start our

discussion on the record, and I certainly appreciate hearing from you on that now.

whether or not this committee can actually, at this time, proceed with the program that the Chairman has indicated that we should be doing right now concerning these suggested rules of administration which have been proposed mainly because these proposed rules have not received, in my opinion, the wide-spread circulation that it is now going to get.

After the last Task Force meeting, it was
then brought to the attention of the powers of the

-- that we were getting from many areas opposition
to the proposed rules as they were being
disseminated and filtered into their area, and
they became knowledgeable of same. So that then
it was decided that the draft of these rules as
you have now would be published in the June issue
of the Texas Bar Journal so that it have complete
exposure throughout the state.

In addition, it's on the agenda to be taken up and discussed at the State Bar Convention on June the 18th at the State Bar Convention in Houston.

Now, I am still -- because I was on the subcommittee of a Task Force under Rule 3, I'm still getting opposition from members of that subcommittee, including one that I got today from James Kronzer, that he is still opposed to what we

did and put into Rule 3.

Now, I feel that perhaps the most that we could do today is merely to look at these proposed rules and see where it may be questionable in the existing Rules of Procedure that we have now. So that then maybe we can then, as these things come along, to make some decision with reference to it.

I can't help but feel that there are some real big questions, and a lot of opposition is going to come to doing this as it is right now, because I've been traveling this state and I've been hearing it. And I don't want word to get back that I am trying to come on a collision course with Chief Justice or anything else. I'm not. I think that we need to do something with reference to it.

But even as we now have these suggested rules, it does not -- nothing is there to address itself to what's happened and to the cases which

are on the dockets now. How are we going to handle those? How are they going to be processed? These rules merely say when a case starts. But what is going to happen to all these cases that are on the docket now? Nothing is addressed to that.

MR. BRANSON: There's a little squib, Judge, that says that the same attitude shall apply to cases pending.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It's a comment under Rule 1.

JUDGE CASSEB: Under Rule 1.

MR. BRANSON: I'm not sure there's even a definition of attitude in the rules.

JUDGE CASSEB: That's right. But how are you going to fit it in there?

Another thing that I see here that you're going to find problems in this, is where you have the courts that handle both civil and criminal cases. You have the same judge like you do in Nueces County. How is he going to be able to fit it in? Also, in your multi-county districts where they have your civil, criminal and whatnot. I think you're going to have that there.

And also, I'm afraid that you're going to

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find that when you -- these rules -- you've got to have a judge working 365 days of the year, and there's no allocation there for what happens if he's on vacation or whatever. What is going to happen to that?

I believe that we're losing sight of the practical aspects of the trial of cases in this huge state of ours and the way it operates in different areas. And you're also finding in here, under these proposed rules, some commitments to reporting, which you're finding, and I've already had written opposition from the district clerks in which it says, "We don't have the money to do it, to put on the personnel. We're not going to do it because we're not answerable to the judges; we're answerable to the people who elected us."

Now, that's an overall view of what I'm telling you. So I think we've got to tread it a little bit more cautiously. I don't want to see this committee spending so much time trying to figure out if these proposed rules, in any which way, conflict with our existing rules when, perhaps, it may not even be adopted.

That's all I have to say.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Two points of

that from the Chair, and the Chief Justice asked us to scrub these for conflicts with the Rules of Civil Procedure One. And we need to do that and I'm not saying whether I favor or disfavor these rules, because maybe that's not my prerogative, at least at this juncture.

But, secondly, if they do get on a fast track, we want to have had our work done because it could happen that they -- I think it could happen that they could get on a fast track. So we need to address them, and the Chief asked us to have this extra day here today to do that.

Finally, before we start, one of the bugles
that Ernie Friessen blows about Canon or Article 3
is that it does not control any single case; that
every case has the potential of being an
exception; that it is a statistical aggregate type
of a rule. And when you read it literally, that's
true, but when it's applied by the courts, it may
not be true.

What we always hear in the Task Force from the Chair or from the advisors in response to things like Judge Casseb just covered is that, well, these rules don't cover any single case. I don't know whether that's to try to get the eyes

off of a single case, which is our concern, to try every client's case as a single case the best we can, or whether it really will be that cases have free opportunity to be exceptions.

I wanted you to hear that, what Friessen says, before we really started our discussion so that you would have that in your mind. But Judge Casseb has certainly voiced what's a very strong voice from a lot of people on the Task Force and otherwise. And I appreciate those comments, Judge, because we need to address them.

MR. BRANSON: Mr. Chairman, in light of the Judge's remarks, might it not be prudent on our part to wait until after the hearing cry from the bar and have a meeting following the bar committee meeting this summer to deal -- to have this committee have whatever input it's going to to these rules.

the substantive input as to whether or not we ought to have them at all, that's fine. But I don't want to delay scrubbing them for harmony with the Rules of the Civil Procedure because they may get on a fast track, and we want to be sure that we don't permit egregious conflict.

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MR. BRANSON: Well, Mr. Chairman most of what Judge Casseb is referring to on parts of these rules which, in fact, conflict with our current Rules of Civil Procedure. I mean, you either, basically, have to follow our current Rules of Civil Procedure or you have to follow these new Administrative Rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we'd have to take them one at a time, Frank, to see where they conflict. They may not --

MR. BRANSON: Can you think of any Rules of Procedure that Rule of Procedure 3 doesn't cross over?

in the Rules of Civil Procedure that says that a judge can't enter a docket control order to control his cases on time standards. That's not a conflict.

JUDGE CASSEB: You've got it under 166.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: 166 permits that.

It expressly permits that.

MR. TINDALL: Luke, why do we -- I mean, I envision from what Judge Casseb is saying there may be substantial revision to these rules.

I mean, it seems like to me, why should we state what yet has not been sort of sanitized into what may be a probably final form.

I know the Family Law Section certainly would like to urge further revision of 1 and 4. If we can do it today and then it's changed again, what have we really accomplished?

MR. BRANSON: Not only that, Mr. Chairman, I get the impression that there may well be some of the membership of this committee that didn't -- was absent because they didn't want to incur the wrath of the Chief Justice regarding this rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rusty McMains.

MR. MCMAINS: Since I think that what you've been indicating as our supposed charge today is more of a -- is almost clever in the sense that you want to identify where there is a deviation or a conflict between these rules and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that would have to be either clarified or require an amendment from one or the other for harmony purposes.

I personally believe that it's not very functional for an entire committee of this size to do that if that's the principle function of what

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it is it wants to be done. And I don't have any problem at all, frankly, from a standpoint of trusting certain members of the committee on a smaller level to get together in a couple of hours and figure that out in total.

And I don't think, as an example, and while he was volunteered by Mr. Dorsaneo, that Dorsaneo has suggested that he and he thinks with Hadley Edgar can probably do that in about two hours. And, whereas, I don't think this committee can probably do that, because I'm not sure this committee agrees on what the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide, let alone what these do, in two days.

And I think that's a much more functional use of the committee time from that function purpose. And I would move or make it in the form of a motion that Hadley and Bill or any other persons you saw fit -- but I wouldn't want to get it too big, because I think they can solve any conflict problems that are irreconcilable, either to solve or pinpoint where those are in a very short period of time.

And I really think that the only thing that most of the people on the committee want to talk

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about is the philosophy behind what is attempting to be done and whether or not we're headed in the right direction, and which is something that, I think, does require full committee input.

motion. I'm assuming everybody that came here today knew that we were going to talk about these administrative rules; some haven't come. I don't know whether their reasons are to avoid confrontation or whether they had conflicts with other matters.

But if there is anyone here who does not want to have an input through our meeting today and to these administrative rules and how they work with the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need for them to be here, because that's what we're going to do today. However many there are, whether it's Bill and you and me or whoever it is. Because I'm going to be a part of that, and the only way I can be a part of it is do it in session or adjourn the session and do it by committee. And I'll do it either way.

MR. BRANSON: Mr. Chairman, let me ask a question.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

MR. BRANSON: Maybe some people in the committee are not sure what our function here is. Maybe Justice Wallace can help us.

Mould the Court like for the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee to look at the work done by the
Task Force and make a recommendation to you as to
whether or not we approve the substance of those
rules, or would the Court like for us to merely
rubber stamp what the Task Force did and let the
court rule, because really, to the committee, I'm
sure it makes no difference whichever way the
Court wants to do it.

the only way I know how, Frank. As I understand the Chief Justice asked the committee to do what Luke has outlined, make sure there was no conflict between these proposed rules and the current Rules of Civil Procedure. And I talked with him Wednesday afternoon, I guess it was -- Tuesday afternoon; and that was, he said, his intent in asking Luke to do this, so that was his.

Now, as the Court itself, as all of you are familiar, you know how the rules are promulgated.

This committee makes recommendations after the Committee on Administrative Justice has considered

proposed amendments, then it goes to the Court and let the Court to do. Nine members of court vote on what happens.

And since I do the black bean on heading up this Task Force, I'm going to do everything I possibly can to get to every member of the Court, every comment that is made and directed to me or to this committee so that they are fully advised of how everybody feels.

Now, that is what I intend -- that is my number one priority. And how each of those nine members on the Supreme Court are going to vote on these administrative rules is going to be up to them. But my job, which I have given myself, since I was assigned as Chairman of this Task Force, is to make sure that the members of the Court are advised of how the people out there are going to work with these rules feel about it.

and I know that those members appointed each and every member of this committee. And if they had not valued your judgment, they would not have voted to appoint you on this committee. And so I think the Court, as a whole, would like hear from members of this committee, how you feel about these rules, as well as all those thousands and

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thousands of lawyers and judges out there who are not on the committee. So, does that answer your question, Frank?

> Yes, sir, it does. MR. BRANSON: CHAIRMAN SOULES: Buddy Low.

MR. LOW: I think what Rusty meant --I don't think Rusty meant to say that the committee wouldn't consider this as a whole. understood what he was saying, he thought that certain things may certainly not be in conflict, no question. I mean, but to go through them in detail, a couple of people will say, "Well, I think this dovetails or it doesn't, or is in conflict," and then to come back and discuss those areas that they think there is possibly a problem with the group, rather than just a group taking it sentence by sentence.

I don't think he meant to do -- what to say. And I would certainly concur in that if -- and I'm willing to sit here because I certainly came here to voice my opinion about these rules and I have one.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Professor Edgar.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Let me just make a suggestion. I'm trying to bring you all together

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I believe Rusty is right, that as far as trying to sit down and determine which of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be in conflict with these Administrative Rules is really probably a waste of of committee time. And what I would like to recommend, to carry out what your mission is, is to adjourn this committee at 3 o'clock this afternoon and for Rusty and Bill and me and you to sit down together for two hours, go over these rules, and I think we can come back with a subcommittee report to this committee tomorrow morning to carry out what you perceive our mission to be.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, we may do that in a minute, but we can't do it at 3:00 because we have other business tomorrow and Saturday that's going to take all of tomorrow and Saturday, but that may work.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: But I think that a small group could work far more efficiently and do what you perceive our mission to be today.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. That's fine. The Administrative Rules are really, to me, not that complicated. They may be very

controversial --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, the reason I suggested before is --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- but not particularly --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: -- because we have all been on the Task Force and we basically know what the Administrative Rules provide, and it won't take us very long to look through the Rules of Procedure and see where apparent conflicts might exist without going to the merits of the rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: You may --

JUDGE CASSEB: I'll make that in the form of a motion.

MR. LOW: I second it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: How many want to participate -- I'm not going to exclude anyone who's here today from participating in the look at these rules one by one to say whether or not you feel they conflict with a different part of the Rules of Civil Procedure than before.

How many want to participate in the look at these rules one by one and the input into where you feel they conflict? Show me your hands. No

one.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): You mean, other ones that are --

MR. LOW: Other than the ones in the motion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Other than the ones that are in motion. No one else wants to have input. Pat does.

MR. BEARD: The basic philosophy
problem I have with the Rules that I expressed on
the Task Force is, I don't think that the
Administrative Rules we're talking about have
continuance rules in them. And I think those all
ought to be over rules and they ought to be
incorporated by reference in these rules.

And I just don't -- we're not looking at making them harmonious repeating them. It appears to me that the continuance rules ought to be over in the Rules of Civil Procedure and incorporated by referencing.

Lawyers should not have to look in two different places and have additional requirements in the rules because they're going to make mistakes in the process. And that's the only thing I can say about it, that as far as making

them harmonious, we should make reference and incorporate the Rules of Civil Procedure where we have procedures already.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. The last thing I'll say about that is that this committee has an opportunity today, as a whole, to look at these rules in full text, in session, and together.

If the committee votes not to pursue that, that's fine with me. If they want to adjourn to a subcommittee, that's fine with me. But I do want you to know that these rules will not be back here probably, and that's my judgment call. But I think they will not be back here again.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The administrative rules.

JUDGE THOMAS: Which rule?

MR. TINDALL: I thought we were only referring to them against the TRCP at this time, and we could still open up for discussion about the substanty requirements of rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, we're going to adjourn, though, in 15 minutes for a two-hour adjournment, and then we're going to start on the Rules of Civil Procedure conflicts

because that's what the Chief has told me to do.

But I can't delay that until the end of the

afternoon because we've put Sam Sparks off three

times now, and he's got about 50 rules to report

on. And aside from these administrative rules,

there is 600 and -- well, that includes these

administrative rules, which isn't very many

pages.

We've got 661 pages of materials that have been sent to us from the public to deal with that we have not dealt with in three previous sessions. And we have dealt with a lot in the three previous sessions, including this book, which is just as thick on the Appellate Rules. We just have an awful lot of work to do. So we can't put this off until tomorrow. And it's fine with me.

All I want is that I want everybody, when they vote on whether we adjourn into a small group, to know that when we do reconvene, say at 1 o'clock, we're going to have that four and a half hours to shoot at the whole project and also, to take up the Rules of Civil Procedure conflicts.

To me, one approach, or a different approach,

would be to start with Rule 1. It doesn't take long to read them. Every one of us can read fast and go through these today, and everybody shoot at Rule 1 as Rule 1 and its substance, and shoot at Rule 1 as to how it conflicts with TRCP, and go through them. But that's just a contrary view to the motion that's on the table and all I want to do is have it expressed.

If we're going to compress our -- we may wind up compressing our discussions into less time if we go along with the motion and adjourn at 11:00. But if we adjourn, we're going to adjourn at 11:00 to 1:00 and then reconvene.

MR. TINDALL: Luke, I detect the committee would like to discuss the philosophy of the rules and let a subcommittee meet while we're even meeting to perhaps go over the conflict.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We can't do that because the Chairman has to be both places.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Mr. Chairman, in your view, which process will take less time?

Just guess.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think if you run them both together, you've got on the record here "Rule 1 addressed." As to how it philosophically

fits our view and how it, as a practical matter and as a working matter, dovetails into the TRCP, and when we're through with Rule 1, we go to Rule 2. And I believe an orderly process like that will create a record that will be most meaningful. But it may be that it gets bogged down in oversights.

JUDGE CASSEB: I agree; there are too many.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Buddy Low.

MR. LOW: I don't see the committee as doing exactly what you're saying, that we're giving up our chance and our charge to do this, because I don't see that the motion included the fact that when these people come back, that we want to bring up Rule 1; they don't mention we can do it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right.

MR. LOW: So I don't see this committee doing exactly what you're saying and the rest we're delegating everything to them. I don't see it that way because as I see it, we still have a right to come in, and they pinpoint these things; we discuss what we need.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. LOW: So I see it as being streamlined, but not giving up any doing that we charge to do, because I don't think any member of this committee is doing that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, I don't think so either. I'm just asking, who wants to be a part of this first process, or do we really want to do it that way?

MR. TINDALL: Is the alternative that we can take up the rules now and discuss as a committee as a whole, both conflict with the TRCP and substantive comments about the rules. Is that the alternative?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That was my approach to it when I came here, if we got into the substantive aspects of it. As I said, I didn't say we couldn't; I just said I didn't, you know -- Judge Wallace has said that he wants to hear that. And that's the first time that we've been told clearly that.

So that would be the organization that I would pursue if we stay in session as a whole and start with Rule 1 and finish with Rule 9 with both aspects of it on the table. So that's what we're going to vote on.

Carry.

23 The motion is that we designate a 1 2 subcommittee to look at it for a couple of hours 3 to look at these rules for where conflicts may 4 appear with the Rules of Civil Procedure and then 5 reconvene this committee as a whole -- for what, Judge? To discuss those, Judge Casseb, and the 6 7 substantive reports? 8 JUDGE CASSEB: Yes. And then go into 9 your substantive deal. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's a 11 motion. And was it seconded by you, Buddy? 12 MR. LOW: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And Rusty. Okay.

All in favor show by hand.

Those that want to stay in session and proceed rule by rule show by hands. Okay, that's two. You two are certainly invited to leave with our committee and have your --

MR. TINDALL: What we voted on will not preclude us from discussing the rules philosophically.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's correct. Well, it precludes two hours of that.

Yes, sir. Sam Sparks from San Angelo.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I have some

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problem with separating the conflicts from the philosophical point.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I do too.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): And, you know, I went over and talked to Judge Curt Steib in San Angelo. He's probably one of the best administrative judges that I have seen and wanted his input, and he said he didn't really give a damn. The Supreme Court wasn't going to slow our docket down anyway. That was his attitude, because we trialed in about three months. It's a different world out there.

But, on the other hand, the conflict I get is the continuance problem we're talking about, because I have stood in that court before where both the plaintiff and the defendant -- there were three defendants in a complicated suit saying "We're not ready." The Judge said, "It doesn't a matter; you're going to trial."

Well, it's fantastic because you try to work out some settlements when you're really down to that and really move the docket along. But philosophically, justice doesn't necessarily get done. And that's what bothers me, when there is no method for review of what your trial judge

does. So the continuances and what happens thereafter -- that conflict between the Rules of Procedure and what happens here is not only a conflict, but it's a philosophic difference with me.

So for the subcommittee to look at it, I want them to -- I voted for them to look. I think that's very important, and we can do it faster. But that is the very area that bothers me; it's not the recordkeeping or whether we got the money to do it or anything else. It's just when you let speed get in the way of justice.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, I'm satisfied that this committee is going to express some views. The stuff that all may have had an interest in. But we do stand adjourned as a committee, and the subcommittee will please move here and meet right up here. And everybody who wants to be on the subcommittee can stay and be on the subcommittee.

MR. SPIVEY: When will the rest of us come back? Do we come back at 1:00?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we'll have lunch served in the hallway here at noon. We'll work through lunch in here with our lunches, but

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we're going to stay. We'll be on the record with the subcommittee as well. See you at 1 o'clock.

(Some members left room while (subcommittee reconvened.

is convening at 11 o'clock. It was recommended and voted on by the committee as a whole, the subcommittee, to try to identify where there are conflicts with the Administrative Rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The only comment

I have about Rule 1 with respect to the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure is that I think that it

conflicts potentially with Rules 1 and 2 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because aside from

this introductory paragraph, that I don't know is

part of anything, there isn't any resolution of

inconsistencies or potential disharmony between

the Rules of Civil Procedure and these proposed

administrative rules.

I think we just kind of hide or pretend that there isn't going to be a problem at some point.

So let's resolve that one of them prevails over

the other if there is a conflict.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, I agree, but I think that the language as proposed, clearly shows that it's intended that the administrative rules will be held superior in times of any conflict. My only point is, we ought to bring that out to the committee.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Sam, is it your thought that these Administrative Rules would take precedence over the Rules of Civil Procedure where they are in conflict?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No, that's not my thought, but I think that's what it says.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think that's just the opposite.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I think that's just the opposite; that's why I mentioned it.

MR. MCMAINS: I agree with the observation. First of all, it troubles me that whatever the purpose clause of the rules -- whatever it is, isn't in the rules. It is in our current Rules of Civil Procedure. And it would seem to me that Rule 1 of the Administrative Rules, whether you have a policy rule or not, ought to also have a purpose rule and something

which says which one governs, whether it is the Rules of Civil Procedure in case of conflict or the Administrative Rules in case of conflict.

Because I can see arguments both ways right now that these rules are intended to cover or that the Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to cover when there is any inconsistency.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Let me also say, I think that if there's going to be any sense to these rules, the Administrative Rules are going to govern individual cases as they proceed.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: My specific comment, with respect to the Rule 2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that's related to the previous comments, is that it provides in its opening sentence that these rules, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the procedure in justice, county and district courts of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature.

And at the very least, Rule 2 of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure will need to be amended

in order to take into account the promulgation of

these proposed Administrative Rules.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Or couldn't we simply recommend the insertion of a sentence in

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the purpose clause up here, something to the effect that, in the event of inconsistency, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure will govern?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me ask you, what about this? What about just putting a period after "procedure." "It is intended that these rules be consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, but that doesn't tell you, though, what happens in the event of a conflict.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It would say that you resolve that conflict in a way consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure because that's the intent, is that these be consistent and not inconsistent so that you would look at a consistent resolution.

MR. MCMAINS: But it's still not part of the rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sorry?

mean, it's still just kind of sitting up here; it's not even part of the rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So you would say, "inconsistencies shall be resolved in favor of the

Rules of Civil Procedure?" 1 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No, no. 2 He's 3 saying --4 MR. MCMAINS: No. I'm saying, 5 The first paragraph of the not in a rule. document is not in the rules. 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. 8 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Maybe the way to cure 9 that would be to make the purpose paragraph Rule 1, so that it will be a part of the rules. 10 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. 12 PROFESSOR EDGAR: You see, Rusty's 13 concern is that it's just hanging there, and it 14 really doesn't have any advocacy at all. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That solves that. 16 Does that solve it for you, Rusty? 17 MR. MCMAINS: Well, I mean, that 18 solves the initial question. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now then, we're down 20 to my question, and that is, can we just delete 21 the last part of it after the word "procedure," or 22 do we have to go on and say --23 PROFESSOR EDGAR: That would be okay. MR. MCMAINS: You don't have any 24 25 problems with me on that, but my perception of the Task Force and Justice Hill's position on this, is that the Administrative Rules will control.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that needs to be presented.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, all we do is present our view.

MR. MCMAINS: I understand. I don't disagree with that view, but all I'm saying is that it was my perception that these rules were expected to be more specific in the control of individual docket matters and were anticipated that they would control even if there was a conflict, so that's a fundamental, philosophical difference.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But the Supreme

Court in the '40s said those rules comply, to

contol those Rules of Civil Procedure. If they're

going to change that, they've got to change it.

And we're saying there is a conflict there, and

they haven't told us one way or the other. And if

they're going to change the Rules of Civil

Procedure, they need to make that change. And if

they are not, then they need to make it clear that

Rule 1 still applies in civil cases by deleting

this -- not specifically covered by these rules,

because that's somewhat confusing. What do you do? I mean, we've got two different views on what that means and they are opposite to one another right here.

MR. MCMAINS: That's right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If we delete that, then we're saying that you're resolved. Then maybe we need to say that, specifically, that apparent inconsistencies between the Administrative Rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure will be resolved in favor of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

I don't know whether we need to go that far, but we can take that up, I guess, in the committee, as a whole, and we would add that part.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think that's a real policy, though, decision more so than it's --

MR. MCMAINS: That's a fundamental policy decision.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I don't think these rules make any sense if they're going to be subject to the Rules of Procedure, but I think the Court has answered that recently in that case involving on the Dallas County Local Rules on

Discovery where the --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Are we going to make the purpose clause in Rule 1?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rule 1.

MR. MCMAINS: Aren't you going to suggest it?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I mean, that's my recommendation. Yeah, pardon me.

the difference between local rules and these rules is that the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly say how you do that. The Rules of Civil Procedure control because they can't enact the local rules that are inconsistent, but you got the same courts passing two separate rules.

MR. MCMAINS: In that connection, Mr. Soules, you must understand that if we do a purpose clause that says that when inconsistent in any manner, that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply, you then also have the Rules of Civil Procedure expressed provision for local rules.

Now, so that an argument can then easily be made that a local rule conflicting with the Administrative Rules, which is authorized by the Texas Rules, will then prevail over the

But then

No.

Administrative Rules. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that probably 2 3 needs to be a rule now. JUSTICE WALLACE: It particularly 5 says there are only -- that the Supreme Court Committee to the Supreme Court can approve --6 MR. MCMAINS: That's true. 7 8 JUSTICE WALLACE: -- can take 9 effect --10 MR. MCMAINS: That's true. by now, I assume that most of them have been. 11 12 they haven't been? 13 JUSTICE WALLACE: No, none of them 14 have been. 15 MR. MCMAINS: All right. CHAIRMAN SOULES: We probably need a 16 17 Rule 11 that local rules may not conflict with these rules. I mean, at least we need to put that 18 to the court one way or the other. Is that --19 20 JUSTICE WALLACE: Well --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge, I'm talking 21 about the rule in the Administrative Rules that 22 say that because the Rules of Civil Procedure take 23 24 care of themselves, but the Administrative Rules,

I don't think, take care of themselves. Well, of

course, the Supreme Court has got to approve it.

MR. MCMAINS: The Supreme Court could always, I suppose, say that we're not going to approve these local rules because they conflict with our Administrative Rules, in which case that would eliminate the argument. But what that does is it puts the onus on the Supreme Court of 254 counties trying to create exceptions.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think --

MR. MCMAINS: I'm not sure. I mean, maybe that's fine. Maybe what the Administrative Rules should provide is that unless that there are local rules that are approved in conflict -- because most people's complaint is that a lot of their systems seem to be working fine.

And if that's a vehicle -- if the use of local rules is a vehicle to kind of get around the universal application of these if, in fact, they're functional, I certainly don't have any problem with inviting that and inviting a little bit of experimentation. But maybe the Court might not want to get into the problem of administrating 254 different counties.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Well, I propose that the next step, as soon as we get these next

administrative rules out of the way -- and we had started on it before this came up and they put it on the back burner, is that each administrative judge must approve any local rules, and before he is to approve them, then they are to be as nearly uniform as possible within his district. And then once he has done that, then send it on up for us to go over.

We're just doing everything. The big move is to eliminate so far as possible all these local rules. And what is necessary, then go ahead and put them in the Rules of Civil Procedure and all the those "rinky, dinky, little let's-get-the-out-of-town boy" we'll just do away with it then.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's discuss with the committee as a whole whether we add a Rule 11 that just says local rules shall not conflict with these rules. And maybe that ought to be expressly stated. The Supreme Court might want to say that in these Administrative Rules.

Okay. Look at that second sentence now, Rule

1, what we now call the rule. "In the execution

of these rules, telephone hearings or conferences

in lieu of court appearances are encouraged."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The third sentence.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The third sentence. Do we need that? Why is that in there? Right up there in the front, "Do business by telephone instead of in person."

JUSTICE WALLACE: I don't --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I remember when it was discussed in the committee hearing, and it was simply a vehicle by which matters could be expedited, to try and encourage the use of the telephone conferences rather than having hearings in person in open court.

think, that we may well need to put something like that in our Rules of Civil Procedure somewhere, because it is a fact that our Texas practice of having meetings and sitting in courtrooms when neither a meeting nor a three-hour delay before a meeting takes place is necessary, is probably outmoded and does contribute to delay.

I would suggest that this be considered as either a separate Administrative Rule or a separate Rule of Civil Procedure that would be included, perhaps, in the Rules of Civil Procedure

in the general rules in Part Two relating to practice in district and county courts. It's a good idea but there isn't much here expect a precatory kind of statement.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: How about Rule 21?

MR. MCMAINS: That's actually part of
the Nueces County practice, as we have docket
control conferences all the time that are by
telephone. That's the way our initial docket
control conferences are all a part of, generally,
not always, but, generally, handled, is by
telephone. It works very well.

On the other hand, I, personally, have some concerns to the extent you're talking about telephone conferences on very fundamental decisions, either under the discovery rules or under these rules in terms of the availability of a record, in that, unless these things are recorded through the clerk's office or by the reporter -- you know, if it's on the speaker phone and are reported in chambers or something, because the Rules are very clear that if anybody request that the proceedings be transcribed, they are entitled to it.

And nobody is going to want to be

blind-sighted. Your first telephone call -- you know, maybe you're a virgin, but after that, if something untorrid comes out of your first significant telephone call conference, you scramble around trying to figure out how to file bills of exception and get things done.

I've got no problem with conducting business over the telephone, so long as we can assure a record can come out of that. And the problem with that, being the one of fundamental problem of expense of whether or not recording devices, speaker phones, et cetera, are really and truly available to all the district judges or their court reporters.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Do we want to give priority preference to telephone conferences as opposed to open-court hearings on all the matters that are subject except those that are precluded? Some of them are precluded. You get over to the family law and you can't talk by phone; you got to show, under these rules.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think the language is fine. It just says it's encouraged.

I like the language because there a lot of places that if you had this, a judge down there in Marfa

"No. Come down there." But I don't want to do anymore than encourage it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's prioritize it. It says, "Conferences in lieu of hearings are encouraged."

MR. MCMAINS: But again, that doesn't -- it says it's encouraged, but that's in concert with the expeditious intent of rules. It's certainly nothing required. But my only --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, telephone hearings may be held in lieu of court appearances.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But this, to me, prioritizes the telephone conferences.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I had in mind that this sentence was also directed really at a larger problem. And that is, in lieu of having court appearances, we can dispose of motions or particular matters on a written record with the assistance of the telephone conference, et cetera. We have in this jurisdiction the practice of going to the courthouse to dispose of everything that simply is a gigantic waste of time.

MR. MCMAINS: Because a lot of times your opposition doesn't show up.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And on many

Fridays, I spend three hours in the courthouse to argue something for 20 minutes. That's a pointless exercise. When, quite frankly, I would do much better to have it written down, because I can't anticipate what the counter-argument is.

I understand that in some counties that there are local rules that suggest that matters be dealt with without the necessity of formally appearing in court. I think, for example, venue matters, what's the point of having a venue hearing at this point in time? What's the point, in a lot of instances, of having a court appearance?

Again, I would suggest that we consider such a rule that would encourage the disposition of motions without court appearance when that would facilitate the expeditious handling of the court's business without affecting the judicial process, but that it be included in Section 1 of Part Two of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which concern general rules of practice in district and county courts.

And I think this is merely a beginning point,

and I don't really believe it belongs in the Administrative Rules at all.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's what I'm thinking.

MR. MCMAINS: I agree.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If we are going to prioritize it, I don't think maybe we should. I think we ought to probably set out maybe some different language, and we already have -- you know, I've encountered a practice in Houston that works fine. And that is, if you file a motion, it will be set for submission. If you don't ask for oral submission, it will be heard by the judge on submission day without appearance, and the other side is not expected to be there, and if you come, you should not expect to be heard because you didn't ask to be orally heard.

Now, the problem is that some of the judge's good political friends may show up and argue and you get ex parte. And you got to be damn careful about that because local rules are not tight enough on what if one guy shows. They should be tight enough to preclude him from being able to speak, but that's not the case always.

But if you're a defendant, the same thing, if

you want an oral submission, you have to give notice and it will be set for oral submission. But if neither side asks for oral submission, it is heard on submission day by the Court without oral submission all based on the other pleadings. And there's no problem with that practice, not that I like everything they do in federal courts.

I suppose the Texas practice would favor, if somebody wants one, you give it to him instead of like the federal practice where you're just lucky if you ever get heard.

But I think you're right. I think probably this needs to be in the Rules of Civil Procedure, that telephone conferences may be held in lieu of --

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Maybe it ought to say they are permitted.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: They are permitted in lieu of any hearing required by these rules.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think that's a good suggestion.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, I don't know about any hearing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So long as there's a record.

g. General 1 MR. MCMAINS: Because there are 2 hearings that require testimony. 3 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Let's leave the details of it until later. 4 5 PROFESSOR EDGAR: No, you wouldn't б want that because --

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: We already have it. PROFESSOR EDGAR: -- you might want the -- I can think of a lot of situations where you would really want some type of recording even though there was no testimony because statements were made by counsel that later may be construed as admission and things like this that were really not intended.

MR. MCMAINS: I agree with that. I'm saying, clearly, anything in which there was an evidentiary hearing, you've got --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, we already permit sworn testimony in court by telephone.

> No, I understand that. MR. MCMAINS:

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why exclude it from this if the judge -- we may be on a motion. we can take depositions by telephone right now, and that's admissible into evidence, Summary Judgment evidence, for example.

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MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's right because you've got a court reporter. But you could say that telephone conferences or hearings are permitted --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the court reporter may be on the phone. You just have to have a Notary that swears the witness that can say they are a Notary. The court reporter may be on a different phone and not even present with one of the witnesses.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, that's right. Usually they're in the lawyer's office.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Usually they would be there and they testify.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): But that telephone arrangement, I guarantee you, it doesn't exist in some parts of West Texas.

put that in the early Rules of Civil Procedure permitting things other than open-court hearings and then something that says, if neither party requests an oral hearing, the Judge can hear the motion -- can hear a -- whatever we would describe it. You were worried about the word "motion" before Bill -- but can hear whatever is before him

based on the written pleadings of the parties when the time comes for submission.

Okay. Well, those things we can cover.

Let's go on to 20 unless somebody else really sees something in 1 that we need to address. Rusty, you started to make a statement earlier about how this might conflict with Rules 1 and 2.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, if you have a purpose rule, it -- I mean, you know, it just didn't have a purpose rule. I mean, most people, I would think, would interpret a policy rule would be the same thing as a purpose rule. Once you've relabeled the purpose rule, then that eliminates much of the problem.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Now, we also have a problem there where this is a new rule setting time standards on pending cases. And we have a comment that says it's suppose to govern pending cases as well as new cases.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So we're all of a sudden in the throws of a lot of cases where we're counsel of record.

MR. MCMAINS: Where we're beyond all of these provisions.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Beyond all these provisions. And what kind of soup are we swimming in?

MR. MCMAINS: It seems to me that there has to be a specific rule on any Administrative Rule that tries to set up timetables that has to have in it a new rule, I mean, a specific rule that tells you when you start calculating on cases already pending.

I mean, if you want to say that all cases

pending shall be treated as having been filed on

the date of the enactment of the rules -- I mean,

I'm not suggesting that that's a good idea, but we

need to know.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That may be the best we can get.

MR. MCMAINS: Very specific.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: What would be wrong with that?

taken dockets, taken cases. We have not loaded our own dockets for clients that we represent and with whom we have fiduciary relationships to accommodate these kinds of time standards because those have not been imposed on us in our fiduciary

capacity that is representative of our clients until these rules start.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You would also have to take the problem that somebody may take advantage of it and say, "I now have 270 days," whatever the timeframes are. In other words, "I don't have to go to trial next month."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't think that business litigators have the same degree of problem. I can live with these, certainly, if all my cases are deemed filed on the day these rules become effective, because we tend to handle fewer cases. Or if we do, they're cases that we can -- we've got a lot of collection cases we can somehow automate them on word processors and go over there and have -- we can manage; it may be tight.

But the injuries lawyers who take referrals

-- and I don't know whether Rusty is in that, but
I have a lot of good friends in Houston, and they
take referrals from Angleton and all those towns
down there, and they take the good ones and the
bad ones. Because the lawyers that refer those
cases don't just let you pick and choose. And
they've got some old cases that they took, a lot
of old cases. I don't know what the percentage

is, but say, there's one good 1 in 20, or whatever the number may be, comes out of Lake Jackson.

They took those cases without having to worry about these rules to deal with them as they found time to deal with them, or however. Now, all of a sudden, they've got 300 or 400 plaintiffs' cases of which there are 50 of them they're working on, and they've got to get all of them disposed of posthaste and deal with them in a fuduciary manner. And I think they're going to have some problems if we throw them all together.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that that issue is really outside this subcommittee's purview. It doesn't deal with the conflict, and that's --

MR. MCMAINS: Well, except that I think that what we need to say is that the comment that is in this rule --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Beyond Rule 1.

MR. MCMAINS: -- puts us in a real conundrum with regards to the Texas Rules themselves, because it would appear that just the ordinary rules applied to the Administrative Rules. There's nothing specifically applying. Somehow they have to be reconciled. That's all.

I think that's the only function of our committee, is just to identify that that comment isn't really satisfactory for what happens to the existing caseload.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You put that as item 3 on the agenda?

MR. MCMAINS: Yes.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The things we've gone through.

MR. MCMAINS: This may be beyond the scope of what we're supposed to be doing as well, and I won't dwell on it very much. But any attempt to do this is, well --

I mean, any attempt in the Administrative
Rules to set timeframes, like in Rule 1, puts us
in a worse posture than we ever had been in terms
of the recurring problem now in business, as well
as PI litigation, people going to bankruptcy
court, of bringing in new defendants who file new
motions to transfer, of cases actually physically
getting transferred, maybe after the thing is, you
know, already set for trial. You've already got
all this stuff, and then the case gets
transferred. I mean, this thing has got no
provisions in it for starting times over when it

gets refiled in a new county.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're going to get to that one, though, because we get over to where you've got a lot of bankruptcy dockets; that's back in here, but not transfer dockets. I don't think transfer dockets.

MR. MCMAINS: Where is the bankruptcy stuff?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it's back here a little bit further.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): With the active and passive --

MR. MCMAINS: But anyway, I'm just -CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm not sure it
covers your problem.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes. See, the problem I have, though, is this says, you know, the clock is ticking. And we really don't have, once it's a deficiency, frankly, in our Texas Rules -- because we don't have any provisions with our Texas Rules that dovetail and show you that even though you've got certain time limits to do things, if all of a sudden the Federal Court says, "You can't handle your lawsuit anymore for a while until I let you free from the stay over," there's nothing in the

Texas Rules that says that you get any protection from that.

And that's not just true in the trial rules; that's true in the Appellate Rules. I've had people that have gone into bankruptcy after the appeal is perfected or even after the case is argued. But worse, after it's perfected but before the record is filed or, you know, at times, maybe even before the appeal is perfected in terms of the bond, do you get any extensions of time, I mean, these things are recurring new problems that have not been addressed by our rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, why don't we put in something there about all other civil actions or something about Rule 2 that has to do with interrupted dockets. I don't know what term you want to talk about but --.

MR. MCMAINS: Same thing with removals. I mean, you know, you bring in a new defendant, he removes, and you --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Removal, transfer.

MR. MCMAINS: You fool around in Federal Court for a while. And I'm sure most everybody here has had experience with federal judges not managing to get the case remanded or

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even decided for, you know, 6, 8, 10 or 12, maybe even longer, months.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Rather than using this as a -- I'm making this suggestion that we recommend that, rather than using this comment, what if there was simply a sentence in Rule 2 to the effect that cases pending on the effective date of these rules and cases which are transfer cases -- I'm trying to think of some term to use -- shall be treated as new cases.

Just simply make a statement, because something has to be done about this. This is going to be a genuine problem, and I think that we could help the Court in making an expression of policy here that they be treated as new cases.

MR. SPARKS (El Paso): Does everybody then have 180 additional days on a five-year-old case that somebody doesn't want to try?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's right.

MR. MCMAINS: No, no, no. He's talking now about cases that are set for trial now in less time. He doesn't want to give them any more time when it says that they'll have at least "X" period of time under these rules to do certain things.

If you start saying it's going to be treated as a new case -- the date of the passage of the rules, then all of a sudden he says, "See, this rule that says I've got 180 more days; I don't have to go to trial." He's trying to avoid a disruption of the docket.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I think that that's just simply a policy decision that somebody's going to have to make. What are you going to do about those cases?

MR. MCMAINS: Well, I think that, obviously, any scheduling that has already occurred or any, you know -- these rules should not be intended to have any impact on any case that is on a faster track than is already here.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: These rules would not be a basis for a Motion for Continuance in any case that's set.

MR. MCMAINS: Right.

JUSTICE WALLACE: How do you-all interpret that sentence, that last sentence, starting on the bottom of Page 2 there, on Rule 3, "Nothing in this rule shall be interpreted to prevent a Court in an individual case from issuing an exception order based on the specific finding

that the interest of justice requires who a modification of the routine processes as prescribed."

Would that be broad enough to cover these transfer cases of stay orders of bankruptcy court and things like that?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It should, and that's why it's in there.

JUSTICE WALLACE: We discussed it, and I thought that it covered it.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You know, another related problem --

MR. MCMAINS: It could be. The problem is, what happens if the judge doesn't want to do it?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe you ought to go on what's proposed to be Rule 2 rather than to Rule 3 as applicable to a particular segment of the case.

MR. MCMAINS: For one thing -- of course, I suspect that the reason they didn't want to do that is because they don't want to make all the rules subject to the judge modifying them.

And I don't know.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Another rabbit

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trail that we could talk about, but one that I think is more practical and that is, you go in, you get your orders under these rules, and the 270th day comes by and the case is continued because he can't get it to trial, the judge can't get it to trial, and then the rules just leave you. You've completed discovery. The only phrase we have in there that protects you is further discovery by agreement or good cause shown with a court order. But the rules just leave it.

The rules are theoretically resolved, in that 270 days away you're going to get a trial date, and that's, of course, the biggest problem that I see that these judges are going to have with them. But that's not a conflict with the Rules of Procedure, but that's another area.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's go to what was Rule 2.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's Rule 3

MR. MCMAINS: There is just a task of the Administrative Judge. I'm sure there's a bunch of judges that aren't going to like that.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): County

Commissioners and clerks are going to dislike it

more.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Does that conflict
-- let's look at Rule 165A for just a minute.

MR. DORSANEO: I don't think Rule 2 conflicts anything, does it?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Rule 246, "The clerk shall keep a record in his office of all cases set for trial, and it shall be his duty to inform any non-resident attorney of the date of settings upon request by mail accompanied by return mail.

Failure of the clerk to furnish such information shall be a proper ground for continuance." Is there any conflict between that rule and this Rule?

MR. MCMAINS: This is just a reporting of Rule 2.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Okay. All right. I just wanted to make sure of that. Yes, but I think it might affect us somewhere down the line.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So I suggest we go to 3.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Go all the way just skip through 2 because it's reporting and go to 3, "Control of the flow of non-probate civil cases."

MR. MCMAINS: Okay. The initial problem, I think, that was noted by Bill is that we don't really have an adequate definition or instruction on what a non-probate case is. That is a term undefined in these rules.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): And you think you know exactly what it is until you try to define it.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Most of the ones that are not defined have that problem inherently. In specific things, though, in terms of -- if I can just jump in, things that conflict or relate to matters in the Rules of Civil Procedure, I note, basically, the following:

In Paragraph C of Proposed Administrative
Rule 3, the term "initial pleading" is more than
merely an undefined term. It is a troublesome
term because we do have a system that has terms in
it in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under Rule 45 of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure our pleading system is by petition and answer. Those are not, in Texas, merely labels for things.

Everything the defendant files is technically an answer and everything the plaintiff files is

technically a petition. The remaining rules, for example, Rule 78 and 45, define petition and answer in more refined terms. And I do not think it would be advisable to insert a new word, "initial pleading," that is not defined anywhere because it will impair the integrity of our Texas system and the definitional scheme contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

I would suggest that we use the terms used in the Rules of Civil Procedure. If we're talking about a defendant, we're talking about an answer; that's what defendants file. And everything that they file is considered to be an answer, although, I would recognize that there is some problem that people have with something that's a motion being thought of as an answer.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Is it technically an answer, Your Honor?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think technically it is.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, Rule 84 excepts special appearances, motions to transfer venue from the answer.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, it doesn't.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It says it may be

excepted therefrom, 84.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But that's just excepted from the order. Rule 84 indicates what the defendant may put in his answer, and it indicates that the Court shall dispose of these matters in the order that the Court wants to, except that the Court cannot decide to consider a special appearance or a motion to transfer venue out of order. That's the way I read it.

Now, maybe we would have some -- instead of saying "answer in lieu of initial pleading" in 3C of the proposed Administrative Rules, we'd say "answer or motion -- first motion."

CHAIRMAN SQULES: Can a party appear, other than by the filing of the pleading, and be held to an appearance?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Yes, if you just show up in person.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: When you appear in open court.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Special appearances is about the only thing, and if it's sustained, then it's over with. Then if it's not sustained,

1 then he's assumed to have answered 20 days 2 afterwards. 3 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Motion to Quash 4 is the same. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe making an 5 6 appearance would be the appropriate thing to use. 7 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): But you don't 8 make an appearance for the special --9 PROFESSOR EDGAR: What if you just say 10 "a general appearance?" 11 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Or "special" if 12 you need discovery. 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, but that's one 14 thing I had a -- and this goes back to what Bill 15 was saying a minute ago. What if you file a 16 special appearance? Is that embraced within the 17 term "initial pleading" here? That's the 18 question, you see. 19 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes. CHAIRMAN SOULES: W're talking about 20 21 all these kinds of pleadings. 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I just 23 point out --24 PROFESSOR EDGAR: And when we mean 25 general appearance, within 30 days after a general appearance by the last defendant to appear, is that what we mean?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): We have a

general appearance concept.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Every appearance is a general appearance if it's not a special appearance.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, but does it say that?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The reason I put "general" there is because if you just say "appearance," then the question would be, do you mean a "special appearance" as well as a "general appearance," and that's why it just seems to me that we should just say "a general appearance."

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think that's a good suggestion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The party that shows up for a temporary injunction hearing, without ever having filed a pleading, makes a general appearance just by showing up in open court?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Subjects himself to the general jurisdiction of the court.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: And what if he wants 1 to file a special appearance? 2 3 PROFESSOR EDGAR: He better file a special appearance. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Before he shows up 6 in open court? PROFESSOR EDGAR: You'd better believe 8 it. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Before he opens his 10 mouth. 11 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Before he says a 12 word. 13 MR. MCMAINS: In response to the show 14 Cause order, I'm not certain that he has waived a 15 general appearance. MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I'm not either, 16 17 but I sure file them. 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm not either, 19 but if we go through on this proposed 20 Administrative Rule 3C, I see the term "initial 21 pleading" as being an unsatisfactory term and one 22 that conflicts with at least Texas Rules of Civil 23 Procedure 45, 78, 84, 85, and 120A. 24 MR. MCMAINS: Well, I have another

problem with that sentence, too, because -- in two

1 respects. First, it says "the last defendant --2 the initial pleading of the last defendant." PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Who is the last 3 4 one? 5 MR. MCMAINS: Well, it says "the last 6 defendant to appear." 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: He may not have 8 appeared yet. 9 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's the way 10 we do it. 11 MR. MCMAINS: Well, one of the 12 problems that I have is that --

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): A way around it; we've got it.

MR. MCMAINS: Okay. Wait a minute. As a co-defendant, you don't know what time the other defendant has -- I mean, he doesn't know who to send it to, to send his answer to, if you're filing answers in the same thing. You file answers to the plaintiff. I mean, the defendants don't know what their times are. They don't know when anybody respectfully got served initially, and they don't get told by the Court, the Court doesn't ever communicate with them about, you know, that an answer has been filed by anybody.

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2 the only defendant or all the defendants until you 3 go over there and check. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: You're supposed to 5 get served. MR. MCMAINS: But not necessarily by 6 7 the -- when I mean, the plaintiff serves you, he 8 doesn't tell you who the -- at the same time, if he serves five defendants --9 10 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Luke is right. 11 MR. MCMAINS: -- you don't know who 12 those other defendants are. CHAIRMAN SOULES: It should be in the 13 petition. 14 15 MR. MCMAINS: Yes, but you don't have 16 to serve them. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think you do under 18 I never thought about it until you just rules. 19 said it, but you now have to serve answers. 20 MR. MCMAINS: I don't disagree that you're supposed to serve them, but what I'm saying 21 22 is, it doesn't always happen. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It doesn't happen, 24 that's true, a lot of times. 25 MR. MCMAINS: Because all they know is

You don't know whether you're the first defendant,

who the parties are to serve. All right. And what is a co-defendant who may actually be served by a defendant's answer before he gets served by the petition? He's sitting there not knowing what the hell that -- you know, what does this have to do with me? This is an answer by somebody that hasn't sued me and what do I with that?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think that Hadley's suggestion that 30 days after the filing of the general appearance --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: No, within 30 days after the general appearance of the last -- CHAIRMAN SOULES: The general

appearance -- now then, we're worried about the last --

MR. MCMAINS: General appearance of a

PROFESSOR EDGAR: By the --

MR. MCMAINS: That's the other thing, is who's the defendant? What's the third party defendant?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I was going to ask that myself. They claim in the task force -- the drafters claim that that term clearly indicated the third-party defendant, and then

there was a tremendous argument thereafter that kind of lead some doubts on that statement.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why does it have to be that anyway? Why can't it be the last party to appear. Suppose there's an intervenor. there's a new --

MR. MCMAINS: I don't disagree with that at all. I'm just saying that we don't know what this is.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why shouldn't it be the last filing within 30 days after the general appearance by the last party to appear? I still realize that has a problem "to appear," "the last to appear."

MR. MCMAINS: All I'm saying is there is a considerable lack of definition here as I think what we are getting at, and they don't really comport with our rules of practice, if not the rules of procedure.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I'm not supporting the premise, but the argument by Dean Friessen in this case was that he wanted the time frame to run from answer date of the original defendant's suit, whether it be one defendant or five defendants, and that the time frame then had

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to go at that point.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's not even what this says, though.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No.

"the last defendant to appear." It could be an after added defendant.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I understand that that was changed.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It's very sloppy because the last defendant to appear in this -- suppose the defendant doesn't appear on time but appears long after there's been a default and they have filed a motion for new trial having now the default is set aside. That's not necessarily a short time, the last defendant to appear. It could appear --

MR. MCMAINS: It's a question of what you're appearing to.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, if he doesn't appear, of course, I guess he'd be severed and take a default judgment against him.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: They're not even meant to be severed in order to make it a default judgment filed; it's not meant to happen.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You know, I asked this question on one of the Saturdays and nobody -- Friessen didn't seem to answer it. Of course, he had his hands full answering some other things.

What happens seven months into a case and the plaintiff sues an additional defendant, does the process start over again? I never could find the solution in these rules for that. Do you then -- and his idea at that time was, "yes, you then have to propose a new plan," but that didn't ring.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I suggest we leave this thing because we could talk about it as an item and go on to other conflicts.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's at least talk about -- do we want to put in "within 30 days after the general appearance by the last party to appear." Do we want to suggest at least those two?

MR. MCMAINS: Not "last party."

Because as you -- well, unless you want to do what you were saying.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: By the last original defendant.

MR. MCMAINS: Because if you got a

subrogation case and the intervenor appears 12 months down the road

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Doesn't he have the right for some time to get ready for trial?

MR. MCMAINS: Well, I'm not agreeing with that, but if the idea of this is that you're moving on down the way, you don't want -- you're moving on down the road, you don't want to be putting everything off automatically until the intervenor or somebody else appears.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I think you got a better chance of justice if it says "the last party," because the judge can always strike and sever and separately try parties and say, *Okay. We were interrupted but now we're going to get back on track, and I'm not going to give you much time."

MR. MCMAINS: Luke, I don't disagree with the philosophy of that, and I'm not going to prejudice the judge here. He's got a pending case in front of the Court right now in which the argument is being made that you got to have everybody in sight in the lawsuit before you can even try the lawsuit.

> PROFESSOR DORSANEO: All this talks

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about -- it does not talk about that. It just talks about, the parties may, without waiver, file a proposed plan for completion and it was 21 days after.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, except for 4. It says, "after the time period for responding to the proposed plan has as elapsed, the Court shall enter its order."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It says we'll do it now.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, you know we're sitting there --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: With all that so prefaced on A, though, that nothing in this rule shall be interpreted to prevent the Court in an individual case from issuing an exception based on a specific finding that the interest of justice requires a modification.

MR. MCMAINS: Okay, now, I don't disagree with that either, except that again, the problem you have there is because the fast track E doesn't refer to A.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, wait a minute. We're just not reading. You talk defendant -- look at C-3. It says additional

parties are joined after the order, then they have 21 days to request a proposal.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes. It says "such additional parties," but it doesn't say the party joining has any time. That's what I mean.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, but why should he?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): He may need a deposition.

MR. MCMAINS: Because how many times

PROFESSOR EDGAR: But he made that decision, though.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, because the plaintiff, in so many cases, has sued a party which decides to change its organizational structure, or has decided, from the time that the cause of action arose until the time that you have filed the suit, and/or decides to identify that, "I'm not really the defendant who sold the product; it's Y defendant." And you're trying to bring in parties who are potentially responsible.

Now, we do our best to do that. The good lawyers I think do their best to do that the first time that they are out of box. But sometimes you

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can't do it any other way than filing suit and getting the information.

And when you limit the ability to change a plan on the scheduling of trial to the party brought in, it is to the great disadvantage of the party initiating the suit. You didn't know the party existed until then.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: You suggest then that any party may propose a change?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Right. That's an easy change.

MR. MCMAINS: Any party or any affected party but it seems to me that any party should be able to because, you know, a co-defendant may decide that he needs some more discovery.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let me just say, I think it conflicts with Rule 38, and that's just a specific statement. I think the first sentence conflicts with Rule 38.

It says I can join a third party within 30 days without any leave. Now that I've made that person a party and didn't require leave, he is a party; he's not a defendant; he's a third-party defendant.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So I think it ought to be "the last party to appear." Now, somebody who isn't a party, isn't a party to appear; he isn't a party for anything. So if you use the word "party," we're just talking about parties, that is, people who have been named in the suit by somebody else or chose to come in as intervenors. But the minute they come in, they are a party at that juncture. But whatever may be their status as a party, we don't start this until everybody who is a party has appeared, generally.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You know, I've sued some awful young children as involuntary plaintiffs before.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That would help try to resolve maybe some of those complex things that trial judges are going to have to look at.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right. You would say, C then, "within 30 days after the" -- after what now?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Within 30 days after the general appearance or a general appearance.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Of the "last party to appear."

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. I'm not saying I like the language necessarily, but the concept is there.

MR. MCMAINS: Do you want to say "the party that last appeared?"

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The last party to appear.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Of course, then when do you decide that no more parties are going to be made?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm going on the premise that he's not a party until he's a party to the lawsuit.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I understand.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Somebody who is out there in the world is not a party, and you have the last party to appear when everybody that's named in the lawsuit is present. Somebody may come in later, so you get sued. And then they become a new party and then you get into this additional party aspect of it but that does not address what Rusty's problem is.

Now, do we all get to start over, at least, as to the new party? And I just hadn't gotten there with you; I was dragging behind, Rusty. No

1 I'm with you, finally. 2 PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right. So then within 30 days after the general appearance of the 3 4 last party to appear, is that what you're saying? 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir, or a 6 general appearance. 7 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, it would be 8 the general appearance of the last party. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: To appear, yes. 10 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I'm still 11 dragging. I have not reached Rusty, but then I 12 never have. 13 MR. MCMAINS: Well, if my discovery 14 order resumed tomorrow and I joined you --15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sir? 16 MR. MCMAINS: If my discovery order 17 with everybody else's is over tomorrow, my 18 original one, and I joined you today, you've got a 19 right to change the plan, but I don't under these 20 rules. 21 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No, no. 22 don't even have a right. I have a right to

propose it.

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MR. MCMAINS: Well, that's right.

You've got a right to propose it. Now, why would

Then on

That has

1 you propose it if I didn't have any discovery? MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): But on C here, 2 3 I went along with your change there. Any party 4 should have that right. 5 MR. MCMAINS: That's what I mean. MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I'm not so sure 6 7 that the initial running shouldn't be 8 defendant's. 9 MR. MCMAINS: Oh, I don't --PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right. 10 11 C-3, you would recommend, Rusty, that it would 12 just say then "any party"? MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes. 13 to be C-3. 14 15 PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right, then any 16 party. 17 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's Luke's party up in the first sentence of C that I'm 18 19 afraid should be defendant. I just think you 20 don't really know what that's going to be. But 21 it's interpreted like you're thinking; that's 22 right. But "any party" is a lot of things. 23 I think if you put it that way, Luke, every time you add a new party, you have, as a matter of 24

right, 21 more days to propose a new order,

whereas under C-3, if you add a new party, you can request it but the Court controls it. So it's not a matter of right; it's more of the management of the presiding judge.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's get that all on the table.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: One last comment: Whatever anybody decides the time table is going to be for starting and restarting the clock, someone with familiarity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure needs to write that in the same language used in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, by speaking in terms of petitions, answers and motions, and not in some other undefined way. Otherwise, we're going to create conflicts that the courts are going to have to resolve and a lot of trouble on this very important matter.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where do you see the --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Specifically, what part --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I'm not getting into the details of it, whether it should be defendant or party, but the term "initial

pleading" is an unsatisfactory term. If it's going to be last party to appear, then we need to talk about petition or the answer --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: We change that to read "general appearance."

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, yes, that would be fine assuming that this all stays the way it is. As I understood, our charge was to point out the conflicts. And I'm not sure it's going to come out this way.

MR. MCMAINS: I will make one other observation in terms of the change that you made to the appearance of the last party. Is that what you --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: General appearance of the last party.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, you know, suppose that I find out about a -- I've got a wrongful death claim, and I find out about a father, that I didn't know about, of my decedent, and I add it.

Does it start all the times over again? He appears for the first time in my amended petition.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: No. It simply means that any party may then propose a change in the schedule.

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1 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): But you see, 2 then you've fallen into the trap, and that's why 3 defendant probably should be right on the first 4 paragraph. It should read, I think, "Within 30 5 days after filing of the general appearance of the б last defendant to appear and thereafter any 7 additional parties, everybody has the option of 8 requesting a change in the discovery." 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: So you're saying 10 third parties should be controlled by C-2 to C-3? MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): C-3, yes. 11 And 12 Rusty's change is an excellent one. Anybody 13 should have the right to propose it, not just the 14 ones who --15 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And intervenors 16 or plaintiffs that try to come in later are just 17 good luck. 18 MR. MCMAINS: Well, there are people 19 who can propose a change, propose the order under 20 3. 21

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Sure.

- PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't know --"that are joined." I don't know what that means. Does that mean "who joined."

> MR. MCMAINS: That's a good point. Ιf

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1 you're going to have "appearance" up there, 2 wouldn't you want to say, "in the event additional 3 parties appear or are joined"? 4 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'd say, in the 5 event additional persons become parties. CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: In the event 8 additional persons become parties after the order 9 is scheduled. That would be consistent with 10 everybody; somebody intervening, your additional 11 father, in effect, intervening because of hiring 12 the same lawyer. 13 MR. MCMAINS: You could hire a 14 different lawyer to intervene. 15 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Couldn't you 16 just say, "in the event of additional parties 17 after the order of discovery"? 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: What's wrong with 19 the language that I suggested? 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Persons" is 21 bothering me. 22 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Why? "Persons" 23 is defined in --24 JUSTICE WALLACE: It's a 25 corporation --

1	MR. MCMAINS: It's defined in the
2	rules, yes.
3	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Is this going to
4	be subject to the Code Construction Act?
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We haven't said that
6	yet.
7	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: If it is, then I
8	can tell you, there's a definition in there that
9	is very comprehensive.
10	JUSTICE WALLACE: That would include
11	corporations and partnerships and even estates.
12	MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Associations.
13	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And anybody you
14	can think of.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: In the event
16	additional parties "join" or "are joined"?
17	MR. MCMAINS: No, "appear." I mean,
18	I'm not sure that are you saying "join or are
19	joined"?
20	MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I like the word
21	"appear." It just seems like they just all of a
22	sudden
23	MR. MCMAINS: Appear or materialize.
2 4	PROFESSOR DORSANEO: At any rate, we
25	want do include "intervenors" in C-2.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: C-3.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I mean, C-3, include intervenor or make sure they're covered.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Intervenors or third-party defendants?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): They're all parties. I don't know why you couldn't just say, "in the event of additional parties after the order for the schedule of the completion of discovery and preparation of trial has been entered, then any party may within 20" --

MR. MCMAINS: You say, "additional parties" or people who are added?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No. I skipped it all just by saying, "in the event of additional parties after."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think what Rusty said, though, "in the event of additional parties appear." The more I think about it, I don't see any real problem with it.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Now, 97-F of the Rules of Civil Procedure says "Persons, other than those made parties in the original action, may be made parties, et cetera. " So I never understood that anybody can make the argument that

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corporations are not persons.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, since the TBCA says they're persons.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The TBCA takes care of it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "In the event additional persons become parties," is that what you're saying there? "After"?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I don't see anything wrong with that language, in the event additional persons become parties after."

MR. MCMAINS: It probably reads better.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes.

MR. MCMAINS: You prefer to prepositional phrases, I notice.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's true, I But I just know some judges that aren't going to say, "Well, that just says person; that doesn't mean corporation."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: "In the event any such additional party may" -- okay. Now, go back up to the C, though, "Within 30 days after the general appearance of the last defendant." we decided to go back to that or are we going to

say the last time?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think "defendant" is right. But I don't know which defendant is the last defendant. I don't know if that's a new defendant or a third defendant.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Now, what about the definition of non-probate civil cases, though?

Should we deal with that? Should we try and talk about non-probate civil cases?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: You mean, what does it mean?

MR. MCMAINS: I thought we just kind of left it open, the fact that it's an undefined term.

JUSTICE WALLACE: It's not criminal and it's not probate in discovery so I guess that's the only way to look at it.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Or family.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Bill, did you say defendant has a meaning --

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think we ought to leave that alone. We could talk about it forever.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't think -that's a lawyer professor's refinement. I think

technically under Federal and Texas Rules, a third-party defendant is different from --

"last original defendant"?

MR. MCMAINS: Well, the only problem with that is, if by "original defendant," you mean defendant to the original petitioner, if that's what you were going to say.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Why don't you say

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's the only way it makes sense.

MR. MCMAINS: I mean, because it's frequent that we would file an amended pleading almost overnight when somebody comes in and says, "That's not us; who you want to sue is "X."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well then, why don't you say, "The appearance of last defendant, excluding third-party defendants, to appear"?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's not the problem I have. Where I'm coming from is that six months into the case, you amend and add defendants. Plaintiff amends and adds defendants. See, I don't think it speaks to that eventuality.

I think we are talking about original

defendants, like you were using Hadley. In other words, the first group that really gets pulled together, whether they do it in the amended in the original or amended petition. But I don't know how to define that group of people or persons. Maybe just use "defendant"; see how it works out.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Quite frankly, our Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that don't take any of these matters into account are not time conscious. We allow amendments, free amendments, forever. We don't require a leave of court. There's not a division between permissive intervention and intervention as of right. We are just not concerned with time in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Just --

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, we're going to change that.

(Recess - lunch.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We have identified here that Rule 3-C and D contain conflicts with Rule 166 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly, Rule 3-C4, that conflicts with Rule

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166-G. Also, back over on Page 5 under Rule 3-E. Too, we've identified that the 45-day provision conflicts with the 30-day provision concerning experts and other discovery under Rule 166-B.

Now, those specifics have been identified.

And the general discussion has been that the discovery track under Rule 3 is inconsistent with Rule 166-B of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and other rules that pertain to discovery and that those need a lot of attention in order to get them in harmony, whichever changes.

MR. MCMAINS: They are also inconsistent with the amendment rules, in terms of your time limits on how late you can amend.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right, with the name of the pleadings.

MR. MCMAINS: Right. Same thing with regards to, you know, the discovery time frames, in the entire discovery rules, really aren't geared to tell you that you have so much time and you get to respond and so on. And if the request is made within the time that your discovery is due before the time, there is nothing, of course, in these rules showing you how you get that done or coordinated.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just as a matter of fact, discovery is cut off by the Administrative Rules under this scheme before the parties have a duty to supplement under the Rules of Civil Procedure, so new information would be coming out

deliberately or otherwise.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): But that's not necessarily true because the rule -- I agree that there is conflict, but the rule -- the order entered by the Court should require the parties to exchange that information by a certain date. So in that sense, any order on the discovery and the management of the trial supercede one Rule 166-B.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rule 166-B5 allows you to get right up against 30 days prior to trial before you have to supplement when you know information was wrong when it was given.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes, but if you have an order that says interrogatories should be supplemented 90 days before trial, and particularly in light of this Dallas case that has had, what, 60 days, wasn't it, in the local rule in Dallas, 60 days? And they excluded an expert witness which was upheld. And maybe, that's -- was that you-all's case or the Court of Appeals in

Dallas?

JUSTICE WALLACE: I think it was the Court of Appeals.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It must not have been your court. But in any event, if it's covered in the order entered by the judge in the management of this particular case, the question is, does that supercede the conflict in the Rules of Civil Procedure?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But, Sam, I guess the point that Rusty was making earlier is that Rule 3-E2 says discovery is to be completed 45 days before the date it's set for trial, and you don't have to have an order.

MR. MCMAINS: Right, that's right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It says the final limits shall take affect.

MR. MCMAINS: That's right. The fast track is definitely inconsistent with current rules.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): They're definitely in conflict, that's right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: They have to be harmonized. Okay, 3-E contra to 166-B. And what's the pleading rule, Rusty? Do you got that

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reference in your mind?

MR. MCMAINS: Anybody figured out what this does to trial amendments?

(Off the record discussion (ensued.

MR. MCMAINS: Rule 63 says parties may amend their pleadings, file suggestions of death, et cetera, at such time so as not to operate surprise provided that any amendment offered within seven days or thereafter, as may be ordered by the judge under Rule 166, shall be filed only after leave of the judges is obtained.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: What rule is that, Rusty?

MR. MCMAINS: Rule 63.

Rule 4 which is now 5. That reference was to Rule 63 and the fact that the provisions of 3-E and other provisions of Rule 3 also conflict with Rule 63 governing amendments and pleadings.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Are you going to skip H?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes. But what about

1 motions for continuance now?

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay, H?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes.

(ensued.

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(Off the record discussion

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think that by certified mail is about as insulting as something could get. I mean, it really does rub my fur that I can't certify to a judge that I've mailed something to my client and be believed.

It says a copy mailed, a copy of the contingency. If they want to do that, that's fine, but to charge officers of the court by sending it by certified to their own clients is an affront.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I think that's the same commentary on the manner in which some lawyers practice law. And I think this is necessary simply because some lawyers won't do what they have stated to the Court that they have done.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: When caught, they can be disbarred.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, the problem is
that they are not disbarred. They're not even
reprimanded in many instances, and this is just an
affront to everybody because of the quality of
lawyers that appear before the courts.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Some lawyers.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I mean, some lawyers, that's right. And everybody, I think, is -- and I think you can justify the way we do it but I think that's just the way it is.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it may be the way it is, but I don't think we should be required by rule to prove to the Court that we did something that we tell the Court we did until a question arises.

(Off the record discussion (ensued.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does it conflict with the motion for continuance rule?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think that
motions for continuance, as Pat Beard said, ought
to be put in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. I
think that there are a lot of formal requirements
in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that are

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probably directed at the same kind of problem that Professor Edgar was talking about and I would suggest that the entire matter of continuances be dealt with.

I agree with you, Luke, that imposing a lot of technical, specific requirements on lawyers as a basis for precluding them for arguing that the motion for continuance denial was an abuse of discretion is something that I always found to be offensive.

Why should we be treated differently from other witnesses or persons when presenting information to the Court? And why should there be a presumption that we don't tell the truth? And I find that that is a peculiar way to deal with the profession.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It's a sad commentary.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm not treated that way in the courts and I don't want to be treated that way in this rule. If I am, I am; but I don't want to be.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It's one thing to have the motion say that the thing has been presented to the client, et cetera, et cetera.

It's another thing -- I mean why shouldn't I have to get a letter from the client or have the client sign it, or have the client sign it within the presence of another lawyer who has advised the client what prejudice there might be.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What does certified mail do for you? It doesn't say "return receipt requested." You don't have to go to court with a green card. Well, I think that if these requirements are going to affect the validity of the motion and have to do with the review of the motion, that they certainly ought to be in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I've got a question. Rule 251 --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And some reference could be made here about continuances.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I don't think

I've read it before. But does that read that if
the parties consent, continuance is automatically
granted?

MR. MCMAINS: I have taken that position before and was overruled. But the continuance rule, as it has existed throughout the

1 history of Texas practice, has assumed that if the 2 parties agreed, that there was no discretion in 3 the trial judge to do otherwise. 4 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's the way 5 I read it. 6 The most recent movement MR. MCMAINS: 7 in the area, however, would by the cases appear to 8 have limited that to where the Court has some 9 independent interest in the management of its 10 docket, and if it finds that it would be 11 disruptive to its docket, then that affirmed. 12 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: In some cases it 13 suggests that that rule lets there be one of 14 these. 15 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): And that's 16 correct. But in any event, there's a conflict 17 between Rule 251, as written, and 4-H. 18 MR. MCMAINS: There is a conflict also 19 between 254. 20 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's -21 legislative. 22 MR. MCMAINS: No, not 254, not 252 23 which is the application, which is actually much 24 more specific in many respects as Bill notes.

When you get right down to the crux of these

entire rules, by and large, at least in Rule 3, it is going to depend on where you put and what the limitations are in the continuance. Well, there isn't anything else going to work if you just give —— I mean, if the cart blanche decision is, issue continuance rests in the discretion of the trial judges, then there isn't anything in these rules that's going to change anything, in my opinion, which, I guess, is where you get down to the bottom line.

I don't have near as much trouble getting trial settings as I do a trial. I get trial settings almost everywhere without too much problem, but getting to the courthouse is another story. And I'm not sure these rules are going to help that.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Also, Rule 254 makes a legislative continuance mandatory, and this makes it discretionary.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The only answer we found to that in San Antonio is to discharge, at the will of the voters, the abusers, and they did.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I know, but I'm just saying there's a conflict here between this. This makes it discretionary; Rule 254 makes it

mandatory.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sure.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Something has to give there.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It has to give. And it's not going to be discretionary, because those guys over there got the reigns on that.

MR. MCMAINS: There's another question here in terms of definitions in this entire section when we are talking being set for trial because -- and I'm in situations now where a judge says, "Well, for all purposes of any other court, you are in trial. Now, you go home and I'll call you whenever we're ready."

Now, I don't know what this means when we're talking about, you know, it's got to be set for trial within 270 days. Does that mean that that's supposed to be the first day of trial?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No. That was the original proposal, Rusty, and that was our big fuss in the Task Force, was a cut-off date is initiated by the initial pleadings. And so we reversed the order saying the only thing that moves cases are trial settings.

So in these cases which are to be managed,

then you ought to be working off the trial setting, much like the Colorado system, which, you know, when you answer, you get a trial date, and you make it unless you die. And they used to be a year; now they're about 16 months. But the point is, you're supposed to have a trial setting which is the strength of the rule if it's enforced. The weakness of the rule is, I don't know how in the world they're going to do it.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes. The question I have, though, is, I get a trial setting, for instance, on the Nueces County practice, but the only trial setting I can get in less than a year is a number 6.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I don't know how they are now operated.

MR. MCMAINS: There aren't but 365
days in the year, you know, so a given court can't
give you more than 365 settings if he thought he
was going to try us all in one day, if you're
talking about a number one. Now if you're talking
about a week, you're talking about, roughly, what,
48 trial weeks probably, at the most, that you
have in a given year. You know, I would be
delighted to crown most of the trial judges who

try 48 trials, at least in the jury fashion, if you try 48 jury trials in a year.

And you cannot physically keep the trial setting the first time around if every one of those cases goes to trial. You have to, obviously, depend on some of them being disposed of and some are. But it's very seldom that any of our cases set below number 4 -- I mean, above number 4 go to trial; very rare. And if all of this relates to that and your trial setting moves another year or another -- I mean, what happens on the second trial setting, I guess, I'm saying?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Of course, my problem is, how do you get the second trial setting if it's not covered by the --

MR. MCMAINS: Yes, well, that's what I mean. What I'm saying is, this all assumes that you get to go to trial when it's set for trial. And that's an assumption that is simply insupportable as a physical fact, especially if you apply these rules to existing cases.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Absolutely.

MR. MCMAINS: Now, if you don't apply them to existing cases, then you're giving preference to the new cases, and that doesn't make

1 any sense.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Unless you run in tandem with the new cases, something like that San Antonio operation.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, even so, though, you still priortize the new cases if you follow this, if you say every other week will be a new case.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, let's

go to the family law. I'm sure we are going to
have new observations from others as we go through
these in the committee as a whole.

MR. MCMAINS: Don't these rules on the setting for trial, all up to what I was getting at back on the conflicts, conflict with our current -- there are some current rules on setting of cases.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Only the precedence in which cases ought to be tried.

MR. MCMAINS: Now there are rules on notice of trial settings.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 245 needs to be dealt with.

MR. MCMAINS: Assignment of Cases For Trial, "may set contested cases on motion of any

party or on the court's own motion with reasonable notice of not less than 10 days."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Rule 245.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Which, of course, has been a problem, is a current problem.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anybody got anything on this family law that's different from the problem we've identified before.

MR. MCMAINS: I'm interested in what -- this says, "control of the flow of divorce cases." Does that define divorce cases to include child custody or other matters relating to that, child support?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Ask Harry. was involved in that. Rule 4, on the flow of divorce cases; was that intended to cover just divorces or --

MR. TINDALL: It's not defined.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I know. What was the intent, though? I know it's not defined; that's the problem.

MR. TINDALL: I think, truthfully, the way it's written, it's designed to cover the traditional divorce case and not include the child custody case or the modification of support and

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visitation, establishment of support, paternity, 1 2 obstensibly, but it's not clear. 3 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): If you look on Page 7, it sets out what the disposition proposal 4 5 is supposed to include. 6 MR. MCMAINS: It's got child support 7 orders. 8 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's got 9 orders. 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There tends to be 11 confusion. If you look back at Rule 1, that uses 12 the term "domestic actions." 13 MR. TINDALL: The term, generically, 14 should be family law matter just for style 15 purposes, but you can break them out. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Rule 4 uses the 16 17 parenthetical "family," which I suppose means 18 something other than -- and broader than the term 19 "divorce;" otherwise, it's pretty ridiculous. 20 MR. TINDALL: Sure. 21 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, what's the 22 proper term to use here then? What would be the 23 proper descriptive term instead of "divorce"? 24 MR. TINDALL: On those points, on Rule

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1, instead of saying "domestic," that's a word

1 that's very archaic anymore. I'm not trying to go back. It ought to be "family law actions." And 2 3 then you could pick up on Rule 4 and say "the 4 control of family law cases." 5 PROFESSOR EDGAR: "The control of the flow of" --6 7 MR. TINDALL: "The control of the flow 8 of family law cases shall be subject to the 9 following." 10 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So that would be 11 a change in both Rule 1 and Rule 4. 12 MR. TINDALL: Rule 4, just purge the 13 term "domestic" or the term "divorce. " And while 14 you're on that, there are some other terms that 15 you might purge from this, too. On the bottom of 16 page -- are you on the 37 revision; is that 17 right? 18 PROFESSOR EDGAR: We're looking at our 19 big book, the big book. Rule what? 20 MR. TINDALL: It should be 4-B3. Ιt 21 should be "a conservatorship order," not "child 22 custody." -23 PROFESSOR EDGAR: It's C-3. A 24 proposed conservatorship order?

1	MR. TINDALL: Conservatorship order.
2	I believe those are the style changes required.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Would that be every
4	place that that appears, like also in 2?
5	MR. TINDALL: I didn't catch it in 2.
6	If it's in 2, it should be obviously
7	PROFESSOR EDGAR: A proposed child
8	support order there.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No child support
10	order?
11	MR. TINDALL: Child suppport is fine.
12	It should be conservatorship.
13	PROFESSOR EDGAR: Instead of child
14	custody.
15	MR. TINDALL: That's right.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
17	MR. MCMAINS: Not being a family law
18	practitioner, can you still oppose a divorce?
19	MR. TINDALL: No. There's one case
20	that says if you want a divorce and your wife
21	doesn't, that proves right there that they are
22	insupportable.
23	MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): We've had two
24	trials in El Paso.
25	PROFESSOR EDGAR: But you get them on

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1 whether or not you can reach separate property or 2 something in the event of infidelity or 3 something. MR. TINDALL: You can't touch separate 4 5 property. 6 PROFESSOR EDGAR: You can invade the 7 share of your -- you can get a disproportionate share of the community estate. 8 9 MR. TINDALL: Based on fault. PROFESSOR EDGAR: Shares on fault. 10 11 And so then you have the right to a jury trial on 12 that. 13 MR. MCMAINS: You're saying the trial 14 15 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): One was a 16 lawyer and it didn't take the jury long to rule. 17 MR. TINDALL: That's right. You're 18 entitled to a finding of fact on whether their 19 marriage is insupportable. 20 MR. MCMAINS: Suppose there is a 21 finding that it is not insupportable. 22 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You can't get 23 it. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You can't get a

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divorce. An example is the husband who decides

that he wants to go out with younger women, and his wife says that, "He's not insupportable; he's just fooling around. You know, he'll get over it."

MR. MCMAINS: Well, the only reason I was curious is because C on the disposition proposal presupposes that there will be a divorce, and I just thought that if there was at least an argument, that there might not be, or if that was a contested issue at trial.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You know, one of the things I don't understand that maybe, Harry, you can give me some help on it is, this is the only time where paragraphs F and G in Rule 4 all of a sudden start talking about local rules again.

MR. MCMAINS: No. There are some local rules in 3, as well. But it's on what you call or how you decide a disposition conference.

MR. WALLACE: I suppose that was put in at Ken Fuller's request the last time we met, wasn't it?.

MR. TINDALL: Well, Ken talked to Dean Friessen about that and that's where some of that came in.

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1 MR. MCMAINS: See right here. MR. TINDALL: I don't have any problem 2 3 with that. 4 JUDGE THOMAS: I think it came about 5 as a result of our having some concern that there 6 are particular family law cases where, frankly, 7 the process should be speeded up in that in the 8 suits to establish paternity and in child support enforcement, and I think that was the sort of 9 10 proposal that would give us some leeway in those 11 areas. 12 JUSTICE WALLACE: This really requires 13 local rules in family law matters. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why do we need local. 14 15 rules for that? 16 MR, TINDALL: Well, let me read 17 through this and I'll see if I can respond. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 19 MR. TINDALL: Are you referring to F 20 now? 21 JUSTICE WALLACE: F and G. MR. TINDALL: I think, to me, as I 22 read G. from Dean Friessen's revision, it adds 23 24 nothing other than it would give the trial judge

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the right at the local level to say, "I am going

to try certain matters on a speed-trial basis" which really, I think, in drafting this, should be part of Rule 1. I'll talk about that to the committee at large. I think that's all it's getting at, that you deal with an incredible number of hearings and divorce cases.

The hearing on temporary orders can last for days. The motions for enforcement of an order can last for a good long time. And so it would give the trial judge the discretion to hear those at an earlier date than he would a scheduled divorce case.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me back up just one minute. Where in Rule 3 do we talk about local rules? I just can't find it.

MR. MCMAINS: 3-E5.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Page 5.

MR. MCMAINS: I mean 4. Yes, 4. 3 on the disposition conference talks about "as prescribed by local rule."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why don't we just say what kind of report that is?

MR. MCMAINS: I guess they just didn't want to get into the details of what's supposed to be in it, but I don't know.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Why not?

MR. MCMAINS: But when you start opening up local rules, that appears to require a local rule, too.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): What if you don't have one?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Local Rule 4-F, Harry, what does that bring to the table? What does that add?

MR. TINDALL: Let me look.

ruling on the motion to enlarge time." The judge has got that inherent power. You have to have a local rule on how that process works. He's got the right to do that from the bench, doesn't he?

MR. TINDALL: Well, I think what we were getting at here is -- and it's a major problem -- is you have these discovery deadlines and disposition deadlines. Does this allow by local rules to permit the litigants to mail in an agreement to extend time without having to go to the courthouse and take the time of the Court to stand before the judge and say, "Judge, we all agree upon a 90-day extension. We don't have the real estate appraisals done." This would sort of

let the local judges say, you know, "It's signed on by the attorneys and mailed in and that will grant a 90-day extension." I think that's what that was getting at.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I guess it could even up this process and by local rule could say if somebody files a motion that the process can be to grant it if somebody files.

MR. TINDALL: It is stayed. If deadlines are stayed till there's a hearing on it, I didn't think that was envisioned, but I think it was to permit local opt out on these disposition and discovery deadlines by local rule.

MR. MCMAINS: Incidently, back to what you were first talking about, about the use of divorce instead of the other matters, G in the rule, of course, says that, "All family law matters other than divorce will be the subject of local rules to assure their timely disposition," which sounds like that they're taking them out of it. I don't know what that is.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, it would still be in the rule; it just would be dealt with in paragraph G and rather than paragraphs A through F.

MR. TINDALL: I know the history of G was to get at what concerns us is, and that is, we want these courts to have expedited deadlines for getting rid of postjudgment enforcements because we have got some fed mandates that we have to deal with, or paternity actions, or temporary hearings. It's the law of the jungle until we get an order entered. And right now that's the problem that faces most courts, not these final dispositions.

JUDGE THOMAS: Or writs.

MR. TINDALL: Yes. Writ of habeus corpus, kids not returned. How do you deal with those in here? It would take a day to try one of those.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Do we have any statistics on that? We're getting out of the conflict area. Do we have any statistics on how many divorce cases and how many suits affecting the parent/child relationship that aren't divorce cases and how many motions to modify or anything like that?

MR. TINDALL: Yes. I can give you the figures in Harris County because I just did a report on that. If you include all the tax cases

in Harris County, the divorces comprise 40 percent of the litigation. If you throw out all the tax cases, the ad valorem tax cases, we comprise 60 percent of all litigation in Harris County as family law cases.

Now, if you take that 60 percent and make it 100 percent, 25,000 of them each year are divorces and another 13,000 cases involve modification each year. And you have another 8,000 that involve enforcement of existing orders.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: So it would be possible to read this Rule 4 as dealing with the divorce cases only with a specific proposal and the other family law cases --

MR. TINDALL: No, I don't think it was --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I don't care what's intended. I'm just reading what it says.

MR. TINDALL: Yes.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And there might be good reason to do this at this point in time because we don't have any scheme devised for enforcement cases and suits affecting the parent/child relationship and these other matters that involve entirely different considerations.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's what it says.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Now, the question that I would have, should those other cases be dealt with under Rule 3 as other civil cases, or should they be put out under Rule 4-G and dealt with in some local matters?

MR. TINDALL: Well, I think, Bill, the way we had proposed and I think -- it can all be dealt with in Rule 1 in terms of disposition deadlines, but enforcement and paternity and temporary order hearings, which are really trials in many instances, should be treated separate and apart from a divorce.

MR. MCMAINS: And writs.

MR. TINDALL: And writs.

not intend for those actions to be handled under local rules, but rather our proposal was that it go back under Rule 1 in a certain time light, because we didn't want to be in the position where that the Dallas rule is different from Fort Worth is different from Houston. So our proposal was to handle the cases differently but do it under Rule 1 with specific time limits.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's how I read this as how it would work, especially with Harry's suggestion on changing the titles. Rule 1 applies to family law actions. Rule 4 applies to family law actions, too, but A and B and C --

MR. TINDALL: A through F, really.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: -- apply to divorce cases in all -- maybe G should say all other family law matters. All family law matters other than divorce will be subject to local rules and, of course, to Rule 1.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Thomas has raised a point about the differences between "local rules," but in Harris County there are many many sets of local rules. Every judge has taken it upon himself to have his own local rules.

If I'm on llth court and I'm, you know -Judge Blanton may have to sit there; I'm not
trying to blame anybody, and I don't agree with
Judge Solito on how I want to run my court. We
just have it different, and Judge Phillips -- we
all just do our own thing.

Now, of course, the Supreme Court has refused to approve those and that's a hard thing to come to grips with. But these, to me, should not direct

the courts that they follow local rules. It ought to direct the courts to either find other rules here or Rules of Civil Procedure to dispose of those cases with, period. MR. TINDALL: I think that's sound. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the local rule aspects of this ought to be deleted everywhere. MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It doesn't mean 8 9 anything. 10

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it may empower the judges to do things that we know that the Supreme Court doesn't intend them to be empowered to do right now.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's true.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: In other words, it may give them something in which we don't really want.

MR. MCMAINS: Except that the whole thing with local rules is that any local rules right now would be promulgated under the Texas Rule and that would be pretty much Supreme Court. So you would indulge some assumption that the Supreme Court wasn't going to rubber-stamp something that it didn't want happened.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: But it is already

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said here. You know, if it promulgates this, you have got to get some local rules on this.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I quess what I'm thinking about, all these cases, is they ought to be dealt with under different rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Under Rule 1 or some of them.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Because they are different; they're not like divorce cases.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's try to approach that with the committee as a whole, but if we're more or less in agreement that we're going to take the local rule references out and find another way to deal with these other problems, then we can get that to the committee as a whole and go on down to Rule 5 which is Liquidated Monetary Claim. Bill, you've addressed that quite a bit, I know, in the Task Force. problems do you see there, anybody?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I would say, we have -- you know, I wouldn't call it a conflict, but we ought to cross-reference Rule 185 in some respect or another. Of course, there are other conflicts and in titling these things "original petition and a suit on a debt." I don't

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know whether we would call that a conflict, but

Rule 78 in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

talks about how things are entitled and that's a

new deal. But beyond that, I don't really have

any comment on it. There's 165-A, cross-reference

was put in here.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): F.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: And F.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: In B-3 on Page 9,
"the 'suspense docket', for cases where the
parties have made application to defer entry of
judgment," or rendition of judgment.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It must mean rendition.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I would think so.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No. I don't remember this. Apparently, there's a lot of agreements where it's agreed that a judgment will be entered if a party does not make certain payments.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: They mean render.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: You're not talking about the clerical entry; you're talking about the Court's pronouncement of judgment, which is rendition, I think.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Well, I think that was just the opposite. The Court has rendered ruling, the judgment, he's signed it. It is just not -- the clerk does not enter it.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Okay. All right.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): What it is, it is a judgment for \$100,000 and if they pay five years at \$45,000, they won't enter the \$100,000, if they break their --

MR. MCMAINS: But entry doesn't make any difference.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It doesn't make a bit of difference.

There's three things. Of course, we all know that. There's rendition of judgment, that's when he says what it is; and a signing of a judgment, that's when he signs the written judgment; and then entry of a judgment by the clerk into the minutes. And actually, what it deferred is both signing and entry; isn't that right? The parties agree that they enter into an agreement, that the attached judgment will be signed by the Court if default occurs in the following agreement, which agreement is as follows.

MR. MCMAINS: If the purpose of it is to defer signing of the judgment, that's the only thing that stops any of the enforcement processes of the judgment.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is signing it.

MR. MCMAINS: Is the signing it, because that's what activates the periods in which to take any post judgment steps. If it is signed, the deference of entry of the judgment has no legal impact at all to the enforcement of the judgment through ordinary means, nor the loss of your right of appeals.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So what ought to be signed?

MR. MCMAINS: So if it is going to be anything, it ought to be signed.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, it's my understanding that that whole rule was put in so that if you announced you had an agreement, they could remove that off the active docket and they wanted the case pending because they didn't want to have a final judgment in the case entered. But as long as they had an agreement and was on a active docket, they had to make monthly reporting. So they wanted the suspense docket

where you could, in effect, put this case in limbo 1 2 to see if the guy made his payments in five years. 3 PROFESSOR EDGAR: It's signing. 4 MR. MCMAINS: It's signed. That's the 5 only thing that can start it and still keep it 6 pending. 7 Because once it's PROFESSOR DORSANEO: 8 signed, the clock has started. 9 PROFESSOR EDGAR: To that should be 10 the signing of judgment. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: To defer signing of 12 judgment. 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: And also down in 14 C-1. 15 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Good point. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: C-1. 17 PROFESSOR EDGAR: "Or has been 18 disposed of and is awaiting signing of judgment." 19 Is that what's meant there as well? Is that the 20 same thing? 21 MR. MCMAINS: Yes. Luke, these rules 22 do provide for the so-called bankruptcy docket in 23 these cases. But you see, what I was getting at is that there is nothing, either in the section 24 25 three or in any of our Rules of Civil Procedure,

that has to do with the interruption of the trial process by a bankruptcy proceeding. If you haven't got one of those, you aren't handling as much litigation as I think you are.

It took us two years to get out of bankruptcy court in one of our cases. We had bankruptcy court in Massachusetts. It was two years before they would let us -- I mean, even though they have five million in insurance coverage, we're the only claim; just couldn't get it done.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We need to provide a means by which all cases can be carried on a bankruptcy docket, not just suits for debt because all cases may wind up on the bankruptcy docket.

JUSTICE WALLACE: You can get divorce cases on a bankruptcy docket.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes. Divorce is just as bad as any of them.

MR. TINDALL: Divorce is a real mess.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: There is no kind of case that can't become a subject of a bankruptcy proceeding because any party that becomes subject to a bankruptcy proceeding involves every aspect.

MR. TINDALL: Yes. I'm hearing about estates going into bankruptcy. Let the heirs hold

on to the money a little bit longer.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's make a note there then beside B-4 that we provide a bankruptcy docket for all cases --

MR. TINDALL: Shouldn't that be in Rule 1?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Somewhere.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes, it needs something.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And I'm going to put this word, I'm going to put "interruption?" How broad? Do we just want to put "call for an interruption docket"? It could be bankruptcy. It could be death of a party wherein -- don't the statutes delay everything for a year if somebody dies and give them --

MR. MCMAINS: Or you could have an abatement fight.

abatement; you could have a transfer that gets fooled around with by the clerks, and maybe we would want to create a new "interruption docket."

I don't know what to call it, and then try to define a bunch of things like, we have affirmative defenses and in all others, try to say so that we don't have parties rights terminated by

Administrative Rules when they can't get their rights heard, for reasons that they are prohibited from being heard. Okay. I'll put that here then.

MR. MCMAINS: Now, there is one other general comment that I have that's not on there; it's on the same order. What do we do with the Bill of Review? The reason I ask is because the Bill of Review is an attack on the underlying judgment, and if successful, is then tried on the merits; and therefore, it becomes a trial. And it is docketed as an independent claim, and I don't know what it is for purposes of these rules. Is it just another civil action and we dispose of it in the same --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can it be handled that way?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Sure.

MR. TINDALL: Is this part of the mandate for this committee? Linda asked me whether Rule 3 was an overlay on Rule 4 for family law. Do we have to --

MR. MCMAINS: Since it talks about -
MR. TINDALL: Do we read them

together? Or is Rule 4 exclusive and apart from

all those matters covered by --

MR. MCMAINS: It was explained to us that in an appropriate case in the family law area, you could request the Court to be handled under Rule 3 and go through the discovery and the management order as a complicated case.

MR. TINDALL: Shouldn't that be in the part of Rule 4 then that it can be moved out and placed over in --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It certainly doesn't give you that feeling right now. I'll agree with you, yes.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): But that was how it was explained, wasn't it, Judge? I remember him saying that you could do that.

MR. TINDALL: There's a memo from Dean Friessen about how you could do it, something about, you could have it certified as a complex case.

MR. MCMAINS: Except the problem with that is, it deals with what is forensically in Rule 3 only because of certification on complex cases.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rule 6, governing the presiding judges of the administrative

regions. I don't see that that's got any
problem. I think maybe the only place they
referred to in the rules is in Rule 18-A. I can't
think of any place else you could even refer to
the presiding judges of administrative regions.

MR. MCMAINS: I don't want to say
anything, but do the administrative judges take

anything, but do the administrative judges take any offense to what we say is -- Rule 6-C says "review each month." We're not asked to do anything; we're instructing him to.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Jim Clawson and his two administrative judges wrote it, so I guess they're happy with it.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I guess they're satisfied with it, because the committee didn't have anything to do with this. The judges themselves wrote it.

JUSTICE WALLACE: That entire subcommittee was made up of administrative judges.

18-A to say "region" instead of "district."

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Page what?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We need to change

Rule 18-A.

18-A was written, the people were called Presiding
Judges of Administrative Judicial Districts, and

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1 now they're called Presiding Judge of 2 Administrative Regions under the Court Administration Act. 3 4 MR. TINDALL: Also, back on Rule 6, 5 isn't 200a-1 now folded in to --6 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No, that's 7 200a-1. It will be; it's 200a-1. 8 MR. TINDALL: Now? I thought they had 9 folded it into the -- under the government code. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The Administrative 11 Act. 12 MR. WALLACE: Yes, government code; it 13 got a new number, whatever it might be. 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It's 200a-1. 15 200a is in the Government Code, and that's been superceded by House Bill 1658, which was 200a-1, 16 17 the Court Administration Act. 18 MR. MCMAINS: The Court Administration 19 Act is supposed to be put in the Government Code. 20 That's why it's still in session. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But that's the 21 22 same session, so it didn't get there yet. 23 MR. TINDALL: This reference here, 24 should it not be referenced to as defined in the 25 Government Code?

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right now you've got 2 two codes. You've got the Government Code, which 3 has got a lot of things in it. Then you've got 4 the Court Administration Act, which is that little 5 separate white pamphlet that hasn't rolled into 6 the Government Code if it's going to --7 MR. TINDALL: Right. I know. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: But where is that 9 "as defined"? 10 JUSTICE WALLACE: It's in the main 11 part of Rule 6. 12 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Page 11. 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Third line of Rule 14 6. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We need to revise 16 the statutory reference. 17 MR. MCMAINS: Well, except that is --18 I mean, it is correct the way it is now. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's what it's 20 called. 21 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: You might call it the Court Administration Act. 22 23 MR. TINDALL: This is what West tagged 24 the Court Administration Act, this 200 -- I'm 25 sorry. I thought this was referring to the

apportionment of all the district and county courts.

MR. MCMAINS: No. In fact, it's what the legislature defined.

MR. TINDALL: No. It's a whole clause; it's not a statutory reference.

the region; regular meetings of the judges; qualifications of administrative personnel; minimum qualifications; procedures for submitting budgets; control of the content, adoption and issuance of rules and standing orders by the courts; adoption of local administrative rules; and regular meetings. I don't see that those have anything, really, to do with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: No.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Control of the content, adoption and issuance of rules in standing orders" may deal with local rules, but they don't deal in such a way as to conflict with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

MR. MCMAINS: Let me ask you this: In K, that -- you're in Rule 8?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm just

getting to 8; I'm ready. What do you see, Rusty?

MR. MCMAINS: Oh, that's the -- okay.

This is on the local administrative judges.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: B has to do with local rules again, but that's all.

MR. MCMAINS: I'm just curious about

-- I guess I'm talking about E in Rule 7. E in

Rule 7 is talking about supervising budgetary

requests. That is, procedures for determining and
submitting budgetary requirements to the county

governments. I'm just wondering if we have a

statutory overlap problem in terms of giving power

to administrative region judges with regards to

budgetary requests that are directed to specific

counties.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know.

MR. MCMAINS: I don't know; I'm

JUSTICE WALLACE: And I don't recall.

Judge Wood or Judge Tunks -- whatever statute it

is, that the portions of administrative costs

between the counties based on population. Do you

recall that Statute 8? That's the only one it

is. And it just says that the administrative

judge shall determine what the cost for his

just --

district is going to be for next year and he should notify each of the counties of how much they're going to pay. So I don't think there's any conflict here.

MR. MCMAINS: Okay. And that's the administrative judge for the region?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Right.

MR. MCMAINS: That's not the local administrative judge?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Local, they're talking about such things as furniture, space, supplies, and that sort of stuff, and whatever else they can talk the County Commissioners out of.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's budgetary requirements for operating the administrative region?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Administrative region, now that's set by statute. It's not in the rules but it is a statute.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But is this E,

Judge, talking about budgetary requirements for

operating the administrative region? Do the

counties share that? In fact, it's on top of page

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132 1 JUSTICE WALLACE: Yes, administrative 2 regions, yes. All this Rule 7 applies to what the 3 admininstrative region judge shall do, the presiding judge of each administrative region. 5 MR. MCMAINS: Okay. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think we were 7 concerned that that might say, "I'm the 11th 8 District Court and the presiding judge of the 9 administrative region is telling me how to submit 10

my budget to the county government."

MR. MCMAINS: That's what I was just curious about.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And this is talking about how to submit the budgetary requirements of the administrative regions in various counties.

JUSTICE WALLACE: All of it applies to the administrative regions.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. MCMAINS: But the rule itself, though, just says that he "shall adopt and publish rules relating to the following matters," and one of them is "procedures for determining and submitting budgetary requirements to the county governments."

All I was saying is that a lot of the local

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administrative judges are the ones that have to actually do that, and this could be interpreted as an administrative region judge having to promulgate rules of procedures for what the contents of those requests are. I'm not suggesting that was what was intended.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the Court needs to determine whether 7-E means procedures for determining and submitting budgetary requirements of all courts to the various county governments, or whether it means procedures for determining and submitting budgetary requirements of the administrative region to the various county governments. I don't know which it means.

JUDGE THOMAS: Well, it looks like if you look at 8-K, they're giving the local administrative judge the control over the budgeting within, for instance, Gerry Meier would have it in Dallas County as the local administrative judge. She now has to supervise and prepare all of our budget requests.

MR. MCMAINS: Correct.

JUSTICE WALLACE: You see in 8-K where it speaks to the local administrative judges they had the same, supervised the preparation of budget

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requests and the presentation thereof to appropriate authorities and expenditure of funds on behalf of the courts.

MR. MCMAINS: Judge, I'm not disagreeing with who has the responsibility to present it. What I'm saying is, 8 says the responsibility to present it, and supervise the preparation of it is on the local administrative judges. 7 says that the administrative regions have to prepare rules setting out procedures for budgetary requests.

My question was, is that 7 supposed to have the administrative region judges saying, "Your budgetary requests, Administrative Judge, shall be in the following form by rule." I don't know either, A, whether they have the power, or B, whether they want it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: They have the power if the rule gives them that, and it may be -
MR. MCMAINS: I'm talking about the statute, though.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- that that's intended because this -- some of the concept of this is court coordinators and how you're going to be staffed, and it may be that they expect for the

presiding judge to the administrative region to say, "This is the way the court is going to be. There's going to be a judge, coordinator, the court reporter, and the secretary and the clerk. And you're going to have to budget all those items." I mean, but anyway, I can't read it and know now what it means. It either means the budget for the administrative region or it means that he is going to have some uniformity in what he requires district judges and local administrative judges to submit to their county commissioner and courts.

MR. MCMAINS: That's all I was pointing out. I'm not saying that it --

JUSTICE WALLACE: Whatever it means, there's no conflict with the present rules that I know of.

MR. MCMAINS: Oh, I agree.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's right. It appears to be purposefully ambiguous.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rule 8, E augments our local rule provision under the Rules of Civil Procedure. They go through the region and then to the court, Supreme Court, which Judge Morris talked about earlier.

MR. MCMAINS: 8-B is little bit 1 2 strange. I don't know what that --3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It gives them a 4 hammer. We're going to have a single set of rules 5 in each --JUSTICE WALLACE: Tell that local 6 7 judge that he's going to have to get all his 8 Harris County judges working under one set of 9 rules is what it says. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The local 11 administrative judge is going to have to get one 12 set of rules for the local administrative area. 13 And if he can't get it, he declares the rules. 14 MR. MCMAINS: Well, now, I understand 15 that, but what I'm saying is that it sounds like 16 that those rules become effective immediately. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: When they're 18 approved by the Supreme Court. See, then you've 19 got to read it. If you look at C --20 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Look at C following 21 that. 22 MR. MCMAINS: Then you send them to 23 the administrative region judge and then he 24 transmits them to the Supreme Court.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think "declared

the rules to be in effect" is probably bad wording.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Where does it say
here under Rule 9 that the local rules will not go
into effect until they have been approved by the
Supreme Court? I don't think it says that.

MR. MCMAINS: 8-B, no it doesn't. 8-B specifically says, "the judge shall declare the rules to be in effect." And I think I know what they were trying to do there, but I don't think they did it, because it sounds to me like that he doesn't have to go through the Supreme Court.

JUSTICE WALLACE: I think it would be more accurate to say "shall determine the rules which he believes most clearly implements administrative rules."

MR. MCMAINS: And which shall be submitted to the Supreme Court for approval, something like that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Help me; run through that again.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Local administrative judge shall declare the rules -- shall determine the rules which he believes most clearly implements the administrative rules of the Supreme

1 Court. Strike out "to be in effect." 2 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe, Your 3 Honor, that local administrative judges shall 4 adopt the rules. 5 JUSTICE WALLACE: I don't want them to 6 adopt them whether they're approved by the court --8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where is that local provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure? 10 MR. TINDALL: It's up near the front. 11 MR. MCMAINS: We moved it. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Copies of rules of 13 amendments so made shall, before their 14 promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme Court of 15 Texas for approval. 16 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Where is that? 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's in the last 18 sentence to Rule 3-A which was put in there 19 effective April 1, '84. 20 MR. MCMAINS: It was also moved. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the rest of it 22 was moved from 895 or something. 23 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Why don't we say 24 then -- look over here then on page 14, paragraph

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C, and then just say at the end of that, "and

approval before they are transmitted to the Supreme Court pursuant to rule so and so, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or something like that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Before they are furnished, which is the rule of 3-A, to the Supreme Court for approval pursuant to --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that get the rest of 8?

professor edgar: 9-A, why don't we just say "provisions for the assignment, docketing, transfer and hearing of all cases, subject to jurisdictional limitations." Because you see district courts and statutory county courts, yet there are some constitutional county courts that have trial court jurisdiction. And I don't know why we put statutory county courts in there deleting constitutional county courts. I don't remember why this was done, do you Judge Wallace?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Ask Judge Casseb.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Why, Judge Casseb?

JUDGE CASSEB: They're not applicable.

They don't come under these rules.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The constitutional 1 2 county courts don't? 3 JUDGE CASSEB: Like you take, say, in 4 Bexar County, we have two of them which is probate 5 and they just handle probate matters. That's, I 6 believe, one reason why the language was put this 7 way. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Could they handle 9 other matters? 10 JUDGE CASSEB: What? CHAIRMAN SOULES: Are they empowered 11 12 with jurisdiction to handle other matters? 13 MR. WALLACE: They are in the Millie Hills (phonetic) docket for one thing. At least 14 15 particular probate courts in Harris County handle 16 the Millie Hills dockets. They did. I guess they 17 still do, don't they Harry? PROFESSOR EDGAR: I guess my question 18 19 is: Let's assume we have rural county that doesn't 20 have a statutory county court; it has simply a 21 constitutional county court. Why would they not fall under these rules? 22 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: For nonprobate 24 matters.

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PROFESSOR EDGAR: For nonprobate

matters.

MR. TINDALL: Luke, before you tread into that thicket, you know, the constitution was very quietly amended last November that just rewrites that whole Article 5 with respect to jurisdiction of the courts and what the legislature may now prescribe, so there may be greater freedom here than initially thought to make it applicable to county constitutional courts.

in there. It's not going to be altogether unconstitutional. If it's unconstitutional as it applies to those courts, that will be all. If we can get them, let's get them. If not, then not. I mean, I'm not saying that these rules ought to be applied everywhere, but if they're going to be applied someplace, they probably ought to be applied.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I just want to make sure that we don't run afoul of anything, Judge Casseb. Would you tell me again why?

JUDGE CASSEB: Well, let me tell you.

This Rule 9 applies to the local courts in the county to have their own rules, okay? All right.

In Bexar County -- the only one I know and study and have -- the only ones that these rules will apply is to the district courts and the statutory county courts. The two constitutional courts don't even attend the meetings. They feel that they're to themselves. Now, that's the only reason I'm bringing it out.

MR. MCMAINS: Because they haven't

MR. MCMAINS: Because they haven't been counseled respectively.

JUDGE CASSEB: No. They had themselves excluded out they contended.

JUSTICE WALLACE: They are strictly special probate courts, aren't they?

JUDGE CASSEB: Correct.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes. But we have a number of constitutional county courts. I mean, out in the country, for example, you have a lot of constitutional county courts that try cases within the limit of their monetary jurisdiction.

JUSTICE WALLACE: And they try condemnation cases.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: They try all kinds of cases. Now, why aren't they included within the rules, if that's what -- are they intended to be excluded from these rules or just local rules?

It says the rules adopted by the courts of each county shall be in writing. Now, those the are local rules?

JUDGE CASSEB: That's right; that's That's what this implies, to just the local rules.

MR. TINDALL: Local rules for county court, or does that mean in district court too? PROFESSOR EDGAR: What I'm trying to find out is what rule --

JUDGE CASSEB: District courts and county courts.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Of course, they were attempting to exclude the county judge in metropolitan areas from being included in it because, clearly, his activities don't come within this category, I think was the reason for saying statutory county courts as opposed to county courts because they wanted to exclude, well, like I say, in Harris County, Dallas County, Bexar County, the county judge presides over the Comissioner's Court and runs the county administrative business.

> PROFESSOR EDGAR: Right.

JUSTICE WALLACE: But some of them

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1 will under the constitution, have authority to 2 handle certain legal matters. 3 JUDGE CASSEB: We had suggested to include in there district courts and county courts 5 where applicable. 6 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, maybe I'm not 7 getting my question across. Should we say, then, 8 that this rule then be entitled to local rules 9 adopted by the courts of each county or such --10 you see, it says "each county," which makes you 11 believe that each county is required to have local 12 rules. 13 MR. MCMAINS: They are under this 14 proposal. PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, you don't have 15 16 to have local rules. If you don't have any local 17 rules, then you just fall under the general rules. 18 MR. MCMAINS: We've already pointed 19 out that the document is currently proposed. 20 JUSTICE WALLACE: You say, change 21 "each" to "a" maybe? 22 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, first of all, 23 is this rule talking only about local rules? 24 JUSTICE WALLACE: Yes. 25 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Why don't we say,

"the local rules adopted by the court of a county 1 2 shall be in writing and shall include the 3 following." It seems to me that that gives us a little different connotation. 5 JUSTICE WALLACE: I think it covers 6 that quite a bit. 7 MR. MCMAINS: Or of any county; it 8 doesn't matter. 9 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Or of a county. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What about multiple 11 county districts? That's a more grammatical 12 matter than substance. PROFESSOR EDGAR: So then, this then 13 14 means, Judge Casseb, does it not, that 15 constitutional county courts are exempted from 16 having any local rules? 17 JUDGE CASSEB: That's my understanding. 18 PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right. But now 19 as far as being subject to the rest of these rules 20 as far as voluminous cases are concerned, they 21 will be subject to that. 22 JUDGE CASSEB: That's correct. 23 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well then, I think 24 we've done that then by leaving the language of A

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as it is.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Leave that last sentence out, or the last line.

JUDGE CASSEB: As you recall, at the beginning you got the control of non-probate cases.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Probate cases are left out of Rule 1, I had thought, because they're so different, in terms of their breadth, that they hadn't had a system devised for them yet.

JUSTICE WALLACE: No. They had gone to the legislature and got an administrative system for probate judges. Pat Gregory in Houston is the state probate judge administrator and they have their own bailiwick.

JUDGE CASSEB: Their own time schedule, too.

MR. MCMAINS: What's Rule 9 read now?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The local rules

adopted by the courts of a county shall be in

writing.

MR. MCMAINS: That's what I'm saying, though. It hasn't changed the content because it says "shall include the following."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: If they do have

1 local rules, then it shall include the following. 2 MR. MCMAINS: No, that doesn't say 3 that. 4 PROFESSOR EDGAR: It doesn't say they 5 shall have local rules. 6 MR. MCMAINS: It means if they have 7 any local rule at all they have to have all of 8 them. 9 PROFESSOR EDGAR: No. It says it has 10 to be in writing and shall include the following, 11 and then A through H, that's right; that's what it 12 says. 13 MR. MCMAINS: The rules themselves 14 contemplate that they are going to have local 15 rules. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The administrative 17 judge of the region is responsible for the 18 adoption of local rules. 19 PROFESSOR EDGAR: If they have local 20 rules. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It says he shall be 22 responsible for the adoption of local rules. 23 PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right. 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's 8-B. 25 MR. MCMAINS: That's all I was

saying. There's no question that this document, as it currently stands, requires local rules for PROFESSOR EDGAR: Under 8-B, that's MR. MCMAINS: Well, I mean, in addition to all the other references that we got in there, which requires things to be handled by CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've taken all that MR. MCMAINS: Did you take it out of CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, I think. I don't see any need for it in 3-E4. MR. MCMAINS: It was in 3-4, 3-E4. CHAIRMAN SOULES: "As prescribed by local rule," that phrase doesn't add anything, MR. MCMAINS: Well, the only thing it is, is that it's trying to tell you that somebody is supposed to get -- since you can get your case dismissed if you don't comply with the disposition and the report in the form that they require it, it would be nice to know what form they require.

But they don't tell you here.

JUSTICE WALLACE: But it says each county must have a set of rules. They must be approved by the regional administrative judge and send them on up to us, and we approve them to make sure that everybody --

MR. MCMAINS: I don't have any problem with that. What I'm saying is, though, under those circumstances, we ought to leave it in in the earlier places because they're there for a reason.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: To let people know.

MR. MCMAINS: They are there for, because since they're going to penalize you if you don't comply with doing a report that has everything in it that they require you need to know what that is ahead of time.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The thing that I don't see in Rule 9 as a mandatory requirement of local rules is a form of disposition report.

MR. MCMAINS: No, that isn't in there.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's required by Rule 3-E4.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, it's D; it's

1 specific forms and procedures. 2 JUDGE CASSEB: Because it says in 3 compliance with Rules 3, 4 and 5. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All similar cases. 5 MR. MCMAINS: Well, it says any form 6 and procedure. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: To be used by the 8 courts for all similar cases. 9 MR. MCMAINS: Yes. "To the end that 10 the courts shall take control of a case when it is 11 filed and maintain control of the case until 12 finally disposed in compliance with Rules 3, 4 and 13 5." 14 PROFESSOR EDGAR: And now it will be 15 4, 5, and 6. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Shall we take 17 5 or 10 minutes? 18 19 (Brief recess. 20 21 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's a little after 23 It took us a little bit longer than we thought 24 to get through these. I apologize for delaying to 25 this point, but we have gone through the nine

rules and are ready to report back to you-all where we feel that there is some need to make adjustment for the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Let me get the wishes of the committee whether we take both the Civil Procedure Rule problems and the philosophical problems together, or whether we go through them first with rules' problems and then come back, or do we start with the philosophical problems? To me, well, it doesn't really matter. What are the wishes? Anybody want to suggest an approach?

JUDGE CASSEB: We've been waiting for your subcommittee to report; let's get their report. Then we at least got the Chief Justice requirement complied with and then we'll move over to Justice Wallace's.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that satisfy everybody? Okay. Opening up here on Page 12 of your materials.

There was a feeling that we ought to have the purpose be Rule 1, and then all of the other rules numbered successively after that, so 1 would become 2, 2 would be 3, 3 would be 4, and go along with me because I'm going to refer to them that way with their new numbers.

Rule 4, on Page 6, would become Rule 5. Rule 5 on Page 8, would become Rule 6, Rule 6 on 11 will become 7. And Rule 7 on Page 12 becomes 8. Rule 8 on Page 11 becomes Rule 9. And Rule 9 on page 15 would become Rule 10.

In Rule 1, in order to make it clear that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be regarded as the dominant rules, the second sentence would end at word "procedure." It would simply say, "It is intended that these rules be consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure," and strike "which shall govern all matters not specifically covered by these rules" because it's not clear from that whether that means -- you could argue that these rules, these administrative rules, would govern over the Rules of Civil Procedure, where specifics are mentioned. And then from the balance of our work, we tried to reconcile any differences.

The third sentence, "In the execution of these rules, telephone hearings or conferences in lieu of court appearances are encouraged," the subcommittee felt that that should be made a part of a general Rule of Civil Procedure that made it permissive to hold telephone hearings in lieu of court -- in court hearings wherever hearings are

required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

There was some questions; or there was a question raised by Rusty, and I don't know -- of course, we didn't get everything resolved. We really more identified problems than anything else -- that matters that require the taking of evidence not be heard by telephone, and then on the other hand, we recognized the fact that we do take depositions by telephone now, or are permitted to, and those support summary judgments. The transcripts can be put into evidence and so forth. So I guess the same way you could have a Notary swear in a witness over the telephone and have a hearing involving an evidentiary matter.

But however that is to be approached, it was the subcommittee's view that the third sentence of this now Rule 1 be put into Rules of Civil Procedure and govern procedure in cases rather than these set forth here. And that there not be any preferential treatment; in other words, that it not be suggested that phone hearings are preferred, which is one way you could read that third sentence.

Any discussion so far? That's all we had on Rule 1.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Mr. Chairman, in 1 2 that change on which rules govern, I'll throw this 3 out for the committee to consider, after 4 "procedure," add "which shall govern in the event 5 of conflict," which makes it clear that the Rules 6 of Civil Procedure shall be the dominant. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think I'll sure go 8 for that. . 9 JUSTICE WALLACE: "Which shall govern 10 in the event of conflict." 11 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Which could refer 12 to these rules or could refer to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 14 JUSTICE WALLACE: Well, wouldn't it 15 refer back to the nearest --16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Buddy Low. 17 MR. LOW: It refers back to the thing 18 that modifies Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Or which shall 20 govern. 21 MR. BRANSON: That's sure going to be 22 a lot harder to argue in trial cases than it would 23 be to just make it clear now. 24 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Why don't you

just change it around and say, "It is intended

that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure shall control in the event of conflict?"

JUSTICE WALLACE: Well, it is intended that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern in event of conflict with these rules?

JUDGE CASSEB: He said leave out "it is intended."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Leave "Rules of Texas."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think they want to state that it's intended that these rules be consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure. I think we ought to just break that into two sentences. Leaving in, "It is intended that these rules be consistent with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure." And then say, "The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern in event of conflict."

JUSTICE WALLACE: That ought to make it crystal clear.

TRCP. Now, exactly where we move -- permission to have telephone hearings, I don't know where in the rules --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I was looking at

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that earlier and it might fit in Rule 21, but I'm really wondering whether we should take the time with the committee now to find an appropriate place or maybe do that later.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The only reason I'm even touching on it is to try to decide which standing subcommittee to assign the responsibility to.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Mr. Chairman, I think it would logically go in Section 1 of Part 2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure beginning at, I think, Rule 15 and going through Rule 21.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Maybe it's 1 through 21.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'll get those.

MR. BEARD: Luke, do we have to provide that telephones hearings will be considered as having been conducted in open court?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're not going to be able to get that done, I don't think, in this series of meetings. That's probably going to be in our September meeting, but I need to get it assigned because all those kinds of things need to

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be thought through. And that will be assigned to

El Paso Sam. Okay. El Paso Sam?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I've got it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay, thanks. Rule

2 then, "It shall be the policy to manage their

work load." There is feeling that we need to -
and I guess maybe the sentence we've just added to

Rule 1 makes it clear that Rule 1 of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure is going to dominate 2,

and that is to be administered in the interest of

justice, and Rule 2, that these rules shall govern

procedure in the justice county and district

courts and so forth.

If we've got that covered, we don't need to say it again. But these time standards, of course, could work to violate Rules 1 and 2 if they are too slavishly followed. The time standards only deal with the cases in gross, all the cases that the judge has. They don't apply to any single case according to the history of the promulgation of that Rule 2.

MR. BRANSON: Mr. Chairman, would it be all right to put in there then that these rules should be applied consistent with Rules 1 and 2 since there is such an apparent potential

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l conflict?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We certainly can do that.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: We thought we covered that in Rule 1 by stating that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern.

MR. BRANSON: Well, I understand, but if you specifically refer them back to Rule 1 and 2, which is the equitable provisions in the rule, you at least -- the Court has reminded the trial judge specifically of those provisions when interpreting it at the time.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. If we inserted after "within the periods of times listed" something to the effect "consistent with TRCP 1 and 2. Would that do then?

MR. BRANSON: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can we have a consensus? How many, show by hands, favor that insertion? Okay. Opposed? That is the consensus that we suggest that insertion then.

Down where it says "domestic actions," that should be changed to "family law."

MR. TINDALL: "Family law actions."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Domestic would

1 replaced with "family law," that's right. And it 2 would say "family law actions." Now, we get to 3 where we need some input here. We wanted to add 4 something into Rule 2 or 3. We could take it now, 5 that deals with something that would be like an 6 interruption docket. Maybe that goes better in 7 Rule 3 where we set the more specific times, I 8 guess, or where, in event of bankruptcy, 9 abatement, where you get, like, one-year 10 interruption due to a death, where a party cannot 11 proceed with the case that the time periods don't 12 run. But I guess that we'll get to that under 13 Rule 3. 14

MR. TINDALL: I think it should be in Rule 2, Luke, because it applies to all actions, wouldn't it, whether it's a dead action, a family action, a complex action?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, now, that's true. But Rule 3 --

MR. TINDALL: Doesn't apply to cases under 4 or 5 unless you certify them to be.

MR. BRANSON: Mr. Chairman, can you explain to me what the comment means there in Rule 2?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm going to

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get to that when that's a problem. The next conceptual problem I want to deal with is, how do we feel about applying this rule to pending cases? And that's the very next thing that's here. And I believe that those two matters will resolve what we made notes on.

Sam, if we make an interruption docket, how should we -- are you still with me on that feature of it?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes. The more I got to thinking about the problem, pretrial or prejudgment on an interruption docket like bankruptcy, I kept wondering why the third sentence in 3-A, or your now 4-A, on Page 2, why does it come into play on that sentence? "Nothing in these rules should be interpreted to prevent a court in an individual case in issuing an exception order," et cetera.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If that does it, then it does; I mean, maybe it does. How many feel that that third sentence in Rule 4-A, the bottom of Page 2, "Nothing in this rule shall be interpreted to prevent a court in an individual case in issuing an exception order based on a

specific finding and that the interest of justice requires a modification under routine processes --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's something different.

MR. MCMAINS: That's a different problem. It's not a question as to whether or not the Court should perceive on its active docket, those things that aren't really active by virtue of some other impediment.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Bill Dorsaneo?

thinking about that. In terms of the bankruptcy problem and related kinds of problems, we could devise a sentence or two to go to this new Rule 2 that indicates that when an action is abated, and we have that concept, that it is not running on the clock, or it's off the clock, or something like that, that it's put in some status that as it not been counted for these time table purposes. And I'm thinking the concept of abatement, temporary suspension, while there is some outside problem, would be a Texas concept we could use. And someone could ask for that relief by filing a plea of abatement. We could fit it in, and I

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think really the plea of abatement, the idea is that it is suspended rather than dismissed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But could you even file a plea of abatement if a bankruptcy order had been entered?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's the problem.

MR. MCMAINS: See, that's what I was getting at. You know, our problem is not just applying for relief or even being able for a judge to individually grant relief, but it's how it bears on the total use of the statistics. It really bears on the reporting as well, whether or not it should be classified differently for reporting purposes.

I venture to say that I would be surprised if there aren't at least two percent, since that's the only latitude we got here in this time table. Ninety-eight percent of most trial court's docket probably are affected by bankruptcy or something similar in major metropolitan areas.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Do the terms "stay" and "abate" embrace all these? Because we call bankruptcy stays. I don't know what a removal does; I don't know whether that stays or abates

1 the trial court process of the state courts. 2 MR. MCMAINS: Yes. It comprises the 3 jurisdiction. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, do you call it 5 stay or abate? Well, I quess if it comprises the jurisdiction, it's no longer a pending case, is б 7 it? It's been disposed of under the statistics. 8 MR. MCMAINS: Well, no. If it gets 9 remanded, it goes right back into it, and it 10 doesn't get refiled, and they don't lose their own 11 individuality in terms of where they are. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Stay, abate or 13 removed, -- does that get them all? 14 MR. LOW: The court doesn't have 15 jurisdiction during that time. 16 MR. MCMAINS: Use three words. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Stay, abate or 18 removed. That's what I'm trying to do, trying to 19 get as general terms as we can. 20 MR. MCMAINS: Until such impediment is 21 lifted or something? 22 - CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. 23 MR. MCCONNICO: We might ought to have 24 "enjoin." Sometimes you'll enjoin a party from 25 proceeding with a suit in another jurisdiction.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. If 2 that's not embraced by "stay," we need to put it 3 there. MR. MCCONNICO: What? 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: If it is not 6 embraced by "stay," then I don't think it would. 7 Stay, enjoined, abated or removed. 8 MR. BRANSON: How about saying "or in 9 any other manner, suspended by court order." That 10 would cover all of those. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 12 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): What, sort 13 of, we're saying is like -- comes under the 14 Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, bankruptcy just 15 not counted in these statistics. 16 MR. MCMAINS: Or subject to the 17 rules. 18 MR. MORRIS: This is your subcommittee 19 report, and is this having to do with making this 20 not inconsistent with the Rules of Civil 21 Procedure? Is that what we're doing right now? 22 - CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. And we're 23 trying to recognize problems that would come up 24 under the Rules of Civil Procedure if it did

apply. Now, again, this interruption docket, you

know, I guess, is arguably in or outside the scope of that.

MR. MORRIS: I guess part of my inquiry is -- we're not supposed to sit here and amend this to where it's acceptable to us, as I understand it, just make it comply with or what would be consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure and say we do or don't like it, I quess.

we're going to take up the philosophical problems. But there's pleas and abatement and things that are provided for in the Rules of Civil Procedure and we need to recognize that when we set time standards. And then when we got into that, we also realized that back in the suits for debt, monetary claims, we've got a bankruptcy docket that suspends things, and, really, every kind of case may be suspended by bankruptcy, domestic relations case or any other kind of case, or a suit against a doctor or whatever.

MR. BRANSON: Would there be some merit, not to take things out of order -- but would there be some merit to seeing whether or not this committee, as a whole, is in favor of these

rules as a whole? Because if they're not, it seems like we might be wasting a lot of time going through and making something better we don't like anyway.

I'll take a consensus on that, but this committee, as many of us as are willing to stay and work, are going to stay here and go through these today and find out if they agree with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Because that is the reason that we are here. The Chief Justice asked me to have an extra day's meeting today. We were only going to meet Friday and Saturday when we left here the last time -- to meet today to see if these met with the Rules of Civil Procedure and we've got to do that.

JUDGE CASSEB: I can see where we're getting off what we're supposed to be doing.

Instead of trying to write into these rules what we feel may be in conflict with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, I think maybe what we ought to do is just make mention and point it out and then let these who are going to finally draft these rules tackle that problem.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I don't know

JUDGE CASSEB: Because what we're doing now, you're finding yourself -- you're actually changing these rules, which I don't think that's the prerogative of this committee.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I perceive our instructions is to go amend the Rules of Civil Procedure, that is, to go along with it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. That's not

JUDGE CASSEB: It's to point out where they may be in conflict. And I think that's what we should do and that's all we should do.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm just going to overrule you, Judge. We're going to find out where they are in conflict, and we're going to suggest to the Court how to resolve the conflict.

JUDGE CASSEB: That's all right. But, I mean, we're saying, "Let's rewrite, and put this

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's what we are trying to do, is how to solve it, and we have a benefit of these minds here today to do it.

> JUDGE CASSEB: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that's what I'm

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trying to do, is get the solution. And that's what the Chief has asked us to do, and so we want to try to do that.

MR. LOW: I was just going to say that I think it would make it easier if we just assume that we had all voted and these are the rules that we want, even though that might be a false assumption. And then as best we can, it would be our duty to try to feed those into the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as I understand it; not making substantive changes, but just making such changes. So, I think if we operate on that assumption, we have apparently done our charge; then our duty would be pretty well spelled out.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. And it may be that as we go through these rule by rule, when we get down to now what is 10, that the comments that we make about the rules, philosophically, may have more substance. I don't know.

JUDGE CASSEB: The only thing I was thinking about, just like you were pointing out right now, it does not address to that issue; stays or bankruptcies or anything of that nature.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it does to the extent that we have pleas in abatement, Judge,

under our rules, that abate cases and don't permit 1 2 them to go forward on these time standards. 3 we're trying to do is expand pleas in abatement. 4 There are other things that have the same effect. 5 MR. TINDALL: We would have mandamus actions? 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, they don't 8

stop anything, unless the Court -- of course, the stays, that would be a stay. That would be a mandamus.

MR. TINDALL: Interlocutory appeals.

MR. LOW: Motions to disqualify until they are heard and so forth. They don't last that long. So I guess you're really talking about any proceeding that, through that legal action or some other, is prohibited or stayed from going forward.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. What I've got here now is: Stayed, enjoined, abated, removed or in any other manner suspended from proceeding.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): That covers it. And under Rule 3, are you going to require another Section F to report those types of cases?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're going to have to do something about that, yes, when we get to

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the reporting. But in Number 2, now, we would have the policy where we would say it has got to be consistent with Rules 1 and 2. We're going to change "domestic" to "family law actions," and we're going to add a sentence that says, "That these time standards shall not apply to actions which are stayed, enjoined, abated or removed or in any other manner suspended from proceeding."

MR. MCMAINS: During the period of such suspension.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "During the period of any such suspension." Now we got to get to the issue of dealing with --

JUDGE CASSEB: Does that include taking it under advisement?

Out in our discussion, there's not anything in here that says that your judge has got to give you a trial or render or assign a judgment; it just says he's got to set the case.

JUDGE THOMAS: Luke, would you read the language, just that last sentence, one more time? "These time standards shall not apply for actions" --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "These time

standards shall not apply to cases which are stayed, enjoined, abated, removed or in any other manner suspended from proceeding during the period of any such suspension. Maybe that can be more artfully written, but that's the concept of it, Judge.

While that's sinking in, let's talk about the second issue, which is a big issue, which Frank

Branson recognized a moment ago, and that is, what are we going to do about pending cases?

JUDGE CASSEB: That's right.

MR. BRANSON: I move we exclude them from these rules. Make them prospective only if additional cases are --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's certainly not a bad approach to it, and I mean as a whole practical matter. The process that is being used in Bexar County and going to be used in Webb County and going to be used in El Paso, too, if George Thurmond has his way, he's told me, is a way to clean up the old cases, and an effective way.

MR. LOW: What would be wrong with having each -- the judges who know what the policy is, the judges shall, as they deem appropriate,

make fair -- and make pending cases, make this applicable as they deem appropriate. I mean, each judge would have a little latitude, but he wouldn't just have to say, "You know, here's a case that's been on file two years and now it's already 30 days old."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The history of this was, the pending cases were not addressed. Then it got to be a quarrel about how are you going to address pending cases? The way that got resolved was that Freissen said, "Well, I'll tell you, let's just put a comment in there and let's talk about what attitude we ought to have towards pending cases." And that's the reason that this word "attitude" is in this comment and the reason there's a comment instead of some provision. But that may or may not work.

And something that I have not heard discussed until today is this, that we, as fiduciaries, and nobody has a higher fiduciary responsiblity and liability for violating that fiduciary responsiblity than we have to our clients. We have set our dockets, taken cases, become obligated to clients pursuant to a fiduciary duty and with real heavy liabilities without having any

rights and with the plan to achieve those rights and protect and pursue those rights, without these rules being in place, and now the rules are changing. And our clients' rights are going to be affected and our responsibilities are vastly affected, whether we like it or not.

MR. BRANSON: That's the basis of the motion -- if you're practicing bar, I don't perceive practicing bar can accommodate these rules if they were passed without tripling their current office staff and lawyer force. I think you're going to have to give them some leeway, some time to gear up, or you're going to end up with just a mass of lawsuits on legal malpractice.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. You would be substituting plaintiff's cases against drunk drivers for plaintiff's cases against lawyers, who necessarily do or don't do that sort of thing.

MR. BRANSON: Right. In all candor, I have some philosophical problems with the rules as a whole, but if they're going to pass you've got to give the trial courts and the district courts an opportunity to set up a mechanism for all these

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millions of papers they're going to have to count, but the trial lawyers are going to have to have some leeway also.

MR. MORRIS: I second Frank's motion. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Thank you, Lefty. Mr. McMains, you've had your hand up.

MR. MCMAINS: I perceive, however, a problem if you honestly believe that these rules are going to come into effect. And I honestly believe, as well, that our advice that they not apply to family cases is going to be taken, both of which I have some concern about, is that these rules require the new cases to get set.

Now, I'm looking at the fiduciary duties and other obligations I've got to clients I've got now. And I don't want the new cases to get preference over cases that may be real close to being to trial, or being ready for trial, subject to me getting a trial setting, which is a more fundamental problem we have, in that all these rules do is guarantee you a trial setting. They don't guarantee you a trial.

But if, as I anticipate, when they ultimately finish the process, if they ever do get passed, it's going to be passed with an expectation that

the cases that are subject to these rules do, in fact, get an opportunity to be tried.

If that happens, I don't want new cases that are six months old going to trial ahead of mine that are two-and-a-half years in the works.

MR. BRANSON: I amend my motion to include that the effective dates of these rules be 540 days from the date the rule was passed, thereby taking care of 98 percent of the cases according to Dean Friessen.

MR. O'QUINN: Second.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): You know, Frank makes some humor, and yet that has been the biggest suggestion I have heard from practicing lawyers, and that is, if these new rules are to be applicable to pending cases, make them applicable to all cases and put an effective date on new filings for 12 months. Many of you, I'm sure, received the same letters I have. But that suggestion was made far more than any others.

MR. MCMAINS: Well, I think an accommodation, frankly, is what I was getting at, has to be made between providing an opportunity to expeditiously move new filings, but at the same time, allowing the dockets to proceed as they have

on cases that are already jammed and carte blanche exclusions.

It just concerns me in terms of what I perceive, as do you, as to what might ultimately become of these rules if they get passed. There is going to be some anticipation that they're going to work in giving people an opportunity to get tried within the 360 days, or whatever. And if that's true, the only way they are going to do that is to push back cases that are already planning on being tried at that same time. And that's a disruption to the process that is not going to be solved by this problem by these rules. I don't have an answer; I have big questions.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think it is unlikely, though, that Dean Friessen's advice to the Court is going to be anything like that, because his whole premise is, if you force these rules, strictly all of these cases will evaporate and that's what the whole premise is, that 90 percent settle, and they only try two and only really have to deal with four to six percent of all the cases filed.

So when we think about that, I really view

1 that to be more of a problem with the Court than our function or the individual judges. don't know how you can exempt all pending cases. I kind of favor the concept of delaying for 12 months all cases filed after a date, and then 6 generally applying these rules however they come out to the pending cases.

> MR. LOW: As I understand, the Chief Justice, he's pretty dedicated to these rules going into effect fairly soon. Maybe I've misinterpreted him. So I doubt that anything that we say is going to delay it a year or something like that.

> I would think the most that we could hope for that he might go along with, and might not, would be that these rules are effective now, but have some clause in there giving the trial judge for, say, a year's period, a chance to apply these rules as he sees fit, but not to the detriment of the older cases, giving the older cases priority, but so that the older cases aren't shuffled back; that then the rules would be applied then. then after a year, they will be applied literally. In other words, now they apply the rule, but precedent would go to older cases.

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He might suspend the applying of the rule for a period of time, so as to work in older cases. I don't have the language. But something like that, I think, would come near working with him than saying we just are not going to do it.

MR. MORRIS: I'm kind of alluding to what Judge Casseb did when I was in the Task Force everytime this ever came up. It was my understanding that all we were going to do now is deal with this Task Force report that's before us, it really doesn't tell us what to do with the old cases, and I don't think our charge today is to tell the Court what we recommend they do with the old cases.

I think that is for another problem that I understand Dean Friessen is going to work with them to help them solve. If we go in and start -- for example, I think this whole rule ought to be deleted.

But that's not my charge today, at this moment, anyway. And I think for us to venture off out into, "Well, let's tell the Supreme Court how we think they ought to handle old cases," it is really getting too far afield. I think we should be saying whether or not there are inconsistencies

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with the Rules of Civil Procedure, and if there are, how we recommend they deal with those. And then, what I understand, we'll have a philosophical vote.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we have Rule 165-A that has dismissals for want of prosecution. I mean all kinds of problems can -- there all sorts of tools that the trial judges can find in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to achieve Rule 2, if it applies to everything. And the comment says the same attitude applies.

MR. MORRIS: Well, I hear you. But it was my understanding that they were going to come up with a Task Force or something else to deal with pending cases like to send a battalion of judges to Harris County or something like that. I mean, that was what I was hearing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I haven't heard that.

MR. BRANSON: Maybe I misunderstood our charge, also. I didn't necessarily understand that we were charged for satisfying the Chief Justice's request, but we were satisfying the Court as a whole. And I don't think that we need to necessarily direct our attention to merely

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. I don't think it's wrong or right. Some of these things are instructive and policy-sort of statements. And I've just jotted a couple of things down and tried to cover both of these. Say, "These time standards may be applied to pending cases in the interest of justice." Lay it out there just like that. "And preference in trial settings shall be

negotiating the Chief Justice over his position.

MR. BRANSON: With regard to your fiduciary duties to your clients that we discussed earlier, how are you going to know which of those have been violated?

given to pending cases in the interest of

MR. LOW: Just the same way, Frank, how do you decide now when you get two cases --

MR. BRANSON: I mean, but how are you going to know which cases to put on the front burner in your office, and which ones are going to get dismissed because someone decided to apply these rules without you being informed?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm not sure that that's a different problem than we have

justice."

end every case filed prior to 1984 that hadn't been tried will probably be dismissed.

MR. BRANSON: You could be put to trial the day these rules come out and stay in trial for six months and come back and your entire office will be dismissed because someone decided in the interest of justice these rules are going to be applied along with the contentions.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm hoping that the "interest of justice" comment imposes some degree of fairness, and that's why I use those words. I'll use any words that will work better.

JUDGE WOOD: There is a place in here that says that the Court can accept a case from the provisions of these rules for various reasons, as I understand.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me follow you, Judge.

JUDGE WOOD: We've got a provision in here somewhere that the Court in a given case can grant a special exception and excuse it from the operation of the rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

JUDGE WOOD: All right. Why don't we just say, "All cases pending at the time of the adoption of these rules shall be regarded as accepted from the operation of these rules as for scheduling and trial"?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That gets to Rusty's problem; you may want that schedule. You may want a pending case to come under the schedule.

MR. BRANSON: Why not exclude those pending cases, and then give you 12 months during which the trial bar and the trial courts and the district clerks can regear or remachine or whatever they're going to have to do to accommodate these things.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rusty wants a case tried in six months though; he doesn't want it delayed.

MR. BRANSON: But he can try it within six months under the existing rules if it is already pending. And according to everything I can see out of the Task Force, that can be done in 98 percent of the counties in Texas now. It's only in Harris County, apparently, that there is a major problem anyway.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that was

Buddy's point, is whether we are to say, "These rules shall not apply to any cases until six months after their effective date."

MR. BRANSON: I would urge a year. In all the correspondance that the Task Force members got was a year minimum.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.

MR. TINDALL: I want something to apply right away. A lot of family law cases it's -- I think to delay the suspension of these rules is just cutting the heart out of them. And if you go by that, then you've got this great backlog. I mean, the whole idea is that if these rules have any validity is that we are going to start imposing stringent deadlines on lawyers and litigants and judges to get rid of this.

And if you start accepting out everything that's pending in the courts of Texas today, then the rules will never come to fruition because the trial court and the lawyers are all going to say, "Well, we've got these old cases that we have got to get rid of before we ever reach the millennium."

JUDGE THOMAS: I have one question and that is, as we're talking right now, are we saying

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when you say "these rules," you know, old cases shall be excluded or so forth, are we just saying on this disposition or the entire group of rules?

I'm talking about CHAIRMAN SOULES: these time standards that are in Rule 2; I'm not talking about the rest of them. Now, we haven't gotten to those. We may have the same problems. Well, let me see if I can get a consensus. don't know whether these are all the options. Number one, is that we just say that may be applied in the interest of justice; two, that we try to get them an arbitrary six-month extension before they apply to pending cases; or three, that we try to get an arbitrary year extension before they apply to pending cases. And I know there are Some people want them to competing interests. apply right now to all their cases. Some people don't want them to apply for a year to any of their cases.

Rusty, do you want to speak to the possibility of that consensus?

MR. MCMAINS: Well, in terms of your suggestions, though, one of the other alternatives I was talking about was, or least as I understood what Frank was talking about, was that these rules

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do not apply to new cases for a period of time.

MR. BRANSON: For a year.

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to pending cases alone, but that they not apply to

MR. MCMAINS: Not that they not apply

5 new cases.

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MR. BRANSON: That's going to give the

trial courts a year to dispose of their existing

dockets, or if you use Dean Friessen rules, you

have 560 days.

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(Off the record discussion (ensued.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right, there is a fifth one. And maybe the suggestion that I was hearing there is that the rules -- our suggestion be that the effective date of these rules be one year after they are promulgated, period, forever. Now, that certainly is an easy way to do it, if that is acceptable.

MR. BEARD: The Court is going to give us a notice that we're on track or are we going to have to -- you know, we have got cases -- I've been practicing law a long time. I get motions dismissed where -- I got one that's 12 years old. I'm representing the defendant. I almost didn't

1 find the file. Are we going to get some notice? 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. 3 MR. BEARD: Because some of us don't know all the cases that we got pending out 5 there. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. 165-A still 7 has to be followed. 165-A still controls. 8 MR. O'QUINN: One advantage to a 9 delayed starting date would be, for one thing, to 10 get everybody -- the judges -- now, there are two 11 principle areas where the judges get their CLE, 12 that's in regional judicial conferences held in 13 the spring, and then the state-wide judicial 14 conference in September. You've got your CLE 15 programs going on continuously for the lawyers.

16 And a delayed starting date would at least give 17

everybody chances to get to some of these CLE programs, find out exactly what the rules say, and

19 what can be expected of them. That would be one

advantage to a delayed date.

JUDGE CASSEB: May I suggest

something?

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

JUDGE CASSEB: I think you ought to put a caveat in the report that would go back to the Court concerning the comment, as stated herein

that, the suggestion is that the effective date

of the rules shall not be put into operation for

at least a year, and then you answer that and then

go on.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Maybe we've got a consensus now. How many feel that the way to handle the pending-case problem and the preferential setting -- perhaps preferential settings to new cases if we don't do them all at the same time, the way to handle that is, just simply to ask the Court to delay effective date one year from enactment? How many? Show by hands.

MR. BRANSON: Mr. Chairman, may I raise a point before this? Aren't you going to meet yourself coming back in one year from that date? Aren't you then going to have all pending cases automatically in violation of these Administrative Rules?

MR. LOW: No. Because you have a provision that says, "any case pending shall be construed as having been filed on the effective date." And it might be a lot of them at that time. And then you start building, so you know

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what your docket is. But any case already pending shall be considered as having been filed the effective date of these rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Being filed on the effective date of the rules.

of this effective date is that that judge knows those dockets are going to have to be cleared up in a year's time. The administrative judges know that. And whatever it takes to get visiting judges in and operate the drop docket, like Judge Casseb is doing in San Antonio now, give them time to do that and work off all this backlog they can before this would become effective.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And it would give the lawyers that want to refer, that don't want to try certain cases -- they've got an opportunity to clear with their clients or refer all of those cases to other lawyers. I guess that's one way to put it.

Okay. Are we ready that we would say that,
"cases pending would be deemend filed on the
effective date of the rules." And that "the
effective date of the rules be one year after they
are promulgated by the Court to final form"?

How many so feel? How many opposed? Okay. There are three opposed.

Let me see the hands for, again, so I can count them.

JUDGE THOMAS: Here, again, we're assuming in this vote that we like the rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're assuming that they are going to be rules anyway.

JUDGE THOMAS: Okay.

MR. O'QUINN: May I ask a question?
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

MR. O'QUINN: Is your motion that the rules apply to all cases, the existing as well as new ones? We had a discussion as to whether they ought to apply to the old ones, as well as the new ones. So, which way are we going on this vote?

that, are we willing to have -- assuming we're going to have rules. We've kind of been by that in all this discussion. Are we willing to have the rules applied to all cases with a one-year delay and effective date? And that may be all we can get. We're trying to solve a very practical problem here. How do we handle this, and suggest to the Court a way that would be fair?

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Okay. Those in favor, show your hands again and let me count them. Opposed? 12 for and 4 opposed.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Luke, as a practical matter, do you think we ought to have an alternate consensus? The reason I'm opposed to it is, I think is, a practical matter. We've got a better chance, and it may work out better, to have the rules imposed on pending cases with a year effective date on all cases filed after the passage of the rule.

MR. LOW: Within a year you still have the same problem Rusty is talking about.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's just a steppingstone, but at least it gives you a year to get rid of some of the older cases.

MR. O'QUINN: Luke, I want to echo what Sam said. One reason I voted against the last motion, and that's why I asked you the question is, and I'm not speaking just for myself, but for a lot of lawyers in Houston on both sides of the docket, and this echos something you said earlier.

We're sitting down there with dockets that -- you know, if I just did nothing but stay in trial,

lawyers over at Fulbright and Jaworski who are carrying 150 cases, or however many cases they've got, they don't know how they're going to be able to live on this. Of course with a year that may help. But, you know, it has been similarly expressed today about exempting the existing cases.

So, my concern is applying it to the existing cases. That was some of my concern. Okay.

That's why I voted against that. Because of our present commitments and those things of that nature. And I'm very much concerned about it.

You've been down in Harris County recently trying a case, and I don't know whether you kicked this around with anybody, but I think if you were down there practicing law, I think you would find that there's a lot of concern on the part of both sides of the docket about how you could even take a new case.

I mean, I hear people talking about, well there would be no way I could even take a new case if they put this rule in effect, because I've got so many now. If they put it on this kind of fast track I'm going to be lucky to grapple

There could

1 successfully and not drop the ball. 2 be so many balls in the air, in my firm, that I 3 don't see how you can get another ball in the 4 air. I don't care if it's a good client that 5 comes to me with something else. I've just got a major problem, or else I'm going to have to hire a 6 7 whole bunch of lawyers. 8 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): You pick 9 out the five cases you want and give the rest of 10 them to back. 11 MR. O'QUINN: Well, I'll guess I'll 12 send them to Sparks or San Angelo. 13 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): I'll take 14 them. 15 16 17 18

MR. O'QUINN: But anyway, what Sam is saying, he'd like to have an alternative to exempt the existing cases, but that's what he's saying, and maybe he's not.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO) El Paso. just the opposite. No I would think that the rules could apply to all pending case as if they were filed at the time the rules are enacted, but have a years delay for all cases filed within the next year.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's just the

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opposite.

MR. O'QUINN: You don't want to exempt anything?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No. I would think that the rules could apply to all pending cases as if they were filed at the time the rules are enacted, but have a year's delay for all cases filed within the next year.

MR. LOW: What you're saying, a stage -- the effective date that all cases -- then the next year the whole thing goes into effect and those that are pending between that year then would be effective and then you strike out from there.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It's just a two step rather than a one step or a no step.

MR. LOW: In other words, you work one year on the old cases on this --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, let's see how many favor that as an alternative.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, Harry just pointed out, though, that in the family area they need relief immediately.

MR. TINDALL: We want certain actions heard. That's where they get to the substance --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't think
there's anything new to be said on it. I mean,
everybody has heard Harry. He feels like he has
got to rejoin and give a rejoinder to what John
said. We know that there's a feeling here of some
that they want all cases treated the same, either
all in or all out because they want them all on
the same track whether it's this track or the old
track.

MR. TINDALL: Hadley, I don't have any trouble with that, Sam's idea.

that say they want to delay application to old cases because of the heavy dockets, and some that want to have a delay application to the new cases because it gives the old cases a chance to be disposed of. I guess those are the positions that have been taken, and we have gotten a pretty strong consensus that to delay one year and have it apply to everything is the first alternative that this committee would recommend.

Do we want to have a second alternative? How many feel like there should be any alternatives submitted to the Court? In other words, how many feel that we ought to just go with the one we've

got and not submit any alternatives? Show your hands. And how many feel that we should submit the alternative that Sam suggested? Okay. There are really not many votes either way on that.

JUDGE CASSEB: Luke, I think you ought to give it to them so they could study it and work it out, seriously. Actually, I go back to the fact that this is not on the agenda for us to do anything about.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, Judge, I believe it is. You and I just disagree about that.

JUDGE CASSEB: That's why you're the Chairman.

me, basically, there's no doubt that awfully good points have been made and some lawyers are genuinely concerned about what is going to happen to their case load and their cases. Any way we write some proviso aren't we going to have to depend upon the common sense of the trial judges and not just dismiss a bunch of a man's cases because they happen to not be ready on the 160th day, or whatever it is, and he knows that lawyer has been busy trying to dispose of the case as

fast as he can. We have got to give him some opportunity to get those things put on some exception list and reset them.

I can't imagine that we're going to have wholesale dismissal of cases represented by lawyers like are on this committee. Maybe I just can't believe that will happen. If so, then I would be against the whole thing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, there have been some harsh statements made in those Task Force committee meetings, Judge, about that, and, well, those lawyers will just get all those cases and won't be able to take all those cases, and some other lawyers will get some cases. There have been some harsh comments made along those lines. And I don't know if you read everything that has been said. It's a real mixed bag about the attitudes of how these rules will apply.

JUDGE WOOD: It's scary.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It really is, Judge.

But there are some scary things about it in the history behind them. And whoever the speakers were may or may not have known really what the philosophy is, but there's an awful lot of background on the things already and some of them

are all right.

Okay. Well, we will submit the one-year delay and then schedule a phase-in of old cases first, then new cases. I think, I had a pretty even spread of the house on that because Harry doesn't want all the new cases delayed.

MR. TINDALL: I don't mind that, as long as we never get to some subsidy changes on Rule 2 that may ameliorate the problems of family law cases. But I think what Sam proposed makes good sense, because I don't think in a year's time, based on the data I've seen, that we are going to have the backlog cleared out.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: You do not --

MR. TINDALL: Not when I hear about cases in '72 and '73 still pending on the docket. That's what Judge Casseb said he discovered down in Webb County last week.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we discovered that in San Antonio, too, but we've gotten rid of them. There just wasn't many cases and we haven't had any appeals -- 12,000 of them.

What has happened in the past -- we discovered this as far as those old cases are concerned -- they come up on a drop docket and the

lawyer that handles them comes over and says,

"Judge, we don't want it dropped; we want a

setting." It gets set. Then the lawyers, by

agreement, agree to drop the setting and the case

goes dormant. Then it comes up on drop docket

again. That's the first time it is looked at

again.

So these old cases have been on several drop dockets, but you never had a disposition order that said a case that's on a drop docket has to be disposed of. So a lot of those old cases are now being dismissed for the first time because the lawyers don't want to try them now and never really did, but they always kept them from being dropped because they would come and appear at the drop docket and preserve them.

So in some cases, I think one district court just didn't hold drop docket, just never did worry about them. He didn't figure it was anything more than a statistical problem, which is true. Others did, but they would continue any case a fellow showed up for. And now then both of those have been wiped out, we're having drop dockets. If you show up, you're going to have to go to trial and we're disposing of all those ancient cases, and

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they're going away. That's probably going to be most of what Webb County shows, too, and I bet Harris County is bound to have some old cases.

MR. TINDALL: As I understand Sam's alternative, all these rules would not apply to any case now on file for one year. But with respect to any case filed after the rule became effective, the disposition of rules would not become operative for one additional year from the date each new suit is filed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's not what I heard. It was effective as to old cases on the effective date and new cases a year later. So we're not going to get two years. If the rule is going to be effective, they're going to be effective before two years from now on new cases.

Well, I'll say as an alternative, generally, that where there would be some phase in period where the rules would apply to old cases on some effective date and new cases on a subsequent effective date.

- MR. TINDALL: Which I understood to be one year from the date they are filed, so if you filed tomorrow, these rules would be applied to every new case a year from the date they're

filed. But it gives some priority to the tremendous backlog that people are complaining of.

if they are effective on the 1st of January, all pending cases would be under those rules right then, 1 January '87. Cases filed in the year of 1987, though, would not come under the rules until January 1 of 1988, at which point, all cases would be under, including the '88 cases and all others.

Now, that's Sam's proposal with a hypothetical effective date of whenever the rules do first become effective. There will be no delay in the applications to old cases.

MR. TINDALL: Well, I'll withdraw my support of Sam's. I understood it to be the more delay -- one year as each case is filed for new cases to give a preference to the old cases.

to Rule 3, and this is just a reporting requirement. The clerks have fussed about this a good bit, but according to Judge Stovall, most of these statistics are being kept already and being reported to the Ray Judice's committee. What's that thing called, Judge?

JUDGE CASSEB: Court of

1 Administration.

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JUSTICE WALLACE: Office of Court administration.

Administration. And there were going to be some changes in the way they're presented, but apparently, the data that underpins most of this is already being gathered by the clerks in most cases, isn't it, Judge? So maybe if the clerks understand it, they won't be quite as adverse. Does anyone have any suggestions on Rule 3?

getting judges, clerks and coordinators in from a particular area, about 30 or 40 at a time for a full day's meeting. He already has the procedure for doing this, a manual system, and a personal computer system. He has the software up and he's had about four or five groups so far and everybody who has left said, "We got no problem. We can go back home and do it with what we've got right now." So, I don't think that's going to turn out to be near as much a problem as some of the clerks think it is now.

MR. TINDALL: Luke, I suggest that Rule 2 be reinserted near the back, because the

1 way these rules read, Rule 2 now talks about your disposition rates. To me, just the way my mind 2 3 works, we ought to then go into non-probate civil 4 cases, family cases, liquidated monetary cases, 5 because once you get past those three types of cases, then you do get into a bunch of reporting and administrative matters that do not involve the litigants or their counsel on Rule 7 through the end. CHAIRMAN SOULES: So you suggest moving Rule 3 back to the back somewhere.

> MR. TINDALL: Following the rule regarding disposition of monetary cases.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I believe your suggestion is an organizational matter. Behind what is now Rule 6.

MR. TINDALL: That's correct. Behind the monetary -- that's right.

JUSTICE WALLACE: So, it would make it Number 6.

MR. TINDALL: Well, they would all be moved up. 'It would be number 6; that's right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: This would be 6, and then we'd go back to these others. That's fine, because, I tell you, Rule 3 is infamous as Rule 3,

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so we probably want to leave it as Rule 3.

JUDGE CASSEB: Rule 2 will become -- what we have changed to Rule 2 will become Rule 6.

MR. TINDALL: No. Printed Rule 2 becomes Rule 6.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So 3 is the old 3.

Let's go ahead and go to that then, and see where that leads us.

Well, the committee didn't have any changes in the A and B part of that. There was some worry about what is a non-probate civil case, but we haven't tampered with that really. We have got to see if we have some questions, so if anybody has got anything in A or B or in the title, let's take that up now.

MR. TINDALL: I would urge, if I understand the way these are done now, is that Rule 3, non-probate civil does not apply to family law cases unless it's certified under Rule 4. So we need to exclude under A, if that's the place, Rule 3 shall not apply to family law cases unless it is so certified by the judge handling the family law case.

MR. EDGAR: Doesn't Rule B take care

MR. TINDALL: B?

MR. EDGAR: Yes. "This rule shall apply to all non-probate civil cases filed in the courts of Texas unless a more specific rule covering a specific category or group of cases is otherwise provided.

MR. TINDALL: Well, Linda said -well, there are matters covered here that clearly do not even be dealt -- that are not even dealt with here in Rule 4, Hadley. So the question would be, do you ever deal with Rule 3 on a family law case in the absence of a trial judge saying that Rule 3 applies?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: No.

MR. TINDALL: Then I would like it clear.

JUDGE CASSEB: I think it's clear the way it is.

MR. TINDALL: Do you?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It seems like that provision in Rule B automatically excludes it, and then in Rule 4, it will be excluded unless the court certifies it should be applied under Rule 3. JUDGE THOMAS: My specific question

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is, for instance, motions for continuance in

family law cases. I don't see anything about,

"motions for continuance" under 4, which is

supposed to be dealing with family law, therefore,

are we under 3?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: As I understood it,

you would not be under Rule 3, unless the court

certified that you fell under 3.

MR. TINDALL: Well, can we have that stated.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I'm just saying that I think that was the intent.

MR. BRANSON: So then in a family law case, as I understand it, the lawyers can still agree on continuance.

MR. TINDALL: Yes, which is important.

MR. BRANSON: Would a family law case include the death of the head of a household?

MR. TINDALL: I wouldn't think so. I don't know if it goes under Rule 3, if that's my understanding, we don't -- family law cases are not touched by Rule 3, unless there's a judge who says it's touched by Rule 3. And Linda has raised a good instance of what we're talking about.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why wouldn't the

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1 continuance provisions of this rule apply to the family law cases. Why shouldn't they? 2 MR. TINDALL: Well, do you want to get 3 into that? I'm reluctant to get into those issues 5 if it's not proper agenda at this time other 6 than --7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: My understanding of B is that it really means, unless some more 8 9 specific rules provides otherwise, on a rule by rule basis, these rules apply generally. 10 11 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, didn't 12 the subcommittee consensus adopt Bill Dorsaneo's recommendation that the continuances be spoken to 13 14 on the Rules of Procedure 54. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, that's right. MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Then that would 16 17 make it applicable to all cases. 18 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): It would 19 seem to me that Rules 3, 4 and 5 ought to be in 20 the Rules of Civil Procedure instead of in these 21 rules anyhow. They really don't belong in here. 22 " MR. BRANSON: Is there any reason to 23 exclude the family law practitioners from the

repressive nature of the continuances.

MR. TINDALL: Yes, because we have a

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1 tremendous continuance rate. 2 PROFESSOR EDGAR: For good reason. 3 MR. TINDALL: Pardon? PROFESSOR EDGAR: For good reason. 5 MR. TINDALL: For good reason. And I think you're kidding yourself if you think you are 6 7 going to have people take off time and come down 8 to your office and sign a continuance. And that's 9 just not the world we live in. 10 MR. BRANSON: Same thing in the other 11 civil cases. 12 MR. TINDALL: It may be. 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it was 14 somewhat shocking to me to perceive the policy 15 change from permitting divorce cases to stay on 16 file in hopes of salvaging the family to forcing 17 divorce cases to go to trial, but that changes 18 here. 19 MR. TINDALL: Well, I hope not. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it has 21 happened; it's here. It's right here in these 22 rules. 23 MR. TINDALL: We haven't talked about 24 that yet. 25 We haven't gotten to

JUDGE THOMAS:

argue that one yet.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's been talked about.

MR. BRANSON: Where?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Over at the Task Force.

MR. TINDALL: Well, I hope at some point, Luke, we can talk about tht again at this meeting.

Shocking, but that's a fact, that's just the way it is. They are not going to exempt family law cases from these time standards. And didn't -- when Justice Pope in court imposed the suggested time standards, the first time, the ones that we have now. So that road has been crossed. We may argue it again but it's been --

MR. TINDALL: I hope this committee can bring that issue up again, and as an advisory committee, we can discuss that fully.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: As we go through the balance of this Rule 3 in particular, we may see that there are reasons to exempt actions from monetary demands and family law cases in gross from the operation of general provisions or we may

see that they're not. So I'd rather reserve that 1 2 issue for now and go to C. 3 JUDGE CASSEB: Pardon me one minute. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir, Judge. 5 JUDGE CASSEB: Read back Rule 4G, what it says there. Have we now created a conflict by 6 7 changing the language from domestic actions to 8 family law matters? CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sorry, Judge, I 9 10 missed your question. 11 JUDGE CASSEB: You know, we changed --12 Rule 2 we got changed to Rule 6. We took out 13 "domestic actions" and put in there "family law 14 cases." 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. JUDGE CASSEB: Well, is that going to 16 be in conflict now with our 4G, "All family law 17 18 matters, other than divorce, will be the subject 19 of local rules to assure their timely 20 disposition"? So I think what they're talking 21 about then should be just divorces. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, this says 23 "domestic actions." It doesn't even say divorces. 24 JUDGE CASSEB: I know, but then you

see what this says.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're going to 2 get to whether or not that G should be left in. 3 The committee feels that should be taken out. local rules should not be particularly referenced 5 to any family law. 6 JUDGE CASSEB: I agree with that. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. On C, "within 8 30 days, now, these words were somewhat confusing 9 to us. "Filing the initial pleading by the last 10 defendant to appear. Later on in the rule, it takes care of parties that are added, and we've 11 12 done some changes to that, too, to make that fair 13 to both sides. But on C, we changed that to: 14 "Within 30 days after the general appearance by 15 the last defendant to appear." 16 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Of the last 17 defendant. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Was it "of"? "After 19 the general appearance of ? You were sure that's 20 what we said? 21 MR. LOW: That should take care of 22 special appearances. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And our Rules of

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Civil Procedure don't talk about initial pleading

and those are kind of new words to use. "General

appearance" is something we all understand, including the one, there in court appearance, which our committee regarded as a part of this. Then we didn't have anything in 1.

JUDGE CASSEB: C-1?

MR. CHAIRMAN: C-1 or C-2. Then in C-3, "In the event additional persons become parties," and that fits into Rule 38 where it talks about joining additional persons as parties, and "persons" means everything you can think of. "In the event additional persons become parties," and strike "are joined," "after the order for the schedule for the completion of discovery and preparation for trial as been entered." "Enter" is not the right word there, has been "rendered." PROFESSOR EDGAR: Schedule has been

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Schedule has been entered, the discovery schedule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's order for the schedule has been --

MR. EDGAR: It would be "ordered" then, rather than "rendered."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, order is rendered. See, it says right here, "After the order was scheduled for the completion of discovery and preparation of the trial has been

rendered." I mean, if you put "rendered" there, 1 2 it solves the problem. 3 MR. ADAMS: Well, why don't you put 4 "filed"? Wouldn't it be better just to say 5 "filed"? MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): 6 7 has been filed; he filed the order. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, there is some 8 question about whether orders are ever filed. 9 whether judgements are ever filed -- it should 10 either be "rendered" or "signed." 11 MR. ADAMS: Let's put "signed." 12 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: "Signed." 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. What if it's done from the bench and no order is ever 15 16 signed? MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): If we say 17 18 "signed," then it ought to be signed. What if it 19 is done by telephone and the judge doesn't sign 20 it, he just makes an entry on his docket sheet? 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: In the real world 22 "rendered" is what's going to happen. He's going 23 to render an order either signed or not signed. But how many want to put in "signed" and how many 24 25 want to put in "rendered"? Let's see a show of

hands on "signed." Four. 1 How many prefer 2 "rendered"? 3 JUDGE CASSEB: Do you want to put 4 "signed" or "rendered"? 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, I want it to be 6 one or the other. 7 MR. MCMAINS: There is no question 8 that the Court doesn't enter the order. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The Court does not 10 enter an order; that's true. 11 MR. MCMAINS: So, it has got be 12 changed. 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's either got to 14 be "rendered" or "signed," and "signed" may be 15 misleading to some, because it may never get 16 signed and you may find that your case has been 17 dismissed because you didn't follow an order that 18 the judge rendered. 19 MR. MORRIS: I feel like I'm being 20 negative when I see you working so hard, Luke; it 21 makes me feel a little bit quilty, but I'm going 22 to do it anyway. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, that's fine. 24 JUDGE CASSEB: I'll change with you.

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I'll make it rendered.

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MR. MORRIS: The thing that concerns me about what we are doing today is, it does not really matter, particularly, because this isn't the one that's being printed in the June Bar Journal for publication purposes. And, as I understand, you have to have the thing -- Judge, you can tell me what the rules are, perhaps, but it has to be published for a certain period of This isn't just making things comport with the Rules of Civil Procedure; this is rewriting I mean, it's probably an improvement them. because there was much room for improvement. I just am not sure that we're doing anything that is going to matter much.

being published in the June issue, according to my understanding of what the Chief Justice has said, are being published for information purposes and for comment. They are not promulgated by the Court as being published as promulgated orders pursuant to a 60-day effective date. In other words, these are proposed. Now, whenever they promulgated rules, I believe, twice before their effective date, but at least once. So it's a

different kind of publication, Lefty, and they're looking for input; at least, they say are.

about this "rendered or signed." My concern is that I think there ought to be a written order entered. That's the way we do it in federal court, and I think that that is -- if we are going to have this kind of procedure, that there ought to be a written order entered on the thing. And if we don't want to cover that right at this point and you want to use the term "rendered," that's fine. But I think at some point we ought to have a provision that there would be a signed order that the judge renders.

The problem with that is still the timing, though. Suppose the judge renders the order on May the 15th and he thinks the times are running, but the parties don't get the order approved as to form and back to him until May the 30th and it's signed.

MR. ADAMS: The way they do that in federal court is, it's the judge's responsibility. He has the clerk that types that order out and he signs it and sends a copy to everybody and it's

6. 1 effective.

writing.

to get that done at the State level because of the helm.

MR. ADAMS: I don't know why.

MR. BRANSON: What about making it order entered and parties notified"?

MR. ADAMS: Notified in writing?
MR. BRANSON: Yes, notified in

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): There is too much room for disagreement about what is done, if it's just done orally and that sort of thing.

JUDGE CASSEB: If you render an order you've got to make a notation of it somewhere don't you?

GHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. We're going to get to that in 4 and maybe we can add something to 4 because that is where it actually talks about the court acting. The important part of this, though, was that under C-3, the only party who could move for more time was the newly added party, the way it's written right now. And we want to change that to say, "then any party may within 21 days from the date such parties are

required to answer, and that's a little bit awkward.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: "Within 21 days from the date, the additional party is required to answer."

MR. BRANSON: Don't we need to go back to a general period? What if the new party files a special appearance?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Such additional persons --

MR. BRANSON: Make a general appearance.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Now, see that changes the timing. We just can't think that this work product is the best in the world because we've got to talk about how certain things go from general appearance, but then when we get down to additional parties, it's required to answer. That's the answer date. It doesn't say from the time of general appearance. And I don't know if we want the rules to run from the answer date or from actual answer, but we treat different people different ways in these rules.

MR. BRANSON: It ought to be consistent with everybody, shouldn't it?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: : It should. It ought to be consistent, but it's not, the way it's written. And there's some problems with the rules because of that.

MR. BRANSON: Is that part of our commission to clean that up or do we leave it?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, sure, I mean, if we can, we should now. This is probably the committee that's going to give this the closest scrutiny from this day forward.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It's frightening, isn't it?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Except for the Court; the Court is going to give it a close study.

MR. BRANSON: Having been on the previous committee, it may be the one that gives it the closest scrutiny in general.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it may, except for the Court itself. And I think they are going to listen, and probably most of them are going to read the transcript of this meeting.

MR. LOW: I don't want to interfere, but I got one other question about that when you resolve that on that same provision. I have one

219 1 other practical matter that I'd like to raise. 2 But I don't want to interject that when we're 3 trying to resolve something else. CHAIRMAN SOULES: My view is that we 4 5 ought to have "after such additional persons make 6 a general appearance." And I guess the point 7 there where I'm coming from on that is, if they 8 fail to answer and just take a default against 9 them -- discovery -- we would all probably like 10 more time. It really shouldn't be reopened 11 because the issues in the case haven't changed. 12 So if we're going to say that any party can 13 reopen discovery on the joinder of an additional 14 party, at least, that party ought to be required 15 to answer before that evenuality can take place. 16 So instead of keying it to "answer day," we ought

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Makes a general appearance.

to key it to "making of appearance."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, makes a general appearance.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that make

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does everybody agree

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sense?

1 with that? Okay. This is way number 3 would 2 read. If I am going too fast, just somebody 3 squeak and I'll slow down. "In the event 4 additional persons become parties after the order for the schedule for the completion of discovery 5 6 and preparation of trial has been rendered, then 7 any party may -- * JUSTICE WALLACE: Wait a minute. 8 Didn't we have, "and the parties notified in 9 10 writing," was that put in? 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're going to 12 get down to Number 4 about how the judge handles 13 his order. 14 "Then any party may, within 21 days from the 15 day such additional parties -- " 16 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Enters a general 17 appearance, or makes a general appearance. Let me 18 look at the rules. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "-- makes a general 20 appearance -- additional persons make a general 21 appearance, proposed changes in such schedule." MR. ADAMS: Well, then that excludes 22 23 anyone else from --24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: This way, any party 25

can propose a change in the schedule, where, as it

1 was written, that only the added party can propose 2 a change. 3 PROFESSOR EDGAR: "Makes a general appearance" is okay. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Makes" is okay? Can we say, "From the date such additional persons 6 7 make a general appearance," since we've pluralized it? 8 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Did you say 9 10 "persons" or "party" make? 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Persons make." 12 That's just trying to pick up the same noun and 13 pluralization that we started the sentence with. 14 Okay, 4. 15 MR. LOW: Wait. I have a practical question. Does that person, when he comes in, is 16 17 he supposed to check the docket and see if there 18 have been any orders? How's he going to know? Or 19 are the people already in it, are they obligated, 20 as soon as they get his answer, to let him know 21 that there has been such order already entered? 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: He's on notice of 23 what's in the file. Unfortunately, that's the 24 law.

MR. LOW:

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That's the general rule

but --

to have to get used to the fact that there are time standards and there are pretrial orders entered. I guess, it's kind of like federal court. I mean, if you get in late, you know, probably that there's a pretrial -- unfortunately, too.

MR. LOW: I understand. I know the problems.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. In 4, I have no change except to change "entered" to "rendered." But we are now hearing a good suggestion that all parties be notified. Let's see, do we get that anyway because -- no, it says, "any or all parties may file a proposed plan."

Other parties may respond. New parties get a new start date, and then finally what the Court does. So it doesn't require the court to give notice.

"As soon as reasonably practical after the time prepared for responding to a proposed plan has elapsed, the Court shall render its order, or if additional parties are added, its amended order for completion of discovery and in preparation for trial and trial setting."

1 It does not say anything anywhere in there that the parties are to be notified. 2 JUDGE WOOD: "And notify the parties 3 4 in writing." 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Render its order and notify the parties in writing." 6 7 PROFESSOR EDGAR: It should be "in writing." I think that ought to be required. And 8 9 I think that was the intent. I don't think that anybody intended that that order should be 10 anything other than in writing. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "The Court shall 12 render and sign." 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: 14 "And enter his order 15 in writing." CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Shall render and 16 17 sign its order, or if additional parties are 18 added, its amended order, for completion of 19 discovery and in preparation for trial setting." 20 And then just add a sentence there. "The Court 21 shall mail or deliver a copy of the order to all parties." -22 23 MR. BRANSON: Do you want to make 24 certified? 25 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We haven't gotten

there with the courts anywhere in these rules so far.

JUDGE CASSEB: Shall be notified as the rules provide. You want them in with your Rules of Procedure.

really not a notification of anything other than a final judgment of what a trial judge does in the rules. There are rules that require notice by final judgments of appealable orders, that is, not necessarily final judgment, but appealable orders. Other than that, the judge is not required to give parties delivered or mailed copies of any orders, that I know of.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I think that's right.

JUDGE CASSEB: Do you think this should put the extra burden on the Court to notify?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Mail or deliver copied orders to all parties. That's what I'm hearing from the committee, and I think it's fair. You are now starting the time tables that are going to dispose of parties' rights in short order. What's the consensus on that, that the

1 court should deliver or mail an order? Let's see 2 a show of hands of who thinks the Court should be 3 required to do that. 4 JUSTICE WALLACE: There won't be any trouble. He's going to make the lawyer do that 5 6 anyway. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Those 8 who feel that that should not be required? A11 9 right. It's unanimous that that should be 10 required. 11 MR. LOW: We're talking about the 12 same kind of notice as 21-A then, right? 13 whatever notice is required be in writing and so 14 forth. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. Let me get 16 this last sentence and I'll reread it. 17 "The Court shall mail or deliver a copy of 18 its order or amended order to all parties" or "to 19 counsel for all parties." What should it say? 20 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Under the rule you 21 give notice to the parties by giving notice to the 22 counsel under Rule 21. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's optional. 24 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Go ahead. 25 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Are you-all

1 satisfied that the filing of a plan with the court 2 under this -- in other words, up under C-1, okay. 3 I file a lawsuit, the other side answers, I file a 4 plan, I don't give him a copy, so he doesn't know 5 to file within 21 days. Is there any requirement 6 that you notify your opposition, is what I'm 7 asking? 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. There's a rule 9 that now requires that everything that's filed has 10 to be served on the other parties. 11 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): By 12 certification or whatever. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Correct. 13 14 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): That's one 15 of those Rules in Civil Procedure that existing. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Correct. Served, 16 17 however, you know, in different ways. You can have 18 service -- up until that rule change was made in 19 '84, there was no requirement that an answer be 20 served. A party could go file an answer and just 21 have it on file and go away in the sunset. 22 . PROFESSOR EDGAR: Why don't you say 23 "subject to Rule 21A"? 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, except Rule

21A is certified, isn't it?

1 PROFESSOR EDGAR: No. It just says, 2 "Every notice required by these rules," and so and 3 so on, like that." 4 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): There's no 5 notice required by this. PROFESSOR EDGAR: "To be served by the 6 7 duly authorized agent or his attorney of record 8 and just refer the notice as provided by rule 21A." 9 10 MR. LOW: "Either in person or by 11 registered --" 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, it does; it's 13 certified mail. 14 MR. LOW: No, it's certified mail. 15 JUDGE CASSEB: No, it's certified mail. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Either in person or 17 by registered mail." 18 JUDGE CASSEB: There's also a 19 provision that says it can be by certified mail. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, 21-B says, "a 21 letter certified is as good as registered. 21-A 22 says, "registered. " Well, let's just say counsel 23 for all parties. 24 MR. BRANSON: So the notification will 25 be either in person or by certified mail?

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I'm concerned about CHAIRMAN SOULES: the judge sending the notice to the parties directly. So, I guess, we could say "to counsel for all parties or directed to parties not represented by counsel." MR. LOW: Of course, we have the other 6 7 rule about -- I think it only applies to settings 8 where you send them a postcard and then they have got to give you notice of settings. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Isn't a prose person his own counsel? Isn't that what the rule is? 12 is his own counsel. 13 JUSTICE WALLACE: Yes. 15

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So he is counsel for himself. We got into some kind of a discussion about that recently. Counsel for a party would be himself whenever he's prose. I don't where that came up even.

MR. TINDALL: Why don't you say service on the party. And then the rules cover the fact that if a party has a lawyer, you always serve the lawyer.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, the rules don't. They give that optionally, I think. Let me see. I think they just give that option.

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Maybe I'm wrong about that.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I just have never read the rule as you do, Luke. If you are going to mail it to the person, then you've got to send it registered mail, but advising counsel can go out just by the U.S. Mail.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, sir, absolutely not true. Service is service, and if you don't -- service is a technical concept in Texas and if you don't send it --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: We're talking about notice. Now, we're not talking about service; we're talking about notice under Rule 21-A. We're not talking about service of process. It says that you send it either in person or by registered mail to his last known address and, to me, that's the person not the attorney.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the last five words before you started "or in person," is "or his attorney of record."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I know, but, "at his last known address" is referring to the person's last known address, not the attorney's last known address.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If I were trying to

give service on somebody --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: We're not talking about service; we're talking about notice. Now, service, you're right; I have no problem with service. But there we're dealing with a different ruling.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, how do you want to write it?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I'd just say,
"pursuant to Rule 21-A." We'll let the lawyers
worry about it and let the judge worry about it.

MR. LOW: Right now, does a judge have to send you a copy of the judgment as soon as he enters it?

MR. MCMAINS: The clerk does that; the judge doesn't.

MR. LOW: I mean, is the clerk required to notify you? You know, you argue a case for judgment and then the judge enters it. He just enters it and files it with the clerk. I've always operated on the premise that I've got to double check and keep checking to be sure that the judgment hasn't been entered against me.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): They have got to notify you, but they don't have to send you

1 a copy of it. 2 PROFESSOR EDGAR: 306-A. 3 MR. MCMAINS: Any appealable orders you are supposed to give notice of where it totals 5 your time period until you receive actual notice 6 not to exceed 90 days. And you have three months 7 to do it. 8 MR. LOW: And this wouldn't be an 9 appealable order. 10 MR. MCMAINS: No, this not an appealable order, so it doesn't apply. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's just use 13 the language of 306-A(3), where it says, "notice 14 to the parties or their attorneys of record by 15 first class mail. And that says, "the clerk of 16 the court shall immediately give notice." Do we want to put that in here? The "clerk of the 17 court" or "the court"? 18 19 MR. MCMAINS: It ought to be a clerk 20 function. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "The clerk of the court shall immediately give notice." 22

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MR. TINDALL: I want to be the devil's

MR. TINDALL: Luke?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

advocate on this rule for a minute. Our marching orders are to compare this rule with the Rules of Civil Procedure, right? I mean, without getting into the substance of it. It's obvious to me that we are hopelessly over into the Rules of Civil Procedure at this point. It has nothing to do with the administrative handling of cases.

I mean, to me, this rule is 100 percent in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Now, am I wrong? This is getting into tedious service under rules and by certified mail. All that is in the Rules of Civil Procedure. What has that got to do with the administrative handling of cases?

MR. LOW: Yes, but The Rules of Civil Procedure don't apply. They provide pleadings, motions, but they don't really pertain to this because this is something new. This is a different order. It's not appealable. Rule 306 doesn't apply.

MR. TINDALL: Who's going to write up that order?

- PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's one reason why this really ought to be in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

MR TINDALL: Absolutely.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's something we can recommend to the Court that it do, but I think we ought to go ahead and prepare this so that it can be implemented, whether it is in these rules or in the Rules of Civil Procedure. But I think it really belongs in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

MR. BRANSON: Let's talk about the appealability just a moment. Is there any provision in here if some party is totally wronged by one of these orders to give him any relief? PROFESSOR EDGAR: No.

MR. BRANSON: Let's say the proposed schedule is totally impossible for one party because of death, illness, whatever, to accommodate and the judge enters it anyway, and the party is sitting there. What relief is available?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Mandamus.

MR. BRANSON: Is that adequate remedy for this committee?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: No. But the only way you're going to make it appealable is to have an exception, probably by statute. Because under Article 2249, only final judgments and other types

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1 of certain enumerated interlocutory orders are 2 appealable. And this certainly would be an 3 interlocutory order, so you would have to cover it 4 by statute, I think because you couldn't do it by 5 the rules. 6 MR. BRANSON: Mandamus sure would be a 7 hard remedy --PROFESSOR EDGAR: 8 Well, it is just 9 like any discovery order. It is an onerous 10 burden, but you don't have to show up using 11 discretion or something like that. 12 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Luke, let me ask you 13 a question. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. 15 PROFESSOR EDGAR: I really want to 16 come back just one more time and suggest that we 17 make it clear that this order be in writing. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 19 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Now, you said 20 "rendered and signed." 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. 22 PROFESSOR EDGAR: But I really think 23 it ought to be "rendered in writing," or something 24 like that. I think there ought to be a little 25 more than the expressed burden imposed on the

1 trial court to enter a written order or something. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I'll read it. 3 "The Court shall render and sign its written order." 4 5 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Okay. That's fine. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: So it will read, "As 7 soon as reasonably practical after the time period 8 for responding to a proposed plan as elapsed, the 9 Court shall render and sign its written order, or 10 if any additional parties are added, its amended 11 order for completion of discovery, for preparation 12 of trial and for trial sitting. The clerk of the court shall immediately give notice by copy of the 13 14 order to the parties or their attorneys of record 15 by first class mail." 16 JUDGE THOMAS: Luke, what about --17 just so there's no question, why not put "amended written order" also. 18 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. "Its order or 20 amended order." -- "appeal the order or amended 21 order." Okay. 22 - MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. 24 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): As long as

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we're on C, I still think we should rectify our

conflicts between these Administrative Rules and Rule of Civil Procedures. And I sure want to get notice -- as I read these rules I can, one, not file anything and I got a 270-day trial sitting, or I can go under Class C or I can go under Class D, right? I file a lawsuit and I just want to get mine done in 270. The defense lawyer filed something with the court and doesn't give me notice of it, and I don't think he's required to. And I think you have to conform Rule 72 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states "Whenever any party files or asks leave to file any pleading, plea, motion of any character." Now, either this has got to be any -- or pardon, made without waiver of any rights filed with the Court a proposed motion or completion of discovery or we have to add the word "plan" over in Rule 72 to make it absolutely clear that we're going to get notice of these proposed completion of discovery rulings.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sam, what civil rule did you cite me?

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Rule 72.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rule 72, okay.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Rule 72

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1 doesn't contain the word "plan." We're dealing 2 with a new concept. So instead of calling this a 3 plan we can call it a motion for completion of discovery or we can add the word "plan" to Rule 5 I just want the parties to give each other 6 notice of what to do -- they do. 7 PROFESSOR EDGAR: "Shall file with the 8 court a motion proposing a plan for completion of 9 discovery"? 10 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): No. I think 11 urged Rule C-1, if you're going to leave Rule 72 12 in effect, you don't call this a plan. 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: No, I know. Just 14 listen to me. 15 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Yes. A 16 motion for a plan. 17 PROFESSOR EDGAR: "File with the Court 18 a motion for a proposed plan for completion of 19 discovery." 20 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): That would 21 do it. 22 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Wouldn't that do 23 it? 24 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Sure. That 25 would bring Rule 72 right into effect.

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PROFESSOR EDGAR: "File with the Court a motion for a proposed plan for completion of discovery." And then you have a motion tying you with Rule 72.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): It may be better to file a plea.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): But you might just want to change the Rule 72 and add the word "plan."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The problem is sometimes you forget to do those things. If we could do this in this rule while we've got it here, then we don't have to worry about maybe forgetting about adding something to Rule 72.

MR. ADAMS: Well, it really seems like in the federal practice -- I keep going back to it, but they call it a "scheduling order," is what they call that. And instead of a plan, it seems like it would be more accurate or consistent to use something like a scheduling order because it is an order, it's not a plan. It's going to be an order; it's going to be in writing, and it's going to be sent to all the parties. If you call it a scheduling order it would be --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: A proposed

1 scheduling order? 2 MR. ADAMS: A proposed scheduling 3 order. 4 PROFESSOR EDGAR: It would be a motion 5 for a propped scheduling order. 6 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): A motion for 7 a proposed scheduling order, but you have to 8 change it everywhere it appears as being plaintiff 9 -- change it to motion. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, this has come 11 up before, but I can't remember how it got 12 resolved. Is anything that's filed a pleading or 13 is that just the petition and the answer, and that 14 sort of thing, Rusty? Is this proposed plan --15 MR. MCMAINS: See, there's no talk 16 about -- our rules don't have any definitions of 17 pleadings as an instrument because all the 18 instruments have names. 19 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): You talked 20 earlier about the term within 30 days after filing 21 of the "initial pleading"? And you said our Rules 22 of Civil Procedure don't ever use initial 23 pleading. 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: They don't call that

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"initial pleading."

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): We damn sure don't want a plan of yours either.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, a plan, that's right. I'm trying to address that. I'm just wondering whether "pleading" as used in Rule 72 encompasses everything gets filed except the specifics, which are motions and --

MR. MCMAINS: Well, motion is an application for relief or actions of the court, as defined. I mean, we try to define what "motions" were. And, basically, all instruments that were filed were either pleadings or motions.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): If we adopt Hadley's suggestion, though, there can't be any questions.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right. All right. Where all do we make a change?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: All right. First of all, you do it in C-1 where it says "plan." Then you do it in C-2, twice. Then you do it in C-4, second line and I haven't gotten any further than that. Then it would be in E. There it would simply read to a schedule rather than plan -- just say schedule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where is that now.

MR. MCMAINS: E, Page 4.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's see, that takes care of 4. We talked about the conflict with one 166-G -- C and D.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yeah, I've got a question. C-4 does conflict, I think, with 166-G. And for that matter -- and I hadn't wanted to get ahead of us, but I think that Paragraph A back on Page 2 might conflict with Rule 245.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's see, what conflicts with 245, Hadley?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Just a second.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I think Paragraph

A. Let me look now. I just made a note on there
earlier. Let me look back and see.

You see, Rule 245 deals with the assignment of cases for trial generally. And so it seems to me that all of this, beginning with Subparagraph A, you need to consider Rule 245 because all of this is going to conflict with 245.

All right. It may not, but they're really talking about different things, yet they seem to be somewhat -- and I just raised the question about whether -- I mean, there's really not

anything inconsistent with what we are doing with Rule 245, yet the whole philosophy of assigning cases for trial has drastically changed.

So, again, I come back that I really think that 3, 4, and 5 need to be in the Rules of Procedure. And Rule 245 is one thing that needs to be considered there. And I don't know whether we could do anymore, except maybe to point that out to the Court, and point out that there are apparent inconsistencies with Rule 245, Rule 166-G, and this kind of thing. And somebody needs to go through very carefully and see wherein there might be some other conflicts.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's true.

245 says, "The Court is on its own motion" and I

guess this directs the Court how it must exercise

its discretion in ruling on its own motion, but it

certainly, I mean, no question --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The philosophy is different.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, yes, very much.

- PROFESSOR EDGAR: And these standing
side by side with the Rules of Civil Procedure
governing over these in the event of any conflict

would certainly give rise to --

MR. LOW: Plus, 245 says, "may," and then our rule uses sometimes "shall." You know, the Court "shall" do certain things. 245 says the Court "may."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I'm saying that I think the rules literally could sit side by side, but the philosophy expressed in them are inconsistent.

MR. LOW: Well, and also, the language will somewhat have to be changed. It might have to be from "may" to "shall" in some cases. And I agree that we ought to just point out to them that they should consider putting part of this, maybe, into Rule 245 as they deem appropriate or changing 245 to dovetail with that. And that's the most you can do.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I mean, really, it seems to me that the Court could simply abolish current Rule 245, and make Rules 3, 4 and 5 Subdivisons A, B and C of new Rule 245.

MR. LOW: Right.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Or something. There are a number of different ways it can be done.

But it's going to take some real careful thought,

it seems to me. And I don't really know that we

igneric Target are equiped to sit here right now and try to think through all of the possible ramifications in the best way recommended that it be done.

MR. LOW: I would move that that's what we do.

and 5 out of these Administrative Rules and put them right into 166, first of all, and then started splitting what would be a pleading or what, you know, facts -- broadcasting that through the rules, then you would really be able to put all this in the rules because it's pretrial docket control. It's right what 166 originally started out to do with a lot more specifics and teeth and less discretion with a trial court whether to do or not to do it.

MR. LOW: And by some definitions, in other words, so you wouldn't have to repeat by each rule such and such means pleadings, docket control. You know, what you are talking about right in the rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: There are conflicts with Rule 166-G and C and D, because 166 is altogether discretionary, and this rule takes that discretion away and makes it mandatory. So what

166 says the Court may do, and what 245 says the Court may do, the Court is now required to do under those Administrative Rules, in many cases; is that right, Judge?

JUDGE CASSEB: That's right. But then you're saying that the Rules of Procedure are going to take precedence over this thing. But then if you take this out and put it under rules, then you're not going to have nothing to comply with House Bill 1658.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I know. And that's not likely that we're going to get these in the rules, probably not likely.

We get now to this 3D, we get to the problem that Kronzer has raised. Jim believes that when a party feels aggreived by the entry or the rendition of an order for completion of discovery for preparation for trial and for trial setting, that that party ought to be able to ask for a hearing and get a hearing to complain in open court to the judge.

In any case, these rules only permit that if the case appears to be sufficiently complicated to require close supervision. In other words, 4 is the only place where you can request that a

scheduling conference be held which the Court shall hold.

MR. LOW: And it goes further.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Now, what did you just say, 4?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sorry, D.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: D, all right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I apologize. I was reading the 4 in parenthesis. D on Page 15 of the materials is labeled 4; is that right. No, it's on Page 3. That's right, at the bottom there, right below where we've been working. I've got two drafts going here.

It is the only place where you can ask for and require the Court to hold a hearing on your scheduling.

MR. LOW: In addition to that, I mean, if you write it the way that Crown is talking about, it might take care of another problem.

Because what if somebody has filed a motion for scheduling order, does that take priority then that you can't have a conference unless it's complicated? Or what takes priority, you know?

And if you put it like he says, that in any case they may do that, that would include a case where

somebody has already made application or there might be other orders.

I think you ought to be able to get a hearing at any time, and that ought to take precedence over the other, because what happens the way it's written is, if somebody has already made application for one, does that preempt this, or what? Which one prevails, D or the one above?

And if Kronzer -- what he's talking about will take care of that situation, priorities.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So the Court doesn't have to have any conference with the lawyers or the parties unless the Court thinks the case requires close supervision.

JUDGE CASSEB: Or to put it on the complex docket.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's the way they would define it, requires close supervision.

MR. LOW: I would move that we put that any party may request that a scheduled conference be held. You might have to change some of the other language. I think the party ought to have the right to request it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just say, "at any time," and strike out "a case appears to be

sufficiently complicated to require close
supervision." "At any time a party may request
that a scheduling conference be held, which the
Court shall hold."

MR. LOW: You don't want to put it

MR. LOW: You don't want to put it where somebody requests it, like, within three days of trial. I don't know. We better just go ahead and leave it like you have got it, because I see a can of worms.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Just change D.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): No, you can't change D because all these things run after it on the next page. D is set up for that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's make this -- well, let's see. Is D ever referred to after that?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's just insert the D. Let's see if we can make that E, what is now D, and then just write a new D that says part of that language. The part that we were going to leave in, D. "If at any time a case" -- no, "at any time a party may request that a scheduling conference be held."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The party may

request a scheduling conference.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: "May request a scheduling conference." A scheduling hearing is easier because hearings are defined, and notice to the parties, and all that sort of thing. So "the scheduling hearing which the Court shall hold."

JUDGE CASSEB: Within the same timeframe period.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Within 10 days.

JUDGE WOOD: 10 days of what?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Of the request.

JUDGE WOOD: Well, the request shouldn't be made until all parties have answered to appear.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Actually, this doesn't kick in until you have got appearances, Judge.

JUDGE WOOD: All right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Then old D would become E. Judge, what we've done here is, the committee's consensus is that, any party should have the right to have a scheduling conference. The only scheduling conference that is provided for now is, whenever a party believes that the case needs close supervision, that's D. So we

have suggested that we insert a new D.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Luke, why don't you put that on 5 within C because it's the only one it could apply to. You've got that --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. That's fine. It would be (5) under C. (5) under C would be, "At any time a party may request a scheduling hearing which the Court shall hold within 10 days of the request."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, now, the top
of C talks about "within 30 days after the general
appearance of the last defendant to appear." Then
we don't want to say "at any time." You might
say, "within any time thereafter."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, why don't we just strike out "any time."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's right.

JUDGE CASSEB: That's it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "A party may request a scheduling hearing which the Court shall hold within 10 days of the request." Then D would stay D.

MR. BEARD: Now, are all of those subsections on D back in under that, too? Are you going to repeat that?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That will be C-5, so
we don't change D.

MR. BEARD: Well, you're required
under the present D to file -- under 1 and 2

you're supposed to do certain things.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're not going to talk about how complicated it is or why it needs special attention. It's just that if you want to have a hearing on scheduling, you'll get a hearing.

JUDGE CASSEB: And then go on to something else.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then D goes into trying to get a certification as a complex case.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): So I gather what you are saying by 5 is, that any party can request a scheduling hearing before a judge under C to amend the already schedule that has been filed.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: For any purpose.

That or just whenever he files his proposal. In other words, whenever you file, Sam, your -- C-1, C-2 and 3, you could say, "I want a hearing on this." Of course, if it's C-2, the 10 days is not going to work.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Say you have 1 2 added additional parties and everybody has come 3 in, and we all file a new plan. 20 more days qo 4 by and we want to amend that plan. Can you do it 5 under 5, is what I'm asking you. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, I think so. PROFESSOR EDGAR: Now, would you refer 7 to the scheduling conference under D as a 8 9 scheduling conference or as a scheduling hearing? 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think it ought to be "hearing," because "hearing" already requires 11 12 notice to the parties and open court and that sort 13 of thing. 14 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Okay. So you want 15 to change that "conference" on the last line to 16 read "hearing"? 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, conference 18 permits it to be held in chambers. If parties 19 don't object, hearings can be held in chambers, 20 too. Don't you think that ought to be "hearing" 21 because we know what hearings are? 22 PROFESSOR EDGAR: I agree. 23 JUDGE CASSEB: Where are you 24 changing? 25 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's in Line 3 of

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1 D, the very last line on Page 3. JUDGE CASSEB: Okay. Changing it to 2 3 what? 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: To "scheduling 5 hearing." 6 JUDGE CASSEB: Okay. 7 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Although you do have 8 pretrial conferences. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Then that 10 would be in the third line of the fourth page, 11 too, "scheduling hearings." 12 PROFESSOR EDGAR: And the next 13 sentence, the next line underneath that, too. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And hearing, yes. 15 PROFESSOR EDGAR: And in 2, also. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Conference" would 17 be changed to "hearing" throughout so I could pick 18 up the notice requirements. 19 MR. BEARD: Under this scheduling 20 hearing, the judge does not have to do anything. 21 He listens to them and he just says "forget it;" is that right. Under D, he has to do one, two, 22 23 three, four, five, six. But in this one he 24 listens, and he doesn't have to do anything?

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

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That's right.

What's been omitted is the opportunity to go to . 1 2 the judge and plead with him. 3 Okay. We didn't have any other changes on Page 4. 5 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Now, under rule --6 nothing on Page 4, you did change E, didn't you, 7 the schedule a while ago? 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Scheduling 9 hearing"? 10 MR. EDGAR: In E, in all cases where 11 the proceeding is not subject to a "schedule" 12 rather than "plan." You know, we changed "plan" to 13 "schedule" a while ago. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay, good. 15 JUSTICE WALLACE: Is that "schedule" or "scheduling order"? 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Scheduling order." 18 JUSTICE WALLACE: Is it "schedule" or 19 "scheduling order"? We referred to "scheduling 20 order." 21 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Let's see what 22 Subsection E is. 23 JUSTICE WALLACE: It's on the motion 24 for a proposed scheduling plan. 25 PROFESSOR EDGAR: I guess that would

be "schedule order." Yes, "scheduling order." 1 2 JUDGE THOMAS: So, could we just say 3 like on E, "In all cases where the proceedings are 4 not subject to a scheduling order under Section C 5 or Section D"? 6 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Right. 7 JUDGE THOMAS: Comma. 8 PROFESSOR EDGAR: JUSTICE WALLACE: 9 How did "scheduling 10 order" get under there when it was a "plan" 11 everywhere else? 12 PROFESSOR EDGAR: I don't know. think Mr. Friessen probably was thinking of those 13 14 alternatively in his mind because it would --15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, under D, a 16 close supervision case, you have to have an order. 17 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, you do under 18 C, too. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Under C we talked 20 about plan and that's --21 MR. EDGAR: Yes, we had a scheduling plan, though. The Court then could render an 22 23 order. See, so it's going to be subject to a 24 scheduling order as a result of a plan. See C-4,

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so it would be scheduling order under both of

1 them. 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right. There 3 are some language inconsistencies. PROFESSOR EDGAR: At the top of Page 4 5 5. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 7 PROFESSOR EDGAR: I think we need to 8 take a look at Rule 166-B(5)(b). 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've got some 10 problems here with parenthesis 2 at the top of 11 Page 5 because of the provisions in Rule 166-B and 12 elsewhere. 13 PROFESSOR EDGAR: B(5)(b) 14 specifically, and Rule 63. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: B(5)(b) and Rule 163 -- Rule 63, isn't it? 16 17 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Rule 63. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: On pleadings and 19 discovery, which are 30 days and 10 days before 20 trial and 7 days before trial. 21 MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Let me 22 interject too because I'm going to be 23 corss-examined about this. As you read subsection

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2 there, literally on its face, you can't get to

trial before 135 days. So you've got 90 days for

257 1 discovery and 25 days before the trial setting. 2 And I was instructed specifically to tell you-all, "Ain't no damn Supreme Court going to slow our 3 courts down." 4 5 I'm serious. We try some cases within 40 days of filing. 6 7 MR. MORRIS: The answer to that is, 8 don't get on that track. Filing those -- over 9 there under the other two options, file what you 10 That's only for people who don't do a damn want. 11 thing, Sam. 12 JUDGE CASSEB: What's the conflict you 13 said? 14 We'll get right to that. 15

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've got 30 days.

JUDGE CASSEB: Tell me what the rule is. I don't have a copy.

> PROFESSOR EDGAR: Rule 166-B(5)(b). JUDGE CASSEB: Says what?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, it talks about the 30 days. Let me find it here. "If you expect to call an expert witness when the identity of so and so has not been previously disclosed if -appropriate inquiry, then you must supplement to include the names and telephone numbers, but in no

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event less than 30 days prior to the beginning of trial except upon legal court."

Rules of Discovery, as they were overhauled in 1984, contemplated that -- we got a pretty serious problem here on this (2) on top of Page 5. And it is a direct conflict with the discovery rules.

The discovery rules that we set up in 1984 permitted us to take discovery all along. Of course, 166 could set a different schedule, and without any kind of an order being entered, discovery was to be supplemented not less than 30 days prior to trial, including the designation of experts and a lot of people practice that, they don't designate their experts until they get up to that 30-day deadline for a lot of good reasons, maybe some bad ones. But, anyway there are a few.

The way this is set up, discovery has to be completed 45 days before the date set for trial, so we've got an absolute conflict there.

MR. MORRIS: Luke, not really. As you know, I was on that subcommittee that put this mess together. Down there in G, once again, you've been given the right to extend time limits

by agreement of the parties. And if you come up to that 45-day period and you haven't got it completed, both parties can extend it. I know up there it says "shall," but the feeling was that by giving the parties the right under G to extend their discovery, that they were getting off the hook.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If Rule 1 says TRCP controls, then you can supplement inside of 45 days. You can supplement down to 30 days, so you're making discovery in violation of this rule without agreement.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: If the parties agree, Lefty, then you wouldn't have any problem. But if the parties don't agree, then you would have a direct conflict. So I don't really think that the rule really solves the problem.

MR. LOW: That's a re-drafting problem that's going to take some time.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the supplementation of the rule, you know, that is if you discover that an answer, when given, was wrong. So a party Branson knows that an answer, when given to me was wrong six months ago, and he answers it on 31 days prior to trial, he amends,

which is his duty. And when he has done that, he's straightened it out under the rules; he has no more responsibility to me. I'm cut off from discovery long since. And he isn't going to agree to me taking the deposition of a guy over again because he doesn't have to. So I don't get any discovery on a changed answer that he knew was wrong whenever it was given.

I don't mean to blame Frank. He would never do that to me. But there's an example of how it can happen, and the rules are in conflict there and they need to be straightened out. Are we going to -- and for information that constitutes supplementation and gives rise to the need for discovery, is that good cause to take discovery within 30 days?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I think the place to attack this problem, though, is is 166-B. Because 166-B on the 30-day rule is really almost in a -- particularly in a medical malpractice case or a products case is your continuance motion.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Is what?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Is a

continuance motion on 31 days before a trial you

get your -- the real experts. You have to run out there and take their depositions and then you have to name your experts and run out and get them, and so the trial court just passes the case. And I really think we ought to attack the problem in 166-B.

What's happening is, the courts, with the local rules are the pre-trial rules, are saying, "Plaintiffs will designate their experts by January 1; defendant's will do theirs by February 1." And that will be 60 days before trial.

And I noticed -- I haven't seen it, but

Kilgarlin was saying in a talk he gave that the

Dallas Court of Appeals has excluded or reversed

because the trial judge allowed a witness to be

disclosed in violation of their rules, which is a

60-day rule, and said that that witness shouldn't

have been allowed to testify.

So I don't know how you're going to do it, but I really think that we need to amend 166-B so that these experts are designated in enough time in advance for trial so that we could complete discovery.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: The scheduling order should take care of that.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That's right.

But there is no scheduling order in this part of
the Administrative Rules. This is when you don't
do anything, as Rusty called my attention to it.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This last 45 days is when 50 percent of all discovery is done.

MR. BRANSON: The person that gets a products or malpractice suit into this time slot doesn't need an expert anyway. You can't possibly get through this process with a medical negligence suit or products suit.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes, but the problem is, a lot of times one side knows always when they lose their expert they just consult until a few days before trial. But you're right; there's an absolute conflict that has to be remedied either here or more, practically, I think in 166-B.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, you've got two dates. So really, Sam, it seems to me like we've got to deal with both. We've got to say that supplementation has got to be done by a date and discovery finished by a subsequent date because when that supplementation comes down you need time to take discovery if you feel you need it. What

if 166-B(5) were changed to say, 45 days and this were changed to say 30 days and that would give you 15 days to try to get the work done, and if not to at least set a basis for good cause?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I'm sure I'm in favor of that because I'm more and more, just like the rest of you, I'm taking a deposition, say, on the first day of trial or they take a deposition on the first day of trial because of the scheduling with the lawyers and the witnesses.

And the judge says, "Well, I'm not going to grant a continuance, this case has been set, but before Dr. Jones testifies you can have his deposition Tuesday night." And, you know, we're all doing that all the time. It seems to me that that the purpose of the rule was to avoid it and we ought to really try to avoid it by the rules.

MR. ADAMS: If you've got a case that's worth all of this discovery that you're talking about, you're going to depose with those experts, you're going to have a scheduling order and that's going to provide for designation of witnesses and the time to take your depositions and all this sort of thing, and if you're not going to have a scheduling order, I think you

ought to just leave it like it is. If neither party cares enough to have a scheduling order rendered, then it's not a distinct enough case to be trying to draw some rules on a hearing.

after a lot of years at it, I'll say that we often have to wake ourselves up to the fact that we're trying a lot of special kinds of cases, those of us who are at this table, and they represent not a very large percentage of the cases that are on file or that even get tried.

And the rules have to accommodate also those cases that the other half of the Bar practices for the other half of the clients that are represented in the state and we shouldn't leave a trap there. We should have supplementation at some point and the opportunity to do discovery if they want to because a lot of those lawyers never will file a scheduled plan or a motion to get a case set for supervision. They'll just try their cases, and probably that's the best way to have cases tried, because people don't have to pay too much to get that kind of trial, and they get as good a trial as they need.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, if the

sentiment of the group is that maybe 30 days is too short a time under Rule 166-B, then if we recommended the amendment of that rule to 45 days, that would coincide with the 45 days here, and then there wouldn't be any conflict between them.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Still don't have any discovery after supplementation, and that's why I wanted to move this to 30, so there would be a 15-day period between supplementation and discovery cutoff where you could at least scramble and try to set up good cause if you couldn't get it done.

MR. BRANSON: That sounds logical.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So we'll change 166-B to 45 days and this one to 30.

MR. BRANSON: Luke, I'm sorry I was out of the room when you-all discussed D under 4. There was a question that bothered me throughout the Task Force that I never quite understood. What happens if the judge doesn't hold a hearing? It says "shall."

MR. MCMAINS: We fixed that.

MR. BRANSON: You did? Okay. It's

been handled.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we really 1 2 didn't fix D. It says, "If at any time the Court 3 believes. Suppose he says, "I don't believe." MR. MCMAINS: But you fixed the 4 scheduling hearing. Are you talking about 5 6 under --7 MR. BRANSON: 4-D. CHAIRMAN SOULES: He's talking about 8 9 D, and what if the judge doesn't believe? That's the first full sentence at the top of 4, Rusty. 10 We should probably say, "The Court shall hold a 11 hearing," like we did on the other one. 12 13 MR. BRANSON: Okay. But let's say you 14 apply, and the Court is in trial, or the Court is in the hospital and the Court, for some reason, 15 16 does not comply by the rule. What are the 17 remedies? 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: None now, because it's discretionary whether he does or doesn't hold 19 20 a hearing. 21 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, it says the court "shall" hold a hearing within 10 days of 22 23 request. 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, I see.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: So it says "shall

1 hold."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm not reading it right.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It seems to me you have to got to go back to mandamus. If that is a mandatory duty and the Court fails to do it, just like failing to hold an in-camera inspection or something like that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If you're entitled to a hearing. You can get that. You may have wished you hadn't.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I really think, though, that language could be cleaned up, saying, "If at any time the Court believes," it requires -- I think it maybe should say, "Should the Court determine that the case requires close supervision it may --" rather than -- I think that's a little more judicial.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Professional.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: "Should the Court determine."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Or "if at any time the Court determines." That would be the least language change.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: "If at any time the

Court determines."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If you want to change it differently, Hadley, that's fine with me.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's fine. I don't care.

JUDGE CASSEB: Where are you now?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're just back on 4

up there at the top. Instead of "If at any time

the Court believes," change it to, "If at any time

the Court determines that a case requires," and so

forth.

All right. I was distracted there. Someone was making a comment about one of these rules on 5 or 6. Was it you Sam Sparks of San Angelo?

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): What happens on -- almost any personal injury case, you want to take the doctor's deposition as close to the date of trial as you can take it. And under these rules, you can't do it. I mean, 30 days under what you amended -- it is 45 right here, 30 is better. But, you know, I don't see why the parties by agreement can't agree to take an expert or do some discovery closer to the date of trial.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: They can under G.

1 Look under G, Sam. MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): All right. 2 JUDGE CASSEB: Tell me what date you 3 changed. You changed 45 to 30? 4 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. In this 6 rule on page --7 JUDGE CASSEB: 5. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 5, in the third 9 line, we changed that to 30. JUDGE CASSEB: Oh, okay. 10 11 PROFESSOR EDGAR: And then you're going to recommend that 165-B(5) be changed to 45. 12 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right, to 14 create 45. PROFESSOR EDGAR: Is that Sam Sparks' 15 16 committee discovery rules? 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Exactly. MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): You know, 18 19 Gilbert and I are standing here talking. You've got a personal injury charge, you're going to have 20 a doctor to testify. A week before trial, he 21 walks in and he says, "I can't come and testify." 22 23 You know, the other side looks at you and says, 24 "I'm not agreeing to any damn deposition." And

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you go to the judge and say, "Well, Judge, I want

a continuance." And he says, "Oh, no, I'm bound by these rules here. You're going to trial."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: You've got good cause, though, see.

problem, Sam. And you're right; motions for continuance are a separate problem, and they're dealt with on Page 6, under subdivision H. We talked about this in the subcommittee earlier today, too. There's a problem here in a conflict between this and our current motions for continuance practice under Rules 251 through 254. And that needs to be separately addressed by the Supreme Court because you're right; I think that might be a proper ground for a continuance under our current rules.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Well, in the current rules, you don't have to show unavailabilty for the first continuance and the next one you do.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: That's right.
That's right.

MR. ADAMS: But the rules right now only require reasonable notice to take a deposition.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right.

MR. ADAMS: And reasonable notice may be the week before a trial. That still be reasonable notice. Under these rules, you're going to take all that out.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: See, the reasonable notice provision of the deposition thing is under fire right now, but that is the only discovery tool there is that doesn't have a long fuse. If you get into a tight spot and you have to have discovery close to trial, there's only one way and that's depositions. And that's why we've got to keep that reasonable and not start giving a bunch of arbitrary deadlines back into depositions because at least you've still got that way out.

MR. ADAMS: Is this going to cut this off with this 30-day or 45-day rule and are they going to cut off --

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Sure, because you don't have a agreement.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Except good cause.
You would have to show good cause.

MR. SPARKS (SAN ANGELO): Well, then you have got to amend that to say by agreement or good cause.

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1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, it says that. PROFESSOR EDGAR: 2 That's what it says 3 on Subdivision G. CHAIRMAN SOULES: On G. 4 5 MR. ADAMS: But then you have got to take up the Court's time with a motion and a 6 7 hearing. CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right. 8 9 whenever you cut off discovery, you have got to 10 show a good cause to get it or by agreement. 11 MR. ADAMS: I think the other party 12 ought to show a prejudice. The party who doesn't 13 want that deposition to be taken is the party who 14 ought to file the motion and ought to come forward 15 with something that substantiates a reason to have 16 it other than just some arbitrary rule. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's not where the 18 burden is on discovery. I mean, maybe that would 19 have been a better way to do it. 20 MR. BRANSON: Maybe we ought to make 21 his client sign. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sorry. 23 MR. BRANSON: Maybe we ought to make 24 his client sign. 25 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's get on, if we can. We do have some problems with this continuance. They need to go into the rules.

It's a quarter to five, so we can work as late as you-all want to work.

We didn't have anything else on Page 5, except -- let's see here. Okay. That's all. Now, on H, I object to the certified mail.

MR. BRANSON: Since there is a conflict between the current rules and the proposed Administrative Rules, would it be appropriate for this committee to move that we delete that portion?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The certified mail portion?

MR. BRANSON: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think so. How many feel we ought to delete it? How many feel you ought to have to communicate with your client by certified mail to be able to prove it to the Court with a green card? No hands.

How many feel you ought to be able to certify to the Court that you have mailed your client a copy and the Court ought to accept that subject to some contest. Show by hands.

MR. BRANSON: I would suggest that the

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entire provision currently conflicts with our
Rules of Civil Procedure. I would move that this
committee urge the deletion of the entire
provision page and continue with our Rules of
Civil Procedure on continuance. And I don't think
that ever got a fair and reasonable hearing in the
Task Force, at least, not at any committee meeting
I was present at.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that is the recommendation of the committee that met that these provisions be put into Rules 251, 252 and 254 where we have the procedures for motions for continuance and the requisites.

MR. BRANSON: At this time I would move that rather than putting them in the rules, we merely urge the Court to delete Section H and continue with our present rules on continuance.

JUDGE WOOD: Without having heard all the reasons in the Task Force, I would agree. I don't see the point. It simply presumes, I would assume, prima facia that the lawyer is somehow or another not advising his client of it and violating his fiduciary relationship with this client. But as I say if it's been hashed out and that's what everybody wants --

MR. BRANSON: That's really not what happened in the committee. Any time anyone attempted to address this problem, they were repressed in the Task Force.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, that's not exactly right. They finally did amend it so you could send a copy of it, but you didn't have to have a signature. For awhile they were strong.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: It only required the signature of your client for a while, Frank, remember?

MR. BRANSON: I'm not suggesting there wasn't discussions, but I'm suggesting that at the point in time this rule was discussed with the full Task Force there was pressure placed on the Task Force that was undue. And the rule was not representing the majority of the Task Force members. It was merely what the Task Force thought the Chief Justice desired. And I would urge that this committee at least go on record opposing Section 8.

- JUDGE WOOD: Well, I have stated my position on it and I agree, but we're not doing that here today, are we?

MR. BRANSON: No. We're at Section 8.

JUDGE WOOD: We're not here discussing 1 philosophy. 2 3 MR. BRANSON: Well, but it does 4 conflict with the current Rules of Civil Procedure 5 so it gives us an opportunity to address that. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've got a motion 7 to delete Subdivision 8 because it conflicts with 8 Rules 1 and 2 because it puts requisites of motions for continuance in two places, two 9 10 independent sets of rules which would be 11 confusing. Is there a second? 12 MR. LOW: I second it. 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Move to second. All 14 in favor show by hands. Opposed? It is unanimous 15 that we delete --16 MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I voted no. 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, I'm sorry. 18 opposed. MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): On my vote, I 19 20 want the record to reflect that I am not for 8 as 21 written, but I think we have to address it, and I 22 would -- -23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What are we 24 addressing? The fact that you give your client a

copy of the motion for continuance, is that the

aspect of it that you want to address, Sam?

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Yes. There was a lot of support for this, not just with the Professor but also with the trial judges in the Task Force and I don't like this. I am really more for making uniform rules of continuance in the 251 series. I'm not for having to get a client to sign it. And I've sure got mixed emotions about mailing a copy, but I voted for mailing a copy and I think that's the compromise that I would probably support, because I was convinced with the problems that are going across the state that that may be a way to eliminate some of the continuances that were not valid.

I just think we have to address it rather than recommend to the Court that this be deleted, because I think something is going to happen and I just assumed we had input on it.

MR. BRANSON: Sam, that was the type of statement that was made in the Task Force, but I never did find out what the cause that went across the state would be. This administrative set of rules is to attempt to address docket problems. I submit Section H does not do that.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, this was

particularly a concern, as I recall, in domestic cases where parties wanted the divorce and they were calling the judge and wanting to know, "Why in the hell can't we get a divorce?" And the Court then looked at the docket and said, "Well, the parties came in and asked for a continuance." And the parties didn't know anything about it, but the attorneys had done it without their client's consent. Now, as I recall, that was part of the problem, wasn't it, Judge Casseb --

JUDGE CASSEB: That's correct.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: -- as we heard it?

And the trial judges were very concerned about this and felt that if the client, in some way, had to be a party to the continuance, that less continuances would be granted.

MR. MCMAINS: Yes. But this is also in Rule 3; it isn't in Rule 4. The first section of it says that Rule 3 doesn't apply, if there's a category case that controls Rule 4. So whoever the lawyers were doing that, that fixed it.

- MR. BRANSON: If it's a problem in domestic relations cases, we could leave it in the domestic relations.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I'm just trying to

reconstruct what happened in the Task Force that's all. I'm not trying to amend it one way or the

MR. MCMAINS: But, I mean, I think we had already established earlier on that we had taken the family cases out of Rule 3.

MR. BRANSON: One thing that got squelched when we attempted to discuss in the Task Force that really bothered me was, by doing this in Rule 3 and making it applicable to family law in Rule 4, you really have taken the profession of law and changed it something other than professional. You basically said, "Lawyers cannot be trusted, and we're going to acknowledge that by the Administrative Rules." And I have not seen in 17 years of law practice that that is the case. And I objected to it then. No one really cared to discuss it with the Task Force. I object to it arduously now, and I consider it an insult.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Did you have a comment to make, Judge Thomas?

JUDGE THOMAS: Going back to what was said, I do agree that there was some conversation that this was a problem in some family law cases, but I got the impression that it was a problem in

other.

the smaller areas as opposed to the specialized family courts. And I'll certainly go on record as saying that it is not something that the family law counsel or the Board's certified family law specialists, who happened, also, to be judges, feel is necessary.

MR. LOW: I think, as Frank said, that's dealt with in the Canon's of Ethics about, you know -- I think it ought to be dealt with there and not here.

attended those, I think if we don't address mailing the thing to your client, at least, that this is going to be a part of the Administrative Rules just like it reads right now. That is something that the Task Force powers it be are going to require.

MR. BRANSON: I still believe you have got nine reasonable men sitting on the court, and I can't believe that they're going to adopt this and slap the legal professors in the face. I couldn't believe that from the Task Force. I think if there is a grievance procedure established, it needs to be followed. And if lawyers are not doing that, they need to be

reprimanded by the same token. I can't see slapping every lawyer in the face in the State of Texas saying, "You can't be trusted."

MR. MORRIS: I think you're right, at least, in your perception, from my having served on that committee with you. The thing that you may recall is that Dean Friessen pointed out that this had been done in a couple of states, and where it had been done, the motions for continuance dropped by over 50 percent and it helped get cases through the system. And that's the purpose of what this Task Force is doing, is getting cases through the system.

address it, and we really talk about just the first sentence, I think the rest of this H is in the rules, "shall state the reason for the delay." You always have got to state the grounds for the motion for continuance; that's already there. "The Court shall make a finding on the record," that's not in the rule but we could change the rule.

But the last thing I want to point out is, if this goes through the way it is, this says "all motions for continuance." It doesn't even say

282 "continuance of the trial date." Every time you 1 file the motion -- you're in trial and you can't 2 take a deposition, you're in trial, and you want a 3 motion for sanctions delayed. Now, this says all motions for continuance. And we file those a lot 5 more often on pretrial matters where really it's 6 just a lawyer's conflict, than we do on a trial 7 date. It may be intended to be directed at the 8 9 trial date, but that's not what it says. PROFESSOR EDGAR: It is; that's what 10 was intended. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's not 12 13 what it says. PROFESSOR EDGAR: But that's what was 14

intended.

MR. BRANSON: Did we not just vote, Luke, to recommend to the Court that they delete Rule 8?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We did.

MR. BRANSON: Well, aren't we now qoing back and doing just what we voted to do.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We are. I just want to be sure that everybody understands that the risk of just shooting at it that way is that this is going in like it reads.

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MR. BRANSON: Going in where?
CHAIRMAN SOULES: In the

MR. BRANSON: To go where?

Administrative Rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: To be promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas and make it a rule that we all have to live with.

MR. BRANSON: Well, isn't it to be addressed by the Supreme Court? I mean, we're not assuming approval of the Supreme Court of that Task Force, which I would submit was not an adequate study of this problem.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: There's a high risk that this will go in like it's written if we don't address the specifics of it that we object to and if -- in other words, I don't want to --

MR. BRANSON: Is that right? If we recommend to the Court that Rule H conflicts with our current rules and recommend against, is there a high risk that the Supreme Court will adopt that verbatim?

JUSTICE WALLACE: Repeating again what I said this morning, there are 9 individuals on the court, and on every other rule that we considered up there everybody has had their say

majority vote.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: My response may not be exactly like being heard, Frank. I'm saying if we just put it to them, up or down, we may not have communicated all we wanted them to hear. If it's going to be adopted judges -- if you don't agree with us to excise it totally, listen to the problems that are there and at least address these where ever you accept H at least change it, in other words. So far all we've told them is up or down. We haven't told them --

Mr. Chairman is, should -- certainly a motion for continuance should be written and signed and it should state the reasons. And I would assume what we're objecting to -- or some of us are objecting to -- is the elite words "by the client" and shall contain a certification by counsel that a copy has been mailed by certified mail to his client. That expression, I assume, is what we're objecting to, isn't it.

- CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the word "all" as opposed to a motion for continuance of the trial date.

MR. BRANSON: And why should the trial

judge enter a specific reason for the continuance?

JUSTICE WALLACE: If the reason to set out in the motion and the judge signs the order is that not a finding on the record or the reason for the delay?

MR. BRANSON: It always has been.

JUSTICE WALLACE: It looks like that's
just a duplicate to me.

MR. BEARD: I spoke to them the last time we had it up. I don't think the trial court should do anything but, you know, grant or deny these motions. And it's only on findings of fact and conclusions of law we should say anything else. I said that the last time we went through it but — the trial courts have got plenty to do and it depends on the lawyers to go draw it up anyway. The lawyers are going to draw it up with all these reasons in there. I just don't think the Court should have to make anymore findings.

maybe the Court might like to know, at least I want it in the record, it is sufficiently inexplicit as to what a client is. I'd be real interested if you ever get down to the Witlog and

Styers case (phonetic) case, to find out whether or not lawyers send motions for continuance to the insurance company or to his insured, in order to identify who he thought his client was, or as to whether or not he ought to send it to both, or only the insured, or whatever. I mean, it's that type of nonspecificity that there's a lot of things here that don't meet the eye. They are designed to deal with, you know, a specific type of problem. There ought to be some other way to control it. But I'm inclined to agree with Frank, just slapping everybody's face because of a few violators, is not a good way to handle it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I just want to be sure everybody's comments are on record.

We've taken a vote, and Frank is right. But at least if the Court disagrees with us, I want them to be able to look at this and see the reasons why we did object, and if we are going to take any part of it, at least try to take only those parts that make sense.

JUDGE THOMAS: The other extremely controversial area, at least, that we've hit so far were, you know, the effective dates and we came up in that situation with an alternative.

And, you know, going along with what you say, my experience from having talked to the Dean and served, also, on the Advisory Committee is, you know, this is an area where he's real big. And, therefore, if he has a shot of getting it back in by making his pitch to the Court, maybe this would be another appropriate place to say, "Okay.

Here's an alternative." So if we did it on the time limits and the effective dates, then this might be a good one to do it.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Let me make a suggestion along that line. Let me just read what I've kind of constructed here. "All motions for continuance of the trial date shall be made in writing and signed by the client or shall contain a statement by counsel that a copy has been mailed to the client. The motion shall comply with the applicable Texas Rules of Civil Procedure." And that way then you've got to go back, and we're right back to Rule 251 to 254.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If the Court is going to take any of H, how many feel that's acceptable or livable? Show your hands.

MR. LOW: That's all right. But I have one comment on that. 251 allows the

attorneys and so forth; 252 is just the client only. So, now, if you say that, you know, "or" that the clients received a copy, are you implying that then the client didn't sign it?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: "It shall be made in writing and signed by the client or shall contain a statement by counsel that a copy has been mailed to the client."

MR. LOW: All right. What I'm saying is, I see where you're making it on the lack of want of testimony, then the client has got to sign. I don't know. You know how the courts have interpreted that, but that's got to be signed by the client anyway. You might be implying in that that the attorney can do it in that situation or you amend --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Well, I think you can.

MR. LOW: You know, maybe the cases have held that, but the rule up here says -- Rule 251, says by the attorney or the client, the affidavit here. I mean, if we're not running any conflict, I agree with what you're saying; I'm not disagreeing.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): I disagree. I

don't think anybody is going to get a signature with a rule that permits you to send a copy. And I think the very -- and that's the reason I voted against Frank's motion. I think to even have the option of having a client sign is going to bring problems to lawyers, because as a practical matter, where it's a defense situation I usually can figure out who my client is.

As a matter of fact, the criticism has been, you know, there are less plaintiffs out there that would agree to a continuance if you had to bring them in to sign a motion. But just having those words in there when I know with that option lawyers are going to send copies to clients, and having signed them, just having that option, I think is going to bring problems to lawyers. And for that reason, my alternative position would simply be a certification that you send a copy and drop the language "having the clients sign a motion for continuance." And many times, it's a real problem getting a signature of a client.

- CHAIRMAN SOULES: Would you accept that, Hadley?

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I don't have any problem with it, but what's wrong with the

option? I mean, as long as the option is there,
why how does that create a problem, Sam?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If I could I speak
to that. So that the lawyer is on the stand under

Yes. Why didn't you?

cross-examination he's been sued. You had the option, did you not, to have your client sign

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): That was my answer, Hadley.

MR. BEARD: It still needs to be mailed or delivered because occasionally you have a client that does not want anything mailed to him --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Mailed or delivered to the client.

MR. BEARD: -- or to his home, because he doesn't want anybody to know that he's been sued.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: My only concern,

Sam, is that in view of what I remember from that

Task Force meeting, that many of the judges,

particularly, felt that the language of the client

signing the motion for continuance would reduce

the number of continuances.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But the Judge can

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this?

handle that by saying, "I'm going to reset this in three days and I want your client here to give some testimony. I want to hear your client on this point."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I understand that.

But I'm just trying to thing of getting this

through the Supreme Court, that's all.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, I know.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I have no problem with proceeding with that suggestion personally, but I don't know whether practically that will sell or not.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: How many feel that the option to have the matters signed by the client should be included in the rule? How many feel that it should be deleted from the rule? How many feel that it should be continued? Let me see that.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I don't think it should be, but --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All votes -- there's two. You vote, O'Quinn, to continue it in there?

MR. O'QUINN: It's optional either way.

MR. BRANSON: Luke, what he's saying

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is, you can leave out the defendant or client. 1 PROFESSOR EDGAR: John's voting that 2 3 we should leave the option in there. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. It's 7 to 2 5 to delete it. And the court should be apprised 6 that there is feeling on the committee that the 7 option should be preserved. But the feeling is 8 that the alternative would be, "All motions for 9 continuance of the trial dates shall be in writing 10 and shall contain a statement by counsel that a copy has been mailed or delivered to the client. 11 12 The motion shall comply with the applicable Texas Rules of Civil Procedure." 13 14 MR. TINDALL: Could that be a trial on 15 the merits? CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, they use trial 16 17 dates on this. 18 MR. TINDALL: Well, in family law cases you've got a whole series of trials. That's 19 a day long -- well, you do; you have day-long show 20 21 causes. - MR. MCMAINS: Well, at the moment, 22 23 this rule doesn't apply to the family law anyway. 24 MR. TINDALL: Okay. As long as I'm 25 not --

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MR. O'QUINN: I don't understand why this rule doesn't apply to family law cases.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think it may.

They use "trial date" and "trial setting". Either one is fine with me, whichever. Does it matter to anybody?

to being overruled again by the Chair, I think you've gotten into the philosophy right now on that vote and did not address the deal as you say who is commissioned to do. Show the conflict and then try to resolve the conflict with it, the existing Rules of Civil Procedure. Now, I'm saying we have gotten away from that and take a vote to do away with this whole thing, that, to me, getting into the philosophy of this thing.

I'm telling you, personally, I always have been against it, but what I'm saying is, we're getting off track here. And if we're going to start getting into philosophy on these rules, we ought to address to all of them once and for all and not keep jumping around.

Now, if these rules, as they stand here, are in conflict with the Rules of Procedure that we are on now, we ought to do it like you have been

doing right along.

Some of the discussion was off point, and I can see that. And I appreciate your bringing us back on track. The next changes that we had on Page 6, that was to change, and I'll have to go through all these in order -- because the last bears on it

JUDGE CASSEB: Why don't we agree to quit at 5:30, Luke, seriously.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're not going to resume on these tomorrow, but we can adjourn.

MR. MORRIS: If we're not going to resume then, I think that we -- if we're going to do a philosophical-type vote, we ought to sure try to get that in before we quit.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's do that but first I'd like to get a vote that will you will refer the changes back to the subcommittee and whatever, you know, sort of like we did the Appellate Rules, that we can express to the Supreme Court the matters that we did bring up earlier as being our requested changes.

Let me just tell you what they are so that nobody is surprised. We changeed "family law"

into "title," delete the provisions to local rules in F and G so that all family law matters are controlled by Rule 4 and not by variance of various local rules.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Luke, on page 7

JUSTICE WALLACE: Luke, on page 7 there we changed "child custody" to "conservatorship."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: C-3.

was changed to "conservatorship shall order."

That takes care of the family law parts on Rule

5. That needs to be scrubbed out against Rule

185, "sworn account rule," which we didn't have

time to do but we know we have to. Then on

page 9 --

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Signing of judgment.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: "Defer signing of judgment" under B-3, instead of "entry of judgment," the same problem we've had; that should be "defer signing of judgment."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: And then C-1, same thing. -

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And C-1, the same.

Change "entry" to "signing." We did not have

anything on Page 10.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I think on Page 10 --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Maybe we did.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: No, four lines from the bottom of E, the word "then" shouldn't be there.

JUSTICE WALLACE: "Occurs," and then strike "then."

PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The word "then" should be deleted. Okay, strike that. And then we've got to revise a statute reference whenever it gets codified for 200-A on Page 11. And then on Page 12 we have to signal a change in 18-A to change a word. Rule 18-A was written whenever the office of the presiding judge of the Administrative Judicial Region was called a Presiding Judge of the Administrative Judicial District. That's not a big deal there.

On Page 13, we have a question as to whether or not E applies to all budgeting in all courts or with just the budgeting for the Administrative Region, and that's on the record in our subcommittee meeting and the Court can look at that and decide. And then on Page 14 at the top on item C.

1	PROFESSOR EDGAR: Page what?
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Page 14.
3	PROFESSOR EDGAR: Page 13.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Do we have a change
5	there?
6	PROFESSOR EDGAR: 9-B, third line from
7	the bottom, delete "to be in effect."
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sorry. Where is
9	that now? Page 13.
10	PROFESSOR EDGAR: Third line from the
11	bottom on Page 13.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
13	JUDGE CASSEB: To do what?
14	PROFESSOR EDGAR: Delete the words "to
15	be in effect," and that then ties in with Rule C,
16	which you're going to give us.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right. Thank
18	you, Hadley. Okay, then we get over here to C at
19	the top of Page 14. It should be changed to read,
20	"Submit the local rules," and this is the
21	presiding judge of the
22	JUDGE CASSEB: Local administrative.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: "The local
2 4	administrative judge will submit the local rules
2 5	adopted by their courts to the presiding judge of

1 the administrative region for review, comment and approval before they are furnished, " is the way 2 the Rules of Civil --3 JUDGE CASSEB: Take out the word 5 "transmitted"? CHAIRMAN SOULES: The word "furnished" 6 7 is used in the Rules of Civil Procedure; 8 "furnished" instead of "transmitted." 9 JUDGE CASSEB: Okay. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: " -- to the Supreme 11 Court. And add for approval pursuant to Tex R. 12 Civ. P. 3-A.* JUDGE CASSEB: 3-A? 13 14 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Yes. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We have got Page 15, 16 Rule 9, that will now be 10. The local rules -other than that, that's the only change. 17 18 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Since each county is 19 going to have to do it, then maybe "each" should be proper, because each county is going to have to 20 21 adopt local rules, are they not, which will 22 ultimately be approved by the Supreme Court? 23 Isn't that what I was told? 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. Well, 25 actually, some of them. In the multi-district

counties, I quess that's okay, too. 1 PROFESSOR EDGAR: So it would be each 2 county. 4 JUDGE CASSEB: They have them in each 5 county now. CHAIRMAN SOULES: In multi-county 6 districts the rules can be different in the court 7 in Zapata County and Webb County for the same 8 9 court. All right, Judge. 10 MR. TINDALL: Yes. Because you have 11 another judge overlapping from another district 12 that comes in. 13 JUDGE CASSEB: So you have got 14 overlapped in some, right, and then you got the 15 terms? You still got terms there you know. 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay, Hadley, I guess 17 I wasn't following you. We just insert "local" and do we make any other changes? 18 PROFESSOR EDGAR: Just insert "local." 19 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: No other changes on 21 15? PROFESSOR EDGAR: No other changes. 22 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then at the end 24 on Page 16, add a little "i." It says, "Local rules shall not conflict with these rules." 25

"These rules," that's a term that's used all 1 2 through, "these rules" and that's it. Anybody 3 object to those or got any additional ones? JUDGE CASSEB: We have got "effective 4 5 date." 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Effective date. talked about that one. Okay, now we're ready to 7 8 philosophize, and I don't say that lightly. 9 know I'm serious. Who wants to start? 10 MR. BEARD: Luke, are we going to have 11 a bigger attendance tomorrow? CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know. 12 13 MR. BEARD: It's not a very fair 14 representation of this committee for us to vote on 15 philosophy, I don't think. 16

CHAIRMAN SOULES: This committee was notified in writing more than once that this day would be the day to pass on these rules, and the Chair can do no more than notify everybody of the schedule. We've got 661 pages of other business to tend to, and we'll be lucky to get through the important parts of it tomorrow and Saturday.

PROFESSOR EDGAR: I assume then we will not discuss this matter tomorrow at all. CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're through with

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the Administrative Rules for this session, and I don't know whether we will get another shot at them.

JUDGE CASSEB: I think, then, let them express what they want to express and we don't have to take any kind of a vote.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right. I'm not expecting a vote, but put everything on the table that you wish.

MR. BEARD: I don't think the Court is going to pay a lot of attention to us, whatever we would vote with the limited group we have here.

That's all I'm saying.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I know and I'm sorry. It's still not 5:30, and this meeting was scheduled to last until 5:30. Who wants the floor first?

MR. TINDALL: I want to talk about the disposition rates. I'm not here to get some verbal broad-side on the rules. I want to try to work with what's been presented to us but be serious about recommending from this committee a change on family law cases.

The rules as presently proposed treat all family law cases the same and that's simply

wrong. An action brought for temporary orders where the couple is just breaking up, an action brought by the Attorney General for paternity of a child to get support, an action by a mother to get her child support enforced are totally different creatures from a couple that's been married for 35 years and going through the pain of a divorce.

And we in the counsel have struggled with this and have tried to come back with different sets of requirements for the courts to give expedited hearings on matters that involve a need for temporary orders when they're in the house or there's been a grab of furniture or cars and no one is getting paid. Those cases need to be mandated and be given expedited hearings.

Paternity cases where children are not getting support need to be given expedited hearings. People that are not getting their orders enforced for support ought to be given expedited hearings. And we proposed far greater disposition rates than what's in these actions.

Now, the other side of that, though, is it is wrong in the counsel's opinion to start forcing the disposition of the divorce case, not these other matters that I don't want to get mixed in.

And what we have urged is that the divorces not fall within this 90, 180 and 360, except when any party files a motion for disposition.

Now, short of that it is wrong to start
mandating the divorce cases that are going to be
set. Now, socially, that is wrong. The courts
are not prepared for it. And it's not a problem
in the courthouse of getting divorces set if
that's what you need. The problem is you can't
get the parties controlled at the time of
separation or the orders are not being enforced or
children can't get paternity cases heard. That's
the problem on the early end.

And I urge this committee to accept -- I've worked with Judge Thomas on this; our counsel is unanimous on this; trying to make some sophistication about family law cases and not just throw them into cases in the pot of liquidated monetary claims, as they are vastly different.

And I think that that makes a sensible change in these rules that we can live with.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Let me understand what you're asking, Harry, that you leave -- you take divorce itself and put it over in 3 with other civil cases?

MR. TINDALL: It can be that the deadline for disposing of 50 percent of all divorce cases not be 90, 180 and 360 from the time that they are filed, but 90, 180 and 360 from the time any party files a motion for disposition.

Because so much of our work involves people filing and then I talked to Hadley, yes, we know our clients are talking and things are calming down. And we don't want to set it and we hadn't gotten information from the pension plan in New York.

I mean, there are things we do informally and as long as we're talking, it doesn't make sense if we start getting pressed by a trial docket on a case. And 90 percent of these cases end up getting resolved out of court. And, I think, socially, that is a policy that should not be disrupted. We all know, if you have handled any of these cases, that the trial can be very, very embittering on the parties.

So we don't mind expedited handling of cases, but let's think of where it needs to be done and not on these matters down the line. And we're not trying to say that, "Hey, you have got a hot case. All the lawyers have got to do after that 60-day waiting period is file a motion for

1 disposition and he's right on track." 2 not --3 5 us. 6 MR. TINDALL: I will, absolutely 7 because --JUSTICE WALLACE: 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

JUSTICE WALLACE: Will you put your proposal, those changes, in writing and send it to

Now, Friessen admitted at the Task Force hearing, he really gave practically no thought to family law matters. had a little problem getting the report from you-all's committee in, and we just didn't have input we needed. So if you do that, I don't think that we will have all that problem with it.

MR. BEARD: I urged that same argument at the Task Force and it didn't come out that way. In other words, if you want on a fast track, one of parties the can move for it; otherwise, just let it sit there.

MR. TINDALL: That's right, because that parlays back --

MR. BEARD: Dean Friessen doesn't really, I don't believe, believe in that.

MR. TINDALL: I called San Diego. I was concerned that maybe we are not going to

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1 change the way they do in California, and this is I called San Diego; I called Los 2 3 Angeles; I called San Francisco, and I talked to 4 5 6 7 8 9 can't be done. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

leading family law attorneys out there. They don't do any of what's here so I'm not trying to -- you get to Rule 4 on family law cases, they want you, within 60 days, to file a disposition proposal for settlement of the case. Now, that There's no way that anyone in a middle-class divorce case can possibly be ready to exchange a settlement proposal in 60 days. Freissen's reply to that was, "All you do is go down and get an extension." Well, again, if either party wants to make a motion for disposition they can, but it's not right to put everyone into the fast track and then make them go to the court and get back out. That's all I'm saying. I could go into some other problems that you would have. And oftentimes attorneys -- or there are third party interventions like grandparents, and there are a whole lot of other little problems you get into. But basically, until either agreed litigant seeks to move on it, I don't see what is being done socially here to put everyone into this scheme.

JUDGE THOMAS: Judge, the other thing is that, at least the memo that I saw, is that Friessen did look at and closely examine the recommendation of the counsel. But then some of the conclusions that he came up with in the redrafting which we have got here, which he says addresses the problems we still don't think addresses the problems.

An example being Rule 4 on page 7, which talks about, yes, we did get a concession on a motion to enlarge time for mediation and counseling. But the experience would indicate that you cannot have any meaningful mediation or therapeutic counseling under some kind of arbitrary time limit. You-all have to settle this in 60 days or go back to court, and what's the judge going to do then? So he did -- he got the report and he looked at it, and at least the memo that I got -- and I guess what I'm asking you is, would you like for us to restate it again, because I don't think that what he came up with addressed what we were asking.

JUSTICE WALLACE: I don't have a copy of that report. Friessen must have the only one because I have not seen that.

MR. TINDALL: We have it. His response to our proposals? I have it right here.

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MR. BRANSON: I think what the Judge was suggesting is that you make the recommendation just like the Court directed.

MR. TINDALL: That's fine. I would be delighted to do that. Well, those are the feelings we have. The other thing that I think we really need some clarification on here, Luke, is whether Rule 3 is an overlay on Rule 4. If it is, then I think we have got to really -- I sort of could get into a mental lapse here on some of the complexities of about what you do when there is not a disposition order in certain kinds of cases and third parties have been enjoined. Because I think the rules ought to stand autonomously, rather than having to read 4, but then see how that matches back on Rule 3.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, you have to have discovery in some family law cases. That, to me, is governed by the schedule. Maybe Rule 3 doesn't come in until there is a request for hearing.

MR. TINDALL: Well, if it's certified as a complex case, then it kicks over. But

"Folks, this is real complicated." There is, you know, many businesses to evaluate and all kinds of things. But I think it should be clear that Rule 3 does not apply in the case that says there is an overt act saying that, "Hey, you've got to live under Rule 3."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why?

MR. TINDALL: Why?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Why shouldn't you be under a discovery schedule and a disposition schedule after -- I understand that you are saying that -- and all I am trying to do is make a record here of your points.

I understand that you feel that the trial scheduling that is imposed by Rule 3 has some bad effects on family law matters particularly, reconciliation and things of that nature. And I made remarks earlier that indicate to you and the others that I agree with that.

MR. TINDALL: Reconciliation, mediation or just the out-of-court peaceable settlement of the case.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know whether you will be able to settle that or not, the family

law section, but you ought to be able to get a delay in the trial scheduling while that sort of thing goes on. But once you want a setting, you're going to have -- you conclude you're going to have a trial. Why shouldn't 3-C apply just like all the rest? You have got a discovery schedule; you have got to get your discovery done; You have got to have a cut-off 30 days before trial. Because then you're just into an old --

MR. TINDALL: Because Rule 4 as written has a whole other set of rules on the exchange of disposition for proposals, and you have cases to be certified.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: They are not discovery. In other words, those are things that are in addition to the trial track that is addressed in 3.

MR. TINDALL: If it's only discovery, I'd have to go back and examine.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's discovery, trial setting.

MR. TINDALL: But with discovery, I have no problem, once it's certified as a complex case to kick back up over on that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, no, you don't

have to certify it. Either party may, without a waiver of their rights, file with the Court a proposed plan for completion of discovery in preparation of trial, and trial setting, bang, you are in 3 even though you are in a divorce case.

The other side can reply and you can be in a simple case. Either side can ask for a scheduling hearing in a simple case.

MR. TINDALL: Luke, you might be right on discovery, on the issue of discovery alone.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And preparation of trial and trial setting. And that's what 3 deals with, those three things. Either complex or not complex or just don't worry about it. Then you'll have 90 days for discovery, and it's got to be finished 30 days before trial. But maybe 3 shouldn't attach to a family law case until something is done. For example, I think if the parties move for a trial date -- this is me talking -- 3 ought to apply. Because you have now said, "We are going to have a trial." And a trial judge ought to have that on the pretrial schedule.

MR. TINDALL: I agree. Once you move into not just having a divorce on file, but one that is set for trial.

a setting, you ought to be able to be willing to live under Rule 3, for discovery, trial preparation and a trial setting. In other words, fine, if you want to argue that we ought to have a kick-off point of some kind or a trigger.

MR. TINDALL: Well, I thought Rule 3 was getting into a lot more than just discovery.

I thought Rule 3 also dealt with trial settings.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It does, discovery, trial preparation and trial setting, all three of those things.

MR. TINDALL: I'm not sure how trial settings impact back on what we have discussed about in terms of segregating various types of family law cases, but I don't have any discovery or trial preparation because at that point one of the parties has moved for disposition, which would trigger it being a contested matter.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So they may work together, but you would want to motion for disposition to be a trigger as opposed to just the filing of the lawsuit to be a trigger?

MR. TINDALL: Right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And I think you're

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probably going to get some sympathy with that, just as a matter of state policy to -- it all comes down to a trial until --

MR. BEARD: But once a party says, "I want to get this over with," then it gets on that -- whatever the fast track is.

JUDGE THOMAS: Then it gets on the fast track.

MR. BEARD: That's right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Unless it's exempted from that as a complex case, in which event it is on a complex track. Okay. Let's hear from Frank Branson now on his point.

MR. BRANSON: I just want to make certain that with the work that has been done today, I have a fear that the Supreme Court might look at the changes that have been recommended and take it that we're overall recommending that these changes make this acceptable. And if we are to serve indeed in an advisory capacity, it seems to me like that we should be able to say whether or not we advise the Court to adopt these rules even if they make the changes, Luke.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's what we're hearing right now, and I would like to have your

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view on that; I'm sure the Court would.

MR. BRANSON: I don't think the rule should be adopted.

MR. MCMAINS: I think what he's saying is he wants to vote on it.

MR. BRANSON: Yes. That's what I'm saying, but I think Luke is not saying that.

The point was made earlier that we are down now to 13, and it is just now barely time to adjourn this meeting. We started with about 25 or 30, I think, or 25. You know, attendance is not compulsory at this meeting and neither is participation. It's just an opportunity. But here we are with 13. If we want to vote with the 13 of us, that's fine, let's vote, and let's talk because let's let our voices be heard. We came to be heard; and let's be heard.

MR. LOW: And apparently the ones that left weren't interested enough to vote and the ones that stayed feel strongly enough about our position that we're here to vote.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So let's be heard and let's get it on the record.

MR. TINDALL: As much as Frank -- as

much as we would like to vote up or down, we've talked about a lot of changes here today, some of which have been constructive and good. And I think -- are we going to vote on it just as here? That's kind of an idiotic thing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We can vote on it as Ernie proposes it, and we can vote on it as we have had input at this juncture.

MR. TINDALL: Then I'd like to see -there were very complex discussions here today.

And we've got some things I'd like to see
incorporated.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think that certainly I will transmit to the Court anything that comes to me in writing to supplement this record.

MR. BRANSON: I'd like the opportunity to address the system in the manner in which this problem is addressed by the Task Force.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's hear it.

MR. BRANSON: In the 17 years that

I've had the privilege of practicing law in this

state, I have never witnessed any group of

attorneys who did so little in an effort to solve

what was alleged to be such a great problem. It's not that the attorneys on the Task Force, nor the Chair, did not have positive goals in mind, but it appeared to me, as a member of the Task Force, that Dean Friessen's proposal had been accepted by the Chief Justice before the Task Force ever studied the problem, and that any attempt to address Dean Friessen's recommendations were immediately squelched by the Chief Justice.

And I have all the respect in the world for the Chief Justice and for his opinions, but I do perceive him as merely one member of Supreme Court of Texas. And I do believe that the rules that were promulgated by Dean Friessen would be very much like a grandmother with four children, one named Harris, one named Travis, one named Bexar, and one named Dallas, at a time when Bexar got sick, giving Castor oil to all four children. And I do not perceive that there was sufficient evidence presented to the Task Force to mandate the drastic changes that Dean Friessen recommends.

And I think it would be a substantial miscarriage of justice to totally overhaul our entire Rules of Procedure in order to effectuate

changes that may be needed in five percent of the counties of this state. And I think a new Task Force, if a Task Force is the method desired to address the problem, should be appointed from practicing judges and lawyers in the State of Texas and from law professors from the State of Texas, who have practiced in our courts regularly and are familiar with our problems, and an individual county report be made by that Task Force, and individual problems within the counties be addressed as opposed to attempting to cure an overall system which, even according to Dean Friessen's reports to the Task Force, was not sick as a whole.

When the Dean addressed the problems, he was addressing problems in Harris County and one or two other counties and making every lawyer and every citizen of the State of Texas change a well-proven, well-functioning system to address a few acute problems.

And I object to the manner in which was handled by the Task Force. I object fervently to the manner in which questions about Dean Friessen's recommendations were addressed by the Chief Justice. I really felt pressure being

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applied to members of that Task Force like I have not seen in my practice of law. And I was sorely disappointed in the entire process and would like to go on record, both as member of that Task Force and of this Advisory Committee, objecting to the entire process and ask that a fair, impartial body be created to look at on a county-by-county basis what problems, if any, exist.

MR. SPARKS (EL PASO): Well, I have a different perspective because I do view that we need change, and I do view that the concept of these rules is one that can accomplish some change. However, I'm not in favor of the rules simply for this reason, is that they are not going to work. And that is because the dockets and the filings are so numerous that that system is only going to work if you can get trial settings.

And every lawyer in the state, those lawyers in this room, know when we go on any of these tracks, the probability is we are not going to go to trial when it says we are going to go to trial. And that's the reason I don't think the rules are going to work and I think it's just going to create more chaos than we have because we're going to be operating under rules that

practically are not going to work because we're not going to go to trial. And if you're not going to trial, they're not going to work.

You can't go the 270 days with an alleged special setting, it falls through and you're not supposed to have anymore discovery. It just doesn't make sense. If we could go to trial, I think the rules have a shot of working. And I am in the practice of defending lawsuits, and I am acutely aware and try to get my cases up because without going into the merits of prejudgment interest, and applying inability to compute them, it is something that we're trying to do, and that is, to get trial settings and get the liability, if there is, settled on behalf of the defendant.

But I don't think these rules are going to work because I think we can all sit down there and see that the trial settings are not available with the pending docket, and we're going to be operating under rules where the goal of trial is not there. And that's why I think there is great difficulty.

MR. LOW: I would join Frank first, and I would also add this: I think that the Supreme Court would be -- I think this program is

going to be unpopular with the lawyers, just like the federal judges. They don't care how unpopular it is; they are appointed for life. But this is the situation, and I think our Supreme Court would have a different relationship with our Supreme Court. And I think the rules are arbitrary. I don't think they are reasonable.

I think the approach from it is to approach it from the other end, like Judge Casseb does with the old cases, look at your tried/dismissed docket and move it that way. I think that would be the proper way to approach the thing rather than just the rules. Now, I disagree with the concept.

You're going to have Administrative Rules. Well, you can call it what you want to. These are rules of substance that should be in the Rules of Civil Procedure. You have got to go down there.

Somebody says, "well, here's my Rules of Civil Procedure; here's my Administrative Rules." Even though they're not in conflict you got two sets of rules.

Now, the way these things are drawn, you have got the rules like what the clerk -- perfunctory things that the presiding judge should report that. That's something that they can handle about

the reporting. But I think the substance of the rules, that affects the lawyers and the litigants, are such that, if you're going to do it, it ought to be in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

We have rules sufficient now to take care of the problem. It's a question of getting the judges and the lawyers to do it. And I don't think this is the right approach, and it's probably one of the most unpopular proposals I have seen in my area from the judges and the lawyers.

MR. MCMAINS: I'll second the popularity problem. I spoke just a couple weeks ago with the state T.A.D.C., the Texas Association of Defense Counsel meeting. And my understanding is that there was a widespread unpopularity of rules. This is not something that is politic with either docket, either side of the docket, from a personal injury standpoint.

And certainly, in fact, the percentage of cases I think -- I'm not sure that it's not true statewide the percentage of cases. Family law represents a very substantial portion of it, and yet it was given very short shrift in the entire formulation of these rules, which I think is

indicative of, in a way, attempting to do something just -- it's kind of the rocking chair attitude of just making movement and making it look like we're moving but we aren't going anywhere. Because like Sam has indicated, the real issue is not even addressed in these rules and that is your right to get a trial fast and not whether or not you get a trial setting fast, because we got trial settings, for instance, in Nueces County; I got them through 1987 already.

And unless you're going to move those off, there's no room for anything else. There's only so many trials that the Court can dispose of. The disposition of the cases that need to be encouraged, and the way to do that is from the other end, and that is, to make certain when the trial dates actually are and that you're going to get a trial, and to do that, you've got to have the courts, the courtroom, the judges and the personnel to make sure you get a trial. And we don't have any provisions in regards to expanding that or what happens.

For instance, in these rules what happens when you get a continuance passed under either rule, whether it's in the Administrative Rules

Where are you when the next trial setting is? This thing all assumes that there's only going to be one trial setting and that's it. if that trial setting is gone, then what do you You're going to have to kick somebody else out next week if you keep it on the docket, or are you going to have to continue moving everybody a week down the way? And there's just nothing addressed in these rules. The assumption that is false is that that trial setting date can be met, and that assumption is simply physically and economically untrue. It's a premise that is insupportable under the facts, in my judgment, and under the statistics and is one of the problems we have now.

We have now, I believe, in most counties

parties willing to go to trial on their lawsuits

if they could get one, and can't; can't get

there. And others are blocking it because they

claim they want a trial, and then when they get up

to the trial date, it doesn't happen. And there

are courts sitting around vacant that don't have

trials going on, but we don't have any real good

way of good communication for getting cases in

there or, in some respects, some of those cases

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may be the fault of the judges who aren't really all that interested in working all that hard in that area. And that's not an indictment; it's just that there are problems that are isolated and this is not a universal question.

But this assumptions, upon which these rules are promulgated, are false. And I think that's the biggest thing; I think it's misleading. I think it's misleading I think it's misleading to the citizens or the Bar to suggest that this is going to solve anybody's problem. As far as I can tell, it is designed principally to solve Harris County's problem, and it isn't going to solve Harris County's problem, is what everybody in Harris County has told me, that they don't think that it's going to do one bit of good. Because the problem they have got is the backlog, which these rules don't even address.

So, I mean, the long and the short of it is,
I think it's a whole lot of window dressing and
not much meat may cause a lot of grief and is not
going to do a great deal of good.

JUDGE THOMAS: One of things, when it starts off with the purpose, it says, you know, that we're going to provide for a "just and

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expeditious disposition. And I think that if you look at Rule 3, 4 or 5, that they really don't do that.

And that gets back to what Rusty was saying. Because I can see in all of those areas where you have actually increased court time, you've increased hearings and really increased litigation. And, for instance, family law -- the Dean told me, has told other judges, has told representatives of the counsel, that, for instance, frankly, family law is not where the problem is. That is not what has been the big complaint in the court system throughout the state. But once we get the rules, they have done away with maybe the one thing that we do best, and that is, agreed property settlements and uncontested divorces, because they've thrown some requirements in here that just create more paperwork. So what the lawyers are going to start doing is having to create paperwork to meet the rules.

Another example would be the disposition report that you have to find, and you have to file it 60 days or so. And I can see the paperwork. The lawyers will file their proposed property

disposition, but it's not going to serve the Court and it's not going to serve the lawyers. Because what they're going to say, their proposal will be, 4 "I want all of the community property and all the separates that the other person can't prove." That 5 complies with the rule, but it certainly does not 6 7 help to expedite. And so I agree with the 8 consensus that the rules, while there is a good 9 purpose, and we can all use some change, they don't do what we need to do and that is to get rid 10 11 of the backlog.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anybody else? Judge Casseb, do you have anything you want to say in reply to any of this?

MR. TINDALL: Luke, I want to put one on the record. Harris County has, what I think is, a totally indenfensible habit in our family law courts and that is, they have dead weeks. there's one thing that ought to be dealt in local rules, under these Administrative Rules, is to abolish dead weeks.

Our family law courts take off the last week of every even-numbered month. And it used to be, Judge -- I think they might have gotten rid of it when you were on the trial bench. Certainly, I

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know, all the civil trial courts in Harris County had dead weeks, six weeks a year wasted, valuable trial time.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What do they do?

They just don't do anything?

MR. TINDALL: They don't do anything.

They "catch up on paperwork." They don't try

cases for six weeks out of the year.

MR. ADAMS: I agree with many of the comments that have already been said, and I'm not going to reiterate them.

I do think that in the event that some rules are promulgated, that there ought to be a threshold level at which they become applicable. And that if the courts are not performing at some acceptable level, then these rules would be triggered to help these judges that are not performing. And maybe there are some other things that could be done, too, some sanctions or recommendations, or some publicity, or whatever, to get some judges to be more productive.

But I don't think that any set of rules can be designed that should be applied across this state, and would be able to effectively deal with the problems of moving cases across the State.

For instance, in Jefferson County, we have -as we probably would rate the best in the state
with regard to moving cases. And our courts have
designed a system that works well, and they don't
need to be interfered with. And they ought not to
be penalized, and their individuality should be
recognized. And I think in the long range is the
history of the court administration, that having
various judges come up with ideas and demonstrate
and have the dockets around the state and judges
around the state be able to develop new ideas and
share new ideas, in the long run, will better aid
the administration of justice in trying to set
some rules in stone here for everybody.

MR. BRANSON: I move that this committee vote to reject Dean Friessen's proposal in toto.

MR. LOW: I'll second that motion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Before we vote,

Chief Justice Hill believes that a strong

statement to the legislature that our courts are

going to move cases faster and more efficiently

will get more help for the courts to try to

accomplish that task. That is one of the things

that's at the heart of this effort. I don't know

whether this is a way to do it or not. We have certainly heard a lot of controversy about it all over in this room and elsewhere, but that needs to be said. I mean, that is what is one of the things that's motivating him and the Court to consider these rules whether they're adopted or not is that they feel this will signal that there is a system or there will be a system or there can be a system that will improve the flow of cases and the disposition of litigation if our judges can just get enough help to meet these schedules and move cases as indicated.

MR. BRANSON: Well, Luke, that may be a conflict, but I'm not opposed.

MR. LOW: Let me say this. By my seconding that motion, I'm not criticizing the Chief Justice. I agree the problems and, everything and, you know, I'm not saying that he's wrong. It's just my opinion this is not the way to do it. And I'm certainly not overlooking the problem and he's recognizing the problem, and if there is a problem, but I'm just saying I don't think it's the way to do it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. There are 12 here. Motion was made and seconded. Any further

discussion? Those who believe the rules should be rejected show by hands. 9. Those who believe that the rules should be passed, show by hands.

MR. BEARD: Well, are you saying "as is" or the general idea? I vote that we should do something and I don't object to all the general idea. And there's not anything that the Court puts out there that they cannot reverse. And I believe that something needs to be done, and I don't think the lawyers will ever agree on any change.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: The vote is nine to one, and two abstaining. I'm not voting as Chairman. I vote that I think something needs to be done. But I'm not sure -- I vote because I think something needs to be done. But I'm not sure.

MR. TINDALL: I think you can get a unanimity on that. We all want our cases tried. We all want hearings. We want adequate personnel. I mean that's --

MR. MCMAINS: One other comment, before we break up, that I would like on the record, one of things which has been mentioned to me in private by a number of judges, trial judges,

is, what are you going to do with a judge who doesn't follow the rules? There are no penalties in these rules. You do have reporting requirements, and you have got kind of veiled threats that might materialize in there, but there's not really any enforcement mechanism in here to require anything. And if a judge can't give you a trial of that type because he's trying something else, nothing should be done.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, but until we get an accountability, which is another word that the Chief Justice uses, and he expects to achieve that through here, he does not expect to be able to get anything --

MR. MCMAINS: Don't get me wrong. I'm not opposed to any of the statistical recording stuff, as I don't think anybody is here. We're talking about changing the way cases are set and moved through the Court, not the Court reporting on them. That's totally different. That's a totally different issue in terms of accountability.

MR. O'QUINN: Let me say something here. Also, I don't think anybody in this room is opposed to courts giving fixed times to try a

lawsuit. God knows, if that was the rule, I'd be shrieking to pass it. What I think is going to happen is we're going to force lawyers to get on Draconian schedules to hurry up and wait and spend lots of time on paper work and BS, and nothing is going to happen.

The problem is the cases aren't getting tried, not that the lawyers aren't doing the discovery. And every trial judge in this state has already had the power to solve that problem in his courtroom. He can take all the cases that are in there and say they're set and by God, they're going to be tried. And I don't care if you've done discovery or not; they're going to be set.

But what we have here now is a set of rules that says the lawyers are going to have to do all this work in a certain period of time and the trial judge doesn't have to do a darn thing.

And I think what needs to be, is some rules that says trial judges must go to trial unless he can show and send a written copy of his reasons as to why he didn't go to trial to the Chief Judge like I have to send to my client a motion for continuance. Let him explain why he didn't go to trial. That's where the accountability needs to

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be. And then he will put the heat on the lawyers to do their job. But to put heat on me to do my job does not get the case out of that trial court because I can't put any heat on that trial judge. So I say the problem is, come up with a set of rules that puts the heat on the trial judge by statistical reporting and by accountability of the Supreme Court or whomever, as to why those cases aren't being tried, and then he will put the heat on the lawyers to get them ready. And a system like that I am totally for. I am totally for any system that gets cases tried quickly.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Essentially, the counties that are in good shape, are the counties have hard working judges that cooperate with one another for the disposition of cases.

MR. O'QUINN: Exactly.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And the counties that are in trouble are the counties that have a number of judges who don't work hard enough and many judges who won't cooperate with the others. And until that problem is solved nothing we do is going to take care of disposition cases.

MR. O'QUINN: Okay. There's a district judge in Houston, Texas who was the

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ancillary judge for this half of May, the first half. During her responsibility as ancillary judge, she walked out of her courtroom and went to Europe on a vacation; she did not care. She put the burden of her ancillary docket on the rest of the judges. She just said, "I'm leaving. You have got ancillary problems, go find somebody else." Now how are you going to tell her to do anything Monday?

She called a pretrial conference Monday she had a courtroom full of lawyers with the air conditioning off. Yes, sir, off, sitting there for a pretrial status conference, she made everybody sit there and all they had to do was tell her what the status of the case was. And the defense bar and the plaintiff's bar was berserk and they finally concluded the only reason she did it was to try to force people to settle cases. She doesn't want to try anything. Yet the poor lawyers are going to get discovery done on Draconian basis to sit around and waste three years to get a trial. We'll be adjourned until 8:30.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

(Proceedings Recessed.

STATE OF TEXAS >< 1 2 COUNTY OF TRAVIS 3 We, Elizabeth Tello and Chavela V. Bates, 5 Certified Shorthand Reporters in and for the County of Travis, State of Texas, do hereby 6 7 certify that the foregoing typewritten pages 8 contain a true and correct transcription of our 9 shorthand notes of the proceedings taken upon the 10 occasion set forth in the caption hereof, as 11 reduced to typewriting by computer-aided 12 transcription under our direction. 13 WITNESS OUR HANDS AND SEAL OF THIS OFFICE, this. 14 day of June, 1986. 15 16 17 Elizabeth Tello, Court Reporter 316 W. 12th Street, Suite 315 18 Austin, Texas 78701 512-474-5427 19 Notary Public Expires 07-13-86 CSR #2387 Expires 12-31-87 20 Chavela V. Bates 21 Chavela V. Bates, Court Reporter 22 316 W. 12th Street, Suite 315 Austin, Texas 78701 512-474-5427 23 Notary Public Expires 09-30-89 CSR #3064 Expires 12-31-87 24 25

Job No. 0870

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Received, (deposition or statement of facts) of:
1. May 15, 1986 2. May 16, 1986 3. May 17, 1986
Exhibits Included:
Plaintiff's Exhibits No
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