ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Misc Docket No. 98-9017

Appointment of a District Judge to Preside
in a State Bar Disciplinary Action

The Supreme Court of Texas hereby appoints the Honorable Denise Collins, Judge of the 208th District Court of Harris County, Texas, to preside in the Disciplinary Action styled:

The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. H. Wayne Meachum

to be filed in a District Court of Dallas County, Texas.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall promptly forward to the District Clerk of Dallas County, Texas, a copy of this Order and of the Disciplinary Petition for filing and service pursuant to Rule 3.03, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

As ordered by the Supreme Court of Texas, in chambers,

with the Seal thereof affixed at the City
of Austin, this 26th day of January, 1998.

JOHN T. ADAMS, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

This assignment, made by Misc. Docket No. 98-9017, is also an assignment by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Texas Government Code §74.057.

Signed this 30 day of January, 1998.

Thomas R. Phillips
Chief Justice

NO. _____

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
	§	
V.	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
	§	
H. WAYNE MEACHUM	§	_____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DISCIPLINARY PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Petitioner, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, a committee of the State Bar of Texas (hereinafter called "Petitioner"), complaining of Respondent, H. Wayne Meachum, (hereinafter called "Respondent"), showing the Court:

I.

Petitioner brings this disciplinary action pursuant to the State Bar Act, Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 1988), the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. The complaint which forms the basis of the Disciplinary Petition was filed on or after May 1, 1992.

II.

Respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas and is a member of the State Bar of Texas. Respondent is a resident of and has his principal place of practice in Dallas County, Texas. An officer may serve citation on Respondent by and through his attorney, Ruth A. Kollman, Kollman & Kubicki, L.L.P., 6517 Hillcrest, Suite 209, Dallas, Texas 75205.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

III.

Respondent was engaged by Louann Bradford (hereinafter referred to as "Bradford"), daughter of John Stanglin, Complainant (hereinafter referred to as "Stanglin"), to represent her in her divorce and related proceedings, including paying off the mortgage on her house. Respondent advised Bradford that $116,000 would pay off the mortgage, so Bradford contacted her father, Stanglin, who agreed to advance the funds, if Bradford would convey title to the property to him so that he could, in turn, sell the property and recover his money. With this understanding, on or about July 19, 1993, Stanglin caused Bank One in Tyler to wire transfer $116,000 from his account to the account of H. Wayne Meachum, Trustee, Bank One Preston, Dallas. The funds were to be used for the exclusive purpose of paying off the mortgage on Bradford's house.

IV.

After Stanglin had wire transferred the $116,000 to Respondent's IOLTA account in July 1993, Respondent failed to immediately use the funds and pay off the mortgage on Bradford's house. Thereafter, Respondent negligently or intentionally converted a portion of Stanglin's funds to his own use or to the use of other third parties. In so doing, Respondent failed to hold funds belonging to a third party separate from his own property. Moreover, in October 1995, in order to pay off the $85,739.93 balance owing on the mortgage on Bradford's house, Stanglin was required to write another check and advance additional funds to make the payment. Upon request, Respondent, however, refused to render Stanglin a full accounting to document what had happened to the $116,000 he had deposited in Respondent's IOLTA account. Respondent asserted

that Stanglin was not his client, therefore, he would violate the attorney/client privilege that existed between Stanglin's daughter, Bradford, and himself were he to produce records accounting for Stanglin's funds.

V.

In or around May 1994 and May 1995, the mortgagor threatened to foreclose on the Bradford house. In or around October 1995, on behalf of Bradford, Respondent drafted a Settlement Agreement between the mortgagor, certain other parties and Bradford, which provided for full payment of the mortgage on the Bradford house. Because the $116,000 that Stanglin originally wire transferred to Respondent's IOLTA account was unaccountably disposed of, Stanglin issued another check, made payable directly to the mortgagor, in the amount of $85,739.93 in full payment of the balance owing on the mortgage on the Bradford house.

VI.

In exchange for paying off the mortgage on the house, Bradford had agreed to convey title to the her house to Stanglin. On behalf of Bradford, Respondent prepared a Quit Claim Deed, which was to serve as the instrument to convey title to Bradford's house to Stanglin. Earlier, by letter dated on or about December 14, 1993, Respondent advised Stanglin that title to Bradford's house had not been encumbered, except by the mortgage, since Bradford and her former husband had purchased the property. Respondent advised Stanglin that there was no need to incur the expense of having a formal closing at a title company in order to convey title to Bradford's house to Stanglin, and there was no need to run an abstract of title on the property and go to the expense of obtaining a title policy. Respondent failed to advise Stanglin that, because Bradford and her

former husband were delinquent in payment of their federal income taxes, federal tax liens in the aggregate amount of approximately $46,000 had been filed against the Bradford house. By failing to disclose the existence of the federal tax liens to Stanglin and by refusing to account for the funds Stanglin initially deposited into Respondent's IOLTA account, Respondent knowingly assisted his client, Bradford, to perpetrate fraudulent acts upon Stanglin. By his acts and conduct, Respondent, himself, violated the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and he knowingly engaged in and assisted his client, Bradford, to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

VII.

Such acts and/or omissions on the part of Respondent as are described in Paragraphs III, IV, V and VI, hereinabove, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct which violates Rules 1.14(a), 1.14(b), 4.01(b), 8.04(a)(1) and/or 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

VIII.

The complaint which forms the basis of the Cause of Action hereinabove set forth was brought to the attention of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by John Stanglin filing a complaint on or about April 25, 1996.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

IX.

On or about October 17, 1995, William Z. Hornbuckle ("Hornbuckle") hired Respondent to advise him concerning his interest in a certain partnership and to represent him in connection

with a potential partnership dispute. On or about November 21, 1995, Hornbuckle met with Respondent, signed a contract for legal services and, in several installments, paid Respondent a $2,000.00 retainer. In the November meeting with Respondent, Hornbuckle disclosed the events leading up to the potential partnership dispute and delivered all pertinent documentation to him. Respondent assured Hornbuckle that he had a strong case for a lawsuit and told Hornbuckle he would begin working on the case immediately.

X.

Thereafter, Hornbuckle called Respondent's office to inquire about the status of his matter and left messages asking Respondent to return his calls. Respondent neglected to return Hornbuckle's telephone calls, however, in December 1995, Respondent did agree to meet with Hornbuckle and Hornbuckle's in-laws, the Pickards, who were contemplating a separate legal action against the same partnership. During the December 1995 meeting, Respondent advised Hornbuckle he would file suit on his behalf, but informed Hornbuckle that he would require advanced payment of the filing fees. Hornbuckle advanced the filing fees but requested an accounting of the billing against his retainer. Respondent agreed to provide an accounting to Hornbuckle at a later time but failed to do so.

XI.

Following receipt of the filing fees, Respondent failed to keep Hornbuckle reasonably informed about the status of his matter and failed to inform Hornbuckle whether or not he had filed Hornbuckle's law suit. Hornbuckle, again, made repeated attempts to speak with Respondent, but Respondent failed to return Hornbuckle's telephone calls until Hornbuckle's

partner's lawyer requested a meeting. Then, one day prior to the scheduled date of the meeting, Respondent informed Hornbuckle of the meeting.

XII.

Hornbuckle and Respondent attended the meeting with Hornbuckle's partner's lawyer. Respondent neglected to review Hornbuckle's files in preparation for the meeting, and he failed to bring Hornbuckle's partnership documentation to the meeting. Following the meeting, Respondent advised Hornbuckle he was not interested in going to court and that he was counting on a settlement.

XIII.

After the meeting with Hornbuckle's partner's lawyer, Hornbuckle, again, made repeated attempts to communicate with Respondent, seeking to learn the status of his matter, seeking to learn what action Respondent intended to take and seeking additional legal advice from Respondent on additional partnership-related matters. Respondent consistently failed to return Hornbuckle's telephone calls; canceled scheduled meetings; spoke in vague, general terms and failed to explain matters to Hornbuckle to the extent reasonably necessary for him to make informed decisions. Over the course of his representation, Respondent both neglected Hornbuckle's matter and gave him inconsistent legal advice.

XIV.

In July 1996, about six (6) months after Hornbuckle advanced the filing fees, Respondent filed suit on behalf of Hornbuckle. Thereafter, Respondent continued his habit of failing to communicate with Hornbuckle and of failing to keep Hornbuckle advised about the status of his

case. Respondent also repeatedly neglected to respond to Hornbuckle's requests for an accounting of draws against Hornbuckle's retainer.

XV.

Because Respondent had performed no meaningful legal services for Hornbuckle during the preceding year, by letter dated October 5, 1996, Hornbuckle terminated Respondent's services. In his letter, Hornbuckle asked Respondent to refund his $2,000.00 retainer and to return all of his documents and papers within ten (10) days. Respondent failed to comply with Hornbuckle's request and neither refund Hornbuckle's retainer nor returned his files.

XVI.

After Hornbuckle terminated Respondent's services, Hornbuckle's former partner filed a countersuit against Hornbuckle. On November 20, 1996, Respondent was served as attorney for Hornbuckle, since he had failed to withdraw as attorney of record in Hornbuckle's law suit. Following receipt of service, Respondent did not advise Hornbuckle the countersuit had been filed until December 31, 1996. Thereafter, Hornbuckle, himself, and without benefit of counsel, negotiated a settlement with his former partner.

XVII.

Such acts and/or omissions on the part of Respondent as are described in Paragraphs IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI, hereinabove, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct which violates Rules 1.01(b)(1), 1.03(a), 1.03(b), 1.14(b), 1.14(c) and/or 8.04(a)(1) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

XVIII.

The complaint which forms the basis of the Cause of Action hereinabove set forth was brought to the attention of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by filing William Z. Hornbuckle filing a complaint on or about November 7, 1996.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

XIX.

In December 1995, Billy W. Pickard ("Pickard"), together with his son-in-law, Hornbuckle, whom Respondent was already representing, met with Respondent to consult about separate legal matters, which involved the same partnership. Following this meeting, on or about January 15, 1996, Pickard faxed Respondent a letter that recounted the facts underlying his dispute with the partnership. After reviewing Pickard's letter, Respondent met with Pickard. Respondent advised Pickard that he had strong a case and informed Pickard he would take his case on a contingency fee basis, provided Pickard advanced a $3,000.00 retainer. On February 12, 1996, Pickard gave Respondent a check for the $3,000.00 retainer and asked Respondent if he needed to sign anything. Respondent replied he did not.

XX.

After Pickard paid Respondent the retainer, Respondent neglected Pickard's legal matter and failed to take any action on Pickard's behalf. Pickard attempted to communicate with Respondent about the status of his matter and attempted to consult with Respondent to receive his legal advice, because Pickard, himself, was engaged in direct negotiations with his partners. Respondent failed to respond to Pickard's telephone calls and faxes and failed to carry out the obligations he owed to Pickard by neglecting to assume his responsibility as Pickard's legal

counsel and negotiate with Pickard's partners, himself.

XXI.

On or about April 17, 1996, Pickard decided negotiations with his partners were unfruitful, and he faxed a letter to Respondent requesting that he file suit on behalf of Pickard within the next two (2) weeks. Thereafter, Pickard called Respondent and faxed messages to him, repeatedly, inquiring about the status of his matter, but Respondent neglected to respond to Pickard's telephone calls and faxes. When, by chance, Pickard called and did manage to speak with Respondent, Respondent told Pickard he could not decided what course of action would be best for Pickard's matter, but assured Pickard he had a good case and that he was working on it.

XXII.

On or about August 11, 1996, six (6) months after he had given Respondent his retainer, Pickard was able to meet with Respondent, who still had failed to take any action on Pickard's behalf and had not filed suit. Pickard stressed that it was urgent that Respondent file his lawsuit before August 31, 1996, because the partnership books closed on that date. Respondent assured Pickard that he would file suit prior to that date. When Respondent failed to file suit on behalf of Pickard, on or about September 28, 1996, Pickard sent Respondent a letter dismissing him as his attorney, because Respondent had neglected to pursue Pickard's case and had failed to take any legal action on his behalf. In his letter, Pickard also asked Respondent to refund his $3,000.00 retainer and to return all of his papers and files within ten (10) days. Respondent failed to comply with Pickard's request and neither refunded Pickard's retainer nor returned his files.

XXIII.

Such acts and/or omissions on the part of Respondent as are described in Paragraphs XIX, XX, XXI and XXII, hereinabove, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct which violates Rules 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2), 1.03(a), 1.03(b), 1.14(b), 1.14(c), 1.15(d) and/or 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

XXIV.

The complaint which forms the basis of the Cause of Action hereinabove set forth was brought to the attention of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by filing Billy W. Pickard filing a complaint on or about November 21, 1996.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXV.

On or about February 28, 1996, Daron D. Sneed ("Sneed") met with Respondent concerning a lawsuit that had been filed against him. After consultation, Respondent agreed to provide legal services for Sneed and agreed upon legal fees of $300.00 for his services, because Sneed did not have the $500.00 Respondent originally requested. As of the date of the agreement with Respondent, Sneed had not filed his Answer in the suit.

XXVI.

Following the initial consultation, Respondent informed Sneed that he was attempting to negotiate an out of court settlement with plaintiff's counsel. Thereafter, Respondent failed to report back the Sneed and consult with him about the status of the negotiations or the status of the lawsuit. Repeatedly, over the next five (5) to six (6) months, Sneed both paged and left telephone messages for Respondent inquiring about the status of his case. Respondent failed to respond to

Sneed's pages and/or telephone messages. Respondent did not inform Sneed that, in or around May 1996, he submitted a settlement proposal on behalf of Sneed to plaintiff in the amount of $2,500.00. Furthermore, Respondent did not inform Sneed that plaintiff rejected the settlement offer and submitted a counter-offer of $7,000.00 for consideration.

XXVII.

On or about July 29, 1996, counsel for plaintiff informed Respondent that she intended to file a Motion for Default Judgment, because Sneed still had not filed an Answer. Respondent misrepresented to opposing counsel that he had, unsuccessfully, been attempting to contact Sneed, and asked for more time. Thereafter, on or about September 5, 1996, without informing Sneed of the threatened Motion for Default Judgment and without Sneed's knowledge or approval, on behalf of Sneed, Respondent drafted, subscribed Sneed's name to and filed an Answer in the form of a general denial. In the Answer, Respondent designated Sneed as being Defendant Pro Se. Thereafter, opposing counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Sneed's Answer was not in the form of a sworn denial, which was required in this cause of action.

XXVIII.

A hearing on the Motion was set for December 6, 1996. Respondent drafted Sneed's Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and called him to come to his law office to sign the document. Once again, Respondent drafted the document so that Sneed signed as Defendant Pro Se. Respondent failed to advise Sneed as to the meaning of "Pro Se." Respondent gave Sneed every impression that he was representing Sneed. The night before the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Respondent contacted Sneed and informed Sneed that

he would have to appear in court without Respondent's presence, because Respondent would be in another court, at that time. As a result, Sneed appeared in court, alone, without benefit of counsel, and Summary Judgment was entered against him.

XXIX.

Following his appearance in court without benefit of counsel and having had Summary Judgment entered against him, Sneed contacted Respondent. Respondent counseled Sneed and advised him that the judge could not enter the Summary Judgment, because there was a law preventing judgments in the absence of representation. Respondent then drafted a Motion for New Trial for Sneed, and on or about December 11, 1996, Sneed, once again, came to Respondent's law office and signed the document as Defendant Pro Se. When Sneed decided to appeal the Summary Judgment, Respondent continued representing Sneed in this manner. Respondent would give Sneed legal advice, draft the document for Sneed and then ask Sneed to come to his law office, where Sneed would sign as Defendant Pro Se. Respondent, in turn, sent the document to the court for filing. Sneed later learned that Respondent had been administratively suspended from the practice of law on September 4, 1996, for failure to pay his occupational tax.

XXX.

In the Fall of 1996, without disclosing to Sneed his unsuccessful settlement negotiations in the Spring of 1996 and before plaintiff's counsel filed her Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent called Sneed and advised him that it would be helpful to his settlement negotiations if Sneed would place cash in trust with Respondent for settlement negotiation purposes. Relying on Respondents advice, Sneed borrowed $2,500.00, and on September 25, 1996, he delivered a

check for that amount to Respondent. After delivering the $2,500.00 check to Respondent, Sneed received notice from the court advising that his case was set for a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 6, 1996. With receipt of the court's notice, it became obvious to Sneed that plaintiff was not interested in settling. Therefore, in or around October 1996, Sneed began calling Respondent, asking him to refund his money, minus $500.00 in payment of Respondent's legal fees. Respondent countered by informing Sneed that he had put approximately ten (10) to twelve (12) hours into Sneed's case; therefore, at his billing rate, the value of the time Respondent had invested in Sneed's case exceeded $2,500.00. Respondent retained Sneed's $2,500.00, claiming Sneed owed him $2,500.00 in legal fees.

XXXI.

Such acts and/or omissions on the part of Respondent as are described in Paragraphs XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX and XXX, hereinabove, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct which violates Rules 1.01(b)(1), 1.03(a), 1.14(b), 8.04(a)(3) and/or 8.04(a)(11) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

XXXII.

The complaint which forms the basis of the Cause of Action hereinabove set forth was brought to the attention of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by filing Daron D. Sneed filing a complaint on or about February 28, 1997.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner prays for judgment that

Respondent be disciplined as the facts shall warrant; and that Petitioner have such other relief to which entitled, including costs of Court and attorney's fees.

Respectfully submitted,

Steve W. Young
General Counsel

Assistant General Counsel
Angela Methvin
State Bar of Texas
Litigation - Dallas
5910 N. Central Expressway
Suite 920
Dallas, Texas 75206
(214) 368-0083
FAX (214) 368-6953



Angela Methvin
State Bar Card No. 00792698

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

STATE BAR OF TEXAS

Office of the General Counsel

December 23, 1997

CMRRR NO. P 104 073 523

John T. Adams, Clerk
Supreme Court of Texas
P.O. Box 12248
Austin, Texas 78711

RE:: ***Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. H. Wayne Meachum***

Dear Mr. Adams:

Enclosed please find an original and two (2) copies of a Disciplinary Petition being filed by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline against H. Wayne Meachum. Mr. Meachum has designated Dallas County, Texas, as his principal place of practice. Request is hereby made that the Court appoint an active District Judge who does not reside in the Administrative Judicial Region in which Respondent resides to preside in this case. Upon appointment, request is made that you notify the Respondent by and through his attorney at the address shown below and the undersigned of the identity and address of the judge assigned:

H. Wayne Meachum
c/o Ruth A. Kollman
Kollman & Kubicki, L.L.P.
6517 Hillcrest, Suite 209
Dallas, Texas 75205

As a practical matter, I would respectfully suggest that you inquire with the judge to be appointed as to: (1) whether he or she will be able to comply with the 180 day deadline by which the case must be set for trial set forth in Section 3.07 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure; and (2) whether he or she can accommodate compliance with ***Mellon Service Co., et al v. Touche Ross Co.***, 946 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), which requires that all proceedings incident to a case occur in the county of proper venue. If not, I would respectfully request that an alternate appointment be made.

Regency Plaza, 3710 Rawlins, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214) 559-4353 Fax: (214) 559-4335

Once a trial judge has been appointed, please forward the original and two (2) copies of the Disciplinary Petition, the filing fee check, also enclosed herewith, and the Court's appointing order to the District Clerk of Dallas County, Texas, with the request that the suit be filed, service be obtained, and a file-marked copy of the petition be returned to the undersigned.

Also enclosed are a pre-addressed envelope for your use in transmitting the petition, etc., to the District Clerk of Dallas County, Texas, and a return envelope to be sent to the District Clerk of Dallas County, Texas, for the Clerk's use in returning a file-marked copy of the Petition to the undersigned.

Thank you for your courtesies in this matter.

Sincerely,

Angela Methvin
Assistant General Counsel

Enclosures

Regency Plaza, 3710 Rawlins, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214) 559-4353 Fax: (214) 559-4335

POST OFFICE BOX 12248 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711
TEL: (512) 463-1312
FAX: (512) 463-1365

February 6, 1998

The Honorable Bill Long
District Clerk of Dallas County
George L. Allen Courts Building
600 Commerce Street
Dallas, Texas 75202

Dear Mr. Long:

Pursuant to Rule 3.03 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, I am sending for filing State Bar of Texas Disciplinary Action styled: The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. H. Wayne Meachum and a copy of the Supreme Court's order appointing the Honorable Denise Collins, Judge of the 208th District Court, Houston, Texas, to preside in this Disciplinary Action.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John T. Adams
Clerk

cc: Hon. Denise Collins
Mr. H. Wayne Meachum
Ms. Angela Methvin

POST OFFICE BOX 12248 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711
TEL: (512) 463-1312
FAX: (512) 463-1365

February 6, 1998

Honorable Denise Collins
Judge, 208th District Court
301 San Jacinto Street, #806
Houston, Texas 77002

Dear Judge Collins:

We enclose for your information a copy of the order of assignment, a copy of the Disciplinary Action, a copy of the notification letter to Ms. Methvin and Mr. Meachum, and a copy of the letter to the District Clerk of Dallas County.

We then recommend that, either before or immediately after you set the case for trial, the Dallas County District Court Administrative Office (214-653-6510) be contacted to reserve a courtroom, provide for a court reporter, etc. Finally, you should contact the Presiding Judge of the Administrative Judicial Region into which you have been assigned (214-653-2943) to obtain information on lodging, allowable expenses, and claims forms for your expenses incident to presiding over this disciplinary case.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John T. Adams
Clerk

THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

POST OFFICE BOX 12248 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711
TEL: (512) 463-1312
FAX: (512) 463-1365

February 6, 1998

Ms. Angela Methvin
Assistant General Counsel, State Bar of Texas
3710 Rawlins, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75219

Mr. H. Wayne Meachum
c/o Ruth A. Kollman
Kollman & Kubicki, L.L.P.
6517 Hillcrest, Suite 209
Dallas, Texas 75205

Dear Ms. Methvin and Mr. Meachum:

Pursuant to Rule 3.02 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, I hereby notify you that the Supreme Court of Texas has appointed the Honorable Denise Collins, Judge of the 208th District Court, Houston, Texas, to preside in

Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. H. Wayne Meachum

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John T. Adams
Clerk