AFTERNOON SESSION

1

3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The materials that we're going to talk about now have been sent out 5 twice, once in this book and once earlier. So, if 6 you didn't bring your materials that were distributed earlier, these will be the Evidence 7 8 Rules and they're about in the middle of the very last group of materials. They start with a letter 9 10 on State Bar of Texas stationery that is signed by 11 Newell Blakely. And it is a letter of transmittal

> MR. NIX: One more time, Luke, what portion of the book?

for certain proposed changes in Rules of Evidence.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. If you go all the way to the back, it's a supplement that we sent out. And each topic that we're going to address is separated by a blue sheet. So, between the last blue sheet and the back cover, about halfway, you find a letter on State Bar of Texas stationery, and behind that are the proposed Rule of Evidence changes. And -- well, before Newell starts, we have so few people here, I hate to do that to him. Let me make a different -- take a different position on the agenda.

14 15

12

13

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 I will take volunteers now for persons who 2 are willing to serve on the Trial Court 3 Administration Committee to deal with this Court Administration Bill and the mandates thereunder. 5 MR. NIX: I'd like to work on that one. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Let me --7 Jim Kronzer, Sam Sparks. 8 Steve, were you one of the volunteers on that 9 or who -- let's see. 10 MR. NIX: Tom Ragland. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Thomas, Judge Linda Thomas. 12 13 MR. NIX: Tom Ragland. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom Ragland. Who else 15 would like to serve on this committee to address 16 the Legislature's mandate and the Court 17 Administration Bill? All right. I would think 18 Judge Hittner would be helpful on that. He's not 19 here. 20 JUDGE HITTNER: I'll serve on the 21 committee. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Judge, I'm sorry, I didn't see where you were sitting. I 23 24 didn't see you in view. But would you help on 25 that?

JUDGE HITTNER: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think your experience would be very helpful.

Okay. That gives us two district judges.

Let's put Pat Beard -- my view -- what is the feeling of the people here about the size of that committee? It seems to me like that committee is dealing with so many fundamental concepts, that the size of it should be large at first and then maybe be revised later, but try to get as much as a cross section as we can for input. How does that suit you all?

Jim, how do you feel about that?

MR. KRONZER: I think that you ought to try to get as many people from different parts of the state, too. Because the practice is so dissimiliar in different parts of the state. And those rules, as I quickly looked at that act, don't really apply to all parts of the state.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Bill Dorsaneo.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I really agree with that. I think we need to have some people from Dallas and some from San Antonio and not a preponderance of people from Houston because that's a bad place.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've got Pat Beard from Waco. I'm going to ask Judge Casseb to serve on that because he was so instrumental in what is now the San Antonio practice. That gives us a judge from San Antonio, a judge from Houston, a judge from Dallas. We're going to need very much to interface with the Committee on Administration of Justice Subcommittee that's handling this. And Judge Thurmond from Del Rio is the spearhead of that. And that will give us a rural judge. Then Sam from El Paso. Tom Ragland from Waco. I would say Hadley Edgar to get a professor, plus another West Texan from Lubbock. And I'm listening. I want to hear any suggestions that ya'll have.

MR. KROZNER: Well, Luke, I'm satisfied from talking with Judge Hill during the noon hour that he's going to be very actively interested in the almost a day by day progress of all of the work of that committee. And that probably is going to necessitate some breakdown into subcommittees dealing with court administration, power of the chief under it to unitize the judicial system, and a lot of different aspects of it, the visiting judges and all the other things. And so, I think it ought to be large enough to where it can be

broken off into those subcommittees also if he wants to study those sections, too.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is that the consensus here? It seems to me that we need a large committee because there are so many topics to be addressed.

JUDGE HITTNER: Mr. Chairman, if it's that complex and I don't doubt what Mr. Kronzer says is correct, maybe we ought to just have a committee as a whole. It seems to be that way the more we talk about it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me say this by way of trying to organize it. We're probably not going to be able to have another meeting of this committee until September or October. What I would like to do is appoint maybe eight or ten, at least, to meet, divide up the subjects, each of them become the designee to head up a second tier of subcommittee. Let me know what that report is and any suggestions that you may have for drafting people to help on the second tiered subcommittees, and I will assign not only those you request, but also additional people to help until we have used the entire personnel.

Now, who will -- this is going to be a big

undertaking. Who will be a second tiered committee 1 2 chairman? I'm going to assume everybody that has 3 volunteered so forth is interested enough to do that. So --5 JUDGE KRONZER: Make it Sam Sparks. Make 6 him come all the way from El Paso. 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Jim Kronzer, Sam 8 Sparks, Judge Linda Thomas, Tom Ragland. 9 MR. NIX: Put me on, Harold Nix from 10 Daingerfield, I want to serve on that committee and 11 take care of my piece of Texas. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Harold Nix. Okay. 13 MR. KRONZER: Reasoners gone. Why don't 14 you put him on it? 15 PROFESSOR WALKER: He's not here. 16 MR. KRONZER: Make him the chairman. 17 He's good at that. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Lefty? Is he here? 19 you want to be a second tier subcommittee chairman 20 for part of this effort? MR. MORRIS: We're going to have to be 21 22 reporting back when? CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'd like for 23 24 ya'll to either meet by telephone or what have you, 25 after you have a chance to review this bill and

divide it into sections and let me know which section each of you is going to take and who you want on your team. And I'd say I'd like to hear that by the end of June.

MR. MORRIS: I'll do it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Are there any other people then -- we're now talking about the Court Administration Bill; and, of course, it's very diverse and has many subjects.

MR. CASSEB: I'd like to serve on that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Good, because you got drafted while you were gone, Judge, with the compliment of what you did in San Antonio organizing that.

MR. KRONZER: He organized Houston, too.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I meant the court system, Judge, I didn't mean the rest of the City.

I have then people who are willing to take a part of that and then work with the subcommittee to be subsequently appointed; Jim Kronzer, Sam Sparks, Judge Linda Thomas, Tom Ragland, Judge David Hittner, Pat Beard, Judge Casseb, Hadley Edgar, Harold Nix, is that right?

MR. NIX: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And Lefty Morris.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, this is going to be critically important to how the administration of justice proceeds from this point forward in this state and as Judge Hill's lead horse as far as administrative revision. So, if anybody else wants to have a subcommittee, let me know now. All right. you all meet on a coffee break, those 11 people --Hadley's not here -- and decide among yourselves who you'd like to have to be the overall chairman of this effort and let me know. And in that same organizational meeting, try to pick a date that ya'll will meet and divvy up the projects under this bill. And then I'll know who's the chairman and what day you're supposed to meet. probably take a coffee break around 3:30.

All right. We will then proceed with Newell Blakely. Did someone else --

MR. SPARKS: It looks to me like -- I don't know what the rules of the committee are, but it looks to me like we might ought to try to solicit a couple of lawyers who practice in the criminal field to be on that committee. And I can certainly speak for myself, the only criminal things I do are appointed; and I try to get out of that best I can. But we're going to need some

insight in that area, obviously, from what I've read of it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we certainly are.

And I think that the subcommittee chairman -- I'll

declare that you're free to consult all available

sources for input into what we should do. And if

you can solicit help from someone active in the

criminal practice, then your subcommittee, if you

need that, should pursue that.

Mr. Chief Justice, we just named a committee who will meet on the coffee break and pick their chairman and pick a date when they will meet. It's Jim Kronzer, Sam Sparks, Judge Linda Thomas, Tom Ragland, Judge David Hittner, Pat Beard, Judge Sol Casseb, Professor Hadley Edgar, Harold Nix and Lefty Morris.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And they are going to meet and divvy up the subjects that are covered by that bill and become second tier subcommittee chairmen and then we'll appoint people to fill out their committees and go to work on this with your permission.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: Oh, absolutely. I'm going to look to Judge Wallace, of course, on this.

I want to be personally involved in it, but he is our person on rules and he is -- I can't tell you -- I can't lay enough good words on my colleague. He's a marvelous person, a great judge, and he's done a real good piece of work in this rules area. And he knows a lot of my thinking and I think shares most of it. And so, let's start trying to flesh it out. And there's some rules in Ohio, I believe, that might be helpful to look through. I really don't know. This is going -- it puts us really on the cutting edge of being right out in front. I'm not even sure any state has the detail of rules for administration that we contemplate coming out of it.

And, again, I recognize that the lawyers who tend to their business, who take care of their business and get their cases ready and get them to trial, have very little involved. And I just hope that they will not, though, be an opposition force, because it's here. And we need to be as true to what they're saying to us, in my judgment, as possible, without being ridiculous, without getting to the point where lawyers can't live with it. And it may be a little unfair to -- Houston, of course, is our number one area of concern. You can go out

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to San Angelo and they'll say, "Hey, we -- just everybody's current." A lot of people will tell you they're current. And what they don't tell you is they're current if the lawyers want to get the cases to trial.

The one thing that has to be appreciated for this thing to make any sense is the concept is that every litigant who files a case is entitled for the court to take responsibility for it. And that's the concept. If you can't buy that, we're in trouble going out of the blocks. It's a custodial sort of thing. A ward -- a litigant is kind of a ward of that court, and it's that court's responsibility, with the lawyer that's not getting their job done, to see that that case moves along to some sort of disposition. And so, we're then to be the quardians here of saying "Now here's the way you can get that job done. Here are the kind of rules that if you utilize them and be true to them and be faithful to them, they'll work." They won't hurt the people in San Angelo. If they're already doing all that anyway or don't need them, it's there.

But in the area -- I don't think that -Lefty, for example, might not share this, being in

practice up here in Austin. My experience in Austin, when I practiced here, was not as good as a lot of the people are telling me it is. Maybe I just got jinxed.

MR. MORRIS: Well, It's gotten better.

Harley Clark has really gotten after it over there.

We went through a real sag, John, but it's gotten a
lot better.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: I'm delighted to hear that. David can testify that Houston is moving now. A lot of things are happening. Maybe this is all a part of the tide that we're catching in anticipation of this or maybe trying to forestall it. I don't know. But there are some good -- Dallas, for example, was very inconsistent the way I found it, Frank. It depended on kind of which court you were in. What sayeth thou about Dallas today?

MR. BRANSON: Well, I think that's pretty accurate, John. There were some really progressive judges there who run the docket real well. And then there was basic intellectual pockets of poverty among the Dallas trial bench, some of which have been recently cured by the electorate.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: Over Sols way --

every time I mention anything about dockets, anyone from San Antonio -- and I'll direct this to Sol, they just say, "Please leave us alone. We are just doing super in San Antonio. We just love our dockets and nothing could work better." But the few times I went over there, it just looked like -- I don't know, just absolute bedlam. Maybe I was just in the wrong -- maybe I just, you know, was in the wrong court, wrong place. But what sayeth thou, Sol Casseb, about San Antonio? Are ya'll really doing all that good?

MR. CASSEB: As far as the jury dockets, we are doing exceptionally well. If you want a trial, you get a trial within four to five months. Our difficulty now, which needs to be brought current and I'm hoping that it can be done, is we have all of the cases, domestic cases as well as any other type of case all go to one judge, and it needs to be segregated out because of the influx of more divorce cases that you have now. And that's why you see it so crowded every morning because you have got 150 divorce cases that shouldn't be mingled in with the other type of cases; that that needs to be straightened out locally and if it cannot be done locally, you got the vehicle right

here to do it.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: But, Sam, you know what I'm talking about.

MR. SPARKS: We have eight different sets.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: They kind of want somebody to say, "This is the way it's going to be." Now I don't know that you share that. What do you say about El Paso?

MR. SPARKS: No, no. I think all the lawyers that try lawsuits on the both sides of docket would encourage that. Because we do. We have eight separate sets of district court rules.

JUDGE HITTNER: You ought to try in Harris County. We have 25 different sets.

MR. O'QUINN: I'm glad you're the one that said that, Judge.

JUDGE HITTNER: Well, I'll say it,
because it's the truth. We have one general set of
rules, and every other court is doing it
differently. Monday dockets now are still Monday
morning and a bunch of them Friday afternoon,
Friday morning. I mean literally 25 different set
of rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Hittner?

JUDGE HITTNER: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I just conferred with Judge Wallace. He said you don't have 25. They haven't been approved, and they're not going to be.

MR. O'QUINN: Thank you, thank you.

JUDGE HITTNER: What I'm talking about, of course, are the individual court rules when we have Monday dockets versus Friday dockets on motions and everybody does it differently and it's a real problem for the practicing lawyer.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: The home town of lawyers that get their cases dismissed because of rules they don't even know about, they're not even in writing, and other things that happen, have got to stop. We've got to have uniformity about our local rules as much as possible. And we need to approach this task with a feeling that it can be done is all I'm saying. And let's don't go into it with "Oh, that's a bunch of hogwash." Let's just take off our coats and get down with it and see if we can't come up with something that would really be a fresh new day for moving our dockets in this state.

Now, I've been all over Texas and I'm fully aware that Texas has tremendous variety and you

can't put a blanket over it and say it's this way here. Because things are different and we've got to take that into account. There's got to be some flexibility here.

But at the same time I think the message has got to go out just like we did in that writ refused case. The docket -- we just got to say -- that the public is demanding that we do a better job of getting our whole docket moved out in a reasonable length of time. That's the basic message. No case should be withheld from trial that needs to go to trial for justice sake. One day it should not be delayed, whatever, if it's been on file two months. If justice demands that the case be tried and litigated, we ought to work to produce a system that will not deny justice to people because of the system itself.

JUDGE HITTNER: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, let me add one thing to that. That's assuming you've got competent judges down below, and that's a real problem we have throughout the state.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: Well, you're going to help us with that one because we've got mandatory judicial education now. We've just received the funding for it. That is one piece of

-

good news about this session. And Judge Gonzales will be our liaison on the Supreme Court for the program. And we need the David Hittners to get the program design and make it substantive and meaningful. I don't hear anything about corrupt judges.

JUDGE HITTNER: No, sir.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: That ought to be a given that we don't have corrupt judges. We ought not to even have to discuss it or debate it. I do hear questions of competency raised in occasional places. And we need to address that just like we need to with lawyers while we're on that subject.

I tell you very frankly that I intend to plug for mandatory CLE, and don't turn me off until you've given me a hearing. Don't throw me out until you've heard me out. It's a signal. Even if we don't need it, it's a signal. We need to start sending these strong signals that we're serious about competency of our professional brethren and sisters and we're serious about competency of judges. I didn't mean to get into my bar foundation speech. But, yes, I hear you.

And there's a lot of exciting things right now in the judiciary. There's a time for

J,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

everything in public affairs. And we may be very close to the time when the administration of justice is going to come to the forefront. we'll work hard these next two years, it's very possible that we could emerge as the highest priority in the next legislative session. just possible. We need to raise up a few more friends. We need to get our homework done a little bit better. We need to precondition the Legislature. We need to politic a little heavier. We need to get our judges more involved and our lawyers more involved. But it's out there. We want to go for it, in my opinion. The climate is just about right. Maybe we had to go through this session this time and take a few lumps to buy some credibility, to learn all over again what I knew from seven years ago. And the time just sort of erased it from my mind. You have to politic.

I said I was going to set an apolitical tone for this court and I definitely mean that in terms of the court, itself and its processes and our work. We would not want it any other way. But I'll tell you, I'm going to be very political when it comes to working with that Legislature in trying to get this ball across the goal line that we need.

23

24

25

This is -- we'll never have a better time in our state, in our time to really improve the administration of justice for all of our people, than we'll have over the next five or ten years, in This is just part of it. It's being my opinion. thought out, see. We're not just talking smoke anymore. We're not just talking generalities. We're talking specifics now. Just like this bill is very specific. And education of judges is mandatory, that's very specific. Our new rules of discipline are very specific. Our new judicial conduct code is very specific. Our commission is not a mirage, it's very much real. Our court reporter problems are getting identified. They're very real. But they're very specific. The Board of Law Examiners -- Judge Kilgarlin did his yeomanship work over there this time. We're keeping them in business. We almost lost. schools -- we're getting very specific about the curriculum and what we can do to make better lawyers. The admissions committees are more at work out there. They're really taking their jobs seriously.

So, there's just a multitude of things that we've got emerging along this course. So, we can

Δ

do better. We've got a good thing going. We've got a good profession. We've got a good system. But we just need to -- care, nurture and guidance, just a little care, nurture and guidance is what -- that's the era that we're in right now. And it will happen if we want it to happen. We won't agree on everything and I'll get out ahead of you on some things and you're going to have to pull me back sometimes and say, "No, that's not the way we want to move." But let's do move and address these problems while we've got a chance.

I really thank you for the opportunity of serving in this office.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge, I think that certainly sets the tone for our committee, and we've got the bill -- several copies of the bill here. And when we take our coffee break, if you people who are on the committee will pick up a copy of it so that you can see it and study it before you meet again, I would appreciate it.

Franklin, did you have something?

MR. JONES: I walked in about halfway through this discussion and I think you had already appointed this committee. And my friend Sam Sparks punched me and said, "Volunteer to serve on it." I

don't know what he's getting me into. But I'd do anything he asked me to even if I thought it was wrong. So, what I'm saying is put me on there, if you don't mind.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Thank you. I appreciate that.

MR. JONES: Now that I've got you interrupted, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to speak up before the noon hour when you were asking if there were any other issues or questions which also should be assigned to what I'm going to call the Branson Committee or the Bill Dorsaneo Committee that you appointed just before lunch to study this — these rules.

There was something I wanted to speak about at that point, but I wanted first to be sure I wasn't getting out on a point where the court didn't want me. And so I didn't say anything about it. But at this point in time, I'd like to bring it up because I'm satisfied that I'm not going to be going against the wishes of the court. And that is I think that committee should be charged -- or subcommittee should be charged to also study the question, the overall question, of blindfolding of juries in civil trials in Texas. And by that I

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

mean the prohibition, if it still exists, I'm not sure it really does under the new rules. But if it does still exist, I think this subcommittee ought to study where Texas is with respect to the main stream of the jurisprudence of this country on the question of telling a jury they're not allowed to know the effects of their answers. And telling lawyers that you're not allowed to tell them the effect of their answers or telling the judges you're not allowed to tell them the effect of their answers. And I would like to see that issue referred to that subcommittee for their consideration along with the other matters you've got them charged with.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Are you not talking about -- you're not talking about the Appellate Rules Committee or is that the one you do have in mind?

MR. JONES: I don't see why they couldn't do just as well as anybody else.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think we're going to -- we will take up new matters in a little while, Franklin, and let me put that down to assign a subcommittee to it.

MR. JONES: Would the chair like a

25

motion?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I will assign that out. Why don't you be thinking about who else you want on your committee.

MR. O'QUINN: He's going to make you the chairman of that.

MR. JONES: I like that committee you already had and I'm not on.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I know, but that's really not an appellate issue, Franklin, in my judgment. And that committee is really going to be saddled with a lot of work, and I don't want to assign something, in addition to their appellate work, to them. I'd rather have that be a smaller committee of one or two or three to report back.

Yes, Rusty.

MR. McMAINS: Luke, I've been out of the room for a minute, so I really don't know exactly where you are and maybe I'm out of order as I usually am. But I've been in the Supreme Court Advisory Committee a couple of times, at least, by appointment. And it seems to me that we spent a lot of time frequently at these meetings talking about, you know, appointments of ad hoc subcommittees with regards to particular rule

24

25

situations. It would seem to me to be a better use of manpower if -- because right now most of the communications of recommendations, either from administration of justice, or wherever, will go to Judge Wallace and then to you. And then you have to basically or seem to be basically having to wait until we have a full meeting before we do any work It seemed to me that if we had some more on it. formal standing subcommittees, as it were, in the areas, for instance, one on discovery, one on appellate rules, one, you know, in that specific area, rather than all of us having to go through and volunteer for where we're going to put any of these things, then any requests or recommendations could be channeled through Judge Wallace and to you for your assignment to a particular standing subcommittee, which in my judgment should be regional. I mean, basically, pick out three lawyers on this committee that are on a subcommittee that are more or less in the same vicinity, that they can get together periodically and hammer something out and cull through them and the ones that aren't worth a darn. I mean, they can show them to the rest of committee or be responsible for communicating with the rest of the

committee, but their position is, "It ain't worth working on." And it would seem to me to be a more efficient use of personnel rather than an ad hoc subcommittee bases.

I just throw that out. It may be, as I say, out of order, but otherwise you're talking about trying to, I think, assign all of these evaluations to that same type of thing. And in light of what Justice Hill indicated, we've got a lot of work that needs to be done in a lot of areas, and I think that we need to streamline this committee as well as we need to do anything.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: This committee has typically met once a year or less frequently.

MR. McMAINS: Right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It has not had standing subcommittees. It hasn't had subcommittees except in rare instances.

MR. McMAINS: I understand that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: This year, in 1985, we're going to meet twice. Normally it meets with no preparation except in a few instances where large matters have been assigned previously. The second time it meets in 1985, it will meet prepared because all of the matters before us will have been

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

assigned to committees for study.

Now, we have an awful lot of matters before us and whenever -- at the COAJ, as you know, we did establish standing committees. Maybe that's the right way to go about organizing it. essentially, today's meeting is going to be an input and organizational meeting looking towards really getting some work done in September.

As things have gone and since -- for the most part since I've been on this committee, we would wind up today and we wouldn't meet again for another year. And we would simply have to pass on these rules just as we see them and as fast as we can get through them today whether we're going to recommend them or not. And I don't feel like that's really the best approach.

We did decide on this meeting on a bit of a short order and I got the agenda to you late. confess that. But for the next meeting, we would have had -- this will be the agenda for the next meeting with a few additional items that may come in in the interim.

MR. McMAINS: Well, I wasn't being critical or anything in terms of this committee, you know, of it's being handled or the necessity

for everybody's total input.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm not being defensive about that either. We had one extremely organized meeting that had an agenda that went out ahead of And it was really the last meeting. never could have gotten all that work done without it, but we didn't have very active subcommittees before that meeting. And it was the best organized meeting, I think, that we'd had since I was on the committee. And I'm trying to take that one step beyond now and not only have a booklet before everybody with all the rules in them in the order we're going to address them, but also have reports that have been assigned out to various people for our September, October meeting. I think it is a good idea to establish standing committees. But are you suggesting that we do that now and then as these rules may fall, they'll be assigned to those particular committees?

MR. McMAINS: The way we were proceeding, it appeared that you were basically asking for volunteers on an ad hoc basis. It would seem to me that if, as a committee, we could come up with what would probably be logic components of standing subcommittees and members to be assigned, then it

would be a fairly clerical job to go through here and send these things to those people and maybe even conceivably have time for the subcommittees together -- to get together and start dividing up the work themselves today.

MR. McMAINS: I throw that out, but -CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me ponder on that a
bit while we hear Newell's report on the Rules of
Evidence and see if I can adjust to do it that way
and see if that's a better way to do what I was
going to do. It may be.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's -- let me --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: May I be recognized?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir, please. Mr.

Blakely.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Judge Wallace's office sent out an envelope with two documents.
One of these is entitled "Agenda for Meeting April 12, 1985." That was the meeting of the State Bar Committee on the Administration of Rules of Evidence in Civil Cases. And obviously not everything in there is before this committee. A bunch of those proposals were rejected. And I passed it along to the Supreme Court simply as background and so on. But nevertheless, it was

sent out to you. And to avoid confusion, if you've got that document, you may want to put it under something, so that you won't be confused by it.

He also sent in that same envelope a document entitled "The 1984, '85 State Bar Committee on the Administration of Rules of Evidence of Civil Cases recommends to the Supreme Court of Texas the following changes in the Rules of Evidence." And that's dated May 1, 1985. There are 13 proposed changes here. They came from that State Bar Committee on the Rules of Evidence from our April 12 meeting.

Now, in your hard bound book that was passed out this morning, you find a cover letter from me to Chief Justice Hill. Right behind that you find ll pages, numbered 1 through ll, and those are the proposals that we're now going to consider.

Beginning immediately after that, you have a number of unnumbered pages without a title to it. And I can see, because of my familiarity with it, that it's a part of that agenda. A few pages are missing there at the first, one or two. Somebody ought to take a black crayola and go through and mark out those pages. Either that or put in the missing pages, so you'd have a packet. I'm scared

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to death that the Supreme Court may go back there and pick up something and enact it and promulgate it, thinking that they're getting proposals from the Evidence Committee.

All right. So I'm looking now at an 11-page document, that the pages are numbered 1 through 11. These are the proposed changes in the Rules of Evidence. Rule 509, of course, is the Physician/Patient Privilege. And 510 is the mental health privilege, the Psychiatrist/Patient Privilege. Both of those, of course, have a list of exceptions. Both have an exception that might be referred to as the litigation exception. our committee considered those two together. would be on Page 1 of your document. That would be 509(d)(4). The litigation exception to the Physician/Patient Privilege. And on Page 3, 510(d)(5) -- you have to skip a proposal on Page 2. 510(d)(5) is the litigation exception to the Psychiatrist/Patient Privilege. And we're recommending changes in both beginning here on 509(d)(4) on Page 1. And by the by, we adopted the convention of bracketing deletions and underlining new language.

And looking at the bracketed language there,

3

4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

we recommend elimination of that second sentence "Any information is discoverable in any court or administrative proceeding," so forth, so forth, so forth. That sentence really simply refers you to the Rules of Civil Procedure. And the Rules of Evidence, as presently written, are pretty well clear of discovery matters. We've tried to stay out of discovery, and this reference really is a reference for discovery purposes. It would change nothing to delete that sentence. It will simply clean it up. And we don't have that sentence, you see, in all the other privileges. And, of course, you look to the Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery. So, that's one reason we want to change that.

Now, the first sentence we would strike also. For one thing, the -- as presently written, 509 is more protective of the Physician/Patient Privilege than 510 is of the Psychiatrist/Patient. And that shouldn't be so. They either ought to be the same or the Psychiatrist/Patient should be the more protective. We are going to recommend, do recommend, that they be exactly the same.

A problem arose -- Jim Parsons, up at Palestine, got involved in a will contest case, and

- '

he was claiming that the testator was incompetent and he was met -- the person representing him asserted the Patient/Physician Privilege. Here's the person, person's representative, who is apt to benefit the most in our not getting at the truth in a situation like that. He felt that some change ought to be made, and this change would accommodate his grievance in that particular case.

There is something to be said for uniformity between the litigation exception on Physician/Patient and the litigation exception on Psychiatrist/Patient. It's confusing to have them different. Sometimes it's difficult to decide which really is involved, Physician/Patient or Psychiatrist/Patient. So, this proposed change would make them uniform.

We propose that it read as you see underlined there on Page 1. The condition of the patient, physical, mental or emotional, would have to be an element of the cause of action or defense. In other words, it would have to be central to the case. If it is, there would be no privilege. If it's simply relevant in the case, some other issue, then it would be privileged. That is the effect of it.

9.

So, Luke, I don't know whether I'm going to run till somebody objects, or whether you want to have a motion on each one of these.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: As you proceed to finish any grouping, let's go ahead and debate.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: All right. I'll move approval of the proposed change on Page 1, 509(d)(4) as recommended by the Evidence Committee and approval on Page 3 of 510(d)(5).

MR. McMAINS: Seconded.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That motion has been made by Newell Blakely and seconded by Rusty McMains and we're now open for discussion of those changes. Bill Dorsaneo.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Why are the three words "an issue of" located in the second line looking at Page 1, the language there?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Probably a historical explanation. It may have -- I don't know where it came from. It could have come from the original statute or some prior wording. I see it is in the -- it was in the Psychiatrist/Patient Exception 510(d)(5) as presently written. So, it probably came from the original statute. It may not be necessary.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: My question would be does it mean anything? I can think of various things it could mean. And I don't see any reason to have that word -- those words in there, any good reason.

MR. FRANK BRANSON: May I address this for a moment? One way to deal with it is becoming relevant in the practitioner area is the tort litigation. The insurance carriers are using this provision as carte blanche to talk to the plaintiff's doctors other than merely getting written records from them. And I think perhaps that provision regarding discoverability may be the basis of that current conflict within the trial law, because plaintiff's lawyers don't generally take too kindly to that.

MR. McMAINS: But he's just talking about the word, the issue.

MR. O'QUINN: He's just talking -PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The relevant issue
of physical, mental or emotional.

MR. BRANSTON: I'm sorry. I thought he was --

MR. McMAINS: No, he's not talking about the first part.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: He's talking about just deleting "an issue of" so that the language would be "as to a communication or record relevant to the physical, mental or emotional condition." What's the necessity for those three words, "relevant to an issue of the physical," and so forth.

MR. BRANSON: I was addressing the discoverability portion.

MR. McMAINS: I suppose if there were to be an argument made, it would probably be the -- if the condition, is itself, undisputed in one form or another, then there might be no reason for the discoverability of it. That is, it is an issue when it is drawn as an issue. Whereas, the other way it would always be relevant to the condition as to what that condition was. But the fact that that condition exists is -- it may not be an issuable for either for purposes of discovery or trial, if it's undisputed. So, why embarrass the patient with a particular revelation of a communication with a doctor that isn't disputed by anybody. I don't know if that's the reason for it, but that may be.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I can't explain it other than just the history of the words.

MR. TINDALL: Can we move the question on this one?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If there's no further discussion. Is there any other -- Frank.

MR. BRANSON: Could we -- could I just ask Dean Blakely -- I missed the Rules of Evidence meeting where this particular provision came out originally. Was there a discussion as to whether or not it was intended to be used in discovery for the purposes I previously addressed?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: The intent is simply leave it to the discovery rules in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The evidence rules are not answering the question, they're simply referring you to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Of course, if it's privileged, then it's not discoverable.

MR. BRANSON: I think it's as you addressed earlier, by leaving the word "discovery" in the rule, it is being used on a regular basis to allow open communication between the adverse attorney and the doctor. Was that the intention of the rule?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: No, no. The intention there is simply to refer to the Rules of Civil Procedure, it seems to me.

JUSTICE WALLACE: And your recommendation is that any information that is discoverable will be taken out and will no longer be in the rules.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes. And then you go to the Rules of Civil Procedure. And, of course, it's privileged. It's not discoverable. It's kind of a run for it there. It's kind of a blindfold there, but it shapes it up.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: These communications would clearly be discoverable under the discovery rules unless these privileges makes it nondiscoverable.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: That's right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any further discussion on this? Sam Sparks.

MR. SPARKS: I have one question that may be -- it appears to me that you can read the amended or the proposed rule in such a way that you can enlarge upon the old rule because it is "of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies," where the patient can be a witness rather than a party. I'm not opposed to that. I'm sure Frank might be, but I'm not. But is there -- was there any thought in the committee that perhaps we're enlarging upon in the rule that we're looking

Ιn

1 at, to change "the patient was the party." In the 2 proposed change, "the patient," as I read it, is 3 not necessarily the party. PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I think that's right. 5 A party has got to rely upon the condition. 6 got to be a material proposition in the case. But 7 it need not be the patient who is relying on it. 8 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The patient could be 9 a witness, like a bus driver who can't see. 10 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Could be. 11 MR. SPARKS: Doctor who can't see. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other question or 13 discussion? 14 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This condition would 15 have to be put in issue somehow. 16 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes. Under the 17 substantive law governing the case, it would have 18 to be an element of the cause of action or an 19 element of the defense. Material proposition. 20 other words, it would have to be central in the 21 case and not merely evidentiary. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other discussion? 23 Any other questions? 24 Bill, are you making any suggestion as to 25 those three words?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Not really, Luke. have trouble with the words "to an issue of." I understood — that's what Rusty said is what I was thinking. It seems to me that if we're going to require somebody to do something to put this in issue — this condition in issue, I have a little trouble with — I understand the concept of it being important to the case, but "relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense" I have a little trouble with that language, but I can't improve on it.

MR. O'QUINN: Why should it be where the condition is relevant -- where the condition is relevant to an issue in the case?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's what I would think. They obviously --

MR. O'QUINN: All it has to be is relevant to the case.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Then you might as well throw the whole thing out. You're simply down to a question of relevancy. If it's relevant, it comes in. You have no privilege at all.

Obviously, these changes would shrink the coverage of the privilege, but it's still there to some extent. And if you just want to say it's

O

admissible if it's relevant, then there is no privilege at all. And that may be your position.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I guess I'll file something that says this condition is an issue in the discovery content. This condition is an issue in the case because if I rely on the condition as an element of my claim of defense, and then what does somebody say back?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: What somebody would say back -- look -- outline your cause of action there or outline your defense. What are the elements of it. And you don't have the say so. The substantive law gives the answer to that, substantive law in your pleadings. What are the elements of respondent superior? What are the elements of negligent entrustment? You don't have any say so, the substantive law answers that for you.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Not as to factual theories that -- look up -- I wonder if this means anything different from "relevant to an issue in the case." I can see that it's trying to be narrower than that, but I can't identify its contours by reading it. That's probably okay because it's a very difficult thing to resolve.

MR. O'QUINN: Let me take his example of the bus driver with bad eyesight. Where are you going to be if you're met with an objection that his eyesight is not an element of the case? The element of the case is, was the bus driver's negligence in lookout. I don't know what the element of the case is. Did he negligently drive the bus that day? Dorsaneo wants to argue, "Yeah, the reason he did bad is because he can't see," or whatever. He's got bad eyesight, I guess, is what you're talking about.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's right. I said that's relevant to negligence.

MR. O'QUINN: Why shouldn't the jury know about that?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But -- no. But I can't see where you ever stopped it. If it's not relevant to an issue in the case seems to be what he's getting at, but he's trying not to get that far.

MR. O'QUINN: But what you're saying -if I hear you right, you're saying, Professor, that
even though it's relevant to the case, there can be
occasions in which you can't get it in because
somehow it doesn't meet this test of being the

central issue.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes, it's not an element of the cause of action. Not an element of defense.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, somebody's physical condition never is an element of defense unless it's negligence.

MR. O'QUINN: How can it be relevant unless it's raised by the pleadings, is what I don't understand. And pleadings raise the defense is then cause of action.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, all kinds of evidence becomes pertinent to prove some material proposition, and you didn't have to plead your evidence.

MR. BRANSON: Would a general denial be sufficient to allow the defense to use this provision since there really are not many elements to it?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I don't know. It doesn't sound like it.

PROFESSOR WALKER: All of the evidence is admissible under a general denial.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: But just take the lack of competency of the testator. I take it that

might put his mental condition -- make his mental condition of material proposition in a will contest.

MR. TINDALL: I see what you -PROFESSOR BLAKELY: There would be no
privilege there, you see.

MR. TINDALL: This rule has always created problems in divorce cases where a party's claiming they cannot work and they want a greater division of the marital estate. And yet because the rule is now limited to damage suits, you can't get to the evidence.

MR. O'QUINN: I don't conceive of -- you probably have one, but I don't conceive of the example where something could be relevant, which means in my mind has to be raised by the pleadings and yet not be an issue in the case.

MR. TINDALL: If it's relevant it's going to be discoverable and admissible.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Unless it's privileged.

MR. O'QUINN: Yeah, but we're saying if
it's relevant, it's no longer --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: You've got all kinds of lawsuits where there is no material proposition in there consisting of a person's mental, physical

or emotional condition.

MR. O'QUINN: Sure. Contract.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: And even if a person's mental, emotional or physical condition might tend to prove something in the case, it might be relevant, nevertheless it would not be a material proposition in the case. It would not be an element of the party's cause of action or defense.

MR. O'QUINN: My problem is I don't conceive of a case where it would be relevant to prove something and it wasn't raised as an issue in the case.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: It's not enough that -MR. O'QUINN: If it's not an issue in the
case, how can it be --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: It's not enough that the party's condition is relevant to an issue in the case. The issue has to be his condition. That has to be a material proposition.

MR. O'QUINN: What you're saying in his bad eyesight case, that if somebody alleges the bus company negligently hired this man with bad eyesight, it comes into evidence. But if somebody just claims that he had a bad driving day and one

1 of the reasons he had a bad driving day is because 2 he's got terrible eyes, is not going to come in. 3 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: You tell me the substantive law in the area and maybe I can --5 MR. O'QUINN: The issue is, did he negligently drive the bus in the second example. 7 The issue in the first example, did they 8 negligently hire him with bad eyesight. 9 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Outline the elements 10 of the cause of action. State what the material 11 proposition is. Not your evidence, but your --12 MR. O'QUINN: Did the bus company 13 negligently hire him with bad eyesight? Was that a proximate cause of the accident? That's the first 14 15 The second case: Did the bus driver case. 16 negligently drive the bus? Is that a proximate 17 cause of the accident? 18 MR. KRONZER: So, John, on your supposed 19 example, his eyesight has still got to be causing 20 it. 21 MR. O'QUINN: You mean either way? 22 MR. KRONZER: Either way. 23 MR. O'QUINN: You're right. I left out 24 Did they negligently hire him with bad issues. eyesight? Secondly -- well, he had a proximate 25

cause. But I don't see why it should come in one case and not come in the other. I don't understand the difference there.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think saying that the substantive law provides us with the answer makes us avoid deciding the issue, because the substantive law probably doesn't provide us with the answer. We spend a lot of time thinking about causes of action, elements, but it's a lot more complicated than that. I suppose one could read this to say that the only time that the party relies on a condition as an element of his claim of defense, with respect to the claim, I suppose, would be -- what element, damages.

MR. O'QUINN: Physical condition, incompetency.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yeah, or something like that. Or defense. When does somebody rely upon the condition, physical or mental, of the person as an element of his defense read in a very strict sense.

MR. ADAMS: What so the plaintiff?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Avoidance of a contractual obligation.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I guess. And I see

this could either be read as broadly as an issue in the case or in some narrow way that is unknowable.

MR. O'QUINN: You might have the defense, I think, in a tort case. Maybe the defense was that the plaintiff was intoxicated. Somebody wants to get at the medical records of him immediately after to prove that the records of the treating doctor showed he was intoxicated.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Suppose somebody pleads statute of limitation on a cause of action.

MR. O'QUINN: All right.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: And then the plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff was non compos mentis during a period. And thus toll the -- the statute was tolled during that period. Would that -- I don't know whether that's -- I guess that's an offensive use in a sense. That might be considered part of her cause of action.

MR. O'QUINN: What I'm having a hard time --MR. KRONZER: That wouldn't be, Dean, that only arises if it's pled defensively. And that's an avoidance of defensive plea. It's not part of the --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: We should perhaps -should have put in a rebuttal, element of rebuttal.

8

3

5

6

7

10 11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. KRONZER: That's what that would be.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: You could argue that
it's an element of cause of action if it's a
rebuttal element, technical rebuttal. Surely our
choice is not to abolish the privilege altogether
or have it — have no exceptions to it, no
litigation exception to it. Surely those are not
our options.

MR. REASONER: Dean, I think it might have helped me if you would indicate what is it that you wish to avoid by putting in this last phrase "which any party relies on upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense." What are you worried about coming in if you simply say, "relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, emotional condition of a patient in any proceeding?"

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, it seemed that that issue is broad. I suppose we offer A to prove, B to prove, C to prove, D maybe. And we saw this as the ultimate -- as the end of the line. The condition would have to be the end of the line in that chain of proof material proposition.

MR. REASONER: I guess my problem is that our jurisprudence is so murky on what a cause --

1 what the elements of a cause of action are, that 2 that's still not really much guidance, it seems to 3 me. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's what I was 5 trying to say. PROFESSOR BLAKELY: And it wouldn't --6 you would say then it doesn't improve it in the set 7 8 of conditions we said. A material proposition relies upon the condition as a material proposition 9 10 of his claim or defense. That would be a 11 synonymous term. 12 MR. O'QUINN: It's getting worse. MR. REASONER: I'm not familiar with any 13 14 cases defining what a material proposition is. 15 MR. O'QUINN: That's only part of an 16 element of a cause of action. 17 MR. ADAMS: Something like relevance. You 18 just have to say relevance. 19 MR. SPARKS: Yeah, what if you change "as" and then you -- instead of saying, "an element 20 of," are you talking about as evidentiary to a 21 22 claim or defense? 23 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: No. It's not merely 24 evidentiary. It's got to be --MR. SPARKS: So you're talking about 25

1 something more broad, more limited? 2 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes. It doesn't do 3 -- it's simply circumstantial evidence in the case. It's got to be -- if you outline your cause of 5 action, or outline your defense -- and I think of 6 substantive law in those terms, over in the 7 criminal law field, it's fairly easy to see the 8 elements of crime or the elements of the defensive theory. It's more difficult, I suppose, in civil 9 10 cases, but I still think in terms of cause of 11 action or --12 MR. REASONER: Well, would this be 13 designed to prevent you from using it for 14 impeachment purposes? 15 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yeah, it wouldn't be 16 useable for impeachment purposes, no. 17 MR. O'QUINN: What if the testate -- what 18 if somebody came in and said the testator was 19 competent, you couldn't get the record to impeach 20 What if a doctor got on the stand and said 21 that the testator was --22 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, then --23 MR. O'QUINN: Could I get his records to 24 impeach him?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY:

If there was an issue

25

9.

of competency, it really wouldn't be an element of issue. This is one of the requirements of substantive law, that he be competent.

MR. O'QUINN: Okay. But you could use it -- so really you're back to whether it's a crucial issue in the lawsuit.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yeah.

MR. O'QUINN: To me, just here thinking about it -- to me the thing about information that my doctor has, or things of that nature, mainly I don't want that out. I don't want somebody discovering it. That to me is the point of that privilege. That's personally between he and I, what we've talked about. And that should not be discoverable.

Leaving aside this, I think once it's discoverable, I don't see what the big policy argument is about not letting the jury hear it. I mean, it's already discovered. It's out. It's known. And to me it's -- the privilege is a public policy. We're excluding the truth. And any time you exclude the truth, it seems like to me you've got to have a counter weight of public policy. And to me the public policy is, don't let anybody discover my medical record because that's a

_

personal thing between me and the doctor. But if there's some issue in the case that warrants discovery of that information, I don't see why it shouldn't then come on in, assuming that it still is relevant to the lawsuit. But I'm just saying that the lawsuit -- that's irrelevant.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Dean, the concept of waiver of a privilege by an issue injection is one that we saw recently in a Supreme Court case where they got the woman's mental records.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Ginsberg (Phon.)

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Ginsberg. Discovering privileged matter, of course, is prohibited unless there's been a waiver. Does that law -- does that new case take care of this rewrite? Do we need the writing in view of Ginsberg? Are we going to say --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: You probably don't from the plaintiff's standpoint. She was going to use it, the court said, as a sword.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's a waiver by the party who could claim the privilege by injecting the issue. Either side, defense or plaintiff, either as a sword or as a shield, if they put that issue in evidence under Ginsberg, they waive it. And the waiver takes care of the discoverability of

it, it seems to me, at that juncture. I don't know whether we still need a rewrite, which obviously is difficult, or whether we think we can rely on that. And what I'm really headed to here is, do we believe that today, around this table, we're going to be able to make an informed vote on whether to recommend these changes to the Supreme Court or do we feel they need further study by people like O'Quinn and Branson and Newell.

MR. O'QUINN: I'm already staying.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: A lot of these things -see, this committee has not met for -- didn't meet
in all of 1984 and probably hasn't met in 18
months. And so we've got a lot of backlog, but
things that need study, we should study, I feel.
And I don't know whether this is one of them. Let
me get a consensus on that.

How many feel that we're going to get this resolved if we keep working on it here? On the other hand, I'm going to say how many feel it should be referred for further analysis and report next time? How many feel we should continue to work on it now? Raise your hands. Seven. All right. How many feel it should be referred to committee? Okay. Well, we'll keep working on it

then. What further discussion do we have? 1 2 MR. BEARD: Why should we not be able to 3 have discovery to impeach a witness? He says he saw or he heard, the medical record showed that he was 2500 or couldn't hear. Why shouldn't that be 5 6 disclosed? JUDGE HITTNER: And usable. 7 8 MR. BEARD: And usable. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that go to the 10 issue of whether there should be a privilege at 11 all? Your question, Pat. 12 MR. BEARD: Well --13 MR. KRONZER: But it depends what the 14 issue is. 15 MR. BEARD: I don't think discovery 16 should completely go on the relevancy issue, but I 17 don't see why you should not be able to impeach a 18 witness to show he couldn't see or hear what he was 19 claiming he was. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: What's your input, Mr. 21 Kronzer? 22 MR. KRONZER: What is an issue in Texas? 23 Does it have to be the elements of a substantive 24 cause of action or are you talking about something 25 like Pat's talking about? And that does pretty

much away with the whole privilege, if you're talking about that.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: You're two poles, of course, are no privilege, one pole. The other is complete blanket privilege, no exceptions.

MR. BRANSON: Dean, didn't that privilege come out 4590(i), originally?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes.

MR. BRANSON: Had the Legislature already addressed the issue? The chairman asked us whether we need to deal with the privilege.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, the Supreme Court, when it promulgated the Rules of Evidence, repealed that statute insofar as the civil cases are concerned. So this is it. This is the controlling -- this is the control.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Isn't there a middle pole like the one that's used for trade secrets?

Granted, it's a little bit sloppy.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, in that case -PROFESSOR DORSANEO: If the allowance and
the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice involve the balancing
conflict.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Now or otherwise work

1 injustice.

MR. O'QUINN: I love that.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: You want to say element of a cause of action is vague, how about injustice.

MR. O'QUINN: Well, we deal with that all the time. We know how to handle that.

MR. McMAINS: Justice is losing.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Listen to me here for a minute. It seems to me that this is the kind of thing -- we're going to have it not be absolutely privileged and it's just not going to be absolutely privileged. Then this is going to -- why wouldn't it be a good idea to have it decided on an individual case basis as to whether this is just the kind of thing that ought not to be discoverable because its relevance as to an issue in the case is marginal and disclosure of it would be really harmful? Is that adding too much procedure in this?

MR. McMAINS: Let me ask you this. Use of the term "records". Use the term "relevance" that is here, but carry forward the relevance that is in terms of the legal relevance that's used in the code.

1 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: If your only 2 limitation is relevancy, then you have no 3 privilege. MR. KRONZER: That's right. We're 5 already subject to that. 6 MR. BRANSON: Bill, read that language 7 again down in the trade secrets. 8 MR. McMAINS: No, you know what I'm 9 talking about, the section in the Rules of 10 Relevance that says --11 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: 401. 12 MR. KRONZER: I'm not sure in some of my 13 cases I want to limit this. 14 MR. McMAINS: The relevance is so slight, 15 it can't cause harm or whatever. 16 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: 403. 17 MR. McMAINS: That's admissibility. 18 JUDGE HITTNER: Excuse me. I know the 19 problem the court reporter's facing because they 20 get this every day in trial. When they start 21 throwing their hands up, that means everybody's 22 talking at the same time. So really, if we want to 23 get it down --24 I gather that was your position, right? 25 They can only take one at a time.

1 nothing else to say.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. What language are we going to use? Are we going to vote on this language or does somebody have a change in language or are we going to refer it to the committee? I either want a change in language or vote on this language or refer it to a committee.

JUDGE HITTNER: Mr. Chairman, can we have
-- sum it up -- a couple of sentences to each side?
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Fine. Who wants to -Newell, why don't you speak for the proposition.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Probably it's not necessary. I'd simply repeat -- I sit here thinking of causes of action being made up of elements. I'm thinking about "Prosser on Torts" or something and defenses being made up of elements And the substantive law as pled in the case. So, the pleading might -- the pleading selects the particular cause of action or the theory of the cause of action. And the condition of the patient would have to be an element, either the cause of action or the defense for the privilege to go. Otherwise it would be privileged. It's merely evidentiary, merely logically relevant for something in the case. That wouldn't do.

_

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Let's have the counter of that.

MR. O'QUINN: Let me ask Bill something. What word would you remove, Bill? Because I don't want to speak against the issue generally, because I think the privilege ought to be straightened out anyway. I agree with the basic premise, I'm saying whether you have a counter proposal.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'm not going to make a counter proposal. I think different wording could be used, but I think this is a difficult area and I'm just going to defer to the evidence, Professor, on it. I mean, I'd like to ask him is it not true that in many modern codes of evidence they treat this on a balancing kind of basis, rather than trying to make some sort of a rule oriented approach?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I'd hesitate to say so. I know very often the clergy privilege is on the balancing sort of thing and the trade secrets on a balancing sort of thing and so forth. I don't know if it's Physician/Patient,

Psychiatrist/Patient. It may be their jurisdiction.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The difficulty that I have is knowing what is the better policy choice either from a personal perspective. And I do think this is — that this coordination of 509 and 510 and the elimination of the discovery language, I think this is a definite improvement over what we have now. And I'd be reluctant to be too critical of it because I can't suggest how it could be improved and I don't necessarily think that the balancing approach is the appropriate one. But I'm not certain about it.

MR. O'QUINN: Let me ask this question,
Bill. To me the problem is what Harry Reasoner
kind of mentioned is trying to figure out what
these elements are. Why don't we just say "as a
part of the claim of defense?" We don't get caught
up in the legalism about what are elements or not.
Would that be a problem?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, does part mean more to you than elements of cause of action?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Steve McConnico, do you have a question?

MR. McCONNICO: I just didn't understand what his "part" was?

MR. O'QUINN: "Part of a claim of the

defendant."

myself because the term "cause of action" has so many cases. I could talk for about a half an hour about all the different definitions of all the various professors over the years, defined in one way or the another. You could read Page Keeton's early article on this subject. And we would probably be better off to stay the heck away from all that. And I think it would be no great damage done to the principal by saying "part of", and I don't think saying "an element" solves any problems for us. I think it sends us off into a lot of technicalities that don't really have much to do with the thrust of the proposal.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there a Motion to Amend to change "an element" to "a part"?

MR. O'QUINN: I move.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Second?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Second.

MR. KRONZER: What's the Motion? Excuse

me.

MR. McMAINS: Motion is to change the word "element," basically, "an element" to "a part."

MR. KRONZER: Well, I know that -- if I may speak -- I know that Professor Dorsaneo has blessed it with there being some perceptable distinction between the two, however, I need an explanation of that. The difficulty following how you can counsel these angels standing on different pinpoints.

MR. McMAINS: I think he said there is an imperceptible distinction.

MR. O'QUINN: What he's saying -- as I understand what he's saying is, that we don't get caught up in esoteric arguments about what are the elements of the cause of action. In other words, if the matter involves part of somebody's claim or somebody's defense, then it's involved in their claim or defense, then the condition -- information about the condition should be told to the jury.

MR. BRANSON: But then aren't you really bringing it back to relevancy and doing away with the frivilous?

MR. O'QUINN: No, not entirely, because one thing he was concerned about is if somebody was testifying and somebody wanted to find out if a person was even a competent witness, go get all his medical record and see if he's got degenerative

brain disease where he maybe can't recall events correctly. He didn't want all this type of stuff coming in.

MR. KRONZER: But you're not going to let the bar down for that. That would get me.

Other matters here that we have to deal with and there are a lot of them. So, I'm going to split the vote three ways. Those in favor of the proposition -- well, first of all those in favor of the amendment? And unopposed? And then with -- without the amendment as that vote goes. Those in favor of the recommendations, those against recommendations and those in favor of further study. So, those in favor of the amendment to substitute "a part" in the place of "an element," please raise your hands. That looks like 13.

Those opposed -- there are 6. Those in favor of the recommendations, please raise your hands.

MR. TINDALL: As amended?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: As amended.

MR. TINDALL: One question here before we vote. I notice we seem to be dissecting this code. Should we put by any chance "to the party's claim or defense"?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: In favor of that, say 1 2 Opposed? With those two amendments, those in aye. 3 favor of the recommendation, please show your hands. 5 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I thought we were 6 still discussing. He asked a question. 7 MR. TINDALL: I asked a question. 8 we use "the parties claim or defense." 9 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Now, "the party" 10 would refer back to the party with the condition. 11 And as it's worded, any party relies. 12 MR. O'QUINN: Let's don't get caught up 13 in dissecting. 14 MR. TINDALL: I thought you were trying 15 to get rid of his and hers through this. 16 MR. O'QUINN: Well, an occasional his --17 MR. TINDALL: I'm not going to play those 18 language games, but later on we vote on one like 19 that. 20 MR. O'QUINN: How about a claim? 21 MR. TINDALL: The claim or defense. 22 MR. O'QUINN: Okay. The claim. 23 MR. REASONER: I don't understand the 24 problem using party, you've already used party in 25 the phrase.

1 MR. SPARKS: You used patient earlier. MR. O'QUINN: So, what do you want to 2 say, "of the party"? 3 Parties claim for defense. MR. TINDALL: MR. McMAINS: You want "the" or "a"? 5 should be "a". 6 7 MR. BRANSON: Does the party there refer 8 to the party of litigation or the party of the 9 condition? 10 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Party in the 11 litigation. 12 MR. O'QUINN: That's right. 13 So, if you had a witness MR. BRANSON: 14 who's competence came into being, this would not 15 apply? 16 MR. O'QUINN: Right. Would not apply. 17 Because it's not a part of a claim or defense. 18 MR. BRANSON: But just out of curiosity, 19 why not? If you've got someone who alleges to have seen something, that's blind as a bat. 20 MR. O'QUINN: If I understand what 21 22 Professor Blakely says, we're not going to let the 23 bars down entirely. We're not going to let 24 everything come in just because it's relevant to 25 something. We're going to have to kind of let the

bar down a little bit. 1 2 MR. KRONZER: He didn't inject the issue, 3 Frank. The party or the witness didn't inject, he 4 was drug in there. 5 MR. BRANSON: Sometimes he's drug in early enough, you can find out about his record. 6 7 MR. KRONZER: That's true. MR. O'QUINN: Did you move to change 8 9 "his" to "a party"? 10 MR. TINDALL: "A party" or "the party's" 11 claim or -- it would be "a party's." 12 JUDGE HITTNER: P-A-R-T-Y-'-S? CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Those in 13 14 favor of changing "his" to "a party" or "the 15 party." MR. TINDALL: "A party's" apostrophe S. 16 17 CHAIRMAN SOULES: "A party's" apostrophe 18 S, say Aye. Opposed? Okay. With those two 19 changes, those in favor of the recommendations for 20 changes to Rule 509(d)(4) and 510(d)(5), please 21 hold your hands up. 17 in favor. Those opposed? One. Does anyone -- that's a majority. That makes 22 23 a majority without taking a third count. All 24 right. Dean, if you'll go forward then with the next

25

recommendation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: If you'll turn back to Page 2. If you'll turn back to Page 2, we're back on Physician/Patient again and a different exception, 509(d)(5). And as that reads presently, a doctors done something wrong and hears an investigation under the Medical Practice Act and so on. The privilege has to give way there, the present rule says. You have the same problem on the investigation of a nurse. And as the reporter's note says down there, that problem was brought to the attention of the committee by counsel to the Board of Nurse Examiners. And there's the same need to provide an exception when you're investigating a nurse. So, I recommend the approval of that new language underlined at the bottom of Page 2. So moved.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Second.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Was that Bill Dorsaneo?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does this need discussion? Okay. We're ready to vote. Those in favor, say aye. Opposed? There are none. That carries.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: On Page 4 is a

competency problem. We set up in 601 incompetency -- certain incompetency provisions with respect to children -- (a)(2), 601(a)(2), "children or other persons who, after being examined by the court, appear not to possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which they are interrogated." That came from the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Code of Criminal Procedure also had provided "or who do not understand the obligation of an oath."

A bill was dropped into the Legislature by
Representative Mike Toomey to provide -- let me see
here where I -- that would amend our evidence rule
as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure.
"However, no child nine years of age or younger may
be excluded from giving testimony for the sole
reason that such child does not understand the
obligation of an oath."

Well, the liaison committee that originally proposed the Rules of Evidence started to do away with this competency thing altogether. The federal rules do away with it and simply leave it to the attorney. If he wants to put the person on, all right, and leave it to the jury to evaluate the testimony. But our committee decided, the liaison

committee, the Supreme Court promulgated the Code of Criminal Procedure provision.

Representative Toomey raising the problem, we decided it wouldn't cost anything to throw out "or who do not understand the obligation of an oath." If a child has sufficient intellect to grasp the situation and say something sensible about it, the jury wouldn't be misled. In all likelihood he has some elementary grasp of the difference between truth and a story. And if he likes one, he would like the other. So, it probably is not costly to eliminate that, and the committee just decided to go ahead and make that change. So, we would eliminate that bracketed language "or who do not understand the obligation of an oath."

Move for approval, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CASSEB: I second it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Casseb seconds.

Does this need discussion? Those in favor, say

aye. Opposed? There are none. That carries.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: On Page 5 here is
Rule 610. This was recommended to the Supreme
Court by the original liaison committee. It's
copied from the federal rules. "Evidence of the

beliefs or opinions of a witness on the matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced." This really had come to be the common law practice. are, a small community, let's say of Baptist, and we want to show this witness is a Catholic because we hold Catholics in our little community in low esteem and whatever they would say would be unreliable, and so on. That has felony disuse of common law, and the federal rules prohibit it and we so recommended to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court dropped it. And did not promulgate I do not know why. So, at our meeting of the Evidence Committee, it was recommended that once again we try with the court to put in 610.

It may be that the court thought that the constitutional provision, which provides, "No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the courts of this state on account of his religious opinions or for want of any religious beliefs." Thought that that had covered it. But it does not. That constitutional provision simply provides that no person shall be incompetent, it doesn't say about impeachment.

Also there's a Statute 3717, "No person shall be incompetent to testify," so forth, so forth. That, too, deals with incompetency. It does not deal with impeachment. The way the rule is worded -- proposed rule is worded, it would allow you to impeach to show bias or prejudice. This plaintiff is -- here comes a witness, testifies favorable to the plaintiff, very favorable. Shouldn't the jury know that both of them are on the Board of Deacons down at the 142nd Baptist Church. Sure. A member of the same little group.

And so you could use it to show bias. You would not be using it to show that by reason of the nature of their particular religious belief that their credibility is impaired or enhanced. So, the committee decided to try the court once again on this. It would mean renumbering 611, 12, 13 and 14, and that would put it back in sync with the federal rules. We got out of number alignment with the federal rules when the court dropped 610. So, it would mean renumbering those.

I recommend approval, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Frank Branson.

MR. BRANSON: Dean, I understand the reasoning behind the recommendation for the

standard organized religions and the regional differences. But the definition of religion has occasionally caused the court some problems. Let's assume you have a rather unorthodox religious organization. Is that not the type of thing that would be reasonable to question the witness about, such as the airline pilots who set up a church to avoid paying taxes?

JUDGE HITTNER: I think this is only geared toward credibility, though, isn't that correct?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes.

JUDGE HITTNER: Am I correct in saying if there's any other reason to go into this, it would not be prohibited? You're talking just about basic credibility as a human being testifying from the witness stand?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes.

MR. BRANSON: Well, let's assume the organized religion that believes in human sacrifice.

MR. ADAMS: So what?

MR. BRANSON: Is that contradicting religion?

PROFESSOR WALKER: That's your religion.

1 MR. BRANSON: But the problem that I had 2 with it is not the general proposition that you 3 gave, but there are a lot of potential exceptions and a lot of legal opinions that are going to have 5 to be written, I suspect, to define religion. 6 MR. TINDALL: It's been in the federal 7 rules how many years, ten? 8 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, I think it's been -- in the federal rules? Oh, yes, since '75. 10 ten years. 11 MR. TINDALL: Has it created any cases in 12 ten years, that you know of? 13 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Not that I know of. 14 And it's conceivable that the absence of it 15 wouldn't change the question very much. 16 Nevertheless, the sponsors of it, before our 17 committee, felt very strongly about it. 18 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Why did they feel 19 that? 20 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Some of them are 21 school teachers and they find it uncomfortable to 22 have to keep on saying Federal Rule 11 -- Texas 23 Rule 11, Federal Rule 12, you know. 24 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's what I 25 thought.

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: That's part of it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: There's a motion. Is there a second?

MR. ADAMS: Second.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. It's been moved and seconded that we adopt this change. Any discussion of these changes, that is, to add 610 and to renumber the rest of the six hundred series accordingly? Those in favor, say aye. Opposed? There are none. That carries.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: On Page 6, Rule 610(c). We are recommending that we add to 610(c) "except as may be necessary to develop his testimony." The federal rule reads "Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness, except as may be necessary to develop his testimony." The reason the federal rule has that additional language, and that additional language, by the by, was recommended to the Supreme Court, originally, is to take care of those situations where the -- if you're dealing with a child, you've asked the question six different ways. You cannot elicit the testimony. You know he knows. You need to lead him. You ask the Court's permission. Or you come at an adult

witness six different questions. You know he knows. You've been unable to elicit. You need to refresh his memory. You get the court's permission. Someone who has difficulty with the language, he's a farmer, so forth, so forth. There are those situations where you need to lead, they're exceptional, you get the court's permission.

I would say that under our present language the Texas court does not have the discretion to permit leading in those situations. You say, "Why, yes, it does." Where does he get it? Here's a flat prohibition against leading questions on direct. But the common law practice permitted leading in those special situations, and I think we ought to bring forward the common law practice with that amendment.

I so recommend -- or I so move.

MR. BRANSON: Second.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's been with regard to Rule --

MR. KRONZER: You can't ask questions without leading language. You've got to have something.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's with

1 regard to --2 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: 610(c). 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is that going to still have -- will that be numbered 610(c) after the last 5 change? 6 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: No, it would have to 7 be renumbered accordingly. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Renumbered 611(c). PROFESSOR BLAKELY: But I do not want to 9 10 assume that the court had bought our 610. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's proposal on 610(c), which if the other change was made, it 12 would be 611(c). Just trying to keep my notes 13 14 straight. Moved by Dean Blakely. And who was the 15 second on it? Frank Branson. Okay. Those in 16 favor, say aye. Opposed? 17 MR. SPARKS: Opposed. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: One opposed. Jim 19 Kronzer's opposed. 20 MR. KRONZER: No, I did not oppose that. 21 Let's get the record straight, Mr. Chairman. 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sorry. Who was it? 23 Sam Spark's opposed. 24 MR. SPARKS: Just changed one rule to the 25 other.

which the actual writing is admissible. And for goodness sake, it might contain all kinds of objectionable matter, and you'd be getting it in despite those objections or whatever they might be. It might be a copy. It might be a false instrument. You can even use an instrument known not to be so to refresh somebody's memory.

MR. KRONZER: We're talking about two different things, Dean.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, we're talking about the purpose for which the writing would be admissible.

MR. KRONZER: But if that writing comes forth as an otherwise admissible document that's generated through this device that you've got because the witness used it for --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, if it's otherwise admissible, there is no objection to it.

MR. KRONZER: No. no.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: He wouldn't have to have --

MR. KRONZER: No, sir. These cases hold that even if it was a privileged attorney/client protected document, and you've used it for purposes of refreshment, that comes forward, and for the

Δ

first time it becomes probative in the case -- I'm talking about the federal cases interpreting the very rule we're talking about -- you just let your, I'll say, drawers down when you've done that.

Now, a lot of times the witness says, "I didn't look at the document." That's something else. But we've seen this in the last three and a half years in many, many ways. What I'm saying an attempt to prescribe the usability of a document that comes forward is a dangerous game to play or to impose upon the federal practice that we're trying to adopt wherever we can. And that was my objection then and it is now.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Frank Branson.

MR. BRANSON: Dean, isn't there some merit in the way the rule reads now in letting the lawyer who is giving material to the witness to review, make the decision and take the good with the bad if he's going to give the witness the document? Which is really, as I understand it, what the federal rules have historically done, rather than having --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, you can make the argument, but isn't the right to cross-examine from the document a sufficient offsetting feature?

Why do you have to go so far as to say the document, itself, which no one has put in and which may have objectional matter in it, why should the document, itself, be admissible except for impeachment?

MR. KRONZER: I'm not suggesting that if the document is otherwise subject and debilitated for other reasons, Dean, that it doesn't fail.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Jim, I think you're arguing unless you put this limitation. And, see, the rule presently says you can get in the writing — the opposing side can get in the writing without limitation. He can put it in as substantive evidence to prove what he says.

MR. KRONZER: No, it doesn't say so.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Dean, it doesn't -- it says, unless there's something that was failed -- that was not underscored or not bracketed. It says "those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness." That's the only thing that's admissible.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes.

MR. KRONZER: And it doesn't say it's probative evidence. I'm not --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, fine.

MR. KRONZER: -- saying to expand it or to limit it or to change any other rule. I'm merely saying that when the discovery of that documentation, what he's looked at, leads you in that document, itself, or into the documents he's looked at, to those, otherwise are usable and would not have been otherwise usable, then they are probative evidence and should not be limited to impeachment value. And they are not in the federal practice. Once you get them out of that lawyers pocketbook, you got you some evidence.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Now, Jim, when you say is otherwise admissible, you mean if -- suppose we just struck altogether -- you read -- this would read "and to cross-examine thereon" period. Now, if you stopped right there and eliminated all the balance, would that change the law? Would that let in the writing? The writing wouldn't come in, would it?

MR. KRONZER: Because of the rule if it didn't otherwise more than impeachment value, it wouldn't.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: So, this must be -this must intend when it says "and to introduce in
evidence those portions which relate to the

testimony of the witness," must mean here is permission to override what would otherwise be objectionable matter.

MR. KRONZER: Are you then -- take the contrary to that, the converse. Are you suggesting that we should limit any testimony so received and so developed to only having impeachment value?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: No, the writing. Limit the writing.

MR. KRONZER: I'm saying the writing.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: To impeachment, yeah.

MR. KRONZER: And regardless of whether it, itself, as a matter of original impression, would have probative value?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: If without reference to whether it had been used to refresh and so on, is admissible anyway. If there's no objection to it, then you don't need this.

MR. KRONZER: If the lawyer has not -either by foolishness or whatever the reason, did
give him that, it might be privileged, but whatever
the reason, but it has now become open game, I'm
saying to you it is then admissible and
introducible in evidence in the federal practice
and under the federal rule. And you want to limit

3 4

5 6

7

8 9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

that by this change.

MR. McMAINS: But privilege -- the Texas practice, as I understand it, does not make it non-probative. It may make it non-discoverable, but it's not going to make it non-probative.

MR. KRONZER: But he's saying it would, Rusty.

MR. McMAINS: No, I don't think so. saying if it's probative, it's probative. All he's suggesting is that you don't toss in the writing just for the fun of it.

MR. KRONZER: Well, I didn't understand that to be the case. He's saying it's impeachment only and comes from that source.

JUDGE HITTNER: I believe what Mr. Kronzer is saying, that once you bring your witness into trial and if he doesn't have it up in his head, you're going to hand it to this person, then it's fair game.

MR. KRONZER: No, the federal -- Judge Hittner, the federal cases are uniformly holding that it does not make any difference at which time you refreshed your memory. You could have done it back in your office.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's what it says.

25

MR. KRONZER: The old state rule is gone. It's gone now in Texas. And that you have to bring those documents forward. Now I'm saying that the federal practice that we are purporting to adopt says those documents are admissible when you bring And they don't purport to classify them forward. them as probative or impeachment value. That is for the court to do depending on other rules, but not by prescribing or limiting them in this rule. And that's my objection. And we ought not to be just lollygaging around with the federal rules just every time we think we're going to adopt some new things in the state practice.

MR. REASONER: Dean, are there any examples that have been problems in the federal practice?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I cannot give you examples. I do not say there are none.

MR. REASONER: I understand. But it does seem to me that there is merit in keeping our rules congruent with the federal practice unless we have a good reason to change it.

MR. WELLS: I move we reject this proposal.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I have one other

question before we went to that. Since the rule has been held to apply to the deposition practice, too. So, for example, if an attorney has done a memorandum of the facts, turns that over to his — foolishly or otherwise, as Jim said, shows that work product to his client or to a witness, or to his client for purposes of preparing the client for deposition, that work product then is discoverable. Because —

MR. BRANSON: And is admissible.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What? Pardon me?

MR. BRANSON: And is admissible.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And admissible. Now, if we change this to limit the admissibility to impeachment — there is some rationale in the cases that impeachment — matters discovered for impeachment only are not relevant to the subject matter. Therefore, they're not discoverable because discovery is based on — is limited — the scope of discovery is limited to matters that are relevant to the subject matter. Would the addition of this language protect that work product that's been shown for purposes of preparing the witness to testify, from discovery, since it would then be used only for impeachment? That's just a thought.

_

I don't know whether it's worth even talking about.

MR. McMAINS: The cat's already out of the bag by the time you get to this decision.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, not if it's only impeachment, it may not be discoverable because --

MR. McMAINS: No, but I mean the rule of admissibility doesn't come into play until it's produced and physically there. So you've got it under either change.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I'm talking about discoverability, though. It's discoverable if the witness admits that he looked at his lawyer's memorandum before he testified in order to refresh his recollection. I thought his memorandum was indiscoverable. I'm saying if the use of that memorandum is limited to impeachment, it may not be discoverable.

All right. The motion was made by Dean Blakely and seconded, I believe, by Judge Tunks that this recommendation be received. And obviously there is some opposition to it. Are we ready for a vote on the subject? All right. Those in favor, say aye. Opposed? All right. I'm going to need a show of hands on that, please. Those in favor, raise your hands, please. Four. Opposed?

2

3

5

6

7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

12. 12 opposed. That then failed.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Mr. Chairman, beginning at the bottom of Page 7 and running on over to the top of Page 8 is a proposed change on 801 defines hearsay, and as we know (a), (b), (c), and (d), in Texas, define hearsay, but then when you come to (e), you begin taking out statements that otherwise would be hearsay. So, you start taking them out. And at the top of page 8, (e) starts taking out -- (e) "A statement is not hearsay if-- (1) prior statement by witness. declarant testifies at the trial or hearing -- " so he's there live. "-- And is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement -- " He's made a prior statement, you see. "-- And the statement is inconsistent with his testimony..."

The proposal would be to stop right there and delete a limitation that's found under federal rules. The federal rules are "(A) inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding." Now, this is not a use of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach. It's the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence on a theory that the reasons

for the hearsay rule there are weak. This fellow's on the stand. He's made this prior inconsistent statement. You can ask him which one is true. You now can cross-examine him, although it's stale cross. His statement was made six months ago, a year ago. You can now observe his demeanor and he's now under oath and so on.

The rule, as we're proposing the change, was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court originally, but Congress put the limit on it "and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or proceeding." But our committee felt that this should come in as substantive evidence even though it was made on a street corner. A few states have adopted that position. It, of course, is contrary to the majority position in the country. So, we're recommending that the bracketed language be deleted. And I so move.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there a second?

MR. CASSEB: Seconded.

MR. TINDALL: Why are we -- what's the push for deviating, again, from the federal rule?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That was moved by Dean Blakely and seconded by Judge Casseb. All right.

Discussion?

2

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. TINDALL: What's been the push to change, again, from the federal rule? I asked the same question as Jim Kronzer.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, you see, in the reporter's note, that is explained. It says that Congress added that limitation for criminal case purposes. The federal rules, of course, control criminal cases as well. And the person who recommended this change -- our rules, which apply only to civil cases, should permit this substantive use of prior inconsistent statements and so forth. That this is a position -- well, let me read this last sentence. "There is absolutely no reason in civil cases not to implement fully this reform of the common law that was avidly supported by Wigmore, Morgan, McCormick, Holmes, Learned Hand and, so far as we know, every other reputable authority on the law of evidence."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Harry Reasoner.

MR. REASONER: Dean, this would apply to an oral statement that anybody else claimed they heard on the street corner?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes, yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Jim Kronzer.

MR. KRONZER: Mr. Chairman, I -- they put

21

22

23

24

25

rules.

been and to then have him called as a witness when those pressures may have changed for whatever reason. I don't need to get in -- everybody here who's a litigator knows how those things happen. And yet that evidence, that statement, that is unsworn to, unverified, at a place and time where you had nothing to say about it, becomes substantive, probative evidence in that lawsuit.

Now, that is not the common law of Texas.

Now, that is not the common law of Texas.

And I read McCormick's book again. I don't find

that same argument on me then, the reputable

authority argument. And I don't fall in the

category of reputable authority. And I opposed it

vigorously then and I do now. Even though it would

basically be more helpful to plaintiffs, I suppose,

than defendants. But it has not been the common

law of Texas prior to the promulgation of our new

under oath, has never been probative in Texas

unless the witness admitted to the truth of that

statement while on the stand. If he disavowed it

or denied it, it was impeached, impeachment value

and all. Now, what this purports to do is to let a

statement, taken anywhere, under any circumstances,

from a witness, whatever his pressures may have

An out of court statement not signed, not

that in Mo
McCormick.

McCormick.

but I don'

all that of

But

never ador

and the Co

I say that

that in McCormick. I don't find it in McCleary on McCormick. So, I'm not the reputable authority, but I don't agree with Professor Walker that it's all that clear.

But what is also important, the federal rules never adopted that. The judicial conference didn't and the Congress didn't. And the Congress didn't. I say that's letting the bars down to let in pure ex parte statements taken under questionable circumstances become proof to support findings and elements in any case. I think that's wrong, whoever it helps or hurts.

MR. TINDALL: Now in federal civil cases this is not permitted, right, these out of court statements?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: That's right. The Congress put the limitation on there for the federal rules, whether civil or criminal.

MR. TINDALL: That's right. But it applies clearly to civil and criminal in a case.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes.

JUSTICE WALLACE: Dean, I have one question working toward these Uniform Rules of Evidence. In fact, I already got a draft out between us and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

1 ' '

Would that have any effect on this, you think?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, the draft -- of course, it went to the Court of Criminal Appeals -- followed the federal rule. It had the limitation on there, the requirement that the prior statement be given under oath subject to penalty of perjury at the trial, hearing, or other proceeding. If this committee buys this limitation, I mean this change, and the Supreme Court buys it, then, of course, it would be some -- the Court of Criminal Appeals would be apprised of that. They might or might not buy it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Orville Walker.

PROFESSOR WALKER: All right. Now, first, I don't think we're changing anything unless I'm missing something. Statements which are not hearsay is a prior inconsistent statement. It's never been hearsay. It is not hearsay. It's offered for impeachment and not for it's truth. So, that statement is -- it makes no change in the common law. A statement is not hearsay if it's a prior statement and it's -- the defendant testified at trial and is subject to cross-examination and it's inconsistent. It's impeachment and not hearsay. So, there's no change.

problem. You never had one. But if he disavows it on the stand, this would make it still probative value.

PROFESSOR WALKER: And no predicate would be required.

MR. KRONZER: That's correct.

PROFESSOR WALKER: Just put words in his mouth and he's not even there to defend himself.

MR. KRONZER: He comes out of chute No. 5 on a cyclone. And then you got in evidence with the court some finding that you want. And it's a two-way street. This is a double cutter.

Those in favor, say aye. Opposed? Well, the no's have it. But let me take a vote on it anyway because I think the Supreme Court is often interested in the weighing of that. Those in favor, please show your hands. One hand. I thought I heard more than one voice. Those opposed? Okay. That's the rest of the house. Thank you.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I want the record to show that I read eloquently Guy Wellburn's reporter's note down here. I didn't get to vote in the committee.

J

proceeding in the suit in which they were taken" and so forth and so forth. And the rule had been construed by the cases as not requiring unavailability. Even though the deponent was there, it would come in.

Now, 213, old 213 has disappeared into new 207; and this committee considered that two and a half years ago or whenever it was that the committee met. And a reporter's comment to new 207 included the statement that there was no intent to change the practice on unavailability. They would continue to let in depositions even though the deponent was available at the trial. All right.

Well, what about depositions that were taken in different lawsuits, that were taken in one lawsuit and offered in another, or perhaps taken in another jurisdiction and not in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure?

We contemplated when the rules were originally enacted that they would be hearsay, but would come in under the exception to the hearsay Rule 804(b)(l), former testimony. And that would require that the deponent be unavailable. All right.

There has been some confusion on all that.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And so, when our committee met April 12, we thought to -- we thought to clarify, not change -- not change anything, but just to help try to clarify. And so, we're recommending that 8 -- here at the bottom of Page 8, 801(e)(3) we strike the word "offered" and insert the word "used." Some members of the committee thought that somehow was more illuminating, that we add the comment -- comment: "See Rule 207 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding use of depositions." And then over on 804(b)(1) we add the comment, at the top of Page 10, comment: "A deposition in some circumstances may be admissible without regard to unavailability of the deponent. See Rule 801(e)(3) and comment thereto." And so, where all that would leave us is where we were before.

An attorney would first look at -- if this thing is admissible under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, then there is no requirement of unavailability. If it's not, then you'd have to go over to 804(b)(l) and try to get in over there.

And that, of course, would require unavailability.

Now, this amendment, this insertion of the Rules of Civil Procedure 207 enlarges on prior practice. Prior practice, the deposition was

admissible only in the same lawsuit as a deposition. This thing enlarges 207, and it's admissible -- may be used by any person for any purpose against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof. So, there's no requirement that the offering party have been a party to that prior lawsuit.

So, the effect of that and the interplay between the Evidence Rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure is to mean -- that means that depositions are now admissible though the deponent is available where they wouldn't have been admissible if you go back several years. But at any rate, the whole effort by the Evidence Rules and the Evidence Committee is to leave it to the Rules of Civil Procedure in essence.

I move approval of these comments and this one change, delete "offered" and insert the word "used."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there a second?

MR. ADAMS: Second.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Seconded by Gilbert Adams for the suggested changes to 801(e)(3) and 804(b)(1). Is there discussion?

3

_

7 8

9

11

12 13

1'

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Bill Dorsaneo.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: This is one of those areas where we're dealing with the two sets of rules which, if you'll go back in time to drafting stage, were being drafted independently, one from the other by two separate and distinct committees. My basic comment is that we need to have a subcommittee to actually work out the interrelationship between the Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Evidence with respect to depositions and perhaps some other matters as well. The reason why I say that is that unless we deal with the two things together at some point, the procedural rule people will say, "Well, this admissibility question is for the Rules of Evidence people." And the Rules of Evidence people will say, "This is for the Rules of Procedure." And nobody will ever deal with it adequately.

By way of example, Rule 207, Paragraph One, which is entitled, "Use of Depositions," and Professor Blakely talked about, was not intended to broaden anything, by me at least, when I wrote down that language. That was a mistake by me in my judgment. Maybe the Supreme Court agrees with the mistake. But that just happened. Some of those

things happen. I don't believe it has been construed, so we don't know whether it means what it says literally or not. The assumption of the Evidence Committee that something was going on there other than that is not necessarily supported by any foundation. The foundation would have to be bound by what happened in the Supreme Court because in all of the committees that proceeded the adoption of Rule 207 of the Rules of Procedure by the Supreme Court, this matter never was discussed. It essentially is worded the way it is through, in my judgment, a drafting mistake committed by me.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, the Evidence Committee didn't seem to have any problem with that. It was discussed. They were aware because Tom Black had proposed, "Look here, we adopted this thing originally, proposed it originally on the assumption that it had to be in the same lawsuit to dispense with the requirement of unavailability." But Tom's -- and Tom proposed that we reword to retain that limitation, but the committee didn't go with that. Rather it decided to do what you see here before you today.

JUDGE HITTNER: You mean refer to -- back to the rules, back to 207?

25

JUDGE HITTNER: Is this the only comment -- or would this be the only comment in the Rules of Evidence referring back to Rules of Civil Anybody recall any others? PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Yes. I can't point I can turn some pages and find it, but there are one or two instances where that's so --PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Reference to Rule

JUDGE HITTNER: Well, does this, in effect by putting a comment in, pull the rug out from No. 3? It just, in effect -- the comment -is it a comment just to 3, is that correct?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: In essence, yes. essence it's a reference to 207. If it fits 207, It's not hearsay and therefore no requirement of unavailability.

I'm not sure, for interpretation purposes, it might not be best just to leave it the way it is. Just to leave it with 3 without comment. Because now you're going from the Rules of Evidence going back now to a long rule on depositions. Runs about half a page, doesn't it, 207?

1 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, Judge, you 2 presently are referring there to Texas Rules of 3 Civil Procedure without mentioning a number. MR. ADAMS: You're just helping the 5 reader, directing it back to the book. 6 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: So, we're just being 7 more specific. Where in the Texas Rules of Civil 8 Procedure? 9 MR. REASONER: Dean, I'm puzzled. You 10 say that the view of the Evidence Committee that 11 "offered" is synonymous with "use", that you're not 12 making a substantive change? 13 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: No, they thought it 14 was more illuminating. 15 MR. REASONER: Well, it also seems much 16 broader to me. 17 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It is. 18 MR. McMAINS: I think it is. 19 MR. REASONER: That's the way it seems to 20 me, but I understood Dean to be saying the 21 contrary. 22 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: At any rate, that's 23 what we recommend. MR. BRANSON: Dean, how did the Evidence 24 25 Committee define "used"? So, the trial lawyer used

it to assist him in getting ready for trial, but never offered it. It was intended that it be usable as long as it had been taken in accordance with the rules?

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Jim, were you there when that was being discussed?

MR. KRONZER: No, sir.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Gilbert?

MR. ADAMS: I was just trying to recall,
Dean. I think we thought that offered was not
applicable. It was sort of a -- that a person -that you really need to be using it in accordance
with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and not
necessarily offering it. Because I don't know that
the rule -- the rule did -- the caption of the Rule
207, Paragraph One, is "Use of Depositions". And
it deals with the use of depositions and not the
offering of them. And it was sort of just a
misleading type of --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: It may be that's where we picked up --

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That must be the case.

MR. ADAMS: It wasn't -- it wasn't meant to be anything more than to try to conform to the

same type of language that the Rules of Civil
Procedure used. And, see, Rule 207 says, "use of
depositions in court proceedings," and not offering
of them. It's use of them. And that really is
cosmetic more than any kind of substantive --

MR. BRANSON: Isn't it possible that the committee was addressing the problem of in a subsequent trial, having to go back to the transcript of the trial to see whether or not the previously taken deposition was, in fact, offered in trial?

MR. ADAMS: I don't recall that discussion at all.

MR. BRANSON: That certainly is currently a potential problem. It is eliminated by the use of the word "used" as opposed to "offered." It can become technically, extremely difficult. You've got a trial that occurred in Florida. You're attempting to use depositions of the same expert. You go back to the trial transcript and determine whether the deposition was actually offered in trial. Whereas, I assume it can be presumed if it was taken, it was used for some purpose.

MR. ADAMS: I really think, as I recall, my recollection is that it was more of a cosmetic

thing, that was the thought of the committee at that time. That the rule says, "use of deposition," it ought to be consistent with the -- with our language in this Rule 801.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I'm comfortable, Mr. Chairman, with changing "offered" to "used" and adding the two comments. Did I move for approval?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

MR. McMAINS: It was seconded.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It was seconded. Is there further discussion? Bill Dorsaneo.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, I think that would be fine for now. But I do think we need to address the hidden policy question in paragraph one of Rule 207 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Because it really had not been addressed when these rules were amended April 1, 1984.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: We just stumbled fortuitously.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's right. And I know exactly how it happened. But the only other thing I could say is that -- that comment to 804 -- I don't really like the way it's worded, Dean, because it doesn't seem to me to -- I guess I don't think it's finished yet. I think this is a problem

area that is definitely improved by the suggestions and changes that you've proposed, but I don't think it's finished sufficiently for us to think that we're done in dealing with the procedural rules and the evidence rules in the area of depositions. And there are about four or five other things I could say about it. I won't. Those are basically my comments.

JUDGE HITTNER: May I direct a question to Professor Dorsaneo? Do you think there's a necessity for the comments to either rule that we're talking about?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes, I do. I think that -- professor didn't talk about some of the problem language in 804. The depositions -- on the unavailability requirement for depositions in the same case.

JUDGE HITTNER: So, what is -- I didn't understand your position then. You were opposing the comment -- one of the comments?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The comments are better, but they don't -- by virtue of the fact that even -- you're commenting on what is the need for the comments. The comments aren't good enough. Because it would be apparent if the comments were

worded more clearly to indicate what the problems are that are being addressed.

. 2

.3

. 4

.5

MR. McMAINS: I have one question. Is there any real need in the comment — in the second comment, the one in 804, for the words "in some circumstances"? I mean "may" means that anyway. If you just say "a deposition may be admissible without regard to unavailability" you see that? Why do you need to say "in some circumstances"? That seems to think that maybe there are some circumstances where you qualify under 801(3), that it still isn't admissible. Which isn't true.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Well, it elaborates a little on the word "may". If you just say "may". A deposition may be admissible without regard. You see "may" as meaning, well, if it complies with the other. But one -- and that's the intent, of course. But one might quickly read it as thinking, yeah, it is, anytime. You can go to 801 and it comes in without regard --

MR. McMAINS: Well, then you go to 801(e)(3) and it says only if it's taken in accordance with Texas rules. So, you're never here unless -- unless you aren't there. I mean, so I don't --

s

Maybe it's one entirely desirable, but if we're going to recommend it, I'd like to have an in-depth explanation of why it should be done.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tom.

MR. RAGLAND: Well, we have a joint question back here. It escapes me the significance of having the phrase "and used" when really the -- it seems to me the key to it is if the deposition was taken -- the prior deposition was taken in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, why place an additional burden on having to prove it was used?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: It makes sense.

MR. McCONNICO: If we study it, why don't we just consider knocking out both "offered" and "used." And just say, "It is a deposition taken in accordance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Those are the suggestions of Tom Ragland and Steve McConnico.

Steve, would you say again what your suggestion is.

MR. McCONNICO: We're saying just state "It is a deposition taken in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure."

MR. McMAINS: Yeah, but if it's another

case, another Texas case, it's going to be taken in accordance with the Texas Rules.

MR. McCONNICO: Well --

MR. McMAINS: And that doesn't make it non-hearsay in another case.

MR. McCONNICO: Then you have to go back -MR. McMAINS: Case A in Harris County

does not become automatically admissible in Case B
in Harris County simply because Case A was taken -a deposition was taken in Case A.

MR. KRONZER: Depending on which court you're in.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But the current language doesn't deal with that problem either.

MR. McCONNICO: We're not going to avoid that problem because we still have our Rules of Civil Procedure to 207 to talk about that. We're not going to avoid that. I think all we're saying is let's avoid trying to get into what is "used" and "offered." Just avoid the whole problem of what is "used"? "Used" is, maybe I read it. We took it and read it, but never offered it at the courthouse. Just avoid every bit of that.

MR. BRANSON: I have one other concern in that regard. In light of the fact that we're going

to be dealing in this rule many times with depositions taken in other states, since we're really attempting to track a rule that's been in use in federal courts for sometime, don't we run into some difficulty by saying that the depositions have to be taken in accordance with the Texas Rules? Couldn't we broaden that and make it, "Or in accordance with the rules of the state in which they were taken"? It accomplishes the same purpose in that there may be some states that don't have quite the technicalities we do in some regards to depositions.

MR. McMAINS: Well, that's true, but usually you're still taking them in accordance under our rules if it's a Texas case.

MR. BRANSON: No, we're trying a Texas case, but a deposition has been taken in New York, but not in a Texas manner, in a New York manner, and you want to use it. As I understand the federal rules, it's contemplated as usable if we make that prior deposition be taken in -- pursuant to our -- it's not usable, Rusty? You're shaking your head.

MR. McMAINS: I'm not sure that it is.
I'm not going to say that it's not.

1 MR. BRANSON: What is it about these 2 rules that would prevent that? 3 MR. KRONZER: If you have unavailability, it's usable. 5 MR. McMAINS: Yes. PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Assuming that 7 everything else is usable. 8 MR. BRANSON: But you've added another --9 you've added another requisite by requiring that 10 out of state depositions, before it's usable, to have been taken in accordance with our deposition 11 12 practice, which may be an unreasonable burden on 13 the party attempting to offer it. 14 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Of course, if it's 15 federal and used federally, you'd have to show 16 unavailability. It would have to come in under 17 804(b)(1). 18 MR. BRANSON: Yes, sir. 19 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Now, do you want to 20 -- do you want that federal deposition admissible 21 in Texas without regard to unavailability? 22 MR. BRANSON: Well, let's assume since 23 it's out of state, unavailability is going to be 24 easy to show, Dean. All I'm saying is, are we 25 adding an unnecessary requisite, that if you've got

a witness who was taken originally in Michigan or Florida, it's unlikely he's going to be traveling through Texas at the time of trial.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: But he's not unavailable if his deposition could have been taken in this case, under our case law, under the wording of 804, if I'm right, which I'm sure I am.

MR. BRANSON: All right. Let's make it a deposition taken when the man's dead. Is that out of state testimony still going to have to --

MR. McMAINS: You don't have a problem if you go to --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think -- let me see if -- just an indication of how many feel that we're going to be able to work through this today or whether it should be referred to a later report -- referred to a committee for a report next time?

MR. TINDALL: I think -- I believe we've come close to hammering it out.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let me see what the feeling is. How many feel that we are about to get it straightened out and we need to act on it, please show your hands.

MR. ADAMS: I don't understand the vote.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm trying to get a

consensus as to whether or not we feel this is something that we can work out today and get behind us or whether it's something we need to refer to a committee since we need to get down the road a little bit further with the agenda, if possible.

I'm not trying to cut this off. If we can get finished with it, we can go on and work with it. How many feel that we can get through if we continue here for awhile on this subject?

MR. JONES: Can I make a point of inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir. Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: I noticed when we called this meeting we said we were not going to meet tomorrow, we were going to quit at 5:00.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's right.

MR. JONES: That gives us 45 minutes. I don't know how far we are on the agenda, but I sure think --

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: I have three more quick evidence rules, and I believe they'll be passed in a hurry. I believe they will be non-controversial.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then we're going to need to at least get --

MR. CASSEB: Why don't you jump to the three that he's got that are non-controversial and let's come back to this thing, in the interest of time, and see where we're at?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm going to finish responding to Franklin Jones, and then I'm going to do that. After we get through with these evidence rules, we're going to at least need to appoint subcommittee heads and divide up the balance of this work for the next session. So, we've got that ahead of us, and that's going to be the rest of our agenda today. We won't be able to get to anything else substantively that I see.

All right. With that in mind, how many feel that we can continue with this until we get it concluded? Please hold your hands up. Five.

How many feel that this particular matter of use of depositions, I'll describe it that way, should be referred for further study?

Well, the latter votes have it, so it will be referred for further study to whoever heads up our discovery subcommittee. Well, I'll get your position on that. Should it be referred for further study to an Evidence Committee or to a committee that handles discovery rules under the

deposition practice?

MR. McMAINS: It's not a discovery issue.

It's evidence.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. It will be referred to the Evidence Committee.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, due to the fact that our rule books treat it as a discovery issue.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. We'll go on then to the completion of the Rules of Evidence Report.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Mr. Chairman, on Page 9, in the middle of the page, Rule 803(6). This is the business records exception. As it presently reads, it says, "All these requirements can be shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness." We all know that you can get it in by affidavit, under 902(10). It was thought by the committee that we ought to sort of make that a little bit more clear, because that's not really testimony when it's coming in by affidavit, by adding the phrase "or by affidavit that complies with Rule 902(10)." Changes nothing, just makes it a little more clearly that 803(6) opens up to the affidavit.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. So, you so 2 move? 3 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: So move. 4 MR. ADAMS: Second. 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Gilbert Adams 6 seconds. Those in favor, say aye. Opposed? 7 carries. 8 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: Over on Page 10 is 9 Rule 902(10)(b). This is the notary's jurat at the 10 end of that affidavit that gets in your business 11 records. Certain statutes have changed the notary 12 form. He's no longer limited to operating in and 13 for the county of such and such. He can operate 14 statewide. He's now supposed to put when his 15 commission expires. He's supposed to print his 16 name under there. So, the change here is simply to 17 throw out our old notary's jurat and put in a new 18 notary's jurat. And I so move. 19 MR. ADAMS: Second that. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and seconded. 21 Any discussion? Those in favor, say aye. Opposed? 22 That carries. 23 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: At the bottom of Page 24 10, with respect to Rule 1007 -- really over on 25 Page 11 -- this is -- you're over under the Best

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

.11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Evidence Rule.

In common law if a party admitted that a writing contained such and such, his admission sufficed. You could get around the Best Evidence Rule by using his admission. This rule relates to that. It, of course, narrows it to his written admission or his in-court admission.

The title to that thing is, 1007, "Testimony or Written Permission of Party." It's got nothing to do with anybody's permission. typographical error. I don't know when it got in there, but we're just cleaning it up and changing it to "admission." That's the title of the federal rule and it was our title recommended. Move approval.

MR. ADAMS: Second.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Seconds? It's been moved and seconded. Those in favor, say aye. It's carried. Opposed?

The rest of that packet is superfluous material, I guess.

PROFESSOR BLAKELY: If you're operating in the bound book, once you pass Page 11, that's just part of our committee's agenda and could be marked through.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Rusty, in keeping with your suggestion, I tried to look through the rules here and separate them into categories using some of the separation that's already in the rules by sectioning; and then, of course, the long section on Rules of Practice in district and county courts has got to be broken up some.

What I have come up with is the first rules, Rules 1 to 14. That's not many rules, but it's got the bulk of this work concerning local rules in it, and so, it will be a major piece of work.

The next category will be Rule 15 to 215(a) and this is all the pleadings, parties, joinder causes of action, severance, separate trial, and on through discovery before picking a jury. I don't think we have an awful lot of work in that, but there are a lot of rules and that seems to be departmentalized into something that's manageable.

MR. McMAINS: It seems to me that really -- from a chronological standpoint, you're talking about two aspects of pretrial procedure. One is discovery and one is everything else.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right, but we don't have enough work to separate that into two parts.

I think we can just put that altogether in our

J

agenda.

MR. McMAINS: Well, that's probably true right now on the pretrial non-discovery.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, right now, yeah.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I think we have some clean-up work to do. We have done a lot, or the court has done a lot, in recent years. And we've had it for awhile, but I think there are some things that have occurred to people that didn't occur before.

That package would about cover those things we've just gone over that basically need a little work here and there, but not too much.

then, you know, the discovery. We need to address the whole concept of whether discovery matters should be filed or not filed in the state practice. We're getting a lot of agitation from district clerks and commissioner's courts, and so forth, to cut down on that because it's so little used and so much to store on a permanent basis. But anyway, we'll have some work in that area.

Then the rules from 216 to 314 which cover from picking a jury to the entry of judgment. And then Rules 315 to 331, which are the post-trial

rules, remittitur, motion for new trial and that 1 sort of thing.

> And then the courts of appeals' practice, which is already a subject of the first item on the agenda today, it covers Rule 352 to 472. Supreme Court rules then that cover from 474 to And then the currently very hot topic covered by 523 to 591, the justice court rules. And then the ancillary proceedings which have had a lot of work, may need some work. Well, actually receivership has never been addressed since we started revising rules; and our rules still provide, I believe, for an ex parte receiver. if we're going to do some clean-up work, that could get to be more of a job than what's currently -what we have to do would require.

And then, finally, 737 to 813, which is -are the -- what we call special proceedings, bill of discovery and -- I don't know whether anything really needs to be done in those areas. Bill of discovery, F, E & D, real estate partition, quo warranto, trespass to try title. I don't see enough of that kind of litigation to know. I know that trespass to the forcible entry and detainer rules have been overhauled in view of some

2 3

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

constitutional objections.

So, those would be the separations that I see. And the reason that I raise them is to try to get some input from you as to where in that separation -- well, first of all, whether you feel that's logical and appropriate to separate along those lines; and if so, where your interest lies so that I can establish standing committees. I think Rusty's suggestion is a good one. Then I can proceed to go through this agenda, and by mail, assign projects. And where one group is significantly overloaded, maybe even call someone to take on special projects to relieve that overload.

So, as far as the general rules and dealing with the attempt to get uniform local rules, who in particular is interested in that area? All right.

I'll assign --

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, are we at an appropriate point in your agenda now for me to move about the question of jury blindfolding which happens -- which I brought up earlier?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What I was going to try to do, Franklin, was maybe get through the establishing of these committees and then open up

for discussion of any new matters that are not seen in any agenda now that the committee feels like we should address, so that we can add those for the next meeting and assign them to committees for study. And that probably will use the rest of our time.

Since I've got this division before the -topics before the group now, I'd like to try to get -at least get a chairman for each of those separate
areas. And then I'd like to take your idea for any
additional item that should be on the agenda.

MR. JONES: I don't want to interfere with your agenda. I just don't want to get away without passing on --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I definitely want to hear -- I heard two or three suggestions for matters that were -- feelings that needed to be dealt with that are not in this book. And we want to get all those before us prior to adjournment. Thank you.

All right. I'm going to assign then the work on the harmonizing of the local rules to Judge Linda Thomas, who is not here, otherwise I'm sure she'd volunteer.

On pretrial and discovery, the Rules 15

7 -

through 215(a), is there a volunteer to chair that standing committee?

Absent a volunteer, will you do it, Sam Sparks?

MR. SPARKS: Okay. It's hard to chair from El Paso, but you say there's little work. So, that's what I work in. So, I'll do it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: For Rules 216 through 314, the trial rules, do I have a volunteer on that?

MR. McMAINS: I have a suggestion. Why don't we put Franklin as chairman of the trial procedure rules, which has all the charge rules in it and all the stuff about comments on the weight and stuff. So, basically, he can submit his own suggestions without any problem as well, from a committee standpoint.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Would you be willing to serve on that, Frank?

MR. JONES: I will if nobody wants me to give the trial judges a right to comment on the weight of the evidence. Talk about cross-examining in the federal courts.

MR. KRONZER: I thought that was by choice.

MR. SPARKS: Financial necessity.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. For the post-trial -- Harry Tindall, I've already heard your interest in that. Where's Harry?

MR. McMAINS: Harry had to leave.

JUDGE HITTNER: He said he would be interested in that.

MR. KRONZER: He's going to a post-trial.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Trying to lead into the court of appeals rules that -- well, he was talking about that. I'm going to assign him, unless someone else wants to volunteer for that, assign that to Harry to chair. Okay. That will be Harry Tindall for Rules 315 to 331.

And, Bill Dorsaneo, you've already got the new rules on the court of appeals. So, that's really logically assigned to you in conjunction with those rules, isn't it, Rules 352 to 472? 472 is the end of the court of appeals.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, you got me into the Supreme Court a little bit. But that's all right.

MR. McMAINS: Well, are you trying to limit it to the court of appeals and then move to the supreme court rules?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. And I was going to ask, Rusty, that you take the supreme court rules.

So, that we've got -- Harry Tindall is interested in the part about perfecting the appeal. And Bill has already done so much work in the middle, as have you, Rusty. I know you worked on that committee, too.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: We really need some guidance on the appellate rules as to whether or not we're supposed to consider whether the supreme court rules or the court of criminal appeals rules would be part of that numbering, or just let that be and don't worry about it or what?

MR. McMAINS: I'll be glad to, if you want, to call it a committee, but I think, basically, we've got enough working committee on the other thing.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, they can be combined, but if we could take responsibility for individually reporting in those sections and y'all can meet combined and work combined. I have no problem with that.

MR. McMAINS: That's fine.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Will that work out?

MR. McMAINS: Yeah.

A

CHIEF JUSTICE WALLACE: Was your question, Bill, just continue the appellate rules numbers on through the supreme court, is that what you were asking about?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Yes, Your Honor,
whether the court wants us to think about that or -CHIEF JUSTICE WALLACE: That would be
fine with me, appellate rules all the way through.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: Oh, yeah, I don't think we need to be left out. Look at us.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I think that some of the supreme court rules are going to key to some of this harmonizing. And some changes are going to have to be made there really for housekeeping.

And we talked before whether the Supreme

Court might be willing to listen to a suggestion
that there be separate Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure, which would run numerically and
sequentially from wherever they start in the
process all the way through the Supreme Court of
Texas.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: I would think they would be willing, because he's got the proxy.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Wallace is the

proxy and says he thinks that would be logical. Is that subject --

MR. McMAINS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Then I don't know if we need a committee on the justice courts. Is anyone very excited about that topic? Does anyone know of any problems?

MR. KRONZER: Mr. Reasoner and I -PROFESSOR DORSANEO: Well, there are a
lot of problems.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: They've got a great recusal rule. You challenge, he leaves.

MR. REASONER: That's all that's left to us, Bill.

MR. O'QUINN: They got to go for the biggest thing in Texas, the littlest small claims.

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: There are a lot of problems because we don't -- those are pretty much left alone forever. And there aren't many appellate court opinions about them. And a lot of them are essentially very mysterious. I'm forced to teach them every once in a while, and I think somebody ought to take a look at that at some point. Maybe we have enough to do without worrying about it.

1	MR. O'QUINN: I think we've got enough to
2	do.
3	JUDGE HITTNER: We'll get Judge Wapner to
4	deal with that.
5	MR. O'QUINN: Judge Wapner.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we'll omit that
7	for now.
8	MR. McMAINS: I think you can wait until
9	you see if you've got any ground swell of
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We haven't had much
11	yet.
12	MR. McMAINS: information and then you
13	could appoint somebody then if you needed to.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: What about ancillary
15	proceedings?
16	MR. McMAINS: Extraordinary remedies?
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Extraordinary remedies.
18	MR. BRANSON: Broadus is not here. You
19	ought to put him on the JC's.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. That would
21	be Broadus Spivey.
22	CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: The last justice
23	court I visited was out near Garner Park. And I
24	had to go over there to try to help a young man who
25	had been busted in the park for having a beer. And

you ought to see where that court was being held. 2 It was a little old chicken coop in the back of this fellow's house. I continued my great record 3 in the justice court, not doing any good for my client. It was the maximum. But, yeah, they've 6 got some problems out there. 7 PROFESSOR DORSANEO: The courts are 8 definitely misnamed. CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: I would avoid them. 10 MR. KRONZER: Luke, I would like to serve 11 on the relief committee, whatever you call it. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, there was a lot 13 of debate about whether or not non-lawyers should 14 be allowed to represent corporations in justice 15 courts. And part of the resolution to that was, 16 "Well, if the judges don't have to be lawyers, why 17 should the representatives have to be lawyers." 18 MR. O'QUINN: Why should the lawyers have 19 to be lawyers. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there anyone here 21 who --22 MR. McMAINS: Judge Kronzer just 23 volunteered. 24 MR. KRONZER: I'd like to serve on the 25 extraordinary remedies.

1

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Jim Kronzer.
2	MR. KRONZER: I've seen some real felt
3	some of them.
4	MR. McMAINS: There're going to be really
5	extraordinary next time.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then the special
7	proceedings rules, at least we might take a look
8	through those. Who would be willing to look at
9	those, Bill of Discovery and so forth, these
10	special proceedings, quo warranto?
11	MR. McMAINS: I really think that's
12	MR. KRONZER: That's what I'm trying to
13	say.
14	MR. McMAINS: really what's in his
15	area.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, I see. I thought I
17	understood you to say ancillary proceedings. I'm
18 ·	sorry.
19	MR. KRONZER: Mandamus, quo warranto,
20	prohibition. I mean the real prohibition.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: What about attachments,
22	sequestrations, receivership and that sort of
23	thing?
24	MR. KRONZER: Oh, no, that's like that
25	justice court stuff. Let's assign that to Broadus,

too.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Pat, you did some work on this. Pat Beard did some work on this one time.

Pat, would you take a look at those?

MR. BEARD: All right. I'll look at them. Matt Dawson wrote most of those things.

MR. KRONZER: That's why it's stayed under constitutional attack. Pat Beard and Matt Dawson did it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Knowing now the breakdown and the respective chairman, does anyone want to volunteer to be put in a particular slot, because everybody's going to be on -- going to have to be on a committee.

MR. BRANSON: I'd like to be on Franklin's committee.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

JUDGE HITTNER: I'll take the 115 to 215.

Is that Sam Sparks' committee?

PROFESSOR DORSANEO: I'd like to be on that one, too.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. That's Judge
Hittner and Bill Dorsaneo. In order to get some
temperance into Jones and Branson, I think I'll
assign David Beck to that group as well.

1 Yes, sir. 2 MR. RAGLAND: Sparks. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And, Steve, would you 3 -- Steve McConnico, would you serve on that trial 5 group? MR. McCONNICO: You bet. CHAIRMAN SOULES: You've done a lot of 7 work, particularly in special issues. I know 9 you've written all in this area and that would be a 10 biq help. 11 Tom? 12 MR. RAGLAND: I would like to serve on Sam Sparks' committee. 13 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Are there 15 any other persons who are particularly interested 16 in given areas? Pick a subject or pick your 17 chairman or get assigned, I guess. 18 MR. KRONZER: How about Dean Blakely? 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now for the 20 evidence -- we do need an Evidence Subcommittee. 21 And, Newell, would you take on the 22 responsibility to chair that for us? 23 PROFESSOR BLAKELY: All right, sir. 24 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And it was Dorsaneo's 25 suggestion that we probably need a committee to

just oversee and interrelate Rules of Evidence problems and Rules of Civil Procedure problems. Do we want to do that or just --

MR. McMAINS: I think if you've got Dean Blakely that really is on both, that you almost have an overseeing effect, as it were, in that connection. I mean, any problems anybody has, if they are channeled to Dean Blakely, then he knows both ways as to which way, you know, whether it was a problem in the Evidence Committee or a problem here, or nobody's thought about it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that satisfies me. I don't know whether Dean has got that -John O'Quinn?

MR. O'QUINN: I'd like to work with Professor Blakely.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: On the evidence? All right.

Is there anyone else that would like to be assigned to evidence and work with Dean Blakely, in particular?

MR. O'QUINN: No, thanks. I said work with Dean, not work for him.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Franklin, let's hear suggestions from you and then anyone else that

3

2

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

has any suggestions for additional topics for us to take up.

I believe, if I heard you MR. JONES: correctly, you put me on to chair the committee to study the question of trial procedure and the court's charge in that matter.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.

MR. JONES: Well, I believe that will cover the point that I have brought up because I believe that's where that issue arises. It's in the charge. So, I don't think you need to consider it any further.

MR. McMAINS: I don't think we need to until we see something in writing anyway.

MR. KRONZER: Or in 269.

JUDGE HITTNER: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to bring up one point that apparently I'll be speaking with my subcommittee on, but it's something I've taken an interest in for quite awhile, summary It seems as though that one loophole, judgments. the only loophole left after the Clear Creek case, that you've got to make all of your objections known at the trial level in order to get a reversal under any grounds on the appellate level. The only one area left, the only one area left is

1 insufficiency as a matter of law. And it would be my point to show lawyer diligence down below where I've seen so many people mess up, not put a response in, and then come on the appellate courts 5 screaming insufficiency as a matter of law. would be a position that I would like to at least bring out at the next meeting. And I will put this in writing that that one 8 last loophole left in the Clear Creek case be

2

3

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

closed, that all insufficiency, including insufficiency of matter of law, be brought to the court's attention down below or be precluded on appeal from bringing it up. That would be a point that I will be bringing up to my subcommittee.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.

MR. O'QUINN: Judge, I don't want to make it easier for you guys to get summary judgments against me.

> JUDGE HITTNER: Get out of here.

MR. O'QUINN: That's what you say, "Get out of here."

What is the best time CHAIRMAN SOULES: for you all for another meeting? We need to have a meeting.

Judge Wallace wants to speak for a moment.

25

One thing -- and I'm JUSTICE WALLACE: not sure which it would go in, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or maybe both, but this problem that we keep running into, the Court of Appeals are right on one point, which they say is positive, and comes on up to the Supreme Court, and they are reversed and yet their insufficiency points, or something like that. And so you've got to go through the entire process again. And I haven't thought this through to know what the answer is. But perhaps it would be a rule that says any point not raised before the Court of Appeals, not addressed by them is presumed to have been overruled by them. Maybe that would take care of it. But get away from remanding back and then come back up again. Do y'all all understand what I'm talking about?

MR. O'QUINN: Yes, sir. It's a good idea really.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Would the -
MR. KRONZER: Of course, you can't do
that on the facts sufficiency.

JUSTICE WALLACE: No.

JUDGE HITTNER: As far as the chairman goes, the only week that you might keep in mine is

that the Judicial Conference this year will be the week commencing September 30th through that Friday the 4th. That is the Judicial Conference in McAllen.

MR. McMAINS: Friday, October the 4th.

JUDGE HITTNER: September 30th through
October the 4th. That week. I think really it
begins on Tuesday or Wednesday, by the way.

MR. McMAINS: Luke, there's a serialized seminar by the State Bar on special issue submission. In fact, Justice Pope's engineering the thing all September -- I mean every Thursday and Friday in September. Under those circumstances, I think October is doing some better from a standpoint of a lot of people I know that are participating on it. They're also on this committee. Some of them aren't here.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: There was a suggestion from Justice Evans that they might have their reports, as far as their preferences about this harmonized rule effort, together for a meeting at the Judicial Conference so that the chief justices and other justices attending there could meet there and do that and, I guess, then pass to us their joint suggestions. If we have that promptly, we're

still going to need -- Bill, you're going to need until at least the end of October, aren't you -- PROFESSOR DORSANEO: That's right. We are.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- for time to digest whatever it is they send in, if it has much -- if there's much to it.

MR. McMAINS: It depends on how persuasive their arguments are.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: But if there is a lot of material, it's just going to take going through it.

JUDGE HITTNER: Are you looking at something around Friday, November 1st, something like that? That's right at the end of October.

MR. HUGHES: That or the 25th.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does that sound -- if we're shooting for effective dates of -- well, I think that's going to delay the effective dates of the appellate rules. Because unless we have by then gotten all the input we need from the Court of Criminal Appeals, it's going to be difficult. But if we have it by then I guess --

JUDGE HITTNER: That would be about one month after the Judicial Conference.

1 MR. BRANSON: Judge Hittner, November 2 1st, though, would interfere with trick or 3 treating. It's the day after Halloween. JUDGE HITTNER: That's right. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE WALLACE: That Court of 5 Criminal Appeals, as far as their work on evidence, 6 7 if they don't do it January 1st, they aren't going 8 to get to do it. So, I'm sure they'll have it in 9 by then, according to this Bill. 10 MR. McMAINS: I see. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's -- is 12 everybody, as far as you know, available on 13 November 1st, Friday, November the 1st? 14 MR. O'OUINN: Terrible for me. 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Pardon? 16 MR. O'QUINN: If you're taking a head 17 count, that's bad. If you're taking a head count, that's bad for me. But you've got a lot of things 18 19 to accommodate. I know I'll be in trial. I know I'm going to be in trial that whole month. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: You're going to be in 21 trial the entire month of November? Well, when 22 will you start trial? That's a Friday. 23 24 MR. O'QUINN: What day of the month? CHAIRMAN SOULES: November the 1st is a 25

1	Friday.
2	MR. McMAINS: Friday is the 1st.
3	MR. O'QUINN: I probably won't be in
4	trial. I'll probably start the Monday after, the
5	3rd. The 3rd or the 4th, whenever it is.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: This still puts you in
7	a bind that close to trial, of course.
8	MR. HUGHES: The 25th is the Friday
9	before.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. How about
11	October the 25? Friday.
12	MR. ADAMS: That's no good for me.
13	JUDGE HITTNER: No good for me.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. November 1st and
15	2nd, we'll have a two day session. We'll probably
16	go all day both days.
17	MR. JONES: What days of the week are
18	those?
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Friday and Saturday.
20	We can meet two weekdays if you prefer. Generally
21	our attendance is better if we limit it to one
22	weekday and a Saturday.
23	JUSTICE WALKER: Is there a football
24	game that Saturday here?
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: There may be. And if

so, just let me know, and I'll get you reservations for a hotel in San Antonio, I guess. I'll attend to that. Okay. November the 1st and 2nd then will be our meeting. And we will, at that point, act on the merits of the entire agenda. And I'll have the agenda to you -- well, let's see.

Bill, if we get the work product of the Judicial Conference --

MR. McMAINS: You need at least two weeks, if you can --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know whether we can wait for them to meet at that meeting and tell us one way or the other.

MR. McMAINS: -- to digest all that.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: If we could get a combined rules work group from the Committee on the Administration of Justice and this Committee for the purpose of trying to work with this new Court Administrator Act, if we can get our administrator office to give this their priority as a work force, follow-up force for the people, we might be able to get our business that I'm so concerned about in some kind of shape by November. It may be too much to hope for.

But, you see, I visited -- there is a lot of

things -- we have to try to all work together. I'm learning that this group here and this group here -- it's kind of like in disciplinary problems, you've got the Oversight Committee over here, you've got the Disciplinary Review Committee over here. One of them is our committee and one is the State Bar's Committee. And if you're not careful, you run the risk of somebody feeling like they got shortchanged or didn't get involved properly, and that creates problems for us. And I'd like to avoid that here by having those two committees --

Luke, if you and Mike Galliger (Phon.) could get together and form us some sort of a task force on this, and then Ray Judice and his group can be — they can be available. And the Texas Judicial Counsel probably should feel a little bit left out if they don't get consulted. You might ask Judge Grant if he wants to participate.

Because I tell you, gentlemen, I hate to sound like a broken record. I know we've got a lot of problems and I'm more sensitive about this than any of the others because of all these "shalls" in here about what the Chief Justice has to do. I shall I'm sure, shall do this and shall do that. And so, if we could crank our business in there,

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Luke, and maybe within the next 30 days or so have a group agree to "Okay. I have." And it's got to be people that know what they're doing and have the time to do it. And there's no hard feelings if somebody just flat doesn't have the time. how busy you all are right now. And it may be that you just have to end up with two or three that are willing to say "Yeah, I'm willing to take this home." Because it's going to take a heavy committment of time to work out these Rules of Administration and bring them back before this group and get them approved, get the Committee on Administration of Justice to approve them and then we'll implement them as a part of the Rules of Procedure of this state. And they're going to have to be harmonized with local rules, and it's a big, big order.

But anyway, I just want to get one more lick in, one more closing argument on the importance that we attach to this and the need for help. I just can't come over there and I don't want to cry on your shoulders, but, like, we get our work on Thursday. We have 32 applications next week and over 12 hard and heavy opinions to work through. So, we really need most of our time over there.

And we -- there's no one -- we can't delegate that. That's just our work. It's indispensable. So, we just need some help here to get the administrative part of our program in a little better shape. And anything any of you could do to help us on that, we will be ever grateful.

Sol, I sure wish you'd get your head way deep in this thing and start trying to get your fertile mind to work and see if you can't get aboard this thing. And you sure would be a lot of help if you could just -- because you've been there. You've been a trial judge and you're a practical person. And I'm really kind of fingering you right now because we need somebody to just say, "Hey, I'm willing to take three or four months and get this thing done."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Thank you very much, Mr. Chief Justice.

I think then we'll use the last ten minutes to have a short meeting of this Court Administrative Bill Committee. And any of you that don't want to take a section as your own responsibility, can stay and hear what we resolve about it or can wait to be assigned. But let's see, so far the volunteers who are willing to take

sections of it are Jim Kronzer, who apparently had to leave, Sam Sparks, Judge Linda Thomas, Tom Ragland, Judge Hittner, Pat Beard, Franklin Jones, Judge Casseb, Harold Nix and Lefty Morris. rest of you are certainly welcome to stay and are --CHIEF JUSTICE HILL: What about our cocktail hour --CHAIRMAN SOULES: Our cocktail hour is just on the other side of this same building. It will be this same room just through the hallway there, as I understand it, at 5:00 o'clock. Then the committee as a whole stands adjourned until 10:00 o'clock. (Proceedings recessed)

1	STATE OF TEXAS)
2)
3	COUNTY OF TRAVIS)
4	· .
5	
6	I, Mary Ann Vorwerk, Certified Shorthand
7	Reporter in and for the County of Travis, State
8	of Texas, do hereby certify that the foregoing
9	typewritten pages contain a true and correct
10	transcription of my shorthand notes of the
11	proceedings taken upon the occasion set forth in
12	the caption hereof, as reduced to typewriting by
13	computer-aided transcription under my direction.
14	
15	
16	
17	WITNESS MY HAND this the $30^{1/4}$ day of
18	June, 1985.
19	
20	may am Varwerla
21	MARY ANN VORWERK Certified Shorthand Reporter
22	CSR #2176, Expires 12/31/86
23	805 W. 10th, Suite 301 Austin, Texas 78701
24	(512) 478-2752
25	